+++ /dev/null
---- lynx2-8-6/CHANGES.old 2008-11-06 15:29:26.000000000 +0100
-+++ lynx2-8-6/CHANGES 2008-11-06 15:32:44.000000000 +0100
-@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
- Changes since Lynx 2.8 release
- ===============================================================================
-+2008-10-26
-+* modify patch for CVE-2005-2929 to prompt user before executing command via
-+ a lynxcgi link even in advanced mode, as the actual URL may not be shown but
-+ hidden behind an HTTP redirect
-+* set TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none in lynx.cfg to disable all lynxcgi URLs by default
-+ [CVE-2008-4690]
-
- 2007-05-09 (2.8.6rel.5 fix from 2.8.7dev.5)
- * correct loop-limit in print_crawl_to_fd(), which broke
---- lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c.old 2008-11-06 15:29:58.000000000 +0100
-+++ lynx2-8-6/src/LYCgi.c 2008-11-06 15:30:53.000000000 +0100
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static BOOL can_exec_cgi(const char *lin
- if (!exec_ok(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), linktext, CGI_PATH)) {
- /* exec_ok gives out msg. */
- result = FALSE;
-- } else if (user_mode < ADVANCED_MODE) {
-+ } else {
- StrAllocCopy(command, linktext);
- if (non_empty(linkargs)) {
- HTSprintf(&command, " %s", linkargs);
---- lynx2-8-5.orig/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ lynx2-8-5/lynx.cfg 2008-10-26 21:45:38.000000000 +0100
-@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ CHARACTER_SET:utf-8
- # ====
- # Do not define this.
- #
--#TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
-+TRUSTED_LYNXCGI:none
-
-
- .h2 LYNXCGI_ENVIRONMENT