--- /dev/null
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/Documentation/Configure.help linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/Documentation/Configure.help
+--- linux-2.4.22/Documentation/Configure.help 2003-10-20 18:59:11.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/Documentation/Configure.help 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2977,6 +2977,20 @@
+ If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
+ Documentation/modules.txt. If unsure, say `N'.
+
++stealth networking support
++CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
++ Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
++ ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you
++ are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
++ you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
++ drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
++ machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
++ destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
++ instance.
++
++ If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
++ Documentation/modules.txt. If unsure, say `N'.
++
+ MAC address match support
+ CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MAC
+ MAC matching allows you to match packets based on the source
+@@ -23554,6 +23568,871 @@
+
+ "Area6" will work for most boards. For ADX, select "Area5".
+
++Grsecurity
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features that
++ will enhance the security of your system. It is highly recommended
++ that you say Y here and read through the help for each option so
++ you fully understand the features and can evaluate their usefulness
++ for your machine.
++
++Additional security levels
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW
++
++ Low additional security
++ -----------------------------------------------------------------------
++ If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
++ be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
++ of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
++ conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot of
++ unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher security
++ levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the following features
++ are enabled:
++
++ linking restrictions
++ fifo restrictions
++ random pids
++ enforcing nproc on execve()
++ restricted dmesg
++ random ip ids
++ enforced chdir("/") on chroot
++
++ Medium additional security
++ -----------------------------------------------------------------------
++ If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included in the
++ low additional security level will be enabled. These features provide
++ even more security to your system, though in rare cases they may
++ be incompatible with very old or poorly written software. If you
++ enable this option, make sure that your auth service (identd) is
++ running as gid 10 (usually group wheel). With this option the following
++ features (in addition to those provided in the low additional security
++ level) will be enabled:
++
++ random tcp source ports
++ altered ping ids
++ failed fork logging
++ time change logging
++ signal logging
++ deny mounts in chroot
++ deny double chrooting
++ deny sysctl writes in chroot
++ deny mknod in chroot
++ deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
++ deny pivot_root in chroot
++ denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
++ /proc restrictions with special gid set to 10 (usually wheel)
++ address space layout randomization
++
++ High additional security
++ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
++ If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be enabled,
++ that will protect you against many kinds of attacks against
++ your system. The heightened security comes at a cost of an
++ increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software on your
++ machine. It is highly recommended that you view
++ <http://grsecurity.net/features.htm> and read about each option. Since
++ this security level enabled PaX, you should also view
++ <http://pageexec.virtualave.net> and read about the PaX project. While
++ you are there, download chpax.c and run chpax -p on binaries that cause
++ problems with PaX. Also remember that since the /proc restrictions are
++ enabled, you must run your identd as group wheel (gid 10).
++ This security level enables the following features in addition to those
++ listed in the low and medium security levels:
++
++ additional /proc restrictions
++ chmod restrictions in chroot
++ no signals, ptrace, or viewing processes outside of chroot
++ capability restrictions in chroot
++ deny fchdir out of chroot
++ priority restrictions in chroot
++ segmentation-based implementation of PaX
++ mprotect restrictions
++ removal of /proc/<pid>/[maps|mem]
++ kernel stack randomization
++ mount/unmount/remount logging
++ kernel symbol hiding
++
++Customized additional security
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
++ option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
++ covered in the basic security levels. These additional features include
++ TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for grsecurity. It is
++ advised that you read through the help for each option to determine its
++ usefulness in your situation.
++
++Enforce non-executable pages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC
++ By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory
++ pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make
++ use of this feature. In practice this means that if a page is
++ readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable.
++
++ There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this
++ fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can
++ introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's
++ memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.
++
++ If the attacked program was running with different (typically
++ higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate
++ his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
++ which he does not have write access to, etc).
++
++ Enabling this option will let you choose from various features
++ that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in
++ a program.
++
++ This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and
++ expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family
++ of functions is executable (which it is not). Notable examples
++ are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine.
++
++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to enable/disable this
++ feature on a per file basis. chpax is available at
++ <http://pageexec.virtualave.net>
++
++Paging based non-executable pages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU.
++ On i386 it has a variable performance impact on applications
++ depending on their memory usage pattern. You should carefully
++ test your applications before using this feature in production.
++ On alpha, parisc, sparc and sparc64 there is no performance
++ impact. On ppc there is a slight performance impact.
++
++Segmentation based non-executable pages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the
++ CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will
++ be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB.
++
++Emulate trampolines
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
++ another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
++ non-executable memory pages. Most notable examples are the
++ signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
++ the GCC trampolines.
++
++ If you enabled CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC or
++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC then such programs will no longer
++ work under your kernel.
++
++ As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' utility to
++ enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs yet still
++ have the protection provided by the non-executable pages.
++
++ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as
++ well, otherwise your system will not even boot.
++
++ Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' utility
++ to disable CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC and
++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC for the affected files.
++
++ NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
++ protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker
++ could abuse. Therefore the best solution is to not have any
++ files on your system that would require this option. This can
++ be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
++ signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
++ that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
++ Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
++ nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
++
++Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++ and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack
++ that would otherwise lead to task termination.
++
++ This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with
++ legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17,
++ Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically
++ everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in
++ normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does.
++
++ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your
++ system will not even boot.
++
++ NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis
++ and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided
++ by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any
++ files on your system that would require this option.
++
++Restrict mprotect()
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ Enabling this option will prevent programs from
++ - changing the executable status of memory pages that were
++ not originally created as executable,
++ - making read-only executable pages writable again,
++ - creating executable pages from anonymous memory.
++
++ You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
++ the enforcement of non-executable pages.
++
++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to control this
++ feature on a per file basis. chpax is available at
++ <http://pageexec.virtualave.net>
++
++Disallow ELF text relocations
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++ Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective
++ in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an
++ attacked task's address space. There remain only two venues
++ for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already
++ existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it
++ create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap()
++ an already existing ELF library that does not have position
++ independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it
++ writable and copy his code there. While protecting against
++ the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented
++ by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not
++ need to relocate their code). If you are sure this is your case,
++ then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even
++ be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM
++ modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default).
++
++ NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested
++ when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked
++ your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.zip package
++ referenced there has already been updated to support this).
++
++Enforce non-executable kernel pages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
++ that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
++ and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself.
++
++Address Space Layout Randomization
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++ Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of
++ certain addresses in the attacked program. The following options
++ will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization
++ to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to
++ guess them in most cases. Any failed guess will most likely crash
++ the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts
++ and react on them. PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms,
++ instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of grsecurity's
++ built-in crash detection features or develop one yourself.
++
++ By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas:
++ - top of the task's kernel stack
++ - top of the task's userland stack
++ - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one
++ (this includes all libraries)
++ - base address of the main executable
++
++ It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout
++ randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides
++ a very effective protection.
++
++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to control most of these features
++ on a per file basis.
++
++Randomize kernel stack base
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel
++ stack on every system call. This will not only force an attacker
++ to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible
++ leaked information about it.
++
++ Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization
++ may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very
++ carefully test your system. Note that once enabled in the kernel
++ configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis.
++
++Randomize user stack base
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland
++ stack. The randomization is done in two steps where the second
++ one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and
++ cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more
++ than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is).
++ For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' on
++ a per file basis.
++
++Randomize ET_EXEC base
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize the base address of normal
++ ET_EXEC ELF executables as well. This is accomplished by mapping the
++ executable in memory in a special way which also allows for detecting
++ attackers who attempt to execute its code for their purposes. Since
++ this special mapping causes performance degradation and the attack
++ detection may create false alarms as well, you should carefully test
++ your executables when this feature is enabled.
++
++ This solution is intended only as a temporary one until you relink
++ your programs as a dynamic ELF file.
++
++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to control this feature
++ on a per file basis.
++
++Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++ On some architectures like the alpha there are incorrectly
++ created applications that require text relocations and would
++ not work without enabling this option. If you are an alpha
++ user, you should enable this option and disable it once you
++ have made sure that none of your applications need it.
++
++Automatically emulate ELF PLT
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
++ and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files.
++ On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and
++ become non-executable leading to task termination. Therefore
++ it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc,
++ sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot.
++
++ NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection
++ provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper
++ solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does
++ not need to be writable.
++
++
++Randomize mmap() base
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for
++ mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves. As a result
++ all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses
++ and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker
++ attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a
++ shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated
++ privilege level).
++
++ Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
++ base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
++ randomization of the address space layout. Attacking such programs
++ becomes a guess game. You can find an example of doing this at
++ <http://pageexec.virtualave.net/et_dyn.zip> and practical samples at
++ <http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz> .
++
++ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to control this feature
++ on a per file basis.
++
++Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
++ be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
++ /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
++ support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
++ currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
++ Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
++ you use the ACL system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
++ modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
++ If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
++ case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
++ legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
++ but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
++ case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
++ not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
++ Enabling this feature could make certain apps like VMWare stop working,
++ as they need to write to other locations in /dev/mem.
++ It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
++ conditions above.
++
++Disable privileged I/O
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++ If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
++ Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
++ Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
++ the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
++ remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
++ enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
++ correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
++ enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86
++ and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
++ use the ACL system.
++
++Hide kernel symbols
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++ If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
++ displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
++ to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective
++ provided the following conditions are met:
++ 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
++ 2) You are using the ACL system and hiding other files such as your
++ kernel image and System.map
++ 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
++ /proc/kcore
++ If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
++ useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
++ overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
++
++/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++ If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
++ directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
++ The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
++ This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
++ to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the
++ process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
++ the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
++
++Proc Restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
++ will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. Depending
++ upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see
++ only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
++ view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
++ the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as
++ a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
++
++Restrict /proc to user only
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
++ processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
++ and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
++
++Restrict /proc to user and group
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
++ able to view all processes, network-related information, and
++ kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want
++ to run identd as a non-root user.
++
++Remove addresses from /proc/pid/[maps|stat]
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++ If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will
++ give no information about the addresses of its mappings if
++ PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task.
++ If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it
++ closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid
++ binaries.
++
++Additional proc restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++ If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
++ /proc that keep normal users from viewing cpu and device information.
++
++Dmesg(8) Restriction
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++ If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
++ to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
++ created.
++
++Linking restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++ If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
++ will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
++ world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
++ symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
++ able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
++
++FIFO restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
++ own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
++ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
++ created.
++
++Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++ If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
++ have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system
++ only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option
++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
++
++Single group for auditing
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++ If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
++ will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended
++ if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
++ amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled,
++ a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
++
++GID for auditing
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
++ Here you can choose the GID that will be the target of kernel auditing.
++ Remember to add the users you want to log to the GID specified here.
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose here won't matter.
++ You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup script by echoing the GID
++ to the proper /proc entry. View the help on the sysctl option for more
++ information. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "audit_gid" is created.
++
++Chdir logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++ If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
++
++(Un)Mount logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
++ created.
++
++IPC logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
++ and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++ sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
++
++Exec logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++ If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
++ other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
++ will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
++ of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++ name "exec_logging" is created.
++ WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
++ on an active system.
++
++Resource logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++ If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
++ be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
++ limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here.
++
++Signal logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++ If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
++ SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
++ occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "signal_logging" is created.
++
++Fork failure logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++ If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
++ This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
++ their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++ with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
++
++Time change logging
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++ If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "timechange_logging" is created.
++
++Chroot jail restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
++ make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you
++ encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
++ is recommended that you enable each one.
++
++Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++ connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
++ domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
++ that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++ with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
++
++Deny shmat() out of chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
++ to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
++ It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
++ a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
++
++Protect outside processes
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++ kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid,
++ getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
++ created.
++
++Deny mounts in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
++ mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++ sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
++
++Deny pivot_root in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
++ a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
++ works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
++ function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
++ of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
++ created.
++
++Deny double-chroots
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
++ again. This is a widely used method of breaking out of a chroot jail
++ and should not be allowed. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
++ option with name "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
++
++Deny fchdir outside of chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++ If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
++ to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
++ outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
++
++Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++ If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
++ applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
++ The man page on chroot(2) states:
++ Note that this call does not change the current working
++ directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
++ `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
++ `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
++
++ It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
++ any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++ name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
++
++Deny (f)chmod +s in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
++ or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
++ against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
++ created.
++
++Deny mknod in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
++ mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
++ would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
++ as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
++ anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
++ they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
++ that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
++ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
++
++Restrict priority changes in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
++ the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
++ processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
++ removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
++ is created.
++
++Log all execs within chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++ If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
++ to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
++ applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
++ is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++ sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
++
++Deny sysctl writes in chroot
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++ If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
++ write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
++ interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
++ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
++
++Chroot jail capability restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
++ chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
++ system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
++ files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
++ This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
++ if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
++ tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
++ name "chroot_caps" is created.
++
++Trusted path execution
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
++ supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
++ These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
++ root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
++ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
++
++Group for trusted path execution
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
++ Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for.
++ Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID
++ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
++ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created.
++
++Partially restrict non-root users
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++ If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
++ group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
++ execute files in directories they own that are not group or
++ world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
++ root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
++
++Randomized PIDs
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++ If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
++ pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along
++ with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
++ pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part
++ of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
++ those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code
++ to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created.
++
++Larger entropy pools
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++ If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
++ and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity
++ features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
++ here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
++ /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
++
++Truly random TCP ISN selection
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++ If you say Y here, Linux's default selection of TCP Initial Sequence
++ Numbers (ISNs) will be replaced with that of OpenBSD. Linux uses
++ an MD4 hash based on the connection plus a time value to create the
++ ISN, while OpenBSD's selection is random. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_isns" is created.
++
++Randomized IP IDs
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets
++ will be randomized. This hinders os fingerprinters and
++ keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable
++ portscan. Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging
++ to the same packet have the same id. By default linux only
++ increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host.
++ We use a port of the OpenBSD random ip id code to achieve the
++ randomness, while keeping the possibility of id duplicates to
++ near none. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "rand_ip_ids" is created.
++
++Randomized TCP source ports
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++ If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the
++ fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that
++ the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing
++ algorithm. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
++ "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created.
++
++Randomized RPC XIDs
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++ If you say Y here, the method of determining XIDs for RPC requests will
++ be randomized, instead of using linux's default behavior of simply
++ incrementing the XID. If you want your RPC connections to be more
++ secure, say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
++ with name "rand_rpc" is created.
++
++Socket restrictions
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
++ If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
++ groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
++ will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
++
++Deny all socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
++ applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++ sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
++
++Group for disabled socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
++ Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
++ add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
++ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
++ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
++
++Deny all client socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
++ able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
++ you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
++ from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
++ sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
++
++Group for disabled client socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
++ Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
++ Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
++ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
++ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
++
++Deny all server socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
++ be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl
++ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
++
++Group for disabled server socket access
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
++ Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
++ Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
++ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
++ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
++ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
++ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
++ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
++
++Sysctl support
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++ If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
++ grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
++ kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
++ to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries
++ are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
++ All features are disabled by default. Please note that this option could
++ reduce the effectiveness of the added security of this patch if an ACL
++ system is not put in place. Your init scripts should be read-only, and
++ root should not have access to adding modules or performing raw i/o
++ operations. All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock
++ entry should be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
++ *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
++
++Number of burst messages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
++ This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
++ within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The
++ default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
++ many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
++ raise this value.
++
++Seconds in between log messages
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
++ This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
++ grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most
++ people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
++ to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
++ prevent flooding.
++
++Hide kernel processes
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++ If you say Y here, when the ACL system is enabled via gradm -E,
++ an additional ACL will be passed to the kernel that hides all kernel
++ processes. These processes will only be viewable by the authenticated
++ admin, or processes that have viewing access set.
++
++Maximum tries before password lockout
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
++ This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
++ to authorize themselves with the grsecurity ACL system before being
++ denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
++ The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
++
++Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds
++CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
++ This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
++ authorize to the ACL system with the maximum number of invalid
++ passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
++ a password.
++
+ Disable data cache
+ CONFIG_DCACHE_DISABLE
+ This option allows you to run the kernel with data cache disabled.
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/Makefile linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/Makefile
+--- linux-2.4.22/Makefile 2003-10-20 18:59:11.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/Makefile 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ VERSION = 2
+ PATCHLEVEL = 4
+ SUBLEVEL = 22
+-EXTRAVERSION =
++EXTRAVERSION = -grsec
+
+ KERNELRELEASE=$(VERSION).$(PATCHLEVEL).$(SUBLEVEL)$(EXTRAVERSION)
+
+@@ -134,9 +134,10 @@
+
+ CORE_FILES =kernel/kernel.o mm/mm.o fs/fs.o ipc/ipc.o
+ NETWORKS =net/network.o
++GRSECURITY =grsecurity/grsec.o
+
+ LIBS =$(TOPDIR)/lib/lib.a
+-SUBDIRS =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto
++SUBDIRS =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto grsecurity
+
+ DRIVERS-n :=
+ DRIVERS-y :=
+@@ -279,7 +280,7 @@
+
+ export CPPFLAGS CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL
+
+-export NETWORKS DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS
++export NETWORKS DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS GRSECURITY
+
+ .S.s:
+ $(CPP) $(AFLAGS) $(AFLAGS_KERNEL) -traditional -o $*.s $<
+@@ -298,6 +299,7 @@
+ $(CORE_FILES) \
+ $(DRIVERS) \
+ $(NETWORKS) \
++ $(GRSECURITY) \
+ $(LIBS) \
+ --end-group \
+ -o vmlinux
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -457,3 +457,12 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
++
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2003-06-13 16:51:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/fpu.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -230,6 +231,11 @@
+ struct file *file = NULL;
+ unsigned long ret = -EBADF;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ #if 0
+ if (flags & (_MAP_HASSEMAPHORE | _MAP_INHERIT | _MAP_UNALIGNED))
+ printk("%s: unimplemented OSF mmap flags %04lx\n",
+@@ -240,6 +246,13 @@
+ if (!file)
+ goto out;
+ }
++
++ if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ fput(file);
++ ret = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, off);
+@@ -1357,6 +1370,10 @@
+ merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps
+ this feature should be incorporated into all ports? */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ if (addr) {
+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
+ if (addr != -ENOMEM)
+@@ -1364,8 +1381,15 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE. */
+- addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE),
+- len, limit);
++
++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++ addr += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
++ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
+ if (addr != -ENOMEM)
+ return addr;
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-13 16:51:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -275,6 +276,10 @@
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ if (!child)
+ goto out_notsk;
++
++ if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out;
++
+ if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ goto out;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2002-11-29 00:53:08.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -53,6 +53,139 @@
+ __reload_thread(¤t->thread);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++ if (regs->r26 == regs->pc)
++ return 1;
++ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++ unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp;
++
++ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U &&
++ (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++ jmp == 0x6BFB0000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long r27, addr;
++ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++ unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++ addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++ err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr);
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ regs->r27 = r27;
++ regs->pc = r27;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++ unsigned int ldah, lda, br;
++
++ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++ err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U &&
++ (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
++ (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL;
++ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
++ unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
++
++ regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
++ regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++ unsigned int br;
++
++ err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++
++ if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) {
++ unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp;
++ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver;
++
++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
++ err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr);
++ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
++ err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (br2 == 0xC3600000U &&
++ ldq == 0xA77B000CU &&
++ nop == 0x47FF041FU &&
++ jmp == 0x6B7B0000U)
++ {
++ regs->r28 = regs->pc+4;
++ regs->r27 = addr+16;
++ regs->pc = resolver;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++ unsigned int c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%08x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+
+ /*
+ * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
+@@ -133,8 +266,32 @@
+ good_area:
+ info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
+ if (cause < 0) {
+- if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc)
++ goto bad_area;
++
++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ case 2:
++ case 3:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 4:
++ return;
++#endif
++ }
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp());
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++#else
+ goto bad_area;
++#endif
++ }
+ } else if (!cause) {
+ /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/arm/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/arm/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/arm/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/arm/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -734,3 +734,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/cris/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/cris/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/cris/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/cris/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -275,3 +275,12 @@
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
+ endmenu
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
++
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/Makefile linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/Makefile
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/Makefile 2003-06-13 16:51:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/Makefile 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@
+
+ MAKEBOOT = $(MAKE) -C arch/$(ARCH)/boot
+
++arch/i386/vmlinux.lds: arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S FORCE
++ $(CPP) -C -P -I$(HPATH) -imacros $(HPATH)/linux/config.h -imacros $(HPATH)/asm-i386/segment.h -imacros $(HPATH)/asm-i386/page_offset.h -Ui386 arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S >arch/i386/vmlinux.lds
++
+ vmlinux: arch/i386/vmlinux.lds
+
+ FORCE: ;
+@@ -150,6 +153,7 @@
+ @$(MAKEBOOT) clean
+
+ archmrproper:
++ rm -f arch/i386/vmlinux.lds
+
+ archdep:
+ @$(MAKEBOOT) dep
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/config.in 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -500,3 +500,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@
+ __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ "pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+- "lcall %%cs:" SYMBOL_NAME_STR(apm_bios_entry) "\n\t"
++ "lcall *%%ss:" SYMBOL_NAME_STR(apm_bios_entry) "\n\t"
+ "setc %%al\n\t"
+ "popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ "popl %%edi\n\t"
+@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@
+ __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
+ "pushl %%edi\n\t"
+ "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
+- "lcall %%cs:" SYMBOL_NAME_STR(apm_bios_entry) "\n\t"
++ "lcall *%%ss:" SYMBOL_NAME_STR(apm_bios_entry) "\n\t"
+ "setc %%bl\n\t"
+ "popl %%ebp\n\t"
+ "popl %%edi\n\t"
+@@ -1985,6 +1985,12 @@
+ __va((unsigned long)0x40 << 4));
+ _set_limit((char *)&gdt[APM_40 >> 3], 4095 - (0x40 << 4));
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ set_base(gdt2[APM_40 >> 3],
++ __va((unsigned long)0x40 << 4));
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_40 >> 3], 4095 - (0x40 << 4));
++#endif
++
+ apm_bios_entry.offset = apm_info.bios.offset;
+ apm_bios_entry.segment = APM_CS;
+ set_base(gdt[APM_CS >> 3],
+@@ -1993,6 +1999,16 @@
+ __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg_16 << 4));
+ set_base(gdt[APM_DS >> 3],
+ __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.dseg << 4));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ set_base(gdt2[APM_CS >> 3],
++ __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg << 4));
++ set_base(gdt2[APM_CS_16 >> 3],
++ __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg_16 << 4));
++ set_base(gdt2[APM_DS >> 3],
++ __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.dseg << 4));
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS
+ if (apm_info.bios.version == 0x100) {
+ #endif
+@@ -2002,6 +2018,13 @@
+ _set_limit((char *)&gdt[APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
+ /* For the DEC Hinote Ultra CT475 (and others?) */
+ _set_limit((char *)&gdt[APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS
+ } else {
+ _set_limit((char *)&gdt[APM_CS >> 3],
+@@ -2010,6 +2033,16 @@
+ (apm_info.bios.cseg_16_len - 1) & 0xffff);
+ _set_limit((char *)&gdt[APM_DS >> 3],
+ (apm_info.bios.dseg_len - 1) & 0xffff);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_CS >> 3],
++ (apm_info.bios.cseg_len - 1) & 0xffff);
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_CS_16 >> 3],
++ (apm_info.bios.cseg_16_len - 1) & 0xffff);
++ _set_limit((char *)&gdt2[APM_DS >> 3],
++ (apm_info.bios.dseg_len - 1) & 0xffff);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ #endif
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -211,6 +211,17 @@
+ jae badsys
+ call *SYMBOL_NAME(sys_call_table)(,%eax,4)
+ movl %eax,EAX(%esp) # save the return value
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++ cli # need_resched and signals atomic test
++ cmpl $0,need_resched(%ebx)
++ jne reschedule
++ cmpl $0,sigpending(%ebx)
++ jne signal_return
++ call SYMBOL_NAME(pax_randomize_kstack)
++ jmp restore_all
++#endif
++
+ ENTRY(ret_from_sys_call)
+ cli # need_resched and signals atomic test
+ cmpl $0,need_resched(%ebx)
+@@ -391,8 +402,56 @@
+ jmp error_code
+
+ ENTRY(page_fault)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ ALIGN
++ pushl $ SYMBOL_NAME(pax_do_page_fault)
++#else
+ pushl $ SYMBOL_NAME(do_page_fault)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+ jmp error_code
++#else
++ pushl %ds
++ pushl %eax
++ xorl %eax,%eax
++ pushl %ebp
++ pushl %edi
++ pushl %esi
++ pushl %edx
++ decl %eax # eax = -1
++ pushl %ecx
++ pushl %ebx
++ cld
++ movl %es,%ecx
++ movl ORIG_EAX(%esp), %esi # get the error code
++ movl ES(%esp), %edi # get the function address
++ movl %eax, ORIG_EAX(%esp)
++ movl %ecx, ES(%esp)
++ movl %esp,%edx
++ pushl %esi # push the error code
++ pushl %edx # push the pt_regs pointer
++ movl $(__KERNEL_DS),%edx
++ movl %edx,%ds
++ movl %edx,%es
++ GET_CURRENT(%ebx)
++ call *%edi
++ addl $8,%esp
++ decl %eax
++ jnz ret_from_exception
++
++ popl %ebx
++ popl %ecx
++ popl %edx
++ popl %esi
++ popl %edi
++ popl %ebp
++ popl %eax
++ popl %ds
++ popl %es
++ addl $4,%esp
++ jmp system_call
++#endif
+
+ ENTRY(machine_check)
+ pushl $0
+@@ -404,7 +463,7 @@
+ pushl $ SYMBOL_NAME(do_spurious_interrupt_bug)
+ jmp error_code
+
+-.data
++.section .rodata, "a"
+ ENTRY(sys_call_table)
+ .long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_ni_syscall) /* 0 - old "setup()" system call*/
+ .long SYMBOL_NAME(sys_exit)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/head.S
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2003-06-13 16:51:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2003-10-21 14:24:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
+ *
+ * On entry, %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer.
+ */
++.global startup_32
+ startup_32:
+ /*
+ * Set segments to known values
+@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@
+ PRESENT+RW+USER */
+ 2: stosl
+ add $0x1000,%eax
+- cmp $empty_zero_page-__PAGE_OFFSET,%edi
++ cmp $0x00c00007,%eax
+ jne 2b
+
+ /*
+@@ -100,9 +101,19 @@
+ movl %eax,%cr0 /* ..and set paging (PG) bit */
+ jmp 1f /* flush the prefetch-queue */
+ 1:
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_SMP)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ orw %bx,%bx
++ jz 1f
++#endif
++
+ movl $1f,%eax
+ jmp *%eax /* make sure eip is relocated */
+ 1:
++#endif
++
+ /* Set up the stack pointer */
+ lss stack_start,%esp
+
+@@ -121,7 +132,7 @@
+ */
+ xorl %eax,%eax
+ movl $ SYMBOL_NAME(__bss_start),%edi
+- movl $ SYMBOL_NAME(_end),%ecx
++ movl $ SYMBOL_NAME(__bss_end),%ecx
+ subl %edi,%ecx
+ rep
+ stosb
+@@ -272,8 +283,6 @@
+ jmp L6 # main should never return here, but
+ # just in case, we know what happens.
+
+-ready: .byte 0
+-
+ /*
+ * We depend on ET to be correct. This checks for 287/387.
+ */
+@@ -319,13 +328,6 @@
+ jne rp_sidt
+ ret
+
+-ENTRY(stack_start)
+- .long SYMBOL_NAME(init_task_union)+8192
+- .long __KERNEL_DS
+-
+-/* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */
+-int_msg:
+- .asciz "Unknown interrupt\n"
+ ALIGN
+ ignore_int:
+ cld
+@@ -347,6 +349,18 @@
+ popl %eax
+ iret
+
++.data
++ready: .byte 0
++
++ENTRY(stack_start)
++ .long SYMBOL_NAME(init_task_union)+8192
++ .long __KERNEL_DS
++
++.section .rodata,"a"
++/* This is the default interrupt "handler" :-) */
++int_msg:
++ .asciz "Unknown interrupt\n"
++
+ /*
+ * The interrupt descriptor table has room for 256 idt's,
+ * the global descriptor table is dependent on the number
+@@ -372,41 +386,58 @@
+ SYMBOL_NAME(gdt):
+ .long SYMBOL_NAME(gdt_table)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++.globl SYMBOL_NAME(gdt2)
++ .word 0
++gdt_descr2:
++ .word GDT_ENTRIES*8-1
++SYMBOL_NAME(gdt2):
++ .long SYMBOL_NAME(gdt_table2)
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * This is initialized to create an identity-mapping at 0-8M (for bootup
+ * purposes) and another mapping of the 0-8M area at virtual address
+ * PAGE_OFFSET.
+ */
+-.org 0x1000
++.section .data.swapper_pg_dir,"a"
+ ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
+- .long 0x00102007
+- .long 0x00103007
+- .fill BOOT_USER_PGD_PTRS-2,4,0
++ .long pg0-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
++ .long pg1-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
++ .long pg2-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
++ .fill BOOT_USER_PGD_PTRS-3,4,0
+ /* default: 766 entries */
+- .long 0x00102007
+- .long 0x00103007
++ .long pg0-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
++ .long pg1-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
++ .long pg2-__PAGE_OFFSET+7
+ /* default: 254 entries */
+- .fill BOOT_KERNEL_PGD_PTRS-2,4,0
++ .fill BOOT_KERNEL_PGD_PTRS-3,4,0
+
+ /*
+ * The page tables are initialized to only 8MB here - the final page
+ * tables are set up later depending on memory size.
+ */
+-.org 0x2000
++.section .data.pg0,"a"
+ ENTRY(pg0)
++ .fill 1024,4,0
+
+-.org 0x3000
++.section .data.pg1,"a"
+ ENTRY(pg1)
++ .fill 1024,4,0
++
++.section .data.pg2,"a"
++ENTRY(pg2)
++ .fill 1024,4,0
+
+ /*
+ * empty_zero_page must immediately follow the page tables ! (The
+ * initialization loop counts until empty_zero_page)
+ */
+-
+-.org 0x4000
++.section .data.empty_zero_page,"a"
+ ENTRY(empty_zero_page)
++ .fill 1024,4,0
+
+-.org 0x5000
++.text
+
+ /*
+ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
+@@ -419,7 +450,7 @@
+ * in the text section because it has alignment requirements
+ * that we cannot fulfill any other way.
+ */
+-.data
++.section .rodata,"a"
+
+ ALIGN
+ /*
+@@ -430,19 +461,55 @@
+ */
+ ENTRY(gdt_table)
+ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL descriptor */
+- .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
+- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* 0x18 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
+- .quad 0x00cffa000000ffff /* 0x23 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+- .quad 0x00cff2000000ffff /* 0x2b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x08 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0xc0cf9b400000ffff /* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0xc0400000 */
++#else
++ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++#endif
++
++ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x18 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0x00cffb000000ffff /* 0x23 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0x00cff3000000ffff /* 0x2b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
++ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
++ /*
++ * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
++ * and limits are set at run time.
++ */
++ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0x40 APM set up for bad BIOS's */
++ .quad 0x00409b0000000000 /* 0x48 APM CS code */
++ .quad 0x00009b0000000000 /* 0x50 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
++ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0x58 APM DS data */
++ .fill NR_CPUS*4,8,0 /* space for TSS's and LDT's */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ENTRY(gdt_table2)
++ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL descriptor */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x08 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0xc0cf9b400000ffff /* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0xc0400000 */
++#else
++ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
++ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
++#endif
++
++ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x18 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
++ .quad 0x60c5fb000000ffff /* 0x23 user 1.5GB code at 0x60000000 */
++ .quad 0x00c5f3000000ffff /* 0x2b user 1.5GB data at 0x00000000 */
++
+ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
+ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* not used */
+ /*
+ * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
+ * and limits are set at run time.
