grsecurity-nopax-2.0-rc1-2.4.21.patch

   1 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help
   2 --- linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help   2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400
   3 +++ linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
   4 @@ -2609,6 +2609,20 @@
   5    If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
   6    Documentation/modules.txt.  If unsure, say `N'.
   7
   8 +stealth networking support
   9 +CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
  10 +  Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
  11 +  ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports.  If you
  12 +  are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
  13 +  you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
  14 +  drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
  15 +  machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
  16 +  destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
  17 +  instance.
  18 +
  19 +  If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read
  20 +  Documentation/modules.txt.  If unsure, say `N'.
  21 +
  22  MAC address match support
  23  CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MAC
  24    MAC matching allows you to match packets based on the source
  25 @@ -21729,6 +21743,619 @@
  26
  27    "Area6" will work for most boards. For ADX, select "Area5".
  28
  29 +Grsecurity
  30 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
  31 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features that
  32 +  will enhance the security of your system.  It is highly recommended
  33 +  that you say Y here and read through the help for each option so
  34 +  you fully understand the features and can evaluate their usefulness
  35 +  for your machine.
  36 +
  37 +Additional security levels
  38 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW
  39 +
  40 +  Low additional security
  41 +  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  42 +  If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
  43 +  be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
  44 +  of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
  45 +  conflicts with the additional security measures.  If you run a lot of
  46 +  unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher security
  47 +  levels, you should say Y here.  With this option, the following features
  48 +  are enabled:
  49 +
  50 +  linking restrictions
  51 +  fifo restrictions
  52 +  random pids
  53 +  enforcing nproc on execve()
  54 +  restricted dmesg
  55 +  random ip ids
  56 +  enforced chdir("/") on chroot
  57 +
  58 +  Medium additional security
  59 +  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  60 +  If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included in the
  61 +  low additional security level will be enabled.  These features provide
  62 +  even more security to your system, though in rare cases they may
  63 +  be incompatible with very old or poorly written software.  If you
  64 +  enable this option, make sure that your auth service (identd) is
  65 +  running as gid 10 (usually group wheel). With this option the following
  66 +  features (in addition to those provided in the low additional security
  67 +  level) will be enabled:
  68 +
  69 +  random tcp source ports
  70 +  altered ping ids
  71 +  failed fork logging
  72 +  time change logging
  73 +  signal logging
  74 +  deny mounts in chroot
  75 +  deny double chrooting
  76 +  deny sysctl writes in chroot
  77 +  deny mknod in chroot
  78 +  deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
  79 +  deny pivot_root in chroot
  80 +  denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
  81 +  /proc restrictions with special gid set to 10 (usually wheel)
  82 +  address space layout randomization
  83 +
  84 +  High additional security
  85 +  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
  86 +  If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be enabled,
  87 +  that will protect you against virtually all kinds of attacks against
  88 +  your system.  The much hightened security comes at a cost of an
  89 +  increased chance of incompatabilities with rare software on your
  90 +  machine.  It is highly recommended that you view
  91 +  <http://grsecurity.net/features.htm> and read about each option.
  92 +  Also remember that since the /proc restrictions are
  93 +  enabled, you must run your identd as group wheel (gid 10).
  94 +  This security level enables the following features in addition to those
  95 +  listed in the low and medium security levels:
  96 +
  97 +  additional /proc restrictions
  98 +  chmod restrictions in chroot
  99 +  no signals, ptrace, or viewing processes outside of chroot
 100 +  capability restrictions in chroot
 101 +  deny fchdir out of chroot
 102 +  priority restrictions in chroot
 103 +  mprotect restrictions
 104 +  removal of /proc/<pid>/[maps|mem]
 105 +  kernel stack randomization
 106 +  mount/unmount/remount logging
 107 +  kernel symbol hiding
 108 +
 109 +Customized additional security
 110 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
 111 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
 112 +  option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
 113 +  covered in the basic security levels.  These additional features include
 114 +  TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for grsecurity.  It is
 115 +  advised that you read through the help for each option to determine its
 116 +  usefulness in your situation.
 117 +
 118 +Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
 119 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
 120 +  If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
 121 +  be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
 122 +  /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
 123 +  support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
 124 +  currently used  to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
 125 +  Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
 126 +  you use the ACL system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
 127 +  modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
 128 +  If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
 129 +  case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
 130 +  legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
 131 +  but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
 132 +  case.  If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
 133 +  not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
 134 +  Enabling this feature could make certain apps like VMWare stop working,
 135 +  as they need to write to other locations in /dev/mem.
 136 +  There are a few video cards that require write access to the BIOS,
 137 +  one of which is the Savage.  If you have this video card, you must say
 138 +  N here, or Xfree86 will not function.
 139 +  It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
 140 +  conditions above.
 141 +
 142 +Disable privileged I/O
 143 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
 144 +  If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
 145 +  Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
 146 +  Unfortunately, some problems need this access to operate properly,
 147 +  the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock.  hwclock can be
 148 +  remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
 149 +  enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
 150 +  correctly.  XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
 151 +  enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86.  If you use XFree86
 152 +  and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
 153 +  use the ACL system.
 154 +
 155 +Hide kernel symbols
 156 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
 157 +  If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
 158 +  displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
 159 +  to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE.  This option is only effective
 160 +  provided the following conditions are met:
 161 +  1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
 162 +  2) You are using the ACL system and hiding other files such as your
 163 +     kernel image and System.map
 164 +  3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
 165 +     /proc/kcore
 166 +  If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
 167 +  useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
 168 +  overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
 169 +
 170 +/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support
 171 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
 172 +  If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
 173 +  directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
 174 +  The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
 175 +  This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
 176 +  to a local attack.  The entry is readable by only the owner of the
 177 +  process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
 178 +  the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
 179 +
 180 +Proc Restrictions
 181 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
 182 +  If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
 183 +  will be altered to enhance system security and privacy.  Depending
 184 +  upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see
 185 +  only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
 186 +  view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
 187 +  the "restrict to user only" option.  NOTE: If you're running identd as
 188 +  a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
 189 +
 190 +Restrict /proc to user only
 191 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
 192 +  If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
 193 +  processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
 194 +  and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
 195 +
 196 +Restrict /proc to user and group
 197 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
 198 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
 199 +  able to view all processes, network-related information, and
 200 +  kernel and symbol information.  This option is useful if you want
 201 +  to run identd as a non-root user.
 202 +
 203 +Additional proc restrictions
 204 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
 205 +  If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
 206 +  /proc that keep normal users from viewing cpu and device information.
 207 +
 208 +Dmesg(8) Restriction
 209 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
 210 +  If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
 211 +  to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
 212 +  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
 213 +  created.
 214 +
 215 +Linking restrictions
 216 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
 217 +  If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
 218 +  will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
 219 +  world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
 220 +  symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
 221 +  able to hardlink to files they do not own.  If the sysctl option is
 222 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
 223 +
 224 +FIFO restrictions
 225 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
 226 +  If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
 227 +  own in world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
 228 +  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.  If the sysctl
 229 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
 230 +  created.
 231 +
 232 +Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs
 233 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
 234 +  If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
 235 +  have the value checked during execve() calls.  The current system
 236 +  only checks the system limit during fork() calls.  If the sysctl option
 237 +  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
 238 +
 239 +Single group for auditing
 240 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
 241 +  If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
 242 +  will only operate on a group you specify.  This option is recommended
 243 +  if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
 244 +  amount of logs from the entire system.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
 245 +  a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
 246 +
 247 +GID for auditing
 248 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
 249 +  Here you can choose the GID that will be the target of kernel auditing.
 250 +  Remember to add the users you want to log to the GID specified here.
 251 +  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose here won't matter.
 252 +  You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup script by echoing the GID
 253 +  to the proper /proc entry.  View the help on the sysctl option for more
 254 +  information.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 255 +  "audit_gid" is created.
 256 +
 257 +Chdir logging
 258 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
 259 +  If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged.  If the sysctl
 260 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
 261 +
 262 +(Un)Mount logging
 263 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
 264 +  If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged.  If the
 265 +  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
 266 +  created.
 267 +
 268 +IPC logging
 269 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
 270 +  If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
 271 +  and shared memory will be logged.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
 272 +  sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
 273 +
 274 +Exec logging
 275 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
 276 +  If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
 277 +  other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
 278 +  will be logged).  Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
 279 +  of their users.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
 280 +  name "exec_logging" is created.
 281 +  WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
 282 +  on an active system.
 283 +
 284 +Resource logging
 285 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
 286 +  If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
 287 +  be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
 288 +  limit.  It is highly recommended that you say Y here.
 289 +
 290 +Signal logging
 291 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
 292 +  If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
 293 +  SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
 294 +  occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
 295 +  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 296 +  "signal_logging" is created.
 297 +
 298 +Fork failure logging
 299 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
 300 +  If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
 301 +  This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
 302 +  their process limit.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
 303 +  with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
 304 +
 305 +Time change logging
 306 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
 307 +  If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
 308 +  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 309 +  "timechange_logging" is created.
 310 +
 311 +Chroot jail restrictions
 312 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
 313 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
 314 +  make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult.  If you
 315 +  encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
 316 +  is recommended that you enable each one.
 317 +
 318 +Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
 319 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
 320 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
 321 +  connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
 322 +  domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot.  It is recommended
 323 +  that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
 324 +  with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
 325 +
 326 +Deny shmat() out of chroot
 327 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
 328 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
 329 +  to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
 330 +  It is recommended that you say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled,
 331 +  a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
 332 +
 333 +Protect outside processes
 334 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
 335 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
 336 +  kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid,
 337 +  getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot.  If the sysctl
 338 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
 339 +  created.
 340 +
 341 +Deny mounts in chroot
 342 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
 343 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
 344 +  mount or remount filesystems.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
 345 +  sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
 346 +
 347 +Deny pivot_root in chroot
 348 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
 349 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
 350 +  a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41.  It
 351 +  works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem.  This
 352 +  function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
 353 +  of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed.  If the sysctl
 354 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
 355 +  created.
 356 +
 357 +Deny double-chroots
 358 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
 359 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
 360 +  again.  This is a widely used method of breaking out of a chroot jail
 361 +  and should not be allowed.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
 362 +  option with name "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
 363 +
 364 +Deny fchdir outside of chroot
 365 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
 366 +  If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
 367 +  to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
 368 +  outside the filesystem will be stopped.  If the sysctl option
 369 +  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
 370 +
 371 +Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots
 372 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
 373 +  If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
 374 +  applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
 375 +  The man page on chroot(2) states:
 376 +  Note that this call does not change  the  current  working
 377 +  directory,  so  that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
 378 +  `/'.  In particular, the  super-user  can  escape  from  a
 379 +  `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
 380 +
 381 +  It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
 382 +  any software.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
 383 +  name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
 384 +
 385 +Deny (f)chmod +s in chroot
 386 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
 387 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
 388 +  or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits.  This protects
 389 +  against another published method of breaking a chroot.  If the sysctl
 390 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
 391 +  created.
 392 +
 393 +Deny mknod in chroot
 394 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
 395 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
 396 +  mknod.  The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
 397 +  would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
 398 +  as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
 399 +  anyhing from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
 400 +  they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data).  It is recommended
 401 +  that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
 402 +  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 403 +  "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
 404 +
 405 +Restrict priority changes in chroot
 406 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
 407 +  If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
 408 +  the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
 409 +  processes outside the chroot.  This provides more security than simply
 410 +  removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set.  If the
 411 +  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
 412 +  is created.
 413 +
 414 +Log all execs within chroot
 415 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
 416 +  If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
 417 +  to syslog.  This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
 418 +  applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
 419 +  is therefore left as an option.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
 420 +  sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
 421 +
 422 +Deny sysctl writes in chroot
 423 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
 424 +  If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
 425 +  write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
 426 +  interface.  It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
 427 +  sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 428 +  "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
 429 +
 430 +Chroot jail capability restrictions
 431 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
 432 +  If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
 433 +  chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
 434 +  system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
 435 +  files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
 436 +  This is left an option because it can break some apps.  Disable this
 437 +  if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
 438 +  tasks.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
 439 +  name "chroot_caps" is created.
 440 +
 441 +Trusted path execution
 442 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
 443 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
 444 +  supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
 445 +  These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
 446 +  root-owned directories writeable only by root.  If the sysctl option
 447 +  is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
 448 +
 449 +Group for trusted path execution
 450 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
 451 +  Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for.
 452 +  Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID
 453 +  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
 454 +  here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
 455 +  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
 456 +  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
 457 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created.
 458 +
 459 +Partially restrict non-root users
 460 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
 461 +  If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
 462 +  group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
 463 +  execute files in directories they own that are not group or
 464 +  world-writeable, or in directories owned by root and writeable only by
 465 +  root.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 466 +  "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
 467 +
 468 +Randomized PIDs
 469 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
 470 +  If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
 471 +  pseudo-randomly generated.  This is extremely effective along
 472 +  with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
 473 +  pids of daemons, etc.  PIDs are also used in some cases as part
 474 +  of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
 475 +  those filenames from being predicted as well.  We also use code
 476 +  to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon.  If the sysctl
 477 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created.
 478 +
 479 +Larger entropy pools
 480 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
 481 +  If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
 482 +  and grsecurity will be doubled in size.  Since several grsecurity
 483 +  features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
 484 +  here.  Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
 485 +  /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
 486 +
 487 +Truly random TCP ISN selection
 488 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
 489 +  If you say Y here, Linux's default selection of TCP Initial Sequence
 490 +  Numbers (ISNs) will be replaced with that of OpenBSD.  Linux uses
 491 +  an MD4 hash based on the connection plus a time value to create the
 492 +  ISN, while OpenBSD's selection is random.  If the sysctl option is
 493 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_isns" is created.
 494 +
 495 +Randomized IP IDs
 496 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
 497 +  If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets
 498 +  will be randomized.  This hinders os fingerprinters and
 499 +  keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable
 500 +  portscan.  Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging
 501 +  to the same packet have the same id.  By default linux only
 502 +  increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host.
 503 +  We use a port of the OpenBSD random ip id code to achieve the
 504 +  randomness, while keeping the possibility of id duplicates to
 505 +  near none.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 506 +  "rand_ip_ids" is created.
 507 +
 508 +Randomized TCP source ports
 509 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
 510 +  If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the
 511 +  fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that
 512 +  the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing
 513 +  algorithm.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
 514 +  "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created.
 515 +
 516 +Randomized RPC XIDs
 517 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
 518 +  If you say Y here, the method of determining XIDs for RPC requests will
 519 +  be randomized, instead of using linux's default behavior of simply
 520 +  incrementing the XID.  If you want your RPC connections to be more
 521 +  secure, say Y here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
 522 +  with name "rand_rpc" is created.
 523 +
 524 +Altered Ping IDs
 525 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
 526 +  If you say Y here, the way Linux handles echo replies will be changed
 527 +  so that the reply uses an ID equal to the ID of the echo request.
 528 +  This will help in confusing OS detection.  If the sysctl option is
 529 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "altered_pings" is created.
 530 +
 531 +Socket restrictions
 532 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
 533 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
 534 +  If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
 535 +  groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
 536 +  will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
 537 +
 538 +Deny all socket access
 539 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
 540 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
 541 +  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
 542 +  applications from your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
 543 +  sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
 544 +
 545 +Group for disabled socket access
 546 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
 547 +  Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
 548 +  add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
 549 +  specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
 550 +  here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
 551 +  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
 552 +  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
 553 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
 554 +
 555 +Deny all client socket access
 556 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
 557 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
 558 +  be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
 559 +  able to run servers.  If this option is enabled, all users in the group
 560 +  you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
 561 +  from the shell on your machine.  If the sysctl option is enabled, a
 562 +  sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
 563 +
 564 +Group for disabled client socket access
 565 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
 566 +  Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
 567 +  Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
 568 +  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
 569 +  choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
 570 +  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
 571 +  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
 572 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
 573 +
 574 +Deny all server socket access
 575 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
 576 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
 577 +  be unable to run server applications from your machine.  If the sysctl
 578 +  option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
 579 +
 580 +Group for disabled server socket access
 581 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
 582 +  Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
 583 +  Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
 584 +  the GID specified here.  If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
 585 +  choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
 586 +  script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry.  View the help
 587 +  on the sysctl option for more information.  If the sysctl option is
 588 +  enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
 589 +
 590 +Sysctl support
 591 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
 592 +  If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
 593 +  grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
 594 +  kernel.  You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
 595 +  to enable (1) or disable (0) various features.  All the sysctl entries
 596 +  are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
 597 +  All features are disabled by default. Please note that this option could
 598 +  reduce the effectiveness of the added security of this patch if an ACL
 599 +  system is not put in place.  Your init scripts should be read-only, and
 600 +  root should not have access to adding modules or performing raw i/o
 601 +  operations.  All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock
 602 +  entry should be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
 603 +  *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
 604 +
 605 +Number of burst messages
 606 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
 607 +  This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
 608 +  within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option.  The
 609 +  default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
 610 +  many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
 611 +  raise this value.
 612 +
 613 +Seconds in between log messages
 614 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
 615 +  This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
 616 +  grsecurity log messages.  The default should be suitable for most
 617 +  people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
 618 +  to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
 619 +  prevent flooding.
 620 +
 621 +Hide kernel processes
 622 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
 623 +  If you say Y here, when the ACL system is enabled via gradm -E,
 624 +  an additional ACL will be passed to the kernel that hides all kernel
 625 +  processes.  These processes will only be viewable by the authenticated
 626 +  admin, or processes that have viewing access set.
 627 +
 628 +Maximum tries before password lockout
 629 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
 630 +  This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
 631 +  to authorize themselves with the grsecurity ACL system before being
 632 +  denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
 633 +  The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
 634 +
 635 +Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds
 636 +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
 637 +  This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
 638 +  authorize to the ACL system with the maximum number of invalid
 639 +  passwords.  The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
 640 +  a password.
 641 +
 642  Disable data cache
 643  CONFIG_DCACHE_DISABLE
 644    This option allows you to run the kernel with data cache disabled.
 645 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/Makefile linux-2.4.21/Makefile
 646 --- linux-2.4.21/Makefile       2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
 647 +++ linux-2.4.21/Makefile       2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 648 @@ -123,9 +123,10 @@
 649  CORE_FILES     =kernel/kernel.o mm/mm.o fs/fs.o ipc/ipc.o
 650  NETWORKS       =net/network.o
 651  CRYPTO         =crypto/crypto.o
 652 +GRSECURITY     =grsecurity/grsec.o
 653
 654  LIBS           =$(TOPDIR)/lib/lib.a
 655 -SUBDIRS                =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto
 656 +SUBDIRS                =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto grsecurity
 657
 658  DRIVERS-n :=
 659  DRIVERS-y :=
 660 @@ -265,7 +266,7 @@
 661
 662  export CPPFLAGS CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL
 663
 664 -export NETWORKS CRYPTO DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS
 665 +export NETWORKS CRYPTO DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS GRSECURITY
 666
 667  .S.s:
 668         $(CPP) $(AFLAGS) $(AFLAGS_KERNEL) -traditional -o $*.s $<
 669 @@ -284,6 +285,7 @@
 670                 $(CORE_FILES) \
 671                 $(DRIVERS) \
 672                 $(NETWORKS) \
 673                 $(CRYPTO) \
 674 +               $(GRSECURITY) \
 675                 $(LIBS) \
 676                 --end-group \
 677                 -o vmlinux
 678 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in
 679 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in   2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 680 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 681 @@ -444,3 +444,12 @@
 682  endmenu
 683
 684  source lib/Config.in
 685 +
 686 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 687 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 688 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 689 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 690 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
 691 +fi
 692 +endmenu
 693 +
 694 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
 695 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c    2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 696 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 697 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 698  #include <linux/file.h>
 699  #include <linux/types.h>
 700  #include <linux/ipc.h>
 701 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 702
 703  #include <asm/fpu.h>
 704  #include <asm/io.h>
 705 @@ -240,6 +246,13 @@
 706                 if (!file)
 707                         goto out;
 708         }
 709 +
 710 +       if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
 711 +               fput(file);
 712 +               ret = -EACCES;
 713 +               goto out;
 714 +       }
 715 +
 716         flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
 717         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 718         ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, off);
 719 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
 720 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c     2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 721 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 722 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 723  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 724  #include <linux/user.h>
 725  #include <linux/slab.h>
 726 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 727
 728  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 729  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 730 @@ -275,6 +276,10 @@
 731         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 732         if (!child)
 733                 goto out_notsk;
 734 +
 735 +       if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
 736 +               goto out;
 737 +
 738         if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
 739                 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
 740                 goto out;
 741 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in
 742 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in     2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
 743 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 744 @@ -657,3 +657,11 @@
 745  endmenu
 746
 747  source lib/Config.in
 748 +
 749 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 750 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 751 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 752 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 753 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
 754 +fi
 755 +endmenu
 756 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in
 757 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400
 758 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 759 @@ -263,3 +263,12 @@
 760
 761  source lib/Config.in
 762  endmenu
 763 +
 764 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 765 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 766 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 767 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 768 +    source grsecurity/Config.in
 769 +fi
 770 +endmenu
 771 +
 772 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in
 773 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400
 774 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 775 @@ -485,3 +485,11 @@
 776  endmenu
 777
 778  source lib/Config.in
 779 +
 780 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 781 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 782 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 783 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 784 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
 785 +fi
 786 +endmenu
 787 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c
 788 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c        2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 789 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c        2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 790 @@ -373,13 +373,16 @@
 791
 792  static inline int restore_i387_fxsave( struct _fpstate *buf )
 793  {
 794 +       int err;
 795         struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 796         clear_fpu( tsk );
 797 -       if ( __copy_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, &buf->_fxsr_env[0],
 798 -                              sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct) ) )
 799 -               return 1;
 800 +       err = __copy_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, &buf->_fxsr_env[0],
 801 +                              sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct) );
 802         /* mxcsr bit 6 and 31-16 must be zero for security reasons */
 803         tsk->thread.i387.fxsave.mxcsr &= 0xffbf;
 804 +       if (err)
 805 +               return 1;
 806 +
 807         return convert_fxsr_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, buf );
 808  }
 809
 810 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c
 811 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c      2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400
 812 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 813 @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 814  #include <linux/smp.h>
 815  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 816  #include <linux/stddef.h>
 817 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 818
 819  /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
 820  static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, short base, short extent, int new_value)
 821 @@ -59,8 +60,16 @@
 822
 823         if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_SIZE*32))
 824                 return -EINVAL;
 825 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
 826 +       if (turn_on) {
 827 +               gr_handle_ioperm();
 828 +#else
 829         if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 830 +#endif
 831                 return -EPERM;
 832 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
 833 +       }
 834 +#endif
 835         /*
 836          * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the
 837          * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(),
 838 @@ -109,8 +118,13 @@
 839                 return -EINVAL;
 840         /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 841         if (level > old) {
 842 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
 843 +               gr_handle_iopl();
 844 +               return -EPERM;
 845 +#else
 846                 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
 847                         return -EPERM;
 848 +#endif
 849         }
 850         regs->eflags = (regs->eflags & 0xffffcfff) | (level << 12);
 851         return 0;
 852 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
 853 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c      2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 854 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 855 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 856  #include <linux/errno.h>
 857  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 858  #include <linux/user.h>
 859 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 860
 861  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 862  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 863 @@ -177,6 +178,9 @@
 864         if (pid == 1)           /* you may not mess with init */
 865                 goto out_tsk;
 866
 867 +       if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
 868 +               goto out_tsk;
 869 +
 870         if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
 871                 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
 872                 goto out_tsk;
 873 @@ -256,6 +260,17 @@
 874                           if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] &&
 875                              ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break;
 876
 877 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 878 +                         if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] &&
 879 +                            addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){
 880 +                                 long reg   = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2;
 881 +                                 long type  = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3;
 882 +                                 long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3;
 883 +                                 if((type & 1) && (data & align))
 884 +                                       break;
 885 +                         }
 886 +#endif
 887 +
 888                           if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[7]) {
 889                                   data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
 890                                   for(i=0; i<4; i++)
 891 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
 892 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c    2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 893 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 894 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 895  #include <linux/mman.h>
 896  #include <linux/file.h>
 897  #include <linux/utsname.h>
 898 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 899
 900  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 901  #include <asm/ipc.h>
 902 @@ -55,8 +61,14 @@
 903                         goto out;
 904         }
 905
 906 +       if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
 907 +               fput(file);
 908 +               error = -EACCES;
 909 +               goto out;
 910 +       }
 911 +
 912         down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
 913         error = do_mmap_pgoff(mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
 914         up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
 915
 916         if (file)
 917 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in
 918 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
 919 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 920 @@ -290,3 +290,12 @@
 921  fi
 922
 923  endmenu
 924 +
 925 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 926 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 927 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 928 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 929 +    source grsecurity/Config.in
 930 +fi
 931 +endmenu
 932 +
 933 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
 934 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c      2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
 935 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 936 @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 937  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 938  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 939  #include <linux/user.h>
 940 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 941
 942  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 943  #include <asm/processor.h>
 944 @@ -1179,6 +1180,9 @@
 945         if (pid == 1)           /* no messing around with init! */
 946                 goto out_tsk;
 947
 948 +       if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
 949 +               goto out_tsk;
 950 +
 951         if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
 952                 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
 953                 goto out_tsk;
 954 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
 955 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c    2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
 956 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 957 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 958  #include <linux/smp.h>
 959  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 960  #include <linux/highuid.h>
 961 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
 962
 963  #include <asm/shmparam.h>
 964  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 965 @@ -212,6 +213,11 @@
 966                 goto out;
 967         }
 968
 969 +       if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
 970 +               addr = -EACCES;
 971 +               goto out;
 972 +       }
 973 +
 974         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 975         addr = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
 976         up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 977 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in
 978 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:29.000000000 -0400
 979 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 980 @@ -563,3 +563,11 @@
 981  endmenu
 982
 983  source lib/Config.in
 984 +
 985 +mainmenu_option next_comment
 986 +comment 'Grsecurity'
 987 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
 988 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
 989 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
 990 +fi
 991 +endmenu
 992 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in
 993 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
 994 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
 995 @@ -7,3 +7,11 @@
 996  define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 n
 997
 998  source arch/mips/config-shared.in
 999 +
1000 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1001 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1002 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1003 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1004 +        source grsecurity/Config.in
1005 +fi
1006 +endmenu
1007 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in
1008 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in  2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1009 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1010 @@ -7,3 +7,11 @@
1011  define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 y
1012
1013  source arch/mips/config-shared.in
1014 +
1015 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1016 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1017 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1018 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1019 +        source grsecurity/Config.in
1020 +fi
1021 +endmenu
1022 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in
1023 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in  2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1024 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1025 @@ -197,3 +197,11 @@
1026  endmenu
1027
1028  source lib/Config.in
1029 +
1030 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1031 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1032 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1033 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1034 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1035 +fi
1036 +endmenu
1037 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c
1038 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c   2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1039 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1040 @@ -1434,7 +1434,11 @@
1041          * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
1042          * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
1043          */
1044 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1045 +       if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1046 +#else
1047         if (current->tty == tty || suser())
1048 +#endif
1049                 return 1;
1050         return 0;
1051  }
1052 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
1053 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c    2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400
1054 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1055 @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
1056  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
1057  #include <linux/user.h>
1058  #include <linux/personality.h>
1059 -
1060 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1061  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1062  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
1063  #include <asm/system.h>
1064 @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@
1065         if (pid == 1)           /* no messing around with init! */
1066                 goto out_tsk;
1067
1068 +       if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
1069 +               goto out_tsk;
1070 +
1071         if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
1072                 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
1073                 goto out_tsk;
1074 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
1075 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c        2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1076 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c        2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1077 @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
1078  #include <linux/mman.h>
1079  #include <linux/shm.h>
1080  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
1081 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1082
1083  int sys_pipe(int *fildes)
1084  {
1085 @@ -104,6 +110,11 @@
1086                         goto out;
1087         }
1088
1089 +       if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
1090 +               fput(file);
1091 +               return -EACCES;
1092 +       }
1093 +
1094         flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
1095
1096         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
1097 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c
1098 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c      2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1099 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1100 @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
1101  #include <linux/highmem.h>
1102  #include <linux/highuid.h>
1103  #include <linux/mman.h>
1104 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1105
1106  #include <asm/types.h>
1107  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1108 @@ -177,6 +178,11 @@
1109         struct file *file;
1110         int retval;
1111         int i;
1112 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1113 +       struct file *old_exec_file;
1114 +       struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
1115 +       struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
1116 +#endif
1117
1118         file = open_exec(filename);
1119
1120 @@ -184,6 +190,20 @@
1121         if (IS_ERR(file))
1122                 return retval;
1123
1124 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes));
1125 +
1126 +       if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
1127 +               allow_write_access(file);
1128 +               fput(file);
1129 +               return -EAGAIN;
1130 +       }
1131 +
1132 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
1133 +               allow_write_access(file);
1134 +               fput(file);
1135 +               return -EACCES;
1136 +       }
1137 +
1138         bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
1139         memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
1140
1141 @@ -209,11 +238,24 @@
1142         if (retval < 0)
1143                 goto out;
1144
1145 +       if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
1146 +               retval = -EACCES;
1147 +               goto out;
1148 +       }
1149 +
1150 +       if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
1151 +               retval = -EACCES;
1152 +               goto out;
1153 +       }
1154 +
1155         retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
1156         if (retval < 0)
1157                 goto out;
1158
1159         bprm.exec = bprm.p;
1160 +
1161 +       gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
1162 +
1163         retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
1164         if (retval < 0)
1165                 goto out;
1166 @@ -222,11 +264,31 @@
1167         if (retval < 0)
1168                 goto out;
1169
1170 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1171 +       old_acl = current->acl;
1172 +       memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
1173 +       old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
1174 +       get_file(file);
1175 +       current->exec_file = file;
1176 +#endif
1177 +
1178 +       gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
1179 +
1180         retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
1181 -       if (retval >= 0)
1182 +       if (retval >= 0) {
1183 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1184 +               if (old_exec_file)
1185 +                       fput(old_exec_file);
1186 +#endif
1187                 /* execve success */
1188                 return retval;
1189
1190 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1191 +       current->acl = old_acl;
1192 +       memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
1193 +       fput(current->exec_file);
1194 +       current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
1195 +#endif
1196  out:
1197         /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
1198         allow_write_access(bprm.file);
1199 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in
1200 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in     2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400
1201 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1202 @@ -461,3 +461,12 @@
1203    bool 'Support for early boot texts over serial port' CONFIG_SERIAL_TEXT_DEBUG
1204  fi
1205  endmenu
1206 +
1207 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1208 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1209 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1210 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1211 +    source grsecurity/Config.in
1212 +fi
1213 +endmenu
1214 +
1215 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
1216 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c       2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400
1217 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c       2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1218 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
1219  #include <linux/errno.h>
1220  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
1221  #include <linux/user.h>
1222 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1223
1224  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1225  #include <asm/page.h>
1226 @@ -182,6 +183,9 @@
1227         if (pid == 1)           /* you may not mess with init */
1228                 goto out_tsk;
1229
1230 +       if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
1231 +               goto out_tsk;
1232 +
1233         if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
1234                 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
1235                 goto out_tsk;
1236 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c
1237 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c     2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400
1238 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1239 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
1240  #include <linux/ipc.h>
1241  #include <linux/utsname.h>
1242  #include <linux/file.h>
1243 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1244
1245  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1246  #include <asm/ipc.h>
1247 @@ -181,8 +182,14 @@
1248                         goto out;
1249         }
1250
1251 +       if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
1252 +               fput(file);
1253 +               ret = -EACCES;
1254 +               goto out;
1255 +       }
1256 +
1257         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
1258         ret = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
1259         up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
1260         if (file)
1261                 fput(file);
1262 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c
1263 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c    2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400
1264 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1265 @@ -1789,7 +1789,11 @@
1266          * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
1267          * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
1268          */
1269 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1270 +       if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1271 +#else
1272         if (current->tty == tty || suser())
1273 +#endif
1274                 return 1;
1275         return 0;
1276  }
1277 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in
1278 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in    2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400
1279 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in    2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1280 @@ -76,3 +76,11 @@
1281  endmenu
1282
1283  source lib/Config.in
1284 +
1285 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1286 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1287 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1288 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1289 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1290 +fi
1291 +endmenu
1292 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in
1293 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in   2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400
1294 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1295 @@ -80,3 +80,11 @@
1296  endmenu
1297
1298  source lib/Config.in
1299 +
1300 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1301 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1302 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1303 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1304 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1305 +fi
1306 +endmenu
1307 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in
1308 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in      2003-06-23 11:42:32.000000000 -0400
1309 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1310 @@ -388,3 +388,11 @@
1311  endmenu
1312
1313  source lib/Config.in
1314 +
1315 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1316 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1317 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1318 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1319 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1320 +fi
1321 +endmenu
1322 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile
1323 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile       2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
1324 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile       2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1325 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
1326
1327  BTOBJS := $(HEAD) init/main.o init/version.o init/do_mounts.o
1328  BTLIBS := $(CORE_FILES_NO_BTFIX) $(FILESYSTEMS) \
1329 -       $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS)
1330 +       $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS) $(GRSECURITY)
1331
1332  # I wanted to make this depend upon BTOBJS so that a parallel
1333  # build would work, but this fails because $(HEAD) cannot work
1334 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in
1335 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in   2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
1336 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1337 @@ -276,3 +276,11 @@
1338  endmenu
1339
1340  source lib/Config.in
1341 +
1342 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1343 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1344 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1345 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1346 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1347 +fi
1348 +endmenu
1349 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
1350 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c     2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
1351 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1352 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
1353  #include <linux/user.h>
1354  #include <linux/smp.h>
1355  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
1356 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1357
1358  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
1359  #include <asm/system.h>
1360 @@ -310,6 +311,9 @@
1361                 goto out;
1362         }
1363
1364 +       if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
1365 +               goto out_tsk;
1366 +
1367         if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
1368             || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
1369                 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
1370 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
1371 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c  2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400
1372 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1373 @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
1374  #include <linux/utsname.h>
1375  #include <linux/smp.h>
1376  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
1377 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1378
1379  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1380  #include <asm/ipc.h>
1381 @@ -240,6 +253,12 @@
1382         if (len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE || addr + len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE)
1383                 goto out_putf;
1384
1385 +       if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
1386 +               fput(file);
1387 +               retval = -EACCES;
1388 +               goto out;
1389 +       }
1390 +
1391         flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
1392
1393         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
1394 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in
1395 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
1396 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1397 @@ -310,3 +310,11 @@
1398  endmenu
1399
1400  source lib/Config.in
1401 +
1402 +mainmenu_option next_comment
1403 +comment 'Grsecurity'
1404 +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1405 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
1406 +       source grsecurity/Config.in
1407 +fi
1408 +endmenu
1409 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c
1410 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c  2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
1411 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1412 @@ -2046,7 +2046,11 @@
1413          * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
1414          * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
1415          */
1416 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1417 +       if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1418 +#else
1419         if (current->tty == tty || suser())
1420 +#endif
1421                 return 1;
1422         return 0;
1423  }
1424 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
1425 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c   2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
1426 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c   2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1427 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
1428  #include <linux/user.h>
1429  #include <linux/smp.h>
1430  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
1431 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1432
1433  #include <asm/asi.h>
1434  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
1435 @@ -161,6 +162,11 @@
1436                 goto out;
1437         }
1438
1439 +       if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) {
1440 +               pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
1441 +               goto out;
1442 +       }
1443 +
1444         if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
1445             || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
1446                 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
1447 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
1448 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c        2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
1449 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c        2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1450 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
1451  #include <linux/slab.h>
1452  #include <linux/ipc.h>
1453  #include <linux/personality.h>
1454 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1455
1456  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1457  #include <asm/ipc.h>
1458 @@ -280,6 +288,12 @@
1459                 if (!file)
1460                         goto out;
1461         }
1462 +
1463 +       if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) {
1464 +               retval = -EACCES;
1465 +               goto out_putf;
1466 +       }
1467 +
1468         flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
1469         len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
1470         retval = -EINVAL;
1471 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c
1472 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c      2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400
1473 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1474 @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
1475  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
1476  #include <linux/dnotify.h>
1477  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
1478 +#include <linux/random.h>
1479 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1480
1481  #include <asm/types.h>
1482  #include <asm/ipc.h>
1483 @@ -3203,6 +3205,11 @@
1484         struct file * file;
1485         int retval;
1486         int i;
1487 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1488 +       struct file *old_exec_file;
1489 +       struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
1490 +       struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
1491 +#endif
1492
1493         bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
1494         memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES * sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
1495 @@ -3213,6 +3229,20 @@
1496         if (IS_ERR(file))
1497                 return retval;
1498
1499 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes));
1500 +
1501 +       if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
1502 +               allow_write_access(file);
1503 +               fput(file);
1504 +               return -EAGAIN;
1505 +       }
1506 +
1507 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
1508 +               allow_write_access(file);
1509 +               fput(file);
1510 +               return -EACCES;
1511 +       }
1512 +
1513         bprm.file = file;
1514         bprm.filename = filename;
1515         bprm.sh_bang = 0;
1516 @@ -3233,11 +3263,24 @@
1517         if (retval < 0)
1518                 goto out;
1519
1520 +       if(!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
1521 +               retval = -EACCES;
1522 +               goto out;
1523 +       }
1524 +
1525 +       if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
1526 +               retval = -EACCES;
1527 +               goto out;
1528 +       }
1529 +
1530         retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
1531         if (retval < 0)
1532                 goto out;
1533
1534         bprm.exec = bprm.p;
1535 +
1536 +       gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
1537 +
1538         retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
1539         if (retval < 0)
1540                 goto out;
1541 @@ -3246,11 +3289,32 @@
1542         if (retval < 0)
1543                 goto out;
1544
1545 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1546 +       old_acl = current->acl;
1547 +       memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
1548 +       old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
1549 +       get_file(file);
1550 +       current->exec_file = file;
1551 +#endif
1552 +
1553 +        gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
1554 +
1555         retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs);
1556 -       if (retval >= 0)
1557 +       if (retval >= 0) {
1558 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1559 +               if (old_exec_file)
1560 +                       fput(old_exec_file);
1561 +#endif
1562                 /* execve success */
1563                 return retval;
1564 +       }
1565
1566 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1567 +       current->acl = old_acl;
1568 +       memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
1569 +       fput(current->exec_file);
1570 +       current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
1571 +#endif
1572  out:
1573         /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
1574         allow_write_access(bprm.file);
1575 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c
1576 --- linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c  2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400
1577 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1578 @@ -1932,7 +1932,11 @@
1579          * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
1580          * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
1581          */
1582 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1583 +       if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1584 +#else
1585         if (current->tty == tty || suser())
1586 +#endif
1587                 return 1;
1588         return 0;
1589  }
1590 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c
1591 --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c     2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400
1592 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1593 @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
1594  #include <linux/raw.h>
1595  #include <linux/tty.h>
1596  #include <linux/capability.h>
1597 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1598
1599  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1600  #include <asm/io.h>
1601 @@ -41,6 +42,10 @@
1602  #if defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE) && defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE_CHAR)
1603  extern void tapechar_init(void);
1604  #endif
1605 +
1606 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1607 +extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
1608 +#endif
1609
1610  static ssize_t do_write_mem(struct file * file, void *p, unsigned long realp,
1611                             const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
1612 @@ -114,6 +119,11 @@
1613         unsigned long p = *ppos;
1614         unsigned long end_mem;
1615
1616 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
1617 +       gr_handle_mem_write();
1618 +       return -EPERM;
1619 +#endif
1620 +
1621         end_mem = __pa(high_memory);
1622         if (p >= end_mem)
1623                 return 0;
1624 @@ -186,6 +196,12 @@
1625  {
1626         unsigned long offset = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
1627
1628 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
1629 +       if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma))
1630 +               return -EPERM;
1631 +#endif
1632 +
1633 +
1634         /*
1635          * Accessing memory above the top the kernel knows about or
1636          * through a file pointer that was marked O_SYNC will be
1637 @@ -285,6 +301,11 @@
1638         ssize_t virtr = 0;
1639         char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
1640
1641 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
1642 +       gr_handle_kmem_write();
1643 +       return -EPERM;
1644 +#endif
1645 +
1646         if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
1647                 wrote = count;
1648                 if (count > (unsigned long) high_memory - p)
1649 @@ -517,6 +538,15 @@
1650
1651  static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
1652  {
1653 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
1654 +       gr_handle_open_port();
1655 +       return -EPERM;
1656 +#endif
1657 +       return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
1658 +}
1659 +
1660 +static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
1661 +{
1662         return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
1663  }
1664
1665 @@ -609,7 +639,6 @@
1666  #define full_lseek      null_lseek
1667  #define write_zero     write_null
1668  #define read_full       read_zero
1669 -#define open_mem       open_port
1670  #define open_kmem      open_mem
1671
1672  static struct file_operations mem_fops = {
1673 @@ -685,6 +714,11 @@
1674                 case 9:
1675                         filp->f_op = &urandom_fops;
1676                         break;
1677 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1678 +               case 10:
1679 +                       filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
1680 +                       break;
1681 +#endif
1682                 default:
1683                         return -ENXIO;
1684         }
1685 @@ -711,7 +745,10 @@
1686         {5, "zero",    S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,           &zero_fops},
1687         {7, "full",    S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,           &full_fops},
1688         {8, "random",  S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &random_fops},
1689 -       {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &urandom_fops}
1690 +       {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,           &urandom_fops},
1691 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1692 +       {10,"grsec",   S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO,           &grsec_fops}
1693 +#endif
1694      };
1695      int i;
1696
1697 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c
1698 --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c  2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400
1699 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1700 @@ -260,9 +260,15 @@
1701  /*
1702   * Configuration information
1703   */
1704 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
1705 +#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024
1706 +#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256
1707 +#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512
1708 +#else
1709  #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
1710  #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
1711  #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
1712 +#endif
1713  #define USE_SHA
1714
1715  /*
1716 @@ -387,6 +393,7 @@
1717  /*
1718   * Static global variables
1719   */
1720 +
1721  static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
1722  static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
1723  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
1724 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c
1725 --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c  2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400
1726 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c  2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1727 @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
1728  #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
1729  #include <linux/selection.h>
1730  #include <linux/devfs_fs_kernel.h>
1731 -
1732 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1733  #include <linux/kmod.h>
1734
1735  #ifdef CONFIG_VT
1736 @@ -1397,7 +1397,11 @@
1737                 retval = -ENODEV;
1738         filp->f_flags = saved_flags;
1739
1740 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1741 +       if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1742 +#else
1743         if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !suser())
1744 +#endif
1745                 retval = -EBUSY;
1746
1747         if (retval) {
1748 @@ -1499,7 +1503,11 @@
1749  {
1750         char ch, mbz = 0;
1751
1752 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1753 +       if ((current->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1754 +#else
1755         if ((current->tty != tty) && !suser())
1756 +#endif
1757                 return -EPERM;
1758         if (get_user(ch, arg))
1759                 return -EFAULT;
1760 @@ -1537,7 +1545,11 @@
1761         if (inode->i_rdev == SYSCONS_DEV ||
1762             inode->i_rdev == CONSOLE_DEV) {
1763                 struct file *f;
1764 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1765 +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1766 +#else
1767                 if (!suser())
1768 +#endif
1769                         return -EPERM;
1770                 spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
1771                 f = redirect;
1772 @@ -1589,7 +1601,11 @@
1773                  * This tty is already the controlling
1774                  * tty for another session group!
