--- /dev/null
+--- lynx2-8-6/CHANGES.old 2008-11-06 15:29:26.000000000 +0100
++++ lynx2-8-6/CHANGES 2008-11-06 15:32:44.000000000 +0100
+@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
+ Changes since Lynx 2.8 release
+ ===============================================================================
++2008-10-26
++* modify patch for CVE-2005-2929 to prompt user before executing command via
++ a lynxcgi link even in advanced mode, as the actual URL may not be shown but
++ hidden behind an HTTP redirect
++* set TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none in lynx.cfg to disable all lynxcgi URLs by default
++ [CVE-2008-4690]
+
+ 2007-05-09 (2.8.6rel.5 fix from 2.8.7dev.5)
+ * correct loop-limit in print_crawl_to_fd(), which broke
+--- lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c.old 2008-11-06 15:29:58.000000000 +0100
++++ lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c 2008-11-06 15:30:53.000000000 +0100
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static BOOL can_exec_cgi(const char *lin
+ if (!exec_ok(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), linktext, CGI_PATH)) {
+ /* exec_ok gives out msg. */
+ result = FALSE;
+- } else if (user_mode < ADVANCED_MODE) {
++ } else {
+ StrAllocCopy(command, linktext);
+ if (non_empty(linkargs)) {
+ HTSprintf(&command, " %s", linkargs);
+--- lynx2-8-5.orig/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:02.000000000 +0100
++++ lynx2-8-5/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:38.000000000 +0100
+@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ CHARACTER_SET:utf-8
+ # ====
+ # Do not define this.
+ #
+-#TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
++TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
+
+
+ .h2 LYNXCGI_ENVIRONMENT