+ */
+- .quad 0x0040920000000000 /* 0x40 APM set up for bad BIOS's */
+- .quad 0x00409a0000000000 /* 0x48 APM CS code */
+- .quad 0x00009a0000000000 /* 0x50 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
+- .quad 0x0040920000000000 /* 0x58 APM DS data */
++ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0x40 APM set up for bad BIOS's */
++ .quad 0x00409b0000000000 /* 0x48 APM CS code */
++ .quad 0x00009b0000000000 /* 0x50 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
++ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0x58 APM DS data */
+ .fill NR_CPUS*4,8,0 /* space for TSS's and LDT's */
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c 2003-10-20 18:59:00.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -74,6 +74,9 @@
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_cmos_time);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(apm_info);
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(gdt);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gdt2);
++#endif
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page);
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_IOVIRT
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2003-06-13 16:51:29.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/stddef.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
+ static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, short base, short extent, int new_value)
+@@ -59,8 +60,16 @@
+
+ if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_SIZE*32))
+ return -EINVAL;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++ if (turn_on) {
++ gr_handle_ioperm();
++#else
+ if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++#endif
+ return -EPERM;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++ }
++#endif
+ /*
+ * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the
+ * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(),
+@@ -109,8 +118,13 @@
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
+ if (level > old) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++ gr_handle_iopl();
++ return -EPERM;
++#else
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+ return -EPERM;
++#endif
+ }
+ regs->eflags = (regs->eflags & 0xffffcfff) | (level << 12);
+ return 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -124,6 +124,13 @@
+ }
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & 2)) {
++ error = -EINVAL;
++ goto out_unlock;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ entry_1 = ((ldt_info.base_addr & 0x0000ffff) << 16) |
+ (ldt_info.limit & 0x0ffff);
+ entry_2 = (ldt_info.base_addr & 0xff000000) |
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/pci-pc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/pci-pc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/pci-pc.c 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/pci-pc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+ #include <asm/smp.h>
+ #include <asm/smpboot.h>
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+
+ #include "pci-i386.h"
+
+@@ -575,10 +576,16 @@
+ * the array there.
+ */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS 0x08
++#else
++#define __FLAT_KERNEL_CS __KERNEL_CS
++#endif
++
+ static struct {
+ unsigned long address;
+ unsigned short segment;
+-} bios32_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} bios32_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS };
+
+ /*
+ * Returns the entry point for the given service, NULL on error
+@@ -619,7 +626,9 @@
+ static struct {
+ unsigned long address;
+ unsigned short segment;
+-} pci_indirect = { 0, __KERNEL_CS };
++} pci_indirect = { 0, __FLAT_KERNEL_CS };
++
++#undef __FLAT_KERNEL_CS
+
+ static int pci_bios_present;
+
+@@ -1456,6 +1465,7 @@
+ if ((pci_probe & PCI_BIOS_SORT) && !(pci_probe & PCI_NO_SORT))
+ pcibios_sort();
+ #endif
++
+ }
+
+ char * __devinit pcibios_setup(char *str)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -590,7 +590,11 @@
+ {
+ struct pt_regs * childregs;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++ childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p - sizeof(unsigned long))) - 1;
++#else
+ childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p)) - 1;
++#endif
+ struct_cpy(childregs, regs);
+ childregs->eax = 0;
+ childregs->esp = esp;
+@@ -651,6 +655,16 @@
+ dump->u_fpvalid = dump_fpu (regs, &dump->i387);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++void pax_switch_segments(struct task_struct * tsk)
++{
++ if (tsk->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++ __asm__ __volatile__("lgdt %0": "=m" (gdt_descr2));
++ else
++ __asm__ __volatile__("lgdt %0": "=m" (gdt_descr));
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * This special macro can be used to load a debugging register
+ */
+@@ -690,6 +704,10 @@
+
+ unlazy_fpu(prev_p);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ pax_switch_segments(next_p);
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
+ */
+@@ -832,3 +850,25 @@
+ }
+ #undef last_sched
+ #undef first_sched
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void)
++{
++ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id();
++ unsigned long time;
++
++ rdtscl(time);
++
++ /* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */
++#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4
++ time &= 0x3EUL;
++ time <<= 1;
++#else
++ time &= 0x1FUL;
++ time <<= 2;
++#endif
++
++ current->thread.esp0 ^= time;
++ tss->esp0 = current->thread.esp0;
++}
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -182,6 +183,9 @@
+ if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
+ goto out_tsk;
+
++ if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out_tsk;
++
+ if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ goto out_tsk;
+@@ -261,6 +265,17 @@
+ if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] &&
+ ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] &&
++ addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){
++ long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2;
++ long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3;
++ long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3;
++ if((type & 1) && (data & align))
++ break;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[7]) {
+ data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
+ for(i=0; i<4; i++)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2003-10-20 18:59:00.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -3147,7 +3147,7 @@
+ set_tss_desc(nr,t);
+ gdt_table[__TSS(nr)].b &= 0xfffffdff;
+ load_TR(nr);
+- load_LDT(&init_mm);
++ _load_LDT(&init_mm);
+
+ /* Clear %fs and %gs. */
+ asm volatile ("xorl %eax, %eax; movl %eax, %fs; movl %eax, %gs");
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -48,6 +49,11 @@
+ int error = -EBADF;
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ file = fget(fd);
+@@ -55,8 +61,14 @@
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ fput(file);
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+- error = do_mmap_pgoff(mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
++ error = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ if (file)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S 2002-11-29 00:53:09.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/trampoline.S 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
+ lmsw %ax # into protected mode
+ jmp flush_instr
+ flush_instr:
+- ljmpl $__KERNEL_CS, $0x00100000
++ ljmpl $__KERNEL_CS, $SYMBOL_NAME(startup_32)-__PAGE_OFFSET
+ # jump to startup_32 in arch/i386/kernel/head.S
+
+ idt_48:
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2002-11-29 00:53:09.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -228,14 +228,23 @@
+ show_stack((unsigned long*)esp);
+
+ printk("\nCode: ");
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
+ if(regs->eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
+ goto bad;
++#endif
+
+ for(i=0;i<20;i++)
+ {
+ unsigned char c;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i+__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET])) {
++#else
+ if(__get_user(c, &((unsigned char*)regs->eip)[i])) {
+ bad:
++#endif
++
+ printk(" Bad EIP value.");
+ break;
+ }
+@@ -258,8 +267,13 @@
+
+ eip = regs->eip;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ eip += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++#else
+ if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
+ goto no_bug;
++#endif
++
+ if (__get_user(ud2, (unsigned short *)eip))
+ goto no_bug;
+ if (ud2 != 0x0b0f)
+@@ -267,7 +281,13 @@
+ if (__get_user(line, (unsigned short *)(eip + 2)))
+ goto bug;
+ if (__get_user(file, (char **)(eip + 4)) ||
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ __get_user(c, file + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET))
++#else
+ (unsigned long)file < PAGE_OFFSET || __get_user(c, file))
++#endif
++
+ file = "<bad filename>";
+
+ printk("kernel BUG at %s:%d!\n", file, line);
+@@ -417,6 +437,18 @@
+ gp_in_kernel:
+ {
+ unsigned long fixup;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS) {
++ if (current->curr_ip)
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: task %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, may have attempted to execute invalid code at %08lx\n",
++ NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid, regs->eip);
++ else
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: task %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, may have attempted to execute invalid code at %08lx\n",
++ current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid, regs->eip);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ fixup = search_exception_table(regs->eip);
+ if (fixup) {
+ regs->eip = fixup;
+@@ -527,13 +559,12 @@
+ {
+ unsigned int condition;
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+- unsigned long eip = regs->eip;
+ siginfo_t info;
+
+ __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%db6,%0" : "=r" (condition));
+
+ /* If the user set TF, it's simplest to clear it right away. */
+- if ((eip >=PAGE_OFFSET) && (regs->eflags & TF_MASK))
++ if (!(regs->xcs & 3) && (regs->eflags & TF_MASK) && !(regs->eflags & VM_MASK))
+ goto clear_TF;
+
+ /* Mask out spurious debug traps due to lazy DR7 setting */
+@@ -855,11 +886,55 @@
+ void set_tss_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr)
+ {
+ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table+__TSS(n), (int)addr, 235, 0x89);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table2+__TSS(n), (int)addr, 235, 0x89);
++#endif
++
++}
++
++void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr, unsigned int size)
++{
++ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table+__LDT(n), (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table2+__LDT(n), (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+ void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr, unsigned int size)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ unsigned long temp, cr3;
++ pgd_t* pgd;
++ pmd_t* pmd;
++
++ asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3));
++ for (temp = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; temp < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; temp += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) {
++ pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(cr3) + __pgd_offset(temp);
++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, temp);
++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) | _PAGE_RW));
++ }
++ __flush_tlb_all();
++#endif
++
+ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table+__LDT(n), (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ _set_tssldt_desc(gdt_table2+__LDT(n), (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ for (temp = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; temp < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; temp += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) {
++ pgd = (pgd_t *)__va(cr3) + __pgd_offset(temp);
++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, temp);
++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++ }
++ flush_tlb_all();
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VISWS_APIC
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2003-10-20 18:59:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
+ * Copyright (C) 1995 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
++#include <linux/config.h>
+ #include <linux/signal.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+@@ -19,6 +20,8 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/vt_kern.h> /* For unblank_screen() */
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -123,6 +126,10 @@
+ asmlinkage void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
+ extern unsigned long idt;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs);
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
+ * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
+@@ -133,23 +140,31 @@
+ * bit 1 == 0 means read, 1 means write
+ * bit 2 == 0 means kernel, 1 means user-mode
+ */
+-asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++static int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
++#else
++asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
++#endif
+ {
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct * vma;
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
+ unsigned long address;
++#endif
+ unsigned long page;
+ unsigned long fixup;
+ int write;
+ siginfo_t info;
+
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
+ /* get the address */
+ __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
+
+ /* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */
+ if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
+ local_irq_enable();
++#endif
+
+ tsk = current;
+
+@@ -256,7 +271,7 @@
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ tsk->in_page_fault = 0;
+- return;
++ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Something tried to access memory that isn't in our memory map..
+@@ -268,6 +283,39 @@
+
+ /* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
+ if (error_code & 4) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if ((error_code == 4) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) {
++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 5:
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ case 4:
++ return 0;
++ case 3:
++ case 2:
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ case 1:
++ default:
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++ if (address >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) {
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+ tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
+@@ -276,7 +324,7 @@
+ /* info.si_code has been set above */
+ info.si_addr = (void *)address;
+ force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, tsk);
+- return;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -289,7 +337,7 @@
+
+ if (nr == 6) {
+ do_invalid_op(regs, 0);
+- return;
++ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -297,7 +345,7 @@
+ /* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
+ if ((fixup = search_exception_table(regs->eip)) != 0) {
+ regs->eip = fixup;
+- return;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -310,6 +358,18 @@
+
+ if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference");
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ else if (init_mm.start_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET <= address && address < init_mm.end_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++ if (tsk->curr_ip)
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
++ NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
++ else
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
++ tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ else
+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request");
+ printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address);
+@@ -364,7 +424,7 @@
+ /* Kernel mode? Handle exceptions or die */
+ if (!(error_code & 4))
+ goto no_context;
+- return;
++ return 0;
+
+ vmalloc_fault:
+ {
+@@ -397,6 +457,337 @@
+ pte_k = pte_offset(pmd_k, address);
+ if (!pte_present(*pte_k))
+ goto no_context;
+- return;
++ return 0;
++ }
++}
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */
++static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
++{
++ pgd_t *pgd;
++ pmd_t *pmd;
++
++ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
++ if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd))
++ return 0;
++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, address);
++ if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd))
++ return 0;
++ return pte_offset(pmd, address);
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when gcc trampoline was detected
++ * 5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4};
++#endif
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ unsigned long esp_4;
++ if (regs->eip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->eip < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++ err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4UL));
++ if (err || esp_4 == regs->eip)
++ return 1;
++ regs->eip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 5;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
++ unsigned char pop, mov;
++ unsigned short sys;
++ unsigned long nr;
++
++ err = get_user(pop, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
++ err |= get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 1));
++ err |= get_user(nr, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 2));
++ err |= get_user(sys, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 6));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (pop == 0x58 &&
++ mov == 0xb8 &&
++ nr == __NR_sigreturn &&
++ sys == 0x80cd)
++ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ int sig;
++ struct k_sigaction *ka;
++ __sighandler_t handler;
++
++ if (get_user(sig, (int *)regs->esp))
++ return 1;
++ if (sig < 1 || sig > _NSIG || sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP)
++ return 1;
++ ka = ¤t->sig->action[sig-1];
++ handler = ka->sa.sa_handler;
++ if (handler == SIG_DFL || handler == SIG_IGN) {
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++ return 1;
++ } else if (!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ regs->esp += 4;
++ regs->eax = nr;
++ regs->eip += 8;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++ unsigned char mov;
++ unsigned short sys;
++ unsigned long nr;
++
++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
++ err |= get_user(nr, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++ err |= get_user(sys, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 5));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (mov == 0xb8 &&
++ nr == __NR_rt_sigreturn &&
++ sys == 0x80cd)
++ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ int sig;
++ struct k_sigaction *ka;
++ __sighandler_t handler;
++
++ if (get_user(sig, (int *)regs->esp))
++ return 1;
++ if (sig < 1 || sig > _NSIG || sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP)
++ return 1;
++ ka = ¤t->sig->action[sig-1];
++ handler = ka->sa.sa_handler;
++ if (handler == SIG_DFL || handler == SIG_IGN) {
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++ return 1;
++ } else if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ regs->eax = nr;
++ regs->eip += 7;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
++ unsigned char mov1, mov2;
++ unsigned short jmp;
++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++ unsigned short call;
++
++ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10));
++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++ (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++ (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) &&
++ (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF &&
++ (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) &&
++ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
++ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
++ {
++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1;
++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2;
++ regs->eip = addr2;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
++ unsigned char mov, jmp;
++ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
++ unsigned short call;
++
++ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
++ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
++ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
++ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
++ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
++ jmp == 0xE9 &&
++ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
++ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
++ {
++ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
++ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ return 1; /* PaX in action */
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
++ unsigned char c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%02x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: handle the extra page faults or pass it down to the original handler
++ *
++ * returns 0 when nothing special was detected
++ * 1 when sigreturn trampoline (syscall) has to be emulated
++ */
++asmlinkage int pax_do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
++{
++ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++ unsigned long address;
++ pte_t *pte;
++ unsigned char pte_mask;
++ int ret;
++
++ __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
++
++ /* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */
++ if (likely(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF))
++ local_irq_enable();
++
++ if (unlikely((error_code & 5) != 5 ||
++ address >= TASK_SIZE ||
++ !(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)))
++ return do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
++
++ /* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
++
++ /* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
++ if (unlikely((error_code == 5) && (regs->eip == address))) {
++ /* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
++ ret = pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs);
++ switch (ret) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 5:
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ case 4:
++ return 0;
++ case 3:
++ case 2:
++ return 1;
++#endif
++ case 1:
++ default:
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++ }
++
++ pte_mask = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1));
++
++ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
++ if (unlikely(!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte))) {
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
++ return 0;
+ }
++
++ if (unlikely((error_code == 7) && !pte_write(*pte))) {
++ /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
++ */
++ __asm__ __volatile__ (
++ "orb %2,%1\n"
++#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC)
++/*
++ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's
++ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any*
++ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only
++ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will
++ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write
++ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs
++ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all.
++ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the
++ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we
++ * can no longer flush unintended entries.
++ */
++
++ "invlpg %0\n"
++#endif
++
++ "testb $0,%0\n"
++ "xorb %3,%1\n"
++ :
++ : "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte) , "q" (pte_mask) , "i" (_PAGE_USER)
++ : "memory", "cc");
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/mm/init.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
+ #include <asm/e820.h>
+ #include <asm/apic.h>
+ #include <asm/tlb.h>
++#include <asm/page_offset.h>
++#include <asm/desc.h>
+
+ mmu_gather_t mmu_gathers[NR_CPUS];
+ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn;
+@@ -122,7 +124,7 @@
+
+ /* References to section boundaries */
+
+-extern char _text, _etext, _edata, __bss_start, _end;
++extern char _text, _etext, _data, _edata, __bss_start, _end;
+ extern char __init_begin, __init_end;
+
+ static inline void set_pte_phys (unsigned long vaddr,
+@@ -514,7 +516,7 @@
+ reservedpages = free_pages_init();
+
+ codesize = (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text;
+- datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext;
++ datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data;
+ initsize = (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Memory: %luk/%luk available (%dk kernel code, %dk reserved, %dk data, %dk init, %ldk highmem)\n",
+@@ -582,6 +584,42 @@
+ totalram_pages++;
+ }
+ printk (KERN_INFO "Freeing unused kernel memory: %dk freed\n", (&__init_end - &__init_begin) >> 10);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ /* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */
++ {
++ unsigned long limit;
++
++ limit = (unsigned long)&_etext >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++ gdt_table[2].a = (gdt_table[2].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL);
++ gdt_table[2].b = (gdt_table[2].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL);
++
++ /* PaX: nuke __FLAT_KERNEL_CS, no longer needed */
++ gdt_table[1].a = 0UL;
++ gdt_table[1].b = 0UL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ gdt_table2[2].a = (gdt_table2[2].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL);
++ gdt_table2[2].b = (gdt_table2[2].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL);
++
++ /* PaX: nuke __FLAT_KERNEL_CS, no longer needed */
++ gdt_table2[1].a = 0UL;
++ gdt_table2[1].b = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++ /* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */
++ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET + 0x00400000UL; addr += (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)) {
++ pgd_t *pgd;
++ pmd_t *pmd;
++
++ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
++ pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, addr);
++ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
++ }
++ flush_tlb_all();
++ }
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds 2002-02-25 20:37:53.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
+-/* ld script to make i386 Linux kernel
+- * Written by Martin Mares <mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>;
+- */
+-OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
+-OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
+-ENTRY(_start)
+-SECTIONS
+-{
+- . = 0xC0000000 + 0x100000;
+- _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
+- .text : {
+- *(.text)
+- *(.fixup)
+- *(.gnu.warning)
+- } = 0x9090
+-
+- _etext = .; /* End of text section */
+-
+- .rodata : { *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) }
+- .kstrtab : { *(.kstrtab) }
+-
+- . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */
+- __start___ex_table = .;
+- __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
+- __stop___ex_table = .;
+-
+- __start___ksymtab = .; /* Kernel symbol table */
+- __ksymtab : { *(__ksymtab) }
+- __stop___ksymtab = .;
+-
+- .data : { /* Data */
+- *(.data)
+- CONSTRUCTORS
+- }
+-
+- _edata = .; /* End of data section */
+-
+- . = ALIGN(8192); /* init_task */
+- .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) }
+-
+- . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */
+- __init_begin = .;
+- .text.init : { *(.text.init) }
+- .data.init : { *(.data.init) }
+- . = ALIGN(16);
+- __setup_start = .;
+- .setup.init : { *(.setup.init) }
+- __setup_end = .;
+- __initcall_start = .;
+- .initcall.init : { *(.initcall.init) }
+- __initcall_end = .;
+- . = ALIGN(4096);
+- __init_end = .;
+-
+- . = ALIGN(4096);
+- .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.idt) }
+-
+- . = ALIGN(32);
+- .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) }
+-
+- __bss_start = .; /* BSS */
+- .bss : {
+- *(.bss)
+- }
+- _end = . ;
+-
+- /* Sections to be discarded */
+- /DISCARD/ : {
+- *(.text.exit)
+- *(.data.exit)
+- *(.exitcall.exit)
+- }
+-
+- /* Stabs debugging sections. */
+- .stab 0 : { *(.stab) }
+- .stabstr 0 : { *(.stabstr) }
+- .stab.excl 0 : { *(.stab.excl) }
+- .stab.exclstr 0 : { *(.stab.exclstr) }
+- .stab.index 0 : { *(.stab.index) }
+- .stab.indexstr 0 : { *(.stab.indexstr) }
+- .comment 0 : { *(.comment) }
+-}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/i386/vmlinux.lds.S 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
++/* ld script to make i386 Linux kernel
++ * Written by Martin Mares <mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>;
++ */
++OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
++OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
++ENTRY(_start)
++SECTIONS
++{
++ . = __PAGE_OFFSET + 0x100000;
++ .text.startup : {
++ BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ LONG(startup_32 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - __PAGE_OFFSET)
++#else
++ LONG(startup_32 - __PAGE_OFFSET)
++#endif
++
++ SHORT(__KERNEL_CS)
++ }
++
++ . = ALIGN(32);
++ _data = .;
++ .data : { /* Data */
++ *(.data)
++ CONSTRUCTORS
++ }
++
++ . = ALIGN(32);
++ .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) }
++
++ . = ALIGN(8192);
++ .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) }
++
++ . = ALIGN(4096);
++ .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.swapper_pg_dir) }
++
++ _edata = .; /* End of data section */
++
++ __bss_start = .; /* BSS */
++ .bss : {
++ *(.bss)
++ LONG(0)
++ }
++ __bss_end = . ;
++
++ . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */
++ __init_begin = .;
++
++ .data.init : {
++ *(.data.pg0)
++ *(.data.pg1)
++ *(.data.pg2)
++ *(.data.init)
++ }
++ . = ALIGN(16);
++ __setup_start = .;
++ .setup.init : { *(.setup.init) }
++ __setup_end = .;
++ __initcall_start = .;
++ .initcall.init : { *(.initcall.init) }
++ __initcall_end = .;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ __text_init_start = .;
++ .text.init (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT (__text_init_start) {
++ *(.text.init)
++ . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024) - 1;
++ BYTE(0)
++ }
++ __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++
++/*
++ * PaX: this must be kept in synch with the KERNEL_CS base
++ * in the GDTs in arch/i386/kernel/head.S
++ */
++ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
++ .text : AT (. + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
++#else
++ .text.init : { *(.text.init) }
++ . = ALIGN(4096);
++ __init_end = .;
++ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
++ .text : {
++#endif
++
++ *(.text)
++ *(.fixup)
++ *(.gnu.warning)
++ } = 0x9090
++
++ _etext = .; /* End of text section */
++ . = ALIGN(4096);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
++#endif
++
++ .rodata.page_aligned : {
++ *(.data.empty_zero_page)
++ *(.data.idt)
++ }
++ .rodata : { *(.rodata) *(.rodata.*) }
++ .kstrtab : { *(.kstrtab) }
++
++ . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */
++ __start___ex_table = .;
++ __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
++ __stop___ex_table = .;
++
++ __start___ksymtab = .; /* Kernel symbol table */
++ __ksymtab : { *(__ksymtab) }
++ __stop___ksymtab = .;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++ _end = ALIGN(4*1024*1024);
++#else
++ _end = .;
++#endif
++
++ /* Sections to be discarded */
++ /DISCARD/ : {
++ *(.text.exit)
++ *(.data.exit)
++ *(.exitcall.exit)
++ }
++
++ /* Stabs debugging sections. */
++ .stab 0 : { *(.stab) }
++ .stabstr 0 : { *(.stabstr) }
++ .stab.excl 0 : { *(.stab.excl) }
++ .stab.exclstr 0 : { *(.stab.exclstr) }
++ .stab.index 0 : { *(.stab.index) }
++ .stab.indexstr 0 : { *(.stab.indexstr) }
++ .comment 0 : { *(.comment) }
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -291,3 +291,12 @@
+ fi
+
+ endmenu
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
++
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/processor.h>
+@@ -1213,6 +1214,9 @@
+ if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */
+ goto out_tsk;
+
++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out_tsk;
++
+ if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/highuid.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/shmparam.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -206,6 +207,11 @@
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ addr = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ addr = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/m68k/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/m68k/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/m68k/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/m68k/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -564,3 +564,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/mips/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/mips/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/mips/config.in 2002-11-29 00:53:09.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/mips/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,3 +7,11 @@
+ define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 n
+
+ source arch/mips/config-shared.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/mips64/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/mips64/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/mips64/config.in 2002-11-29 00:53:10.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/mips64/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,3 +7,11 @@
+ define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 y
+
+ source arch/mips/config-shared.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -198,3 +198,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-20 18:58:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1435,7 +1435,11 @@
+ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
+ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (current->tty == tty || suser())
++#endif
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2002-11-29 00:53:10.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
+-
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@
+ if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */
+ goto out_tsk;
+
++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out_tsk;
++
+ if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2002-11-29 00:53:10.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/shm.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ int sys_pipe(int *fildes)
+ {
+@@ -90,6 +91,11 @@
+ inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ if (inode && (flags & MAP_SHARED) && (inode->i_mapping->i_mmap_shared)) {
+ addr = get_shared_area(inode, addr, len, pgoff);
+ } else {
+@@ -104,12 +110,23 @@
+ {
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+ unsigned long error = -EBADF;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ file = fget(fd);
+ if (!file)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ fput(file);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2003-06-13 16:51:31.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
+ #include <linux/highuid.h>
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/types.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -177,6 +178,11 @@
+ struct file *file;
+ int retval;
+ int i;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct file *old_exec_file;
++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+
+ file = open_exec(filename);
+
+@@ -184,7 +190,26 @@
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return retval;
+
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes));
++
++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++ bprm.p -= (get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
++#endif
++
+ memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
+
+ DBG(("do_execve32(%s, %p, %p, %p)\n", filename, argv, envp, regs));
+@@ -209,11 +234,24 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ bprm.exec = bprm.p;
++
++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+@@ -222,11 +260,32 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ old_acl = current->acl;
++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++ get_file(file);
++ current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
+- if (retval >= 0)
++ if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (old_exec_file)
++ fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ /* execve success */
+ return retval;
++ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ current->acl = old_acl;
++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ fput(current->exec_file);
++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
+ out:
+ /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
+ allow_write_access(bprm.file);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -637,9 +637,7 @@
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]);
+- if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)
+- && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+-
++ if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) {
+ fault_address = regs->iaoq[0];
+ fault_space = regs->iasq[0];
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2003-06-13 16:51:31.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/unistd.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/traps.h>
+@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@
+ static unsigned long
+ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst)
+ {
+- if (code == 6 || code == 16)
++ if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16)
+ return VM_EXEC;
+
+ switch (inst & 0xf0000000) {
+@@ -139,6 +140,136 @@
+ }
+ #endif
+
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ instruction_pointer(regs) < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++#if 0
++ /* PaX: this needs fixing */
++ if ((regs->gr[2] & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++ regs->iaoq[0] += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ if ((regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ (regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) < current->mm->end_code)
++ regs->iaoq[1] += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
++ unsigned int bl, depwi;
++
++ err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs));
++ err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) {
++ unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12;
++
++ err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (ldw == 0x0E801096U &&
++ bv == 0xEAC0C000U &&
++ ldw2 == 0x0E881095U)
++ {
++ unsigned int resolver, map;
++
++ err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++ err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8;
++ regs->gr[21] = map;
++ regs->gr[22] = resolver;
++ regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL;
++ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++
++ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++ unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
++ err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
++ err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) &&
++ ldi2 == 0x3414015AU &&
++ bel == 0xE4008200U &&
++ nop == 0x08000240U)
++ {
++ regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1;
++ regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
++ regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16;
++ regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1];
++ regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL;
++ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
++ regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2];
++ regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2];
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++ unsigned int c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%08x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code,
+ unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -164,8 +295,38 @@
+
+ acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir);
+
+- if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type)
++ if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) &&
++ (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
++ {
++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 4:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ case 3:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ case 2:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++ }
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]);
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ goto bad_area;
++ }
+
+ /*
+ * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -488,3 +488,12 @@
+ bool 'Support for early boot texts over serial port' CONFIG_SERIAL_TEXT_DEBUG
+ fi
+ endmenu
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
++
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+ #include <linux/user.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+@@ -195,6 +196,9 @@
+ if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
+ goto out_tsk;
+
++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out_tsk;
++
+ if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
+ ret = ptrace_attach(child);
+ goto out_tsk;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <linux/ipc.h>
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -175,14 +176,25 @@
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+ int ret = -EBADF;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ if (!(file = fget(fd)))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ fput(file);
++ ret = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+- ret = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
++ ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (file)
+ fput(file);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -52,6 +55,360 @@
+ void bad_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, int sig);
+ void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int write_access)
++{
++ struct page* page;
++ unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++ if (!page)
++ return page;
++
++ kaddr = kmap(page);
++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++ kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
++ __flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
++ kunmap(page);
++ return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++ close: pax_syscall_close,
++ nopage: pax_syscall_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++ vma->vm_start = addr;
++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL;
++ vma->vm_file = NULL;
++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++ ++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ * 6 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ * 7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->nip < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++ if (regs->link == regs->nip)
++ return 1;
++
++ regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 5;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
++ unsigned int blrl;
++
++ err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip);
++
++ if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
++ unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
++
++ regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
++ regs->link = temp + 4UL;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++ unsigned int b;
++
++ err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++
++ if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++ regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++ return 3;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
++ unsigned int li, b;
++
++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++ unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++ err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
++ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
++ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++ {
++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++#if 0
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
++ unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
++
++ err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++ err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
++ (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
++ (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
++ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++ {
++ unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++ addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
++ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
++ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
++ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32));
++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++ (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
++ rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
++ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
++ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
++ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
++ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
++ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++ {
++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] =
++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
++ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
++ unsigned int li, b;
++
++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
++ unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
++ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
++
++ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
++ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
++ (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
++ mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
++ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
++ {
++ unsigned int r11;
++
++ addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++ addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
++
++ err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
++ regs->ctr = r11;
++ regs->nip = r11;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
++ unsigned int li, sc;
++
++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++ if (!err && li == 0x38007777U && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++ unsigned long call_syscall;
++
++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (likely(call_syscall))
++ goto emulate;
++
++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ goto emulate;
++ }
++
++ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
++ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = 0x7777UL;
++ regs->nip = call_syscall;
++ return 6;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
++ unsigned int li, sc;
++
++ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
++ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
++
++ if (!err && li == 0x38006666U && sc == 0x44000002U) {
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++ unsigned int call_syscall;
++
++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (likely(call_syscall))
++ goto rt_emulate;
++
++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
++ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ goto rt_emulate;
++ }
++
++ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
++ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++rt_emulate:
++ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = 0x6666UL;
++ regs->nip = call_syscall;
++ return 7;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++ unsigned int c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%08x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
+ * an update addressing form which will update r1.