1775                  */
1776 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1777 +               if ((arg == 1) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
1778 +#else
1779                 if ((arg == 1) && suser()) {
1780 +#endif
1781                         /*
1782                          * Steal it away
1783                          */
1784 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c
1785 --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c      2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400
1786 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c      2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1787 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
1788  #include <linux/vt_kern.h>
1789  #include <linux/kbd_diacr.h>
1790  #include <linux/selection.h>
1791 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1792
1793  #ifdef CONFIG_FB_COMPAT_XPMAC
1794  #include <asm/vc_ioctl.h>
1795 @@ -443,7 +444,11 @@
1796          * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user.
1797          */
1798         perm = 0;
1799 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1800 +       if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1801 +#else
1802         if (current->tty == tty || suser())
1803 +#endif
1804                 perm = 1;
1805
1806         kbd = kbd_table + console;
1807 @@ -1038,12 +1043,20 @@
1808                 return do_unimap_ioctl(cmd, (struct unimapdesc *)arg, perm);
1809
1810         case VT_LOCKSWITCH:
1811 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1812 +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1813 +#else
1814                 if (!suser())
1815 +#endif
1816                    return -EPERM;
1817                 vt_dont_switch = 1;
1818                 return 0;
1819         case VT_UNLOCKSWITCH:
1820 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1821 +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
1822 +#else
1823                 if (!suser())
1824 +#endif
1825                    return -EPERM;
1826                 vt_dont_switch = 0;
1827                 return 0;
1828 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c
1829 --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c     2003-06-23 11:42:12.000000000 -0400
1830 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c     2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400
1831 @@ -562,7 +562,15 @@
1832                 pci_for_each_dev(dev) {
1833                         pci_proc_attach_device(dev);
1834                 }
1835 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
1836 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
1837 +               entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL);
1838 +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
1839 +               entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
1840 +#endif
1841 +#else
1842                 entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL);
1843 +#endif
1844                 if (entry)
1845                         entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations;
1846         }
1847 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c
1848 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c       2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
1849 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c       2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
1850 @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
1851   */
1852
1853  #include <linux/module.h>
1854 +#include <linux/config.h>
1855
1856  #include <linux/sched.h>
1857  #include <linux/kernel.h>
1858 @@ -113,10 +114,12 @@
1859  /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
1860     if we wrote the stack, but not the data area.  */
1861  #ifdef __sparc__
1862 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize);
1863         if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) >
1864             current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
1865                 dump.u_dsize = 0;
1866  #else
1867 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE);
1868         if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
1869             current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
1870                 dump.u_dsize = 0;
1871 @@ -124,10 +127,12 @@
1872
1873  /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
1874  #ifdef __sparc__
1875 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize);
1876         if ((dump.u_ssize) >
1877             current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
1878                 dump.u_ssize = 0;
1879  #else
1880 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE);
1881         if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
1882             current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
1883                 dump.u_ssize = 0;
1884 @@ -276,6 +281,8 @@
1885         rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
1886         if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
1887                 rlim = ~0;
1888 +
1889 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss);
1890         if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
1891                 return -ENOMEM;
1892
1893 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c
1894 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c        2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
1895 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
1896 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
1897
1898  #include <linux/module.h>
1899
1900 +#include <linux/config.h>
1901  #include <linux/fs.h>
1902  #include <linux/stat.h>
1903  #include <linux/sched.h>
1904 @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
1905  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
1906  #include <linux/compiler.h>
1907  #include <linux/highmem.h>
1908 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1909
1910  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1911  #include <asm/param.h>
1912 @@ -1003,8 +1163,11 @@
1913  #undef DUMP_SEEK
1914
1915  #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr)   \
1916 +       do { \
1917 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr)); \
1918         if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
1919 -               goto end_coredump;
1920 +               goto end_coredump; \
1921 +       } while (0);
1922  #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \
1923         if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
1924                 goto end_coredump;
1925 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c
1926 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c    2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
1927 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c    2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
1928 @@ -1781,6 +1781,9 @@
1929         int err;
1930
1931         err = -EFBIG;
1932 +
1933 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size);
1934 +
1935          limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
1936         if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
1937                 send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
1938 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c
1939 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c      2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
1940 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c      2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
1941 @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
1942  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1943  #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
1944  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
1945 +#include <linux/major.h>
1946 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1947
1948  #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD
1949  #include <linux/kmod.h>
1950 @@ -687,6 +725,9 @@
1951                         cap_set_full(bprm->cap_effective);
1952         }
1953
1954 +       if (gr_handle_ptrace_exec(bprm->file->f_dentry, bprm->file->f_vfsmnt))
1955 +               return -EACCES;
1956 +
1957         memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
1958         return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
1959  }
1960 @@ -752,6 +793,8 @@
1961          current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
1962          current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
1963
1964 +       gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
1965 +
1966         if(do_unlock)
1967                 unlock_kernel();
1968         current->keep_capabilities = 0;
1969 @@ -885,6 +928,11 @@
1970         struct file *file;
1971         int retval;
1972         int i;
1973 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1974 +       struct file *old_exec_file;
1975 +       struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
1976 +       struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
1977 +#endif
1978
1979         file = open_exec(filename);
1980
1981 @@ -892,7 +940,21 @@
1982         if (IS_ERR(file))
1983                 return retval;
1984
1985 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes));
1986 +
1987 +       if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
1988 +               allow_write_access(file);
1989 +               fput(file);
1990 +               return -EAGAIN;
1991 +       }
1992 +
1993 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
1994 +               allow_write_access(file);
1995 +               fput(file);
1996 +               return -EACCES;
1997 +       }
1998 +
1999         bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
2000         memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0]));
2001
2002         bprm.file = file;
2003 @@ -916,11 +987,26 @@
2004         if (retval < 0)
2005                 goto out;
2006
2007 +       if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
2008 +               retval = -EACCES;
2009 +               goto out;
2010 +       }
2011 +
2012 +       if(gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
2013 +               retval = -EACCES;
2014 +               goto out;
2015 +       }
2016 +
2017         retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm);
2018         if (retval < 0)
2019                 goto out;
2020
2021         bprm.exec = bprm.p;
2022 +
2023 +       gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
2024 +
2025 +       gr_handle_exec_args(&bprm, argv);
2026 +
2027         retval = copy_strings(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm);
2028         if (retval < 0)
2029                 goto out;
2030 @@ -929,11 +1015,32 @@
2031         if (retval < 0)
2032                 goto out;
2033
2034 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
2035 +       old_acl = current->acl;
2036 +       memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
2037 +       old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
2038 +       get_file(file);
2039 +       current->exec_file = file;
2040 +#endif
2041 +
2042 +       gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
2043 +
2044         retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
2045 -       if (retval >= 0)
2046 +       if (retval >= 0) {
2047 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
2048 +               if (old_exec_file)
2049 +                       fput(old_exec_file);
2050 +#endif
2051                 /* execve success */
2052                 return retval;
2053 +       }
2054
2055 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
2056 +       current->acl = old_acl;
2057 +       memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
2058 +       fput(current->exec_file);
2059 +       current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
2060 +#endif
2061  out:
2062         /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
2063         allow_write_access(bprm.file);
2064 @@ -1090,6 +1234,7 @@
2065         if (!is_dumpable(current))
2066                 goto fail;
2067         current->mm->dumpable = 0;
2068 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump);
2069         if (current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump)
2070                 goto fail;
2071
2072 @@ -1109,7 +1254,7 @@
2073                 goto close_fail;
2074         if (!file->f_op->write)
2075                 goto close_fail;
2076 -       if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0)
2077 +       if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0)
2078                 goto close_fail;
2079
2080         retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file);
2081 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c
2082 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c     2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2083 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2084 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
2085  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
2086  #include <linux/slab.h>
2087  #include <linux/iobuf.h>
2088 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2089
2090  #include <asm/poll.h>
2091  #include <asm/siginfo.h>
2092 @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@
2093         write_lock(&files->file_lock);
2094
2095         error = -EINVAL;
2096 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start);
2097         if (orig_start >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
2098                 goto out;
2099
2100 @@ -86,6 +88,7 @@
2101         }
2102
2103         error = -EMFILE;
2104 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd);
2105         if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
2106                 goto out;
2107
2108 @@ -148,6 +151,7 @@
2109         if (newfd == oldfd)
2110                 goto out_unlock;
2111         err = -EBADF;
2112 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd);
2113         if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
2114                 goto out_unlock;
2115         get_file(file);                 /* We are now finished with oldfd */
2116 @@ -448,6 +452,10 @@
2117                         match = -p->pgrp;
2118                 if (pid != match)
2119                         continue;
2120 +               if (gr_check_protected_task(p))
2121 +                       continue;
2122 +               if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
2123 +                       continue;
2124                 send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band);
2125         }
2126  out:
2127 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c
2128 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c     2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
2129 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2130 @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
2131  static struct file_lock *locks_alloc_lock(int account)
2132  {
2133         struct file_lock *fl;
2134 +       if(account) gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_LOCKS, current->locks);
2135         if (account && current->locks >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_LOCKS].rlim_cur)
2136                 return NULL;
2137         fl = kmem_cache_alloc(filelock_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
2138 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c
2139 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c     2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
2140 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2141 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
2142  #include <linux/dnotify.h>
2143  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
2144  #include <linux/personality.h>
2145 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2146
2147  #include <asm/namei.h>
2148  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
2149 @@ -343,6 +344,13 @@
2150                 current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
2151                 schedule();
2152         }
2153 +
2154 +       if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
2155 +                                 dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) {
2156 +               path_release(nd);
2157 +               return -EACCES;
2158 +       }
2159 +
2160         current->link_count++;
2161         current->total_link_count++;
2162         UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
2163 @@ -641,6 +649,10 @@
2164                         }
2165                 }
2166  return_base:
2167 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
2168 +                       path_release(nd);
2169 +                       return -ENOENT;
2170 +               }
2171                 return 0;
2172  out_dput:
2173                 dput(dentry);
2174 @@ -1013,7 +1025,21 @@
2175                 error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag), nd);
2176                 if (error)
2177                         return error;
2178 +
2179 +               if (gr_acl_is_enabled() && nd->dentry->d_inode &&
2180 +                   S_ISBLK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
2181 +                   !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
2182 +                       error = -EPERM;
2183 +                       goto exit;
2184 +               }
2185 +
2186 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
2187 +                       error = -EACCES;
2188 +                       goto exit;
2189 +               }
2190 +
2191                 dentry = nd->dentry;
2192 +
2193                 goto ok;
2194         }
2195
2196 @@ -1046,7 +1072,16 @@
2197         if (!dentry->d_inode) {
2198                 if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
2199                         mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
2200 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) {
2201 +                       error = -EACCES;
2202 +                       up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2203 +                       goto exit_dput;
2204 +               }
2205 +
2206                 error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode);
2207 +               if (!error)
2208 +                       gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt);
2209 +
2210                 up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2211                 dput(nd->dentry);
2212                 nd->dentry = dentry;
2213 @@ -1056,12 +1091,35 @@
2214                 /* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */
2215                 acc_mode = 0;
2216                 flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
2217 +
2218                 goto ok;
2219         }
2220
2221         /*
2222          * It already exists.
2223          */
2224 +
2225 +       if (gr_acl_is_enabled() && S_ISBLK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
2226 +           !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
2227 +               error = -EPERM;
2228 +               up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2229 +               goto exit_dput;
2230 +       }
2231 +
2232 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
2233 +               error = -EACCES;
2234 +               up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2235 +               goto exit_dput;
2236 +       }
2237 +
2238 +       inode = dentry->d_inode;
2239 +
2240 +       if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
2241 +               up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2242 +               error = -EACCES;
2243 +               goto exit_dput;
2244 +       }
2245 +
2246         up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
2247
2248         error = -EEXIST;
2249 @@ -1151,7 +1209,7 @@
2250                 if (!error) {
2251                         DQUOT_INIT(inode);
2252
2253 -                       error = do_truncate(dentry, 0);
2254 +                       error = do_truncate(dentry,0,nd->mnt);
2255                 }
2256                 put_write_access(inode);
2257                 if (error)
2258 @@ -1182,6 +1240,13 @@
2259          * stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
2260          * are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
2261          */
2262 +
2263 +       if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode,
2264 +                                 dentry, nd->mnt)) {
2265 +               error = -EACCES;
2266 +               goto exit_dput;
2267 +       }
2268 +
2269         UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
2270         error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
2271         dput(dentry);
2272 @@ -1280,6 +1345,18 @@
2273
2274         mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
2275         if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
2276 +               if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
2277 +                       error = -EPERM;
2278 +                       dput(dentry);
2279 +                       goto out_dput;
2280 +               }
2281 +
2282 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
2283 +                       error = -EACCES;
2284 +                       dput(dentry);
2285 +                       goto out_dput;
2286 +               }
2287 +
2288                 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
2289                 case 0: case S_IFREG:
2290                         error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode);
2291 @@ -1293,8 +1370,13 @@
2292                 default:
2293                         error = -EINVAL;
2294                 }
2295 +
2296 +               if(!error)
2297 +                       gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
2298 +
2299                 dput(dentry);
2300         }
2301 +out_dput:
2302         up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
2303         path_release(&nd);
2304  out:
2305 @@ -1346,7 +1428,16 @@
2306                 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
2307                         if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
2308                                 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
2309 -                       error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
2310 +                       error = 0;
2311 +
2312 +                       if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
2313 +                               error = -EACCES;
2314 +
2315 +                       if(!error)
2316 +                               error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
2317 +                       if(!error)
2318 +                               gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
2319 +
2320                         dput(dentry);
2321                 }
2322                 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
2323 @@ -1431,6 +1522,8 @@
2324         char * name;
2325         struct dentry *dentry;
2326         struct nameidata nd;
2327 +       ino_t saved_ino = 0;
2328 +       kdev_t saved_dev = 0;
2329
2330         name = getname(pathname);
2331         if(IS_ERR(name))
2332 @@ -1455,7 +1548,22 @@
2333         dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
2334         error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
2335         if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
2336 -               error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
2337 +               error = 0;
2338 +               if (dentry->d_inode) {
2339 +                       if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
2340 +                               saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
2341 +                               saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
2342 +                       }
2343 +
2344 +                       if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt))
2345 +                               error = -EACCES;
2346 +               }
2347 +
2348 +               if (!error)
2349 +                       error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
2350 +               if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
2351 +                       gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev);
2352 +
2353                 dput(dentry);
2354         }
2355         up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
2356 @@ -1499,6 +1607,8 @@
2357         char * name;
2358         struct dentry *dentry;
2359         struct nameidata nd;
2360 +       ino_t saved_ino = 0;
2361 +       kdev_t saved_dev = 0;
2362
2363         name = getname(pathname);
2364         if(IS_ERR(name))
2365 @@ -1517,7 +1627,21 @@
2366                 /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
2367                 if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
2368                         goto slashes;
2369 -               error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
2370 +               error = 0;
2371 +               if (dentry->d_inode) {
2372 +                       if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
2373 +                               saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
2374 +                               saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
2375 +                       }
2376 +
2377 +                       if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt))
2378 +                               error = -EACCES;
2379 +               }
2380 +
2381 +               if (!error)
2382 +                       error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
2383 +               if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
2384 +                       gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev);
2385         exit2:
2386                 dput(dentry);
2387         }
2388 @@ -1581,7 +1705,15 @@
2389                 dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
2390                 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
2391                 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
2392 -                       error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
2393 +                       error = 0;
2394 +
2395 +                       if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from))
2396 +                               error = -EACCES;
2397 +
2398 +                       if(!error)
2399 +                               error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
2400 +                       if (!error)
2401 +                               gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
2402                         dput(dentry);
2403                 }
2404                 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
2405 @@ -1665,7 +1797,27 @@
2406                 new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
2407                 error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
2408                 if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
2409 -                       error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
2410 +                       error = 0;
2411 +
2412 +                       if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt,
2413 +                                              old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
2414 +                                              old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) {
2415 +                               error = -EPERM;
2416 +                               goto out_error;
2417 +                       }
2418 +
2419 +                       if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt,
2420 +                                                old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to)) {
2421 +                               error = -EACCES;
2422 +                               goto out_error;
2423 +                       }
2424 +
2425 +                       error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry,
2426 +                                       nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
2427 +
2428 +                       if (!error)
2429 +                               gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt);
2430 +out_error:
2431                         dput(new_dentry);
2432                 }
2433                 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
2434 @@ -1896,10 +2048,15 @@
2435         if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
2436                 goto exit4;
2437
2438 -       lock_kernel();
2439 -       error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
2440 +       error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt,
2441 +                                    old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt, newname);
2442 +
2443 +       if (error == 1) {
2444 +               lock_kernel();
2445 +               error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
2446                                    new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
2447 -       unlock_kernel();
2448 +               unlock_kernel();
2449 +       }
2450
2451         dput(new_dentry);
2452  exit4:
2453 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c
2454 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
2455 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2456 @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
2457  #include <linux/quotaops.h>
2458  #include <linux/acct.h>
2459  #include <linux/module.h>
2460 +#include <linux/sched.h>
2461 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2462
2463  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
2464
2465 @@ -325,6 +327,8 @@
2466                         lock_kernel();
2467                         retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, 0);
2468                         unlock_kernel();
2469 +
2470 +                       gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
2471                 }
2472                 up_write(&sb->s_umount);
2473                 return retval;
2474 @@ -350,6 +354,9 @@
2475         }
2476         spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
2477         up_write(&current->namespace->sem);
2478 +
2479 +       gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
2480 +
2481         return retval;
2482  }
2483
2484 @@ -729,6 +736,12 @@
2485         if (retval)
2486                 return retval;
2487
2488 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) {
2489 +               retval = -EPERM;
2490 +               path_release(&nd);
2491 +               return retval;
2492 +       }
2493 +
2494         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2495                 retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
2496                                     data_page);
2497 @@ -740,6 +753,9 @@
2498                 retval = do_add_mount(&nd, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
2499                                       dev_name, data_page);
2500         path_release(&nd);
2501 +
2502 +       gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
2503 +
2504         return retval;
2505  }
2506
2507 @@ -909,6 +925,9 @@
2508         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
2509                 return -EPERM;
2510
2511 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
2512 +               return -EPERM;
2513 +
2514         lock_kernel();
2515
2516         error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_POSITIVE|LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd);
2517 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c
2518 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c      2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400
2519 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c      2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2520 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
2521  #include <linux/slab.h>
2522  #include <linux/tty.h>
2523  #include <linux/iobuf.h>
2524 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2525
2526  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
2527
2528 @@ -95,7 +96,7 @@
2529         write_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2530  }
2531
2532 -int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length)
2533 +int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt)
2534  {
2535         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2536         int error;
2537 @@ -105,6 +106,9 @@
2538         if (length < 0)
2539                 return -EINVAL;
2540
2541 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt))
2542 +               return -EACCES;
2543 +
2544         down(&inode->i_sem);
2545         newattrs.ia_size = length;
2546         newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME;
2547 @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@
2548         error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
2549         if (!error) {
2550                 DQUOT_INIT(inode);
2551 -               error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length);
2552 +               error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt);
2553         }
2554         put_write_access(inode);
2555
2556 @@ -215,7 +219,7 @@
2557
2558         error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
2559         if (!error)
2560 -               error = do_truncate(dentry, length);
2561 +               error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt);
2562  out_putf:
2563         fput(file);
2564  out:
2565 @@ -284,6 +288,12 @@
2566                     (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
2567                         goto dput_and_out;
2568         }
2569 +
2570 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
2571 +               error = -EACCES;
2572 +               goto dput_and_out;
2573 +       }
2574 +
2575         error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
2576  dput_and_out:
2577         path_release(&nd);
2578 @@ -329,6 +339,12 @@
2579                     (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
2580                         goto dput_and_out;
2581         }
2582 +
2583 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
2584 +               error = -EACCES;
2585 +               goto dput_and_out;
2586 +       }
2587 +
2588         error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
2589  dput_and_out:
2590         path_release(&nd);
2591 @@ -371,6 +387,10 @@
2592                 if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
2593                    && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
2594                         res = -EROFS;
2595 +
2596 +               if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode))
2597 +                       res =  -EACCES;
2598 +
2599                 path_release(&nd);
2600         }
2601
2602 @@ -394,6 +414,8 @@
2603         if (error)
2604                 goto dput_and_out;
2605
2606 +       gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
2607 +
2608         set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
2609
2610  dput_and_out:
2611 @@ -424,6 +446,13 @@
2612                 goto out_putf;
2613
2614         error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
2615 +
2616 +       if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt))
2617 +               error = -EPERM;
2618 +
2619 +       if (!error)
2620 +               gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt);
2621 +
2622         if (!error)
2623                 set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
2624  out_putf:
2625 @@ -450,8 +479,16 @@
2626         if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
2627                 goto dput_and_out;
2628
2629 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
2630 +               goto dput_and_out;
2631 +
2632         set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
2633         set_fs_altroot();
2634 +
2635 +       gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
2636 +
2637 +       gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
2638 +
2639         error = 0;
2640  dput_and_out:
2641         path_release(&nd);
2642 @@ -480,8 +517,20 @@
2643         err = -EPERM;
2644         if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
2645                 goto out_putf;
2646 +
2647 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
2648 +               err = -EACCES;
2649 +               goto out_putf;
2650 +       }
2651 +
2652         if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
2653                 mode = inode->i_mode;
2654 +
2655 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
2656 +               err = -EPERM;
2657 +               goto out_putf;
2658 +       }
2659 +
2660         newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
2661         newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
2662         err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
2663 @@ -512,8 +561,19 @@
2664         if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
2665                 goto dput_and_out;
2666
2667 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
2668 +               error = -EACCES;
2669 +               goto dput_and_out;
2670 +       }
2671 +
2672         if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
2673                 mode = inode->i_mode;
2674 +
2675 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
2676 +               error = -EACCES;
2677 +               goto dput_and_out;
2678 +       }
2679 +
2680         newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
2681         newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
2682         error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
2683 @@ -524,7 +584,7 @@
2684         return error;
2685  }
2686
2687 -static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
2688 +static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
2689  {
2690         struct inode * inode;
2691         int error;
2692 @@ -541,6 +601,12 @@
2693         error = -EPERM;
2694         if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
2695                 goto out;
2696 +
2697 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
2698 +               error = -EACCES;
2699 +               goto out;
2700 +       }
2701 +
2702         if (user == (uid_t) -1)
2703                 user = inode->i_uid;
2704         if (group == (gid_t) -1)
2705 @@ -591,7 +657,7 @@
2706
2707         error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
2708         if (!error) {
2709 -               error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
2710 +               error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
2711                 path_release(&nd);
2712         }
2713         return error;
2714 @@ -604,7 +670,7 @@
2715
2716         error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
2717         if (!error) {
2718 -               error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
2719 +               error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
2720                 path_release(&nd);
2721         }
2722         return error;
2723 @@ -618,7 +684,8 @@
2724
2725         file = fget(fd);
2726         if (file) {
2727 -               error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
2728 +               error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user,
2729 +                               group, file->f_vfsmnt);
2730                 fput(file);
2731         }
2732         return error;
2733 @@ -738,6 +805,7 @@
2734          * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
2735          * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
2736          */
2737 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd);
2738         if (fd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
2739                 goto out;
2740
2741 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c
2742 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c        2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2743 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2744 @@ -334,6 +340,11 @@
2745
2746         wchan = get_wchan(task);
2747
2748 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
2749 +       eip = 0;
2750 +       esp = 0;
2751 +#endif
2752 +
2753         collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch);
2754
2755         /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
2756 @@ -684,6 +727,16 @@
2757         return retval;
2758  }
2759
2760 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
2761 +int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
2762 +{
2763 +       int len;
2764 +
2765 +       len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
2766 +       return len;
2767 +}
2768 +#endif
2769 +
2770  #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
2771  int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
2772  {
2773 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c
2774 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2775 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2776 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
2777  #include <linux/string.h>
2778  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
2779  #include <linux/namespace.h>
2780 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2781
2782  /*
2783   * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
2784 @@ -41,6 +42,9 @@
2785  int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct*,char*);
2786  int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct*,char*);
2787  int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct*,char*);
2788 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
2789 +int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
2790 +#endif
2791
2792  static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vfsmount **mnt)
2793  {
2794 @@ -228,9 +232,22 @@
2795
2796  static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2797  {
2798 +       int ret;
2799 +       struct task_struct *task;
2800 +
2801         if (vfs_permission(inode, mask) != 0)
2802                 return -EACCES;
2803 -       return proc_check_root(inode);
2804 +       ret = proc_check_root(inode);
2805 +
2806 +       if (ret)
2807 +               return ret;
2808 +
2809 +       task = inode->u.proc_i.task;
2810 +
2811 +       if (!task)
2812 +               return 0;
2813 +
2814 +       return gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task);
2815  }
2816
2817  static ssize_t pid_maps_read(struct file * file, char * buf,
2818 @@ -546,6 +563,9 @@
2819         PROC_PID_STATM,
2820         PROC_PID_MAPS,
2821         PROC_PID_CPU,
2822 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
2823 +       PROC_PID_IPADDR,
2824 +#endif
2825         PROC_PID_MOUNTS,
2826         PROC_PID_FD_DIR = 0x8000,       /* 0x8000-0xffff */
2827  };
2828 @@ -561,6 +581,9 @@
2829  #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
2830    E(PROC_PID_CPU,      "cpu",          S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
2831  #endif
2832 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
2833 +  E(PROC_PID_IPADDR,   "ipaddr",       S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
2834 +#endif
2835    E(PROC_PID_MAPS,     "maps",         S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
2836    E(PROC_PID_MEM,      "mem",          S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
2837    E(PROC_PID_CWD,      "cwd",          S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
2838 @@ -717,10 +740,17 @@
2839         get_task_struct(task);
2840         inode->u.proc_i.task = task;
2841         inode->i_uid = 0;
2842 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2843 +       inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
2844 +#else
2845         inode->i_gid = 0;
2846 +#endif
2847 +
2848         if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
2849                 inode->i_uid = task->euid;
2850 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2851                 inode->i_gid = task->egid;
2852 +#endif
2853         }
2854
2855  out:
2856 @@ -928,6 +958,12 @@
2857                         inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_cpu;
2858                         break;
2859  #endif
2860 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
2861 +               case PROC_PID_IPADDR:
2862 +                       inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
2863 +                       inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr;
2864 +                       break;
2865 +#endif
2866                 case PROC_PID_MEM:
2867                         inode->i_op = &proc_mem_inode_operations;
2868                         inode->i_fop = &proc_mem_operations;
2869 @@ -1026,13 +1062,34 @@
2870         if (!task)
2871                 goto out;
2872
2873 +       if(gr_check_hidden_task(task)) {
2874 +               free_task_struct(task);
2875 +               goto out;
2876 +       }
2877 +
2878 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
2879 +       if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid)
2880 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2881 +           && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
2882 +#endif
2883 +       ) {
2884 +               free_task_struct(task);
2885 +               goto out;
2886 +       }
2887 +#endif
2888         inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_PID_INO);
2889
2890         free_task_struct(task);
2891
2892         if (!inode)
2893                 goto out;
2894 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
2895 +       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
2896 +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2897 +       inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
2898 +#else
2899         inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
2900 +#endif
2901         inode->i_op = &proc_base_inode_operations;
2902         inode->i_fop = &proc_base_operations;
2903         inode->i_nlink = 3;
2904 @@ -1072,6 +1129,18 @@
2905                 int pid = p->pid;
2906                 if (!pid)
2907                         continue;
2908 +               if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
2909 +                       continue;
2910 +               if(gr_check_hidden_task(p))
2911 +                       continue;
2912 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
2913 +               if (current->uid && (p->uid != current->uid)
2914 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2915 +                       && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
2916 +#endif
2917 +               )
2918 +                       continue;
2919 +#endif
2920                 if (--index >= 0)
2921                         continue;
2922                 pids[nr_pids] = pid;
2923 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c
2924 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c      2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2925 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c      2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2926 @@ -503,6 +503,29 @@
2927         return ent;
2928  }
2929
2930 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
2931 +struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
2932 +{
2933 +       struct proc_dir_entry *ent;
2934 +       mode_t mode = 0;
2935 +
2936 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
2937 +       mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR;
2938 +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2939 +       mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP;
2940 +#endif
2941 +
2942 +       ent = proc_create(&parent, name, mode, 2);
2943 +       if (ent) {
2944 +               ent->proc_fops = &proc_dir_operations;
2945 +               ent->proc_iops = &proc_dir_inode_operations;
2946 +
2947 +               proc_register(parent, ent);
2948 +       }
2949 +       return ent;
2950 +}
2951 +#endif
2952 +
2953  struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_entry(const char *name, mode_t mode,
2954                                          struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
2955  {
2956 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c
2957 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c        2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2958 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2959 @@ -152,7 +152,11 @@
2960                 if (de->mode) {
2961                         inode->i_mode = de->mode;
2962                         inode->i_uid = de->uid;
2963 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
2964 +                       inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
2965 +#else
2966                         inode->i_gid = de->gid;
2967 +#endif
2968                 }
2969                 if (de->size)
2970                         inode->i_size = de->size;
2971 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
2972 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c    2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
2973 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c    2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
2974 @@ -568,6 +568,7 @@
2975  void __init proc_misc_init(void)
2976  {
2977         struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
2978 +       int gr_mode = 0;
2979         static struct {
2980                 char *name;
2981                 int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
2982 @@ -582,48 +583,81 @@
2983  #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC
2984                 {"stram",       stram_read_proc},
2985  #endif
2986 -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
2987 +#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC)
2988                 {"modules",     modules_read_proc},
2989  #endif
2990                 {"stat",        kstat_read_proc},
2991 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
2992                 {"devices",     devices_read_proc},
2993 -#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
2994 +#endif
2995 +#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
2996                 {"interrupts",  interrupts_read_proc},
2997  #endif
2998                 {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
2999 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3000                 {"dma",         dma_read_proc},
3001                 {"ioports",     ioports_read_proc},
3002                 {"cmdline",     cmdline_read_proc},
3003 +#endif
3004  #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286
3005                 {"rtc",         ds1286_read_proc},
3006  #endif
3007                 {"locks",       locks_read_proc},
3008                 {"swaps",       swaps_read_proc},
3009 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3010                 {"iomem",       memory_read_proc},
3011 +#endif
3012                 {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
3013                 {NULL,}
3014         };
3015         for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
3016                 create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
3017
3018 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
3019 +       gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
3020 +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
3021 +       gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
3022 +#endif
3023 +
3024 +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) && defined(CONFIG_MODULES)
3025 +       create_proc_read_entry("modules", gr_mode, NULL, &modules_read_proc, NULL);
3026 +#endif
3027 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3028 +       create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL);
3029 +       create_proc_read_entry("dma", gr_mode, NULL, &dma_read_proc, NULL);
3030 +       create_proc_read_entry("ioports", gr_mode, NULL, &ioports_read_proc, NULL);
3031 +       create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
3032 +       create_proc_read_entry("iomem", gr_mode, NULL, &memory_read_proc, NULL);
3033 +#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
3034 +       create_proc_read_entry("interrupts", gr_mode, NULL, &interrupts_read_proc, NULL);
3035 +#endif
3036 +#endif
3037 +
3038         proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
3039
3040         /* And now for trickier ones */
3041         entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
3042         if (entry)
3043                 entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
3044 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3045 +       create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
3046 +       create_seq_entry("slabinfo", gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
3047 +#else
3048         create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
3049 -       create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
3050         create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
3051 +#endif
3052 +       create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
3053  #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
3054 -       create_seq_entry("ksyms", 0, &proc_ksyms_operations);
3055 +       create_seq_entry("ksyms", gr_mode, &proc_ksyms_operations);
3056  #endif
3057 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3058         proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
3059         if (proc_root_kcore) {
3060                 proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
3061                 proc_root_kcore->size =
3062                                 (size_t)high_memory - PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE;
3063         }
3064 +#endif
3065         if (prof_shift) {
3066                 entry = create_proc_entry("profile", S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO, NULL);
3067                 if (entry) {
3068 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c
3069 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c     2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
3070 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3071 @@ -174,7 +174,11 @@
3072          * password lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password
3073          * entry.
3074          */
3075 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
3076 +       proc_tty_driver = proc_priv_mkdir("tty/driver", 0);
3077 +#else
3078         proc_tty_driver = proc_mkdir_mode("tty/driver", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0);
3079 +#endif
3080
3081         create_proc_read_entry("tty/ldiscs", 0, 0, tty_ldiscs_read_proc,NULL);
3082         create_proc_read_entry("tty/drivers", 0, 0, tty_drivers_read_proc,NULL);
3083 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c
3084 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
3085 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3086 @@ -37,13 +37,21 @@
3087                 return;
3088         }
3089         proc_misc_init();
3090 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
3091 +       proc_net = proc_priv_mkdir("net", 0);
3092 +#else
3093         proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", 0);
3094 +#endif
3095  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
3096         proc_mkdir("sysvipc", 0);
3097  #endif
3098  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
3099 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
3100 +       proc_sys_root = proc_priv_mkdir("sys", 0);
3101 +#else
3102         proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", 0);
3103  #endif
3104 +#endif
3105  #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE)
3106         proc_mkdir("sys/fs", 0);
3107         proc_mkdir("sys/fs/binfmt_misc", 0);
3108 @@ -67,7 +75,12 @@
3109  #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_RTAS
3110         proc_rtas_init();
3111  #endif
3112 +
3113 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3114 +       proc_bus = proc_priv_mkdir("bus", 0);
3115 +#else
3116         proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", 0);
3117 +#endif
3118  }
3119
3120  static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry)
3121 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c
3122 --- linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c   2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400
3123 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c   2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3124 @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
3125  #include <linux/stat.h>
3126  #include <linux/file.h>
3127  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
3128 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
3129
3130  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
3131
3132 @@ -181,6 +182,7 @@
3133  struct readdir_callback {
3134         struct old_linux_dirent * dirent;
3135         int count;
3136 +       struct nameidata nd;
3137  };
3138
3139  static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
3140 @@ -191,6 +193,10 @@
3141
3142         if (buf->count)
3143                 return -EINVAL;
3144 +
3145 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
3146 +               return 0;
3147 +
3148         buf->count++;
3149         dirent = buf->dirent;
3150         put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino);
3151 @@ -215,6 +221,9 @@
3152         buf.count = 0;
3153         buf.dirent = dirent;
3154
3155 +       buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
3156 +       buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
3157 +
3158         error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
3159         if (error >= 0)
3160                 error = buf.count;
3161 @@ -242,6 +251,7 @@
3162         struct linux_dirent * previous;
3163         int count;
3164         int error;
3165 +       struct nameidata nd;
3166  };
3167
3168  static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
3169 @@ -254,6 +264,10 @@
3170         buf->error = -EINVAL;   /* only used if we fail.. */
3171         if (reclen > buf->count)
3172                 return -EINVAL;
3173 +
3174 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
3175 +               return 0;
3176 +
3177         dirent = buf->previous;
3178         if (dirent)
3179                 put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off);
3180 @@ -286,6 +300,9 @@
3181         buf.count = count;
3182         buf.error = 0;
3183
3184 +       buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
3185 +       buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
3186 +
3187         error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf);
3188         if (error < 0)
3189                 goto out_putf;
3190 @@ -320,6 +337,7 @@
3191         struct linux_dirent64 * previous;
3192         int count;
3193         int error;
3194 +       struct nameidata nd;
3195  };
3196
3197  static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset,
3198 @@ -332,6 +350,10 @@
3199         buf->error = -EINVAL;   /* only used if we fail.. */
3200         if (reclen > buf->count)
3201                 return -EINVAL;
3202 +
3203 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino))
3204 +               return 0;
3205 +
3206         dirent = buf->previous;
3207         if (dirent) {
3208                 d.d_off = offset;
3209 @@ -369,6 +391,9 @@
3210         buf.count = count;
3211         buf.error = 0;
3212
3213 +       buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
3214 +       buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry;
3215 +
3216         error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf);
3217         if (error < 0)
3218                 goto out_putf;
3219 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in
3220 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in   1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
3221 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in   2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3222 @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
3223 +choice 'Security level' \
3224 +        "Low           CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW \
3225 +         Medium                CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID \
3226 +         High          CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI \
3227 +         Customized    CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" Customized
3228 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW" = "y" ]; then
3229 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC n
3230 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC n
3231 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING n
3232 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL n
3233 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME n
3234 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL n
3235 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n
3236 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT n
3237 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n
3238 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE n
3239 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT n
3240 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD n
3241 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC n
3242 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
3243 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n
3244 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n
3245 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL n
3246 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP n
3247 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n
3248 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n
3249 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n
3250 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n
3251 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n
3252 +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
3253 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
3254 +fi
3255 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
3256 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
3257 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n
3258 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
3259 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
3260 +
3261 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
3262 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
3263 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
3264 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
3265 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
3266 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
3267 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
3268 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN n
3269 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
3270 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
3271 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
3272 +fi
3273 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID" = "y" ]; then
3274 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n
3275 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
3276 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n
3277 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n
3278 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n
3279 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n
3280 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n
3281 +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
3282 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
3283 +fi
3284 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
3285 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n
3286 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y
3287 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
3288 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n
3289 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
3290 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n
3291 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
3292 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
3293 +
3294 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
3295 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
3296 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
3297 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
3298 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
3299 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
3300 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
3301 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
3302 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
3303 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y
3304 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y
3305 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y
3306 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING y
3307 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y
3308 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y
3309 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y
3310 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT y
3311 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n
3312 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y
3313 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y
3314 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y
3315 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y
3316 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
3317 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y
3318 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y
3319 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y
3320 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10
3321 +fi
3322 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI" = "y" ]; then
3323 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
3324 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
3325 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y
3326 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y
3327 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y
3328 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y
3329 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y
3330 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y
3331 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y
3332 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y
3333 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING y
3334 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y
3335 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y
3336 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y
3337 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT y
3338 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y
3339 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y
3340 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR y
3341 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y
3342 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y
3343 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y
3344 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y
3345 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS y
3346 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y
3347 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK y
3348 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y
3349 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n
3350 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM y
3351 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y
3352 +define_int  CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10
3353 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM y
3354 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG y
3355 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y
3356 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y
3357 +
3358 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n
3359 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n
3360 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
3361 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
3362 +
3363 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD y
3364 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD y
3365 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE y
3366 +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
3367 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n
3368 +fi
3369 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT y
3370 +fi
3371 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" = "y" ]; then
3372 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3373 +comment 'Address Space Protection'
3374 +bool 'Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
3375 +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then
3376 +  bool 'Disable privileged I/O' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
3377 +  if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO" = "y" ]; then
3378 +    define_bool CONFIG_RTC y
3379 +  fi
3380 +fi
3381 +bool 'Hide kernel symbols' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
3382 +endmenu
3383 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3384 +comment 'Role Based Access Control Options'
3385 +bool 'Hide kernel processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
3386 +int 'Maximum tries before password lockout' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3
3387 +int 'Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30
3388 +endmenu
3389 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3390 +comment 'Filesystem Protections'
3391 +bool 'Proc restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
3392 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC" != "n" ]; then
3393 + bool '   Restrict to user only' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
3394 + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "y" ]; then
3395 +  bool '   Allow special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
3396 +  if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then
3397 +   int  '   GID for special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 1001
3398 +  fi
3399 + fi
3400 + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "n" -o "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then
3401 +  bool '   Additional restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
3402 + fi
3403 +fi
3404 +bool 'Linking restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
3405 +bool 'FIFO restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
3406 +bool 'Chroot jail restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
3407 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT" != "n" ]; then
3408 +bool '   Deny mounts' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
3409 +bool '   Deny double-chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
3410 +bool '   Deny pivot_root in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
3411 +bool '   Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
3412 +bool '   Deny (f)chmod +s' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
3413 +bool '   Deny fchdir out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
3414 +bool '   Deny mknod' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
3415 +bool '   Deny shmat() out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
3416 +bool '   Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
3417 +bool '   Protect outside processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
3418 +bool '   Restrict priority changes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
3419 +bool '   Deny sysctl writes in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
3420 +bool '   Capability restrictions within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
3421 +fi
3422 +endmenu
3423 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3424 +comment 'Kernel Auditing'
3425 +bool 'Single group for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
3426 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP" != "n" ]; then
3427 +int  '   GID for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID 1007
3428 +fi
3429 +bool 'Exec logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
3430 +bool 'Resource logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
3431 +bool 'Log execs within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
3432 +bool 'Chdir logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
3433 +bool '(Un)Mount logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
3434 +bool 'IPC logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
3435 +bool 'Signal logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
3436 +bool 'Fork failure logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
3437 +bool 'Time change logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
3438 +bool '/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
3439 +endmenu
3440 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3441 +comment 'Executable Protections'
3442 +bool 'Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
3443 +bool 'Dmesg(8) restriction' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
3444 +bool 'Randomized PIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
3445 +bool 'Trusted path execution' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
3446 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE" != "n" ]; then
3447 +bool '   Partially restrict non-root users' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
3448 +int  '   GID for untrusted users:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID 1005
3449 +fi
3450 +endmenu
3451 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3452 +comment 'Network Protections'
3453 +bool 'Larger entropy pools' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
3454 +bool 'Truly random TCP ISN selection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
3455 +bool 'Randomized IP IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
3456 +bool 'Randomized TCP source ports' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
3457 +bool 'Randomized RPC XIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
3458 +bool 'Altered Ping IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
3459 +bool 'Socket restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
3460 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET" != "n" ]; then
3461 +bool '  Deny any sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
3462 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL" != "n" ]; then
3463 +int  '   GID to deny all sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID 1004
3464 +fi
3465 +bool '  Deny client sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
3466 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT" != "n" ]; then
3467 +int  '   GID to deny client sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID 1003
3468 +fi
3469 +bool '  Deny server sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
3470 +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER" != "n" ]; then
3471 +int  '   GID to deny server sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID 1002
3472 +fi
3473 +fi
3474 +endmenu
3475 +if [ "$CONFIG_SYSCTL" != "n" ]; then
3476 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3477 +comment 'Sysctl support'
3478 +bool 'Sysctl support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
3479 +endmenu
3480 +fi
3481 +mainmenu_option next_comment
3482 +comment 'Logging options'
3483 +int 'Seconds in between log messages (minimum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10
3484 +int 'Number of messages in a burst (maximum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4
3485 +endmenu
3486 +fi
3487 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile
3488 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile    1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
3489 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile    2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3490 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
3491 +# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
3492 +# during 2001, 2002, and 2003 it has been completely redesigned by
3493 +# Brad Spengler
3494 +#
3495 +# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
3496 +# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL, unless otherwise
3497 +# noted (as in obsd_rand.c)
3498 +
3499 +O_TARGET := grsec.o
3500 +
3501 +obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
3502 +       grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
3503 +       grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o
3504 +
3505 +ifeq ($(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC),y)
3506 +obj-y += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o obsd_rand.o \
3507 +       gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
3508 +       gracl_learn.o
3509 +obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
3510 +else
3511 +obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
3512 +endif
3513 +
3514 +include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make
3515 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c
3516 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c     1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
3517 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
3518 @@ -0,0 +1,2601 @@
3519 +/*
3520 + * grsecurity/gracl.c
3521 + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2001, 2002, 2003
3522 + *
3523 + */
3524 +
3525 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
3526 +#include <linux/sched.h>
3527 +#include <linux/mm.h>
3528 +#include <linux/file.h>
3529 +#include <linux/fs.h>
3530 +#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
3531 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
3532 +#include <linux/slab.h>
3533 +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
3534 +#include <linux/types.h>
3535 +#include <linux/capability.h>
3536 +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
3537 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
3538 +#include <linux/gralloc.h>
3539 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
3540 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
3541 +
3542 +#include <asm/uaccess.h>
3543 +#include <asm/errno.h>
3544 +#include <asm/mman.h>
3545 +
3546 +static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
3547 +static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head;
3548 +static struct name_db name_set;
3549 +static struct name_db inodev_set;
3550 +
3551 +static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
3552 +
3553 +static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
3554 +
3555 +static spinlock_t gr_dev_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
3556 +rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
3557 +
3558 +extern char *gr_shared_page[2][NR_CPUS];
3559 +
3560 +static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
3561 +
3562 +extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
3563 +
3564 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
3565 +extern __inline__ void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
3566 +                                      const int res,
3567 +                                      const unsigned long wanted);
3568 +#endif
3569 +
3570 +static unsigned char system_salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
3571 +static unsigned char system_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
3572 +
3573 +static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
3574 +static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
3575 +
3576 +static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
3577 +
3578 +/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move
3579 +   entries around.  They can be replaced during insert. */
3580 +
3581 +static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject;
3582 +static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object;
3583 +static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev;
3584 +
3585 +/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since
3586 +   nested subject parsing is tricky
3587 +*/
3588 +static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL;
3589 +static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL;
3590 +
3591 +static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
3592 +static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
3593 +
3594 +extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
3595 +extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
3596 +extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
3597 +extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
3598 +
3599 +__inline__ int
3600 +gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
3601 +{
3602 +       return (gr_status & GR_READY);
3603 +}
3604 +
3605 +static __inline__ char *
3606 +d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
3607 +           char *buf, int buflen)
3608 +{
3609 +       char *res;
3610 +       struct dentry *our_dentry;
3611 +       struct vfsmount *our_mount;
3612 +       struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
3613 +       struct dentry *root;
3614 +
3615 +       our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry;
3616 +       our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt;
3617 +
3618 +       read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
3619 +       rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
3620 +       root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
3621 +       read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
3622 +
3623 +       spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
3624 +       res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
3625 +       spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
3626 +       dput(root);
3627 +       mntput(rootmnt);
3628 +       return res;
3629 +}
3630 +
3631 +char *
3632 +gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
3633 +{
3634 +       return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()],
3635 +                          PAGE_SIZE);
3636 +}
3637 +
3638 +char *
3639 +gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
3640 +{
3641 +       return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[1][smp_processor_id()],
3642 +                          PAGE_SIZE);
3643 +}
3644 +
3645 +__inline__ __u32
3646 +to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
3647 +{
3648 +       __u32 retmode = 0;
3649 +
3650 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_READ) ? GR_AUDIT_READ : 0;
3651 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
3652 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_APPEND) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0;
3653 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_EXEC) ? GR_AUDIT_EXEC : 0;
3654 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_INHERIT) ? GR_AUDIT_INHERIT : 0;
3655 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_FIND) ? GR_AUDIT_FIND : 0;
3656 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_SETID) ? GR_AUDIT_SETID : 0;
3657 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_CREATE) ? GR_AUDIT_CREATE : 0;
3658 +       retmode |= (reqmode & GR_DELETE) ? GR_AUDIT_DELETE : 0;
3659 +
3660 +       return retmode;
3661 +}
3662 +
3663 +__inline__ struct acl_role_label *
3664 +lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
3665 +                     const gid_t gid)
3666 +{
3667 +       unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
3668 +       struct acl_role_label *match;
3669 +       struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
3670 +       __u8 i = 0;
3671 +
3672 +       match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3673 +
3674 +       while (match
3675 +              && (match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER))) {
3676 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
3677 +               match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3678 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3679 +       }
3680 +
3681 +       if (!match || match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)) {
3682 +             try_group:
3683 +               index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
3684 +               match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3685 +               i = 0;
3686 +
3687 +               while (match
3688 +                      && (match->uidgid != gid
3689 +                          || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))) {
3690 +                       index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
3691 +                       match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3692 +                       i = (i + 1) % 32;
3693 +               }
3694 +
3695 +               if (!match || match->uidgid != gid
3696 +                   || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))
3697 +                       match = default_role;
3698 +               else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) {
3699 +                       return match;
3700 +               } else {
3701 +                       for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
3702 +                               if (likely
3703 +                                   ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
3704 +                                    (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
3705 +                                       return match;
3706 +                       }
3707 +                       match = default_role;
3708 +               }
3709 +       } else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) {
3710 +               return match;
3711 +       } else {
3712 +               for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
3713 +                       if (likely
3714 +                           ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) ==
3715 +                            (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask)))
3716 +                               return match;
3717 +               }
3718 +               goto try_group;
3719 +       }
3720 +
3721 +       return match;
3722 +}
3723 +
3724 +__inline__ struct acl_subject_label *
3725 +lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
3726 +                     const struct acl_role_label *role)
3727 +{
3728 +       unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
3729 +       struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
3730 +       unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size);
3731 +       struct acl_subject_label *match;
3732 +       __u8 i = 0;
3733 +
3734 +       match = s_hash[index];
3735 +
3736 +       while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
3737 +              (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
3738 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
3739 +               match = s_hash[index];
3740 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3741 +       }
3742 +
3743 +       if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_subject) &&
3744 +                    (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
3745 +                    !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
3746 +               return match;
3747 +       else
3748 +               return NULL;
3749 +}
3750 +
3751 +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
3752 +lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
3753 +                    const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
3754 +{
3755 +       unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
3756 +       struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
3757 +       unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
3758 +       struct acl_object_label *match;
3759 +       __u8 i = 0;
3760 +
3761 +       match = o_hash[index];
3762 +
3763 +       while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
3764 +              (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
3765 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
3766 +               match = o_hash[index];
3767 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3768 +       }
3769 +
3770 +       if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
3771 +                    (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
3772 +                    !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
3773 +               return match;
3774 +       else
3775 +               return NULL;
3776 +}
3777 +
3778 +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
3779 +lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev,
3780 +                    const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
3781 +{
3782 +       unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
3783 +       struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
3784 +       unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
3785 +       struct acl_object_label *match;
3786 +       __u8 i = 0;
3787 +
3788 +       match = o_hash[index];
3789 +
3790 +       while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
3791 +              !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
3792 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
3793 +               match = o_hash[index];
3794 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3795 +       }
3796 +
3797 +       if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
3798 +                    (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
3799 +                    (match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
3800 +               return match;
3801 +
3802 +       i = 0;
3803 +       index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
3804 +       match = o_hash[index];
3805 +
3806 +       while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
3807 +              (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
3808 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
3809 +               match = o_hash[index];
3810 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3811 +       }
3812 +
3813 +       if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) &&
3814 +                    (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) &&
3815 +                    !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
3816 +               return match;
3817 +       else
3818 +               return NULL;
3819 +}
3820 +
3821 +static __inline__ struct name_entry *
3822 +lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
3823 +{
3824 +       unsigned long index = nhash(name, name_set.n_size);
3825 +       struct name_entry *match;
3826 +       __u8 i = 0;
3827 +
3828 +       match = name_set.n_hash[index];
3829 +
3830 +       while (match && (strcmp(match->name, name)) != 0) {
3831 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
3832 +               match = name_set.n_hash[index];
3833 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3834 +       }
3835 +
3836 +       if (unlikely(match && !strcmp(name, match->name)))
3837 +               return match;
3838 +       else
3839 +               return NULL;
3840 +}
3841 +
3842 +static __inline__ struct name_entry *
3843 +lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
3844 +{
3845 +       unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size);
3846 +       struct name_entry *match;
3847 +       __u8 i = 0;
3848 +
3849 +       match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
3850 +
3851 +       while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) {
3852 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
3853 +               match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
3854 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3855 +       }
3856 +
3857 +       if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_inodev) &&
3858 +                    (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev)))
3859 +               return match;
3860 +       else
3861 +               return NULL;
3862 +}
3863 +
3864 +static void
3865 +insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry)
3866 +{
3867 +       unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device,
3868 +                                   inodev_set.n_size);
3869 +       struct name_entry **curr;
3870 +       __u8 i = 0;
3871 +
3872 +       curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
3873 +
3874 +       while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) {
3875 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
3876 +               curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
3877 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3878 +       }
3879 +
3880 +       *curr = nentry;
3881 +
3882 +       return;
3883 +}
3884 +
3885 +static void
3886 +insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
3887 +{
3888 +       unsigned long index =
3889 +           rhash(role->uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
3890 +       struct acl_role_label **curr;
3891 +       __u8 i = 0;
3892 +
3893 +       curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3894 +
3895 +       while (*curr) {
3896 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
3897 +               curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
3898 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3899 +       }
3900 +
3901 +       *curr = role;
3902 +
3903 +       return;
3904 +}
3905 +
3906 +static int
3907 +insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const kdev_t device)
3908 +{
3909 +       unsigned long index = nhash(name, name_set.n_size);
3910 +       struct name_entry **curr;
3911 +       __u8 i = 0;
3912 +
3913 +       curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
3914 +
3915 +       while (*curr && strcmp(name, (*curr)->name)) {
3916 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
3917 +               curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
3918 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3919 +       }
3920 +
3921 +       if (!(*curr)) {
3922 +               struct name_entry *nentry =
3923 +                   acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
3924 +               if (!nentry)
3925 +                       return 0;
3926 +               nentry->name = name;
3927 +               nentry->inode = inode;
3928 +               nentry->device = device;
3929 +               *curr = nentry;
3930 +               /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
3931 +               insert_inodev_entry(nentry);
3932 +       }
3933 +
3934 +       return 1;
3935 +}
3936 +
3937 +static void
3938 +insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
3939 +                    struct acl_subject_label *subj)
3940 +{
3941 +       unsigned long index =
3942 +           fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
3943 +       struct acl_object_label **curr;
3944 +       __u8 i = 0;
3945 +
3946 +       curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
3947 +
3948 +       while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) {
3949 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
3950 +               curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
3951 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3952 +       }
3953 +
3954 +       *curr = obj;
3955 +
3956 +       return;
3957 +}
3958 +
3959 +static void
3960 +insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
3961 +                     struct acl_role_label *role)
3962 +{
3963 +       unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
3964 +       struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
3965 +       unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size);
3966 +       struct acl_subject_label **curr;
3967 +       __u8 i = 0;
3968 +
3969 +       curr = &s_hash[index];
3970 +
3971 +       while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) {
3972 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
3973 +               curr = &s_hash[index];
3974 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
3975 +       }
3976 +
3977 +       *curr = obj;
3978 +
3979 +       return;
3980 +}
3981 +
3982 +static void **
3983 +create_table(__u32 * len)
3984 +{
3985 +       unsigned long table_sizes[] = {
3986 +               7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
3987 +               32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
3988 +               4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
3989 +               268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
3990 +       };
3991 +       void *newtable = NULL;
3992 +       unsigned int pwr = 0;
3993 +
3994 +       while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
3995 +              table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
3996 +               pwr++;
3997 +
3998 +       if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
3999 +               return newtable;
4000 +
4001 +       if ((table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
4002 +               newtable =
4003 +                   kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
4004 +       else
4005 +               newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *));
4006 +
4007 +       *len = table_sizes[pwr];
4008 +
4009 +       return newtable;
4010 +}
4011 +
4012 +static int
4013 +init_variables(const unsigned long acl_obj_size,
4014 +              const unsigned long acl_subj_size,
4015 +              const unsigned long acl_ip_size,
4016 +              const unsigned long acl_role_size,
4017 +              const unsigned long allowed_ip_size,
4018 +              const unsigned long acl_trans_size,
4019 +              const __u16 num_sprole_pws)
4020 +{
4021 +       unsigned long stacksize;
4022 +
4023 +       acl_role_set.r_size = acl_role_size;
4024 +       name_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
4025 +       inodev_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size);
4026 +
4027 +       if (!gr_init_uidset())
4028 +               return 1;
4029 +
4030 +       /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
4031 +
4032 +       stacksize = (3 * acl_obj_size) + (2 * acl_role_size) +
4033 +           (4 * acl_subj_size) + acl_ip_size + (2 * acl_trans_size) +
4034 +           allowed_ip_size + (2 * num_sprole_pws) + 5;
4035 +
4036 +       if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
4037 +               return 1;
4038 +
4039 +       /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */
4040 +       deleted_subject =
4041 +           (struct acl_subject_label *)
4042 +           acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
4043 +       deleted_object =
4044 +           (struct acl_object_label *)
4045 +           acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
4046 +       deleted_inodev =
4047 +           (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
4048 +
4049 +       if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev)
4050 +               return 1;
4051 +
4052 +       memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
4053 +       memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
4054 +       memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry));
4055 +
4056 +       /* We only want 50% full tables for now */
4057 +
4058 +       acl_role_set.r_hash =
4059 +           (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size);
4060 +       name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size);
4061 +       inodev_set.n_hash =
4062 +           (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size);
4063 +
4064 +       if (!acl_role_set.r_hash || !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash)
4065 +               return 1;
4066 +       memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
4067 +              sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
4068 +       memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
4069 +              sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
4070 +       memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0,
4071 +              sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size);
4072 +
4073 +       return 0;
4074 +}
4075 +
4076 +static void
4077 +free_variables(void)
4078 +{
4079 +       struct acl_subject_label *s;
4080 +       struct acl_role_label *r;
4081 +       struct task_struct *task;
4082 +
4083 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4084 +       for_each_task(task) {
4085 +               task->acl_sp_role = 0;
4086 +               task->acl_role_id = 0;
4087 +               task->acl = NULL;
4088 +               task->role = NULL;
4089 +       }
4090 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4091 +
4092 +       /* free all object hash tables */
4093 +
4094 +       if (role_list_head) {
4095 +               for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
4096 +                       if (!r->subj_hash)
4097 +                               break;
4098 +                       for (s = r->proc_subject; s; s = s->next) {
4099 +                               if (!s->obj_hash)
4100 +                                       break;
4101 +                               if ((s->obj_hash_size *
4102 +                                    sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <=
4103 +                                   PAGE_SIZE)
4104 +                                       kfree(s->obj_hash);
4105 +                               else
4106 +                                       vfree(s->obj_hash);
4107 +                       }
4108 +                       if ((r->subj_hash_size *
4109 +                            sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
4110 +                               kfree(r->subj_hash);
4111 +                       else
4112 +                               vfree(r->subj_hash);
4113 +               }
4114 +       }
4115 +
4116 +       acl_free_all();
4117 +
4118 +       if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
4119 +               if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
4120 +                   PAGE_SIZE)
4121 +                       kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
4122 +               else
4123 +                       vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
4124 +       }
4125 +       if (name_set.n_hash) {
4126 +               if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
4127 +                   PAGE_SIZE)
4128 +                       kfree(name_set.n_hash);
4129 +               else
4130 +                       vfree(name_set.n_hash);
4131 +       }
4132 +
4133 +       if (inodev_set.n_hash) {
4134 +               if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
4135 +                   PAGE_SIZE)
4136 +                       kfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
4137 +               else
4138 +                       vfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
4139 +       }
4140 +
4141 +       gr_free_uidset();
4142 +
4143 +       memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
4144 +       memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
4145 +       memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
4146 +
4147 +       role_list_head = NULL;
4148 +       default_role = NULL;
4149 +
4150 +       return;
4151 +}
4152 +
4153 +static __u32
4154 +count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
4155 +{
4156 +       struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
4157 +       __u32 num = 0;
4158 +
4159 +       while (userp) {
4160 +               if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
4161 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
4162 +                       break;
4163 +
4164 +               userp = o_tmp.prev;
4165 +               num++;
4166 +       }
4167 +
4168 +       return num;
4169 +}
4170 +
4171 +static struct acl_subject_label *
4172 +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
4173 +
4174 +static int
4175 +copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
4176 +              struct acl_role_label *role)
4177 +{
4178 +       struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
4179 +       unsigned int len;
4180 +       char *tmp;
4181 +
4182 +       while (userp) {
4183 +               if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
4184 +                    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
4185 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4186 +
4187 +               if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
4188 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
4189 +                       return -EFAULT;
4190 +
4191 +               userp = o_tmp->prev;
4192 +
4193 +               len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
4194 +
4195 +               if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
4196 +                       return -EINVAL;
4197 +
4198 +               if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
4199 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4200 +
4201 +               if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
4202 +                       return -EFAULT;
4203 +
4204 +               o_tmp->filename = tmp;
4205 +
4206 +               insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
4207 +               if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
4208 +                                      o_tmp->device))
4209 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4210 +
4211 +               if (o_tmp->nested) {
4212 +                       o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
4213 +                       if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
4214 +                               return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
4215 +
4216 +                       s_final = o_tmp->nested;
4217 +               }
4218 +       }
4219 +
4220 +       return 0;
4221 +}
4222 +
4223 +static __u32
4224 +count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
4225 +{
4226 +       struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
4227 +       __u32 num = 0;
4228 +
4229 +       while (userp) {
4230 +               if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
4231 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
4232 +                       break;
4233 +
4234 +               userp = s_tmp.prev;
4235 +               /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
4236 +                  they are not included in the hash table, but are
4237 +                  attached to objects.  We have already counted
4238 +                  the subjects in userspace for the allocation
4239 +                  stack
4240 +               */
4241 +               if (!s_tmp.parent_subject)
4242 +                       num++;
4243 +       }
4244 +
4245 +       return num;
4246 +}
4247 +
4248 +static int
4249 +copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
4250 +{
4251 +       struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
4252 +
4253 +       ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
4254 +
4255 +       while (ruserip) {
4256 +               rlast = rtmp;
4257 +
4258 +               if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
4259 +                    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
4260 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4261 +
4262 +               if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
4263 +                                  sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
4264 +                       return -EFAULT;
4265 +
4266 +               ruserip = rtmp->prev;
4267 +
4268 +               if (!rlast) {
4269 +                       rtmp->prev = NULL;
4270 +                       rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
4271 +               } else {
4272 +                       rlast->next = rtmp;
4273 +                       rtmp->prev = rlast;
4274 +               }
4275 +
4276 +               if (!ruserip)
4277 +                       rtmp->next = NULL;
4278 +       }
4279 +
4280 +       return 0;
4281 +}
4282 +
4283 +static int
4284 +copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
4285 +{
4286 +       struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
4287 +       unsigned int len;
4288 +       char *tmp;
4289 +
4290 +       rusertp = rolep->transitions;
4291 +
4292 +       while (rusertp) {
4293 +               rlast = rtmp;
4294 +
4295 +               if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
4296 +                    acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
4297 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4298 +
4299 +               if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
4300 +                                  sizeof (struct role_transition)))
4301 +                       return -EFAULT;
4302 +
4303 +               rusertp = rtmp->prev;
4304 +
4305 +               len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
4306 +
4307 +               if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
4308 +                       return -EINVAL;
4309 +
4310 +               if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
4311 +                       return -ENOMEM;
4312 +
4313 +               if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
4314 +                       return -EFAULT;
4315 +
4316 +               rtmp->rolename = tmp;
4317 +
4318 +               if (!rlast) {
4319 +                       rtmp->prev = NULL;
4320 +                       rolep->transitions = rtmp;
4321 +               } else {
4322 +                       rlast->next = rtmp;
4323 +                       rtmp->prev = rlast;
4324 +               }
4325 +
4326 +               if (!rusertp)
4327 +                       rtmp->next = NULL;
4328 +       }
4329 +
4330 +       return 0;
4331 +}
4332 +
4333 +static struct acl_subject_label *
4334 +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
4335 +{
4336 +       struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL;
4337 +       unsigned int len;
4338 +       char *tmp;
4339 +       __u32 num_objs;
4340 +       struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
4341 +       unsigned long i_num;
4342 +       int err;
4343 +
4344 +
4345 +       if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
4346 +           acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
4347 +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4348 +
4349 +       if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
4350 +                          sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
4351 +               return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
4352 +
4353 +       if (!s_last) {
4354 +               s_tmp->prev = NULL;
4355 +               role->proc_subject = s_tmp;
4356 +       } else {
4357 +               s_last->next = s_tmp;
4358 +               s_tmp->prev = s_last;
4359 +       }
4360 +
4361 +       s_last = s_tmp;
4362 +
4363 +       len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
4364 +
4365 +       if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
4366 +               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
4367 +
4368 +       if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
4369 +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4370 +
4371 +       if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
4372 +               return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
4373 +
4374 +       s_tmp->filename = tmp;
4375 +
4376 +       if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
4377 +               role->root_label = s_tmp;
4378 +
4379 +       /* set up object hash table */
4380 +       num_objs = count_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object);
4381 +
4382 +       s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
4383 +       s_tmp->obj_hash =
4384 +           (struct acl_object_label **)
4385 +           create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size));
4386 +
4387 +       if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
4388 +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4389 +
4390 +       memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
4391 +              s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
4392 +              sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
4393 +
4394 +       /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested
4395 +          acl could be found and be the final subject
4396 +          copied
4397 +       */
4398 +
4399 +       s_final = s_tmp;
4400 +
4401 +       /* add in objects */
4402 +       err = copy_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object, s_tmp, role);
4403 +
4404 +       if (err)
4405 +               return ERR_PTR(err);
4406 +
4407 +       /* add in ip acls */
4408 +
4409 +       if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
4410 +               s_tmp->ips = NULL;
4411 +               goto insert;
4412 +       }
4413 +
4414 +       i_tmp =
4415 +           (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
4416 +                                              sizeof (struct
4417 +                                                      acl_ip_label *));
4418 +
4419 +       if (!i_tmp)
4420 +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4421 +
4422 +       for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
4423 +               *(i_tmp + i_num) =
4424 +                   (struct acl_ip_label *)
4425 +                   acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
4426 +               if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
4427 +                       return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4428 +
4429 +               if (copy_from_user
4430 +                   (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
4431 +                    sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
4432 +                       return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
4433 +
4434 +               if (copy_from_user
4435 +                   (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
4436 +                    sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
4437 +                       return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
4438 +       }
4439 +
4440 +       s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
4441 +
4442 +insert:
4443 +       if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
4444 +                              s_tmp->device))
4445 +               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
4446 +
4447 +       return s_tmp;
4448 +}
4449 +
4450 +static int
4451 +copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
4452 +{
4453 +       struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
4454 +       struct acl_subject_label * ret;
4455 +       int err;
4456 +
4457 +       while (userp) {
4458 +               if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
4459 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
4460 +                       return -EFAULT;
4461 +
4462 +               /* do not add nested subjects here, add
4463 +                  while parsing objects
4464 +               */
4465 +
4466 +               if (s_pre.parent_subject) {
4467 +                       userp = s_pre.prev;
4468 +                       continue;
4469 +               }
4470 +
4471 +               ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
4472 +
4473 +               err = PTR_ERR(ret);
4474 +               if (IS_ERR(ret))
4475 +                       return err;
4476 +
4477 +               insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
4478 +
4479 +               userp = s_pre.prev;
4480 +       }
4481 +
4482 +       s_final->next = NULL;
4483 +
4484 +       return 0;
4485 +}
4486 +
4487 +static int
4488 +copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
4489 +{
4490 +       struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_last;
4491 +       struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
4492 +       unsigned long r_num;
4493 +       unsigned int len;
4494 +       char *tmp;
4495 +       int err = 0;
4496 +       __u16 i;
4497 +       __u32 num_subjs;
4498 +
4499 +       /* we need a default and kernel role */
4500 +       if (arg->role_db.r_entries < 2)
4501 +               return -EINVAL;
4502 +
4503 +       /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
4504 +
4505 +       num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
4506 +       acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
4507 +
4508 +       if (!acl_special_roles) {
4509 +               err = -ENOMEM;
4510 +               goto cleanup;
4511 +       }
4512 +
4513 +       for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
4514 +               sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
4515 +               if (!sptmp) {
4516 +                       err = -ENOMEM;
4517 +                       goto cleanup;
4518 +               }
4519 +               if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
4520 +                                  sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
4521 +                       err = -EFAULT;
4522 +                       goto cleanup;
4523 +               }
4524 +
4525 +               len =
4526 +                   strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
4527 +
4528 +               if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
4529 +                       err = -EINVAL;
4530 +                       goto cleanup;
4531 +               }
4532 +
4533 +               if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
4534 +                       err = -ENOMEM;
4535 +                       goto cleanup;
4536 +               }
4537 +
4538 +               if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
4539 +                       err = -EFAULT;
4540 +                       goto cleanup;
4541 +               }
4542 +
4543 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
4544 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
4545 +#endif
4546 +               sptmp->rolename = tmp;
4547 +               acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
4548 +       }
4549 +
4550 +       r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
4551 +
4552 +       for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.r_entries; r_num++) {
4553 +               r_last = r_tmp;
4554 +
4555 +               r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
4556 +
4557 +               if (!r_tmp) {
4558 +                       err = -ENOMEM;
4559 +                       goto cleanup;
4560 +               }
4561 +
4562 +               if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
4563 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
4564 +                       err = -EFAULT;
4565 +                       goto cleanup;
4566 +               }
4567 +
4568 +               if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
4569 +                                  sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
4570 +                       err = -EFAULT;
4571 +                       goto cleanup;
4572 +               }
4573 +
4574 +               if (!r_last) {
4575 +                       r_tmp->prev = NULL;
4576 +                       role_list_head = r_tmp;
4577 +               } else {
4578 +                       r_last->next = r_tmp;
4579 +                       r_tmp->prev = r_last;
4580 +               }
4581 +
4582 +               if (r_num == (arg->role_db.r_entries - 1))
4583 +                       r_tmp->next = NULL;
4584 +
4585 +               len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, PATH_MAX);
4586 +
4587 +               if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
4588 +                       err = -EINVAL;
4589 +                       goto cleanup;
4590 +               }
4591 +
4592 +               if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
4593 +                       err = -ENOMEM;
4594 +                       goto cleanup;
4595 +               }
4596 +               if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
4597 +                       err = -EFAULT;
4598 +                       goto cleanup;
4599 +               }
4600 +               r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
4601 +
4602 +               if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
4603 +                   && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
4604 +                       default_role = r_tmp;
4605 +               } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
4606 +                       kernel_role = r_tmp;
4607 +               }
4608 +
4609 +               num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject);
4610 +
4611 +               r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
4612 +               r_tmp->subj_hash =
4613 +                   (struct acl_subject_label **)
4614 +                   create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size));
4615 +
4616 +               if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
4617 +                       err = -ENOMEM;
4618 +                       goto cleanup;
4619 +               }
4620 +
4621 +               err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
4622 +               if (err)
4623 +                       goto cleanup;
4624 +
4625 +               err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
4626 +               if (err)
4627 +                       goto cleanup;
4628 +
4629 +               memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
4630 +                      r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
4631 +                      sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
4632 +
4633 +               s_last = NULL;
4634 +
4635 +               err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject, r_tmp);
4636 +
4637 +               if (err)
4638 +                       goto cleanup;
4639 +
4640 +               insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
4641 +       }
4642 +
4643 +       goto return_err;
4644 +      cleanup:
4645 +       free_variables();
4646 +      return_err:
4647 +       return err;
4648 +
4649 +}
4650 +
4651 +static int
4652 +gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
4653 +{
4654 +       int error = 0;
4655 +
4656 +       memcpy(&system_salt, args->salt, sizeof (system_salt));
4657 +       memcpy(&system_sum, args->sum, sizeof (system_sum));
4658 +
4659 +       if (init_variables(args->role_db.o_entries, args->role_db.s_entries,
4660 +                          args->role_db.i_entries, args->role_db.r_entries,
4661 +                          args->role_db.a_entries, args->role_db.t_entries,
4662 +                          args->num_sprole_pws)) {
4663 +               security_alert_good(GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
4664 +               error = -ENOMEM;
4665 +               free_variables();
4666 +       }
4667 +
4668 +       error = copy_user_acl(args);
4669 +       if (error)
4670 +               goto out;
4671 +
4672 +       if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
4673 +               free_variables();
4674 +               goto out;