+@@ -112,7 +469,7 @@
+ * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
+ */
+ if (regs->trap == 0x400)
+- error_code &= 0x48200000;
++ error_code &= 0x58200000;
+ else
+ is_write = error_code & 0x02000000;
+ #endif /* CONFIG_4xx */
+@@ -245,6 +602,38 @@
+
+ /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
++ if ((regs->trap == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ case 2:
++ case 3:
++ case 4:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 5:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ case 6:
++ case 7:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++ }
++
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
+ info.si_errno = 0;
+ info.si_code = code;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-20 18:58:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1801,7 +1801,11 @@
+ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
+ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (current->tty == tty || suser())
++#endif
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/s390/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/s390/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/s390/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/s390/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -81,3 +81,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/s390x/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/s390x/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/s390x/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/s390x/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -85,3 +85,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sh/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sh/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sh/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sh/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -469,3 +469,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile 2002-08-03 02:39:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
+
+ BTOBJS := $(HEAD) init/main.o init/version.o init/do_mounts.o
+ BTLIBS := $(CORE_FILES_NO_BTFIX) $(FILESYSTEMS) \
+- $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS)
++ $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS) $(GRSECURITY)
+
+ # I wanted to make this depend upon BTOBJS so that a parallel
+ # build would work, but this fails because $(HEAD) cannot work
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/config.in 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -277,3 +277,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2002-08-03 02:39:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+@@ -310,6 +311,9 @@
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
++ goto out_tsk;
++
+ if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
+ || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
+ if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -54,6 +55,13 @@
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000)
+ return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++ else
++#endif
++
+ if (!addr)
+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+
+@@ -225,6 +233,11 @@
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+ unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ file = fget(fd);
+ if (!file)
+@@ -243,6 +256,12 @@
+ if (len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE || addr + len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE)
+ goto out_putf;
+
++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ fput(file);
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+ unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ if(flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+ static int cnt;
+ if (cnt++ < 10)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2003-06-13 16:51:32.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/segment.h>
+@@ -200,6 +203,261 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int write_access)
++{
++ struct page* page;
++ unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++ if (!page)
++ return page;
++
++ kaddr = kmap(page);
++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++ flush_dcache_page(page);
++ kunmap(page);
++ return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++ close: pax_emuplt_close,
++ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++ vma->vm_start = addr;
++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL;
++ vma->vm_file = NULL;
++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++ ++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->pc)
++ return 1;
++
++ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code)
++ regs->npc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++ {
++ regs->pc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++ regs->npc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++ {
++ unsigned int addr;
++
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++ regs->pc = addr;
++ regs->npc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++ unsigned int ba;
++
++ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++
++ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++ unsigned int addr;
++
++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++ regs->pc = addr;
++ regs->npc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ }
++
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned int addr;
++
++ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
++ regs->pc = addr;
++ regs->npc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned int addr, save, call;
++
++ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
++
++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int *)addr);
++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++ goto emulate;
++
++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ goto emulate;
++ }
++
++ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ regs->pc = call_dl_resolve;
++ regs->npc = addr+4;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++ unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4));
++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2);
++
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc;
++ regs->pc = dl_resolve;
++ regs->npc = dl_resolve+4;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++#endif
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++ unsigned int c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%08x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
+ asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
+ unsigned long address)
+ {
+@@ -263,6 +521,29 @@
+ if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
+ goto bad_area;
+ } else {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ case 2:
++ case 3:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 4:
++ return;
++#endif
++
++ }
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]);
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
+ if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
+ goto bad_area;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/init.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -350,17 +350,17 @@
+
+ /* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */
+ protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE;
+- protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY;
+- protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY;
+- protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY;
++ protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++ protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
++ protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
+ protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY;
+ protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY;
+ protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE;
+- protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY;
+- protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED;
+- protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED;
++ protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
++ protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
++ protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
+ protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY;
+ protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2003-06-13 16:51:32.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2042,6 +2042,13 @@
+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED));
+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY));
+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY));
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC));
++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC));
++ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC));
++#endif
++
+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL));
+ page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL);
+ pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-10-20 18:59:00.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -312,3 +312,11 @@
+
+ source crypto/Config.in
+ source lib/Config.in
++
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Grsecurity'
++bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
++ source grsecurity/Config.in
++fi
++endmenu
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-20 18:58:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2047,7 +2047,11 @@
+ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
+ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (current->tty == tty || suser())
++#endif
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S 2003-06-13 16:51:32.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/itlb_base.S 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@
+ CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET2(%g4, %g6) ! Create VPTE offset
+ ldxa [%g3 + %g6] ASI_P, %g5 ! Load VPTE
+ 1: brgez,pn %g5, 3f ! Not valid, branch out
+- nop ! Delay-slot
++ and %g5, _PAGE_EXEC, %g4
++ brz,pn %g4, 3f ! Not executable, branch out
++ nop ! Delay-slot
+ 2: stxa %g5, [%g0] ASI_ITLB_DATA_IN ! Load PTE into TLB
+ retry ! Trap return
+ 3: rdpr %pstate, %g4 ! Move into alternate globals
+@@ -74,8 +76,6 @@
+ nop
+ nop
+ nop
+- nop
+- nop
+ CREATE_VPTE_NOP
+
+ #undef CREATE_VPTE_OFFSET1
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
+ #include <linux/user.h>
+ #include <linux/smp.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/asi.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -161,6 +162,11 @@
+ goto out;
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) {
++ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
+ || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
+ if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-08-25 13:44:40.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/ipc.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -63,6 +64,13 @@
+ task_size = 0xf0000000UL;
+ if (len > task_size || len > -PAGE_OFFSET)
+ return -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
++ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
++ else
++#endif
++
+ if (!addr)
+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+
+@@ -289,11 +297,22 @@
+ struct file * file = NULL;
+ unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
+ file = fget(fd);
+ if (!file)
+ goto out;
+ }
++
++ if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out_putf;
++ }
++
+ flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
+ len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
+ retval = -EINVAL;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2003-10-20 18:59:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
+ #include <linux/sysctl.h>
+ #include <linux/dnotify.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/types.h>
+ #include <asm/ipc.h>
+@@ -3235,8 +3237,18 @@
+ struct file * file;
+ int retval;
+ int i;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct file *old_exec_file;
++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+
+ bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++ bprm.p -= (get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
++#endif
++
+ memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES * sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
+
+ file = open_exec(filename);
+@@ -3245,6 +3257,20 @@
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return retval;
+
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes));
++
++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ bprm.file = file;
+ bprm.filename = filename;
+ bprm.sh_bang = 0;
+@@ -3265,11 +3291,24 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++ if(!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ bprm.exec = bprm.p;
++
++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+@@ -3278,11 +3317,32 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ old_acl = current->acl;
++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++ get_file(file);
++ current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs);
+- if (retval >= 0)
++ if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (old_exec_file)
++ fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ /* execve success */
+ return retval;
++ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ current->acl = old_acl;
++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ fput(current->exec_file);
++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
+ out:
+ /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
+ allow_write_access(bprm.file);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@
+ struct file *file = NULL;
+ unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ if(flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+ static int cnt;
+ if (cnt++ < 10)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/pagemap.h>
++#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -299,6 +302,267 @@
+ unhandled_fault (address, current, regs);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++}
++
++static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int write_access)
++{
++ struct page* page;
++ unsigned int *kaddr;
++
++ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
++ if (!page)
++ return page;
++
++ kaddr = kmap(page);
++ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
++ flush_dcache_page(page);
++ kunmap(page);
++ return page;
++}
++
++static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
++ close: pax_emuplt_close,
++ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage,
++};
++
++static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
++{
++ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
++ vma->vm_start = addr;
++ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
++ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
++ vma->vm_pgoff = 0UL;
++ vma->vm_file = NULL;
++ vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
++ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
++ ++current->mm->total_vm;
++}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address)
++ *
++ * returns 1 when task should be killed
++ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
++ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
++ */
++static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
++{
++ int err;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
++ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code)
++ {
++ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->tpc)
++ return 1;
++
++ regs->tpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
++ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code)
++ regs->tnpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
++ return 4;
++ }
++ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++ {
++ regs->tpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
++ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
++ regs->tnpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
++ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long addr;
++
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++ regs->tpc = addr;
++ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
++ unsigned int ba;
++
++ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++
++ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
++ unsigned long addr;
++
++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + (((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++ regs->tpc = addr;
++ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ }
++
++ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
++ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long addr;
++
++ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
++ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
++ regs->tpc = addr;
++ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++ return 2;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
++ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
++ (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long addr;
++ unsigned int save, call;
++
++ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
++
++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
++
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++
++ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
++ goto emulate;
++
++ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
++ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ goto emulate;
++ }
++
++ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
++ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++emulate:
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
++ regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve;
++ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ }
++ } while (0);
++
++ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
++ unsigned int save, call, nop;
++
++ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4));
++ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
++ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
++ if (err)
++ break;
++
++ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
++ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
++ nop == 0x01000000U)
++ {
++ unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
++
++ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc;
++ regs->tpc = dl_resolve;
++ regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4;
++ return 3;
++ }
++ } while (0);
++#endif
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
++{
++ unsigned long i;
++
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
++ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
++ unsigned int c;
++ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
++ printk("<invalid address>.");
++ break;
++ }
++ printk("%08x ", c);
++ }
++ printk("\n");
++}
++#endif
++
++
+ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+ {
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+@@ -338,6 +602,7 @@
+
+ if ((current->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT) != 0) {
+ regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
++ regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
+ address &= 0xffffffff;
+ }
+
+@@ -346,6 +611,34 @@
+ if (!vma)
+ goto bad_area;
+
++ /* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address &&
++ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB))
++ {
++ if (address != regs->tpc)
++ goto good_area;
++
++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ case 2:
++ case 3:
++ goto fault_done;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ case 4:
++ goto fault_done;
++#endif
++
++ }
++ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS));
++ do_exit(SIGKILL);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
+ * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
+ * was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@
+ struct file *file = NULL;
+ unsigned long retval, ret_type;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ /* Do we need it here? */
+ set_personality(PER_SVR4);
+ if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c 2003-10-20 18:58:58.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1933,7 +1933,11 @@
+ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
+ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (current->tty == tty || suser())
++#endif
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/keyboard.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2003-08-25 13:44:41.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -533,6 +533,16 @@
+ if ((kbd->kbdmode == VC_RAW || kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) &&
+ !(SPECIALS_ALLOWED_IN_RAW_MODE & (1 << value)))
+ return;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP)
++ {
++ void *func = spec_fn_table[value];
++ if (func == show_state || func == show_ptregs ||
++ func == show_mem)
++ return;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ spec_fn_table[value]();
+ }
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/mem.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-06-13 16:51:33.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <linux/raw.h>
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -41,6 +42,10 @@
+ #if defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE) && defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE_CHAR)
+ extern void tapechar_init(void);
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
++#endif
+
+ static ssize_t do_write_mem(struct file * file, void *p, unsigned long realp,
+ const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+@@ -114,6 +119,11 @@
+ unsigned long p = *ppos;
+ unsigned long end_mem;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ gr_handle_mem_write();
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ end_mem = __pa(high_memory);
+ if (p >= end_mem)
+ return 0;
+@@ -186,6 +196,12 @@
+ {
+ unsigned long offset = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma))
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
++
+ /*
+ * Accessing memory above the top the kernel knows about or
+ * through a file pointer that was marked O_SYNC will be
+@@ -285,6 +301,11 @@
+ ssize_t virtr = 0;
+ char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ gr_handle_kmem_write();
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
+ wrote = count;
+ if (count > (unsigned long) high_memory - p)
+@@ -401,7 +422,7 @@
+ count = size;
+
+ zap_page_range(mm, addr, count);
+- zeromap_page_range(addr, count, PAGE_COPY);
++ zeromap_page_range(addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot);
+
+ size -= count;
+ buf += count;
+@@ -517,6 +538,15 @@
+
+ static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ gr_handle_open_port();
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
++}
++
++static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
++{
+ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ }
+
+@@ -574,6 +604,11 @@
+ unsigned long offset = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma))
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * If the user is not attempting to mmap a high memory address then
+ * the standard mmap_mem mechanism will work. High memory addresses
+@@ -609,7 +644,6 @@
+ #define full_lseek null_lseek
+ #define write_zero write_null
+ #define read_full read_zero
+-#define open_mem open_port
+ #define open_kmem open_mem
+
+ static struct file_operations mem_fops = {
+@@ -685,6 +719,11 @@
+ case 9:
+ filp->f_op = &urandom_fops;
+ break;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ case 10:
++ filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
++ break;
++#endif
+ default:
+ return -ENXIO;
+ }
+@@ -711,7 +750,10 @@
+ {5, "zero", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &zero_fops},
+ {7, "full", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &full_fops},
+ {8, "random", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &random_fops},
+- {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops}
++ {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops},
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ {10,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops}
++#endif
+ };
+ int i;
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/random.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/random.c 2003-08-25 13:44:41.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/random.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -262,9 +262,15 @@
+ /*
+ * Configuration information
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024
++#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256
++#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512
++#else
+ #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
+ #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
+ #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
++#endif
+ #define USE_SHA
+
+ /*
+@@ -389,6 +395,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Static global variables
+ */
++
+ static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
+ static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
+ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
+@@ -2202,6 +2209,29 @@
+ return halfMD4Transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++/* the following function is provided by PaX under the GPL */
++unsigned long get_random_long(void)
++{
++ static time_t rekey_time;
++ static __u32 secret[12];
++ time_t t;
++
++ /*
++ * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds
++ */
++ t = CURRENT_TIME;
++ if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
++ rekey_time = t;
++ get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
++ }
++
++ secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++ secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
++ return *(unsigned long *)secret;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
+ /*
+ * Secure SYN cookie computation. This is the algorithm worked out by
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/tty_io.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/tty_io.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/tty_io.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/tty_io.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
+ #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
+ #include <linux/selection.h>
+ #include <linux/devfs_fs_kernel.h>
+-
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <linux/kmod.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_VT
+@@ -1425,7 +1425,11 @@
+ retval = -ENODEV;
+ filp->f_flags = saved_flags;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !suser())
++#endif
+ retval = -EBUSY;
+
+ if (retval) {
+@@ -1532,7 +1536,11 @@
+ {
+ char ch, mbz = 0;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if ((current->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if ((current->tty != tty) && !suser())
++#endif
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (get_user(ch, arg))
+ return -EFAULT;
+@@ -1570,7 +1578,11 @@
+ if (inode->i_rdev == SYSCONS_DEV ||
+ inode->i_rdev == CONSOLE_DEV) {
+ struct file *f;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (!suser())
++#endif
+ return -EPERM;
+ spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
+ f = redirect;
+@@ -1622,7 +1634,11 @@
+ * This tty is already the controlling
+ * tty for another session group!
+ */
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if ((arg == 1) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
++#else
+ if ((arg == 1) && suser()) {
++#endif
+ /*
+ * Steal it away
+ */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/vt.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/vt.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/char/vt.c 2002-11-29 00:53:12.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/char/vt.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
+ #include <linux/kbd_diacr.h>
+ #include <linux/selection.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_FB_COMPAT_XPMAC
+ #include <asm/vc_ioctl.h>
+@@ -443,7 +444,11 @@
+ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
+ */
+ perm = 0;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (current->tty == tty || suser())
++#endif
+ perm = 1;
+
+ kbd = kbd_table + console;
+@@ -1038,12 +1043,20 @@
+ return do_unimap_ioctl(cmd, (struct unimapdesc *)arg, perm);
+
+ case VT_LOCKSWITCH:
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (!suser())
++#endif
+ return -EPERM;
+ vt_dont_switch = 1;
+ return 0;
+ case VT_UNLOCKSWITCH:
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
++#else
+ if (!suser())
++#endif
+ return -EPERM;
+ vt_dont_switch = 0;
+ return 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/pci/proc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/drivers/pci/proc.c 2002-11-29 00:53:14.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/drivers/pci/proc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -562,7 +562,15 @@
+ pci_for_each_dev(dev) {
+ pci_proc_attach_device(dev);
+ }
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL);
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
++#endif
++#else
+ entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL);
++#endif
+ if (entry)
+ entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/binfmt_aout.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2001-11-03 02:39:20.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
+ */
+
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/config.h>
+
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel.h>
+@@ -113,10 +114,12 @@
+ /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
+ if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize);
+ if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) >
+ current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ dump.u_dsize = 0;
+ #else
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE);
+ if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
+ current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ dump.u_dsize = 0;
+@@ -124,10 +127,12 @@
+
+ /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
+ #ifdef __sparc__
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize);
+ if ((dump.u_ssize) >
+ current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ dump.u_ssize = 0;
+ #else
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE);
+ if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
+ current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
+ dump.u_ssize = 0;
+@@ -276,6 +281,8 @@
+ rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
+ if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
+ rlim = ~0;
++
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
+ if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+@@ -307,6 +314,24 @@
+ current->mm->mmap = NULL;
+ compute_creds(bprm);
+ current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++ }
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef __sparc__
+ if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
+ loff_t pos = fd_offset;
+@@ -393,7 +418,7 @@
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
+- PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
++ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
+ fd_offset + ex.a_text);
+ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+
++#include <linux/config.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/stat.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+@@ -33,10 +34,13 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/compiler.h>
+ #include <linux/highmem.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/param.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
++#include <asm/system.h>
+
+ #define DLINFO_ITEMS 13
+
+@@ -86,6 +90,12 @@
+ if (end <= start)
+ return;
+ do_brk(start, end - start);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGEALIGN(start + current->mm->delta_exec), 0UL, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, start);
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+
+@@ -445,6 +455,11 @@
+ struct exec interp_ex;
+ char passed_fileno[6];
+ struct files_struct *files;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ unsigned long load_addr_random = 0UL;
++ unsigned long load_bias_random = 0UL;
++#endif
+
+ /* Get the exec-header */
+ elf_ex = *((struct elfhdr *) bprm->buf);
+@@ -617,7 +632,63 @@
+ current->mm->end_data = 0;
+ current->mm->end_code = 0;
+ current->mm->mmap = NULL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++ current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL;
++ current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL;
++ current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL;
++#endif
++
+ current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
++#endif
++
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if (!(elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ if (elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++ if (!(elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP)) {
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++
++#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb))
++
++ current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current));
++ current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current));
++ current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current));
++ }
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if ((elf_ex.e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC) &&
++ (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)))
++ current->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++ gr_set_pax_flags(current);
++
+ elf_entry = (unsigned long) elf_ex.e_entry;
+
+ /* Do this so that we can load the interpreter, if need be. We will
+@@ -673,11 +744,84 @@
+ base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec. This
+ is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable. */
+ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ /* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
++ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec);
++ elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ }
+
+- error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
+- if (BAD_ADDR(error))
+- continue;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC)) {
++ unsigned long addr, len;
++
++ error = -ENOMEM;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot & ~PROT_EXEC, elf_flags);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++ addr = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr);
++ len = elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr);
++ if (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)
++ continue;
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ error = do_mmap_pgoff(bprm->file, addr, len, elf_prot, elf_flags, (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ if (BAD_ADDR(error))
++ continue;
++
++ /* PaX: mirror at a randomized base */
++ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++
++ if (!load_addr_set) {
++ load_addr_random = get_unmapped_area(bprm->file, 0UL, elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAP_PRIVATE);
++ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ continue;
++ }
++ load_bias_random = load_addr_random - vaddr;
++ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
++ if (elf_prot & PROT_EXEC) {
++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), elf_ppnt->p_memsz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, 0UL);
++ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random))
++ load_addr_random -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
++ }
++ } else
++ load_addr_random = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
++ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random))
++ continue;
++ } else
++#endif
++ {
++ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
++ if (BAD_ADDR(error))
++ continue;
++ }
+
+ if (!load_addr_set) {
+ load_addr_set = 1;
+@@ -687,6 +831,11 @@
+ ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr);
+ load_addr += load_bias;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ current->mm->delta_exec = load_addr_random - load_addr;
++#endif
++
+ }
+ k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
+ if (k < start_code) start_code = k;
+@@ -713,6 +862,18 @@
+ start_data += load_bias;
+ end_data += load_bias;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ elf_brk += pax_delta_mask(get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT);
++#undef pax_delta_mask
++#endif
++
++ /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
++ * for the bss and break sections
++ */
++ set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);
++
++ padzero(elf_bss);
++
+ if (elf_interpreter) {
+ if (interpreter_type == INTERPRETER_AOUT)
+ elf_entry = load_aout_interp(&interp_ex,
+@@ -760,13 +921,6 @@
+ current->mm->end_data = end_data;
+ current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;
+
+- /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
+- * for the bss and break sections
+- */
+- set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);
+-
+- padzero(elf_bss);
+-
+ #if 0
+ printk("(start_brk) %lx\n" , (long) current->mm->start_brk);
+ printk("(end_code) %lx\n" , (long) current->mm->end_code);
+@@ -799,6 +953,10 @@
+ ELF_PLAT_INIT(regs);
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ pax_switch_segments(current);
++#endif
++
+ start_thread(regs, elf_entry, bprm->p);
+ if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
+ send_sig(SIGTRAP, current, 0);
+@@ -1026,8 +1184,11 @@
+ #undef DUMP_SEEK
+
+ #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \
++ do { \
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr)); \
+ if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
+- goto end_coredump;
++ goto end_coredump; \
++ } while (0);
+ #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \
+ if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
+ goto end_coredump;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/buffer.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/buffer.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/buffer.c 2003-10-20 18:59:08.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/buffer.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1890,6 +1890,9 @@
+ int err;
+
+ err = -EFBIG;
++
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size);
++
+ limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
+ if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
+ send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/exec.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/exec.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/exec.c 2003-08-25 13:44:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/exec.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
++#include <linux/major.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
+ #include <linux/kmod.h>
+@@ -345,6 +348,11 @@
+ mpnt->vm_start = PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long) bprm->p;
+ mpnt->vm_end = STACK_TOP;
+ mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
++ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_EXEC) & 0x7];
++ else
++#endif
+ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[VM_STACK_FLAGS & 0x7];
+ mpnt->vm_ops = NULL;
+ mpnt->vm_pgoff = 0;
+@@ -610,6 +618,30 @@
+ }
+ current->comm[i] = '\0';
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++#endif
++
+ flush_thread();
+
+ de_thread(current);
+@@ -709,6 +741,9 @@
+ cap_set_full(bprm->cap_effective);
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_ptrace_exec(bprm->file->f_dentry, bprm->file->f_vfsmnt))
++ return -EACCES;
++
+ memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
+ return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
+ }
+@@ -774,6 +809,8 @@
+ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
+ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
+
++ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
+ if(do_unlock)
+ unlock_kernel();
+ current->keep_capabilities = 0;
+@@ -907,6 +944,11 @@
+ struct file *file;
+ int retval;
+ int i;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct file *old_exec_file;
++ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
++ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
++#endif
+
+ file = open_exec(filename);
+
+@@ -914,7 +956,26 @@
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return retval;
+
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes));
++
++ if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
++ allow_write_access(file);
++ fput(file);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++ bprm.p -= (get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
++#endif
++
+ memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
+
+ bprm.file = file;
+@@ -938,11 +999,26 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if(gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ bprm.exec = bprm.p;
++
++ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++ gr_handle_exec_args(&bprm, argv);
++
+ retval = copy_strings(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+@@ -951,11 +1027,32 @@
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ old_acl = current->acl;
++ memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
++ get_file(file);
++ current->exec_file = file;
++#endif
++
++ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
++
+ retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
+- if (retval >= 0)
++ if (retval >= 0) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (old_exec_file)
++ fput(old_exec_file);
++#endif
+ /* execve success */
+ return retval;
++ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ current->acl = old_acl;
++ memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
++ fput(current->exec_file);
++ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
++#endif
+ out:
+ /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
+ allow_write_access(bprm.file);
+@@ -1097,6 +1194,43 @@
+ *out_ptr = 0;
+ }
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp)
++{
++ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
++ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
++ char* buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
++ char* path=NULL;
++
++ if (buffer) {
++ struct vm_area_struct* vma;
++
++ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ vma = mm->mmap;
++ while (vma) {
++ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
++ break;
++ }
++ vma = vma->vm_next;
++ }
++ if (vma)
++ path = d_path(vma->vm_file->f_dentry, vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
++ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
++ }
++ if (tsk->curr_ip)
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
++ "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), path, tsk->comm, tsk->pid,
++ tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
++ else
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
++ "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path, tsk->comm, tsk->pid,
++ tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
++ if (buffer) free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
++ pax_report_insns(pc);
++ do_coredump(SIGKILL, regs);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int do_coredump(long signr, struct pt_regs * regs)
+ {
+ struct linux_binfmt * binfmt;
+@@ -1112,6 +1246,7 @@
+ if (!is_dumpable(current))
+ goto fail;
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump);
+ if (current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump)
+ goto fail;
+
+@@ -1131,7 +1266,7 @@
+ goto close_fail;
+ if (!file->f_op->write)
+ goto close_fail;
+- if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0)
++ if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0)
+ goto close_fail;
+
+ retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/fcntl.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/fcntl.c 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/fcntl.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/iobuf.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/poll.h>
+ #include <asm/siginfo.h>
+@@ -64,6 +65,8 @@
+ int error;
+ int start;
+
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start);
++
+ write_lock(&files->file_lock);
+
+ error = -EINVAL;
+@@ -86,6 +89,7 @@
+ }
+
+ error = -EMFILE;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd);
+ if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -141,6 +145,8 @@
+ struct file * file, *tofree;
+ struct files_struct * files = current->files;
+
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd);
++
+ write_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
+ goto out_unlock;
+@@ -448,6 +454,10 @@
+ match = -p->pgrp;
+ if (pid != match)
+ continue;
++ if (gr_check_protected_task(p))
++ continue;
++ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
++ continue;
+ send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
+ }
+ out:
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/locks.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/locks.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/locks.c 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/locks.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
+ static struct file_lock *locks_alloc_lock(int account)
+ {
+ struct file_lock *fl;
++ if(account) gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_LOCKS, current->locks);
+ if (account && current->locks >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_LOCKS].rlim_cur)
+ return NULL;
+ fl = kmem_cache_alloc(filelock_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/namei.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/namei.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/namei.c 2003-10-20 18:59:08.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/namei.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <linux/dnotify.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/namei.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+@@ -343,6 +344,13 @@
+ current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
+ schedule();
+ }
++
++ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
++ dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++ path_release(nd);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ current->link_count++;
+ current->total_link_count++;
+ UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
+@@ -643,6 +651,10 @@
+ }
+ }
+ return_base:
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++ path_release(nd);
++ return -ENOENT;
++ }
+ return 0;
+ out_dput:
+ dput(dentry);
+@@ -1005,7 +1017,7 @@
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct dentry *dir;
+ int count = 0;
+-
++
+ acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
+
+ /*
+@@ -1015,7 +1027,19 @@
+ error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag), nd);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
++
++ if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ goto exit;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto exit;
++ }
++
+ dentry = nd->dentry;
++
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
+@@ -1050,7 +1074,16 @@
+ if (!dentry->d_inode) {
+ if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
+ mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++ goto exit_dput;
++ }
++
+ error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++ if (!error)
++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt);
++
+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
+ dput(nd->dentry);
+ nd->dentry = dentry;
+@@ -1059,12 +1092,35 @@
+ /* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */
+ acc_mode = 0;
+ flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
++
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It already exists.
+ */
++
++ if (gr_acl_is_enabled() && S_ISBLK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
++ !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++ goto exit_dput;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++ goto exit_dput;
++ }
++
++ inode = dentry->d_inode;
++
++ if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
++ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto exit_dput;
++ }
++
+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
+
+ error = -EEXIST;
+@@ -1154,7 +1210,7 @@
+ if (!error) {
+ DQUOT_INIT(inode);
+
+- error = do_truncate(dentry, 0);
++ error = do_truncate(dentry,0,nd->mnt);
+ }
+ put_write_access(inode);
+ if (error)
+@@ -1185,6 +1241,13 @@
+ * stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
+ * are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
+ */
++
++ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode,
++ dentry, nd->mnt)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto exit_dput;
++ }
++
+ UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
+ error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
+ dput(dentry);
+@@ -1284,6 +1347,18 @@
+ if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
+ mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ dput(dentry);
++ goto out_dput;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ dput(dentry);
++ goto out_dput;
++ }
++
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case 0: case S_IFREG:
+ error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode);
+@@ -1297,8 +1372,13 @@
+ default:
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ }
++
++ if(!error)
++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
++out_dput:
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+ path_release(&nd);
+ out:
+@@ -1352,7 +1432,16 @@
+ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
+ mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
+- error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++ error = 0;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
++ error = -EACCES;
++
++ if(!error)
++ error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
++ if(!error)
++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1436,6 +1525,8 @@
+ char * name;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct nameidata nd;
++ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++ kdev_t saved_dev = 0;
+
+ name = getname(pathname);
+ if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -1460,7 +1551,22 @@
+ dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
+ error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+- error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++ error = 0;
++ if (dentry->d_inode) {
++ if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++ saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++ saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt))
++ error = -EACCES;
++ }
++
++ if (!error)
++ error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++ if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
++ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev);
++
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1505,6 +1611,8 @@
+ char * name;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct nameidata nd;
++ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
++ kdev_t saved_dev = 0;
+
+ name = getname(pathname);
+ if(IS_ERR(name))
+@@ -1523,7 +1631,21 @@
+ /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
+ if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
+ goto slashes;
+- error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++ error = 0;
++ if (dentry->d_inode) {
++ if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
++ saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++ saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt))
++ error = -EACCES;
++ }
++
++ if (!error)
++ error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
++ if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
++ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev);
+ exit2:
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+@@ -1587,7 +1709,15 @@
+ dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
+ error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+- error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
++ error = 0;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from))
++ error = -EACCES;
++
++ if(!error)
++ error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
++ if (!error)
++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1671,7 +1801,27 @@
+ new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
+ error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
+ if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
+- error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
++ error = 0;
++
++ if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt,
++ old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
++ old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ goto out_error;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt,
++ old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto out_error;
++ }
++
++ error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry,
++ nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
++
++ if (!error)
++ gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt);
++out_error:
+ dput(new_dentry);
+ }
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+@@ -1907,10 +2057,15 @@
+ if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
+ goto exit4;
+
+- lock_kernel();
+- error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
++ error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt,
++ old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt, newname);
++
++ if (error == 1) {
++ lock_kernel();
++ error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
+ new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
+- unlock_kernel();
++ unlock_kernel();
++ }
+
+ dput(new_dentry);
+ exit4:
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/namespace.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/namespace.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/namespace.c 2003-06-13 16:51:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/namespace.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
+ #include <linux/quotaops.h>
+ #include <linux/acct.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -325,6 +327,8 @@
+ lock_kernel();
+ retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, 0);
+ unlock_kernel();
++
++ gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
+ }
+ up_write(&sb->s_umount);
+ return retval;
+@@ -350,6 +354,9 @@
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+ up_write(¤t->namespace->sem);
++
++ gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
++
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+@@ -729,6 +736,12 @@
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) {
++ retval = -EPERM;
++ path_release(&nd);
++ return retval;
++ }
++
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
+ data_page);
+@@ -740,6 +753,9 @@
+ retval = do_add_mount(&nd, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
+ dev_name, data_page);
+ path_release(&nd);
++
++ gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
++
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+@@ -909,6 +925,9 @@
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ lock_kernel();
+
+ error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_POSITIVE|LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/open.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/open.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/open.c 2003-08-25 13:44:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/open.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
+ #include <linux/iobuf.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@
+ write_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+ }
+
+-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length)
++int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+ {
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ int error;
+@@ -105,6 +106,9 @@
+ if (length < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt))
++ return -EACCES;
++
+ down_write(&inode->i_alloc_sem);
+ down(&inode->i_sem);
+ newattrs.ia_size = length;
+@@ -165,7 +169,7 @@
+ error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
+ if (!error) {
+ DQUOT_INIT(inode);
+- error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length);
++ error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt);
+ }
+ put_write_access(inode);
+
+@@ -217,7 +221,7 @@
+
+ error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
+ if (!error)
+- error = do_truncate(dentry, length);
++ error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt);
+ out_putf:
+ fput(file);
+ out:
+@@ -286,6 +290,12 @@
+ (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
+ goto dput_and_out;
+ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto dput_and_out;
++ }
++
+ error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+ dput_and_out:
+ path_release(&nd);
+@@ -331,6 +341,12 @@
+ (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
+ goto dput_and_out;
+ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto dput_and_out;
++ }
++
+ error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+ dput_and_out:
+ path_release(&nd);
+@@ -373,6 +389,10 @@
+ if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
+ && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ res = -EROFS;
++
++ if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode))
++ res = -EACCES;
++
+ path_release(&nd);
+ }
+
+@@ -396,6 +416,8 @@
+ if (error)
+ goto dput_and_out;
+
++ gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
+
+ dput_and_out:
+@@ -426,6 +448,13 @@
+ goto out_putf;
+
+ error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
++
++ if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt))
++ error = -EPERM;
++
++ if (!error)
++ gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt);
++
+ if (!error)
+ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
+ out_putf:
+@@ -452,8 +481,16 @@
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ goto dput_and_out;
+
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
++ goto dput_and_out;
++
+ set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
+ set_fs_altroot();
++
++ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
++
++ gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ error = 0;
+ dput_and_out:
+ path_release(&nd);
+@@ -482,8 +519,20 @@
+ err = -EPERM;
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ goto out_putf;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
++ err = -EACCES;
++ goto out_putf;
++ }
++
+ if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
++ err = -EPERM;
++ goto out_putf;
++ }
++
+ newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -514,8 +563,19 @@
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ goto dput_and_out;
+
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto dput_and_out;
++ }
++
+ if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
+ mode = inode->i_mode;
++
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto dput_and_out;
++ }
++
+ newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
+ newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
+ error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
+@@ -526,7 +586,7 @@
+ return error;
+ }
+
+-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
++static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+ {
+ struct inode * inode;
+ int error;
+@@ -543,6 +603,12 @@
+ error = -EPERM;
+ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
+ goto out;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ if (user == (uid_t) -1)
+ user = inode->i_uid;
+ if (group == (gid_t) -1)
+@@ -593,7 +659,7 @@
+
+ error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
+ if (!error) {
+- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
++ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
+ path_release(&nd);
+ }
+ return error;
+@@ -606,7 +672,7 @@
+
+ error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
+ if (!error) {
+- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
++ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
+ path_release(&nd);
+ }
+ return error;
+@@ -620,7 +686,8 @@
+
+ file = fget(fd);
+ if (file) {
+- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
++ error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user,
++ group, file->f_vfsmnt);
+ fput(file);
+ }
+ return error;
+@@ -740,6 +807,7 @@
+ * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
+ * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
+ */
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd);
+ if (fd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
+ goto out;
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/array.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/array.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/array.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -297,6 +297,12 @@
+ return buffer - orig;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
++ task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \
++ task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#endif
++
+ int proc_pid_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
+ {
+ unsigned long vsize, eip, esp, wchan;
+@@ -334,6 +340,19 @@
+
+ wchan = get_wchan(task);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++ if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS) {
++ eip = 0;
++ esp = 0;
++ wchan = 0;
++ }
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++ wchan = 0;
++ eip = 0;
++ esp = 0;
++#endif
++
+ collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch);
+
+ /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
+@@ -372,9 +391,15 @@
+ vsize,
+ mm ? mm->rss : 0, /* you might want to shift this left 3 */
+ task->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur,
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0),
++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0),
++ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0),
++#else
+ mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
+ mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
+ mm ? mm->start_stack : 0,
++#endif
+ esp,
+ eip,
+ /* The signal information here is obsolete.