4675 +       }
4676 +
4677 +       gr_status |= GR_READY;
4678 +      out:
4679 +       return error;
4680 +}
4681 +
4682 +static struct acl_object_label *
4683 +chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
4684 +             const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
4685 +{
4686 +       struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
4687 +       struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
4688 +       struct dentry *root;
4689 +       struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
4690 +       struct acl_object_label *retval;
4691 +
4692 +       read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
4693 +       rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
4694 +       root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
4695 +       read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
4696 +       spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
4697 +
4698 +       for (;;) {
4699 +               if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt))
4700 +                       break;
4701 +               if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
4702 +                       if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
4703 +                               break;
4704 +
4705 +                       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4706 +                       retval =
4707 +                           lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
4708 +                                                dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
4709 +                       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4710 +                       if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
4711 +                               goto out;
4712 +
4713 +                       dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
4714 +                       mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
4715 +                       continue;
4716 +               }
4717 +
4718 +               read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4719 +               retval =
4720 +                   lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
4721 +                                        dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
4722 +               read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4723 +               if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
4724 +                       goto out;
4725 +
4726 +               dentry = dentry->d_parent;
4727 +       }
4728 +
4729 +       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4730 +       retval =
4731 +           lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
4732 +                                subj);
4733 +       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4734 +
4735 +       if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
4736 +               read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4737 +               retval =
4738 +                   lookup_acl_obj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino,
4739 +                                        root->d_inode->i_dev, subj);
4740 +               read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4741 +       }
4742 +      out:
4743 +       spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
4744 +       dput(root);
4745 +       mntput(rootmnt);
4746 +
4747 +       return retval;
4748 +}
4749 +
4750 +static struct acl_subject_label *
4751 +chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
4752 +              const struct acl_role_label *role)
4753 +{
4754 +       struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
4755 +       struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
4756 +       struct dentry *root;
4757 +       struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
4758 +       struct acl_subject_label *retval;
4759 +
4760 +       read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
4761 +       rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
4762 +       root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
4763 +       read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
4764 +       spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
4765 +
4766 +       for (;;) {
4767 +               if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt))
4768 +                       break;
4769 +               if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
4770 +                       if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
4771 +                               break;
4772 +
4773 +                       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4774 +                       retval =
4775 +                           lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
4776 +                                                 dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
4777 +                       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4778 +                       if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
4779 +                               goto out;
4780 +
4781 +                       dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
4782 +                       mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
4783 +                       continue;
4784 +               }
4785 +
4786 +               read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4787 +               retval =
4788 +                   lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
4789 +                                         dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
4790 +               read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4791 +               if (unlikely(retval != NULL))
4792 +                       goto out;
4793 +
4794 +               dentry = dentry->d_parent;
4795 +       }
4796 +
4797 +       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4798 +       retval =
4799 +           lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
4800 +                                 dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
4801 +       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4802 +
4803 +       if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
4804 +               read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4805 +               retval =
4806 +                   lookup_acl_subj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino,
4807 +                                         root->d_inode->i_dev, role);
4808 +               read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4809 +       }
4810 +      out:
4811 +       spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
4812 +       dput(root);
4813 +       mntput(rootmnt);
4814 +
4815 +       return retval;
4816 +}
4817 +
4818 +static __inline__ void
4819 +gr_log_learn(const struct acl_role_label *role, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid,
4820 +            const struct task_struct *task, const char *pathname,
4821 +            const __u32 mode)
4822 +{
4823 +       security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, role->rolename, role->roletype,
4824 +                      uid, gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
4825 +                      task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
4826 +                      1, 1, pathname, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
4827 +
4828 +       return;
4829 +}
4830 +
4831 +__u32
4832 +gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
4833 +             const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
4834 +             const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
4835 +             const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
4836 +{
4837 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
4838 +       __u32 oldmode, newmode;
4839 +
4840 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
4841 +               return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
4842 +
4843 +       obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
4844 +       oldmode = obj->mode;
4845 +
4846 +       if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)
4847 +               oldmode |= (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
4848 +       newmode =
4849 +           gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
4850 +                           oldmode | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
4851 +                           GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
4852 +
4853 +       if ((newmode & oldmode) == oldmode)
4854 +               return newmode;
4855 +       else if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
4856 +               gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
4857 +                       current, gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), oldmode);
4858 +               return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
4859 +       } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
4860 +               return GR_SUPPRESS;
4861 +       else
4862 +               return 0;
4863 +}
4864 +
4865 +__u32
4866 +gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
4867 +              const struct vfsmount * mnt)
4868 +{
4869 +       __u32 retval = mode;
4870 +       struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
4871 +       struct acl_object_label *currobj;
4872 +
4873 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
4874 +               return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
4875 +
4876 +       curracl = current->acl;
4877 +
4878 +       currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
4879 +       retval = currobj->mode & mode;
4880 +
4881 +       if (unlikely
4882 +           ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) && (mode != GR_PTRACERD)
4883 +            && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
4884 +               __u32 new_mode = mode;
4885 +
4886 +               new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
4887 +
4888 +               retval = new_mode;
4889 +
4890 +               if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
4891 +                       gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
4892 +                                    current, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), new_mode);
4893 +       }
4894 +
4895 +       return retval;
4896 +}
4897 +
4898 +__u32
4899 +gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
4900 +               const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
4901 +{
4902 +       struct name_entry *match;
4903 +       struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
4904 +       struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
4905 +       __u32 retval;
4906 +
4907 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
4908 +               return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
4909 +
4910 +       match = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
4911 +
4912 +       if (!match)
4913 +               goto check_parent;
4914 +
4915 +       curracl = current->acl;
4916 +
4917 +       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
4918 +       matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
4919 +       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
4920 +
4921 +       if (matchpo) {
4922 +               if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
4923 +                   (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
4924 +                   && curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) {
4925 +                       __u32 new_mode = mode;
4926 +
4927 +                       new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
4928 +
4929 +                       gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
4930 +                                    current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
4931 +
4932 +                       return new_mode;
4933 +               }
4934 +               return (matchpo->mode & mode);
4935 +       }
4936 +
4937 +      check_parent:
4938 +       curracl = current->acl;
4939 +
4940 +       matchpo = chk_obj_label(parent, mnt, curracl);
4941 +       retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
4942 +
4943 +       if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
4944 +           && (curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)) {
4945 +               __u32 new_mode = mode;
4946 +
4947 +               new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
4948 +
4949 +               gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
4950 +                            current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode);
4951 +               return new_mode;
4952 +       }
4953 +
4954 +       return retval;
4955 +}
4956 +
4957 +int
4958 +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
4959 +{
4960 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
4961 +               return 0;
4962 +
4963 +       if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_FIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
4964 +               return 1;
4965 +
4966 +       return 0;
4967 +}
4968 +
4969 +int
4970 +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
4971 +{
4972 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
4973 +               return 0;
4974 +
4975 +       if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL))
4976 +               return 1;
4977 +
4978 +       return 0;
4979 +}
4980 +
4981 +__inline__ void
4982 +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
4983 +{
4984 +       tsk->used_accept = 0;
4985 +       tsk->used_connect = 0;
4986 +       tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
4987 +       tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
4988 +       tsk->acl = current->acl;
4989 +       tsk->role = current->role;
4990 +       tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
4991 +       if (current->exec_file)
4992 +               get_file(current->exec_file);
4993 +       tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
4994 +       tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
4995 +       if (unlikely(current->used_accept))
4996 +               current->curr_ip = 0;
4997 +
4998 +       return;
4999 +}
5000 +
5001 +static __inline__ void
5002 +gr_set_proc_res(void)
5003 +{
5004 +       struct acl_subject_label *proc;
5005 +       unsigned short i;
5006 +
5007 +       proc = current->acl;
5008 +
5009 +       if (proc->mode & GR_LEARN)
5010 +               return;
5011 +
5012 +       for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
5013 +               if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
5014 +                       continue;
5015 +
5016 +               current->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
5017 +               current->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
5018 +       }
5019 +
5020 +       return;
5021 +}
5022 +
5023 +static __inline__ void
5024 +do_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
5025 +{
5026 +       task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
5027 +
5028 +       return;
5029 +}
5030 +
5031 +void
5032 +gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
5033 +{
5034 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
5035 +       struct file *filp;
5036 +
5037 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5038 +               return;
5039 +
5040 +       filp = task->exec_file;
5041 +
5042 +       /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
5043 +       if (unlikely(!filp)) {
5044 +               task->role = kernel_role;
5045 +               task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
5046 +               return;
5047 +       } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
5048 +               do_set_role_label(task, uid, gid);
5049 +
5050 +       task->acl =
5051 +           chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role);
5052 +
5053 +       task->is_writable = 0;
5054 +
5055 +       /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
5056 +          by the default ACL */
5057 +       obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
5058 +       if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5059 +               task->is_writable = 1;
5060 +       obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
5061 +       if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5062 +               task->is_writable = 1;
5063 +
5064 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
5065 +       printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
5066 +#endif
5067 +
5068 +       gr_set_proc_res();
5069 +
5070 +       return;
5071 +}
5072 +
5073 +void
5074 +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
5075 +{
5076 +       struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
5077 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
5078 +       __u32 retmode;
5079 +
5080 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5081 +               return;
5082 +
5083 +       newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role);
5084 +
5085 +       obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->acl);
5086 +       retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
5087 +
5088 +       if ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT)) {
5089 +               if (obj->nested)
5090 +                       current->acl = obj->nested;
5091 +               else
5092 +                       current->acl = newacl;
5093 +       } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT)
5094 +               security_audit(GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, current->acl->filename,
5095 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
5096 +
5097 +       current->is_writable = 0;
5098 +
5099 +       /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
5100 +          by the default ACL */
5101 +       obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
5102 +       if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5103 +               current->is_writable = 1;
5104 +       obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role->root_label);
5105 +       if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5106 +               current->is_writable = 1;
5107 +
5108 +       gr_set_proc_res();
5109 +
5110 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
5111 +       printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", current->comm, current->pid, current->role->rolename, current->acl->filename);
5112 +#endif
5113 +       return;
5114 +}
5115 +
5116 +static __inline__ void
5117 +do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
5118 +{
5119 +       struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
5120 +       struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
5121 +       struct acl_subject_label *i;
5122 +       struct acl_role_label *role;
5123 +
5124 +       for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
5125 +               for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) {
5126 +                       if (unlikely(i->parent_subject &&
5127 +                                    (i->inode == ino) &&
5128 +                                    (i->device == dev)))
5129 +                               i->mode |= GR_DELETED;
5130 +                       if (unlikely((matchpo =
5131 +                            lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL))
5132 +                               matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
5133 +               }
5134 +
5135 +               if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL))
5136 +                       matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
5137 +       }
5138 +
5139 +       return;
5140 +}
5141 +
5142 +void
5143 +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
5144 +{
5145 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5146 +               return;
5147 +
5148 +       write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
5149 +       if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev)))
5150 +               do_handle_delete(ino, dev);
5151 +       write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
5152 +
5153 +       return;
5154 +}
5155 +
5156 +static __inline__ void
5157 +update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
5158 +                    const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice,
5159 +                    struct acl_subject_label *subj)
5160 +{
5161 +       unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
5162 +       struct acl_object_label **match;
5163 +       struct acl_object_label *tmp;
5164 +       __u8 i = 0;
5165 +
5166 +       match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
5167 +
5168 +       while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
5169 +              (*match)->device != olddevice ||
5170 +              !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
5171 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
5172 +               match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
5173 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
5174 +       }
5175 +
5176 +       if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object)
5177 +           && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
5178 +           && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
5179 +           && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
5180 +               tmp = *match;
5181 +               tmp->inode = newinode;
5182 +               tmp->device = newdevice;
5183 +               tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
5184 +
5185 +               *match = deleted_object;
5186 +
5187 +               insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj);
5188 +       }
5189 +
5190 +       return;
5191 +}
5192 +
5193 +static __inline__ void
5194 +update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
5195 +                     const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice,
5196 +                     struct acl_role_label *role)
5197 +{
5198 +       struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
5199 +       unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
5200 +       unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size);
5201 +       struct acl_subject_label **match;
5202 +       struct acl_subject_label *tmp;
5203 +       __u8 i = 0;
5204 +
5205 +       match = &s_hash[index];
5206 +
5207 +       while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
5208 +              (*match)->device != olddevice ||
5209 +              !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
5210 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
5211 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
5212 +               match = &s_hash[index];
5213 +       }
5214 +
5215 +       if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject)
5216 +           && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
5217 +           && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
5218 +           && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
5219 +               tmp = *match;
5220 +
5221 +               tmp->inode = newinode;
5222 +               tmp->device = newdevice;
5223 +               tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
5224 +
5225 +               *match = deleted_subject;
5226 +
5227 +               insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role);
5228 +       }
5229 +
5230 +       return;
5231 +}
5232 +
5233 +static __inline__ void
5234 +update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice,
5235 +                   const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice)
5236 +{
5237 +       unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size);
5238 +       struct name_entry **match;
5239 +       struct name_entry *tmp;
5240 +       __u8 i = 0;
5241 +
5242 +       match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
5243 +
5244 +       while (*match
5245 +              && ((*match)->inode != oldinode
5246 +                  || (*match)->device != olddevice)) {
5247 +               index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
5248 +               i = (i + 1) % 32;
5249 +               match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
5250 +       }
5251 +
5252 +       if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev)
5253 +           && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
5254 +           && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) {
5255 +               tmp = *match;
5256 +
5257 +               tmp->inode = newinode;
5258 +               tmp->device = newdevice;
5259 +
5260 +               *match = deleted_inodev;
5261 +
5262 +               insert_inodev_entry(tmp);
5263 +       }
5264 +
5265 +       return;
5266 +}
5267 +
5268 +static __inline__ void
5269 +do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
5270 +                const struct vfsmount *mnt)
5271 +{
5272 +       struct acl_subject_label *i;
5273 +       struct acl_role_label *role;
5274 +
5275 +       for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
5276 +               update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
5277 +                                     dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5278 +                                     dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role);
5279 +
5280 +               for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) {
5281 +                       if (unlikely(i->parent_subject &&
5282 +                                    (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
5283 +                                    (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_dev))) {
5284 +                               i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
5285 +                               i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
5286 +                       }
5287 +                       update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
5288 +                                            dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5289 +                                            dentry->d_inode->i_dev, i);
5290 +               }
5291 +       }
5292 +
5293 +       update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
5294 +                           dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
5295 +
5296 +       return;
5297 +}
5298 +
5299 +void
5300 +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
5301 +{
5302 +       struct name_entry *matchn;
5303 +
5304 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5305 +               return;
5306 +
5307 +       matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
5308 +
5309 +       if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
5310 +               write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
5311 +               do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
5312 +               write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
5313 +       }
5314 +
5315 +       return;
5316 +}
5317 +
5318 +int
5319 +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
5320 +                struct dentry *old_dentry,
5321 +                struct dentry *new_dentry,
5322 +                struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
5323 +{
5324 +       struct name_entry *matchn;
5325 +       int error = 0;
5326 +
5327 +       matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
5328 +
5329 +       lock_kernel();
5330 +       error = vfs_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
5331 +       unlock_kernel();
5332 +
5333 +       if (unlikely(error))
5334 +               return error;
5335 +
5336 +       /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
5337 +          NFS silly-renaming
5338 +        */
5339 +
5340 +       write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
5341 +       if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
5342 +               if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5343 +                                       new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) &&
5344 +                   (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
5345 +                       do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5346 +                                        new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
5347 +       }
5348 +
5349 +       if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5350 +                               old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) &&
5351 +           (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
5352 +               do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
5353 +                                old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
5354 +
5355 +       if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
5356 +               do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
5357 +       write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
5358 +
5359 +       return error;
5360 +}
5361 +
5362 +static int
5363 +lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
5364 +                        unsigned char **sum)
5365 +{
5366 +       struct acl_role_label *r;
5367 +       struct role_transition *trans;
5368 +       __u16 i;
5369 +       int found = 0;
5370 +
5371 +       /* check transition table */
5372 +
5373 +       for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
5374 +               if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
5375 +                       found = 1;
5376 +                       break;
5377 +               }
5378 +       }
5379 +
5380 +       if (!found)
5381 +               return 0;
5382 +
5383 +       /* handle special roles that do not require authentication */
5384 +
5385 +       for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
5386 +               if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename)
5387 +                   && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) {
5388 +                       *salt = NULL;
5389 +                       *sum = NULL;
5390 +                       return 1;
5391 +               }
5392 +       }
5393 +
5394 +       for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
5395 +               if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
5396 +                       *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
5397 +                       *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
5398 +                       return 1;
5399 +               }
5400 +       }
5401 +
5402 +       return 0;
5403 +}
5404 +
5405 +static void
5406 +assign_special_role(char *rolename)
5407 +{
5408 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
5409 +       struct acl_role_label *r;
5410 +       struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
5411 +       struct task_struct *tsk;
5412 +       struct file *filp;
5413 +
5414 +       for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next)
5415 +               if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
5416 +                   (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
5417 +                       assigned = r;
5418 +
5419 +       if (!assigned)
5420 +               return;
5421 +
5422 +       tsk = current->p_pptr;
5423 +       filp = tsk->exec_file;
5424 +
5425 +       if (tsk && filp) {
5426 +               tsk->is_writable = 0;
5427 +
5428 +               acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1;
5429 +               tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
5430 +               tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value;
5431 +               tsk->role = assigned;
5432 +               tsk->acl =
5433 +                   chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role);
5434 +
5435 +               /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
5436 +                  by the default ACL */
5437 +               obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
5438 +               if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5439 +                       tsk->is_writable = 1;
5440 +               obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label);
5441 +               if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5442 +                       tsk->is_writable = 1;
5443 +
5444 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
5445 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
5446 +#endif
5447 +       }
5448 +
5449 +       return;
5450 +}
5451 +
5452 +ssize_t
5453 +write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
5454 +{
5455 +       struct gr_arg *arg;
5456 +       struct gr_arg usermode;
5457 +       unsigned char *sprole_salt;
5458 +       unsigned char *sprole_sum;
5459 +       int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg);
5460 +       int error2 = 0;
5461 +
5462 +       spin_lock(&gr_dev_lock);
5463 +
5464 +       arg = (struct gr_arg *) buf;
5465 +
5466 +       if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg)) {
5467 +               security_alert_good(GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, count,
5468 +                                   (int) sizeof (struct gr_arg));
5469 +               error = -EINVAL;
5470 +               goto out;
5471 +       }
5472 +
5473 +       if ((gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
5474 +           && time_before_eq(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) {
5475 +               gr_auth_expires = 0;
5476 +               gr_auth_attempts = 0;
5477 +       }
5478 +
5479 +       if (copy_from_user(&usermode, arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
5480 +               error = -EFAULT;
5481 +               goto out;
5482 +       }
5483 +
5484 +       if (usermode.mode != SPROLE && time_after(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) {
5485 +               error = -EBUSY;
5486 +               goto out;
5487 +       }
5488 +
5489 +       /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
5490 +          do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
5491 +          locking
5492 +        */
5493 +
5494 +       if (usermode.mode != SPROLE && current->uid) {
5495 +               error = -EPERM;
5496 +               goto out;
5497 +       }
5498 +
5499 +       /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
5500 +
5501 +       usermode.pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
5502 +       usermode.sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
5503 +
5504 +       /* Okay.
5505 +        * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
5506 +        * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
5507 +        * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
5508 +
5509 +       switch (usermode.mode) {
5510 +       case SHUTDOWN:
5511 +               if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
5512 +                   && !(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) {
5513 +                       gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
5514 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5515 +                       free_variables();
5516 +                       memset(&usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
5517 +                       memset(&system_salt, 0, sizeof (system_salt));
5518 +                       memset(&system_sum, 0, sizeof (system_sum));
5519 +               } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
5520 +                       security_alert(GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5521 +                       error = -EPERM;
5522 +               } else {
5523 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5524 +                       error = -EAGAIN;
5525 +               }
5526 +               break;
5527 +       case ENABLE:
5528 +               if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(&usermode)))
5529 +                       security_alert_good(GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
5530 +               else {
5531 +                       if (gr_status & GR_READY)
5532 +                               error = -EAGAIN;
5533 +                       else
5534 +                               error = error2;
5535 +                       security_alert(GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
5536 +                                      DEFAULTSECARGS);
5537 +               }
5538 +               break;
5539 +       case RELOAD:
5540 +               if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
5541 +                       security_alert_good(GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG);
5542 +                       error = -EAGAIN;
5543 +               } else if (!(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) {
5544 +                       gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
5545 +                       free_variables();
5546 +                       if (!(error2 = gracl_init(&usermode)))
5547 +                               security_alert_good(GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG,
5548 +                                                   GR_VERSION);
5549 +                       else {
5550 +                               error = error2;
5551 +                               security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
5552 +                                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
5553 +                       }
5554 +               } else {
5555 +                       security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION,
5556 +                                      DEFAULTSECARGS);
5557 +                       error = -EPERM;
5558 +               }
5559 +               break;
5560 +       case SEGVMOD:
5561 +               if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
5562 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG,
5563 +                                           DEFAULTSECARGS);
5564 +                       error = -EAGAIN;
5565 +                       break;
5566 +               }
5567 +
5568 +               if (!(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) {
5569 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG,
5570 +                                           DEFAULTSECARGS);
5571 +                       if (usermode.segv_device && usermode.segv_inode) {
5572 +                               struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
5573 +                               segvacl =
5574 +                                   lookup_acl_subj_label(usermode.segv_inode,
5575 +                                                         usermode.segv_device,
5576 +                                                         current->role);
5577 +                               if (segvacl) {
5578 +                                       segvacl->crashes = 0;
5579 +                                       segvacl->expires = 0;
5580 +                               }
5581 +                       } else if (gr_find_uid(usermode.segv_uid) >= 0) {
5582 +                               gr_remove_uid(usermode.segv_uid);
5583 +                       }
5584 +               } else {
5585 +                       security_alert(GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5586 +                       error = -EPERM;
5587 +               }
5588 +               break;
5589 +       case SPROLE:
5590 +               if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
5591 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5592 +                       error = -EAGAIN;
5593 +                       break;
5594 +               }
5595 +
5596 +               if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES)
5597 +                   && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
5598 +                       current->role->expires = 0;
5599 +                       current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
5600 +               }
5601 +
5602 +               if (time_after(current->role->expires, jiffies)) {
5603 +                       error = -EBUSY;
5604 +                       goto out;
5605 +               }
5606 +
5607 +               if (lookup_special_role_auth
5608 +                   (usermode.sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
5609 +                   && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
5610 +                       || !(chkpw(&usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
5611 +                       assign_special_role(usermode.sp_role);
5612 +                       security_alert_good(GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
5613 +                                           (current->p_pptr) ? current->
5614 +                                           p_pptr->role->rolename : "",
5615 +                                           acl_sp_role_value, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5616 +               } else {
5617 +                       security_alert(GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, usermode.sp_role,
5618 +                                      DEFAULTSECARGS);
5619 +                       error = -EPERM;
5620 +                       current->role->auth_attempts++;
5621 +                       if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
5622 +                               current->role->expires =
5623 +                                   jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ;
5624 +                               security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG,
5625 +                                      CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES,
5626 +                                      usermode.sp_role, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5627 +                       }
5628 +
5629 +                       goto out;
5630 +               }
5631 +               break;
5632 +       default:
5633 +               security_alert(GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, usermode.mode,
5634 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
5635 +               error = -EINVAL;
5636 +               break;
5637 +       }
5638 +
5639 +       if (error != -EPERM)
5640 +               goto out;
5641 +
5642 +       gr_auth_attempts++;
5643 +
5644 +       if (gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) {
5645 +               security_alert(GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES);
5646 +               gr_auth_expires = jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ;
5647 +       }
5648 +
5649 +      out:
5650 +       spin_unlock(&gr_dev_lock);
5651 +       return error;
5652 +}
5653 +
5654 +int
5655 +gr_set_acls(const int type)
5656 +{
5657 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
5658 +       struct task_struct *task;
5659 +       struct file *filp;
5660 +       unsigned short i;
5661 +
5662 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5663 +       for_each_task(task) {
5664 +               /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
5665 +                  if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
5666 +                  ACL */
5667 +
5668 +               if (type && (task->role != current->role ||
5669 +                            task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id))
5670 +                       continue;
5671 +
5672 +               task->acl_role_id = 0;
5673 +
5674 +               if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
5675 +                       do_set_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
5676 +
5677 +                       task->acl =
5678 +                           chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
5679 +                                          task->role);
5680 +                       if (task->acl) {
5681 +                               struct acl_subject_label *curr;
5682 +                               curr = task->acl;
5683 +
5684 +                               task->is_writable = 0;
5685 +                               /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
5686 +                                  by the default ACL */
5687 +                               obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
5688 +                               if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5689 +                                       task->is_writable = 1;
5690 +                               obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
5691 +                               if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
5692 +                                       task->is_writable = 1;
5693 +
5694 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
5695 +                               printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
5696 +#endif
5697 +                               if (!(curr->mode & GR_LEARN))
5698 +                                       for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
5699 +                                               if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << i)))
5700 +                                                       continue;
5701 +
5702 +                                               task->rlim[i].rlim_cur =
5703 +                                                   curr->res[i].rlim_cur;
5704 +                                               task->rlim[i].rlim_max =
5705 +                                                   curr->res[i].rlim_max;
5706 +                                       }
5707 +                       } else {
5708 +                               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5709 +                               security_alert_good(GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm,
5710 +                                                   task->pid);
5711 +                               return 1;
5712 +                       }
5713 +               } else {
5714 +                       // it's a kernel process
5715 +                       task->role = kernel_role;
5716 +                       task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
5717 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
5718 +                       task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND;
5719 +#endif
5720 +               }
5721 +       }
5722 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5723 +       return 0;
5724 +}
5725 +
5726 +void
5727 +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
5728 +                 const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
5729 +{
5730 +       struct acl_subject_label *acl;
5731 +
5732 +       if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
5733 +                    task->acl && (task->acl->mode & GR_LEARN)))
5734 +               goto skip_reslog;
5735 +
5736 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
5737 +       gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted);
5738 +#endif
5739 +      skip_reslog:
5740 +
5741 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
5742 +               return;
5743 +
5744 +       acl = task->acl;
5745 +
5746 +       if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & GR_LEARN) ||
5747 +                  !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
5748 +               return;
5749 +
5750 +       if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
5751 +               unsigned long res_add;
5752 +
5753 +               res_add = wanted;
5754 +               switch (res) {
5755 +               case RLIMIT_CPU:
5756 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
5757 +                       break;
5758 +               case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
5759 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
5760 +                       break;
5761 +               case RLIMIT_DATA:
5762 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
5763 +                       break;
5764 +               case RLIMIT_STACK:
5765 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
5766 +                       break;
5767 +               case RLIMIT_CORE:
5768 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
5769 +                       break;
5770 +               case RLIMIT_RSS:
5771 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
5772 +                       break;
5773 +               case RLIMIT_NPROC:
5774 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
5775 +                       break;
5776 +               case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
5777 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
5778 +                       break;
5779 +               case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
5780 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
5781 +                       break;
5782 +               case RLIMIT_AS:
5783 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
5784 +                       break;
5785 +               case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
5786 +                       res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
5787 +                       break;
5788 +               }
5789 +
5790 +               acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
5791 +
5792 +               if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
5793 +                       acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
5794 +
5795 +               security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename,
5796 +                              current->role->roletype, acl->filename,
5797 +                              acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
5798 +                              "", (unsigned long) res);
5799 +       }
5800 +
5801 +       return;
5802 +}
5803 +
5804 +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
5805 +extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
5806 +
5807 +__u32
5808 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
5809 +                const void *newval)
5810 +{
5811 +       struct proc_dir_entry *tmp;
5812 +       struct nameidata nd;
5813 +       const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
5814 +       char *path = gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()];
5815 +       struct acl_object_label *obj;
5816 +       unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
5817 +       __u32 err = 0;
5818 +       __u32 mode = 0;
5819 +
5820 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5821 +               return 1;
5822 +
5823 +       if (oldval)
5824 +               mode |= GR_READ;
5825 +       if (newval)
5826 +               mode |= GR_WRITE;
5827 +
5828 +       /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
5829 +
5830 +       for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) {
5831 +               len += strlen(tmp->name);
5832 +               len++;
5833 +               depth++;
5834 +       }
5835 +
5836 +       if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE)
5837 +               return 0;       // deny
5838 +
5839 +       memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
5840 +
5841 +       memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
5842 +
5843 +       pos += strlen(proc_sys);
5844 +
5845 +       for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
5846 +               path[pos] = '/';
5847 +               pos++;
5848 +               for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root;
5849 +                    tmp = tmp->parent) {
5850 +                       if (depth == i) {
5851 +                               memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name,
5852 +                                      strlen(tmp->name));
5853 +                               pos += strlen(tmp->name);
5854 +                       }
5855 +                       i++;
5856 +               }
5857 +       }
5858 +
5859 +       if (path_init(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd))
5860 +               err = path_walk(path, &nd);
5861 +
5862 +       if (err)
5863 +               goto out;
5864 +
5865 +       obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl);
5866 +       err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
5867 +
5868 +       if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) && ((err & mode) != mode))) {
5869 +               __u32 new_mode = mode;
5870 +
5871 +               new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
5872 +
5873 +               err = new_mode;
5874 +               gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid,
5875 +                            current, path, new_mode);
5876 +       } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
5877 +               security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", path,
5878 +                              (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
5879 +                              (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
5880 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
5881 +               err = 0;
5882 +       } else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
5883 +               err = 0;
5884 +       } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
5885 +               security_audit(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
5886 +                              path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
5887 +                              (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "",
5888 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
5889 +       }
5890 +
5891 +       path_release(&nd);
5892 +
5893 +      out:
5894 +       return err;
5895 +}
5896 +#endif
5897 +
5898 +int
5899 +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
5900 +{
5901 +       struct file *filp;
5902 +       __u32 retmode;
5903 +
5904 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5905 +               return 0;
5906 +
5907 +       filp = task->exec_file;
5908 +
5909 +       if (unlikely(!filp))
5910 +               return 0;
5911 +
5912 +       retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD, filp->f_vfsmnt);
5913 +
5914 +       if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
5915 +               switch (request) {
5916 +               case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
5917 +               case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
5918 +               case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
5919 +#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA)
5920 +               case PTRACE_SETREGS:
5921 +               case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
5922 +#endif
5923 +#ifdef CONFIG_X86
5924 +               case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
5925 +#endif
5926 +#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
5927 +               case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
5928 +#endif
5929 +                       return 1;
5930 +               default:
5931 +                       return 0;
5932 +               }
5933 +       } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
5934 +                  !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
5935 +                  && (current->acl != task->acl
5936 +                      || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
5937 +                          && current->pid != task->pid))) {
5938 +               security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG,
5939 +                              gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt),
5940 +                              task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
5941 +               return 1;
5942 +       }
5943 +
5944 +       return 0;
5945 +}
5946 +
5947 +int
5948 +gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
5949 +{
5950 +       __u32 retmode;
5951 +       struct acl_subject_label *subj;
5952 +
5953 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
5954 +               return 0;
5955 +
5956 +       if (unlikely
5957 +           ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
5958 +            && !(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE)))
5959 +               retmode = gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt);
5960 +       else
5961 +               return 0;
5962 +
5963 +       subj = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role);
5964 +
5965 +       if (!(retmode & GR_PTRACERD) &&
5966 +           !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
5967 +           (current->acl != subj)) {
5968 +               security_alert(GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG,
5969 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
5970 +               return 1;
5971 +       }
5972 +
5973 +       return 0;
5974 +}
5975 +
5976 +int
5977 +gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
5978 +{
5979 +       struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
5980 +
5981 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) ||
5982 +                    (current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) || !filp ||
5983 +                    !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
5984 +               return 0;
5985 +
5986 +       if (unlikely(current->is_writable))
5987 +               return 0;
5988 +
5989 +       obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
5990 +       obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
5991 +                            current->role->root_label);
5992 +       if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
5993 +               security_alert(GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG,
5994 +                              gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt),
5995 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
5996 +               return 1;
5997 +       }
5998 +
5999 +       return 0;
6000 +}
6001 +
6002 +int
6003 +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
6004 +{
6005 +       __u32 mode;
6006 +
6007 +       if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
6008 +               return 1;
6009 +
6010 +       mode =
6011 +           gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
6012 +                          GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
6013 +                          file->f_vfsmnt);
6014 +
6015 +       if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
6016 +               security_alert(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6017 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
6018 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6019 +               return 0;
6020 +       } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
6021 +               return 0;
6022 +       } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
6023 +               security_audit(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6024 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
6025 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6026 +               return 1;
6027 +       }
6028 +
6029 +       return 1;
6030 +}
6031 +
6032 +int
6033 +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
6034 +{
6035 +       __u32 mode;
6036 +
6037 +       if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
6038 +               return 1;
6039 +
6040 +       mode =
6041 +           gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
6042 +                          GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
6043 +                          file->f_vfsmnt);
6044 +
6045 +       if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
6046 +               security_alert(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6047 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
6048 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6049 +               return 0;
6050 +       } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
6051 +               return 0;
6052 +       } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
6053 +               security_audit(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6054 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
6055 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6056 +               return 1;
6057 +       }
6058 +
6059 +       return 1;
6060 +}
6061 +
6062 +void
6063 +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
6064 +{
6065 +       unsigned long runtime;
6066 +       unsigned long cputime;
6067 +       unsigned int wday, cday;
6068 +       __u8 whr, chr;
6069 +       __u8 wmin, cmin;
6070 +       __u8 wsec, csec;
6071 +       char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
6072 +       char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
6073 +
6074 +       if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
6075 +                    !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
6076 +               return;
6077 +
6078 +       runtime = (jiffies - task->start_time) / HZ;
6079 +       wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
6080 +       runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
6081 +       whr = runtime / 3600;
6082 +       runtime -= whr * 3600;
6083 +       wmin = runtime / 60;
6084 +       runtime -= wmin * 60;
6085 +       wsec = runtime;
6086 +
6087 +       cputime = (task->times.tms_utime + task->times.tms_stime) / HZ;
6088 +       cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
6089 +       cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
6090 +       chr = cputime / 3600;
6091 +       cputime -= chr * 3600;
6092 +       cmin = cputime / 60;
6093 +       cputime -= cmin * 60;
6094 +       csec = cputime;
6095 +
6096 +       security_audit(GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task->comm,
6097 +                      task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->tty,
6098 +                                                                  cur_tty),
6099 +                      task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr,
6100 +                      wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec,
6101 +                      (task->
6102 +                       flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited",
6103 +                      code, task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
6104 +                      NIPQUAD(task->p_pptr->curr_ip),
6105 +                      tty_name(task->p_pptr->tty, parent_tty),
6106 +                      task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid,
6107 +                      task->p_pptr->egid);
6108 +
6109 +       return;
6110 +}
6111 +
6112 +void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
6113 +{
6114 +       if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
6115 +               task->role = kernel_role;
6116 +               task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
6117 +       }
6118 +       return;
6119 +}
6120 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
6121 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c       1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
6122 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c       2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
6123 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
6124 +/* stack-based acl allocation tracking (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
6125 +
6126 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
6127 +#include <linux/mm.h>
6128 +#include <linux/slab.h>
6129 +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
6130 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
6131 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6132 +
6133 +static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
6134 +static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
6135 +static void **alloc_stack;
6136 +
6137 +static __inline__ int
6138 +alloc_pop(void)
6139 +{
6140 +       if ((alloc_stack_next - 1) == 0)
6141 +               return 0;
6142 +
6143 +       if (*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2))
6144 +               kfree(*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2));
6145 +
6146 +       alloc_stack_next--;
6147 +
6148 +       return 1;
6149 +}
6150 +
6151 +static __inline__ void
6152 +alloc_push(void *buf)
6153 +{
6154 +       if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
6155 +               BUG();
6156 +
6157 +       *(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 1) = buf;
6158 +
6159 +       alloc_stack_next++;
6160 +
6161 +       return;
6162 +}
6163 +
6164 +void *
6165 +acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
6166 +{
6167 +       void *ret;
6168 +
6169 +       if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
6170 +               BUG();
6171 +
6172 +       ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
6173 +
6174 +       if (ret)
6175 +               alloc_push(ret);
6176 +
6177 +       return ret;
6178 +}
6179 +
6180 +void
6181 +acl_free_all(void)
6182 +{
6183 +       if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
6184 +               return;
6185 +
6186 +       while (alloc_pop()) ;
6187 +
6188 +       if (alloc_stack) {
6189 +               if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
6190 +                       kfree(alloc_stack);
6191 +               else
6192 +                       vfree(alloc_stack);
6193 +       }
6194 +
6195 +       alloc_stack = NULL;
6196 +       alloc_stack_size = 1;
6197 +       alloc_stack_next = 1;
6198 +
6199 +       return;
6200 +}
6201 +
6202 +int
6203 +acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
6204 +{
6205 +       if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
6206 +               alloc_stack =
6207 +                   (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
6208 +       else
6209 +               alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
6210 +
6211 +       alloc_stack_size = size;
6212 +
6213 +       if (!alloc_stack)
6214 +               return 0;
6215 +       else
6216 +               return 1;
6217 +}
6218 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
6219 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
6220 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
6221 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
6222 +/* capability handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */
6223 +
6224 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
6225 +#include <linux/sched.h>
6226 +#include <linux/capability.h>
6227 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
6228 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6229 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
6230 +
6231 +static const char *captab_log[29] = {
6232 +       "CAP_CHOWN",
6233 +       "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
6234 +       "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
6235 +       "CAP_FOWNER",
6236 +       "CAP_FSETID",
6237 +       "CAP_KILL",
6238 +       "CAP_SETGID",
6239 +       "CAP_SETUID",
6240 +       "CAP_SETPCAP",
6241 +       "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
6242 +       "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
6243 +       "CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
6244 +       "CAP_NET_ADMIN",
6245 +       "CAP_NET_RAW",
6246 +       "CAP_IPC_LOCK",
6247 +       "CAP_IPC_OWNER",
6248 +       "CAP_SYS_MODULE",
6249 +       "CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
6250 +       "CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
6251 +       "CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
6252 +       "CAP_SYS_PACCT",
6253 +       "CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
6254 +       "CAP_SYS_BOOT",
6255 +       "CAP_SYS_NICE",
6256 +       "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
6257 +       "CAP_SYS_TIME",
6258 +       "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
6259 +       "CAP_MKNOD",
6260 +       "CAP_LEASE"
6261 +};
6262 +
6263 +int
6264 +gr_is_capable(const int cap)
6265 +{
6266 +       struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
6267 +
6268 +       if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
6269 +               return 1;
6270 +
6271 +       curracl = current->acl;
6272 +
6273 +       if (!cap_raised(curracl->cap_lower, cap))
6274 +               return 1;
6275 +
6276 +       if ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)
6277 +           && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
6278 +               security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename,
6279 +                              current->role->roletype, current->uid,
6280 +                              current->gid, current->exec_file ?
6281 +                              gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
6282 +                              current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename,
6283 +                              curracl->filename, 0UL,
6284 +                              0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
6285 +               return 1;
6286 +       }
6287 +
6288 +       if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
6289 +               security_alert(GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, captab_log[cap], DEFAULTSECARGS);
6290 +
6291 +       return 0;
6292 +}
6293 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
6294 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c  1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
6295 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c  2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
6296 @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
6297 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
6298 +#include <linux/sched.h>
6299 +#include <linux/types.h>
6300 +#include <linux/fs.h>
6301 +#include <linux/file.h>
6302 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6303 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
6304 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
6305 +
6306 +__u32
6307 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
6308 +                         const struct vfsmount * mnt)
6309 +{
6310 +       __u32 mode;
6311 +
6312 +       if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
6313 +               return GR_FIND;
6314 +
6315 +       mode =
6316 +           gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
6317 +
6318 +       if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
6319 +               security_audit(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6320 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
6321 +               return mode;
6322 +       } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
6323 +               security_alert(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6324 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
6325 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6326 +               return 0;
6327 +       } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
6328 +               return 0;
6329 +
6330 +       return GR_FIND;
6331 +}
6332 +
6333 +__u32
6334 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
6335 +                  const int fmode)
6336 +{
6337 +       __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
6338 +       __u32 mode;
6339 +
6340 +       if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
6341 +               return reqmode;
6342 +
6343 +       if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
6344 +               reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
6345 +       else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
6346 +               reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
6347 +       if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
6348 +               reqmode |= GR_READ;
6349 +
6350 +       mode =
6351 +           gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
6352 +                          mnt);
6353 +
6354 +       if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
6355 +               security_audit(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6356 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
6357 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6358 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
6359 +                              reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
6360 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6361 +               return reqmode;
6362 +       } else
6363 +           if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
6364 +       {
6365 +               security_alert(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6366 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
6367 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6368 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
6369 +                              GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
6370 +               return 0;
6371 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
6372 +               return 0;
6373 +
6374 +       return reqmode;
6375 +}
6376 +
6377 +__u32
6378 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
6379 +                   const struct dentry * p_dentry,
6380 +                   const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
6381 +                   const int imode)
6382 +{
6383 +       __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
6384 +       __u32 mode;
6385 +
6386 +       if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
6387 +               reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
6388 +       if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
6389 +               reqmode |= GR_READ;
6390 +       if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
6391 +               reqmode |= GR_SETID;
6392 +
6393 +       mode =
6394 +           gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
6395 +                           reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
6396 +
6397 +       if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
6398 +               security_audit(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6399 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
6400 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6401 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" :
6402 +                              reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "",
6403 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6404 +               return reqmode;
6405 +       } else
6406 +           if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
6407 +       {
6408 +               security_alert(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6409 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt),
6410 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6411 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
6412 +                              GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS);
6413 +               return 0;
6414 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
6415 +               return 0;
6416 +
6417 +       return reqmode;
6418 +}
6419 +
6420 +__u32
6421 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
6422 +                    const int fmode)
6423 +{
6424 +       __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
6425 +
6426 +       if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
6427 +               reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
6428 +       if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
6429 +               reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
6430 +       if (fmode & S_IROTH)
6431 +               reqmode |= GR_READ;
6432 +
6433 +       mode =
6434 +           gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
6435 +                          mnt);
6436 +
6437 +       if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
6438 +               security_audit(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6439 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
6440 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6441 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
6442 +                              reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
6443 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6444 +               return reqmode;
6445 +       } else
6446 +           if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
6447 +       {
6448 +               security_alert(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6449 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
6450 +                              reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
6451 +                              reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
6452 +                              reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "",
6453 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6454 +               return 0;
6455 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
6456 +               return 0;
6457 +
6458 +       return reqmode;
6459 +}
6460 +
6461 +#define generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
6462 +{ \
6463 +       __u32 mode; \
6464 +       \
6465 +       mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); \
6466 +       \
6467 +       if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
6468 +               security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
6469 +                               gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); \
6470 +               return mode; \
6471 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
6472 +               security_alert(fmt, "denied", gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), \
6473 +                               DEFAULTSECARGS); \
6474 +               return 0; \
6475 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
6476 +               return 0; \
6477 +       \
6478 +       return (reqmode); \
6479 +}
6480 +
6481 +__u32
6482 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
6483 +{
6484 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
6485 +}
6486 +
6487 +__u32
6488 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6489 +{
6490 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
6491 +}
6492 +
6493 +__u32
6494 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6495 +{
6496 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
6497 +}
6498 +
6499 +__u32
6500 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6501 +{
6502 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
6503 +}
6504 +
6505 +__u32
6506 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
6507 +                    mode_t mode)
6508 +{
6509 +       if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
6510 +               generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
6511 +                                  GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
6512 +       } else {
6513 +               generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
6514 +       }
6515 +}
6516 +
6517 +__u32
6518 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
6519 +                   mode_t mode)
6520 +{
6521 +       if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
6522 +               generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
6523 +                                  GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
6524 +       } else {
6525 +               generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
6526 +       }
6527 +}
6528 +
6529 +__u32
6530 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6531 +{
6532 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
6533 +}
6534 +
6535 +__u32
6536 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6537 +{
6538 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
6539 +}
6540 +
6541 +__u32
6542 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
6543 +{
6544 +       generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
6545 +                          GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
6546 +}
6547 +
6548 +__u32
6549 +gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
6550 +                     const ino_t ino)
6551 +{
6552 +       if (likely((unsigned long)(dentry->d_inode))) {
6553 +               struct dentry d = *dentry;
6554 +               struct inode inode = *(dentry->d_inode);
6555 +
6556 +               inode.i_ino = ino;
6557 +               d.d_inode = &inode;
6558 +
6559 +               if (unlikely(!gr_search_file(&d, GR_FIND | GR_NOLEARN, mnt)))
6560 +                       return 0;
6561 +       }
6562 +
6563 +       return 1;
6564 +}
6565 +
6566 +__u32
6567 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
6568 +                  const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
6569 +                  const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
6570 +                  const struct dentry * old_dentry,
6571 +                  const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
6572 +{
6573 +       __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
6574 +       __u32 mode;
6575 +
6576 +       mode =
6577 +           gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
6578 +                         old_mnt);
6579 +
6580 +       if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
6581 +               security_audit(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6582 +                              gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
6583 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6584 +               return mode;
6585 +       } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
6586 +               security_alert(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6587 +                              gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to,
6588 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6589 +               return 0;
6590 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
6591 +               return 0;
6592 +
6593 +       return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
6594 +}
6595 +
6596 +__u32
6597 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
6598 +                     const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
6599 +                     const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
6600 +{
6601 +       __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
6602 +       __u32 mode;
6603 +
6604 +       mode =
6605 +           gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
6606 +                           GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
6607 +                           GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
6608 +
6609 +       if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
6610 +               security_audit(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6611 +                              from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
6612 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6613 +               return mode;
6614 +       } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
6615 +               security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6616 +                              from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt),
6617 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6618 +               return 0;
6619 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
6620 +               return 0;
6621 +
6622 +       return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
6623 +}
6624 +
6625 +#define generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode, fmt) \
6626 +{ \
6627 +       __u32 mode; \
6628 +       \
6629 +       mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); \
6630 +       \
6631 +       if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \
6632 +               security_audit(fmt, "successful", \
6633 +                               gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
6634 +                               DEFAULTSECARGS); \
6635 +               return mode; \
6636 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \
6637 +               security_alert(fmt, "denied", \
6638 +                               gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \
6639 +                               DEFAULTSECARGS); \
6640 +               return 0; \
6641 +       } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \
6642 +               return 0; \
6643 +       \
6644 +       return (reqmode); \
6645 +}
6646 +
6647 +__u32
6648 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
6649 +                   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
6650 +                   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
6651 +                   const int mode)
6652 +{
6653 +       __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
6654 +       if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
6655 +               reqmode |= GR_SETID;
6656 +
6657 +       generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
6658 +                                 reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
6659 +}
6660 +
6661 +__u32
6662 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
6663 +                   const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
6664 +                   const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
6665 +{
6666 +       generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
6667 +                                 GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
6668 +}
6669 +
6670 +#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
6671 +       (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
6672 +        ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
6673 +
6674 +int
6675 +gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
6676 +                    struct dentry *parent_dentry,
6677 +                    const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
6678 +                    struct dentry *old_dentry,
6679 +                    struct inode *old_parent_inode,
6680 +                    struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
6681 +{
6682 +       __u8 gr_replace = 1;
6683 +       __u32 comp1, comp2;
6684 +       int error = 0;
6685 +
6686 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
6687 +               return 1;
6688 +
6689 +       if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
6690 +               gr_replace = 0;
6691 +
6692 +               comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
6693 +                                       GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
6694 +                                       GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
6695 +               comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
6696 +                                      GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
6697 +                                      GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
6698 +                                      GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
6699 +       } else {
6700 +               comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
6701 +                                      GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
6702 +                                      GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
6703 +                                      GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
6704 +                                      GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
6705 +               comp2 =
6706 +                   gr_search_file(old_dentry,
6707 +                                  GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
6708 +                                  GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
6709 +                                  GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
6710 +       }
6711 +
6712 +       if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
6713 +           ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
6714 +               security_audit(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "successful",
6715 +                              gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt),
6716 +                              newname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
6717 +       else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
6718 +                && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
6719 +               security_alert(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "denied",
6720 +                              gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), newname,
6721 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
6722 +               error = -EACCES;
6723 +       } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
6724 +               error = -EACCES;
6725 +
6726 +       if (error)
6727 +               return error;
6728 +
6729 +       error = gr_handle_rename(old_parent_inode, parent_dentry->d_inode,
6730 +                                old_dentry, new_dentry, old_mnt, gr_replace);
6731 +
6732 +       return error;
6733 +}
6734 +
6735 +void
6736 +gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
6737 +{
6738 +       u16 id;
6739 +       char *rolename;
6740 +
6741 +       if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
6742 +               id = current->acl_role_id;
6743 +               rolename = current->role->rolename;
6744 +               gr_set_acls(1);
6745 +               security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG,
6746 +                                   rolename, id, DEFAULTSECARGS);
6747 +       }
6748 +
6749 +       if (current->exec_file) {
6750 +               fput(current->exec_file);
6751 +               current->exec_file = NULL;
6752 +       }
6753 +}
6754 +
6755 +int
6756 +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
6757 +{
6758 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
6759 +               return 0;
6760 +
6761 +       if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
6762 +               return -EACCES;
6763 +
6764 +       return 0;
6765 +}
6766 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
6767 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c  1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
6768 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c  2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
6769 @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
6770 +/*
6771 + * grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
6772 + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
6773 + *
6774 + */
6775 +
6776 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
6777 +#include <asm/uaccess.h>
6778 +#include <asm/errno.h>
6779 +#include <net/sock.h>
6780 +#include <linux/file.h>
6781 +#include <linux/fs.h>
6782 +#include <linux/net.h>
6783 +#include <linux/in.h>
6784 +#include <linux/skbuff.h>
6785 +#include <linux/ip.h>
6786 +#include <linux/udp.h>
6787 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
6788 +#include <linux/types.h>
6789 +#include <linux/sched.h>
6790 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
6791 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6792 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
6793 +
6794 +#define GR_BIND        0x01
6795 +#define GR_CONNECT     0x02
6796 +
6797 +int
6798 +gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
6799 +{
6800 +       struct acl_subject_label *curr;
6801 +
6802 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
6803 +               goto exit;
6804 +
6805 +       if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
6806 +           || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
6807 +               goto exit;      // let the kernel handle it
6808 +
6809 +       curr = current->acl;
6810 +
6811 +       if (!curr->ips)
6812 +               goto exit;
6813 +
6814 +       if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
6815 +           (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
6816 +               goto exit;
6817 +
6818 +       if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
6819 +               /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
6820 +                  dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
6821 +                  bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
6822 +               if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
6823 +                       __u32 fakeip = 0;
6824 +                       security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
6825 +                                      current->role->roletype, current->uid,
6826 +                                      current->gid, current->exec_file ?
6827 +                                      gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
6828 +                                      current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
6829 +                                      curr->filename, curr->filename,
6830 +                                      NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
6831 +                                      protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
6832 +               } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
6833 +                       __u32 fakeip = 0;
6834 +                       security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
6835 +                                      current->role->roletype, current->uid,
6836 +                                      current->gid, current->exec_file ?
6837 +                                      gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
6838 +                                      current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
6839 +                                      curr->filename, curr->filename,
6840 +                                      NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
6841 +                                      protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
6842 +               }
6843 +               /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
6844 +               goto exit;
6845 +       }
6846 +
6847 +       security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, domain, type, protocol, DEFAULTSECARGS);
6848 +
6849 +       return 0;
6850 +      exit:
6851 +       return 1;
6852 +}
6853 +
6854 +static __inline__ int
6855 +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
6856 +                     const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
6857 +{
6858 +       struct acl_subject_label *curr;
6859 +       struct acl_ip_label *ip;
6860 +       unsigned long i;
6861 +       unsigned long ip_addr = 0;
6862 +       __u16 ip_port = 0;
6863 +
6864 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->family != PF_INET))
6865 +               return 1;
6866 +
6867 +       curr = current->acl;
6868 +
6869 +       if (!curr->ips)
6870 +               return 1;
6871 +
6872 +       ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
6873 +       ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
6874 +
6875 +       for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
6876 +               ip = *(curr->ips + i);
6877 +               if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
6878 +                   (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
6879 +                   (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
6880 +                   ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) ==
6881 +                    (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask))
6882 +                   && (ip->
6883 +                       proto[sk->protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->protocol % 32)))
6884 +                   && (ip->type & (1 << type)))
6885 +                       return 1;
6886 +       }
6887 +
6888 +       if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) {
6889 +               security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
6890 +                              current->role->roletype, current->uid,
6891 +                              current->gid, current->exec_file ?
6892 +                              gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
6893 +                              current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
6894 +                              curr->filename, curr->filename,
6895 +                              NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
6896 +                              sk->protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
6897 +               return 1;
6898 +       }
6899 +
6900 +       if (mode == GR_BIND)
6901 +               security_alert(GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
6902 +                              type, sk->protocol, DEFAULTSECARGS);
6903 +       else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
6904 +               security_alert(GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port,
6905 +                              type, sk->protocol, DEFAULTSECARGS);
6906 +
6907 +       return 0;
6908 +}
6909 +
6910 +int
6911 +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
6912 +{
6913 +       return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
6914 +}
6915 +
6916 +int
6917 +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
6918 +{
6919 +       return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
6920 +}
6921 +
6922 +int
6923 +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
6924 +{
6925 +       if (addr)
6926 +               return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
6927 +       else {
6928 +               struct sockaddr_in sin;
6929 +
6930 +               sin.sin_addr.s_addr = sk->daddr;
6931 +               sin.sin_port = sk->dport;
6932 +
6933 +               return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
6934 +       }
6935 +}
6936 +
6937 +int
6938 +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
6939 +{
6940 +       struct sockaddr_in sin;
6941 +
6942 +       if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
6943 +               return 1;       // skip this packet
6944 +
6945 +       sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
6946 +       sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source;
6947 +
6948 +       return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
6949 +}
6950 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
6951 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c       1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
6952 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c       2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
6953 @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
6954 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
6955 +#include <linux/mm.h>
6956 +#include <linux/sched.h>
6957 +#include <linux/poll.h>
6958 +#include <linux/string.h>
6959 +#include <linux/file.h>
6960 +#include <linux/types.h>
6961 +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
6962 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
6963 +
6964 +extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char * buf,
6965 +                                  size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
6966 +
6967 +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
6968 +
6969 +char *learn_buffer[80][NR_CPUS];
6970 +ssize_t learn_buffer_len[80][NR_CPUS];
6971 +
6972 +static ssize_t
6973 +read_learn(struct file *file, char * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
6974 +{
6975 +       DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
6976 +       ssize_t retval = 0, tmp;
6977 +       int i, j;
6978 +
6979 +       add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
6980 +       set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
6981 +       do {
6982 +               for (j = 0; j < 80; j++)
6983 +                       for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++)
6984 +                               if (learn_buffer_len[j][i])
6985 +                                       goto new_data;
6986 +               if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
6987 +                       retval = -EAGAIN;
6988 +                       goto out;
6989 +               }
6990 +               if (signal_pending(current)) {
6991 +                       retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
6992 +                       goto out;
6993 +               }
6994 +
6995 +               schedule();
6996 +       } while (1);
6997 +
6998 +new_data:
6999 +       for (j = 0; j < 80; j++) {
7000 +               for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) {
7001 +                       tmp = learn_buffer_len[j][i];
7002 +                       if (!tmp)
7003 +                               continue;
7004 +                       if (count < ((i * 80 * 16384) + (j * 16384) + tmp)) {
7005 +                               retval = -EINVAL;
7006 +                               goto out;
7007 +                       }
7008 +                       if (copy_to_user(buf + (i * 80 * 16384) + (j * 16384), learn_buffer[j][i], tmp)) {
7009 +                               retval = -EFAULT;
7010 +                               goto out;
7011 +                       } else {
7012 +                               retval += tmp;
7013 +                               learn_buffer_len[j][i] = 0;
7014 +                       }
7015 +               }
7016 +       }
7017 +
7018 +out:
7019 +       set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
7020 +       remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
7021 +       return retval;
7022 +}
7023 +
7024 +static unsigned int
7025 +poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
7026 +{
7027 +       int i, j;
7028 +
7029 +       poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
7030 +
7031 +       for(j = 0; j < 80; j++)
7032 +               for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++)
7033 +                       if (learn_buffer_len[j][i])
7034 +                               return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
7035 +
7036 +       return 0;
7037 +}
7038 +
7039 +void
7040 +gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
7041 +{
7042 +       va_list args;
7043 +       int j;
7044 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
7045 +
7046 +       for(j = 0; j < 80; j++) {
7047 +               if (learn_buffer_len[j][cpu])
7048 +                       continue;
7049 +
7050 +               if (!learn_buffer[j][cpu]) {
7051 +                       learn_buffer[j][cpu] = vmalloc(16384);
7052 +                       if (!learn_buffer[j][cpu])
7053 +                               return;
7054 +               }
7055 +
7056 +               va_start(args, fmt);
7057 +               learn_buffer_len[j][cpu] = vsnprintf(learn_buffer[j][cpu], 16384, fmt, args);
7058 +               va_end(args);
7059 +
7060 +               if (learn_buffer_len[j][cpu] < 0)
7061 +                       learn_buffer_len[j][cpu] = 16384;
7062 +               wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
7063 +               break;
7064 +       }
7065 +
7066 +       return;
7067 +}
7068 +
7069 +struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
7070 +       read:           read_learn,
7071 +       write:          write_grsec_handler,
7072 +       poll:           poll_learn,
7073 +};
7074 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
7075 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7076 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7077 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
7078 +/* resource handling routines (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
7079 +
7080 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7081 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7082 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
7083 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
7084 +
7085 +static const char *restab_log[11] = {
7086 +       "RLIMIT_CPU",
7087 +       "RLIMIT_FSIZE",
7088 +       "RLIMIT_DATA",
7089 +       "RLIMIT_STACK",
7090 +       "RLIMIT_CORE",
7091 +       "RLIMIT_RSS",
7092 +       "RLIMIT_NPROC",
7093 +       "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
7094 +       "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
7095 +       "RLIMIT_AS",
7096 +       "RLIMIT_LOCKS"
7097 +};
7098 +
7099 +__inline__ void
7100 +gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
7101 +               const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
7102 +{
7103 +       if (unlikely(res == RLIMIT_NPROC &&
7104 +           (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
7105 +            cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))))
7106 +               return;
7107 +
7108 +       if (unlikely(wanted >= task->rlim[res].rlim_cur &&
7109 +                    task->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
7110 +               security_alert(GR_RESOURCE_MSG, wanted, restab_log[res],
7111 +                              task->rlim[res].rlim_cur, task->comm,
7112 +                              task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
7113 +                              task->gid, task->egid, task->p_pptr->comm,
7114 +                              task->p_pptr->pid, task->p_pptr->uid,
7115 +                              task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid,
7116 +                              task->p_pptr->egid);
7117 +
7118 +       return;
7119 +}
7120 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
7121 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7122 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7123 @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
7124 +/*
7125 + * grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
7126 + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003
7127 + *
7128 + */
7129 +
7130 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7131 +#include <linux/mm.h>
7132 +#include <asm/uaccess.h>
7133 +#include <asm/errno.h>
7134 +#include <asm/mman.h>
7135 +#include <net/sock.h>
7136 +#include <linux/file.h>
7137 +#include <linux/fs.h>
7138 +#include <linux/net.h>
7139 +#include <linux/in.h>
7140 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
7141 +#include <linux/slab.h>
7142 +#include <linux/types.h>
7143 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7144 +#include <linux/timer.h>
7145 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
7146 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7147 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
7148 +
7149 +static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
7150 +static unsigned short uid_used;
7151 +static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
7152 +extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
7153 +extern __inline__ struct acl_subject_label *lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t
7154 +                                                                 inode,
7155 +                                                                 const kdev_t
7156 +                                                                 dev,
7157 +                                                                 struct
7158 +                                                                 acl_role_label
7159 +                                                                 *role);
7160 +
7161 +int
7162 +gr_init_uidset(void)
7163 +{
7164 +       uid_set =
7165 +           kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
7166 +       uid_used = 0;
7167 +
7168 +       return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
7169 +}
7170 +
7171 +void
7172 +gr_free_uidset(void)
7173 +{
7174 +       if (uid_set)
7175 +               kfree(uid_set);
7176 +
7177 +       return;
7178 +}
7179 +
7180 +int
7181 +gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
7182 +{
7183 +       struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
7184 +       uid_t buid;
7185 +       int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
7186 +
7187 +       while (high >= low) {
7188 +               mid = (low + high) >> 1;
7189 +               buid = tmp[mid].uid;
7190 +               if (buid == uid)
7191 +                       return mid;
7192 +               if (buid > uid)
7193 +                       high = mid - 1;
7194 +               if (buid < uid)
7195 +                       low = mid + 1;
7196 +       }
7197 +
7198 +       return -1;
7199 +}
7200 +
7201 +static __inline__ void
7202 +gr_insertsort(void)
7203 +{
7204 +       unsigned short i, j;
7205 +       struct crash_uid index;
7206 +
7207 +       for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
7208 +               index = uid_set[i];
7209 +               j = i;
7210 +               while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
7211 +                       uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
7212 +                       j--;
7213 +               }
7214 +               uid_set[j] = index;
7215 +       }
7216 +
7217 +       return;
7218 +}
7219 +
7220 +static __inline__ void
7221 +gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
7222 +{
7223 +       int loc;
7224 +
7225 +       if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
7226 +               return;
7227 +
7228 +       loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
7229 +
7230 +       if (loc >= 0) {
7231 +               uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
7232 +               return;
7233 +       }
7234 +
7235 +       uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
7236 +       uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
7237 +       uid_used++;
7238 +
7239 +       gr_insertsort();
7240 +
7241 +       return;
7242 +}
7243 +
7244 +void
7245 +gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
7246 +{
7247 +       unsigned short i;
7248 +
7249 +       for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
7250 +               uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i];
7251 +
7252 +       uid_used--;
7253 +
7254 +       return;
7255 +}
7256 +
7257 +int
7258 +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
7259 +{
7260 +       int loc;
7261 +
7262 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
7263 +               return 0;
7264 +
7265 +       read_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
7266 +       loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
7267 +       read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
7268 +
7269 +       if (loc < 0)
7270 +               return 0;
7271 +
7272 +       write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
7273 +       if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, jiffies))
7274 +               gr_remove_uid(loc);
7275 +       else {
7276 +               write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
7277 +               return 1;
7278 +       }
7279 +
7280 +       write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
7281 +       return 0;
7282 +}
7283 +
7284 +static __inline__ int
7285 +proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
7286 +{
7287 +       if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
7288 +           task->uid != task->fsuid)
7289 +               return 1;
7290 +       if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
7291 +           task->gid != task->fsgid)
7292 +               return 1;
7293 +
7294 +       return 0;
7295 +}
7296 +static __inline__ int
7297 +gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
7298 +{
7299 +       unsigned long int flags;
7300 +
7301 +       spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
7302 +       if (t->sig == NULL) {
7303 +               spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
7304 +               return -ESRCH;
7305 +       }
7306 +
7307 +       if (t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
7308 +               t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
7309 +       sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
7310 +       recalc_sigpending(t);
7311 +       spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
7312 +
7313 +       return send_sig_info(sig, (void *) 1L, t);
7314 +}
7315 +
7316 +void
7317 +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
7318 +{
7319 +       struct acl_subject_label *curr;
7320 +       struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
7321 +       struct task_struct *tsk;
7322 +
7323 +       if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
7324 +               return;
7325 +
7326 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
7327 +               return;
7328 +
7329 +       curr = task->acl;
7330 +
7331 +       if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
7332 +               return;
7333 +
7334 +       if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
7335 +               curr->expires = 0;
7336 +               curr->crashes = 0;
7337 +       }
7338 +
7339 +       curr->crashes++;
7340 +
7341 +       if (!curr->expires)
7342 +               curr->expires = jiffies + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
7343 +
7344 +       if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
7345 +           time_after(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
7346 +               if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
7347 +                       security_alert(GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task->comm,
7348 +                                      task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
7349 +                                      task->gid, task->egid,
7350 +                                      task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
7351 +                                      task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid,
7352 +                                      task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid,
7353 +                                      task->uid,
7354 +                                      curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ);
7355 +                       write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
7356 +                       gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
7357 +                       write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
7358 +                       curr->expires = 0;
7359 +                       curr->crashes = 0;
7360 +                       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
7361 +                       for_each_task(tsk) {
7362 +                               if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid)
7363 +                                       gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
7364 +                       }
7365 +                       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7366 +               } else {
7367 +                       security_alert(GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task->comm,
7368 +                                      task->pid, task->uid, task->euid,
7369 +                                      task->gid, task->egid,
7370 +                                      task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid,
7371 +                                      task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid,
7372 +                                      task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid,
7373 +                                      kdevname(curr->device), curr->inode,
7374 +                                      curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ);
7375 +                       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
7376 +                       for_each_task(tsk) {
7377 +                               if (likely(tsk != task)) {
7378 +                                       curr2 = tsk->acl;
7379 +
7380 +                                       if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
7381 +                                           curr2->inode == curr->inode)
7382 +                                               gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
7383 +                               }
7384 +                       }
7385 +                       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7386 +               }
7387 +       }
7388 +
7389 +       return;
7390 +}
7391 +
7392 +int
7393 +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
7394 +{
7395 +       struct acl_subject_label *curr;
7396 +
7397 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
7398 +               return 0;
7399 +
7400 +       read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
7401 +       curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
7402 +                                    filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
7403 +                                    current->role);
7404 +       read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
7405 +
7406 +       if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
7407 +           (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
7408 +               return 0;
7409 +
7410 +       if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
7411 +           time_after(curr->expires, jiffies))
7412 +               return 1;
7413 +       else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) {
7414 +               curr->crashes = 0;
7415 +               curr->expires = 0;
7416 +       }
7417 +
7418 +       return 0;
7419 +}
7420 +
7421 +void
7422 +gr_handle_alertkill(void)
7423 +{
7424 +       struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
7425 +       __u32 curr_ip;
7426 +       struct task_struct *task;
7427 +
7428 +       if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
7429 +               return;
7430 +
7431 +       curracl = current->acl;
7432 +       curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
7433 +
7434 +       if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip &&
7435 +           (curr_ip != 0xffffffff)) {
7436 +               read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
7437 +               for_each_task(task) {
7438 +                       if (task->curr_ip == curr_ip)
7439 +                               gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
7440 +               }
7441 +               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7442 +       } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
7443 +               gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
7444 +
7445 +       return;
7446 +}
7447 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
7448 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7449 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7450 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
7451 +/* shared memory handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */
7452 +
7453 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7454 +#include <linux/mm.h>
7455 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7456 +#include <linux/file.h>
7457 +#include <linux/ipc.h>
7458 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
7459 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7460 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
7461 +
7462 +int
7463 +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
7464 +               const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
7465 +{
7466 +       struct task_struct *task;
7467 +
7468 +       if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
7469 +               return 1;
7470 +
7471 +       task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
7472 +
7473 +       if (unlikely(!task))
7474 +               task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
7475 +
7476 +       if (unlikely(task && ((task->start_time < shm_createtime) ||
7477 +                             (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
7478 +                    (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
7479 +                    (task->acl != current->acl))) {
7480 +               security_alert(GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid,
7481 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
7482 +               return 0;
7483 +       }
7484 +
7485 +       return 1;
7486 +}
7487 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
7488 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c       1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7489 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c       2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7490 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
7491 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7492 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7493 +#include <linux/fs.h>
7494 +#include <linux/file.h>
7495 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7496 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
7497 +
7498 +void
7499 +gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7500 +{
7501 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
7502 +       if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
7503 +            in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
7504 +                                             !grsec_enable_group)) {
7505 +               security_audit(GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
7506 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
7507 +       }
7508 +#endif
7509 +       return;
7510 +}
7511 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
7512 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c      1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7513 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c      2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7514 @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
7515 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7516 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7517 +#include <linux/file.h>
7518 +#include <linux/fs.h>
7519 +#include <linux/types.h>
7520 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
7521 +
7522 +int
7523 +gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
7524 +{
7525 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
7526 +       struct task_struct *p, **htable;
7527 +
7528 +       if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
7529 +               return 1;
7530 +
7531 +       if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
7532 +               return 1;
7533 +
7534 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
7535 +
7536 +       htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)];
7537 +
7538 +       for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next) ;
7539 +
7540 +       if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) {
7541 +               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7542 +               security_alert(GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
7543 +               return 0;
7544 +       }
7545 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7546 +#endif
7547 +       return 1;
7548 +}
7549 +
7550 +int
7551 +gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
7552 +{
7553 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
7554 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7555 +               security_alert(GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
7556 +               return -EPERM;
7557 +       }
7558 +#endif
7559 +       return 0;
7560 +}
7561 +
7562 +int
7563 +gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(task_t *p, const int niceval)
7564 +{
7565 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
7566 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (!have_same_root(p, current)
7567 +                                        || (have_same_root(p, current)
7568 +                                            && (niceval < task_nice(p))
7569 +                                            && proc_is_chrooted(current)))) {
7570 +               security_alert(GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid,
7571 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
7572 +               return -ESRCH;
7573 +       }
7574 +#endif
7575 +       return 0;
7576 +}
7577 +
7578 +int
7579 +gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target)
7580 +{
7581 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
7582 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
7583 +           !have_same_root(current, target)) {
7584 +               security_alert(GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG, target->comm, target->pid,
7585 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
7586 +               return 1;
7587 +       }
7588 +#endif
7589 +       return 0;
7590 +}
7591 +
7592 +int
7593 +gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p)
7594 +{
7595 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
7596 +       if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || (current->pid <= 1))
7597 +               return 0;
7598 +
7599 +       if (p && p->fs && p->fs->root && p->fs->root->d_inode &&
7600 +           child_reaper && child_reaper->fs && child_reaper->fs->root &&
7601 +           child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode && current && current->fs &&
7602 +           current->fs->root && current->fs->root->d_inode) {
7603 +               if (proc_is_chrooted(current) && !have_same_root(current, p))
7604 +                       return 1;
7605 +       }
7606 +#endif
7607 +       return 0;
7608 +}
7609 +
7610 +int
7611 +gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
7612 +{
7613 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
7614 +       if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
7615 +               return 1;
7616 +
7617 +       if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
7618 +               return 1;
7619 +       else {
7620 +               struct dentry *dentry = u_dentry;
7621 +               struct vfsmount *mnt = u_mnt;
7622 +               struct dentry *realroot;
7623 +               struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
7624 +               struct dentry *currentroot;
7625 +               struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
7626 +
7627 +               read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
7628 +               realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
7629 +               realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
7630 +               read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
7631 +
7632 +               read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
7633 +               currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
7634 +               currentroot = dget(current->fs->root);
7635 +               read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
7636 +
7637 +               spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
7638 +               for (;;) {
7639 +                       if (unlikely
7640 +                           ((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
7641 +                            || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
7642 +                               break;
7643 +                       if (unlikely
7644 +                           (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
7645 +                               if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
7646 +                                       break;
7647 +                               dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
7648 +                               mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
7649 +                               continue;
7650 +                       }
7651 +                       dentry = dentry->d_parent;
7652 +               }
7653 +               spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
7654 +
7655 +               dput(currentroot);
7656 +               mntput(currentmnt);
7657 +
7658 +               if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) {
7659 +                       /* ok, they're definitely trying to fchdir outside of the
7660 +                          chroot. */
7661 +                       dput(realroot);
7662 +                       mntput(realrootmnt);
7663 +                       security_alert(GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG,
7664 +                                      gr_to_filename(u_dentry, u_mnt),
7665 +                                      DEFAULTSECARGS);
7666 +                       return 0;
7667 +               } else {
7668 +                       dput(realroot);
7669 +                       mntput(realrootmnt);
7670 +                       return 1;
7671 +               }
7672 +       }
7673 +#endif
7674 +       return 1;
7675 +}
7676 +
7677 +int
7678 +gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
7679 +               const time_t shm_createtime)
7680 +{
7681 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
7682 +       struct task_struct *p, **htable;
7683 +
7684 +       if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
7685 +               return 1;
7686 +
7687 +       if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
7688 +               return 1;
7689 +
7690 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
7691 +
7692 +       htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_cprid)];
7693 +
7694 +       for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_cprid; p = p->pidhash_next) ;
7695 +
7696 +       if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p) &&
7697 +                    (p->start_time < shm_createtime))) {
7698 +               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7699 +               security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
7700 +               return 0;
7701 +       }
7702 +
7703 +       if (unlikely(!p)) {
7704 +               htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_lapid)];
7705 +               for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_lapid;
7706 +                    p = p->pidhash_next) ;
7707 +
7708 +               if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) {
7709 +                       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7710 +                       security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
7711 +                       return 0;
7712 +               }
7713 +       }
7714 +
7715 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
7716 +#endif
7717 +       return 1;
7718 +}
7719 +
7720 +void
7721 +gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7722 +{
7723 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
7724 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
7725 +               security_audit(GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