+@@ -540,7 +565,12 @@
+ #define MAPS_LINE_FORMAT (sizeof(void*) == 4 ? MAPS_LINE_FORMAT4 : MAPS_LINE_FORMAT8)
+ #define MAPS_LINE_MAX (sizeof(void*) == 4 ? MAPS_LINE_MAX4 : MAPS_LINE_MAX8)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++static int proc_pid_maps_get_line (char *buf, struct vm_area_struct *map,
++ struct task_struct *task)
++#else
+ static int proc_pid_maps_get_line (char *buf, struct vm_area_struct *map)
++#endif
+ {
+ /* produce the next line */
+ char *line;
+@@ -575,6 +605,16 @@
+ } else
+ line = buf;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++ if (task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP ||
++ task->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ||
++ task->flags & PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ len = sprintf(line,
++ MAPS_LINE_FORMAT,
++ 0UL, 0UL, str, 0UL,
++ kdevname(dev), ino);
++ else
++#endif
+ len = sprintf(line,
+ MAPS_LINE_FORMAT,
+ map->vm_start, map->vm_end, str, map->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
+@@ -640,7 +680,11 @@
+ off -= PAGE_SIZE;
+ goto next;
+ }
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++ len = proc_pid_maps_get_line(tmp, map, task);
++#else
+ len = proc_pid_maps_get_line(tmp, map);
++#endif
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ len -= off;
+@@ -683,6 +727,16 @@
+ return retval;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
++{
++ int len;
++
++ len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
++ return len;
++}
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
+ {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/base.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/base.c 2003-08-25 13:44:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/base.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <linux/string.h>
+ #include <linux/seq_file.h>
+ #include <linux/namespace.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ /*
+ * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
+@@ -41,6 +42,9 @@
+ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct*,char*);
+ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct*,char*);
+ int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct*,char*);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
++#endif
+
+ static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vfsmount **mnt)
+ {
+@@ -264,9 +268,22 @@
+
+ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+ {
++ int ret;
++ struct task_struct *task;
++
+ if (vfs_permission(inode, mask) != 0)
+ return -EACCES;
+- return proc_check_root(inode);
++ ret = proc_check_root(inode);
++
++ if (ret)
++ return ret;
++
++ task = inode->u.proc_i.task;
++
++ if (!task)
++ return 0;
++
++ return gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task);
+ }
+
+ static ssize_t pid_maps_read(struct file * file, char * buf,
+@@ -576,6 +593,9 @@
+ PROC_PID_STATM,
+ PROC_PID_MAPS,
+ PROC_PID_CPU,
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++ PROC_PID_IPADDR,
++#endif
+ PROC_PID_MOUNTS,
+ PROC_PID_FD_DIR = 0x8000, /* 0x8000-0xffff */
+ };
+@@ -591,6 +611,9 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ E(PROC_PID_CPU, "cpu", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++ E(PROC_PID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
++#endif
+ E(PROC_PID_MAPS, "maps", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
+ E(PROC_PID_MEM, "mem", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
+ E(PROC_PID_CWD, "cwd", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
+@@ -747,10 +770,17 @@
+ get_task_struct(task);
+ inode->u.proc_i.task = task;
+ inode->i_uid = 0;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ inode->i_gid = 0;
++#endif
++
+ if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
+ inode->i_uid = task->euid;
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+ inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ }
+
+ out:
+@@ -958,6 +988,12 @@
+ inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_cpu;
+ break;
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++ case PROC_PID_IPADDR:
++ inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
++ inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr;
++ break;
++#endif
+ case PROC_PID_MEM:
+ inode->i_op = &proc_mem_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &proc_mem_operations;
+@@ -1056,13 +1092,34 @@
+ if (!task)
+ goto out;
+
++ if(gr_check_hidden_task(task)) {
++ free_task_struct(task);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++ ) {
++ free_task_struct(task);
++ goto out;
++ }
++#endif
+ inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_PID_INO);
+
+ free_task_struct(task);
+
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
++#else
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
++#endif
+ inode->i_op = &proc_base_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &proc_base_operations;
+ inode->i_nlink = 3;
+@@ -1102,6 +1159,18 @@
+ int pid = p->pid;
+ if (!pid)
+ continue;
++ if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
++ continue;
++ if(gr_check_hidden_task(p))
++ continue;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ if (current->uid && (p->uid != current->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++ )
++ continue;
++#endif
+ if (--index >= 0)
+ continue;
+ pids[nr_pids] = pid;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/generic.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/generic.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/generic.c 2003-06-13 16:51:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/generic.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -503,6 +503,32 @@
+ return ent;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
++{
++ struct proc_dir_entry *ent;
++ mode_t mode = 0;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR;
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP;
++#endif
++
++ ent = proc_create(&parent, name, mode, 2);
++ if (ent) {
++ ent->proc_fops = &proc_dir_operations;
++ ent->proc_iops = &proc_dir_inode_operations;
++
++ if (proc_register(parent, ent) < 0) {
++ kfree(ent);
++ ent = NULL;
++ }
++ }
++ return ent;
++}
++#endif
++
+ struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_entry(const char *name, mode_t mode,
+ struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
+ {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/inode.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/inode.c 2003-06-13 16:51:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/inode.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -152,7 +152,11 @@
+ if (de->mode) {
+ inode->i_mode = de->mode;
+ inode->i_uid = de->uid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ inode->i_gid = de->gid;
++#endif
+ }
+ if (de->size)
+ inode->i_size = de->size;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -569,6 +569,7 @@
+ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ {
+ struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
++ int gr_mode = 0;
+ static struct {
+ char *name;
+ int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
+@@ -583,48 +584,81 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC
+ {"stram", stram_read_proc},
+ #endif
+-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
++#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC)
+ {"modules", modules_read_proc},
+ #endif
+ {"stat", kstat_read_proc},
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ {"devices", devices_read_proc},
+-#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
++#endif
++#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
+ {"interrupts", interrupts_read_proc},
+ #endif
+ {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ {"dma", dma_read_proc},
+ {"ioports", ioports_read_proc},
+ {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc},
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286
+ {"rtc", ds1286_read_proc},
+ #endif
+ {"locks", locks_read_proc},
+ {"swaps", swaps_read_proc},
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ {"iomem", memory_read_proc},
++#endif
+ {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
+ {NULL,}
+ };
+ for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
+ create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
++#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) && defined(CONFIG_MODULES)
++ create_proc_read_entry("modules", gr_mode, NULL, &modules_read_proc, NULL);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++ create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL);
++ create_proc_read_entry("dma", gr_mode, NULL, &dma_read_proc, NULL);
++ create_proc_read_entry("ioports", gr_mode, NULL, &ioports_read_proc, NULL);
++ create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
++ create_proc_read_entry("iomem", gr_mode, NULL, &memory_read_proc, NULL);
++#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
++ create_proc_read_entry("interrupts", gr_mode, NULL, &interrupts_read_proc, NULL);
++#endif
++#endif
++
+ proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
+
+ /* And now for trickier ones */
+ entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
+ if (entry)
+ entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++ create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
++ create_seq_entry("slabinfo", gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#else
+ create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
+- create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
+ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
++#endif
++ create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
+ #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+- create_seq_entry("ksyms", 0, &proc_ksyms_operations);
++ create_seq_entry("ksyms", gr_mode, &proc_ksyms_operations);
+ #endif
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
+ if (proc_root_kcore) {
+ proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
+ proc_root_kcore->size =
+ (size_t)high_memory - PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (prof_shift) {
+ entry = create_proc_entry("profile", S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO, NULL);
+ if (entry) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/proc_tty.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/proc_tty.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/proc_tty.c 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/proc_tty.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -174,7 +174,11 @@
+ if (!proc_mkdir("tty", 0))
+ return;
+ proc_tty_ldisc = proc_mkdir("tty/ldisc", 0);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ proc_tty_driver = proc_priv_mkdir("tty/driver", 0);
++#else
+ proc_tty_driver = proc_mkdir("tty/driver", 0);
++#endif
+
+ create_proc_read_entry("tty/ldiscs", 0, 0, tty_ldiscs_read_proc,NULL);
+ create_proc_read_entry("tty/drivers", 0, 0, tty_drivers_read_proc,NULL);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/root.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/proc/root.c 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/proc/root.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -37,13 +37,21 @@
+ return;
+ }
+ proc_misc_init();
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ proc_net = proc_priv_mkdir("net", 0);
++#else
+ proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", 0);
++#endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
+ proc_mkdir("sysvipc", 0);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++ proc_sys_root = proc_priv_mkdir("sys", 0);
++#else
+ proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", 0);
+ #endif
++#endif
+ #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE)
+ proc_mkdir("sys/fs", 0);
+ proc_mkdir("sys/fs/binfmt_misc", 0);
+@@ -67,7 +75,12 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_RTAS
+ proc_rtas_init();
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++ proc_bus = proc_priv_mkdir("bus", 0);
++#else
+ proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", 0);
++#endif
+ }
+
+ static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/fs/readdir.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/readdir.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/fs/readdir.c 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/fs/readdir.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
+ #include <linux/stat.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@
+ struct readdir_callback {
+ struct old_linux_dirent * dirent;
+ int count;
++ struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+
+ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -191,6 +193,10 @@
+
+ if (buf->count)
+ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++ return 0;
++
+ buf->count++;
+ dirent = buf->dirent;
+ put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino);
+@@ -215,6 +221,9 @@
+ buf.count = 0;
+ buf.dirent = dirent;
+
++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++
+ error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
+ if (error >= 0)
+ error = buf.count;
+@@ -242,6 +251,7 @@
+ struct linux_dirent * previous;
+ int count;
+ int error;
++ struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+
+ static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -254,6 +264,10 @@
+ buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
+ if (reclen > buf->count)
+ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++ return 0;
++
+ dirent = buf->previous;
+ if (dirent)
+ put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off);
+@@ -286,6 +300,9 @@
+ buf.count = count;
+ buf.error = 0;
+
++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++
+ error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto out_putf;
+@@ -320,6 +337,7 @@
+ struct linux_dirent64 * previous;
+ int count;
+ int error;
++ struct nameidata nd;
+ };
+
+ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
+@@ -332,6 +350,10 @@
+ buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
+ if (reclen > buf->count)
+ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
++ return 0;
++
+ dirent = buf->previous;
+ if (dirent) {
+ d.d_off = offset;
+@@ -369,6 +391,9 @@
+ buf.count = count;
+ buf.error = 0;
+
++ buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
++ buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
++
+ error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto out_putf;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/Config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/Config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/Config.in 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/Config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
++define_bool CONFIG_CRYPTO y
++define_bool CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256 y
++choice 'Security level' \
++ "Low CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW \
++ Medium CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID \
++ High CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI \
++ Customized CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" Customized
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT n
++if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT n
++fi
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
++
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
++fi
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT n
++if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT n
++fi
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
++
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP y
++fi
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI" = "y" ]; then
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y
++
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
++define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
++
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS n
++if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
++if [ "$CONFIG_MODULES" = "n" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC y
++fi
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP n
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT n
++fi
++if [ "$CONFIG_PARISC" = "y" ]; then
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP y
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT y
++fi
++define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT y
++fi
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" = "y" ]; then
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Address Space Protection'
++bool 'Enforce non-executable pages' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC" = "y" ]; then
++ bool 'Paging based non-executable pages' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++ bool 'Segmentation based non-executable pages' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ fi
++ if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_PARISC" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_PPC32" = "y" ]; then
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Emulate trampolines' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT
++ fi
++ fi
++ fi
++ bool ' Restrict mprotect()' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT" = "y" ]; then
++ if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Disallow ELF text relocations (DANGEROUS)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++ else
++ if [ "$CONFIG_ALPHA" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_PARISC" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++ fi
++ if [ "$CONFIG_PPC32" = "y" ]; then
++ define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SYSCALL y
++ fi
++ if [ "$CONFIG_ALPHA" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_PARISC" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_SPARC32" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_SPARC64" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_PPC32" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Automatically emulate ELF PLT' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUPLT" = "y" ]; then
++ if [ "$CONFIG_SPARC32" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_SPARC64" = "y" ]; then
++ define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_DLRESOLVE y
++ fi
++ fi
++ fi
++ fi
++ fi
++fi
++if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" -a "$CONFIG_MODULES" = "n" ]; then
++ bool 'Enforce non-executable kernel pages' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_KERNEXEC
++fi
++bool 'Address Space Layout Randomization' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR" = "y" ]; then
++ if [ "$CONFIG_X86_TSC" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Randomize kernel stack base' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDKSTACK
++ fi
++ bool ' Randomize user stack base' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++ bool ' Randomize mmap() base' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP" = "y" -a "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOEXEC" = "y" ]; then
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC" = "y" -o "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC" = "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Randomize ET_EXEC base' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ fi
++ fi
++fi
++bool 'Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
++if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
++ bool 'Disable privileged I/O' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO" = "y" ]; then
++ define_bool CONFIG_RTC y
++ fi
++fi
++bool 'Remove addresses from /proc/pid/[maps|stat]' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
++bool 'Hide kernel symbols' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++endmenu
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Role Based Access Control Options'
++bool 'Hide kernel processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++int 'Maximum tries before password lockout' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
++int 'Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
++endmenu
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Filesystem Protections'
++bool 'Proc restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC" != "n" ]; then
++ bool ' Restrict to user only' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "y" ]; then
++ bool ' Allow special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then
++ int ' GID for special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 1001
++ fi
++ fi
++ if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "n" -o "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then
++ bool ' Additional restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
++ fi
++fi
++bool 'Linking restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++bool 'FIFO restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++bool 'Chroot jail restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT" != "n" ]; then
++bool ' Deny mounts' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++bool ' Deny double-chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++bool ' Deny pivot_root in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++bool ' Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++bool ' Deny (f)chmod +s' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++bool ' Deny fchdir out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++bool ' Deny mknod' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++bool ' Deny shmat() out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++bool ' Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++bool ' Protect outside processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++bool ' Restrict priority changes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++bool ' Deny sysctl writes in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++bool ' Capability restrictions within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++fi
++endmenu
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Kernel Auditing'
++bool 'Single group for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP" != "n" ]; then
++int ' GID for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID 1007
++fi
++bool 'Exec logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++bool 'Resource logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++bool 'Log execs within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++bool 'Chdir logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++bool '(Un)Mount logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++bool 'IPC logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++bool 'Signal logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++bool 'Fork failure logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++bool 'Time change logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++bool '/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++endmenu
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Executable Protections'
++bool 'Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++bool 'Dmesg(8) restriction' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++bool 'Randomized PIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++bool 'Trusted path execution' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE" != "n" ]; then
++bool ' Partially restrict non-root users' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++int ' GID for untrusted users:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID 1005
++fi
++endmenu
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Network Protections'
++bool 'Larger entropy pools' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
++bool 'Truly random TCP ISN selection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++bool 'Randomized IP IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++bool 'Randomized TCP source ports' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++bool 'Randomized RPC XIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++bool 'Socket restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET" != "n" ]; then
++bool ' Deny any sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL" != "n" ]; then
++int ' GID to deny all sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID 1004
++fi
++bool ' Deny client sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT" != "n" ]; then
++int ' GID to deny client sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID 1003
++fi
++bool ' Deny server sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER" != "n" ]; then
++int ' GID to deny server sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID 1002
++fi
++fi
++endmenu
++if [ "$CONFIG_SYSCTL" != "n" ]; then
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Sysctl support'
++bool 'Sysctl support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++endmenu
++fi
++mainmenu_option next_comment
++comment 'Logging options'
++int 'Seconds in between log messages (minimum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
++int 'Number of messages in a burst (maximum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
++endmenu
++fi
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/Makefile
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/Makefile 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/Makefile 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
++# during 2001, 2002, and 2003 it has been completely redesigned by
++# Brad Spengler
++#
++# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
++# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL, unless otherwise
++# noted (as in obsd_rand.c)
++
++O_TARGET := grsec.o
++
++obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
++ grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
++ grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o
++
++ifeq ($(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC),y)
++obj-y += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o obsd_rand.o \
++ gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
++ gracl_learn.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
++else
++obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
++endif
++
++include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,2766 @@
++/*
++ * grsecurity/gracl.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2001, 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/gralloc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++
++static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
++static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head;
++static struct name_db name_set;
++static struct name_db inodev_set;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
++
++static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
++
++static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem);
++rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++extern char *gr_shared_page[4][NR_CPUS];
++struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++
++static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
++
++extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
++extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++extern __inline__ void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++ const int res,
++ const unsigned long wanted);
++#endif
++
++unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++
++static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
++static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
++
++static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
++
++/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move
++ entries around. They can be replaced during insert. */
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject;
++static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object;
++static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev;
++
++/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since
++ nested subject parsing is tricky
++*/
++static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL;
++static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL;
++
++static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
++
++extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
++extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
++extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++ return (gr_status & GR_READY);
++}
++
++__inline__ int
++gr_acl_tpe_check(void)
++{
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return 0;
++ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE)
++ return 1;
++ else
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++ if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) &&
++ ((gr_status & GR_READY)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ || (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current))
++#endif
++ ))
++ return 1;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
++static __inline__ int
++gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb)
++{
++ int i;
++ unsigned long *l1;
++ unsigned long *l2;
++ unsigned char *c1;
++ unsigned char *c2;
++ int num_longs;
++
++ if (likely(lena != lenb))
++ return 0;
++
++ l1 = (unsigned long *)a;
++ l2 = (unsigned long *)b;
++
++ num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long);
++
++ for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) {
++ if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2))
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ c1 = (unsigned char *) l1;
++ c2 = (unsigned char *) l2;
++
++ i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long));
++
++ for (; i--; c1++, c2++) {
++ if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2))
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ char *
++d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
++ char *buf, int buflen)
++{
++ char *res;
++ struct dentry *our_dentry;
++ struct vfsmount *our_mount;
++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++ struct dentry *root;
++
++ our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry;
++ our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt;
++
++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++
++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++ res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++ dput(root);
++ mntput(rootmnt);
++ return res;
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()],
++ PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[1][smp_processor_id()],
++ PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[2][smp_processor_id()],
++ PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++char *
++gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[3][smp_processor_id()],
++ PAGE_SIZE);
++}
++
++__inline__ __u32
++to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
++{
++ __u32 retmode = 0;
++
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_READ) ? GR_AUDIT_READ : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_APPEND) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_EXEC) ? GR_AUDIT_EXEC : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_INHERIT) ? GR_AUDIT_INHERIT : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_FIND) ? GR_AUDIT_FIND : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_SETID) ? GR_AUDIT_SETID : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_CREATE) ? GR_AUDIT_CREATE : 0;
++ retmode |= (reqmode & GR_DELETE) ? GR_AUDIT_DELETE : 0;
++
++ return retmode;
++}
++
++__inline__ struct acl_role_label *
++lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++ const gid_t gid)
++{
++ unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
++ struct acl_role_label *match;
++ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++ while (match
++ && (match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (!match || match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)) {
++ try_group:
++ index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++ i = 0;
++
++ while (match
++ && (match->uidgid != gid
++ || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (!match || match->uidgid != gid
++ || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))
++ match = default_role;
++ else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) {
++ return match;
++ } else {
++ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++ if (likely
++ ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
++ (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
++ return match;
++ }
++ match = default_role;
++ }
++ } else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) {
++ return match;
++ } else {
++ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
++ if (likely
++ ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
++ (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
++ return match;
++ }
++ goto try_group;
++ }
++
++ return match;
++}
++
++__inline__ struct acl_subject_label *
++lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
++ const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size);
++ struct acl_subject_label *match;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = s_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++ match = s_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_subject) &&
++ (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
++ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++ return match;
++ else
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
++ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++ struct acl_object_label *match;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = o_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++ match = o_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
++ (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
++ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++ return match;
++ else
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
++lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
++ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++ struct acl_object_label *match;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = o_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++ match = o_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
++ (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++ return match;
++
++ i = 0;
++ index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
++ match = o_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
++ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
++ match = o_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
++ (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
++ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
++ return match;
++ else
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct name_entry *
++lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
++{
++ __u16 len = strlen(name);
++ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
++ struct name_entry *match;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
++ match = name_set.n_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(!match || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)))
++ return NULL;
++ else
++ return match;
++}
++
++static __inline__ struct name_entry *
++lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
++{
++ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size);
++ struct name_entry *match;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_inodev) &&
++ (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev)))
++ return match;
++ else
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry)
++{
++ unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device,
++ inodev_set.n_size);
++ struct name_entry **curr;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ *curr = nentry;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ unsigned long index =
++ rhash(role->uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
++ struct acl_role_label **curr;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++
++ while (*curr) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
++ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ *curr = role;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static int
++insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const kdev_t device)
++{
++ struct name_entry **curr;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++ __u16 len = strlen(name);
++ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
++
++ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++
++ while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
++ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (!(*curr)) {
++ struct name_entry *nentry =
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
++ if (!nentry)
++ return 0;
++ nentry->name = name;
++ nentry->inode = inode;
++ nentry->device = device;
++ nentry->len = len;
++ *curr = nentry;
++ /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
++ insert_inodev_entry(nentry);
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
++ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++ unsigned long index =
++ fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
++ struct acl_object_label **curr;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
++ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ *curr = obj;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static void
++insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
++ struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++ unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size);
++ struct acl_subject_label **curr;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ curr = &s_hash[index];
++
++ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++ curr = &s_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ *curr = obj;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static void **
++create_table(__u32 * len)
++{
++ unsigned long table_sizes[] = {
++ 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
++ 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
++ 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
++ 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
++ };
++ void *newtable = NULL;
++ unsigned int pwr = 0;
++
++ while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
++ table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
++ pwr++;
++
++ if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
++ return newtable;
++
++ if ((table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ newtable =
++ kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
++ else
++ newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *));
++
++ *len = table_sizes[pwr];
++
++ return newtable;
++}
++
++static int
++init_variables(const unsigned long acl_obj_size,
++ const unsigned long acl_subj_size,
++ const unsigned long acl_ip_size,
++ const unsigned long acl_role_size,
++ const unsigned long allowed_ip_size,
++ const unsigned long acl_trans_size,
++ const __u16 num_sprole_pws)
++{
++ unsigned long stacksize;
++
++ acl_role_set.r_size = acl_role_size;
++ name_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
++ inodev_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
++
++ if (!gr_init_uidset())
++ return 1;
++
++ /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
++
++ stacksize = (3 * acl_obj_size) + (2 * acl_role_size) +
++ (4 * acl_subj_size) + acl_ip_size + (2 * acl_trans_size) +
++ allowed_ip_size + (2 * num_sprole_pws) + 5;
++
++ if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
++ return 1;
++
++ /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */
++ deleted_subject =
++ (struct acl_subject_label *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
++ deleted_object =
++ (struct acl_object_label *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++ deleted_inodev =
++ (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
++
++ if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev)
++ return 1;
++
++ memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
++ memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
++ memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry));
++
++ /* We only want 50% full tables for now */
++
++ acl_role_set.r_hash =
++ (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size);
++ name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size);
++ inodev_set.n_hash =
++ (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size);
++
++ if (!acl_role_set.r_hash || !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash)
++ return 1;
++ memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
++ memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
++ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
++ memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0,
++ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++free_variables(void)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *s;
++ struct acl_role_label *r;
++ struct task_struct *task;
++
++ gr_clear_learn_entries();
++
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(task) {
++ task->acl_sp_role = 0;
++ task->acl_role_id = 0;
++ task->acl = NULL;
++ task->role = NULL;
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++ /* free all object hash tables */
++
++ if (role_list_head) {
++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
++ if (!r->subj_hash)
++ break;
++ for (s = r->proc_subject; s; s = s->next) {
++ if (!s->obj_hash)
++ break;
++ if ((s->obj_hash_size *
++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <=
++ PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(s->obj_hash);
++ else
++ vfree(s->obj_hash);
++ }
++ if ((r->subj_hash_size *
++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(r->subj_hash);
++ else
++ vfree(r->subj_hash);
++ }
++ }
++
++ acl_free_all();
++
++ if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
++ if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
++ PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++ else
++ vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
++ }
++ if (name_set.n_hash) {
++ if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
++ PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(name_set.n_hash);
++ else
++ vfree(name_set.n_hash);
++ }
++
++ if (inodev_set.n_hash) {
++ if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
++ PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
++ else
++ vfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
++ }
++
++ gr_free_uidset();
++
++ memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
++ memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
++ memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
++
++ role_list_head = NULL;
++ default_role = NULL;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
++ __u32 num = 0;
++
++ while (userp) {
++ if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++ break;
++
++ userp = o_tmp.prev;
++ num++;
++ }
++
++ return num;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
++
++static int
++copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
++ struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
++ unsigned int len;
++ char *tmp;
++
++ while (userp) {
++ if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ userp = o_tmp->prev;
++
++ len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ o_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++ insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
++ if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
++ o_tmp->device))
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (o_tmp->nested) {
++ o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
++ if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
++ return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
++
++ s_final = o_tmp->nested;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static __u32
++count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
++ __u32 num = 0;
++
++ while (userp) {
++ if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++ break;
++
++ userp = s_tmp.prev;
++ /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
++ they are not included in the hash table, but are
++ attached to objects. We have already counted
++ the subjects in userspace for the allocation
++ stack
++ */
++ if (!s_tmp.parent_subject)
++ num++;
++ }
++
++ return num;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++ struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++
++ ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
++
++ while (ruserip) {
++ rlast = rtmp;
++
++ if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
++ sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ ruserip = rtmp->prev;
++
++ if (!rlast) {
++ rtmp->prev = NULL;
++ rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
++ } else {
++ rlast->next = rtmp;
++ rtmp->prev = rlast;
++ }
++
++ if (!ruserip)
++ rtmp->next = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
++{
++ struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
++ unsigned int len;
++ char *tmp;
++
++ rusertp = rolep->transitions;
++
++ while (rusertp) {
++ rlast = rtmp;
++
++ if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
++ sizeof (struct role_transition)))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ rusertp = rtmp->prev;
++
++ len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ rtmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++ if (!rlast) {
++ rtmp->prev = NULL;
++ rolep->transitions = rtmp;
++ } else {
++ rlast->next = rtmp;
++ rtmp->prev = rlast;
++ }
++
++ if (!rusertp)
++ rtmp->next = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL;
++ unsigned int len;
++ char *tmp;
++ __u32 num_objs;
++ struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
++ unsigned long i_num;
++ int err;
++
++
++ if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++ if (!s_last) {
++ s_tmp->prev = NULL;
++ role->proc_subject = s_tmp;
++ } else {
++ s_last->next = s_tmp;
++ s_tmp->prev = s_last;
++ }
++
++ s_last = s_tmp;
++
++ len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
++
++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++ s_tmp->filename = tmp;
++
++ if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
++ role->root_label = s_tmp;
++
++ /* set up object hash table */
++ num_objs = count_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object);
++
++ s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
++ s_tmp->obj_hash =
++ (struct acl_object_label **)
++ create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size));
++
++ if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
++ s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
++ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
++
++ /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested
++ acl could be found and be the final subject
++ copied
++ */
++
++ s_final = s_tmp;
++
++ /* add in objects */
++ err = copy_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object, s_tmp, role);
++
++ if (err)
++ return ERR_PTR(err);
++
++ /* add in ip acls */
++
++ if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
++ s_tmp->ips = NULL;
++ goto insert;
++ }
++
++ i_tmp =
++ (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
++ sizeof (struct
++ acl_ip_label *));
++
++ if (!i_tmp)
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
++ *(i_tmp + i_num) =
++ (struct acl_ip_label *)
++ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
++ if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ if (copy_from_user
++ (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
++ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++
++ if (copy_from_user
++ (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
++ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
++ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
++ }
++
++ s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
++
++insert:
++ if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
++ s_tmp->device))
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
++
++ return s_tmp;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
++ struct acl_subject_label * ret;
++ int err;
++
++ while (userp) {
++ if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
++ return -EFAULT;
++
++ /* do not add nested subjects here, add
++ while parsing objects
++ */
++
++ if (s_pre.parent_subject) {
++ userp = s_pre.prev;
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
++
++ err = PTR_ERR(ret);
++ if (IS_ERR(ret))
++ return err;
++
++ insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
++
++ userp = s_pre.prev;
++ }
++
++ s_final->next = NULL;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
++{
++ struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_last;
++ struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
++ unsigned long r_num;
++ unsigned int len;
++ char *tmp;
++ int err = 0;
++ __u16 i;
++ __u32 num_subjs;
++
++ /* we need a default and kernel role */
++ if (arg->role_db.r_entries < 2)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
++
++ num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
++ acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
++
++ if (!acl_special_roles) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++ sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
++ if (!sptmp) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
++ sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
++ err = -EFAULT;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ len =
++ strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
++
++ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
++ err = -EFAULT;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
++#endif
++ sptmp->rolename = tmp;
++ acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
++ }
++
++ r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
++
++ for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.r_entries; r_num++) {
++ r_last = r_tmp;
++
++ r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
++
++ if (!r_tmp) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
++ err = -EFAULT;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
++ sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
++ err = -EFAULT;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if (!r_last) {
++ r_tmp->prev = NULL;
++ role_list_head = r_tmp;
++ } else {
++ r_last->next = r_tmp;
++ r_tmp->prev = r_last;
++ }
++
++ if (r_num == (arg->role_db.r_entries - 1))
++ r_tmp->next = NULL;
++
++ len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, PATH_MAX);
++
++ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
++ err = -EFAULT;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++ r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
++
++ if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
++ && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
++ default_role = r_tmp;
++ } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
++ kernel_role = r_tmp;
++ }
++
++ num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject);
++
++ r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
++ r_tmp->subj_hash =
++ (struct acl_subject_label **)
++ create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size));
++
++ if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
++ err = -ENOMEM;
++ goto cleanup;
++ }
++
++ err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
++ if (err)
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
++ if (err)
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
++ r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
++ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
++
++ s_last = NULL;
++
++ err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject, r_tmp);
++
++ if (err)
++ goto cleanup;
++
++ insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
++ }
++
++ goto return_err;
++ cleanup:
++ free_variables();
++ return_err:
++ return err;
++
++}
++
++static int
++gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
++{
++ int error = 0;
++
++ memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
++ memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN);
++
++ if (init_variables(args->role_db.o_entries, args->role_db.s_entries,
++ args->role_db.i_entries, args->role_db.r_entries,
++ args->role_db.a_entries, args->role_db.t_entries,
++ args->num_sprole_pws)) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++ error = -ENOMEM;
++ free_variables();
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ error = copy_user_acl(args);
++ if (error)
++ goto out;
++
++ if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
++ free_variables();
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ gr_status |= GR_READY;
++ out:
++ return error;
++}
++
++static struct acl_object_label *
++chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++ struct dentry *root;
++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++ struct acl_object_label *retval;
++
++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++ for (;;) {
++ if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt))
++ break;
++ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++ break;
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++ goto out;
++
++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++ goto out;
++
++ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++ }
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
++ subj);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_obj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino,
++ root->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ }
++ out:
++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++ dput(root);
++ mntput(rootmnt);
++
++ return retval;
++}
++
++static struct acl_subject_label *
++chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
++ const struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
++ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
++ struct dentry *root;
++ struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
++ struct acl_subject_label *retval;
++
++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++
++ for (;;) {
++ if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt))
++ break;
++ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++ break;
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++ goto out;
++
++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
++ goto out;
++
++ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++ }
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ retval =
++ lookup_acl_subj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino,
++ root->d_inode->i_dev, role);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ }
++ out:
++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++ dput(root);
++ mntput(rootmnt);
++
++ return retval;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_log_learn(const struct acl_role_label *role, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid,
++ const struct task_struct *task, const char *pathname,
++ const __u32 mode)
++{
++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, role->rolename, role->roletype,
++ uid, gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
++ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
++ 1, 1, pathname, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
++
++ return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ __u32 oldmode, newmode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++
++ obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
++ oldmode = obj->mode;
++
++ if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)
++ oldmode |= (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++ newmode =
++ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++ oldmode | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ if ((newmode & oldmode) == oldmode)
++ return newmode;
++ else if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++ current, gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), oldmode);
++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++ } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
++ return GR_SUPPRESS;
++ else
++ return 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ __u32 retval = mode;
++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++ struct acl_object_label *currobj;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++ curracl = current->acl;
++
++ currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
++ retval = currobj->mode & mode;
++
++ if (unlikely
++ ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) && (mode != GR_PTRACERD)
++ && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
++ __u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ retval = new_mode;
++
++ if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++ current, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++ }
++
++ return retval;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
++{
++ struct name_entry *match;
++ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++ __u32 retval;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
++
++ match = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
++
++ if (!match)
++ goto check_parent;
++
++ curracl = current->acl;
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ if (matchpo) {
++ if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
++ (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
++ && curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++ __u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++ current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++
++ return new_mode;
++ }
++ return (matchpo->mode & mode);
++ }
++
++ check_parent:
++ curracl = current->acl;
++
++ matchpo = chk_obj_label(parent, mnt, curracl);
++ retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
++
++ if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
++ && (curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)) {
++ __u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++ current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
++ return new_mode;
++ }
++
++ return retval;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_FIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
++ return 0;
++
++ if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++ tsk->used_accept = 0;
++ tsk->used_connect = 0;
++ tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
++ tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
++ tsk->acl = current->acl;
++ tsk->role = current->role;
++ tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
++ if (current->exec_file)
++ get_file(current->exec_file);
++ tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
++ tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
++ if (unlikely(current->used_accept))
++ current->curr_ip = 0;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_set_proc_res(void)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++ unsigned short i;
++
++ proc = current->acl;
++
++ if (proc->mode & GR_LEARN)
++ return;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
++ if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
++ continue;
++
++ current->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
++ current->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return;
++
++ proc = task->acl;
++
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXPAGE)
++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXSEGM)
++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXGCC)
++ task->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXMPROTECT)
++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDMMAP)
++ task->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
++ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDEXEC)
++ task->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
++{
++ task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ struct file *filp;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return;
++
++ filp = task->exec_file;
++
++ /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
++ if (unlikely(!filp)) {
++ task->role = kernel_role;
++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++ return;
++ } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++ do_set_role_label(task, uid, gid);
++
++ task->acl =
++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role);
++
++ task->is_writable = 0;
++
++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
++ by the default ACL */
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ task->is_writable = 1;
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ task->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++
++ gr_set_proc_res();
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ __u32 retmode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return;
++
++ newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role);
++
++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->acl);
++ retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
++
++ if ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT)) {
++ if (obj->nested)
++ current->acl = obj->nested;
++ else
++ current->acl = newacl;
++ } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT)
++ security_audit(GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, current->acl->filename,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++ current->is_writable = 0;
++
++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
++ by the default ACL */
++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ current->is_writable = 1;
++ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ current->is_writable = 1;
++
++ gr_set_proc_res();
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", current->comm, current->pid, current->role->rolename, current->acl->filename);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
++ struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
++ struct acl_subject_label *i;
++ struct acl_role_label *role;
++
++ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
++ for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) {
++ if (unlikely(i->parent_subject &&
++ (i->inode == ino) &&
++ (i->device == dev)))
++ i->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++ if (unlikely((matchpo =
++ lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL))
++ matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL))
++ matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
++{
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return;
++
++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev)))
++ do_handle_delete(ino, dev);
++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
++ const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice,
++ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
++{
++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
++ struct acl_object_label **match;
++ struct acl_object_label *tmp;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++
++ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
++ (*match)->device != olddevice ||
++ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
++ match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ }
++
++ if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object)
++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
++ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++ tmp = *match;
++ tmp->inode = newinode;
++ tmp->device = newdevice;
++ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++ *match = deleted_object;
++
++ insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj);
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
++ const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice,
++ struct acl_role_label *role)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
++ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size);
++ struct acl_subject_label **match;
++ struct acl_subject_label *tmp;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = &s_hash[index];
++
++ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
++ (*match)->device != olddevice ||
++ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ match = &s_hash[index];
++ }
++
++ if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject)
++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
++ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
++ tmp = *match;
++
++ tmp->inode = newinode;
++ tmp->device = newdevice;
++ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
++
++ *match = deleted_subject;
++
++ insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role);
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
++ const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice)
++{
++ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size);
++ struct name_entry **match;
++ struct name_entry *tmp;
++ __u8 i = 0;
++
++ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++
++ while (*match
++ && ((*match)->inode != oldinode
++ || (*match)->device != olddevice)) {
++ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
++ i = (i + 1) % 32;
++ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
++ }
++
++ if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev)
++ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
++ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) {
++ tmp = *match;
++
++ tmp->inode = newinode;
++ tmp->device = newdevice;
++
++ *match = deleted_inodev;
++
++ insert_inodev_entry(tmp);
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *i;
++ struct acl_role_label *role;
++
++ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
++ update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
++
++ for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) {
++ if (unlikely(i->parent_subject &&
++ (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
++ (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_dev))) {
++ i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
++ i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
++ }
++ update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_dev, i);
++ }
++ }
++
++ update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ struct name_entry *matchn;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return;
++
++ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
++
++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++ struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++ struct name_entry *matchn;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
++
++ lock_kernel();
++ error = vfs_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
++ unlock_kernel();
++
++ if (unlikely(error))
++ return error;
++
++ /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
++ NFS silly-renaming
++ */
++
++ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
++ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) &&
++ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
++ do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) &&
++ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
++ do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
++
++ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
++ do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
++ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++static int
++lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
++ unsigned char **sum)
++{
++ struct acl_role_label *r;
++ struct role_transition *trans;
++ __u16 i;
++ int found = 0;
++
++ /* check transition table */
++
++ for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
++ if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
++ found = 1;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (!found)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* handle special roles that do not require authentication */
++
++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
++ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename)
++ && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) {
++ *salt = NULL;
++ *sum = NULL;
++ return 1;
++ }
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
++ if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
++ *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
++ *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
++ return 1;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++assign_special_role(char *rolename)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ struct acl_role_label *r;
++ struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
++ struct task_struct *tsk;
++ struct file *filp;
++
++ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next)
++ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
++ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
++ assigned = r;
++
++ if (!assigned)
++ return;
++
++ tsk = current->p_pptr;
++ filp = tsk->exec_file;
++
++ if (tsk && filp) {
++ tsk->is_writable = 0;
++
++ acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1;
++ tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
++ tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value;
++ tsk->role = assigned;
++ tsk->acl =
++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role);
++
++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
++ by the default ACL */
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ tsk->is_writable = 1;
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ tsk->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
++#endif
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++ssize_t
++write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
++{
++ struct gr_arg *arg;
++ unsigned char *sprole_salt;
++ unsigned char *sprole_sum;
++ int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg);
++ int error2 = 0;
++
++ down(&gr_dev_sem);
++
++ arg = (struct gr_arg *) buf;
++
++ if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg)) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, count,
++ (int) sizeof (struct gr_arg));
++ error = -EINVAL;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if ((gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
++ && time_before_eq(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) {
++ gr_auth_expires = 0;
++ gr_auth_attempts = 0;
++ }
++
++ if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
++ error = -EFAULT;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && time_after(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) {
++ error = -EBUSY;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
++ do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
++ locking
++ */
++
++ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && current->uid) {
++ error = -EPERM;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
++
++ gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++ gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
++
++ /* Okay.
++ * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
++ * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
++ * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
++
++ switch (gr_usermode->mode) {
++ case STATUS:
++ if (gr_status & GR_READY)
++ error = 1;
++ else
++ error = 2;
++ goto out;
++ case SHUTDOWN:
++ if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
++ && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++ security_alert_good(GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ free_variables();
++ memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
++ memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN);
++ memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN);
++ } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++ security_alert(GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EPERM;
++ } else {
++ security_alert_good(GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ }
++ break;
++ case ENABLE:
++ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode)))
++ security_alert_good(GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
++ else {
++ if (gr_status & GR_READY)
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ else
++ error = error2;
++ security_alert(GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++ break;
++ case RELOAD:
++ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG);
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ } else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++ lock_kernel();
++ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
++ free_variables();
++ if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) {
++ unlock_kernel();
++ security_alert_good(GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG,
++ GR_VERSION);
++ } else {
++ unlock_kernel();
++ error = error2;
++ security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++ } else {
++ security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EPERM;
++ }
++ break;
++ case SEGVMOD:
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) {
++ struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
++ segvacl =
++ lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode,
++ gr_usermode->segv_device,
++ current->role);
++ if (segvacl) {
++ segvacl->crashes = 0;
++ segvacl->expires = 0;
++ }
++ } else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) {
++ gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid);
++ }
++ } else {
++ security_alert(GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EPERM;
++ }
++ break;
++ case SPROLE:
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
++ && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
++ current->role->expires = 0;
++ current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
++ }
++
++ if (time_after(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
++ error = -EBUSY;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (lookup_special_role_auth
++ (gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
++ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
++ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
++ assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role);
++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
++ (current->p_pptr) ? current->
++ p_pptr->role->rolename : "",
++ acl_sp_role_value, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ } else {
++ security_alert(GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EPERM;
++ current->role->auth_attempts++;
++ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
++ current->role->expires =
++ jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ;
++ security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG,
++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES,
++ gr_usermode->sp_role, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++
++ goto out;
++ }
++ break;
++ case UNSPROLE:
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EAGAIN;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
++ && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
++ current->role->expires = 0;
++ current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
++ }
++
++ if (time_after(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
++ error = -EBUSY;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if ((current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) &&
++ lookup_special_role_auth
++ (current->role->rolename, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
++ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
++ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG,
++ (current->p_pptr) ? current->
++ p_pptr->role->rolename : "",
++ (current->p_pptr) ? current->
++ p_pptr->acl_role_id : 0, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ gr_set_acls(1);
++ if (current->p_pptr)
++ current->p_pptr->acl_sp_role = 0;
++ } else {
++ security_alert(GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EPERM;
++ current->role->auth_attempts++;
++ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
++ current->role->expires =
++ jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ;
++ security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG,
++ CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES,
++ current->role->rolename, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++
++ goto out;
++ }
++ break;
++ default:
++ security_alert(GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EINVAL;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ if (error != -EPERM)
++ goto out;
++
++ gr_auth_attempts++;
++
++ if (gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
++ security_alert(GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES);
++ gr_auth_expires = jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ;
++ }
++
++ out:
++ up(&gr_dev_sem);
++ return error;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ struct task_struct *task;
++ struct file *filp;
++ unsigned short i;
++
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(task) {
++ /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
++ if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
++ ACL */
++
++ if (type && (task->role != current->role ||
++ task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id))
++ continue;
++
++ task->acl_role_id = 0;
++
++ if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
++ do_set_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
++
++ task->acl =
++ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
++ task->role);
++ if (task->acl) {
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++ curr = task->acl;
++
++ task->is_writable = 0;
++ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
++ by the default ACL */
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ task->is_writable = 1;
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
++ task->is_writable = 1;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
++#endif
++ if (!(curr->mode & GR_LEARN))
++ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
++ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << i)))
++ continue;
++
++ task->rlim[i].rlim_cur =
++ curr->res[i].rlim_cur;
++ task->rlim[i].rlim_max =
++ curr->res[i].rlim_max;
++ }
++ } else {
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ security_alert_good(GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm,
++ task->pid);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ } else {
++ // it's a kernel process
++ task->role = kernel_role;
++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
++ task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND;
++#endif
++ }
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++
++ if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
++ task->acl && (task->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)))
++ goto skip_reslog;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
++ gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted);
++#endif
++ skip_reslog:
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
++ return;
++
++ acl = task->acl;
++
++ if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & GR_LEARN) ||
++ !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
++ return;
++
++ if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
++ unsigned long res_add;
++
++ res_add = wanted;
++ switch (res) {
++ case RLIMIT_CPU:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_DATA:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_STACK:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_CORE:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_RSS:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_NPROC:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_AS:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
++ break;
++ case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
++ res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
++ break;
++ }
++
++ acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
++
++ if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
++ acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
++
++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++ current->role->roletype, acl->filename,
++ acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
++ "", (unsigned long) res);
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
++
++__u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
++ const void *newval)
++{
++ struct proc_dir_entry *tmp;
++ struct nameidata nd;
++ const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
++ char *path = gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()];
++ struct acl_object_label *obj;
++ unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
++ __u32 err = 0;
++ __u32 mode = 0;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return 1;
++
++ if (oldval)
++ mode |= GR_READ;
++ if (newval)
++ mode |= GR_WRITE;
++
++ /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
++
++ for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) {
++ len += strlen(tmp->name);
++ len++;
++ depth++;
++ }
++
++ if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE)
++ return 0; // deny
++
++ memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
++
++ memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
++
++ pos += strlen(proc_sys);
++
++ for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
++ path[pos] = '/';
++ pos++;
++ for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root;
++ tmp = tmp->parent) {
++ if (depth == i) {
++ memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name,
++ strlen(tmp->name));
++ pos += strlen(tmp->name);
++ }
++ i++;
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (path_init(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd))
++ err = path_walk(path, &nd);
++
++ if (err)
++ goto out;
++
++ obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl);
++ err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) && ((err & mode) != mode))) {
++ __u32 new_mode = mode;
++
++ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ err = new_mode;
++ gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
++ current, path, new_mode);
++ } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", path,
++ (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ err = 0;
++ } else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
++ err = 0;
++ } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
++ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++
++ path_release(&nd);
++
++ out:
++ return err;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++ struct file *filp;
++ __u32 retmode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return 0;
++
++ filp = task->exec_file;
++
++ if (unlikely(!filp))
++ return 0;
++
++ retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD, filp->f_vfsmnt);
++
++ if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
++ switch (request) {
++ case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
++ case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
++ case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
++#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA)
++ case PTRACE_SETREGS:
++ case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_X86
++ case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
++ case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
++#endif
++ return 1;
++ default:
++ return 0;
++ }
++ } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
++ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
++ && (current->acl != task->acl
++ || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
++ && current->pid != task->pid))) {
++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt),
++ task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ __u32 retmode;
++ struct acl_subject_label *subj;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (unlikely
++ ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
++ && !(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE)))
++ retmode = gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt);
++ else
++ return 0;
++
++ subj = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role);
++
++ if (!(retmode & GR_PTRACERD) &&
++ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
++ (current->acl != subj)) {
++ security_alert(GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++ struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) ||
++ (current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) || !filp ||
++ !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (unlikely(current->is_writable))
++ return 0;
++
++ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
++ obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
++ current->role->root_label);
++ if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
++ security_alert(GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++ return 1;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
++ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++ file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
++ security_alert(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++ security_audit(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
++ return 1;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
++ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
++ file->f_vfsmnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
++ security_alert(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
++ security_audit(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++ unsigned long runtime;
++ unsigned long cputime;
++ unsigned int wday, cday;
++ __u8 whr, chr;
++ __u8 wmin, cmin;
++ __u8 wsec, csec;
++ char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
++ char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
++
++ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
++ !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
++ return;
++
++ runtime = (jiffies - task->start_time) / HZ;
++ wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
++ runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
++ whr = runtime / 3600;
++ runtime -= whr * 3600;
++ wmin = runtime / 60;
++ runtime -= wmin * 60;
++ wsec = runtime;
++
++ cputime = (task->times.tms_utime + task->times.tms_stime) / HZ;
++ cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
++ cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
++ chr = cputime / 3600;
++ cputime -= chr * 3600;
++ cmin = cputime / 60;
++ cputime -= cmin * 60;
++ csec = cputime;
++
++ security_audit(GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++ task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->tty,
++ cur_tty),
++ task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr,
++ wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec,
++ (task->
++ flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited",
++ code, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++ task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
++ NIPQUAD(task->p_pptr->curr_ip),
++ tty_name(task->p_pptr->tty, parent_tty),
++ task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid,
++ task->p_pptr->egid);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
++ task->role = kernel_role;
++ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
++ }
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++/* stack-based acl allocation tracking (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
++static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
++static void **alloc_stack;
++
++static __inline__ int
++alloc_pop(void)
++{
++ if ((alloc_stack_next - 1) == 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ if (*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2))
++ kfree(*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2));
++
++ alloc_stack_next--;
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++alloc_push(void *buf)
++{
++ if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
++ BUG();
++
++ *(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 1) = buf;
++
++ alloc_stack_next++;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void *
++acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
++{
++ void *ret;
++
++ if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
++ BUG();
++
++ ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++ if (ret)
++ alloc_push(ret);
++
++ return ret;
++}
++
++void
++acl_free_all(void)
++{
++ if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
++ return;
++
++ while (alloc_pop()) ;
++
++ if (alloc_stack) {
++ if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ kfree(alloc_stack);
++ else
++ vfree(alloc_stack);
++ }
++
++ alloc_stack = NULL;
++ alloc_stack_size = 1;
++ alloc_stack_next = 1;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
++{
++ if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
++ alloc_stack =
++ (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
++ else
++ alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
++
++ alloc_stack_size = size;
++
++ if (!alloc_stack)
++ return 0;
++ else
++ return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
++/* capability handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *captab_log[29] = {
++ "CAP_CHOWN",
++ "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
++ "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
++ "CAP_FOWNER",
++ "CAP_FSETID",
++ "CAP_KILL",
++ "CAP_SETGID",
++ "CAP_SETUID",
++ "CAP_SETPCAP",
++ "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
++ "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
++ "CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
++ "CAP_NET_ADMIN",
++ "CAP_NET_RAW",
++ "CAP_IPC_LOCK",
++ "CAP_IPC_OWNER",
++ "CAP_SYS_MODULE",
++ "CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
++ "CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
++ "CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
++ "CAP_SYS_PACCT",
++ "CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
++ "CAP_SYS_BOOT",
++ "CAP_SYS_NICE",
++ "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
++ "CAP_SYS_TIME",
++ "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
++ "CAP_MKNOD",
++ "CAP_LEASE"
++};
++
++int
++gr_is_capable(const int cap)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++ return 1;
++
++ curracl = current->acl;
++
++ if (!cap_raised(curracl->cap_lower, cap))
++ return 1;
++
++ if ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)
++ && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
++ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename,
++ curracl->filename, 0UL,
++ 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
++ security_alert(GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, captab_log[cap], DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++ return GR_FIND;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
++ security_audit(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return mode;
++ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++ security_alert(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
++ return 0;
++
++ return GR_FIND;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++ const int fmode)
++{
++ __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
++ return reqmode;
++
++ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++ else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
++ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++ if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++ reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++ mnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
++ reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return reqmode;
++ } else
++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++ {
++ security_alert(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++ return 0;
++
++ return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++ const int imode)
++{
++ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
++ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
++ if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
++ reqmode |= GR_READ;
++ if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
++ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
++ reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
++ reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return reqmode;
++ } else
++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++ {
++ security_alert(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
++ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++ return 0;
++
++ return reqmode;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++ const int fmode)
++{
++ __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
++
++ if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
++ reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
++ if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
++ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
++ if (fmode & S_IROTH)
++ reqmode |= GR_READ;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
++ mnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return reqmode;
++ } else
++ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
++ {
++ security_alert(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
++ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
++ return 0;
++
++ return reqmode;
++}
++
++#define generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
++{ \
++ __u32 mode; \
++ \
++ mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); \
++ \
++ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
++ security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++ return mode; \
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
++ security_alert(fmt, "denied", gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), \
++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++ return 0; \
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
++ return 0; \
++ \
++ return (reqmode); \
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ mode_t mode)
++{
++ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++ GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++ } else {
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++ }
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ mode_t mode)
++{
++ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
++ GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++ } else {
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
++ }
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
++ GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const ino_t ino)
++{
++ if (likely((unsigned long)(dentry->d_inode))) {
++ struct dentry d = *dentry;
++ struct inode inode = *(dentry->d_inode);
++
++ inode.i_ino = ino;
++ d.d_inode = &inode;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_search_file(&d, GR_FIND | GR_NOLEARN, mnt)))
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
++ old_mnt);
++
++ if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return mode;
++ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++ security_alert(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++ return 0;
++
++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ mode =
++ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++ GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
++ GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++
++ if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
++ security_audit(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return mode;
++ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
++ security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
++ return 0;
++
++ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
++}
++
++#define generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
++{ \
++ __u32 mode; \
++ \
++ mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); \
++ \
++ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
++ security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
++ gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++ return mode; \
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
++ security_alert(fmt, "denied", \
++ gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
++ DEFAULTSECARGS); \
++ return 0; \
++ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
++ return 0; \
++ \
++ return (reqmode); \
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++ const int mode)
++{
++ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
++ if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
++ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
++
++ generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++ reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
++{
++ generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++ GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
++}
++
++#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
++ (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
++ ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++ __u8 gr_replace = 1;
++ __u32 comp1, comp2;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return 1;
++
++ if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
++ gr_replace = 0;
++
++ comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
++ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
++ comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++ GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++ } else {
++ comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
++ GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
++ GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
++ comp2 =
++ gr_search_file(old_dentry,
++ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
++ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
++ }
++
++ if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
++ ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
++ security_audit(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "successful",
++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt),
++ newname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
++ && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
++ security_alert(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "denied",
++ gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), newname,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ error = -EACCES;
++ } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
++ error = -EACCES;
++
++ if (error)
++ return error;
++
++ error = gr_handle_rename(old_parent_inode, parent_dentry->d_inode,
++ old_dentry, new_dentry, old_mnt, gr_replace);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++ u16 id;
++ char *rolename;
++
++ if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
++ id = current->acl_role_id;
++ rolename = current->role->rolename;
++ gr_set_acls(1);
++ security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG,
++ rolename, id, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++
++ if (current->exec_file) {
++ fput(current->exec_file);
++ current->exec_file = NULL;
++ }
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
++ return -EACCES;
++
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
++/*
++ * grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/udp.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++#define GR_BIND 0x01
++#define GR_CONNECT 0x02
++
++static const char * gr_protocols[256] = {
++ "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt",
++ "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet",
++ "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1",
++ "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp",
++ "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++",
++ "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre",
++ "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile",
++ "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63",
++ "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv",
++ "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak",
++ "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf",
++ "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp",
++ "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim",
++ "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip",
++ "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp",
++ "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup",
++ "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135",
++ "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143",
++ "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151",
++ "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159",
++ "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167",
++ "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175",
++ "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183",
++ "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191",
++ "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199",
++ "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207",
++ "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215",
++ "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223",
++ "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231",
++ "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239",
++ "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247",
++ "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255",
++ };
++
++static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = {
++ "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6",
++ "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet"
++ };
++
++static __inline__ const char *
++gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto)
++{
++ return gr_protocols[proto];
++}
++
++static __inline__ const char *
++gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type)
++{
++ return gr_socktypes[type];
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ goto exit;
++
++ if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
++ || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
++ goto exit; // let the kernel handle it
++
++ curr = current->acl;
++
++ if (!curr->ips)
++ goto exit;
++
++ if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
++ (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
++ goto exit;
++
++ if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++ /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
++ dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
++ bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
++ if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
++ __u32 fakeip = 0;
++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++ curr->filename, curr->filename,
++ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++ protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++ } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
++ __u32 fakeip = 0;
++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++ curr->filename, curr->filename,
++ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
++ protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++ }
++ /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
++ goto exit;
++ }
++
++ security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", gr_socktype_to_name(type),
++ gr_proto_to_name(protocol), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++ return 0;
++ exit:
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++ struct acl_ip_label *ip;
++ unsigned long i;
++ __u32 ip_addr = 0;
++ __u16 ip_port = 0;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->family != PF_INET))
++ return 1;
++
++ curr = current->acl;
++
++ if (!curr->ips)
++ return 1;
++
++ ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
++ ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
++
++ for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
++ ip = *(curr->ips + i);
++ if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
++ (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
++ (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
++ ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) ==
++ (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask))
++ && (ip->
++ proto[sk->protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->protocol % 32)))
++ && (ip->type & (1 << type)))
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
++ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
++ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
++ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
++ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
++ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
++ curr->filename, curr->filename,
++ NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
++ sk->protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ if (mode == GR_BIND)
++ security_alert(GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
++ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->protocol),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
++ security_alert(GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
++ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->protocol),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ if (addr)
++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
++ else {
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = sk->daddr;
++ sin.sin_port = sk->dport;
++
++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++ }
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++ struct sockaddr_in sin;
++
++ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
++ return 1; // skip this packet
++
++ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
++ sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source;
++
++ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/poll.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/string.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char * buf,
++ size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
++static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(input_wait);
++static atomic_t learn_buffer_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
++static int gr_learn_attached;
++
++#define LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS 256
++#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
++
++static spinlock_t learn_buffer_lock[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS] = { [0 ... (LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS - 1)] = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED };
++static char *learn_buffer[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS];
++static int learn_buffer_len[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS];
++
++static ssize_t
++read_learn(struct file *file, char * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
++{
++ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
++ ssize_t retval = 0;
++ char *tmp;
++ unsigned int len;
++ int i;
++
++ add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
++ do {
++ if (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > 1)
++ break;
++
++ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
++ retval = -EAGAIN;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (signal_pending(current)) {
++ retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ schedule();
++ } while (1);
++
++
++ for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) {
++ spin_lock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++ len = learn_buffer_len[i];
++ tmp = learn_buffer[i];
++ if (!len || !tmp) {
++ spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++ continue;
++ }
++ learn_buffer[i] = NULL;
++ learn_buffer_len[i] = 0;
++ spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++
++ if (count < ((i * LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE) + len)) {
++ retval = -EINVAL;
++ vfree(tmp);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (copy_to_user(buf + (i * LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE), tmp, len)) {
++ retval = -EFAULT;
++ vfree(tmp);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ retval += len;
++ vfree(tmp);
++ atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count);
++ atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count);
++ }
++
++ wake_up(&input_wait);
++out:
++ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
++ remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
++ return retval;
++}
++
++static unsigned int
++poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
++{
++ poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
++
++ if (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > 1)
++ return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_clear_learn_entries(void)
++{
++ int i;
++
++ atomic_set(&learn_buffer_count, 0);
++ wake_up(&input_wait);
++
++ for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) {
++ if (learn_buffer_len[i]) {
++ vfree(learn_buffer[i]);
++ learn_buffer[i] = NULL;
++ learn_buffer_len[i] = 0;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
++{
++ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
++ va_list args;
++ char *tmpbuf;
++ char *buf;
++ int i;
++ unsigned int len;
++
++ if (!gr_learn_attached)
++ return;
++
++ tmpbuf = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
++
++ if (tmpbuf == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ va_start(args, fmt);
++ len = vsnprintf(tmpbuf, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE, fmt, args);
++ va_end(args);
++
++ if (len < 0)
++ len = LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 1;
++
++ buf = vmalloc(len + 1);
++
++ if (buf == NULL) {
++ vfree(tmpbuf);
++ return;
++ }
++
++ memcpy(buf, tmpbuf, len);
++ buf[len] = '\0';
++ vfree(tmpbuf);
++
++ add_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait);
++
++ atomic_inc(&learn_buffer_count);
++ if (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > ((2 * (LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS - 1)) + 1)) {
++ /* don't sleep under the BKL */
++// if (unlikely(current->lock_depth >= 0)) {
++ remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait);
++ atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count);
++ vfree(buf);
++ return;
++// }
++// sleep_on(&input_wait);
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
++ remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait);
++ atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count);
++ vfree(buf);
++ return;
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) {
++ spin_lock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++
++ if (learn_buffer_len[i]) {
++ spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++ continue;
++ }
++
++ learn_buffer[i] = buf;
++
++ learn_buffer_len[i] = len + 1;
++
++ atomic_inc(&learn_buffer_count);
++ spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]);
++ break;
++ }
++
++ remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait);
++ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static int
++open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached)
++ return -EBUSY;
++ else if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
++ gr_learn_attached = 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
++ gr_learn_attached = 0;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
++ read: read_learn,
++ write: write_grsec_handler,
++ open: open_learn,
++ release: close_learn,
++ poll: poll_learn,
++};
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++/* resource handling routines (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static const char *restab_log[11] = {
++ "RLIMIT_CPU",
++ "RLIMIT_FSIZE",
++ "RLIMIT_DATA",
++ "RLIMIT_STACK",
++ "RLIMIT_CORE",
++ "RLIMIT_RSS",
++ "RLIMIT_NPROC",
++ "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
++ "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
++ "RLIMIT_AS",
++ "RLIMIT_LOCKS"
++};
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
++{
++ if (unlikely(res == RLIMIT_NPROC &&
++ (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
++ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))))
++ return;
++
++ if (unlikely(wanted >= task->rlim[res].rlim_cur &&
++ task->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
++ security_alert(GR_RESOURCE_MSG, wanted, restab_log[res],
++ task->rlim[res].rlim_cur,
++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++ task->gid, task->egid,
++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++ task->p_pptr->comm,
++ task->p_pptr->pid, task->p_pptr->uid,
++ task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid,
++ task->p_pptr->egid);
++
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
++/*
++ * grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
++ * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <asm/errno.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/timer.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
++static unsigned short uid_used;
++static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
++extern __inline__ struct acl_subject_label *lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t
++ inode,
++ const kdev_t
++ dev,
++ struct
++ acl_role_label
++ *role);
++
++int
++gr_init_uidset(void)
++{
++ uid_set =
++ kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
++ uid_used = 0;
++
++ return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_free_uidset(void)
++{
++ if (uid_set)
++ kfree(uid_set);
++
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++ struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
++ uid_t buid;
++ int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
++
++ while (high >= low) {
++ mid = (low + high) >> 1;
++ buid = tmp[mid].uid;
++ if (buid == uid)
++ return mid;
++ if (buid > uid)
++ high = mid - 1;
++ if (buid < uid)
++ low = mid + 1;
++ }
++
++ return -1;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insertsort(void)
++{
++ unsigned short i, j;
++ struct crash_uid index;
++
++ for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
++ index = uid_set[i];
++ j = i;
++ while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
++ uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
++ j--;
++ }
++ uid_set[j] = index;
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++static __inline__ void
++gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
++{
++ int loc;
++
++ if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
++ return;
++
++ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++
++ if (loc >= 0) {
++ uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
++ return;
++ }
++
++ uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
++ uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
++ uid_used++;
++
++ gr_insertsort();
++
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
++{
++ unsigned short i;
++
++ for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
++ uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i];
++
++ uid_used--;
++
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++ int loc;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return 0;
++
++ read_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
++ read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++
++ if (loc < 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, jiffies))
++ gr_remove_uid(loc);
++ else {
++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static __inline__ int
++proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
++ task->uid != task->fsuid)
++ return 1;
++ if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
++ task->gid != task->fsgid)
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++static __inline__ int
++gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
++{
++ unsigned long int flags;
++
++ spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
++ if (t->sig == NULL) {
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
++ return -ESRCH;
++ }
++
++ if (t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
++ t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
++ sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
++ recalc_sigpending(t);
++ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
++
++ return send_sig_info(sig, (void *) 1L, t);
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
++ struct task_struct *tsk;
++
++ if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
++ return;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return;
++
++ curr = task->acl;
++
++ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
++ return;
++
++ if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
++ curr->expires = 0;
++ curr->crashes = 0;
++ }
++
++ curr->crashes++;
++
++ if (!curr->expires)
++ curr->expires = jiffies + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
++
++ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++ time_after(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
++ if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG,
++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++ task->gid, task->egid,
++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++ task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
++ task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid,
++ task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid,
++ task->uid,
++ curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ);
++ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
++ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
++ curr->expires = 0;
++ curr->crashes = 0;
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(tsk) {
++ if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid)
++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ } else {
++ security_alert(GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG,
++ gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm,
++ task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
++ task->gid, task->egid,
++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task),
++ task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
++ task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid,
++ task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid,
++ kdevname(curr->device), curr->inode,
++ curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ);
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(tsk) {
++ if (likely(tsk != task)) {
++ curr2 = tsk->acl;
++
++ if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
++ curr2->inode == curr->inode)
++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
++ }
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ }
++ }
++
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return 0;
++
++ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
++ curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
++ filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
++ current->role);
++ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
++
++ if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
++ (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
++ return 0;
++
++ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
++ time_after(curr->expires, jiffies))
++ return 1;
++ else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
++ curr->crashes = 0;
++ curr->expires = 0;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_alertkill(void)
++{
++ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
++ __u32 curr_ip;
++ struct task_struct *task;
++
++ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
++ return;
++
++ curracl = current->acl;
++ curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
++
++ if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip &&
++ (curr_ip != 0xffffffff)) {
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(task) {
++ if (task->curr_ip == curr_ip)
++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
++ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
++
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
++/* shared memory handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++ struct task_struct *task;
++
++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++ return 1;
++
++ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
++
++ if (unlikely(!task))
++ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
++
++ if (unlikely(task && ((task->start_time < shm_createtime) ||
++ (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
++ (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
++ (task->acl != current->acl))) {
++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++ if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
++ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
++ !grsec_enable_group)) {
++ security_audit(GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++ struct task_struct *p, **htable;
++
++ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
++ return 1;
++
++ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++ return 1;
++
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++ htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)];
++
++ for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next) ;
++
++ if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) {
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ security_alert(GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(const struct task_struct *p, const int niceval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (!have_same_root(p, current)
++ || (have_same_root(p, current)
++ && (niceval < task_nice(p))
++ && proc_is_chrooted(current)))) {
++ security_alert(GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -ESRCH;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
++ !have_same_root(current, target)) {
++ security_alert(GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG, target->comm, target->pid,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
++ inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
++ return 1;
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || (current->pid <= 1))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (p && p->fs && p->fs->root && p->fs->root->d_inode &&
++ child_reaper && child_reaper->fs && child_reaper->fs->root &&
++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode && current && current->fs &&
++ current->fs->root && current->fs->root->d_inode) {
++ if (proc_is_chrooted(current) && !have_same_root(current, p))
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
++ return 1;
++
++ if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
++ return 1;
++ else {
++ struct dentry *dentry = u_dentry;
++ struct vfsmount *mnt = u_mnt;
++ struct dentry *realroot;
++ struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
++ struct dentry *currentroot;
++ struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
++
++ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++ realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
++ realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
++ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
++
++ read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
++ currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
++ currentroot = dget(current->fs->root);
++ read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
++
++ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
++ for (;;) {
++ if (unlikely
++ ((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
++ || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
++ break;
++ if (unlikely
++ (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
++ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
++ break;
++ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
++ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
++ continue;
++ }
++ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
++ }
++ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
++
++ dput(currentroot);
++ mntput(currentmnt);
++
++ if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) {
++ /* ok, they're definitely trying to fchdir outside of the
++ chroot. */
++ dput(realroot);
++ mntput(realrootmnt);
++ security_alert(GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(u_dentry, u_mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ } else {
++ dput(realroot);
++ mntput(realrootmnt);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++ const time_t shm_createtime)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++ struct task_struct *p, **htable;
++
++ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
++ return 1;
++
++ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
++ return 1;
++
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++ htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_cprid)];
++
++ for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_cprid; p = p->pidhash_next) ;
++
++ if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p) &&
++ (p->start_time < shm_createtime))) {
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (unlikely(!p)) {
++ htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_lapid)];
++ for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_lapid;
++ p = p->pidhash_next) ;
++
++ if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) {
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ }
++
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
++ security_audit(GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) &&
++ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
++ task->cap_permitted =
++ cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++ task->cap_inheritable =
++ cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++ task->cap_effective =
++ cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
++ }
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
++ && (op & 002))
++ return -EACCES;
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
++ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
++ ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) &&
++ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
++ security_alert(GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
++/*
++ * when grsecurity is disabled, compile all external functions into nothing
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/config.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/in.h>
++#include <linux/ip.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
++__u32
++gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode)
++{
++ return mode;
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
++ const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_set_acls(const int type)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++__inline__ void
++gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++ struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_is_capable(const int cap)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_alertkill(void)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++ const int fmode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
++ unsigned int *vm_flags)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++ mode_t mode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
++ mode_t mode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++ const int mode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const ino_t ino)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
++ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
++ const int imode)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
++{
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++int
++gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
++{
++ return 1;
++}
++
++void
++gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/capability.h>
++
++#include <asm/uaccess.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_nproc(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++ if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
++ (atomic_read(¤t->user->processes) >
++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
++ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
++ security_alert(GR_NPROC_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EAGAIN;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++ char grarg[64] = { 0 };
++ __u8 execlen = 0;
++ unsigned int i;
++
++ if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
++ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
++ || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
++ return;
++
++ if (unlikely(!argv))
++ goto log;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 62; i++) {
++ char *p;
++ __u8 len;
++
++ if (get_user(p, argv + i))
++ goto log;
++ if (!p)
++ goto log;
++ len = strnlen_user(p, 62 - execlen);
++ if (len > 62 - execlen)
++ len = 62 - execlen;
++ else if (len > 0)
++ len--;
++ if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
++ goto log;
++ execlen += len;
++ *(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
++ *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
++ execlen++;
++ }
++
++ log:
++ security_audit(GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(bprm->file->f_dentry,
++ bprm->file->f_vfsmnt),
++ grarg, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++ if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
++ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
++ (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
++ (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
++ if (!permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode))
++ security_alert(GR_FIFO_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
++ dentry->d_inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++ if (grsec_enable_forkfail)
++ security_alert(GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++#include <linux/slab.h>
++
++int grsec_enable_link;
++int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++int grsec_enable_fifo;
++int grsec_enable_execve;
++int grsec_enable_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_signal;
++int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++int grsec_enable_time;
++int grsec_enable_group;
++int grsec_audit_gid;
++int grsec_enable_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++int grsec_enable_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++int grsec_enable_tpe;
++int grsec_tpe_gid;
++int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++int grsec_enable_randpid;
++int grsec_enable_randid;
++int grsec_enable_randisn;
++int grsec_enable_randsrc;
++int grsec_enable_randrpc;
++int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++int grsec_lock;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
++unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime = 0;
++unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0;
++
++spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
++
++char *gr_shared_page[4][NR_CPUS];
++extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
++extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
++
++void
++grsecurity_init(void)
++{
++ int i, j;
++ /* create the per-cpu shared pages */
++
++ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
++ for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) {
++ gr_shared_page[j][i] = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!gr_shared_page[j][i]) {
++ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
++ return;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ /* allocate memory for authentication structure */
++ gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL);
++ gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++ gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
++
++ if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) {
++ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure");
++ return;
++ }
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++ grsec_lock = 1;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++ grsec_enable_group = 1;
++ grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++ grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ grsec_enable_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++ grsec_enable_link = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++ grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++ grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++ grsec_enable_execve = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++ grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++ grsec_enable_signal = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++ grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++ grsec_enable_time = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++ grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++ grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++ grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++ grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++ grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++ grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++ grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++ grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++ grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++ grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++ grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++ grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++ grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++ grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
++ grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++ grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
++#endif
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++ grsec_enable_randpid = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ grsec_enable_randid = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++ grsec_enable_randisn = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++ grsec_enable_randsrc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++ grsec_enable_randrpc = 1;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++ grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
++ grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++ grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
++ grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++ grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
++ grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
++#endif
++#endif
++
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/types.h>
++#include <linux/ipc.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
++ && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
++ security_audit(GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++ security_audit(GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++ && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
++ security_audit(GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++ security_audit(GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
++ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
++ && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
++ security_audit(GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
++ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
++ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
++ security_audit(GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++ const struct inode *inode,
++ const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++ if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
++ (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
++ (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++ if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
++ (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
++ ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
++ (permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) &&
++ !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
++ security_alert(GR_HARDLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
++ inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_handle_ioperm(void)
++{
++ security_alert(GR_IOPERM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_iopl(void)
++{
++ security_alert(GR_IOPL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_mem_write(void)
++{
++ security_alert(GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
++{
++ security_alert(GR_KMEM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_handle_open_port(void)
++{
++ security_alert(GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
++{
++ if (offset < __pa(high_memory) &&
++ (pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) & PROT_WRITE) &&
++ !(offset == 0xf0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x10000)) &&
++ !(offset == 0xa0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x20000))) {
++ security_alert(GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory))
++ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++ security_audit(GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++ security_audit(GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++void
++gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
++ security_audit(GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int last_pid;
++
++int
++gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++ struct task_struct *p;
++ int pid;
++
++ if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) {
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ spin_lock(pid_lock);
++
++ repeater:
++
++ pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % PID_MAX);
++
++ for_each_task(p) {
++ if (p->pid == pid || p->pgrp == pid ||
++ p->tgid == pid || p->session == pid)
++ goto repeater;
++ }
++ last_pid = pid;
++ spin_unlock(pid_lock);
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ return pid;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++ if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
++ (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
++ if (t->pid == current->pid) {
++ security_alert_good(GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ } else {
++ security_alert_good(GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, sig,
++ gr_task_fullpath(t), t->comm,
++ t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->gid,
++ t->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(t),
++ t->p_pptr->comm,
++ t->p_pptr->pid, t->p_pptr->uid,
++ t->p_pptr->euid, t->p_pptr->gid,
++ t->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, sig, gr_task_fullpath(p),
++ p->comm, p->pid, p->uid,
++ p->euid, p->gid, p->egid,
++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(p), p->p_pptr->comm,
++ p->p_pptr->pid, p->p_pptr->uid,
++ p->p_pptr->euid, p->p_pptr->gid,
++ p->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EPERM;
++ } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) {
++ return -EPERM;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++void
++gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct task_struct *p;
++ unsigned int i;
++ struct inode *inode;
++ struct file *filp;
++ struct socket *connect_sock;
++
++ if (unlikely(sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
++ return;
++
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ for_each_task(p) {
++ if (!p->used_connect)
++ continue;
++ task_lock(p);
++ if (unlikely(!p->files)) {
++ task_unlock(p);
++ continue;
++ }
++ read_lock(&p->files->file_lock);
++ for (i = 0; i < p->files->max_fds; i++) {
++ filp = fcheck_files(p->files, i);
++ if (likely(!filp))
++ continue;
++ inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode;
++ if (likely(!inode || !inode->i_sock))
++ continue;
++ connect_sock = &inode->u.socket_i;
++ if (unlikely(!connect_sock ||
++ connect_sock->sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
++ continue;
++ if (unlikely(sk->rcv_saddr == connect_sock->sk->daddr &&
++ sk->daddr == connect_sock->sk->rcv_saddr &&
++ ntohs(sk->sport) ==
++ ntohs(connect_sock->sk->dport)
++ && ntohs(sk->dport) ==
++ ntohs(connect_sock->sk->sport))) {
++ current->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
++ current->used_accept = 1;
++ read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock);
++ task_unlock(p);
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ return;
++ }
++ }
++ read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock);
++ task_unlock(p);
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++
++ current->curr_ip = sk->daddr;
++ current->used_accept = 1;
++#endif
++ return;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++ if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
++ (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, family, type, protocol,
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++ if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
++ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
++ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++ security_alert(GR_BIND_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++ if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
++ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
++ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
++ security_alert(GR_CONNECT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++gr_cap_rtnetlink(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
++ return current->cap_effective;
++ else
++ return (current->cap_effective & ~(current->acl->cap_lower));
++#else
++ return current->cap_effective;
++#endif
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/sysctl.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++int
++gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++ if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
++ security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++void
++gr_log_timechange(void)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++ if (grsec_enable_time)
++ security_alert_good(GR_TIME_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
++#endif
++ return;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void);
++
++int
++gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
++{
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
++
++ if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) &&
++ (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
++ (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
++ security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++ if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
++ ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
++ (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
++ security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
++ gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
++ DEFAULTSECARGS);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#endif
++#endif
++ return 1;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsum.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/grsum.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/grsum.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/mm.h>
++#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
++#include <linux/crypto.h>
++#include <linux/gracl.h>
++
++
++#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE)
++#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel"
++#endif
++
++int
++chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
++{
++ char *p;
++ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
++ unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++ struct scatterlist sg[2];
++ volatile int retval = 0;
++ volatile int dummy = 0;
++ unsigned int i;
++
++ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0);
++ if (tfm == NULL) {
++ /* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ crypto_digest_init(tfm);
++
++ p = salt;
++ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
++ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
++ sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN;
++
++ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
++
++ p = entry->pw;
++ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
++ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
++ sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw);
++
++ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
++
++ crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum);
++
++ memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
++
++ for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
++ if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
++ retval = 1;
++ else
++ dummy = 1; // waste a cycle
++
++ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
++
++ return retval;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
++
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 2000-2002 Michael Shalayeff.
++ *
++ * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
++ *
++ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.
++ * All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Copyright 1998 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
++ * All rights reserved.
++ * Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> came up with the idea of using
++ * such a mathematical system to generate more random (yet non-repeating)
++ * ids to solve the resolver/named problem. But Niels designed the
++ * actual system based on the constraints.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer,
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
++ * must display the following acknowledgement:
++ * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
++ * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
++ * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/timer.h>
++#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#define RU_OUT 180
++#define RU_MAX 30000
++#define RU_GEN 2
++#define RU_N 32749
++#define RU_AGEN 7
++#define RU_M 31104
++#define PFAC_N 3
++const static __u16 pfacts[PFAC_N] = { 2, 3, 2729 };
++
++static __u16 ru_x;
++static __u16 ru_seed, ru_seed2;
++static __u16 ru_a, ru_b;
++static __u16 ru_g;
++static __u16 ru_counter = 0;
++static __u16 ru_msb = 0;
++static unsigned long ru_reseed = 0;
++static __u32 tmp;
++
++#define TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS 15
++#define TCP_RNDISS_OUT 7200
++#define TCP_RNDISS_MAX 30000
++
++static __u8 tcp_rndiss_sbox[NR_CPUS][128];
++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_msb[NR_CPUS];
++static __u16 tcp_rndiss_cnt[NR_CPUS];
++static unsigned long tcp_rndiss_reseed[NR_CPUS];
++
++static __u16 pmod(__u16, __u16, __u16);
++static void ip_initid(void);
++__u16 ip_randomid(void);
++
++static __u16
++pmod(__u16 gen, __u16 exp, __u16 mod)
++{
++ __u16 s, t, u;
++
++ s = 1;
++ t = gen;
++ u = exp;
++
++ while (u) {
++ if (u & 1)
++ s = (s * t) % mod;
++ u >>= 1;
++ t = (t * t) % mod;
++ }
++ return (s);
++}
++
++static void
++ip_initid(void)
++{
++ __u16 j, i;
++ int noprime = 1;
++
++ ru_x = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xFFFF) % RU_M;
++
++ ru_seed = (tmp >> 16) & 0x7FFF;
++ ru_seed2 = get_random_long() & 0x7FFF;
++
++ ru_b = ((tmp = get_random_long()) & 0xfffe) | 1;
++ ru_a = pmod(RU_AGEN, (tmp >> 16) & 0xfffe, RU_M);
++ while (ru_b % 3 == 0)
++ ru_b += 2;
++
++ j = (tmp = get_random_long()) % RU_N;
++ tmp = tmp >> 16;
++
++ while (noprime) {
++ for (i = 0; i < PFAC_N; i++)
++ if (j % pfacts[i] == 0)
++ break;
++
++ if (i >= PFAC_N)
++ noprime = 0;
++ else
++ j = (j + 1) % RU_N;
++ }
++
++ ru_g = pmod(RU_GEN, j, RU_N);
++ ru_counter = 0;
++
++ ru_reseed = xtime.tv_sec + RU_OUT;
++ ru_msb = ru_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
++}
++
++__u16
++ip_randomid(void)
++{
++ int i, n;
++
++ if (ru_counter >= RU_MAX || time_after(xtime.tv_sec, ru_reseed))
++ ip_initid();
++
++ if (!tmp)
++ tmp = get_random_long();
++
++ n = tmp & 0x3;
++ tmp = tmp >> 2;
++ if (ru_counter + n >= RU_MAX)
++ ip_initid();
++ for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
++ ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % RU_M;
++ ru_counter += i;
++
++ return ((ru_seed ^ pmod(ru_g, ru_seed2 ^ ru_x, RU_N)) | ru_msb);
++}
++
++__u16
++tcp_rndiss_encrypt(__u16 val)
++{
++ __u16 sum = 0, i;
++ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
++
++ for (i = 0; i < TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS; i++) {
++ sum += 0x79b9;
++ val ^= ((__u16) tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu][(val ^ sum) ^ 0x7f]) << 7;
++ val = ((val & 0xff) << 7) | (val >> 8);
++ }
++
++ return val;
++}
++
++static void
++tcp_rndiss_init(void)
++{
++ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
++
++ get_random_bytes(tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu], sizeof (tcp_rndiss_sbox));
++ tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu] = xtime.tv_sec + TCP_RNDISS_OUT;
++ tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] = tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
++ tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] = 0;
++}
++
++__u32
++ip_randomisn(void)
++{
++ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
++
++ if (tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] >= TCP_RNDISS_MAX ||
++ time_after(xtime.tv_sec, tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu]))
++ tcp_rndiss_init();
++
++ return (((tcp_rndiss_encrypt(tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu]++) |
++ tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu]) << 16) | (get_random_long() & 0x7fff));
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
+ set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000 \
+ ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4))
+
+-#define STACK_TOP \
++#define __STACK_TOP \
+ (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL)
+
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2003-08-25 13:44:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -41,6 +41,18 @@
+
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19)
++#endif
++
++
+ /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be
+ registered using atexit. This provides a mean for the dynamic
+ linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2000-03-16 23:07:09.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
+ #define MAP_LOCKED 0x8000 /* lock the mapping */
+ #define MAP_NORESERVE 0x10000 /* don't check for reservations */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_SYNC 2 /* synchronous memory sync */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS)
+ #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE)
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
++#else
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE)
+
+ #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x))
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 1995-06-16 20:33:06.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@
+
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+
+-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define __STACK_TOP ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE)
++#else
++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#endif
+
+ #endif
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/desc.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2001-07-26 22:40:32.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@
+ };
+
+ extern struct desc_struct gdt_table[];
+-extern struct desc_struct *idt, *gdt;
++extern struct desc_struct gdt_table2[];
++extern struct desc_struct *idt, *gdt, *gdt2;
+
+ struct Xgt_desc_struct {
+ unsigned short size;
+@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@
+
+ #define idt_descr (*(struct Xgt_desc_struct *)((char *)&idt - 2))
+ #define gdt_descr (*(struct Xgt_desc_struct *)((char *)&gdt - 2))
++#define gdt_descr2 (*(struct Xgt_desc_struct *)((char *)&gdt2 - 2))
+
+ #define load_TR(n) __asm__ __volatile__("ltr %%ax"::"a" (__TSS(n)<<3))
+
+@@ -67,6 +69,7 @@
+ extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
+ extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr);
+ extern void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr, unsigned int size);
++extern void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr, unsigned int size);
+ extern void set_tss_desc(unsigned int n, void *addr);
+
+ static inline void clear_LDT(void)
+@@ -94,6 +97,21 @@
+ __load_LDT(cpu);
+ }
+
++static inline void _load_LDT (struct mm_struct *mm)
++{
++ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
++ void *segments = mm->context.segments;
++ int count = LDT_ENTRIES;
++
++ if (!segments) {
++ segments = &default_ldt[0];
++ count = 5;
++ }
++
++ __set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count);
++ __load_LDT(cpu);
++}
++
+ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2001-11-22 20:48:29.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -55,7 +55,22 @@
+ the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
+ that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3*2:TASK_SIZE/3*2)
++#else
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x08048000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
++#endif
+
+ /* Wow, the "main" arch needs arch dependent functions too.. :) */
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/hw_irq.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/hw_irq.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/hw_irq.h 2003-08-25 13:44:43.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/hw_irq.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@
+ asmlinkage void x(void); \
+ asmlinkage void call_##x(void); \
+ __asm__( \
++"\n .text" \
+ "\n"__ALIGN_STR"\n" \
+ SYMBOL_NAME_STR(x) ":\n\t" \
+ "pushl $"#v"-256\n\t" \
+@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@
+ asmlinkage void x(struct pt_regs * regs); \
+ asmlinkage void call_##x(void); \
+ __asm__( \
++"\n .text" \
+ "\n"__ALIGN_STR"\n" \
+ SYMBOL_NAME_STR(x) ":\n\t" \
+ "pushl $"#v"-256\n\t" \
+@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@
+ #define BUILD_COMMON_IRQ() \
+ asmlinkage void call_do_IRQ(void); \
+ __asm__( \
++ "\n .text" \
+ "\n" __ALIGN_STR"\n" \
+ "common_interrupt:\n\t" \
+ SAVE_ALL \
+@@ -175,6 +178,7 @@
+ #define BUILD_IRQ(nr) \
+ asmlinkage void IRQ_NAME(nr); \
+ __asm__( \
++"\n .text" \
+ "\n"__ALIGN_STR"\n" \
+ SYMBOL_NAME_STR(IRQ) #nr "_interrupt:\n\t" \
+ "pushl $"#nr"-256\n\t" \
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2000-03-15 02:45:20.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+ #define MAP_LOCKED 0x2000 /* pages are locked */
+ #define MAP_NORESERVE 0x4000 /* don't check for reservations */
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x8000
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/page.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/page.h 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/page.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
+ * and CONFIG_HIGHMEM64G options in the kernel configuration.
+ */
+
+-#define __PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000)
++#include <asm/page_offset.h>
+
+ /*
+ * This much address space is reserved for vmalloc() and iomap()
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/page_offset.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/page_offset.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/page_offset.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/page_offset.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000)
++#define __PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -205,6 +205,16 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#else
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL \
+ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE \
+@@ -237,18 +247,18 @@
+ * This is the closest we can get..
+ */
+ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+ #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P110 PAGE_COPY
+ #define __P111 PAGE_COPY
+
+ #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+ #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
+@@ -324,7 +334,7 @@
+ ((unsigned long) __va(pmd_val(pmd) & PAGE_MASK))
+
+ /* to find an entry in a page-table-directory. */
+-#define pgd_index(address) ((address >> PGDIR_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PGD-1))
++#define pgd_index(address) (((address) >> PGDIR_SHIFT) & (PTRS_PER_PGD-1))
+
+ #define __pgd_offset(address) pgd_index(address)
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/processor.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -261,10 +261,19 @@
+ */
+ #define TASK_SIZE (PAGE_OFFSET)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE ((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2)
++#endif
++
+ /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
+ * space during mmap's.
+ */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3:TASK_SIZE/3)
++#else
+ #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3)
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Size of io_bitmap in longwords: 32 is ports 0-0x3ff.
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/system.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-i386/system.h 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-i386/system.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
+ struct task_struct; /* one of the stranger aspects of C forward declarations.. */
+ extern void FASTCALL(__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next));
+
++void pax_switch_segments(struct task_struct *);
++
+ #define switch_to(prev,next,last) do { \
+ asm volatile("pushl %%esi\n\t" \
+ "pushl %%edi\n\t" \
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2000-12-05 21:29:39.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
+ /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc.
+ * prumpf */
+
+-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
+
+ #endif
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -135,6 +135,17 @@
+
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
++#endif
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+ instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
+ but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2000-12-05 21:29:39.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
+ #define MAP_NORESERVE 0x4000 /* don't check for reservations */
+ #define MAP_GROWSDOWN 0x8000 /* stack-like segment */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_SYNC 1 /* synchronous memory sync */
+ #define MS_ASYNC 2 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -167,6 +167,17 @@
+ #define PAGE_EXECREAD __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_EXECREAD
+ #define PAGE_RWX __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
++#else
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
+ #define __PPC_A_OUT_H__
+
+ /* grabbed from the intel stuff */
+-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
++#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
+
+
+ struct exec
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -46,6 +46,17 @@
+
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 15
++#endif
++
+ #define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP
+ #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -335,6 +335,16 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
+ #define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
++#else
++# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_SHARED)
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL_CI __pgprot(_PAGE_IO)
+@@ -346,21 +356,21 @@
+ * This is the closest we can get..
+ */
+ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X
+-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __P110 PAGE_COPY
++#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X
+ #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X
+
+ #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X
+-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X
+ #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X
+-#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X
+ #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X
+
+ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2000-01-13 21:03:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
+
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+
+-#define STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
++#define __STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
+
+ #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2000-07-12 04:02:37.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,18 @@
+
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000)
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
++#endif
++
++
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+ instruction set this cpu supports. This can NOT be done in userspace
+ on Sparc. */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -97,6 +97,13 @@
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy)
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec)
++BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec)
++#endif
++
+ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
+
+ #define PMD_SHIFT BTFIXUP_SIMM13(pmd_shift)
+@@ -118,6 +125,16 @@
+ #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy))
+ #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly))
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec))
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec))
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec))
++#else
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
++
+ extern unsigned long page_kernel;
+
+ #ifdef MODULE
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2000-07-18 21:29:47.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -73,6 +73,15 @@
+ SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
+ SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++ SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++ SRMMU_REF)
++#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
++ SRMMU_REF)
++#endif
++
+ #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \
+ SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF)
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
+ * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting
+ * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions.
+ */
+-#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < STACK_TOP)
++#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < __STACK_TOP)
+ #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
+ #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size)))
+ #define access_ok(type,addr,size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2001-04-27 07:17:26.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
+
+ #ifdef __KERNEL__
+
+-#define STACK_TOP (current->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
++#define __STACK_TOP (current->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
+
+ #endif
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -82,6 +82,17 @@
+ #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x0000010000000000UL
+ #endif
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL)
++
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
++#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 14 : 28 )
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
++#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 14 : 28 )
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
++#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->thread.flags & SPARC_FLAG_32BIT ? 15 : 29 )
++#endif
++
+
+ /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
+ instruction set this cpu supports. */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2003-06-13 16:51:38.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
+ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
+ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
++#endif
++
+ #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
+ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
+ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h 2002-08-03 02:39:45.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/asm-sparc64/pgtable.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@
+ #define _PAGE_G 0x0000000000000001 /* Global */
+
+ /* Here are the SpitFire software bits we use in the TTE's. */
+-#define _PAGE_MODIFIED 0x0000000000000800 /* Modified Page (ie. dirty) */
++#define _PAGE_MODIFIED 0x0000000000001000 /* Modified Page (ie. dirty) */
++#define _PAGE_EXEC 0x0000000000000800 /* Executable SW bit */
+ #define _PAGE_ACCESSED 0x0000000000000400 /* Accessed Page (ie. referenced) */
+ #define _PAGE_READ 0x0000000000000200 /* Readable SW Bit */
+ #define _PAGE_WRITE 0x0000000000000100 /* Writable SW Bit */
+@@ -150,16 +151,30 @@
+
+ /* Don't set the TTE _PAGE_W bit here, else the dirty bit never gets set. */
+ #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+- __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE)
++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC)
+
+ #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+- __ACCESS_BITS)
++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC)
+
+ #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+- __ACCESS_BITS)
++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_EXEC)
+
+ #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
+- __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS)
++ __PRIV_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | __DIRTY_BITS | \
++ _PAGE_EXEC)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++ __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_WRITE)
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++ __ACCESS_BITS)
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_CACHE | \
++ __ACCESS_BITS)
++#else
++#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
++#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
++#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
++#endif
+
+ #define PAGE_INVALID __pgprot (0)
+
+@@ -170,18 +185,18 @@
+ #define pg_iobits (_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_PRESENT | __DIRTY_BITS | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_E)
+
+ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
+-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
++#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
++#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+ #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __P110 PAGE_COPY
+ #define __P111 PAGE_COPY
+
+ #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
+-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
+-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
+-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
++#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
++#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
++#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+ #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY
+ #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/a.out.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/a.out.h 2001-11-22 20:46:18.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/a.out.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@
+
+ #include <asm/a.out.h>
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDUSTACK
++#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
++#else
++#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL
++#endif
++
++#ifndef STACK_TOP
++#define STACK_TOP (__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK)
++#endif
++
+ #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */
+
+ /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */
+@@ -37,6 +47,14 @@
+ M_MIPS2 = 152 /* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
+ };
+
++/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
++#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
++#define F_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
+ #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/binfmts.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/binfmts.h 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/binfmts.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -61,6 +61,8 @@
+ extern int do_coredump(long signr, struct pt_regs * regs);
+ extern void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
+
++void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp);
++void pax_report_insns(void *pc);
+
+ #if 0
+ /* this went away now */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/elf.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/elf.h 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/elf.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
+ #define DT_DEBUG 21
+ #define DT_TEXTREL 22
+ #define DT_JMPREL 23
++#define DT_FLAGS 30
++#define DF_TEXTREL 0x00000004
+ #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000
+ #define DT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff
+ #define DT_MIPS_RLD_VERSION 0x70000001
+@@ -255,6 +257,13 @@
+ #define R_MIPS_LOVENDOR 100
+ #define R_MIPS_HIVENDOR 127
+
++/* Constants for the e_flags field */
++#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
++#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
+
+ /*
+ * Sparc ELF relocation types
+@@ -550,6 +559,8 @@
+ #define EI_VERSION 6
+ #define EI_PAD 7
+
++#define EI_PAX 14
++
+ #define ELFMAG0 0x7f /* EI_MAG */
+ #define ELFMAG1 'E'
+ #define ELFMAG2 'L'
+@@ -597,6 +608,7 @@
+ #define elfhdr elf32_hdr
+ #define elf_phdr elf32_phdr
+ #define elf_note elf32_note
++#define elf_dyn Elf32_Dyn
+
+ #else
+
+@@ -604,6 +616,7 @@
+ #define elfhdr elf64_hdr
+ #define elf_phdr elf64_phdr
+ #define elf_note elf64_note
++#define elf_dyn Elf64_Dyn
+
+ #endif
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/fs.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/fs.h 2003-10-20 18:59:08.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/fs.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1167,7 +1167,7 @@
+
+ asmlinkage long sys_open(const char *, int, int);
+ asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int); /* yes, it's really unsigned */
+-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start);
++extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *);
+
+ extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
+ extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/gracl.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/gracl.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/gracl.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
++#ifndef GR_ACL_H
++#define GR_ACL_H
++#endif
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/resource.h>
++
++#include <asm/resource.h>
++
++/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
++ * grsecurity ACL System
++ * Main header file
++ * Purpose: define most gracl data structures
++ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
++
++/* Major status information */
++
++#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.0"
++
++enum {
++
++ SHUTDOWN = 0,
++ ENABLE = 1,
++ SPROLE = 2,
++ RELOAD = 3,
++ SEGVMOD = 4,
++ STATUS = 5,
++ UNSPROLE = 6
++};
++
++/* Password setup definitions
++ * kernel/grhash.c */
++enum {
++ GR_PW_LEN = 128,
++ GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
++ GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
++};
++
++enum {
++ GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
++};
++
++/* Begin Data Structures */
++
++struct sprole_pw {
++ unsigned char *rolename;
++ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
++};
++
++struct name_entry {
++ ino_t inode;
++ kdev_t device;
++ char *name;
++ __u16 len;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_db {
++ struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
++ __u32 r_size;
++};
++
++struct name_db {
++ struct name_entry **n_hash;
++ __u32 n_size;
++};
++
++struct crash_uid {
++ uid_t uid;
++ unsigned long expires;
++};
++
++/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
++struct acl_subject_label {
++ char *filename;
++ ino_t inode;
++ kdev_t device;
++ __u32 mode;
++ __u32 cap_raise;
++ __u32 cap_lower;
++
++ struct rlimit res[RLIM_NLIMITS + 1];
++ __u16 resmask;
++
++ __u32 ip_proto[8];
++ __u32 ip_type;
++ struct acl_ip_label **ips;
++ __u32 ip_num;
++
++ __u32 crashes;
++ unsigned long expires;
++
++ struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
++ struct acl_object_label *proc_object;
++ struct acl_ip_label *ip_object;
++ struct acl_subject_label *prev;
++ struct acl_subject_label *next;
++
++ struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
++ __u32 obj_hash_size;
++};
++
++struct role_allowed_ip {
++ __u32 addr;
++ __u32 netmask;
++
++ struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
++ struct role_allowed_ip *next;
++};
++
++struct role_transition {
++ char *rolename;
++
++ struct role_transition *prev;
++ struct role_transition *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_role_label {
++ char *rolename;
++ uid_t uidgid;
++ __u16 roletype;
++
++ __u16 auth_attempts;
++ unsigned long expires;
++
++ struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
++ struct acl_subject_label *proc_subject;
++
++ struct acl_role_label *prev;
++ struct acl_role_label *next;
++
++ struct role_transition *transitions;
++ struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
++ struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
++ __u32 subj_hash_size;
++};
++
++struct user_acl_role_db {
++ struct acl_role_label **r_table;
++ __u32 r_entries; /* number of entries in table */
++ __u32 s_entries; /* total number of subject acls */
++ __u32 i_entries; /* total number of ip acls */
++ __u32 o_entries; /* Total number of object acls */
++ __u32 a_entries; /* total number of allowed ips */
++ __u32 t_entries; /* total number of transitions */
++};
++
++struct acl_object_label {
++ char *filename;
++ ino_t inode;
++ kdev_t device;
++ __u32 mode;
++
++ struct acl_subject_label *nested;
++
++ /* next two structures not used */
++
++ struct acl_object_label *prev;
++ struct acl_object_label *next;
++};
++
++struct acl_ip_label {
++ __u32 addr;
++ __u32 netmask;
++ __u16 low, high;
++ __u8 mode;
++ __u32 type;
++ __u32 proto[8];
++
++ /* next two structures not used */
++
++ struct acl_ip_label *prev;
++ struct acl_ip_label *next;
++};
++
++struct gr_arg {
++ struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
++ unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
++ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
++ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
++ unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
++ struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
++ __u16 num_sprole_pws;
++ kdev_t segv_device;
++ ino_t segv_inode;
++ uid_t segv_uid;
++ __u16 mode;
++};
++
++/* End Data Structures Section */
++
++/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
++ Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times
++ in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match.
++ Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++ return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++fhash(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++ return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
++}
++
++static __inline__ unsigned long
++nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz)
++{
++ return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz;
++}
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/gralloc.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/gralloc.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/gralloc.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
++#define __GRALLOC_H
++
++void acl_free_all(void);
++int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
++void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grdefs.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grdefs.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grdefs.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++#ifndef GRDEFS_H
++#define GRDEFS_H
++
++/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
++
++enum {
++ GR_READY = 0x01,
++ GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state
++};
++
++/* Begin ACL declarations */
++
++/* Role flags */
++
++enum {
++ GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
++ GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
++ GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
++ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
++ GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
++ GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
++ GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040,
++ GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080,
++ GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100
++};
++
++/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
++enum {
++ GR_DELETED = 0x00000080
++};
++
++/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
++enum {
++ GR_READ = 0x00000001,
++ GR_APPEND = 0x00000002,
++ GR_WRITE = 0x00000004,
++ GR_EXEC = 0x00000008,
++ GR_FIND = 0x00000010,
++ GR_INHERIT = 0x00000040,
++ GR_PTRACERD = 0x00000100,
++ GR_SETID = 0x00000200,
++ GR_CREATE = 0x00000400,
++ GR_DELETE = 0x00000800,
++ GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00001000,
++ GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00002000,
++ GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x0004000,
++ GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00008000,
++ GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00010000,
++ GR_AUDIT_INHERIT = 0x00020000,
++ GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00400000,
++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00800000,
++ GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x01000000,
++ GR_SUPPRESS = 0x02000000,
++ GR_NOLEARN = 0x04000000
++};
++
++#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
++ GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
++ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE)
++
++/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
++enum {
++ GR_KILL = 0x00000001,
++ GR_VIEW = 0x00000002,
++ GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000100,
++ GR_LEARN = 0x00000200,
++ GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000400,
++ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++ GR_DUMMY = 0x00000800,
++
++ GR_PAXPAGE = 0x00001000,
++ GR_PAXSEGM = 0x00002000,
++ GR_PAXGCC = 0x00004000,
++ GR_PAXRANDMMAP = 0x00008000,
++ GR_PAXRANDEXEC = 0x00010000,
++ GR_PAXMPROTECT = 0x00020000,
++ GR_PROTSHM = 0x00040000,
++ GR_KILLPROC = 0x00080000,
++ GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00100000,
++ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
++ GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00200000,
++ GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00400000,
++ GR_PROCACCT = 0x00800000
++};
++
++#define GR_CRASH_RES 11
++#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
++
++/* begin resource learning section */
++enum {
++ GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
++ GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
++ GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
++ GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
++ GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
++ GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
++ GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
++ GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
++ GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
++ GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
++ GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
++};
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grinternal.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grinternal.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grinternal.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
++#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
++#define __GRINTERNAL_H
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++
++#include <linux/grdefs.h>
++#include <linux/grmsg.h>
++
++extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
++extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern __inline__ __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
++extern int gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
++ struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
++extern int gr_set_acls(const int type);
++
++extern void gr_handle_alertkill(void);
++extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_link;
++extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
++extern int grsec_enable_execve;
++extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec;
++extern int grsec_forkbomb_max;
++extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_signal;
++extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
++extern int grsec_enable_time;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
++extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
++extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
++extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
++extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
++extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
++extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
++extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
++extern int grsec_audit_gid;
++extern int grsec_enable_group;
++extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
++extern int grsec_enable_mount;
++extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
++extern int grsec_lock;
++
++extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime;
++extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet;
++
++extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
++
++#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
++ gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->p_pptr->exec_file ? \
++ gr_to_filename3(tsk->p_pptr->exec_file->f_dentry, \
++ tsk->p_pptr->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
++
++#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \
++ ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev != \
++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) || \
++ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \
++ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)))
++
++#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev == \
++ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) && \
++ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \
++ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))
++
++#define DEFAULTSECARGS gr_task_fullpath(current), current->comm, \
++ current->pid, current->uid, \
++ current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, \
++ gr_parent_task_fullpath(current), \
++ current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid, \
++ current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid, \
++ current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid
++
++#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
++ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
++
++#define security_alert_good(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++ spin_lock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \
++ \
++ if (!grsec_alertgood_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \
++ grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; \
++ if (current->curr_ip) \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++ else \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++ } else if((jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alertgood_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \
++ grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \
++ if (current->curr_ip) \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++ else \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++ } else if (grsec_alertgood_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \
++ grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \
++ "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \
++ } \
++ \
++ spin_unlock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \
++})
++
++#define security_alert(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++ spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++ \
++ if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \
++ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet = 0; \
++ if (current->curr_ip) \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++ else \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++ } else if((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \
++ grsec_alert_fyet++; \
++ if (current->curr_ip) \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++ else \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
++ } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \
++ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet++; \
++ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \
++ "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \
++ } \
++ \
++ gr_handle_alertkill(); \
++ spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
++})
++
++#define security_audit(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++ spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
++ if (current->curr_ip) \
++ printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", \
++ NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
++ else \
++ printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
++ spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
++})
++
++#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
++({ \
++ gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
++})
++
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grmsg.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grmsg.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grmsg.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
++#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
++#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
++#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_KMEM_MSG "attempted write to /dev/kmem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "attempted open of /dev/port by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "attempted write of /dev/mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "attempted mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "refused attempt to mknod %.950s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect to the unix domain socket %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_NPROC_MSG "attempt to overstep process limit by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning execution of [%.16s:%lu] for %lu seconds"
++#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to mount %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to pivot_root from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to double chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to chmod +s %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "attempted fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s"
++#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
++#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: being fed garbage %d bytes sent %d required"
++#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "Loaded %s"
++#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "Unable to load %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG " RBAC system may already be enabled."
++#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
++#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "Reloaded %s"
++#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "Failed reload of %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "Invalid mode %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d), locking password authentication"
++#define GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d) trying to auth to special role %s, locking auth for role of " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG "denied capset of (%.16s:%d) within chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "Attempted send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "attempt to modify grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "Fatal: Unable to find ACL for (%.16s:%d)"
++#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SOCK_MSG "attempted socket(%d,%d,%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_BIND_MSG "attempted bind() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "attempted connect by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "attempted bind to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "attempted connect to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
++#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount %.30s to %.64s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.63s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
++#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "attempted resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu by " DEFAULTSECMSG
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grsecurity.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
++#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
++#define GR_SECURITY_H
++
++extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(const struct task_struct *p,
++ const int niceval);
++extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
++extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const char *dev_name);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
++
++extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode);
++extern int gr_handle_nproc(void);
++
++extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
++extern void gr_handle_iopl(void);
++
++extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
++
++extern int gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock);
++
++extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_timechange(void);
++extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
++extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
++extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
++extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
++extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
++extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
++extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
++
++extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
++ const struct inode *inode,
++ const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
++ const int acc_mode);
++extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
++ struct inode *inode,
++ const int mode, const char *to);
++
++extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap);
++extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
++ const unsigned long wanted);
++extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
++extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
++extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
++extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
++ const unsigned long prot);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
++ const unsigned long prot);
++extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
++extern int gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
++extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
++extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
++extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
++ const gid_t gid);
++extern void gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct dentry *p_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
++ const int imode);
++extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ const int mode);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ const char *from);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
++ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
++extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
++ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
++ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const ino_t ino);
++extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
++ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
++extern void gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task);
++extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
++extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
++extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
++extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
++extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
++extern void gr_handle_open_port(void);
++extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
++ struct vm_area_struct *vma);
++
++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
++extern __u32 ip_randomisn(void);
++extern unsigned long get_random_long(void);
++
++extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
++extern int grsec_enable_randid;
++extern int grsec_enable_randisn;
++extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
++extern int grsec_enable_randrpc;
++#endif
++
++#endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/kernel.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/kernel.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/kernel.h 2003-10-20 18:58:49.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/kernel.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -71,14 +71,17 @@
+ extern long long simple_strtoll(const char *,char **,unsigned int);
+ extern int sprintf(char * buf, const char * fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3)));
+-extern int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *, va_list);
++extern int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *, va_list)
++ __attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 0)));
+ extern int snprintf(char * buf, size_t size, const char * fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 4)));
+-extern int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args);
++extern int vsnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args)
++ __attribute__ ((format (printf, 3, 0)));
+
+ extern int sscanf(const char *, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__ ((format (scanf,2,3)));
+-extern int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list);
++extern int vsscanf(const char *, const char *, va_list)
++ __attribute__ ((format (scanf, 2, 0)));
+
+ extern void qsort(void *, size_t, size_t, int (*)(const void *,const void *));
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/mm.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/mm.h 2003-10-20 18:58:48.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/mm.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -22,9 +22,13 @@
+ extern struct list_head active_list;
+ extern struct list_head inactive_list;
+
++extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct * task, const int limit,
++ const unsigned long wanted);
++
+ #include <asm/page.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/atomic.h>
++#include <asm/mman.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Linux kernel virtual memory manager primitives.
+@@ -104,6 +108,33 @@
+ #define VM_DONTEXPAND 0x00040000 /* Cannot expand with mremap() */
+ #define VM_RESERVED 0x00080000 /* Don't unmap it from swap_out */
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++#define VM_MIRROR 0x00100000 /* vma is mirroring another */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE 0x00200000 /* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */
++#endif
++
++#ifdef ARCH_STACK_GROWSUP
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS 0x00000233
++#else
++#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS 0x00000133
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++#define VM_STACK_FLAGS (__VM_STACK_FLAGS | \
++ ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
++ ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
++#else
++#define VM_STACK_FLAGS (__VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_MAYEXEC | \
++ ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
++#endif
++#else
++#define VM_STACK_FLAGS (__VM_STACK_FLAGS | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC)
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef VM_STACK_FLAGS
+ #define VM_STACK_FLAGS 0x00000177
+ #endif
+@@ -568,22 +599,50 @@
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flag,
+ unsigned long pgoff);
+
++extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t);
++
+ static inline unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flag, unsigned long offset)
+ {
+ unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr && addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)))
++ goto out;
++#endif
++
+ if ((offset + PAGE_ALIGN(len)) < offset)
+ goto out;
+ if (!(offset & ~PAGE_MASK))
+ ret = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flag,
+ offset >> PAGE_SHIFT);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++#define BAD_ADDR(x) ((unsigned long)(x) > TASK_SIZE)
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !BAD_ADDR(ret) &&
++ (prot & PROT_EXEC) && ((flag & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ && (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) || (file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE)))
++#endif
++ )
++ {
++ unsigned long ret_m;
++ ret_m = do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flag | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret);
++ if (BAD_ADDR(ret_m)) {
++ do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len);
++ ret = ret_m;
++ }
++ }
++#undef BAD_ADDR
++#endif
++
+ out:
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+-extern int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *, unsigned long, size_t);
+-
+ extern unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long, unsigned long);
+
+ static inline void __vma_unlink(struct mm_struct * mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma, struct vm_area_struct * prev)
+@@ -596,6 +655,12 @@
+
+ static inline int can_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
+ {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((vma->vm_flags | vm_flags) & VM_MIRROR)
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
+ if (!vma->vm_file && vma->vm_flags == vm_flags)
+ return 1;
+ else
+@@ -649,7 +714,12 @@
+
+ return gfp_mask;
+ }
+-
++
++/* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */
++extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr);
++extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_prev(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr,
++ struct vm_area_struct **pprev);
++
+ /* vma is the first one with address < vma->vm_end,
+ * and even address < vma->vm_start. Have to extend vma. */
+ static inline int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address)
+@@ -664,11 +734,51 @@
+ address &= PAGE_MASK;
+ spin_lock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
+ grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma->vm_end - address);
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT);
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
++ unsigned long address_m;
++
++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m);
++ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m || !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start) {
++ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ if (vma_m->vm_end - address_m > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
++ ((vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++ ((vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && ((vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm + 2*grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
++ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ vma_m->vm_start = address_m;
++ vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow;
++ vma_m->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
++ if (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
++ vma_m->vm_mm->locked_vm += grow;
++ } else
++#endif
++
+ if (vma->vm_end - address > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
+- ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) {
++ ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur ||
++ ((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && ((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) >
++ current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)) {
+ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
++
+ vma->vm_start = address;
+ vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
+ vma->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
+@@ -678,11 +788,6 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-/* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */
+-extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr);
+-extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_prev(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr,
+- struct vm_area_struct **pprev);
+-
+ /* Look up the first VMA which intersects the interval start_addr..end_addr-1,
+ NULL if none. Assume start_addr < end_addr. */
+ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long start_addr, unsigned long end_addr)
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/proc_fs.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/proc_fs.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -143,6 +143,9 @@
+ extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mknod(const char *,mode_t,
+ struct proc_dir_entry *,kdev_t);
+ extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir(const char *,struct proc_dir_entry *);
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
++extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *, struct proc_dir_entry *);
++#endif
+
+ static inline struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_read_entry(const char *name,
+ mode_t mode, struct proc_dir_entry *base,
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/sched.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/sched.h 2003-10-20 18:59:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/sched.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
+ #include <linux/securebits.h>
+ #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+
++extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap);
++extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p);
++
+ struct exec_domain;
+
+ /*
+@@ -250,6 +253,20 @@
+ unsigned long cpu_vm_mask;
+ unsigned long swap_address;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_DLRESOLVE
++ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
++ unsigned long call_syscall;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ASLR
++ unsigned long delta_mmap; /* PaX: randomized offset */
++ unsigned long delta_exec; /* PaX: randomized offset */
++ unsigned long delta_stack; /* PaX: randomized offset */
++#endif
++
+ unsigned dumpable:1;
+
+ /* Architecture-specific MM context */
+@@ -422,7 +439,7 @@
+ int (*notifier)(void *priv);
+ void *notifier_data;
+ sigset_t *notifier_mask;
+-
++
+ /* Thread group tracking */
+ u32 parent_exec_id;
+ u32 self_exec_id;
+@@ -433,6 +450,19 @@
+
+ /* journalling filesystem info */
+ void *journal_info;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++/* added by grsecurity's ACL system */
++ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
++ struct acl_role_label *role;
++ struct file *exec_file;
++ u32 curr_ip;
++ u16 acl_role_id;
++ u8 acl_sp_role:1;
++ u8 used_accept:1;
++ u8 used_connect:1;
++ u8 is_writable:1;
++#endif
+ };
+
+ /*
+@@ -454,6 +484,13 @@
+
+ #define PF_USEDFPU 0x00100000 /* task used FPU this quantum (SMP) */
+
++#define PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 0x01000000 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
++#define PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 0x02000000 /* Emulate trampolines */
++#define PF_PAX_MPROTECT 0x04000000 /* Restrict mprotect() */
++#define PF_PAX_RANDMMAP 0x08000000 /* Randomize mmap() base */
++#define PF_PAX_RANDEXEC 0x10000000 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
++#define PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 0x20000000 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
++
+ /*
+ * Ptrace flags
+ */
+@@ -574,6 +611,8 @@
+ *p->pidhash_pprev = p->pidhash_next;
+ }
+
++#include <asm/current.h>
++
+ static inline task_t *find_task_by_pid(int pid)
+ {
+ task_t *p, **htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)];
+@@ -581,6 +620,8 @@
+ for(p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next)
+ ;
+
++ if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) p = NULL;
++
+ return p;
+ }
+
+@@ -588,8 +629,6 @@
+ extern struct user_struct * alloc_uid(uid_t);
+ extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *);
+
+-#include <asm/current.h>
+-
+ extern unsigned long volatile jiffies;
+ extern unsigned long itimer_ticks;
+ extern unsigned long itimer_next;
+@@ -756,7 +795,7 @@
+ static inline int capable(int cap)
+ {
+ #if 1 /* ok now */
+- if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
++ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable(cap))
+ #else
+ if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? current->fsuid == 0 : current->euid == 0)
+ #endif
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/sysctl.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-10-20 18:59:00.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@
+ KERN_CORE_PATTERN=56, /* string: pattern for core-files */
+ KERN_PPC_L3CR=57, /* l3cr register on PPC */
+ KERN_EXCEPTION_TRACE=58, /* boolean: exception trace */
++ KERN_GRSECURITY=68, /* grsecurity */
+ };
+
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/net/inetpeer.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/net/inetpeer.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/net/inetpeer.h 2002-02-25 20:38:13.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/net/inetpeer.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
+ #include <linux/spinlock.h>
++
+ #include <asm/atomic.h>
+
+ struct inet_peer
+@@ -34,6 +35,11 @@
+ /* can be called with or without local BH being disabled */
+ struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(__u32 daddr, int create);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++extern int grsec_enable_randid;
++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
++#endif
++
+ extern spinlock_t inet_peer_unused_lock;
+ extern struct inet_peer *inet_peer_unused_head;
+ extern struct inet_peer **inet_peer_unused_tailp;
+@@ -58,7 +64,14 @@
+ __u16 id;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
+- id = p->ip_id_count++;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ id = p->ip_id_count++;
++
+ spin_unlock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
+ return id;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/include/net/ip.h linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/net/ip.h
+--- linux-2.4.22/include/net/ip.h 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/include/net/ip.h 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@
+ void (*destructor)(struct sock *);
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++extern int grsec_enable_randid;
++extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
++#endif
++
+ extern struct ip_ra_chain *ip_ra_chain;
+ extern rwlock_t ip_ra_lock;
+
+@@ -197,7 +202,13 @@
+ * does not change, they drop every other packet in
+ * a TCP stream using header compression.
+ */
+- iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ iph->id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0);
+ } else
+ __ip_select_ident(iph, dst);
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/init/main.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/init/main.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/init/main.c 2003-10-20 18:59:08.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/init/main.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/iobuf.h>
+ #include <linux/bootmem.h>
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+ #include <asm/bugs.h>
+@@ -112,6 +113,8 @@
+ extern void ipc_init(void);
+ #endif
+
++extern void grsecurity_init(void);
++
+ /*
+ * Boot command-line arguments
+ */
+@@ -563,6 +566,7 @@
+ do_basic_setup();
+
+ prepare_namespace();
++ grsecurity_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/ipc/msg.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/msg.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/ipc/msg.c 2003-06-13 16:51:39.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/msg.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/list.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "util.h"
+
+@@ -326,6 +327,9 @@
+ msg_unlock(id);
+ }
+ up(&msg_ids.sem);
++
++ gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg);
++
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -560,6 +564,8 @@
+ break;
+ }
+ case IPC_RMID:
++ gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
++
+ freeque (msqid);
+ break;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/ipc/sem.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/sem.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/ipc/sem.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/sem.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/time.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include "util.h"
+
+@@ -182,6 +183,9 @@
+ }
+
+ up(&sem_ids.sem);
++
++ gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
++
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -724,6 +728,8 @@
+
+ switch(cmd){
+ case IPC_RMID:
++ gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
++
+ freeary(semid);
+ err = 0;
+ break;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/ipc/shm.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/shm.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/ipc/shm.c 2002-08-03 02:39:46.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/ipc/shm.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include "util.h"
+
+@@ -38,8 +39,21 @@
+ time_t shm_ctim;
+ pid_t shm_cprid;
+ pid_t shm_lprid;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ time_t shm_createtime;
++ pid_t shm_lapid;
++#endif
+ };
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
++ const int shmid);
++extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
++ const time_t shm_createtime);
++#endif
++
+ #define shm_flags shm_perm.mode
+
+ static struct file_operations shm_file_operations;
+@@ -209,6 +223,9 @@
+ shp->shm_lprid = 0;
+ shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
+ shp->shm_ctim = CURRENT_TIME;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ shp->shm_createtime = CURRENT_TIME;
++#endif
+ shp->shm_segsz = size;
+ shp->shm_nattch = 0;
+ shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq);
+@@ -254,6 +271,9 @@
+ shm_unlock(id);
+ }
+ up(&shm_ids.sem);
++
++ gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
++
+ return err;
+ }
+
+@@ -509,6 +529,9 @@
+ err=-EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+ }
++
++ gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
++
+ if (shp->shm_nattch){
+ shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
+ /* Do not find it any more */
+@@ -622,9 +645,28 @@
+ shm_unlock(shmid);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
++ shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) {
++ shm_unlock(shmid);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
++ if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
++ shm_unlock(shmid);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ file = shp->shm_file;
+ size = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_size;
+ shp->shm_nattch++;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
++#endif
++
+ shm_unlock(shmid);
+
+ down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/capability.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/capability.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/capability.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/capability.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
+
+@@ -170,6 +171,10 @@
+ target = current;
+ }
+
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_capset(target)) {
++ error = -ESRCH;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+ /* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */
+ if (!cap_issubset(inheritable,
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/exit.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/exit.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/exit.c 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/exit.c 2003-10-21 14:25:43.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
+ #include <linux/config.h>
+ #include <linux/slab.h>
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h>
++#include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/completion.h>
+@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
+ #include <linux/acct.h>
+ #endif
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+@@ -139,12 +141,21 @@
+ {
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (current->exec_file) {
++ fput(current->exec_file);
++ current->exec_file = NULL;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* Reparent to init */
+ REMOVE_LINKS(current);
+ current->p_pptr = child_reaper;
+ current->p_opptr = child_reaper;
+ SET_LINKS(current);
+
++ gr_set_kernel_label(current);
++
+ /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
+ current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
+
+@@ -485,6 +496,11 @@
+ #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
+ acct_process(code);
+ #endif
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++ gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
++ gr_acl_handle_exit();
++
+ __exit_mm(tsk);
+
+ lock_kernel();
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/fork.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/fork.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/fork.c 2003-10-20 18:58:49.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/fork.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <linux/namespace.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
+ #include <linux/compiler.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -94,6 +95,10 @@
+ if (flags & CLONE_PID)
+ return current->pid;
+
++ pid = gr_random_pid(&lastpid_lock);
++ if (pid)
++ return pid;
++
+ spin_lock(&lastpid_lock);
+ beginpid = last_pid;
+ if((++last_pid) & 0xffff8000) {
+@@ -669,6 +674,9 @@
+ * friends to set the per-user process limit to something lower
+ * than the amount of processes root is running. -- Rik
+ */
++
++ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes));
++
+ if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur
+ && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+ goto bad_fork_free;
+@@ -751,6 +759,7 @@
+ retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
+ if (retval)
+ goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace;
++ gr_copy_label(p);
+ p->semundo = NULL;
+
+ /* Our parent execution domain becomes current domain
+@@ -853,6 +862,9 @@
+ free_uid(p->user);
+ bad_fork_free:
+ free_task_struct(p);
++
++ gr_log_forkfail(retval);
++
+ goto fork_out;
+ }
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/ksyms.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/ksyms.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
+ #include <linux/seq_file.h>
+ #include <linux/dnotify.h>
+ #include <linux/crc32.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <asm/checksum.h>
+
+ #if defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
+@@ -622,3 +623,9 @@
+ /* To match ksyms with System.map */
+ extern const char _end[];
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(_end);
++
++/* grsecurity */
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_is_capable);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/module.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/module.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/module.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/module.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -900,6 +900,11 @@
+ struct module *mod;
+ int err;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
++ return -EPERM;
++#endif
++
+ lock_kernel();
+ if (name_user == NULL)
+ mod = &kernel_module;
+@@ -969,6 +974,11 @@
+ int i;
+ struct kernel_sym ksym;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
++ return 0;
++#endif
++
+ lock_kernel();
+ for (mod = module_list, i = 0; mod; mod = mod->next) {
+ /* include the count for the module name! */
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/printk.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/printk.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/printk.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/printk.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/interrupt.h> /* For in_interrupt() */
+ #include <linux/config.h>
+ #include <linux/delay.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -293,6 +294,11 @@
+
+ asmlinkage long sys_syslog(int type, char * buf, int len)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && grsec_enable_dmesg)
++ return -EPERM;
++ else
++#endif
+ if ((type != 3) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return do_syslog(type, buf, len);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/sched.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sched.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/sched.c 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sched.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+ #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
+ #include <linux/completion.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Convert user-nice values [ -20 ... 0 ... 19 ]
+@@ -1192,6 +1193,9 @@
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (increment < -40)
+ increment = -40;
++
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_nice())
++ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ if (increment > 40)
+ increment = 40;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/signal.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/signal.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/signal.c 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/signal.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -553,6 +555,8 @@
+ if (!sig || !t->sig)
+ goto out_nolock;
+
++ gr_log_signal(sig, t);
++
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
+ handle_stop_signal(sig, t);
+
+@@ -602,6 +606,8 @@
+ recalc_sigpending(t);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
+
++ gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
++
+ return send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
+ }
+
+@@ -621,9 +627,13 @@
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ for_each_task(p) {
+ if (p->pgrp == pgrp && thread_group_leader(p)) {
+- int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+- if (retval)
+- retval = err;
++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++ retval = -EPERM;
++ else {
++ int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++ if (retval)
++ retval = err;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+@@ -674,7 +684,10 @@
+ if (tg)
+ p = tg;
+ }
+- error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++ error = -EPERM;
++ else
++ error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ return error;
+@@ -699,10 +712,14 @@
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ for_each_task(p) {
+ if (p->pid > 1 && p != current && thread_group_leader(p)) {
+- int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
+- ++count;
+- if (err != -EPERM)
+- retval = err;
++ if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
++ retval = -EPERM;
++ else {
++ int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++ ++count;
++ if (err != -EPERM)
++ retval = err;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/sys.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sys.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/sys.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sys.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
+ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
+ */
+
++#include <linux/config.h>
+ #include <linux/module.h>
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/utsname.h>
+@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include <linux/prctl.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/highuid.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/io.h>
+@@ -239,6 +241,12 @@
+ }
+ if (error == -ESRCH)
+ error = 0;
++
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++ return -ESRCH;
++ }
++
+ if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ error = -EACCES;
+ else
+@@ -425,6 +433,9 @@
+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
+ (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
+ current->sgid = new_egid;
++
++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
++
+ current->fsgid = new_egid;
+ current->egid = new_egid;
+ current->gid = new_rgid;
+@@ -447,6 +458,9 @@
+ current->mm->dumpable=0;
+ wmb();
+ }
++
++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
++
+ current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
+ }
+ else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
+@@ -530,6 +544,9 @@
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+ wmb();
+ }
++
++ gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
++
+ current->uid = new_ruid;
+ current->user = new_user;
+ free_uid(old_user);
+@@ -626,6 +643,9 @@
+ } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
+ return -EPERM;
+
++ if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ if (old_euid != uid)
+ {
+ current->mm->dumpable = 0;
+@@ -722,8 +742,10 @@
+ current->egid = egid;
+ }
+ current->fsgid = current->egid;
+- if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
++ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
++ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
+ current->gid = rgid;
++ }
+ if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
+ current->sgid = sgid;
+ return 0;
+@@ -1146,6 +1168,10 @@
+ if (new_rlim.rlim_cur > new_rlim.rlim_max)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
++
++ if (old_rlim->rlim_max < old_rlim->rlim_cur)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ if (((new_rlim.rlim_cur > old_rlim->rlim_max) ||
+ (new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max)) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sysctl.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/sysctl.c 2003-10-20 18:59:00.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/sysctl.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,15 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++#include <linux/grinternal.h>
++
++extern int gr_proc_handler(ctl_table * table, int write, struct file * filp,
++ void * buffer, size_t * lenp);
++extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table * table, const void *oldval,
++ const void *newval);
++extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op);
++extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
+
+ /* External variables not in a header file. */
+ extern int panic_timeout;
+@@ -126,6 +135,8 @@
+ static ctl_table dev_table[];
+ extern ctl_table random_table[];
+
++static ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
++
+ /* /proc declarations: */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+@@ -272,8 +283,191 @@
+ {KERN_EXCEPTION_TRACE,"exception-trace",
+ &exception_trace,sizeof(int),0644,NULL,&proc_dointvec},
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++ {KERN_GRSECURITY, "grsecurity", NULL, 0, 0500, grsecurity_table},
++#endif
++ {0}
++};
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
++enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL,
++GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT,
++GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM,
++GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
++GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS,
++GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_RANDISN,
++GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
++GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_TTY, GS_TTYS,
++GS_PTY, GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, GS_RANDRPC,
++GS_FINDTASK, GS_LOCK};
++
++static ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
++ {GS_LINK, "linking_restrictions", &grsec_enable_link, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
++ {GS_FIFO, "fifo_restrictions", &grsec_enable_fifo, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
++ {GS_EXECVE, "execve_limiting", &grsec_enable_execve, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
++ {GS_EXECLOG, "exec_logging", &grsec_enable_execlog, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
++ {GS_SIGNAL, "signal_logging", &grsec_enable_signal, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
++ {GS_FORKFAIL, "forkfail_logging", &grsec_enable_forkfail, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
++ {GS_TIME, "timechange_logging", &grsec_enable_time, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
++ {GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, "chroot_deny_shmat", &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++ {GS_CHROOT_UNIX, "chroot_deny_unix", &grsec_enable_chroot_unix, sizeof(int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
++ {GS_CHROOT_MNT, "chroot_deny_mount", &grsec_enable_chroot_mount, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
++ {GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, "chroot_deny_fchdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
++ {GS_CHROOT_DBL, "chroot_deny_chroot", &grsec_enable_chroot_double, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
++ {GS_CHROOT_PVT, "chroot_deny_pivot", &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
++ {GS_CHROOT_CD, "chroot_enforce_chdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
++ {GS_CHROOT_CM, "chroot_deny_chmod", &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
++ {GS_CHROOT_MK, "chroot_deny_mknod", &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
++ {GS_CHROOT_NI, "chroot_restrict_nice", &grsec_enable_chroot_nice, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
++ {GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, "chroot_execlog",
++ &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
++ {GS_CHROOT_CAPS, "chroot_caps", &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
++ {GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, "chroot_deny_sysctl", &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
++ {GS_TPE, "tpe", &grsec_enable_tpe, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++ {GS_TPE_GID, "tpe_gid", &grsec_tpe_gid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
++ {GS_TPE_ALL, "tpe_restrict_all", &grsec_enable_tpe_all, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
++ {GS_RANDPID, "rand_pids", &grsec_enable_randpid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ {GS_RANDID, "rand_ip_ids", &grsec_enable_randid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++ {GS_RANDSRC, "rand_tcp_src_ports", &grsec_enable_randsrc, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++ {GS_RANDISN, "rand_isns", &grsec_enable_randisn, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
++ {GS_SOCKET_ALL, "socket_all", &grsec_enable_socket_all, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++ {GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, "socket_all_gid",
++ &grsec_socket_all_gid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
++ {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, "socket_client",
++ &grsec_enable_socket_client, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++ {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, "socket_client_gid",
++ &grsec_socket_client_gid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
++ {GS_SOCKET_SERVER, "socket_server",
++ &grsec_enable_socket_server, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++ {GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, "socket_server_gid",
++ &grsec_socket_server_gid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
++ {GS_GROUP, "audit_group", &grsec_enable_group, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++ {GS_GID, "audit_gid",
++ &grsec_audit_gid, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
++ {GS_ACHDIR, "audit_chdir", &grsec_enable_chdir, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
++ {GS_AMOUNT, "audit_mount", &grsec_enable_mount, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
++ {GS_AIPC, "audit_ipc", &grsec_enable_audit_ipc, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
++ {GS_AIPC, "dmesg", &grsec_enable_dmesg, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++ {GS_RANDRPC, "rand_rpc", &grsec_enable_randrpc, sizeof (int),
++ 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
++ {GS_FINDTASK, "chroot_findtask", &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
++ sizeof (int), 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
++#endif
++ {GS_LOCK, "grsec_lock", &grsec_lock, sizeof (int), 0600, NULL,
++ &proc_dointvec},
+ {0}
+ };
++#endif
+
+ static ctl_table vm_table[] = {
+ {VM_BDFLUSH, "bdflush", &bdf_prm, 9*sizeof(int), 0644, NULL,
+@@ -410,6 +604,11 @@
+
+ static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
+ {
++ if (gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op))
++ return -EACCES;
++ if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
++ return -EACCES;
++
+ return test_perm(table->mode, op);
+ }
+
+@@ -443,6 +642,10 @@
+ table = table->child;
+ goto repeat;
+ }
++
++ if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval))
++ return -EACCES;
++
+ error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
+ oldval, oldlenp,
+ newval, newlen, context);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/time.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/time.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/time.c 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/time.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include <linux/mm.h>
+ #include <linux/timex.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+@@ -89,6 +90,9 @@
+ time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
+ time_esterror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
+ write_unlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
++
++ gr_log_timechange();
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -167,6 +171,8 @@
+ * globally block out interrupts when it runs.