7726 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
7727 +#endif
7728 +       return;
7729 +}
7730 +
7731 +int
7732 +gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
7733 +                      const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
7734 +{
7735 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
7736 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) &&
7737 +           proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7738 +               security_alert(GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG,
7739 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
7740 +               return -EPERM;
7741 +       }
7742 +#endif
7743 +       return 0;
7744 +}
7745 +
7746 +int
7747 +gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
7748 +                      const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
7749 +{
7750 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
7751 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7752 +               security_alert(GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name,
7753 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
7754 +               return -EPERM;
7755 +       }
7756 +#endif
7757 +       return 0;
7758 +}
7759 +
7760 +int
7761 +gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
7762 +{
7763 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
7764 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7765 +               security_alert(GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
7766 +               return -EPERM;
7767 +       }
7768 +#endif
7769 +       return 0;
7770 +}
7771 +
7772 +int
7773 +gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7774 +{
7775 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
7776 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7777 +               security_alert(GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG,
7778 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
7779 +               return -EPERM;
7780 +       }
7781 +#endif
7782 +       return 0;
7783 +}
7784 +
7785 +void
7786 +gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
7787 +{
7788 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
7789 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
7790 +               task->cap_permitted =
7791 +                   cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
7792 +               task->cap_inheritable =
7793 +                   cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
7794 +               task->cap_effective =
7795 +                   cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
7796 +       }
7797 +#endif
7798 +       return;
7799 +}
7800 +
7801 +int
7802 +gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
7803 +{
7804 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
7805 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
7806 +           && (op & 002))
7807 +               return -EACCES;
7808 +#endif
7809 +       return 0;
7810 +}
7811 +
7812 +void
7813 +gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
7814 +{
7815 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
7816 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
7817 +               set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
7818 +#endif
7819 +       return;
7820 +}
7821 +
7822 +int
7823 +gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
7824 +                      const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
7825 +{
7826 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
7827 +       if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
7828 +           ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) &&
7829 +           proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
7830 +               security_alert(GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG,
7831 +                              gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS);
7832 +               return -EPERM;
7833 +       }
7834 +#endif
7835 +       return 0;
7836 +}
7837 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
7838 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c    1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
7839 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c    2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
7840 @@ -0,0 +1,368 @@
7841 +/*
7842 + * when grsecurity is disabled, compile all external functions into nothing
7843 + */
7844 +
7845 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
7846 +#include <linux/config.h>
7847 +#include <linux/sched.h>
7848 +#include <linux/file.h>
7849 +#include <linux/fs.h>
7850 +#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
7851 +#include <linux/net.h>
7852 +#include <linux/in.h>
7853 +#include <linux/ip.h>
7854 +#include <linux/skbuff.h>
7855 +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
7856 +
7857 +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
7858 +__u32
7859 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode)
7860 +{
7861 +       return mode;
7862 +}
7863 +#endif
7864 +
7865 +int
7866 +gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
7867 +{
7868 +       return 0;
7869 +}
7870 +
7871 +void
7872 +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
7873 +{
7874 +       return;
7875 +}
7876 +
7877 +int
7878 +gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7879 +{
7880 +       return 0;
7881 +}
7882 +
7883 +int
7884 +gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot)
7885 +{
7886 +       return 0;
7887 +}
7888 +
7889 +int
7890 +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
7891 +{
7892 +       return 0;
7893 +}
7894 +
7895 +void
7896 +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
7897 +                 const int res, const unsigned long wanted)
7898 +{
7899 +       return;
7900 +}
7901 +
7902 +int
7903 +gr_set_acls(const int type)
7904 +{
7905 +       return 0;
7906 +}
7907 +
7908 +int
7909 +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
7910 +{
7911 +       return 0;
7912 +}
7913 +
7914 +int
7915 +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
7916 +{
7917 +       return 0;
7918 +}
7919 +
7920 +__inline__ void
7921 +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
7922 +{
7923 +       return;
7924 +}
7925 +
7926 +void
7927 +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7928 +{
7929 +       return;
7930 +}
7931 +
7932 +void
7933 +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev)
7934 +{
7935 +       return;
7936 +}
7937 +
7938 +void
7939 +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
7940 +{
7941 +       return;
7942 +}
7943 +
7944 +void
7945 +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
7946 +{
7947 +       return;
7948 +}
7949 +
7950 +int
7951 +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
7952 +{
7953 +       return 0;
7954 +}
7955 +
7956 +int
7957 +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
7958 +{
7959 +       return 0;
7960 +}
7961 +
7962 +int
7963 +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
7964 +                struct dentry *old_dentry,
7965 +                struct dentry *new_dentry,
7966 +                struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
7967 +{
7968 +       return 0;
7969 +}
7970 +
7971 +int
7972 +gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
7973 +{
7974 +       return 1;
7975 +}
7976 +
7977 +int
7978 +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
7979 +                     const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
7980 +{
7981 +       return 1;
7982 +}
7983 +
7984 +int
7985 +gr_is_capable(const int cap)
7986 +{
7987 +       return 1;
7988 +}
7989 +
7990 +void
7991 +gr_handle_alertkill(void)
7992 +{
7993 +       return;
7994 +}
7995 +
7996 +__u32
7997 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
7998 +{
7999 +       return 1;
8000 +}
8001 +
8002 +__u32
8003 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
8004 +                         const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8005 +{
8006 +       return 1;
8007 +}
8008 +
8009 +__u32
8010 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
8011 +                  const int fmode)
8012 +{
8013 +       return 1;
8014 +}
8015 +
8016 +__u32
8017 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8018 +{
8019 +       return 1;
8020 +}
8021 +
8022 +__u32
8023 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8024 +{
8025 +       return 1;
8026 +}
8027 +
8028 +int
8029 +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
8030 +                  unsigned int *vm_flags)
8031 +{
8032 +       return 1;
8033 +}
8034 +
8035 +__u32
8036 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
8037 +                      const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8038 +{
8039 +       return 1;
8040 +}
8041 +
8042 +__u32
8043 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8044 +{
8045 +       return 1;
8046 +}
8047 +
8048 +__u32
8049 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
8050 +                    const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
8051 +{
8052 +       return 1;
8053 +}
8054 +
8055 +__u32
8056 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
8057 +                    mode_t mode)
8058 +{
8059 +       return 1;
8060 +}
8061 +
8062 +__u32
8063 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
8064 +                   mode_t mode)
8065 +{
8066 +       return 1;
8067 +}
8068 +
8069 +__u32
8070 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8071 +{
8072 +       return 1;
8073 +}
8074 +
8075 +void
8076 +grsecurity_init(void)
8077 +{
8078 +       return;
8079 +}
8080 +
8081 +__u32
8082 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
8083 +                   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
8084 +                   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
8085 +                   const int mode)
8086 +{
8087 +       return 1;
8088 +}
8089 +
8090 +__u32
8091 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
8092 +                   const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
8093 +                   const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
8094 +{
8095 +       return 1;
8096 +}
8097 +
8098 +__u32
8099 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
8100 +                     const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
8101 +                     const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
8102 +{
8103 +       return 1;
8104 +}
8105 +
8106 +__u32
8107 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
8108 +                  const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
8109 +                  const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
8110 +                  const struct dentry * old_dentry,
8111 +                  const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
8112 +{
8113 +       return 1;
8114 +}
8115 +
8116 +int
8117 +gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
8118 +                    const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
8119 +                    const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
8120 +                    const struct dentry *old_dentry,
8121 +                    const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
8122 +                    const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
8123 +{
8124 +       return 1;
8125 +}
8126 +
8127 +__u32
8128 +gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry * dentry,
8129 +                     const struct vfsmount * mnt, const ino_t ino)
8130 +{
8131 +       return 1;
8132 +}
8133 +
8134 +int
8135 +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
8136 +               const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
8137 +{
8138 +       return 1;
8139 +}
8140 +
8141 +int
8142 +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
8143 +{
8144 +       return 1;
8145 +}
8146 +
8147 +int
8148 +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
8149 +{
8150 +       return 1;
8151 +}
8152 +
8153 +__u32
8154 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
8155 +{
8156 +       return 1;
8157 +}
8158 +
8159 +__u32
8160 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
8161 +                   const struct dentry * p_dentry,
8162 +                   const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
8163 +                   const int imode)
8164 +{
8165 +       return 1;
8166 +}
8167 +
8168 +void
8169 +gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
8170 +{
8171 +       return;
8172 +}
8173 +
8174 +int
8175 +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
8176 +{
8177 +       return 1;
8178 +}
8179 +
8180 +void
8181 +gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
8182 +{
8183 +       return;
8184 +}
8185 +
8186 +int
8187 +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
8188 +{
8189 +       return 0;
8190 +}
8191 +
8192 +int
8193 +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
8194 +{
8195 +       return 1;
8196 +}
8197 +
8198 +int
8199 +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
8200 +{
8201 +       return 1;
8202 +}
8203 +
8204 +void
8205 +gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
8206 +{
8207 +       return;
8208 +}
8209 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
8210 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8211 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8212 @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
8213 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8214 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8215 +#include <linux/file.h>
8216 +#include <linux/fs.h>
8217 +#include <linux/types.h>
8218 +#include <linux/grdefs.h>
8219 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8220 +#include <linux/capability.h>
8221 +
8222 +#include <asm/uaccess.h>
8223 +
8224 +int
8225 +gr_handle_nproc(void)
8226 +{
8227 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8228 +       if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
8229 +           (atomic_read(&current->user->processes) >
8230 +            current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
8231 +           !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
8232 +               security_alert(GR_NPROC_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8233 +               return -EAGAIN;
8234 +       }
8235 +#endif
8236 +       return 0;
8237 +}
8238 +
8239 +void
8240 +gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv)
8241 +{
8242 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
8243 +       char grarg[64] = { 0 };
8244 +       __u8 execlen = 0;
8245 +       unsigned int i;
8246 +
8247 +       if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
8248 +              in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
8249 +             || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
8250 +               return;
8251 +
8252 +       if (unlikely(!argv))
8253 +               goto log;
8254 +
8255 +       for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 62; i++) {
8256 +               char *p;
8257 +               __u8 len;
8258 +
8259 +               if (get_user(p, argv + i))
8260 +                       goto log;
8261 +               if (!p)
8262 +                       goto log;
8263 +               len = strnlen_user(p, 62 - execlen);
8264 +               if (len > 62 - execlen)
8265 +                       len = 62 - execlen;
8266 +               else if (len > 0)
8267 +                       len--;
8268 +               if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
8269 +                       goto log;
8270 +               execlen += len;
8271 +               *(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
8272 +               *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
8273 +               execlen++;
8274 +       }
8275 +
8276 +      log:
8277 +       security_audit(GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(bprm->file->f_dentry,
8278 +                                                        bprm->file->f_vfsmnt),
8279 +                      grarg, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8280 +#endif
8281 +       return;
8282 +}
8283 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
8284 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8285 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8286 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
8287 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8288 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8289 +#include <linux/fs.h>
8290 +#include <linux/file.h>
8291 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8292 +
8293 +int
8294 +gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
8295 +              const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
8296 +{
8297 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8298 +       if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
8299 +           !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
8300 +           (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
8301 +           (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
8302 +               if (!permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode))
8303 +                       security_alert(GR_FIFO_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
8304 +                                      dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
8305 +                                      dentry->d_inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8306 +               return -EACCES;
8307 +       }
8308 +#endif
8309 +       return 0;
8310 +}
8311 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
8312 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8313 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8314 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
8315 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8316 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8317 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8318 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8319 +
8320 +void
8321 +gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
8322 +{
8323 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
8324 +       if (grsec_enable_forkfail)
8325 +               security_alert(GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8326 +#endif
8327 +       return;
8328 +}
8329 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
8330 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8331 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8332 @@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
8333 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8334 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8335 +#include <linux/mm.h>
8336 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
8337 +
8338 +int grsec_enable_link;
8339 +int grsec_enable_dmesg;
8340 +int grsec_enable_fifo;
8341 +int grsec_enable_execve;
8342 +int grsec_enable_execlog;
8343 +int grsec_enable_signal;
8344 +int grsec_enable_forkfail;
8345 +int grsec_enable_time;
8346 +int grsec_enable_group;
8347 +int grsec_audit_gid;
8348 +int grsec_enable_chdir;
8349 +int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
8350 +int grsec_enable_mount;
8351 +int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
8352 +int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
8353 +int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
8354 +int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
8355 +int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
8356 +int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
8357 +int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
8358 +int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
8359 +int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
8360 +int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
8361 +int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
8362 +int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
8363 +int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
8364 +int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
8365 +int grsec_enable_tpe;
8366 +int grsec_tpe_gid;
8367 +int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
8368 +int grsec_enable_randpid;
8369 +int grsec_enable_randid;
8370 +int grsec_enable_randisn;
8371 +int grsec_enable_randsrc;
8372 +int grsec_enable_randrpc;
8373 +int grsec_enable_randping;
8374 +int grsec_enable_socket_all;
8375 +int grsec_socket_all_gid;
8376 +int grsec_enable_socket_client;
8377 +int grsec_socket_client_gid;
8378 +int grsec_enable_socket_server;
8379 +int grsec_socket_server_gid;
8380 +int grsec_lock;
8381 +
8382 +spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
8383 +unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
8384 +unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
8385 +
8386 +spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
8387 +unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime = 0;
8388 +unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0;
8389 +
8390 +spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
8391 +
8392 +char *gr_shared_page[2][NR_CPUS];
8393 +
8394 +extern void arc4_init(void);
8395 +
8396 +void
8397 +grsecurity_init(void)
8398 +{
8399 +       int i, j;
8400 +       /* create the per-cpu shared pages */
8401 +
8402 +       for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
8403 +               for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) {
8404 +                       gr_shared_page[j][i] = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
8405 +                       if (!gr_shared_page[j][i]) {
8406 +                               panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
8407 +                               return;
8408 +                       }
8409 +               }
8410 +       }
8411 +
8412 +       arc4_init();
8413 +
8414 +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
8415 +       grsec_lock = 1;
8416 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
8417 +       grsec_enable_group = 1;
8418 +       grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
8419 +#endif
8420 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
8421 +       grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
8422 +#endif
8423 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8424 +       grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
8425 +#endif
8426 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8427 +       grsec_enable_mount = 1;
8428 +#endif
8429 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
8430 +       grsec_enable_link = 1;
8431 +#endif
8432 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
8433 +       grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
8434 +#endif
8435 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8436 +       grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
8437 +#endif
8438 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8439 +       grsec_enable_execve = 1;
8440 +#endif
8441 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
8442 +       grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
8443 +#endif
8444 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
8445 +       grsec_enable_signal = 1;
8446 +#endif
8447 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
8448 +       grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
8449 +#endif
8450 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
8451 +       grsec_enable_time = 1;
8452 +#endif
8453 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
8454 +       grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
8455 +#endif
8456 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
8457 +       grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
8458 +#endif
8459 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
8460 +       grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
8461 +#endif
8462 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
8463 +       grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
8464 +#endif
8465 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
8466 +       grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
8467 +#endif
8468 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
8469 +       grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
8470 +#endif
8471 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
8472 +       grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
8473 +#endif
8474 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
8475 +       grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
8476 +#endif
8477 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
8478 +       grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
8479 +#endif
8480 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
8481 +       grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
8482 +#endif
8483 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
8484 +       grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
8485 +#endif
8486 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
8487 +       grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
8488 +#endif
8489 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
8490 +       grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
8491 +#endif
8492 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
8493 +       grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
8494 +#endif
8495 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
8496 +       grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
8497 +       grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
8498 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
8499 +       grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
8500 +#endif
8501 +#endif
8502 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8503 +       grsec_enable_randpid = 1;
8504 +#endif
8505 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
8506 +       grsec_enable_randid = 1;
8507 +#endif
8508 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
8509 +       grsec_enable_randisn = 1;
8510 +#endif
8511 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
8512 +       grsec_enable_randsrc = 1;
8513 +#endif
8514 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
8515 +       grsec_enable_randrpc = 1;
8516 +#endif
8517 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
8518 +       grsec_enable_randping = 1;
8519 +#endif
8520 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
8521 +       grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
8522 +       grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
8523 +#endif
8524 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
8525 +       grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
8526 +       grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
8527 +#endif
8528 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
8529 +       grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
8530 +       grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
8531 +#endif
8532 +#endif
8533 +
8534 +       return;
8535 +}
8536 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
8537 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8538 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8539 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
8540 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8541 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8542 +#include <linux/types.h>
8543 +#include <linux/ipc.h>
8544 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8545 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8546 +
8547 +void
8548 +gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
8549 +{
8550 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8551 +       if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8552 +             grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
8553 +                                         !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
8554 +           && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
8555 +               security_audit(GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8556 +#endif
8557 +       return;
8558 +}
8559 +
8560 +void
8561 +gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
8562 +{
8563 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8564 +       if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8565 +            grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
8566 +           (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
8567 +               security_audit(GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8568 +#endif
8569 +       return;
8570 +}
8571 +
8572 +void
8573 +gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
8574 +{
8575 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8576 +       if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8577 +             grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
8578 +                                         !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
8579 +           && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
8580 +               security_audit(GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8581 +#endif
8582 +       return;
8583 +}
8584 +
8585 +void
8586 +gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
8587 +{
8588 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8589 +       if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8590 +            grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
8591 +           (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
8592 +               security_audit(GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8593 +#endif
8594 +       return;
8595 +}
8596 +
8597 +void
8598 +gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
8599 +{
8600 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8601 +       if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8602 +             grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
8603 +                                         !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
8604 +           && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
8605 +               security_audit(GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8606 +#endif
8607 +       return;
8608 +}
8609 +
8610 +void
8611 +gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
8612 +{
8613 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8614 +       if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
8615 +            grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
8616 +           (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
8617 +               security_audit(GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8618 +#endif
8619 +       return;
8620 +}
8621 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
8622 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8623 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8624 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
8625 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8626 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8627 +#include <linux/fs.h>
8628 +#include <linux/file.h>
8629 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8630 +
8631 +int
8632 +gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
8633 +                     const struct inode *inode,
8634 +                     const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
8635 +{
8636 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
8637 +       if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
8638 +           (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
8639 +           (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
8640 +               security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
8641 +                              inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8642 +               return -EACCES;
8643 +       }
8644 +#endif
8645 +       return 0;
8646 +}
8647 +
8648 +int
8649 +gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
8650 +                  const struct vfsmount *mnt,
8651 +                  struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
8652 +{
8653 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
8654 +       if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
8655 +           (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
8656 +            ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
8657 +            (permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) &&
8658 +           !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
8659 +               security_alert(GR_HARDLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt),
8660 +                              inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8661 +               return -EPERM;
8662 +       }
8663 +#endif
8664 +       return 0;
8665 +}
8666 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
8667 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8668 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8669 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
8670 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8671 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8672 +#include <linux/mm.h>
8673 +#include <linux/mman.h>
8674 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8675 +
8676 +void
8677 +gr_handle_ioperm(void)
8678 +{
8679 +       security_alert(GR_IOPERM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8680 +       return;
8681 +}
8682 +
8683 +void
8684 +gr_handle_iopl(void)
8685 +{
8686 +       security_alert(GR_IOPL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8687 +       return;
8688 +}
8689 +
8690 +void
8691 +gr_handle_mem_write(void)
8692 +{
8693 +       security_alert(GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8694 +       return;
8695 +}
8696 +
8697 +void
8698 +gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
8699 +{
8700 +       security_alert(GR_KMEM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8701 +       return;
8702 +}
8703 +
8704 +void
8705 +gr_handle_open_port(void)
8706 +{
8707 +       security_alert(GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8708 +       return;
8709 +}
8710 +
8711 +int
8712 +gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
8713 +{
8714 +       if (offset < __pa(high_memory) &&
8715 +           (pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) & PROT_WRITE) &&
8716 +           (offset != 0xa0000 || ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) > 0x20000))) {
8717 +               security_alert(GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8718 +               return -EPERM;
8719 +       } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory))
8720 +               vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
8721 +
8722 +       return 0;
8723 +}
8724 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
8725 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c       1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8726 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c       2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8727 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
8728 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8729 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8730 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8731 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8732 +
8733 +void
8734 +gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
8735 +{
8736 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8737 +       if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
8738 +               security_audit(GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8739 +#endif
8740 +       return;
8741 +}
8742 +
8743 +void
8744 +gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
8745 +{
8746 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8747 +       if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
8748 +               security_audit(GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8749 +#endif
8750 +       return;
8751 +}
8752 +
8753 +void
8754 +gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
8755 +{
8756 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8757 +       if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
8758 +               security_audit(GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8759 +#endif
8760 +       return;
8761 +}
8762 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c
8763 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8764 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8765 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
8766 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8767 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8768 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
8769 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8770 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8771 +
8772 +extern int last_pid;
8773 +
8774 +int
8775 +gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock)
8776 +{
8777 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8778 +       struct task_struct *p;
8779 +       int pid;
8780 +
8781 +       if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) {
8782 +               read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
8783 +               spin_lock(pid_lock);
8784 +
8785 +             repeater:
8786 +
8787 +               pid = 1 + (arc4random() % PID_MAX);
8788 +
8789 +               for_each_task(p) {
8790 +                       if (p->pid == pid || p->pgrp == pid ||
8791 +                           p->tgid == pid || p->session == pid)
8792 +                               goto repeater;
8793 +               }
8794 +               last_pid = pid;
8795 +               spin_unlock(pid_lock);
8796 +               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
8797 +               return pid;
8798 +       }
8799 +#endif
8800 +       return 0;
8801 +}
8802 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
8803 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8804 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8805 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
8806 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8807 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8808 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8809 +
8810 +void
8811 +gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
8812 +{
8813 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
8814 +       if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
8815 +                                   (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
8816 +               if (t->pid == current->pid) {
8817 +                       security_alert_good(GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig,
8818 +                                           DEFAULTSECARGS);
8819 +               } else {
8820 +                       security_alert_good(GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, sig, t->comm,
8821 +                                           t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->gid,
8822 +                                           t->egid, t->p_pptr->comm,
8823 +                                           t->p_pptr->pid, t->p_pptr->uid,
8824 +                                           t->p_pptr->euid, t->p_pptr->gid,
8825 +                                           t->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8826 +               }
8827 +       }
8828 +#endif
8829 +       return;
8830 +}
8831 +
8832 +int
8833 +gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
8834 +{
8835 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
8836 +       if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
8837 +               security_alert(GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, sig, p->comm, p->pid, p->uid,
8838 +                              p->euid, p->gid, p->egid, p->p_pptr->comm,
8839 +                              p->p_pptr->pid, p->p_pptr->uid,
8840 +                              p->p_pptr->euid, p->p_pptr->gid,
8841 +                              p->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8842 +               return -EPERM;
8843 +       } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) {
8844 +               return -EPERM;
8845 +       }
8846 +#endif
8847 +       return 0;
8848 +}
8849 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
8850 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8851 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8852 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
8853 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8854 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8855 +#include <linux/file.h>
8856 +#include <linux/net.h>
8857 +#include <net/sock.h>
8858 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8859 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8860 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
8861 +
8862 +void
8863 +gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
8864 +{
8865 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
8866 +       struct task_struct *p;
8867 +       unsigned int i;
8868 +       struct inode *inode;
8869 +       struct file *filp;
8870 +       struct socket *connect_sock;
8871 +
8872 +       if (unlikely(sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
8873 +               return;
8874 +
8875 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
8876 +       for_each_task(p) {
8877 +               if (!p->used_connect)
8878 +                       continue;
8879 +               task_lock(p);
8880 +               if (unlikely(!p->files)) {
8881 +                       task_unlock(p);
8882 +                       continue;
8883 +               }
8884 +               read_lock(&p->files->file_lock);
8885 +               for (i = 0; i < p->files->max_fds; i++) {
8886 +                       filp = fcheck_files(p->files, i);
8887 +                       if (likely(!filp))
8888 +                               continue;
8889 +                       inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode;
8890 +                       if (likely(!inode || !inode->i_sock))
8891 +                               continue;
8892 +                       connect_sock = &inode->u.socket_i;
8893 +                       if (unlikely(!connect_sock ||
8894 +                                    connect_sock->sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
8895 +                               continue;
8896 +                       if (unlikely(sk->rcv_saddr == connect_sock->sk->daddr &&
8897 +                                    sk->daddr == connect_sock->sk->rcv_saddr &&
8898 +                                    ntohs(sk->sport) ==
8899 +                                    ntohs(connect_sock->sk->dport)
8900 +                                    && ntohs(sk->dport) ==
8901 +                                    ntohs(connect_sock->sk->sport))) {
8902 +                               current->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
8903 +                               current->used_accept = 1;
8904 +                               read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock);
8905 +                               task_unlock(p);
8906 +                               read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
8907 +                               return;
8908 +                       }
8909 +               }
8910 +               read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock);
8911 +               task_unlock(p);
8912 +       }
8913 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
8914 +
8915 +       current->curr_ip = sk->daddr;
8916 +       current->used_accept = 1;
8917 +#endif
8918 +       return;
8919 +}
8920 +
8921 +int
8922 +gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
8923 +{
8924 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
8925 +       if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
8926 +           (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
8927 +               security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, family, type, protocol,
8928 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
8929 +               return -EACCES;
8930 +       }
8931 +#endif
8932 +       return 0;
8933 +}
8934 +
8935 +int
8936 +gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
8937 +{
8938 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
8939 +       if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
8940 +           in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
8941 +           sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
8942 +           (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
8943 +               security_alert(GR_BIND_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8944 +               return -EACCES;
8945 +       }
8946 +#endif
8947 +       return 0;
8948 +}
8949 +
8950 +int
8951 +gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
8952 +{
8953 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
8954 +       if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
8955 +           sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
8956 +           (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
8957 +               security_alert(GR_CONNECT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8958 +               return -EACCES;
8959 +       }
8960 +#endif
8961 +       return 0;
8962 +}
8963 +
8964 +__u32
8965 +gr_cap_rtnetlink(void)
8966 +{
8967 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
8968 +       if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
8969 +               return current->cap_effective;
8970 +       else
8971 +               return (current->cap_effective & ~(current->acl->cap_lower));
8972 +#else
8973 +       return current->cap_effective;
8974 +#endif
8975 +}
8976 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
8977 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c      1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8978 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c      2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8979 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
8980 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
8981 +#include <linux/sched.h>
8982 +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
8983 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
8984 +
8985 +int
8986 +gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
8987 +{
8988 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
8989 +       if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
8990 +               security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name, DEFAULTSECARGS);
8991 +               return -EACCES;
8992 +       }
8993 +#endif
8994 +       return 0;
8995 +}
8996 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
8997 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8998 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c        2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
8999 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
9000 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
9001 +#include <linux/sched.h>
9002 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
9003 +
9004 +void
9005 +gr_log_timechange(void)
9006 +{
9007 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
9008 +       if (grsec_enable_time)
9009 +               security_alert_good(GR_TIME_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS);
9010 +#endif
9011 +       return;
9012 +}
9013 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
9014 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9015 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
9016 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
9017 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
9018 +#include <linux/sched.h>
9019 +#include <linux/file.h>
9020 +#include <linux/fs.h>
9021 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
9022 +
9023 +int
9024 +gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
9025 +{
9026 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
9027 +       struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
9028 +
9029 +       if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid) &&
9030 +           (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
9031 +                                               (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
9032 +               security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
9033 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
9034 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
9035 +               return 0;
9036 +       }
9037 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
9038 +       if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
9039 +           ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
9040 +            (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
9041 +               security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG,
9042 +                              gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt),
9043 +                              DEFAULTSECARGS);
9044 +               return 0;
9045 +       }
9046 +#endif
9047 +#endif
9048 +       return 1;
9049 +}
9050 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c
9051 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c     1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9052 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c     2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
9053 @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
9054 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
9055 +#include <linux/sched.h>
9056 +#include <linux/gracl.h>
9057 +
9058 +/* digest-sha256.c,v 1.13 2002/10/02 22:02:08 hvr Exp $
9059 + *
9060 + * SHA-256 code by Jean-Luc Cooke <jlcooke@certainkey.com>.
9061 + *
9062 + * Glue code originally by Andrew McDonald and Alan Smithee, mailed
9063 + * to maintainer on pulped trees.
9064 + *
9065 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
9066 + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
9067 + * Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any
9068 + * later version.
9069 + *
9070 + */
9071 +
9072 +typedef struct {
9073 +       __u32 state[8];
9074 +       __u32 count[2];
9075 +       __u8 buf[128];
9076 +} sha256_ctx_t;
9077 +
9078 +static __inline__ __u32
9079 +generic_rotr32(const __u32 x, const unsigned bits)
9080 +{
9081 +       const unsigned n = bits % 32;
9082 +       return (x >> n) | (x << (32 - n));
9083 +}
9084 +
9085 +#define Ch(x,y,z)   ((x & y) ^ (~x & z))
9086 +#define Maj(x,y,z)  ((x & y) ^ ( x & z) ^ (y & z))
9087 +#define RORu32(x,y) generic_rotr32(x, y)
9088 +#define e0(x)       (RORu32(x, 2) ^ RORu32(x,13) ^ RORu32(x,22))
9089 +#define e1(x)       (RORu32(x, 6) ^ RORu32(x,11) ^ RORu32(x,25))
9090 +#define s0(x)       (RORu32(x, 7) ^ RORu32(x,18) ^ (x >> 3))
9091 +#define s1(x)       (RORu32(x,17) ^ RORu32(x,19) ^ (x >> 10))
9092 +
9093 +#define H0         0x6a09e667
9094 +#define H1         0xbb67ae85
9095 +#define H2         0x3c6ef372
9096 +#define H3         0xa54ff53a
9097 +#define H4         0x510e527f
9098 +#define H5         0x9b05688c
9099 +#define H6         0x1f83d9ab
9100 +#define H7         0x5be0cd19
9101 +
9102 +const static __u32 sha256_K[64] = {
9103 +       0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5,
9104 +       0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,
9105 +       0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3,
9106 +       0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,
9107 +       0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc,
9108 +       0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
9109 +       0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7,
9110 +       0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,
9111 +       0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13,
9112 +       0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,
9113 +       0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3,
9114 +       0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
9115 +       0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5,
9116 +       0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,
9117 +       0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208,
9118 +       0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2
9119 +};
9120 +
9121 +#define LOAD_OP(I)\
9122 + {\
9123 +  t1  = input[(4*I)  ] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\
9124 +  t1 |= input[(4*I)+1] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\
9125 +  t1 |= input[(4*I)+2] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\
9126 +  t1 |= input[(4*I)+3] & 0xff;\
9127 +  W[I] = t1;\
9128 + }
9129 +
9130 +#define BLEND_OP(I) W[I] = s1(W[I-2]) + W[I-7] + s0(W[I-15]) + W[I-16];
9131 +
9132 +static void
9133 +SHA256Transform(__u32 * state, const __u8 * input)
9134 +{
9135 +       __u32 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2;
9136 +       __u32 W[64];
9137 +
9138 +       int i;
9139 +
9140 +       /* load the input */
9141 +       LOAD_OP(0);
9142 +       LOAD_OP(1);
9143 +       LOAD_OP(2);
9144 +       LOAD_OP(3);
9145 +       LOAD_OP(4);
9146 +       LOAD_OP(5);
9147 +       LOAD_OP(6);
9148 +       LOAD_OP(7);
9149 +       LOAD_OP(8);
9150 +       LOAD_OP(9);
9151 +       LOAD_OP(10);
9152 +       LOAD_OP(11);
9153 +       LOAD_OP(12);
9154 +       LOAD_OP(13);
9155 +       LOAD_OP(14);
9156 +       LOAD_OP(15);
9157 +
9158 +       /* now blend */
9159 +       for (i = 16; i < 64; i += 8) {
9160 +               BLEND_OP(i);
9161 +               BLEND_OP(i + 1);
9162 +               BLEND_OP(i + 2);
9163 +               BLEND_OP(i + 3);
9164 +               BLEND_OP(i + 4);
9165 +               BLEND_OP(i + 5);
9166 +               BLEND_OP(i + 6);
9167 +               BLEND_OP(i + 7);
9168 +       }
9169 +
9170 +       /* load the state into our registers */
9171 +       a = state[0];
9172 +       b = state[1];
9173 +       c = state[2];
9174 +       d = state[3];
9175 +       e = state[4];
9176 +       f = state[5];
9177 +       g = state[6];
9178 +       h = state[7];
9179 +
9180 +       /* now iterate */
9181 +       for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 8) {
9182 +               t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + sha256_K[i] + W[i];
9183 +               t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
9184 +               d += t1;
9185 +               h = t1 + t2;
9186 +               t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + sha256_K[i + 1] + W[i + 1];
9187 +               t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b);
9188 +               c += t1;
9189 +               g = t1 + t2;
9190 +               t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + sha256_K[i + 2] + W[i + 2];
9191 +               t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a);
9192 +               b += t1;
9193 +               f = t1 + t2;
9194 +               t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + sha256_K[i + 3] + W[i + 3];
9195 +               t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h);
9196 +               a += t1;
9197 +               e = t1 + t2;
9198 +               t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + sha256_K[i + 4] + W[i + 4];
9199 +               t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g);
9200 +               h += t1;
9201 +               d = t1 + t2;
9202 +               t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + sha256_K[i + 5] + W[i + 5];
9203 +               t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f);
9204 +               g += t1;
9205 +               c = t1 + t2;
9206 +               t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + sha256_K[i + 6] + W[i + 6];
9207 +               t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e);
9208 +               f += t1;
9209 +               b = t1 + t2;
9210 +               t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + sha256_K[i + 7] + W[i + 7];
9211 +               t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d);
9212 +               e += t1;
9213 +               a = t1 + t2;
9214 +       }
9215 +
9216 +       state[0] += a;
9217 +       state[1] += b;
9218 +       state[2] += c;
9219 +       state[3] += d;
9220 +       state[4] += e;
9221 +       state[5] += f;
9222 +       state[6] += g;
9223 +       state[7] += h;
9224 +
9225 +       /* clear any sensitive info... */
9226 +       a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = t1 = t2 = 0;
9227 +       memset(W, 0, 64 * sizeof (__u32));
9228 +}
9229 +
9230 +static void
9231 +SHA256Init(sha256_ctx_t * C)
9232 +{
9233 +       C->state[0] = H0;
9234 +       C->state[1] = H1;
9235 +       C->state[2] = H2;
9236 +       C->state[3] = H3;
9237 +       C->state[4] = H4;
9238 +       C->state[5] = H5;
9239 +       C->state[6] = H6;
9240 +       C->state[7] = H7;
9241 +       C->count[0] = C->count[1] = 0;
9242 +       memset(C->buf, 0, 128);
9243 +}
9244 +
9245 +static void
9246 +SHA256Update(sha256_ctx_t * C, const __u8 * input, __u32 inputLen)
9247 +{
9248 +       __u32 i, index, partLen;
9249 +
9250 +       /* Compute number of bytes mod 128 */
9251 +       index = (__u32) ((C->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
9252 +
9253 +       /* Update number of bits */
9254 +       if ((C->count[0] += (inputLen << 3)) < (inputLen << 3)) {
9255 +               C->count[1]++;
9256 +               C->count[1] += (inputLen >> 29);
9257 +       }
9258 +
9259 +       partLen = 64 - index;
9260 +
9261 +       /* Transform as many times as possible. */
9262 +       if (inputLen >= partLen) {
9263 +               memcpy(&C->buf[index], input, partLen);
9264 +               SHA256Transform(C->state, C->buf);
9265 +
9266 +               for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64)
9267 +                       SHA256Transform(C->state, &input[i]);
9268 +               index = 0;
9269 +       } else {
9270 +               i = 0;
9271 +       }
9272 +
9273 +       /* Buffer remaining input */
9274 +       memcpy(&C->buf[index], &input[i], inputLen - i);
9275 +}
9276 +
9277 +static void
9278 +SHA256Final(sha256_ctx_t * C, __u8 * digest)
9279 +{
9280 +       const static __u8 padding[64] = { 0x80, };
9281 +       __u8 bits[8];
9282 +       __u32 t, index, padLen;
9283 +       int i, j;
9284 +
9285 +       /* Save number of bits */
9286 +       t = C->count[0];
9287 +       bits[7] = t;
9288 +       t >>= 8;
9289 +       bits[6] = t;
9290 +       t >>= 8;
9291 +       bits[5] = t;
9292 +       t >>= 8;
9293 +       bits[4] = t;
9294 +       t = C->count[1];
9295 +       bits[3] = t;
9296 +       t >>= 8;
9297 +       bits[2] = t;
9298 +       t >>= 8;
9299 +       bits[1] = t;
9300 +       t >>= 8;
9301 +       bits[0] = t;
9302 +
9303 +       /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
9304 +       index = (C->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f;
9305 +       padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64 + 56) - index);
9306 +       SHA256Update(C, padding, padLen);
9307 +
9308 +       /* Append length (before padding) */
9309 +       SHA256Update(C, bits, sizeof (bits));
9310 +
9311 +       /* Store state in digest */
9312 +       for (i = j = 0; i < 8; i++, j += 4) {
9313 +               t = C->state[i];
9314 +               digest[j + 3] = t;
9315 +               t >>= 8;
9316 +               digest[j + 2] = t;
9317 +               t >>= 8;
9318 +               digest[j + 1] = t;
9319 +               t >>= 8;
9320 +               digest[j] = t;
9321 +       }
9322 +
9323 +       /* Zeroize sensitive information. */
9324 +       memset(C, 0, sizeof (sha256_ctx_t));
9325 +}
9326 +
9327 +int
9328 +chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
9329 +{
9330 +       sha256_ctx_t context;
9331 +       unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
9332 +       volatile int retval = 0;
9333 +       volatile int dummy = 0;
9334 +       unsigned int i;
9335 +
9336 +       SHA256Init(&context);
9337 +       SHA256Update(&context, salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
9338 +       SHA256Update(&context, entry->pw, strlen(entry->pw));
9339 +       SHA256Final(&context, temp_sum);
9340 +
9341 +       memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
9342 +
9343 +       for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
9344 +               if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
9345 +                       retval = 1;
9346 +               else
9347 +                       dummy = 1;      // waste a cycle
9348 +
9349 +       return retval;
9350 +}
9351 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c
9352 --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9353 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400
9354 @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
9355 +
9356 +/*
9357 + * Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 2000-2002 Michael Shalayeff.
9358 + *
9359 + * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99
9360 + *
9361 + * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999.
9362 + * All rights reserved.
9363 + *
9364 + * Copyright 1998 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
9365 + * All rights reserved.
9366 + * Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org> came up with the idea of using
9367 + * such a mathematical system to generate more random (yet non-repeating)
9368 + * ids to solve the resolver/named problem.  But Niels designed the
9369 + * actual system based on the constraints.
9370 + *
9371 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9372 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9373 + * are met:
9374 + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9375 + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer,
9376 + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
9377 + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
9378 + *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
9379 + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
9380 + *    must display the following acknowledgement:
9381 + *    This product includes software developed by Niels Provos.
9382 + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
9383 + *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
9384 + *
9385 + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
9386 + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
9387 + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
9388 + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
9389 + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
9390 + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
9391 + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
9392 + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
9393 + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
9394 + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
9395 + */
9396 +
9397 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
9398 +#include <linux/sched.h>
9399 +#include <linux/timer.h>
9400 +#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
9401 +#include <linux/random.h>
9402 +
9403 +#define RU_OUT 180
9404 +#define RU_MAX 30000
9405 +#define RU_GEN 2
9406 +#define RU_N 32749
9407 +#define RU_AGEN 7
9408 +#define RU_M 31104
9409 +#define PFAC_N 3
9410 +const static __u16 pfacts[PFAC_N] = { 2, 3, 2729 };
9411 +
9412 +static __u16 ru_x;
9413 +static __u16 ru_seed, ru_seed2;
9414 +static __u16 ru_a, ru_b;
9415 +static __u16 ru_g;
9416 +static __u16 ru_counter = 0;
9417 +static __u16 ru_msb = 0;
9418 +static unsigned long ru_reseed = 0;
9419 +static __u32 tmp;
9420 +
9421 +static struct arc4_stream {
9422 +       __u8 s[256];
9423 +       unsigned int cnt;
9424 +       __u8 i;
9425 +       __u8 j;
9426 +} arc4random_state[NR_CPUS];
9427 +
9428 +#define TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS      15
9429 +#define TCP_RNDISS_OUT         7200
9430 +#define TCP_RNDISS_MAX         30000
9431 +
9432 +static __u8 tcp_rndiss_sbox[NR_CPUS][128];
9433 +static __u16 tcp_rndiss_msb[NR_CPUS];
9434 +static __u16 tcp_rndiss_cnt[NR_CPUS];
9435 +static unsigned long tcp_rndiss_reseed[NR_CPUS];
9436 +
9437 +static unsigned long arc4random_reseed[NR_CPUS];
9438 +
9439 +static int arc4random_initialized[NR_CPUS];
9440 +
9441 +static __u16 pmod(__u16, __u16, __u16);
9442 +static void ip_initid(void);
9443 +__u16 ip_randomid(void);
9444 +
9445 +static __inline__ __u8 arc4_getbyte(void);
9446 +static __inline__ void arc4_stir(void);
9447 +static void arc4maybeinit(void);
9448 +__u32 arc4random(void);
9449 +
9450 +static __inline__ __u8
9451 +arc4_getbyte(void)
9452 +{
9453 +       register __u8 si, sj;
9454 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9455 +
9456 +       arc4random_state[cpu].cnt++;
9457 +       arc4random_state[cpu].i++;
9458 +       si = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i];
9459 +       arc4random_state[cpu].j += si;
9460 +       sj = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j];
9461 +       arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i] = sj;
9462 +       arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j] = si;
9463 +       return arc4random_state[cpu].s[(si + sj) & 0xff];
9464 +}
9465 +
9466 +static __inline__ void
9467 +arc4_stir(void)
9468 +{
9469 +       __u8 buf[256];
9470 +       register __u8 si;
9471 +       register int n;
9472 +       int len = sizeof (buf);
9473 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9474 +       unsigned long flags;
9475 +
9476 +       do_gettimeofday((struct timeval *) buf);
9477 +       get_random_bytes(buf + sizeof (struct timeval),
9478 +                        len - sizeof (struct timeval));
9479 +
9480 +       save_flags(flags);
9481 +       cli();
9482 +
9483 +       arc4random_state[cpu].i--;
9484 +       for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
9485 +               arc4random_state[cpu].i++;
9486 +               si = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i];
9487 +               arc4random_state[cpu].j += si + buf[n % len];
9488 +               arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i] =
9489 +                   arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j];
9490 +               arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j] = si;
9491 +       }
9492 +       arc4random_state[cpu].j = arc4random_state[cpu].i;
9493 +       arc4random_state[cpu].cnt = 0;
9494 +
9495 +       restore_flags(flags);
9496 +
9497 +       for (n = 0; n < 256 * 4; n++)
9498 +               arc4_getbyte();
9499 +
9500 +       return;
9501 +}
9502 +
9503 +void
9504 +arc4_init(void)
9505 +{
9506 +       int i, n;
9507 +
9508 +       for (n = 0; n < NR_CPUS; n++) {
9509 +               for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
9510 +                       arc4random_state[n].s[i] = i;
9511 +               arc4random_initialized[n] = 0;
9512 +       }
9513 +}
9514 +
9515 +static void
9516 +arc4maybeinit(void)
9517 +{
9518 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9519 +
9520 +       if (arc4random_initialized[cpu] &&
9521 +           time_after(xtime.tv_sec, arc4random_reseed[cpu]))
9522 +               arc4random_initialized[cpu] = 0;
9523 +
9524 +       if (!arc4random_initialized[cpu]) {
9525 +               arc4random_initialized[cpu]++;
9526 +               arc4_stir();
9527 +               arc4random_reseed[cpu] = xtime.tv_sec + (10 * 60);
9528 +       }
9529 +}
9530 +
9531 +__u32
9532 +arc4random(void)
9533 +{
9534 +       arc4maybeinit();
9535 +       return ((arc4_getbyte() << 24) | (arc4_getbyte() << 16)
9536 +               | (arc4_getbyte() << 8) | arc4_getbyte());
9537 +}
9538 +
9539 +static __u16
9540 +pmod(__u16 gen, __u16 exp, __u16 mod)
9541 +{
9542 +       __u16 s, t, u;
9543 +
9544 +       s = 1;
9545 +       t = gen;
9546 +       u = exp;
9547 +
9548 +       while (u) {
9549 +               if (u & 1)
9550 +                       s = (s * t) % mod;
9551 +               u >>= 1;
9552 +               t = (t * t) % mod;
9553 +       }
9554 +       return (s);
9555 +}
9556 +
9557 +static void
9558 +ip_initid(void)
9559 +{
9560 +       __u16 j, i;
9561 +       int noprime = 1;
9562 +
9563 +       ru_x = ((tmp = arc4random()) & 0xFFFF) % RU_M;
9564 +
9565 +       ru_seed = (tmp >> 16) & 0x7FFF;
9566 +       ru_seed2 = arc4random() & 0x7FFF;
9567 +
9568 +       ru_b = ((tmp = arc4random()) & 0xfffe) | 1;
9569 +       ru_a = pmod(RU_AGEN, (tmp >> 16) & 0xfffe, RU_M);
9570 +       while (ru_b % 3 == 0)
9571 +               ru_b += 2;
9572 +
9573 +       j = (tmp = arc4random()) % RU_N;
9574 +       tmp = tmp >> 16;
9575 +
9576 +       while (noprime) {
9577 +               for (i = 0; i < PFAC_N; i++)
9578 +                       if (j % pfacts[i] == 0)
9579 +                               break;
9580 +
9581 +               if (i >= PFAC_N)
9582 +                       noprime = 0;
9583 +               else
9584 +                       j = (j + 1) % RU_N;
9585 +       }
9586 +
9587 +       ru_g = pmod(RU_GEN, j, RU_N);
9588 +       ru_counter = 0;
9589 +
9590 +       ru_reseed = xtime.tv_sec + RU_OUT;
9591 +       ru_msb = ru_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
9592 +}
9593 +
9594 +__u16
9595 +ip_randomid(void)
9596 +{
9597 +       int i, n;
9598 +
9599 +       if (ru_counter >= RU_MAX || time_after(xtime.tv_sec, ru_reseed))
9600 +               ip_initid();
9601 +
9602 +       if (!tmp)
9603 +               tmp = arc4random();
9604 +
9605 +       n = tmp & 0x3;
9606 +       tmp = tmp >> 2;
9607 +       if (ru_counter + n >= RU_MAX)
9608 +               ip_initid();
9609 +       for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
9610 +               ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % RU_M;
9611 +       ru_counter += i;
9612 +
9613 +       return ((ru_seed ^ pmod(ru_g, ru_seed2 ^ ru_x, RU_N)) | ru_msb);
9614 +}
9615 +
9616 +__u16
9617 +tcp_rndiss_encrypt(__u16 val)
9618 +{
9619 +       __u16 sum = 0, i;
9620 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9621 +
9622 +       for (i = 0; i < TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS; i++) {
9623 +               sum += 0x79b9;
9624 +               val ^= ((__u16) tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu][(val ^ sum) ^ 0x7f]) << 7;
9625 +               val = ((val & 0xff) << 7) | (val >> 8);
9626 +       }
9627 +
9628 +       return val;
9629 +}
9630 +
9631 +static void
9632 +tcp_rndiss_init(void)
9633 +{
9634 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9635 +
9636 +       get_random_bytes(tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu], sizeof (tcp_rndiss_sbox));
9637 +       tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu] = xtime.tv_sec + TCP_RNDISS_OUT;
9638 +       tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] = tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000;
9639 +       tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] = 0;
9640 +}
9641 +
9642 +__u32
9643 +ip_randomisn(void)
9644 +{
9645 +       int cpu = smp_processor_id();
9646 +
9647 +       if (tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] >= TCP_RNDISS_MAX ||
9648 +           time_after(xtime.tv_sec, tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu]))
9649 +               tcp_rndiss_init();
9650 +
9651 +       return (((tcp_rndiss_encrypt(tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu]++) |
9652 +                 tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu]) << 16) | (arc4random() & 0x7fff));
9653 +}
9654 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h
9655 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h     2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400
9656 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
9657 @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@
9658
9659  asmlinkage long sys_open(const char *, int, int);
9660  asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int);       /* yes, it's really unsigned */
9661 -extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start);
9662 +extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *);
9663
9664  extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
9665  extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
9666 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h
9667 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h  1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9668 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
9669 @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
9670 +#ifndef GR_ACL_H
9671 +#define GR_ACL_H
9672 +#endif
9673 +#include <linux/grdefs.h>
9674 +#include <linux/resource.h>
9675 +
9676 +#include <asm/resource.h>
9677 +
9678 +/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
9679 + * grsecurity ACL System
9680 + * Main header file
9681 + * Purpose: define most gracl data structures
9682 + * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
9683 +
9684 +/* Major status information */
9685 +
9686 +#define GR_VERSION  "grsecurity 2.0"
9687 +
9688 +enum {
9689 +
9690 +       SHUTDOWN = 0,
9691 +       ENABLE = 1,
9692 +       SPROLE = 2,
9693 +       RELOAD = 3,
9694 +       SEGVMOD = 4
9695 +};
9696 +
9697 +/* Password setup definitions
9698 + * kernel/grhash.c */
9699 +enum {
9700 +       GR_PW_LEN = 128,
9701 +       GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
9702 +       GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
9703 +};
9704 +
9705 +enum {
9706 +       GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
9707 +};
9708 +
9709 +/* Begin Data Structures */
9710 +
9711 +struct sprole_pw {
9712 +       unsigned char *rolename;
9713 +       unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
9714 +       unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];  /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
9715 +};
9716 +
9717 +struct name_entry {
9718 +       ino_t inode;
9719 +       kdev_t device;
9720 +       char *name;
9721 +};
9722 +
9723 +struct acl_role_db {
9724 +       struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
9725 +       __u32 r_size;
9726 +};
9727 +
9728 +struct name_db {
9729 +       struct name_entry **n_hash;
9730 +       __u32 n_size;
9731 +};
9732 +
9733 +struct crash_uid {
9734 +       uid_t uid;
9735 +       unsigned long expires;
9736 +};
9737 +
9738 +/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
9739 +struct acl_subject_label {
9740 +       char *filename;
9741 +       ino_t inode;
9742 +       kdev_t device;
9743 +       __u32 mode;
9744 +       __u32 cap_raise;
9745 +       __u32 cap_lower;
9746 +
9747 +       struct rlimit res[RLIM_NLIMITS + 1];
9748 +       __u16 resmask;
9749 +
9750 +       __u32 ip_proto[8];
9751 +       __u32 ip_type;
9752 +       struct acl_ip_label **ips;
9753 +       __u32 ip_num;
9754 +
9755 +       __u32 crashes;
9756 +       unsigned long expires;
9757 +
9758 +       struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
9759 +       struct acl_object_label *proc_object;
9760 +       struct acl_ip_label *ip_object;
9761 +       struct acl_subject_label *prev;
9762 +       struct acl_subject_label *next;
9763 +
9764 +       struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
9765 +       __u32 obj_hash_size;
9766 +};
9767 +
9768 +struct role_allowed_ip {
9769 +       __u32 addr;
9770 +       __u32 netmask;
9771 +
9772 +       struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
9773 +       struct role_allowed_ip *next;
9774 +};
9775 +
9776 +struct role_transition {
9777 +       char *rolename;
9778 +
9779 +       struct role_transition *prev;
9780 +       struct role_transition *next;
9781 +};
9782 +
9783 +struct acl_role_label {
9784 +       char *rolename;
9785 +       uid_t uidgid;
9786 +       __u16 roletype;
9787 +
9788 +       __u16 auth_attempts;
9789 +       unsigned long expires;
9790 +
9791 +       struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
9792 +       struct acl_subject_label *proc_subject;
9793 +
9794 +       struct acl_role_label *prev;
9795 +       struct acl_role_label *next;
9796 +
9797 +       struct role_transition *transitions;
9798 +       struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
9799 +       struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
9800 +       __u32 subj_hash_size;
9801 +};
9802 +
9803 +struct user_acl_role_db {
9804 +       struct acl_role_label **r_table;
9805 +       __u32 r_entries;        /* number of entries in table */
9806 +       __u32 s_entries;        /* total number of subject acls */
9807 +       __u32 i_entries;        /* total number of ip acls */
9808 +       __u32 o_entries;        /* Total number of object acls */
9809 +       __u32 a_entries;        /* total number of allowed ips */
9810 +       __u32 t_entries;        /* total number of transitions */
9811 +};
9812 +
9813 +struct acl_object_label {
9814 +       char *filename;
9815 +       ino_t inode;
9816 +       kdev_t device;
9817 +       __u32 mode;
9818 +
9819 +       struct acl_subject_label *nested;
9820 +
9821 +       /* next two structures not used */
9822 +
9823 +       struct acl_object_label *prev;
9824 +       struct acl_object_label *next;
9825 +};
9826 +
9827 +struct acl_ip_label {
9828 +       __u32 addr;
9829 +       __u32 netmask;
9830 +       __u16 low, high;
9831 +       __u8 mode;
9832 +       __u32 type;
9833 +       __u32 proto[8];
9834 +
9835 +       /* next two structures not used */
9836 +
9837 +       struct acl_ip_label *prev;
9838 +       struct acl_ip_label *next;
9839 +};
9840 +
9841 +struct gr_arg {
9842 +       struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
9843 +       unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
9844 +       unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
9845 +       unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
9846 +       unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
9847 +       struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
9848 +       __u16 num_sprole_pws;
9849 +       kdev_t segv_device;
9850 +       ino_t segv_inode;
9851 +       uid_t segv_uid;
9852 +       __u16 mode;
9853 +};
9854 +
9855 +/* End Data Structures Section */
9856 +
9857 +/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
9858 +   Makes good use of the low bits of the inode.  Generally 0-1 times
9859 +   in loop for successful match.  0-3 for unsuccessful match.
9860 +   Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
9861 +
9862 +static __inline__ unsigned long
9863 +rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz)
9864 +{
9865 +       return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
9866 +}
9867 +
9868 +static __inline__ unsigned long
9869 +fhash(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, const unsigned long sz)
9870 +{
9871 +       return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
9872 +}
9873 +
9874 +static __inline__ unsigned long
9875 +nhash(const char *name, const unsigned long sz)
9876 +{
9877 +       return full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) % sz;
9878 +}
9879 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h
9880 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h        1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9881 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
9882 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
9883 +#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
9884 +#define __GRALLOC_H
9885 +
9886 +void acl_free_all(void);
9887 +int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
9888 +void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
9889 +
9890 +#endif
9891 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h
9892 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9893 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
9894 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
9895 +#ifndef GRDEFS_H
9896 +#define GRDEFS_H
9897 +
9898 +/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
9899 +
9900 +enum {
9901 +       GR_READY = 0x01,
9902 +       GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00   // disabled state
9903 +};
9904 +
9905 +/* Begin  ACL declarations */
9906 +
9907 +/* Role flags */
9908 +
9909 +enum {
9910 +       GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
9911 +       GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
9912 +       GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
9913 +       GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
9914 +       GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
9915 +       GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
9916 +       GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040
9917 +};
9918 +
9919 +/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
9920 +enum {
9921 +       GR_DELETED = 0x00000080
9922 +};
9923 +
9924 +/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
9925 +enum {
9926 +       GR_READ = 0x00000001,
9927 +       GR_APPEND = 0x00000002,
9928 +       GR_WRITE = 0x00000004,
9929 +       GR_EXEC = 0x00000008,
9930 +       GR_FIND = 0x00000010,
9931 +       GR_INHERIT = 0x00000040,
9932 +       GR_PTRACERD = 0x00000100,
9933 +       GR_SETID = 0x00000200,
9934 +       GR_CREATE = 0x00000400,
9935 +       GR_DELETE = 0x00000800,
9936 +       GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00001000,
9937 +       GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00002000,
9938 +       GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x0004000,
9939 +       GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00008000,
9940 +       GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00010000,
9941 +       GR_AUDIT_INHERIT = 0x00020000,
9942 +       GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00400000,
9943 +       GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00800000,
9944 +       GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x01000000,
9945 +       GR_SUPPRESS = 0x02000000,
9946 +       GR_NOLEARN = 0x04000000
9947 +};
9948 +
9949 +#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
9950 +                  GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
9951 +                  GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE)
9952 +
9953 +/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
9954 +enum {
9955 +       GR_KILL = 0x00000001,
9956 +       GR_VIEW = 0x00000002,
9957 +       GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000100,
9958 +       GR_LEARN = 0x00000200,
9959 +       GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000400,
9960 +       /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
9961 +       GR_DUMMY = 0x00000800,
9962 +
9963 +       GR_PROTSHM = 0x00040000,
9964 +       GR_KILLPROC = 0x00080000,
9965 +       GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00100000,
9966 +       /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
9967 +       GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00200000,
9968 +       GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00400000,
9969 +       GR_PROCACCT = 0x00800000
9970 +};
9971 +
9972 +#define GR_CRASH_RES   11
9973 +#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
9974 +
9975 +/* begin resource learning section */
9976 +enum {
9977 +       GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
9978 +       GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
9979 +       GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
9980 +       GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
9981 +       GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
9982 +       GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
9983 +       GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
9984 +       GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
9985 +       GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
9986 +       GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
9987 +       GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
9988 +};
9989 +
9990 +#endif
9991 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h
9992 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h     1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9993 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
9994 @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
9995 +#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
9996 +#define __GRINTERNAL_H
9997 +
9998 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
9999 +
10000 +#include <linux/grdefs.h>
10001 +#include <linux/grmsg.h>
10002 +
10003 +extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
10004 +extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
10005 +                           const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10006 +extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10007 +                            const struct dentry *parent,
10008 +                            const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
10009 +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
10010 +extern __inline__ __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
10011 +extern int gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
10012 +                           struct dentry *old_dentry,
10013 +                           struct dentry *new_dentry,
10014 +                           struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
10015 +extern int gr_set_acls(const int type);
10016 +
10017 +extern void gr_handle_alertkill(void);
10018 +extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
10019 +                           const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10020 +
10021 +extern int grsec_enable_link;
10022 +extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
10023 +extern int grsec_enable_execve;
10024 +extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb;
10025 +extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid;
10026 +extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec;
10027 +extern int grsec_forkbomb_max;
10028 +extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
10029 +extern int grsec_enable_signal;
10030 +extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
10031 +extern int grsec_enable_time;
10032 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
10033 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
10034 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
10035 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
10036 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
10037 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
10038 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
10039 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
10040 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
10041 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
10042 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
10043 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
10044 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
10045 +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
10046 +extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
10047 +extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
10048 +extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
10049 +extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
10050 +extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
10051 +extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
10052 +extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
10053 +extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
10054 +extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
10055 +extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
10056 +extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
10057 +extern int grsec_audit_gid;
10058 +extern int grsec_enable_group;
10059 +extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
10060 +extern int grsec_enable_mount;
10061 +extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
10062 +extern int grsec_lock;
10063 +
10064 +extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
10065 +
10066 +extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
10067 +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
10068 +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
10069 +
10070 +extern spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock;
10071 +extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime;
10072 +extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet;
10073 +
10074 +extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
10075 +
10076 +#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a)  ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \
10077 +                         ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev != \
10078 +                         child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) || \
10079 +                         (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \
10080 +                         child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)))
10081 +
10082 +#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev == \
10083 +                         tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) && \
10084 +                         (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \
10085 +                         tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))
10086 +
10087 +#define DEFAULTSECARGS current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, \
10088 +                      current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, \
10089 +                      current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid, \
10090 +                      current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid, \
10091 +                      current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid
10092 +
10093 +#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \
10094 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \
10095 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
10096 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
10097 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
10098 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
10099 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
10100 +       CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
10101 +
10102 +#define security_alert_good(normal_msg,args...) \
10103 +({ \
10104 +       spin_lock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \
10105 +       \
10106 +       if (!grsec_alertgood_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \
10107 +           grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; \
10108 +           if (current->curr_ip) \
10109 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
10110 +           else \
10111 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
10112 +       } else if((jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alertgood_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \
10113 +           grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \
10114 +           if (current->curr_ip) \
10115 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
10116 +           else \
10117 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
10118 +       } else if (grsec_alertgood_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \
10119 +           grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \
10120 +           printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \
10121 +                   "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \
10122 +       } \
10123 +       \
10124 +       spin_unlock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \
10125 +})
10126 +
10127 +#define security_alert(normal_msg,args...) \
10128 +({ \
10129 +       spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
10130 +       \
10131 +       if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \
10132 +           grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet = 0; \
10133 +           if (current->curr_ip) \
10134 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
10135 +           else \
10136 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
10137 +       } else if((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \
10138 +           grsec_alert_fyet++; \
10139 +           if (current->curr_ip) \
10140 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
10141 +           else \
10142 +               printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \
10143 +       } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \
10144 +           grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet++; \
10145 +           printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \
10146 +                   "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \
10147 +       } \
10148 +       \
10149 +       gr_handle_alertkill(); \
10150 +       spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
10151 +})
10152 +
10153 +#define security_audit(normal_msg,args...) \
10154 +({ \
10155 +       spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
10156 +       if (current->curr_ip) \
10157 +               printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", \
10158 +                      NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \
10159 +       else \
10160 +               printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
10161 +       spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
10162 +})
10163 +
10164 +#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
10165 +({ \
10166 +       gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
10167 +})
10168 +
10169 +#endif
10170 +
10171 +#endif
10172 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h
10173 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h  1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
10174 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10175 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
10176 +#define DEFAULTSECMSG "(%.16s:%d) uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent (%.16s:%d) uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
10177 +#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "(%.16s:%d) IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent (%.16s:%d) IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
10178 +#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10179 +#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10180 +#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10181 +#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10182 +#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10183 +#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10184 +#define GR_KMEM_MSG "attempted write to /dev/kmem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10185 +#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "attempted open of /dev/port by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10186 +#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "attempted write of /dev/mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10187 +#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "attempted mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10188 +#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10189 +#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s:%u:%u:%u:%.4095s:%.4095s:%lu:%lu:%.4095s:%lu:%u.%u.%u.%u"
10190 +#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10191 +#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10192 +#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10193 +#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10194 +#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "refused attempt to mknod %.950s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10195 +#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10196 +#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect to the unix domain socket %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10197 +#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10198 +#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10199 +#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10200 +#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10201 +#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10202 +#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10203 +#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10204 +#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10205 +#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10206 +#define GR_NPROC_MSG "attempt to overstep process limit by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10207 +#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10208 +#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10209 +#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
10210 +#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning execution of [%.16s:%lu] for %lu seconds"
10211 +#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to mount %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10212 +#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to pivot_root from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10213 +#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10214 +#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10215 +#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10216 +#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to double chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10217 +#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10218 +#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to chmod +s %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10219 +#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10220 +#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "attempted fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10221 +#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10222 +#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10223 +#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s"
10224 +#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
10225 +#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: being fed garbage %d bytes sent %d required"
10226 +#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10227 +#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10228 +#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10229 +#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10230 +#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10231 +#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10232 +#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "Loaded %s"
10233 +#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "Unable to load %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG " RBAC system may already be enabled."
10234 +#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
10235 +#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "Reloaded %s"
10236 +#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "Failed reload of %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10237 +#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10238 +#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10239 +#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10240 +#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10241 +#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "Invalid mode %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10242 +#define GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d), locking password authentication"
10243 +#define GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d) trying to auth to special role %s, locking auth for role of " DEFAULTSECMSG
10244 +#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10245 +#define GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG "denied capset of (%.16s:%d) within chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10246 +#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10247 +#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10248 +#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG
10249 +#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10250 +#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "Attempted send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10251 +#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "attempt to modify grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10252 +#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10253 +#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10254 +#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "Fatal: Unable to find ACL for (%.16s:%d)"
10255 +#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10256 +#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10257 +#define GR_SOCK_MSG "attempted socket(%d,%d,%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10258 +#define GR_BIND_MSG "attempted bind() by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10259 +#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "attempted connect by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10260 +#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "attempted bind to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %u protocol %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10261 +#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "attempted connect to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %u protocol %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10262 +#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s:%u:%u:%u:%.4095s:%.4095s:%u.%u.%u.%u:%u:%u:%u:%u:%u.%u.%u.%u"
10263 +#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " DEFAULTSECMSG
10264 +#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG
10265 +#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10266 +#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10267 +#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount %.30s to %.64s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10268 +#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10269 +#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.63s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10270 +#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10271 +#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10272 +#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10273 +#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10274 +#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10275 +#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10276 +#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "attempted resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu by " DEFAULTSECMSG
10277 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h
10278 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h     1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
10279 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10280 @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
10281 +#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
10282 +#define GR_SECURITY_H
10283 +
10284 +extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p);
10285 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
10286 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
10287 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target);
10288 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(const struct task_struct *p,
10289 +                                       const int niceval);
10290 +extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
10291 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
10292 +                                  const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10293 +extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
10294 +extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
10295 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
10296 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
10297 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
10298 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
10299 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
10300 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt,
10301 +                                 const char *dev_name);
10302 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
10303 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
10304 +
10305 +extern int gr_handle_nproc(void);
10306 +
10307 +extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
10308 +extern void gr_handle_iopl(void);
10309 +
10310 +extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
10311 +
10312 +extern int gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock);
10313 +
10314 +extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
10315 +extern void gr_log_timechange(void);
10316 +extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
10317 +extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
10318 +                        const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10319 +extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
10320 +                              const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10321 +extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
10322 +extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
10323 +extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
10324 +extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
10325 +extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
10326 +extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
10327 +extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
10328 +extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
10329 +extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
10330 +extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
10331 +
10332 +extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
10333 +                                const struct inode *inode,
10334 +                                const struct dentry *dentry,
10335 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10336 +extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
10337 +                         const struct vfsmount *mnt,
10338 +                         const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
10339 +                         const int acc_mode);
10340 +extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
10341 +                             const struct vfsmount *mnt,
10342 +                             struct inode *inode,
10343 +                             const int mode, const char *to);
10344 +
10345 +extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap);
10346 +extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
10347 +                             const unsigned long wanted);
10348 +extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
10349 +extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
10350 +extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
10351 +extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
10352 +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
10353 +extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
10354 +                             const unsigned long prot);
10355 +extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
10356 +                                 const unsigned long prot);
10357 +extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
10358 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
10359 +                                   const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10360 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
10361 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10362 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
10363 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
10364 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
10365 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
10366 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
10367 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
10368 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
10369 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10370 +extern int gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
10371 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10372 +extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
10373 +extern int gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot);
10374 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
10375 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10376 +extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
10377 +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
10378 +extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
10379 +extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
10380 +                             const gid_t gid);
10381 +extern void gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
10382 +                             const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10383 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
10384 +                                      const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10385 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
10386 +                               const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
10387 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
10388 +                                const struct dentry *p_dentry,
10389 +                                const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
10390 +                                const int imode);
10391 +extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
10392 +                            const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10393 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10394 +                                const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10395 +                                const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
10396 +                                const int mode);
10397 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10398 +                                const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10399 +                                const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
10400 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
10401 +                                const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10402 +extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev);
10403 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
10404 +                                 const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10405 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10406 +                                  const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10407 +                                  const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
10408 +                                  const char *from);
10409 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10410 +                               const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10411 +                               const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
10412 +                               const struct dentry *old_dentry,
10413 +                               const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
10414 +extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
10415 +                               struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10416 +                               const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
10417 +                               struct dentry *old_dentry,
10418 +                               struct inode *old_parent_inode,
10419 +                               struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
10420 +extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
10421 +                          const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
10422 +                          const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
10423 +                          const struct dentry *old_dentry,
10424 +                          const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
10425 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry,
10426 +                                  const struct vfsmount *mnt, const ino_t ino);
10427 +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
10428 +                               const struct vfsmount *mnt);
10429 +extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
10430 +extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
10431 +extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
10432 +extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void);
10433 +
10434 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10435 +extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
10436 +extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
10437 +extern void gr_handle_open_port(void);
10438 +extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
10439 +                             struct vm_area_struct *vma);
10440 +
10441 +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
10442 +extern __u32 ip_randomisn(void);
10443 +extern __u32 arc4random(void);
10444 +
10445 +extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
10446 +extern int grsec_enable_randid;
10447 +extern int grsec_enable_randisn;
10448 +extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
10449 +extern int grsec_enable_randping;
10450 +extern int grsec_enable_randrpc;
10451 +#endif
10452 +
10453 +#endif
10454 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h
10455 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h     2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400
10456 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10457 @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
10458  extern struct list_head active_list;
10459  extern struct list_head inactive_list;
10460
10461 +extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct * task, const int limit,
10462 +                             const unsigned long wanted);
10463 +
10464  #include <asm/page.h>
10465  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
10466  #include <asm/atomic.h>
10467 @@ -639,6 +704,8 @@
10468         address &= PAGE_MASK;
10469         spin_lock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
10470         grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
10471 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma->vm_end - address);
10472 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT);
10473         if (vma->vm_end - address > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur ||
10474             ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) {
10475                 spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock);
10476 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h
10477 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h        2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400
10478 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10479 @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@
10480  extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mknod(const char *,mode_t,
10481                 struct proc_dir_entry *,kdev_t);
10482  extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir(const char *,struct proc_dir_entry *);
10483 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
10484 +extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *, struct proc_dir_entry *);
10485 +#endif
10486
10487  static inline struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_read_entry(const char *name,
10488         mode_t mode, struct proc_dir_entry *base,
10489 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h
10490 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h  2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400
10491 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10492 @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
10493  #include <linux/securebits.h>
10494  #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
10495
10496 +extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap);
10497 +extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p);
10498 +
10499  struct exec_domain;
10500
10501  /*
10502 @@ -415,6 +432,19 @@
10503
10504  /* journalling filesystem info */
10505         void *journal_info;
10506 +
10507 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10508 +/* added by grsecurity's ACL system */
10509 +       struct acl_subject_label *acl;
10510 +       struct acl_role_label *role;
10511 +       struct file *exec_file;
10512 +       u32 curr_ip;
10513 +       u16 acl_role_id;
10514 +       u8 acl_sp_role:1;
10515 +       u8 used_accept:1;
10516 +       u8 used_connect:1;
10517 +       u8 is_writable:1;
10518 +#endif
10519  };
10520
10521  /*
10522 @@ -549,6 +586,8 @@
10523         *p->pidhash_pprev = p->pidhash_next;
10524  }
10525
10526 +#include <asm/current.h>
10527 +
10528  static inline task_t *find_task_by_pid(int pid)
10529  {
10530         task_t *p, **htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)];
10531 @@ -556,6 +595,8 @@
10532         for(p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next)
10533                 ;
10534
10535 +       if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) p = NULL;
10536 +
10537         return p;
10538  }
10539
10540 @@ -576,8 +617,6 @@
10541  extern struct user_struct * alloc_uid(uid_t);
10542  extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *);
10543
10544 -#include <asm/current.h>
10545 -
10546  extern unsigned long volatile jiffies;
10547  extern unsigned long itimer_ticks;
10548  extern unsigned long itimer_next;
10549 @@ -741,7 +780,7 @@
10550  static inline int capable(int cap)
10551  {
10552  #if 1 /* ok now */
10553 -       if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
10554 +       if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable(cap))
10555  #else
10556         if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? current->fsuid == 0 : current->euid == 0)
10557  #endif
10558 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h
10559 --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400
10560 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10561 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
10562         KERN_CADPID=54,         /* int: PID of the process to notify on CAD */
10563         KERN_KDB=55,            /* int: kdb on/off */
10564         KERN_CORE_PATTERN=56,   /* string: pattern for core-files */
10565 +       KERN_GRSECURITY=68,     /* grsecurity */
10566  };
10567
10568
10569 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h
10570 --- linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h 2003-06-23 11:41:37.000000000 -0400
10571 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10572 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
10573  #include <linux/init.h>
10574  #include <linux/sched.h>
10575  #include <linux/spinlock.h>
10576 +
10577  #include <asm/atomic.h>
10578
10579  struct inet_peer
10580 @@ -34,6 +35,11 @@
10581  /* can be called with or without local BH being disabled */
10582  struct inet_peer       *inet_getpeer(__u32 daddr, int create);
10583
10584 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
10585 +extern int grsec_enable_randid;
10586 +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
10587 +#endif
10588 +
10589  extern spinlock_t inet_peer_unused_lock;
10590  extern struct inet_peer *inet_peer_unused_head;
10591  extern struct inet_peer **inet_peer_unused_tailp;
10592 @@ -58,7 +64,14 @@
10593         __u16 id;
10594
10595         spin_lock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
10596 -       id = p->ip_id_count++;
10597 +
10598 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
10599 +       if(grsec_enable_randid)
10600 +               id = htons(ip_randomid());
10601 +       else
10602 +#endif
10603 +               id = p->ip_id_count++;
10604 +
10605         spin_unlock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
10606         return id;
10607  }
10608 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h
10609 --- linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h       2003-06-23 11:41:37.000000000 -0400
10610 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h       2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10611 @@ -64,6 +64,11 @@
10612         void                    (*destructor)(struct sock *);
10613  };
10614
10615 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
10616 +extern int grsec_enable_randid;
10617 +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void);
10618 +#endif
10619 +
10620  extern struct ip_ra_chain *ip_ra_chain;
10621  extern rwlock_t ip_ra_lock;
10622
10623 @@ -196,7 +201,13 @@
10624                  * does not change, they drop every other packet in
10625                  * a TCP stream using header compression.