+ */
+ do_settimeofday(tv);
++
++ gr_log_timechange();
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/kernel/timer.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/timer.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/kernel/timer.c 2003-10-20 18:59:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/kernel/timer.c 2003-10-21 14:24:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -565,6 +565,9 @@
+
+ psecs = (p->times.tms_utime += user);
+ psecs += (p->times.tms_stime += system);
++
++ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs / HZ);
++
+ if (psecs / HZ > p->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) {
+ /* Send SIGXCPU every second.. */
+ if (!(psecs % HZ))
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/filemap.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/filemap.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/filemap.c 2003-10-20 18:59:09.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/filemap.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2258,6 +2258,12 @@
+ }
+ if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage)
+ return -ENOEXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
++#endif
++
+ UPDATE_ATIME(inode);
+ vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
+ return 0;
+@@ -2542,6 +2548,7 @@
+ error = -EIO;
+ rlim_rss = current->rlim ? current->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur :
+ LONG_MAX; /* default: see resource.h */
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_RSS, vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start));
+ if ((vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start)) > rlim_rss)
+ return error;
+
+@@ -3017,6 +3024,7 @@
+ err = -EFBIG;
+
+ if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, pos);
+ if (pos >= limit) {
+ send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
+ goto out;
+@@ -3052,6 +3060,7 @@
+ */
+
+ if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, *count + (u32)pos);
+ if (pos >= inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
+ {
+ if (*count || pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/memory.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/memory.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/memory.c 2002-11-29 00:53:15.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/memory.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -925,6 +925,65 @@
+ establish_pte(vma, address, page_table, pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(mk_pte(new_page, vma->vm_page_prot))));
+ }
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE
++ *
++ * mm->page_table_lock is held on entry and is not released on exit or inside
++ * to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc)
++ */
++static void pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++ unsigned long address, pte_t *pte)
++{
++ unsigned long address_m;
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++ pte_t * pte_m, entry_m;
++ struct page * page_m;
++
++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++ return;
++
++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
++ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m)
++ return;
++
++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++
++ {
++ pgd_t *pgd_m;
++ pmd_t *pmd_m;
++
++ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
++ pmd_m = pmd_offset(pgd_m, address_m);
++ pte_m = pte_offset(pmd_m, address_m);
++ }
++
++ if (pte_present(*pte_m)) {
++ flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m);
++ flush_icache_page(vma_m, pte_page(*pte_m));
++ }
++ entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(pte_m);
++ if (pte_present(entry_m))
++ flush_tlb_page(vma_m, address_m);
++
++ if (pte_none(entry_m)) {
++ ++mm->rss;
++ } else if (pte_present(entry_m)) {
++ page_cache_release(pte_page(entry_m));
++ } else {
++ free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m));
++ ++mm->rss;
++ }
++
++ page_m = pte_page(*pte);
++ page_cache_get(page_m);
++ entry_m = mk_pte(page_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot);
++ if (pte_write(*pte))
++ entry_m = pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(entry_m));
++ establish_pte(vma_m, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write
+ * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address
+@@ -988,6 +1047,11 @@
+
+ /* Free the old page.. */
+ new_page = old_page;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ page_cache_release(new_page);
+@@ -1065,6 +1129,7 @@
+
+ do_expand:
+ limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset);
+ if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
+ goto out_sig;
+ if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
+@@ -1178,6 +1243,11 @@
+
+ /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1223,6 +1293,11 @@
+
+ /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
+ update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, addr, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ return 1; /* Minor fault */
+
+@@ -1303,6 +1378,11 @@
+
+ /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
+ update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
++#endif
++
+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ return 2; /* Major fault */
+ }
+@@ -1367,6 +1447,11 @@
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+ pmd_t *pmd;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
+ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+
+@@ -1375,6 +1460,47 @@
+ * and the SMP-safe atomic PTE updates.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++ pgd_t *pgd_m;
++ pmd_t *pmd_m;
++ pte_t *pte_m;
++
++ address_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
++
++ /* PaX: sanity checks */
++ if (!vma_m) {
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n",
++ address, vma, address_m, vma_m);
++ return 0;
++ } else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++ vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
++ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start)
++ {
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
++ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ address_m = address + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
++ pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m);
++ if (!pmd_m) {
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ pte_m = pte_alloc(mm, pmd_m, address_m);
++ if (!pte_m) {
++ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
+
+ if (pmd) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/mlock.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mlock.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/mlock.c 2001-09-18 00:30:23.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mlock.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -114,9 +114,35 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
+ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
+ {
++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
++ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++
++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, start_m);
++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ __mlock_fixup(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
++ } else
++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++ }
++ return __mlock_fixup(vma, start, end, newflags);
++}
++
++static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#else
++static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#endif
++{
+ int pages, retval;
+
+ if (newflags == vma->vm_flags)
+@@ -209,6 +235,7 @@
+ lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ /* check against resource limits */
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
+ if (locked > lock_limit)
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -276,6 +303,7 @@
+ lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm);
+ if (current->mm->total_vm > lock_limit)
+ goto out;
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/mmap.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mmap.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/mmap.c 2003-10-20 18:58:35.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mmap.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
+ #include <linux/file.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/personality.h>
++#include <linux/random.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -168,6 +170,7 @@
+
+ /* Check against rlimit.. */
+ rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data);
+ if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim)
+ goto out;
+
+@@ -205,6 +208,11 @@
+ _trans(prot, PROT_WRITE, VM_WRITE) |
+ _trans(prot, PROT_EXEC, VM_EXEC);
+ flag_bits =
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ _trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) |
++#endif
++
+ _trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN) |
+ _trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE) |
+ _trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE);
+@@ -401,6 +409,28 @@
+ int error;
+ rb_node_t ** rb_link, * rb_parent;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
++
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
++ /* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */
++ if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff);
++
++ if (!vma_m ||
++ vma_m->vm_start != pgoff ||
++ (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
++ (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ file = vma_m->vm_file;
++ pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff;
++ len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (file && (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->mmap))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+@@ -433,10 +463,32 @@
+ */
+ vm_flags = calc_vm_flags(prot,flags) | mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++ if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
++ if (!file || (prot & PROT_WRITE))
++ vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
++ else
++ vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC
++ if (file && (flags & MAP_MIRROR) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
++ vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++#endif
++
++ }
++#endif
++
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* mlock MCL_FUTURE? */
+ if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ locked += len;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
+ if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+@@ -481,6 +533,9 @@
+ }
+ }
+
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
++ return -EACCES;
++
+ /* Clear old maps */
+ munmap_back:
+ vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
+@@ -491,10 +546,16 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Check against address space limit. */
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++#endif
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len);
+ if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
+ > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+-
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ }
++#endif
+ /* Private writable mapping? Check memory availability.. */
+ if ((vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_WRITE &&
+ !(flags & MAP_NORESERVE) &&
+@@ -518,6 +579,13 @@
+ vma->vm_start = addr;
+ vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+ vma->vm_flags = vm_flags;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if ((file || !(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
++ else
++#endif
++
+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f];
+ vma->vm_ops = NULL;
+ vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
+@@ -546,6 +614,14 @@
+ goto free_vma;
+ }
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
++ vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
++ vma_m->vm_private_data = (void *)(vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start);
++ vma->vm_private_data = (void *)(vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* Can addr have changed??
+ *
+ * Answer: Yes, several device drivers can do it in their
+@@ -581,6 +657,9 @@
+ atomic_inc(&file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
+
+ out:
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(flags & MAP_MIRROR))
++#endif
+ mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+@@ -617,20 +696,49 @@
+ {
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ else
++#endif
++
+ if (len > TASK_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
++#endif
++
+ if (addr) {
+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len < addr)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++#endif
++
+ if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
+ (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
+ return addr;
+ }
+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
++ /* PaX: randomize base address if requested */
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
++ addr += current->mm->delta_mmap;
++#endif
++
+ for (vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len < addr)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ else
++#endif
++
+ if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start)
+@@ -792,6 +900,9 @@
+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
+ unsigned long end = addr + len;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(area->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++#endif
+ area->vm_mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (area->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
+ area->vm_mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+@@ -917,6 +1028,83 @@
+ }
+ }
+
++static inline struct vm_area_struct *unmap_vma(struct mm_struct *mm,
++ unsigned long addr, size_t len, struct vm_area_struct *mpnt,
++ struct vm_area_struct *extra)
++{
++ unsigned long st, end, size;
++ struct file *file = NULL;
++
++ st = addr < mpnt->vm_start ? mpnt->vm_start : addr;
++ end = addr+len;
++ end = end > mpnt->vm_end ? mpnt->vm_end : end;
++ size = end - st;
++
++ if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE &&
++ (st != mpnt->vm_start || end != mpnt->vm_end) &&
++ (file = mpnt->vm_file) != NULL) {
++ atomic_dec(&file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
++ }
++ remove_shared_vm_struct(mpnt);
++ zap_page_range(mm, st, size);
++
++ /*
++ * Fix the mapping, and free the old area if it wasn't reused.
++ */
++ extra = unmap_fixup(mm, mpnt, st, size, extra);
++ if (file)
++ atomic_inc(&file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
++ return extra;
++}
++
++static struct vm_area_struct *unmap_vma_list(struct mm_struct *mm,
++ unsigned long addr, size_t len, struct vm_area_struct *free,
++ struct vm_area_struct *extra, struct vm_area_struct *prev)
++{
++ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt;
++
++ /* Ok - we have the memory areas we should free on the 'free' list,
++ * so release them, and unmap the page range..
++ * If the one of the segments is only being partially unmapped,
++ * it will put new vm_area_struct(s) into the address space.
++ * In that case we have to be careful with VM_DENYWRITE.
++ */
++ while ((mpnt = free) != NULL) {
++ free = free->vm_next;
++ extra = unmap_vma(mm, addr, len, mpnt, extra);
++ }
++
++ free_pgtables(mm, prev, addr, addr+len);
++
++ return extra;
++}
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static struct vm_area_struct *unmap_vma_mirror_list(struct mm_struct *mm,
++ unsigned long addr, size_t len, struct vm_area_struct *free_m,
++ struct vm_area_struct *extra_m)
++{
++ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev;
++
++ while ((mpnt = free_m) != NULL) {
++ unsigned long addr_m, start, end;
++
++ free_m = free_m->vm_next;
++
++ addr_m = addr - (unsigned long)mpnt->vm_private_data;
++ start = addr_m < mpnt->vm_start ? mpnt->vm_start : addr_m;
++ end = addr_m+len;
++ end = end > mpnt->vm_end ? mpnt->vm_end : end;
++ find_vma_prev(mm, mpnt->vm_start, &prev);
++ extra_m = unmap_vma(mm, addr_m, len, mpnt, extra_m);
++
++ free_pgtables(mm, prev, start, end);
++ }
++
++ return extra_m;
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Munmap is split into 2 main parts -- this part which finds
+ * what needs doing, and the areas themselves, which do the
+ * work. This now handles partial unmappings.
+@@ -926,6 +1114,10 @@
+ {
+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, **npp, *free, *extra;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ struct vm_area_struct *free_m, *extra_m;
++#endif
++
+ if ((addr & ~PAGE_MASK) || addr > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-addr)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+@@ -958,60 +1150,69 @@
+ if (!extra)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) {
++ extra_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
++ if (!extra_m) {
++ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, extra);
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++ } else
++ extra_m = NULL;
++
++ free_m = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ npp = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
+ free = NULL;
+ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+ for ( ; mpnt && mpnt->vm_start < addr+len; mpnt = *npp) {
++ mm->map_count--;
+ *npp = mpnt->vm_next;
+ mpnt->vm_next = free;
+ free = mpnt;
+ rb_erase(&mpnt->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (free->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m, *prev_m, **npp_m;
++ unsigned long addr_m = free->vm_start + (unsigned long)free->vm_private_data;
++
++ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */
++ mpnt_m = find_vma_prev(mm, addr_m, &prev_m);
++ if (mpnt_m && mpnt_m->vm_start == addr_m && (mpnt_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++ mm->map_count--;
++ npp_m = (prev_m ? &prev_m->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
++ *npp_m = mpnt_m->vm_next;
++ mpnt_m->vm_next = free_m;
++ free_m = mpnt_m;
++ rb_erase(&mpnt_m->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
++ } else
++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: munmap bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, free->vm_start);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ }
+ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */
+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+
+- /* Ok - we have the memory areas we should free on the 'free' list,
+- * so release them, and unmap the page range..
+- * If the one of the segments is only being partially unmapped,
+- * it will put new vm_area_struct(s) into the address space.
+- * In that case we have to be careful with VM_DENYWRITE.
+- */
+- while ((mpnt = free) != NULL) {
+- unsigned long st, end, size;
+- struct file *file = NULL;
+-
+- free = free->vm_next;
++ extra = unmap_vma_list(mm, addr, len, free, extra, prev);
+
+- st = addr < mpnt->vm_start ? mpnt->vm_start : addr;
+- end = addr+len;
+- end = end > mpnt->vm_end ? mpnt->vm_end : end;
+- size = end - st;
+-
+- if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE &&
+- (st != mpnt->vm_start || end != mpnt->vm_end) &&
+- (file = mpnt->vm_file) != NULL) {
+- atomic_dec(&file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
+- }
+- remove_shared_vm_struct(mpnt);
+- mm->map_count--;
+-
+- zap_page_range(mm, st, size);
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ extra_m = unmap_vma_mirror_list(mm, addr, len, free_m, extra_m);
++#endif
+
+- /*
+- * Fix the mapping, and free the old area if it wasn't reused.
+- */
+- extra = unmap_fixup(mm, mpnt, st, size, extra);
+- if (file)
+- atomic_inc(&file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_writecount);
+- }
+ validate_mm(mm);
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (extra_m)
++ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, extra_m);
++#endif
++
+ /* Release the extra vma struct if it wasn't used */
+ if (extra)
+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, extra);
+
+- free_pgtables(mm, prev, addr, addr+len);
+-
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -1020,8 +1221,15 @@
+ int ret;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
++
+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1048,6 +1256,7 @@
+ if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ locked += len;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
+ if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+@@ -1064,6 +1273,7 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len);
+ if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
+ > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -1076,6 +1286,17 @@
+
+ flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | mm->def_flags;
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
++ if (current->flags & (PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
++ flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)
++ flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
++#endif
++
++ }
++#endif
+ /* Can we just expand an old anonymous mapping? */
+ if (rb_parent && vma_merge(mm, prev, rb_parent, addr, addr + len, flags))
+ goto out;
+@@ -1091,6 +1312,12 @@
+ vma->vm_start = addr;
+ vma->vm_end = addr + len;
+ vma->vm_flags = flags;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
++ else
++#endif
+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f];
+ vma->vm_ops = NULL;
+ vma->vm_pgoff = 0;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mprotect.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/mprotect.c 2003-10-20 18:58:48.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mprotect.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/shm.h>
+ #include <linux/mman.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++#include <linux/elf.h>
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#endif
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
+@@ -236,9 +242,40 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, struct vm_area_struct ** pprev,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
++
+ static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, struct vm_area_struct ** pprev,
+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
+ {
++ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
++ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
++ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
++
++ start_m = vma->vm_start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
++ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++ start_m = start + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ end_m = end + (unsigned long)vma->vm_private_data;
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(newflags & VM_EXEC))
++ __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC));
++ else
++ __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
++ } else
++ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
++ }
++
++ return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
++}
++
++static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, struct vm_area_struct ** pprev,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#else
++static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, struct vm_area_struct ** pprev,
++ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
++#endif
++{
+ pgprot_t newprot;
+ int error;
+
+@@ -246,6 +283,12 @@
+ *pprev = vma;
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_PAGEEXEC
++ if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
++ newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf];
++ else
++#endif
+ newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf];
+ if (start == vma->vm_start) {
+ if (end == vma->vm_end)
+@@ -264,6 +307,68 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments
++ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life.
++ *
++ * The checks favor ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment
++ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones.
++ */
++static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start)
++{
++ struct elfhdr elf_h;
++ struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn;
++ elf_dyn dyn;
++ unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
++
++#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
++ if ((vma->vm_start != start) ||
++ !vma->vm_file ||
++ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) ||
++ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++#endif
++
++ return;
++
++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) ||
++ memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
++ (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) ||
++#else
++ elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN ||
++#endif
++
++ !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) ||
++ elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) ||
++ elf_h.e_phnum > j)
++ return;
++
++ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) {
++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p)))
++ return;
++ if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) {
++ p_dyn = elf_p;
++ j = i;
++ }
++ }
++ if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j)
++ return;
++
++ i = 0UL;
++ do {
++ if (0 > kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn)))
++ return;
++ if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) {
++ vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE;
++ return;
++ }
++ i++;
++ } while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL);
++ return;
++}
++#endif
++
+ long do_mprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len,
+ unsigned long prot)
+ {
+@@ -289,6 +394,16 @@
+ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
+ goto out;
+
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
++ error = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
++ pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start);
++#endif
++
+ for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
+ unsigned int newflags;
+ int last = 0;
+@@ -306,6 +421,13 @@
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
++ /* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
++ newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
++#endif
++
+ if (vma->vm_end > end) {
+ error = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, nstart, end, newflags);
+ goto out;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/mm/mremap.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mremap.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/mm/mremap.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/mm/mremap.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -193,7 +193,9 @@
+ }
+
+ do_munmap(current->mm, addr, old_len);
+-
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(new_vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++#endif
+ current->mm->total_vm += new_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (vm_locked) {
+ current->mm->locked_vm += new_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+@@ -232,6 +234,13 @@
+ old_len = PAGE_ALIGN(old_len);
+ new_len = PAGE_ALIGN(new_len);
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++ (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len ||
++ old_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-old_len))
++ goto out;
++#endif
++
+ /* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */
+ if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
+ if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+@@ -242,6 +251,12 @@
+ if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
+ goto out;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC
++ if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
++ (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || new_addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len))
++ goto out;
++#endif
++
+ /* Check if the location we're moving into overlaps the
+ * old location at all, and fail if it does.
+ */
+@@ -272,6 +287,13 @@
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr);
+ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > addr)
+ goto out;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if ((current->flags & (PF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | PF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) &&
++ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++ return -EINVAL;
++#endif
++
+ /* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
+ if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
+ goto out;
+@@ -283,13 +305,22 @@
+ unsigned long locked = current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ locked += new_len - old_len;
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
+ if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
++#endif
++ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len));
+ if ((current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len)
+ > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
+ goto out;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ }
++#endif
+ /* Private writable mapping? Check memory availability.. */
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_WRITE)) == VM_WRITE &&
+ !(flags & MAP_NORESERVE) &&
+@@ -311,6 +342,9 @@
+ spin_lock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
+ vma->vm_end = addr + new_len;
+ spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDEXEC)
++ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
++#endif
+ current->mm->total_vm += pages;
+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
+ current->mm->locked_vm += pages;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2003-10-20 18:58:34.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+ #include <linux/init.h>
+ #include <linux/poll.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+@@ -374,7 +375,12 @@
+ else
+ sk->protinfo.af_inet.pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
+
+- sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
+
+ sock_init_data(sock,sk);
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/icmp.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/icmp.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/icmp.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/icmp.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
+ #include <linux/errno.h>
+ #include <linux/timer.h>
+ #include <linux/init.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
++
+ #include <asm/system.h>
+ #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+@@ -715,6 +717,7 @@
+
+ icmp_param.data.icmph=*skb->h.icmph;
+ icmp_param.data.icmph.type=ICMP_ECHOREPLY;
++
+ icmp_param.skb=skb;
+ icmp_param.offset=0;
+ icmp_param.data_len=skb->len;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2003-10-20 18:58:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+ #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+ #include <linux/mroute.h>
+ #include <linux/netlink.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ /*
+ * Shall we try to damage output packets if routing dev changes?
+@@ -514,7 +515,13 @@
+ * Begin outputting the bytes.
+ */
+
+- id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid) {
++ id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ } else
++#endif
++ id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
+
+ do {
+ char *data;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in 2003-10-20 18:58:59.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
+ dep_tristate ' TTL match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TTL $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
+ dep_tristate ' address type match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
+ dep_tristate ' tcpmss match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
++ dep_tristate ' stealth match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
+ dep_tristate ' realm match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
+ if [ "$CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK" != "n" ]; then
+ dep_tristate ' Helper match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2003-10-20 18:58:57.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS) += ipt_tcpmss.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM) += ipt_realm.o
++obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
+
+ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_PHYSDEV) += ipt_physdev.o
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
++/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
++ *
++ * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <linux/kernel.h>
++#include <linux/module.h>
++#include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/net.h>
++#include <linux/sched.h>
++#include <linux/inet.h>
++#include <linux/stddef.h>
++
++#include <net/ip.h>
++#include <net/sock.h>
++#include <net/tcp.h>
++#include <net/udp.h>
++#include <net/route.h>
++#include <net/inet_common.h>
++
++#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
++
++MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
++
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++
++static int
++match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
++ const struct net_device *in,
++ const struct net_device *out,
++ const void *matchinfo,
++ int offset,
++ const void *hdr,
++ u_int16_t datalen,
++ int *hotdrop)
++{
++ struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph;
++ struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *) hdr;
++ struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) hdr;
++ struct sock *sk = NULL;
++
++ if (!ip || !hdr || offset) return 0;
++
++ switch(ip->protocol) {
++ case IPPROTO_TCP:
++ if (datalen < sizeof(struct tcphdr)) {
++ *hotdrop = 1;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ if (!(th->syn && !th->ack)) return 0;
++ sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif);
++ break;
++ case IPPROTO_UDP:
++ if (datalen < sizeof(struct udphdr)) {
++ *hotdrop = 1;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh->source, ip->daddr, uh->dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
++ break;
++ default:
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
++ return 1;
++ else {
++ sock_put(sk);
++ return 0;
++ }
++}
++
++/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
++static int
++checkentry(const char *tablename,
++ const struct ipt_ip *ip,
++ void *matchinfo,
++ unsigned int matchsize,
++ unsigned int hook_mask)
++{
++ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0))
++ return 0;
++
++ if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
++ ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
++ && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)))
++ return 1;
++
++ printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++
++static struct ipt_match stealth_match
++= { { NULL, NULL }, "stealth", &match, &checkentry, NULL, THIS_MODULE };
++
++static int __init init(void)
++{
++ return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++static void __exit fini(void)
++{
++ ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
++}
++
++module_init(init);
++module_exit(fini);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include <linux/inet.h>
+ #include <linux/stddef.h>
+ #include <linux/ipsec.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
+ extern int sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
+@@ -221,9 +222,18 @@
+
+ spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
+ rover = tcp_port_rover;
+- do { rover++;
+- if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
+- rover = low;
++ do {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++ if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
++ rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low));
++ } else
++#endif
++ {
++ rover++;
++ if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
++ rover = low;
++ }
++
+ head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
+ spin_lock(&head->lock);
+ for (tb = head->chain; tb; tb = tb->next)
+@@ -546,6 +556,11 @@
+
+ static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++ if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
++ return ip_randomisn();
++ else
++#endif
+ return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr,
+ skb->nh.iph->saddr,
+ skb->h.th->dest,
+@@ -681,9 +696,16 @@
+ rover = tcp_port_rover;
+
+ do {
+- rover++;
+- if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
+- rover = low;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++ if(grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
++ rover = low + (get_random_long() % (high - low));
++ } else
++#endif
++ {
++ rover++;
++ if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
++ rover = low;
++ }
+ head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
+ spin_lock(&head->lock);
+
+@@ -844,11 +866,22 @@
+ if (err)
+ goto failure;
+
+- if (!tp->write_seq)
++ if (!tp->write_seq) {
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++ if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
++ tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn();
++ else
++#endif
+ tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(sk->saddr, sk->daddr,
+ sk->sport, usin->sin_port);
++ }
+
+- sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies;
+
+ err = tcp_connect(sk);
+ if (err)
+@@ -1570,7 +1603,13 @@
+ newtp->ext_header_len = 0;
+ if (newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt)
+ newtp->ext_header_len = newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt->optlen;
+- newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies;
+
+ tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst->pmtu);
+ newtp->advmss = dst->advmss;
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/udp.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
+ #include <net/ipv6.h>
+ #include <net/protocol.h>
+ #include <linux/skbuff.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/udp.h>
+ #include <net/icmp.h>
+@@ -98,6 +99,11 @@
+ #include <net/inet_common.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++ const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
++ const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
+ /*
+ * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
+ */
+@@ -478,9 +484,16 @@
+ ufh.uh.dest = usin->sin_port;
+ if (ufh.uh.dest == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
++
++ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
++ return -EPERM;
+ } else {
+ if (sk->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+ return -EDESTADDRREQ;
++
++ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
++ return -EPERM;
++
+ ufh.daddr = sk->daddr;
+ ufh.uh.dest = sk->dport;
+ /* Open fast path for connected socket.
+@@ -488,6 +501,7 @@
+ */
+ connected = 1;
+ }
++
+ ipc.addr = sk->saddr;
+ ufh.uh.source = sk->sport;
+
+@@ -659,6 +673,11 @@
+ if (!skb)
+ goto out;
+
++ if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
++ err = -EPERM;
++ goto out_free;
++ }
++
+ copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
+ if (copied > len) {
+ copied = len;
+@@ -763,7 +782,13 @@
+ sk->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
+ sk->dport = usin->sin_port;
+ sk->state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
+- sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies;
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++ if(grsec_enable_randid)
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
++ else
++#endif
++ sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies;
+
+ sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst);
+ return(0);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/netlink/af_netlink.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/notifier.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/scm.h>
+
+@@ -625,7 +626,8 @@
+ check them, when this message will be delivered
+ to corresponding kernel module. --ANK (980802)
+ */
+- NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
++
++ NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = gr_cap_rtnetlink();
+
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb,len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/netsyms.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/netsyms.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/netsyms.c 2003-10-20 18:59:08.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/netsyms.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+ #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+ #include <net/route.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+ #ifdef CONFIG_HIPPI
+ #include <linux/hippidevice.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -613,6 +614,51 @@
+
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(softnet_data);
+
++#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
++#if !defined (CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD_MODULE)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_lookup_listener);
++#endif
++extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
++#if !defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_OWNER) && !defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_OWNER_MODULE)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup);
++#endif
++#endif
++
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomid);
++#endif
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC)
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_long);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomisn);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randisn);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randid);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc);
++#endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randrpc);
++#endif
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
++
++extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
++extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
++
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
++EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
++#endif
++
+ #if defined(CONFIG_NET_RADIO) || defined(CONFIG_NET_PCMCIA_RADIO)
+ #include <net/iw_handler.h>
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wireless_send_event);
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/socket.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/socket.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/socket.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/socket.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -85,6 +85,18 @@
+ #include <net/scm.h>
+ #include <linux/netfilter.h>
+
++extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
++ const int protocol);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
++extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
++ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
++ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
++extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
++ const int protocol);
++
+ static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
+ static ssize_t sock_read(struct file *file, char *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos);
+@@ -699,6 +711,7 @@
+
+ int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+ {
++ struct socket *sock;
+ /*
+ * It was possible the inode is NULL we were
+ * closing an unfinished socket.
+@@ -709,8 +722,21 @@
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
++ sock = socki_lookup(inode);
++
+ sock_fasync(-1, filp, 0);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (unlikely(current->used_accept && sock->sk &&
++ (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) &&
++ (sock->sk->daddr == current->curr_ip))) {
++ current->used_accept = 0;
++ current->curr_ip = 0;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ sock_release(socki_lookup(inode));
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -903,6 +929,16 @@
+ int retval;
+ struct socket *sock;
+
++ if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
++ retval = -EACCES;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+@@ -998,12 +1034,26 @@
+ {
+ struct socket *sock;
+ char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
++ struct sockaddr * sck;
+ int err;
+
+ if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
+ {
+- if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0)
++ if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) {
++ sck = (struct sockaddr *) address;
++
++ if(!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) {
++ sockfd_put(sock);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) {
++ sockfd_put(sock);
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
++
+ err = sock->ops->bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
++ }
+ sockfd_put(sock);
+ }
+ return err;
+@@ -1079,6 +1129,8 @@
+ if ((err = sock_map_fd(newsock)) < 0)
+ goto out_release;
+
++ gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
++
+ out_put:
+ sockfd_put(sock);
+ out:
+@@ -1106,6 +1158,7 @@
+ {
+ struct socket *sock;
+ char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
++ struct sockaddr * sck;
+ int err;
+
+ sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
+@@ -1114,6 +1167,24 @@
+ err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, address);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_put;
++
++ sck = (struct sockaddr *) address;
++
++ if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) {
++ err = -EACCES;
++ goto out_put;
++ }
++
++ if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
++ err = -EACCES;
++ goto out_put;
++ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
++ current->used_connect = 1;
++#endif
++
+ err = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) address, addrlen,
+ sock->file->f_flags);
+ out_put:
+@@ -1333,6 +1404,14 @@
+ err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
+ sockfd_put(sock);
+ }
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ if (likely(!err && current->used_accept)) {
++ current->used_accept = 0;
++ current->curr_ip = 0;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ return err;
+ }
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/sunrpc/xprt.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2003-08-25 13:44:44.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ #include <linux/unistd.h>
+ #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
+ #include <linux/file.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/checksum.h>
+@@ -1290,6 +1291,12 @@
+ }
+ ret = xid++;
+ spin_unlock(&xid_lock);
++
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
++ if (grsec_enable_randrpc)
++ ret = (u32) get_random_long();
++#endif
++
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+diff -urN linux-2.4.22/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/unix/af_unix.c
+--- linux-2.4.22/net/unix/af_unix.c 2003-10-20 18:59:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.4.22-grsec-O1/net/unix/af_unix.c 2003-10-21 14:24:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
+ #include <linux/poll.h>
+ #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+ #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
++#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+ #include <asm/checksum.h>
+
+@@ -599,6 +600,11 @@
+ if (err)
+ goto put_fail;
+
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
++ err = -EACCES;
++ goto put_fail;
++ }
++
+ err = -ECONNREFUSED;
+ if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ goto put_fail;
+@@ -622,6 +628,13 @@
+ if (u) {
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ dentry = u->protinfo.af_unix.dentry;
++
++ if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->peercred.pid)) {
++ err = -EPERM;
++ sock_put(u);
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ if (dentry)
+ UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
+ } else
+@@ -720,9 +733,19 @@
+ * All right, let's create it.
+ */
+ mode = S_IFSOCK | (sock->inode->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
++
++ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
++ err = -EACCES;
++ goto out_mknod_dput;
++ }
++
+ err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
++
+ if (err)
+ goto out_mknod_dput;
++
++ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
++
+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+ dput(nd.dentry);
+ nd.dentry = dentry;
+@@ -740,6 +763,10 @@
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
++ sk->peercred.pid = current->pid;
++#endif
++
+ list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
+ } else {
+ list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
+@@ -866,6 +893,9 @@
+ int st;
+ int err;
+ long timeo;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ struct task_struct *p, **htable;
++#endif
+
+ err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, addr_len, &hash);
+ if (err < 0)
+@@ -989,6 +1019,17 @@
+ /* Set credentials */
+ sk->peercred = other->peercred;
+
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
++ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
++ htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(other->peercred.pid)];
++ for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != other->peercred.pid; p = p->pidhash_next);
++ if (p) {
++ p->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
++ p->used_accept = 1;
++ }
++ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
++#endif
++
+ sock_hold(newsk);
+ unix_peer(sk)=newsk;
+ sock->state=SS_CONNECTED;
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