10626                  */
10627 -               iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0);
10628 +
10629 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
10630 +               if(grsec_enable_randid)
10631 +                       iph->id = htons(ip_randomid());
10632 +               else
10633 +#endif
10634 +                       iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0);
10635         } else
10636                 __ip_select_ident(iph, dst);
10637  }
10638 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/init/main.c linux-2.4.21/init/main.c
10639 --- linux-2.4.21/init/main.c    2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10640 +++ linux-2.4.21/init/main.c    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10641 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
10642  #include <linux/iobuf.h>
10643  #include <linux/bootmem.h>
10644  #include <linux/tty.h>
10645 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10646
10647  #include <asm/io.h>
10648  #include <asm/bugs.h>
10649 @@ -107,6 +108,8 @@
10650  extern void ipc_init(void);
10651  #endif
10652
10653 +extern void grsecurity_init(void);
10654 +
10655  /*
10656   * Boot command-line arguments
10657   */
10658 @@ -546,6 +549,7 @@
10659         do_basic_setup();
10660
10661         prepare_namespace();
10662 +       grsecurity_init();
10663
10664         /*
10665          * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
10666 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c
10667 --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c      2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400
10668 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c      2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10669 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
10670  #include <linux/init.h>
10671  #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
10672  #include <linux/list.h>
10673 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10674  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10675  #include "util.h"
10676
10677 @@ -326,6 +327,9 @@
10678                 msg_unlock(id);
10679         }
10680         up(&msg_ids.sem);
10681 +
10682 +       gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg);
10683 +
10684         return ret;
10685  }
10686
10687 @@ -560,6 +564,8 @@
10688                 break;
10689         }
10690         case IPC_RMID:
10691 +               gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
10692 +
10693                 freeque (msqid);
10694                 break;
10695         }
10696 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c
10697 --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c      2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400
10698 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c      2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10699 @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
10700  #include <linux/spinlock.h>
10701  #include <linux/init.h>
10702  #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
10703 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10704  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10705  #include "util.h"
10706
10707 @@ -181,6 +182,9 @@
10708         }
10709
10710         up(&sem_ids.sem);
10711 +
10712 +       gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
10713 +
10714         return err;
10715  }
10716
10717 @@ -728,6 +732,8 @@
10718
10719         switch(cmd){
10720         case IPC_RMID:
10721 +               gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
10722 +
10723                 freeary(semid);
10724                 err = 0;
10725                 break;
10726 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c
10727 --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c      2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400
10728 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c      2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10729 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
10730  #include <linux/mman.h>
10731  #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
10732  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10733 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10734
10735  #include "util.h"
10736
10737 @@ -38,8 +39,21 @@
10738         time_t                  shm_ctim;
10739         pid_t                   shm_cprid;
10740         pid_t                   shm_lprid;
10741 +
10742 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10743 +       time_t                  shm_createtime;
10744 +       pid_t                   shm_lapid;
10745 +#endif
10746  };
10747
10748 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10749 +extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
10750 +                           const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
10751 +                           const int shmid);
10752 +extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
10753 +                    const time_t shm_createtime);
10754 +#endif
10755 +
10756  #define shm_flags      shm_perm.mode
10757
10758  static struct file_operations shm_file_operations;
10759 @@ -209,6 +223,9 @@
10760         shp->shm_lprid = 0;
10761         shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
10762         shp->shm_ctim = CURRENT_TIME;
10763 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10764 +       shp->shm_createtime = CURRENT_TIME;
10765 +#endif
10766         shp->shm_segsz = size;
10767         shp->shm_nattch = 0;
10768         shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq);
10769 @@ -254,6 +271,9 @@
10770                 shm_unlock(id);
10771         }
10772         up(&shm_ids.sem);
10773 +
10774 +       gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
10775 +
10776         return err;
10777  }
10778
10779 @@ -509,6 +529,9 @@
10780                         err=-EPERM;
10781                         goto out_unlock_up;
10782                 }
10783 +
10784 +               gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
10785 +
10786                 if (shp->shm_nattch){
10787                         shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
10788                         /* Do not find it any more */
10789 @@ -622,9 +645,28 @@
10790                 shm_unlock(shmid);
10791                 return -EACCES;
10792         }
10793 +
10794 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10795 +       if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
10796 +                            shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) {
10797 +               shm_unlock(shmid);
10798 +               return -EACCES;
10799 +       }
10800 +
10801 +       if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
10802 +               shm_unlock(shmid);
10803 +               return -EACCES;
10804 +       }
10805 +#endif
10806 +
10807         file = shp->shm_file;
10808         size = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_size;
10809         shp->shm_nattch++;
10810 +
10811 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10812 +       shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
10813 +#endif
10814 +
10815         shm_unlock(shmid);
10816
10817         down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
10818 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c
10819 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c    2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10820 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10821 @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
10822
10823  #include <linux/mm.h>
10824  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10825 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10826
10827  kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
10828
10829 @@ -168,6 +169,10 @@
10830               target = current;
10831       }
10832
10833 +     if (gr_handle_chroot_capset(target)) {
10834 +            error = -ESRCH;
10835 +            goto out;
10836 +     }
10837
10838       /* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */
10839       if (!cap_issubset(inheritable,
10840 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c
10841 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c  2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10842 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10843 @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
10844  #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
10845  #include <linux/acct.h>
10846  #endif
10847 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10848
10849  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10850  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
10851 @@ -165,12 +165,21 @@
10852  {
10853         write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
10854
10855 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
10856 +       if (current->exec_file) {
10857 +               fput(current->exec_file);
10858 +               current->exec_file = NULL;
10859 +       }
10860 +#endif
10861 +
10862         /* Reparent to init */
10863         REMOVE_LINKS(current);
10864         current->p_pptr = child_reaper;
10865         current->p_opptr = child_reaper;
10866         SET_LINKS(current);
10867
10868 +       gr_set_kernel_label(current);
10869 +
10870         /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
10871         current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
10872
10873 @@ -439,6 +440,10 @@
10874  #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
10875         acct_process(code);
10876  #endif
10877 +
10878 +       gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
10879 +       gr_acl_handle_exit();
10880 +
10881         __exit_mm(tsk);
10882
10883         lock_kernel();
10884 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c
10885 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c  2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10886 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10887 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
10888  #include <linux/personality.h>
10889  #include <linux/compiler.h>
10890  #include <linux/mman.h>
10891 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10892
10893  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
10894  #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
10895 @@ -93,6 +94,10 @@
10896         if (flags & CLONE_PID)
10897                 return current->pid;
10898
10899 +       pid = gr_random_pid(&lastpid_lock);
10900 +       if (pid)
10901 +               return pid;
10902 +
10903         spin_lock(&lastpid_lock);
10904         beginpid = last_pid;
10905         if((++last_pid) & 0xffff8000) {
10906 @@ -635,6 +640,9 @@
10907          * friends to set the per-user process limit to something lower
10908          * than the amount of processes root is running. -- Rik
10909          */
10910 +
10911 +       gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes));
10912 +
10913         if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur
10914                       && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
10915                 goto bad_fork_free;
10916 @@ -719,6 +727,7 @@
10917         retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
10918         if (retval)
10919                 goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace;
10920 +       gr_copy_label(p);
10921         p->semundo = NULL;
10922
10923         /* Our parent execution domain becomes current domain
10924 @@ -804,6 +813,9 @@
10925         free_uid(p->user);
10926  bad_fork_free:
10927         free_task_struct(p);
10928 +
10929 +       gr_log_forkfail(retval);
10930 +
10931         goto fork_out;
10932  }
10933
10934 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c
10935 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10936 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10937 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
10938  #include <linux/completion.h>
10939  #include <linux/seq_file.h>
10940  #include <linux/dnotify.h>
10941 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10942  #include <asm/checksum.h>
10943
10944  #if defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
10945 @@ -585,3 +586,9 @@
10946
10947  /* debug */
10948  EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_stack);
10949 +
10950 +/* grsecurity */
10951 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_is_capable);
10952 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
10953 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
10954 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
10955 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c
10956 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c        2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10957 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10958 @@ -887,6 +887,11 @@
10959         struct module *mod;
10960         int err;
10961
10962 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
10963 +       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
10964 +               return -EPERM;
10965 +#endif
10966 +
10967         lock_kernel();
10968         if (name_user == NULL)
10969                 mod = &kernel_module;
10970 @@ -956,6 +961,11 @@
10971         int i;
10972         struct kernel_sym ksym;
10973
10974 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
10975 +       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
10976 +               return 0;
10977 +#endif
10978 +
10979         lock_kernel();
10980         for (mod = module_list, i = 0; mod; mod = mod->next) {
10981                 /* include the count for the module name! */
10982 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c
10983 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c        2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
10984 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
10985 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
10986  #include <linux/interrupt.h>                   /* For in_interrupt() */
10987  #include <linux/config.h>
10988  #include <linux/delay.h>
10989 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
10990
10991  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
10992
10993 @@ -294,6 +295,11 @@
10994
10995  asmlinkage long sys_syslog(int type, char * buf, int len)
10996  {
10997 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
10998 +       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && grsec_enable_dmesg)
10999 +               return -EPERM;
11000 +       else
11001 +#endif
11002         if ((type != 3) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
11003                 return -EPERM;
11004         return do_syslog(type, buf, len);
11005 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c
11006 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11007 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11008 @@ -29,11 +30,13 @@
11009  #include <linux/nmi.h>
11010  #include <linux/interrupt.h>
11011  #include <linux/init.h>
11012 +#include <linux/file.h>
11013  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11014  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
11015  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
11016  #include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
11017  #include <linux/completion.h>
11018 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11019
11020  /*
11021   * Convert user-nice values [ -20 ... 0 ... 19 ]
11022 @@ -910,6 +912,9 @@
11023                         return -EPERM;
11024                 if (increment < -40)
11025                         increment = -40;
11026 +
11027 +               if (gr_handle_chroot_nice())
11028 +                       return -EPERM;
11029         }
11030         if (increment > 40)
11031                 increment = 40;
11032 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c
11033 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c        2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11034 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11035 @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
11036  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
11037  #include <linux/init.h>
11038  #include <linux/sched.h>
11039 +#include <linux/fs.h>
11040 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11041
11042  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11043
11044 @@ -554,6 +556,8 @@
11045         if (!sig || !t->sig)
11046                 goto out_nolock;
11047
11048 +       gr_log_signal(sig, t);
11049 +
11050         spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
11051         handle_stop_signal(sig, t);
11052
11053 @@ -603,6 +607,8 @@
11054         recalc_sigpending(t);
11055         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
11056
11057 +       gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
11058 +
11059         return send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
11060  }
11061
11062 @@ -622,9 +628,13 @@
11063                 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11064                 for_each_task(p) {
11065                         if (p->pgrp == pgrp && thread_group_leader(p)) {
11066 -                               int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11067 -                               if (retval)
11068 -                                       retval = err;
11069 +                               if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
11070 +                                       retval = -EPERM;
11071 +                               else {
11072 +                                       int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11073 +                                       if (retval)
11074 +                                               retval = err;
11075 +                               }
11076                         }
11077                 }
11078                 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11079 @@ -675,7 +685,10 @@
11080                         if (tg)
11081                                 p = tg;
11082                  }
11083 -               error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11084 +               if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
11085 +                       error = -EPERM;
11086 +               else
11087 +                       error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11088         }
11089         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11090         return error;
11091 @@ -700,10 +713,14 @@
11092                 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11093                 for_each_task(p) {
11094                         if (p->pid > 1 && p != current && thread_group_leader(p)) {
11095 -                               int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11096 -                               ++count;
11097 -                               if (err != -EPERM)
11098 -                                       retval = err;
11099 +                               if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig))
11100 +                                       retval = -EPERM;
11101 +                               else {
11102 +                                       int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
11103 +                                       ++count;
11104 +                                       if (err != -EPERM)
11105 +                                               retval = err;
11106 +                               }
11107                         }
11108                 }
11109                 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11110 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c
11111 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c   2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11112 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c   2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11113 @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
11114   *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
11115   */
11116
11117 +#include <linux/config.h>
11118  #include <linux/module.h>
11119  #include <linux/mm.h>
11120  #include <linux/utsname.h>
11121 @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
11122  #include <linux/prctl.h>
11123  #include <linux/init.h>
11124  #include <linux/highuid.h>
11125 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11126
11127  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11128  #include <asm/io.h>
11129 @@ -239,6 +241,12 @@
11130                 }
11131                 if (error == -ESRCH)
11132                         error = 0;
11133 +
11134 +               if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
11135 +                       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11136 +                       return -ESRCH;
11137 +               }
11138 +
11139                 if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
11140                         error = -EACCES;
11141                 else
11142 @@ -425,6 +433,9 @@
11143         if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
11144             (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
11145                 current->sgid = new_egid;
11146 +
11147 +       gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
11148 +
11149         current->fsgid = new_egid;
11150         current->egid = new_egid;
11151         current->gid = new_rgid;
11152 @@ -447,6 +458,9 @@
11153                         current->mm->dumpable=0;
11154                         wmb();
11155                 }
11156 +
11157 +               gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
11158 +
11159                 current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
11160         }
11161         else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
11162 @@ -530,6 +544,9 @@
11163                 current->mm->dumpable = 0;
11164                 wmb();
11165         }
11166 +
11167 +       gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
11168 +
11169         current->uid = new_ruid;
11170         current->user = new_user;
11171         free_uid(old_user);
11172 @@ -626,6 +643,9 @@
11173         } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
11174                 return -EPERM;
11175
11176 +       if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
11177 +               return -EPERM;
11178 +
11179         if (old_euid != uid)
11180         {
11181                 current->mm->dumpable = 0;
11182 @@ -722,8 +742,10 @@
11183                 current->egid = egid;
11184         }
11185         current->fsgid = current->egid;
11186 -       if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
11187 +       if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
11188 +               gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
11189                 current->gid = rgid;
11190 +       }
11191         if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
11192                 current->sgid = sgid;
11193         return 0;
11194 @@ -1140,6 +1162,10 @@
11195         if(copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
11196                 return -EFAULT;
11197         old_rlim = current->rlim + resource;
11198 +
11199 +       if (old_rlim->rlim_max < old_rlim->rlim_cur)
11200 +               return -EINVAL;
11201 +
11202         if (((new_rlim.rlim_cur > old_rlim->rlim_max) ||
11203              (new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max)) &&
11204             !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
11205 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c
11206 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c        2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11207 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11208 @@ -38,6 +38,13 @@
11209  #endif
11210
11211  #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
11212 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11213 +#include <linux/grinternal.h>
11214 +
11215 +extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table * table, const void *oldval,
11216 +                             const void *newval);
11217 +extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op);
11218 +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
11219
11220  /* External variables not in a header file. */
11221  extern int panic_timeout;
11222 @@ -119,6 +126,8 @@
11223  static ctl_table dev_table[];
11224  extern ctl_table random_table[];
11225
11226 +static ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
11227 +
11228  /* /proc declarations: */
11229
11230  #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
11231 @@ -259,8 +268,195 @@
11232         {KERN_S390_USER_DEBUG_LOGGING,"userprocess_debug",
11233          &sysctl_userprocess_debug,sizeof(int),0644,NULL,&proc_dointvec},
11234  #endif
11235 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
11236 +       {KERN_GRSECURITY, "grsecurity", NULL, 0, 0555, grsecurity_table},
11237 +#endif
11238 +       {0}
11239 +};
11240 +
11241 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
11242 +enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL,
11243 +GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT,
11244 +GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM,
11245 +GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
11246 +GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS,
11247 +GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_RANDISN,
11248 +GS_RANDPING, GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
11249 +GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_TTY, GS_TTYS,
11250 +GS_PTY, GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, GS_RANDRPC,
11251 +GS_FINDTASK, GS_LOCK};
11252 +
11253 +static ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
11254 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
11255 +       {GS_LINK, "linking_restrictions", &grsec_enable_link, sizeof (int),
11256 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11257 +#endif
11258 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
11259 +       {GS_FIFO, "fifo_restrictions", &grsec_enable_fifo, sizeof (int),
11260 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11261 +#endif
11262 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
11263 +       {GS_EXECVE, "execve_limiting", &grsec_enable_execve, sizeof (int),
11264 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11265 +#endif
11266 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
11267 +       {GS_EXECLOG, "exec_logging", &grsec_enable_execlog, sizeof (int),
11268 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11269 +#endif
11270 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
11271 +       {GS_SIGNAL, "signal_logging", &grsec_enable_signal, sizeof (int),
11272 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11273 +#endif
11274 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
11275 +       {GS_FORKFAIL, "forkfail_logging", &grsec_enable_forkfail, sizeof (int),
11276 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11277 +#endif
11278 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
11279 +       {GS_TIME, "timechange_logging", &grsec_enable_time, sizeof (int),
11280 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11281 +#endif
11282 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
11283 +       {GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, "chroot_deny_shmat", &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat, sizeof (int),
11284 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11285 +#endif
11286 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
11287 +       {GS_CHROOT_UNIX, "chroot_deny_unix", &grsec_enable_chroot_unix, sizeof(int),
11288 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11289 +#endif
11290 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
11291 +       {GS_CHROOT_MNT, "chroot_deny_mount", &grsec_enable_chroot_mount, sizeof (int),
11292 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11293 +#endif
11294 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
11295 +       {GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, "chroot_deny_fchdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir, sizeof (int),
11296 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11297 +#endif
11298 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
11299 +       {GS_CHROOT_DBL, "chroot_deny_chroot", &grsec_enable_chroot_double, sizeof (int),
11300 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11301 +#endif
11302 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
11303 +       {GS_CHROOT_PVT, "chroot_deny_pivot", &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot, sizeof (int),
11304 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11305 +#endif
11306 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
11307 +       {GS_CHROOT_CD, "chroot_enforce_chdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir, sizeof (int),
11308 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11309 +#endif
11310 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
11311 +       {GS_CHROOT_CM, "chroot_deny_chmod", &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod, sizeof (int),
11312 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11313 +#endif
11314 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
11315 +       {GS_CHROOT_MK, "chroot_deny_mknod", &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod, sizeof (int),
11316 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11317 +#endif
11318 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
11319 +       {GS_CHROOT_NI, "chroot_restrict_nice", &grsec_enable_chroot_nice, sizeof (int),
11320 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11321 +#endif
11322 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
11323 +       {GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, "chroot_execlog",
11324 +        &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, sizeof (int),
11325 +         0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11326 +#endif
11327 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
11328 +       {GS_CHROOT_CAPS, "chroot_caps", &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, sizeof (int),
11329 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11330 +#endif
11331 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
11332 +       {GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, "chroot_deny_sysctl", &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl, sizeof (int),
11333 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11334 +#endif
11335 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
11336 +       {GS_TPE, "tpe", &grsec_enable_tpe, sizeof (int),
11337 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11338 +       {GS_TPE_GID, "tpe_gid", &grsec_tpe_gid, sizeof (int),
11339 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11340 +#endif
11341 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
11342 +       {GS_TPE_ALL, "tpe_restrict_all", &grsec_enable_tpe_all, sizeof (int),
11343 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11344 +#endif
11345 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
11346 +       {GS_RANDPID, "rand_pids", &grsec_enable_randpid, sizeof (int),
11347 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11348 +#endif
11349 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
11350 +       {GS_RANDID, "rand_ip_ids", &grsec_enable_randid, sizeof (int),
11351 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11352 +#endif
11353 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
11354 +       {GS_RANDSRC, "rand_tcp_src_ports", &grsec_enable_randsrc, sizeof (int),
11355 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11356 +#endif
11357 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
11358 +       {GS_RANDISN, "rand_isns", &grsec_enable_randisn, sizeof (int),
11359 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11360 +#endif
11361 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
11362 +       {GS_RANDPING, "altered_pings", &grsec_enable_randping, sizeof (int),
11363 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11364 +#endif
11365 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
11366 +       {GS_SOCKET_ALL, "socket_all", &grsec_enable_socket_all, sizeof (int),
11367 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11368 +       {GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, "socket_all_gid",
11369 +        &grsec_socket_all_gid, sizeof (int),
11370 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11371 +#endif
11372 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
11373 +       {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, "socket_client",
11374 +        &grsec_enable_socket_client, sizeof (int),
11375 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11376 +       {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, "socket_client_gid",
11377 +        &grsec_socket_client_gid, sizeof (int),
11378 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11379 +#endif
11380 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
11381 +       {GS_SOCKET_SERVER, "socket_server",
11382 +        &grsec_enable_socket_server, sizeof (int),
11383 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11384 +       {GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, "socket_server_gid",
11385 +        &grsec_socket_server_gid, sizeof (int),
11386 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11387 +#endif
11388 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
11389 +       {GS_GROUP, "audit_group", &grsec_enable_group, sizeof (int),
11390 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11391 +       {GS_GID, "audit_gid",
11392 +        &grsec_audit_gid, sizeof (int),
11393 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11394 +#endif
11395 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
11396 +       {GS_ACHDIR, "audit_chdir", &grsec_enable_chdir, sizeof (int),
11397 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11398 +#endif
11399 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
11400 +       {GS_AMOUNT, "audit_mount", &grsec_enable_mount, sizeof (int),
11401 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11402 +#endif
11403 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
11404 +       {GS_AIPC, "audit_ipc", &grsec_enable_audit_ipc, sizeof (int),
11405 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11406 +#endif
11407 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
11408 +       {GS_AIPC, "dmesg", &grsec_enable_dmesg, sizeof (int),
11409 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11410 +#endif
11411 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
11412 +       {GS_RANDRPC, "rand_rpc", &grsec_enable_randrpc, sizeof (int),
11413 +        0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11414 +#endif
11415 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
11416 +       {GS_FINDTASK, "chroot_findtask", &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
11417 +        sizeof (int), 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
11418 +#endif
11419 +       {GS_LOCK, "grsec_lock", &grsec_lock, sizeof (int), 0600, NULL,
11420 +        &proc_dointvec},
11421         {0}
11422  };
11423 +#endif
11424
11425  static ctl_table vm_table[] = {
11426         {VM_BDFLUSH, "bdflush", &bdf_prm, 9*sizeof(int), 0644, NULL,
11427 @@ -395,6 +591,11 @@
11428
11429  static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
11430  {
11431 +       if (gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op))
11432 +               return -EACCES;
11433 +       if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
11434 +               return -EACCES;
11435 +
11436         return test_perm(table->mode, op);
11437  }
11438
11439 @@ -428,6 +629,10 @@
11440                                 table = table->child;
11441                                 goto repeat;
11442                         }
11443 +
11444 +                       if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval))
11445 +                               return -EACCES;
11446 +
11447                         error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
11448                                                    oldval, oldlenp,
11449                                                    newval, newlen, context);
11450 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c
11451 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c  2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11452 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11453 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
11454  #include <linux/mm.h>
11455  #include <linux/timex.h>
11456  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
11457 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11458
11459  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11460
11461 @@ -89,6 +90,9 @@
11462         time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
11463         time_esterror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
11464         write_unlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
11465 +
11466 +       gr_log_timechange();
11467 +
11468         return 0;
11469  }
11470
11471 @@ -167,6 +171,8 @@
11472                  * globally block out interrupts when it runs.
11473                  */
11474                 do_settimeofday(tv);
11475 +
11476 +               gr_log_timechange();
11477         }
11478         return 0;
11479  }
11480 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c
11481 --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11482 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11483 @@ -541,6 +541,9 @@
11484
11485         psecs = (p->times.tms_utime += user);
11486         psecs += (p->times.tms_stime += system);
11487 +
11488 +       gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs / HZ);
11489 +
11490         if (psecs / HZ > p->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) {
11491                 /* Send SIGXCPU every second.. */
11492                 if (!(psecs % HZ))
11493 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c
11494 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c   2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11495 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c   2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11496 @@ -2501,6 +2507,7 @@
11497         error = -EIO;
11498         rlim_rss = current->rlim ?  current->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur :
11499                                 LONG_MAX; /* default: see resource.h */
11500 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_RSS, vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start));
11501         if ((vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start)) > rlim_rss)
11502                 return error;
11503
11504 @@ -3004,6 +3011,7 @@
11505         err = -EFBIG;
11506
11507         if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
11508 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, pos);
11509                 if (pos >= limit) {
11510                         send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
11511                         goto out;
11512 @@ -3039,6 +3047,7 @@
11513          */
11514
11515         if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
11516 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, count + (u32)pos);
11517                 if (pos >= inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
11518                 {
11519                         if (count || pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) {
11520 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c
11521 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c    2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11522 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11523 @@ -1065,6 +1129,7 @@
11524
11525  do_expand:
11526         limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
11527 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset);
11528         if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
11529                 goto out_sig;
11530         if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
11531 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c
11532 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c     2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11533 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11534 @@ -209,6 +235,7 @@
11535         lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
11536
11537         /* check against resource limits */
11538 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
11539         if (locked > lock_limit)
11540                 goto out;
11541
11542 @@ -276,6 +303,7 @@
11543         lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
11544
11545         ret = -ENOMEM;
11546 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm);
11547         if (current->mm->total_vm > lock_limit)
11548                 goto out;
11549
11550 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c
11551 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c      2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11552 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c      2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11553 @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
11554  #include <linux/file.h>
11555  #include <linux/fs.h>
11556  #include <linux/personality.h>
11557 +#include <linux/random.h>
11558 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11559
11560  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11561  #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
11562 @@ -168,6 +170,7 @@
11563
11564         /* Check against rlimit.. */
11565         rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
11566 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data);
11567         if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim)
11568                 goto out;
11569
11570 @@ -432,6 +462,7 @@
11571         if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
11572                 unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
11573                 locked += len;
11574 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
11575                 if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
11576                         return -EAGAIN;
11577         }
11578 @@ -480,6 +532,9 @@
11579                 }
11580         }
11581
11582 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
11583 +               return -EACCES;
11584 +
11585         /* Clear old maps */
11586  munmap_back:
11587         vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
11588 @@ -490,6 +545,7 @@
11589         }
11590
11591         /* Check against address space limit. */
11592 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len);
11593         if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
11594             > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
11595                 return -ENOMEM;
11596 @@ -1047,6 +1255,7 @@
11597         if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
11598                 unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
11599                 locked += len;
11600 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
11601                 if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
11602                         return -EAGAIN;
11603         }
11604 @@ -1063,6 +1272,7 @@
11605         }
11606
11607         /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
11608 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len);
11609         if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
11610             > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
11611                 return -ENOMEM;
11612 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c
11613 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c  2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11614 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11615 @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
11616  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
11617  #include <linux/shm.h>
11618  #include <linux/mman.h>
11619 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11620
11621  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11622  #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
11623 @@ -288,6 +392,11 @@
11624         if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
11625                 goto out;
11626
11627 +       if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
11628 +               error = -EACCES;
11629 +               goto out;
11630 +       }
11631 +
11632         for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
11633                 unsigned int newflags;
11634                 int last = 0;
11635 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c
11636 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c    2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11637 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11638 @@ -278,10 +301,13 @@
11639                 unsigned long locked = current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
11640                 locked += new_len - old_len;
11641                 ret = -EAGAIN;
11642 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked);
11643                 if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur)
11644                         goto out;
11645         }
11646         ret = -ENOMEM;
11647 +
11648 +       gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len));
11649         if ((current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len)
11650             > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
11651                 goto out;
11652 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c
11653 --- linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c     2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400
11654 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11655 @@ -822,6 +822,8 @@
11656          */
11657         err = -EFBIG;
11658         if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
11659 +               gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, pos);
11660 +
11661                 if (pos >= limit) {
11662                         send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
11663                         goto out;
11664 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
11665 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c     2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11666 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c     2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11667 @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
11668  #include <linux/init.h>
11669  #include <linux/poll.h>
11670  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
11671 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11672
11673  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11674  #include <asm/system.h>
11675 @@ -374,7 +375,12 @@
11676         else
11677                 sk->protinfo.af_inet.pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
11678
11679 -       sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
11680 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
11681 +       if(grsec_enable_randid)
11682 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
11683 +       else
11684 +#endif
11685 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
11686
11687         sock_init_data(sock,sk);
11688
11689 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c
11690 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c        2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11691 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c        2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11692 @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
11693  #include <linux/errno.h>
11694  #include <linux/timer.h>
11695  #include <linux/init.h>
11696 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11697 +
11698  #include <asm/system.h>
11699  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
11700  #include <net/checksum.h>
11701 @@ -712,6 +714,12 @@
11702
11703                 icmp_param.data.icmph=*skb->h.icmph;
11704                 icmp_param.data.icmph.type=ICMP_ECHOREPLY;
11705 +
11706 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
11707 +               if(grsec_enable_randping)
11708 +                       icmp_param.data.icmph.un.echo.id = skb->h.icmph->un.echo.id;
11709 +#endif
11710 +
11711                 icmp_param.skb=skb;
11712                 icmp_param.offset=0;
11713                 icmp_param.data_len=skb->len;
11714 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
11715 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c   2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11716 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c   2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11717 @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
11718  #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
11719  #include <linux/mroute.h>
11720  #include <linux/netlink.h>
11721 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11722
11723  /*
11724   *      Shall we try to damage output packets if routing dev changes?
11725 @@ -511,7 +512,13 @@
11726          *      Begin outputting the bytes.
11727          */
11728
11729 -       id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
11730 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
11731 +       if(grsec_enable_randid) {
11732 +               id = htons(ip_randomid());
11733 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
11734 +       } else
11735 +#endif
11736 +               id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
11737
11738         do {
11739                 char *data;
11740 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in
11741 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in   2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11742 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in   2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11743 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
11744    dep_tristate '  address type match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
11745    dep_tristate '  tcpmss match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
11746    dep_tristate '  realm match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
11747 +  dep_tristate '  stealth match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
11748    if [ "$CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK" != "n" ]; then
11749      dep_tristate '  Helper match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES
11750    fi
11751 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
11752 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile    2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11753 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11754 @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
11755  obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_UNCLEAN) += ipt_unclean.o
11756  obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STRING) += ipt_string.o
11757  obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS) += ipt_tcpmss.o
11758 +obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
11759  obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o
11760  obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM) += ipt_realm.o
11761
11762 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
11763 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c       1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
11764 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c       2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11765 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
11766 +/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
11767 + *
11768 + * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler  <spender@grsecurity.net>
11769 + *
11770 + */
11771 +
11772 +#include <linux/kernel.h>
11773 +#include <linux/module.h>
11774 +#include <linux/skbuff.h>
11775 +#include <linux/net.h>
11776 +#include <linux/sched.h>
11777 +#include <linux/inet.h>
11778 +#include <linux/stddef.h>
11779 +
11780 +#include <net/ip.h>
11781 +#include <net/sock.h>
11782 +#include <net/tcp.h>
11783 +#include <net/udp.h>
11784 +#include <net/route.h>
11785 +#include <net/inet_common.h>
11786 +
11787 +#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
11788 +
11789 +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
11790 +
11791 +extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
11792 +
11793 +static int
11794 +match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
11795 +      const struct net_device *in,
11796 +      const struct net_device *out,
11797 +      const void *matchinfo,
11798 +      int offset,
11799 +      const void *hdr,
11800 +      u_int16_t datalen,
11801 +      int *hotdrop)
11802 +{
11803 +       struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph;
11804 +       struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *) hdr;
11805 +       struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) hdr;
11806 +       struct sock *sk = NULL;
11807 +
11808 +       if (!ip || !hdr || offset) return 0;
11809 +
11810 +       switch(ip->protocol) {
11811 +       case IPPROTO_TCP:
11812 +               if (datalen < sizeof(struct tcphdr)) {
11813 +                       *hotdrop = 1;
11814 +                       return 0;
11815 +               }
11816 +               if (!(th->syn && !th->ack)) return 0;
11817 +               sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif);
11818 +               break;
11819 +       case IPPROTO_UDP:
11820 +               if (datalen < sizeof(struct udphdr)) {
11821 +                       *hotdrop = 1;
11822 +                       return 0;
11823 +               }
11824 +               sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh->source, ip->daddr, uh->dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
11825 +               break;
11826 +       default:
11827 +               return 0;
11828 +       }
11829 +
11830 +       if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
11831 +               return 1;
11832 +       else {
11833 +               sock_put(sk);
11834 +               return 0;
11835 +       }
11836 +}
11837 +
11838 +/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
11839 +static int
11840 +checkentry(const char *tablename,
11841 +           const struct ipt_ip *ip,
11842 +           void *matchinfo,
11843 +           unsigned int matchsize,
11844 +           unsigned int hook_mask)
11845 +{
11846 +        if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0))
11847 +                return 0;
11848 +
11849 +       if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
11850 +               ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
11851 +               && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)))
11852 +                       return 1;
11853 +
11854 +       printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
11855 +
11856 +        return 0;
11857 +}
11858 +
11859 +
11860 +static struct ipt_match stealth_match
11861 += { { NULL, NULL }, "stealth", &match, &checkentry, NULL, THIS_MODULE };
11862 +
11863 +static int __init init(void)
11864 +{
11865 +       return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match);
11866 +}
11867 +
11868 +static void __exit fini(void)
11869 +{
11870 +       ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
11871 +}
11872 +
11873 +module_init(init);
11874 +module_exit(fini);
11875 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
11876 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c    2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11877 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c    2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11878 @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
11879  #include <linux/inet.h>
11880  #include <linux/stddef.h>
11881  #include <linux/ipsec.h>
11882 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11883
11884  extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
11885  extern int sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
11886 @@ -221,9 +222,18 @@
11887
11888                 spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
11889                 rover = tcp_port_rover;
11890 -               do {    rover++;
11891 -                       if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
11892 -                               rover = low;
11893 +                do {
11894 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
11895 +                       if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
11896 +                               rover = low + (arc4random() % (high - low));
11897 +                       } else
11898 +#endif
11899 +                       {
11900 +                               rover++;
11901 +                               if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
11902 +                                       rover = low;
11903 +                       }
11904 +
11905                         head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
11906                         spin_lock(&head->lock);
11907                         for (tb = head->chain; tb; tb = tb->next)
11908 @@ -546,6 +556,11 @@
11909
11910  static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
11911  {
11912 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
11913 +       if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
11914 +               return ip_randomisn();
11915 +       else
11916 +#endif
11917         return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr,
11918                                           skb->nh.iph->saddr,
11919                                           skb->h.th->dest,
11920 @@ -681,9 +696,16 @@
11921                 rover = tcp_port_rover;
11922
11923                 do {
11924 -                       rover++;
11925 -                       if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
11926 -                               rover = low;
11927 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
11928 +                       if(grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) {
11929 +                               rover = low + (arc4random() % (high - low));
11930 +                       } else
11931 +#endif
11932 +                       {
11933 +                               rover++;
11934 +                               if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
11935 +                                       rover = low;
11936 +                       }
11937                         head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
11938                         spin_lock(&head->lock);
11939
11940 @@ -844,11 +866,22 @@
11941         if (err)
11942                 goto failure;
11943
11944 -       if (!tp->write_seq)
11945 +       if (!tp->write_seq) {
11946 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
11947 +               if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn))
11948 +                       tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn();
11949 +               else
11950 +#endif
11951                 tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(sk->saddr, sk->daddr,
11952                                                            sk->sport, usin->sin_port);
11953 +       }
11954
11955 -       sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies;
11956 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
11957 +       if(grsec_enable_randid)
11958 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
11959 +       else
11960 +#endif
11961 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies;
11962
11963         err = tcp_connect(sk);
11964         if (err)
11965 @@ -1570,7 +1603,13 @@
11966         newtp->ext_header_len = 0;
11967         if (newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt)
11968                 newtp->ext_header_len = newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt->optlen;
11969 -       newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies;
11970 +
11971 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
11972 +       if(grsec_enable_randid)
11973 +               newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
11974 +       else
11975 +#endif
11976 +               newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies;
11977
11978         tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst->pmtu);
11979         newtp->advmss = dst->advmss;
11980 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c
11981 --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400
11982 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
11983 @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
11984  #include <net/ipv6.h>
11985  #include <net/protocol.h>
11986  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
11987 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
11988  #include <net/sock.h>
11989  #include <net/udp.h>
11990  #include <net/icmp.h>
11991 @@ -98,6 +99,11 @@
11992  #include <net/inet_common.h>
11993  #include <net/checksum.h>
11994
11995 +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
11996 +                                       const struct sk_buff *skb);
11997 +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
11998 +                                       const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
11999 +
12000  /*
12001   *     Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
12002   */
12003 @@ -474,9 +480,16 @@
12004                 ufh.uh.dest = usin->sin_port;
12005                 if (ufh.uh.dest == 0)
12006                         return -EINVAL;
12007 +
12008 +               if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
12009 +                       return -EPERM;
12010         } else {
12011                 if (sk->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
12012                         return -ENOTCONN;
12013 +
12014 +               if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
12015 +                       return -EPERM;
12016 +
12017                 ufh.daddr = sk->daddr;
12018                 ufh.uh.dest = sk->dport;
12019                 /* Open fast path for connected socket.
12020 @@ -484,6 +497,7 @@
12021                  */
12022                 connected = 1;
12023         }
12024 +
12025         ipc.addr = sk->saddr;
12026         ufh.uh.source = sk->sport;
12027
12028 @@ -655,6 +669,11 @@
12029         if (!skb)
12030                 goto out;
12031
12032 +       if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
12033 +               err = -EPERM;
12034 +               goto out_free;
12035 +       }
12036 +
12037         copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
12038         if (copied > len) {
12039                 copied = len;
12040 @@ -759,7 +778,13 @@
12041         sk->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
12042         sk->dport = usin->sin_port;
12043         sk->state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
12044 -       sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies;
12045 +
12046 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
12047 +       if(grsec_enable_randid)
12048 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid());
12049 +       else
12050 +#endif
12051 +               sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies;
12052
12053         sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst);
12054         return(0);
12055 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
12056 --- linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c       2003-06-23 11:41:58.000000000 -0400
12057 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c       2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
12058 @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
12059  #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
12060  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
12061  #include <linux/notifier.h>
12062 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12063  #include <net/sock.h>
12064  #include <net/scm.h>
12065
12066 @@ -620,7 +621,8 @@
12067            check them, when this message will be delivered
12068            to corresponding kernel module.   --ANK (980802)
12069          */
12070 -       NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
12071 +
12072 +       NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = gr_cap_rtnetlink();
12073
12074         err = -EFAULT;
12075         if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb,len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
12076 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c
12077 --- linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c  2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400
12078 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c  2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
12079 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
12080  #include <net/checksum.h>
12081  #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
12082  #include <net/route.h>
12083 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12084  #ifdef CONFIG_HIPPI
12085  #include <linux/hippidevice.h>
12086  #endif
12087 @@ -598,6 +599,47 @@
12088
12089  EXPORT_SYMBOL(softnet_data);
12090
12091 +#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
12092 +#if !defined (CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD_MODULE)
12093 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_lookup_listener);
12094 +#endif
12095 +#endif
12096 +
12097 +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID)
12098 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomid);
12099 +#endif
12100 +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC)
12101 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(arc4random);
12102 +#endif
12103 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN
12104 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomisn);
12105 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randisn);
12106 +#endif
12107 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
12108 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randid);
12109 +#endif
12110 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
12111 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc);
12112 +#endif
12113 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
12114 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randrpc);
12115 +#endif
12116 +
12117 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
12118 +
12119 +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
12120 +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
12121 +
12122 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
12123 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
12124 +
12125 +#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
12126 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
12127 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
12128 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
12129 +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
12130 +#endif
12131 +
12132  #if defined(CONFIG_NET_RADIO) || defined(CONFIG_NET_PCMCIA_RADIO)
12133  #include <net/iw_handler.h>
12134  EXPORT_SYMBOL(wireless_send_event);
12135 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c
12136 --- linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c   2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400
12137 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c   2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
12138 @@ -85,6 +85,18 @@
12139  #include <net/scm.h>
12140  #include <linux/netfilter.h>
12141
12142 +extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
12143 +extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
12144 +                             const int protocol);
12145 +extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
12146 +extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
12147 +extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
12148 +                            const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
12149 +extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
12150 +                         const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
12151 +extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
12152 +                           const int protocol);
12153 +
12154  static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
12155  static ssize_t sock_read(struct file *file, char *buf,
12156                          size_t size, loff_t *ppos);
12157 @@ -699,6 +711,7 @@
12158
12159  int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
12160  {
12161 +       struct socket *sock;
12162         /*
12163          *      It was possible the inode is NULL we were
12164          *      closing an unfinished socket.
12165 @@ -709,8 +722,21 @@
12166                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n");
12167                 return 0;
12168         }
12169 +       sock = socki_lookup(inode);
12170 +
12171         sock_fasync(-1, filp, 0);
12172 +
12173 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
12174 +       if (unlikely(current->used_accept && sock->sk &&
12175 +                    (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) &&
12176 +                    (sock->sk->daddr == current->curr_ip))) {
12177 +               current->used_accept = 0;
12178 +               current->curr_ip = 0;
12179 +       }
12180 +#endif
12181 +
12182         sock_release(socki_lookup(inode));
12183 +
12184         return 0;
12185  }
12186
12187 @@ -903,6 +929,16 @@
12188         int retval;
12189         struct socket *sock;
12190
12191 +       if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
12192 +               retval = -EACCES;
12193 +               goto out;
12194 +       }
12195 +
12196 +       if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
12197 +               retval = -EACCES;
12198 +               goto out;
12199 +       }
12200 +
12201         retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
12202         if (retval < 0)
12203                 goto out;
12204 @@ -998,12 +1034,26 @@
12205  {
12206         struct socket *sock;
12207         char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
12208 +       struct sockaddr * sck;
12209         int err;
12210
12211         if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
12212         {
12213 -               if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0)
12214 +               if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) {
12215 +                       sck = (struct sockaddr *) address;
12216 +
12217 +                       if(!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) {
12218 +                               sockfd_put(sock);
12219 +                               return -EACCES;
12220 +                       }
12221 +
12222 +                       if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) {
12223 +                               sockfd_put(sock);
12224 +                               return -EACCES;
12225 +                       }
12226 +
12227                         err = sock->ops->bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
12228 +               }
12229                 sockfd_put(sock);
12230         }
12231         return err;
12232 @@ -1079,6 +1129,8 @@
12233         if ((err = sock_map_fd(newsock)) < 0)
12234                 goto out_release;
12235
12236 +       gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
12237 +
12238  out_put:
12239         sockfd_put(sock);
12240  out:
12241 @@ -1106,6 +1158,7 @@
12242  {
12243         struct socket *sock;
12244         char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
12245 +       struct sockaddr * sck;
12246         int err;
12247
12248         sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
12249 @@ -1114,6 +1167,24 @@
12250         err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, address);
12251         if (err < 0)
12252                 goto out_put;
12253 +
12254 +       sck = (struct sockaddr *) address;
12255 +
12256 +       if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) {
12257 +               err = -EACCES;
12258 +               goto out_put;
12259 +       }
12260 +
12261 +       if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
12262 +               err = -EACCES;
12263 +               goto out_put;
12264 +       }
12265 +
12266 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
12267 +       if (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)
12268 +               current->used_connect = 1;
12269 +#endif
12270 +
12271         err = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) address, addrlen,
12272                                  sock->file->f_flags);
12273  out_put:
12274 @@ -1333,6 +1404,14 @@
12275                 err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
12276                 sockfd_put(sock);
12277         }
12278 +
12279 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
12280 +       if (likely(!err && current->used_accept)) {
12281 +               current->used_accept = 0;
12282 +               current->curr_ip = 0;
12283 +       }
12284 +#endif
12285 +
12286         return err;
12287  }
12288
12289 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c
12290 --- linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c      2003-06-23 11:41:57.000000000 -0400
12291 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c      2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400
12292 @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
12293  #include <linux/unistd.h>
12294  #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
12295  #include <linux/file.h>
12296 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12297
12298  #include <net/sock.h>
12299  #include <net/checksum.h>
12300 @@ -1267,6 +1268,12 @@
12301         }
12302         ret = xid++;
12303         spin_unlock(&xid_lock);
12304 +
12305 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC
12306 +       if (grsec_enable_randrpc)
12307 +               ret = arc4random();
12308 +#endif
12309 +
12310         return ret;
12311  }
12312
12313 diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c
12314 --- linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c     2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400
12315 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c     2003-06-23 11:49:18.000000000 -0400
12316 @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
12317  #include <linux/poll.h>
12318  #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
12319  #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
12320 +#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12321
12322  #include <asm/checksum.h>
12323
12324 @@ -599,6 +600,11 @@
12325                 if (err)
12326                         goto put_fail;
12327
12328 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
12329 +                       err = -EACCES;
12330 +                       goto put_fail;
12331 +               }
12332 +
12333                 err = -ECONNREFUSED;
12334                 if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
12335                         goto put_fail;
12336 @@ -622,6 +628,13 @@
12337                 if (u) {
12338                         struct dentry *dentry;
12339                         dentry = u->protinfo.af_unix.dentry;
12340 +
12341 +                       if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->peercred.pid)) {
12342 +                               err = -EPERM;
12343 +                               sock_put(u);
12344 +                               goto fail;
12345 +                       }
12346 +
12347                         if (dentry)
12348                                 UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
12349                 } else
12350 @@ -720,9 +733,19 @@
12351                  * All right, let's create it.
12352                  */
12353                 mode = S_IFSOCK | (sock->inode->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
12354 +
12355 +               if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
12356 +                       err = -EACCES;
12357 +                       goto out_mknod_dput;
12358 +               }
12359 +
12360                 err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
12361 +
12362                 if (err)
12363                         goto out_mknod_dput;
12364 +
12365 +               gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
12366 +
12367                 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
12368                 dput(nd.dentry);
12369                 nd.dentry = dentry;
12370 @@ -740,6 +763,10 @@
12371                         goto out_unlock;
12372                 }
12373
12374 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
12375 +               sk->peercred.pid = current->pid;
12376 +#endif
12377 +
12378                 list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
12379         } else {
12380                 list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
12381 @@ -866,6 +893,9 @@
12382         int st;
12383         int err;
12384         long timeo;
12385 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
12386 +       struct task_struct *p, **htable;
12387 +#endif
12388
12389         err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, addr_len, &hash);
12390         if (err < 0)
12391 @@ -989,6 +1019,17 @@
12392         /* Set credentials */
12393         sk->peercred = other->peercred;
12394
12395 +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
12396 +       read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12397 +       htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(other->peercred.pid)];
12398 +       for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != other->peercred.pid; p = p->pidhash_next);
12399 +       if (p) {
12400 +               p->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
12401 +               p->used_accept = 1;
12402 +       }
12403 +       read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12404 +#endif
12405 +
12406         sock_hold(newsk);
12407         unix_peer(sk)=newsk;
12408         sock->state=SS_CONNECTED;