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1 | From d29d73fa5d7b5d016f9c17236fff2a741acea247 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |
2 | From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
3 | Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700 | |
4 | Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules | |
5 | ||
6 | Base support for network mediation. | |
7 | ||
8 | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
9 | ||
10 | Conflicts: | |
11 | security/apparmor/Makefile | |
12 | security/apparmor/policy.c | |
13 | --- | |
14 | security/apparmor/.gitignore | 1 + | |
15 | security/apparmor/Makefile | 42 +++++++++- | |
16 | security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 1 + | |
17 | security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 4 + | |
18 | security/apparmor/include/net.h | 44 ++++++++++ | |
19 | security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 3 + | |
20 | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ | |
21 | security/apparmor/net.c | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | |
22 | security/apparmor/policy.c | 1 + | |
23 | security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 46 +++++++++++ | |
24 | 10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) | |
25 | create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h | |
26 | create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c | |
27 | ||
28 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore | |
29 | index 9cdec70..d5b291e 100644 | |
30 | --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore | |
31 | +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore | |
32 | @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ | |
33 | # | |
34 | # Generated include files | |
35 | # | |
36 | +net_names.h | |
37 | capability_names.h | |
38 | rlim_names.h | |
39 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
40 | index d693df8..5dbb72f 100644 | |
41 | --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
42 | +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
43 | @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o | |
44 | ||
45 | apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ | |
46 | path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ | |
47 | - resource.o sid.o file.o | |
48 | + resource.o sid.o file.o net.o | |
49 | apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o | |
50 | ||
51 | -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h | |
52 | +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h | |
53 | ||
54 | ||
55 | # Build a lower case string table of capability names | |
56 | @@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ | |
57 | -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \ | |
58 | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ | |
59 | ||
60 | +# Build a lower case string table of address family names | |
61 | +# Transform lines from | |
62 | +# define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */ | |
63 | +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ | |
64 | +# to | |
65 | +# [1] = "local", | |
66 | +# [2] = "inet", | |
67 | +# | |
68 | +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping. | |
69 | +# Transforms lines from | |
70 | +# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */ | |
71 | +# to | |
72 | +# #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet" | |
73 | +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@ | |
74 | +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\ | |
75 | + sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \ | |
76 | + 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ | |
77 | + echo "};" >> $@ ;\ | |
78 | + echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\ | |
79 | + sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\ | |
80 | + $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ | |
81 | + | |
82 | +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names | |
83 | +# Transform lines from | |
84 | +# SOCK_STREAM = 1, | |
85 | +# to | |
86 | +# [1] = "stream", | |
87 | +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@ | |
88 | +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\ | |
89 | + sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \ | |
90 | + -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\ | |
91 | + echo "};" >> $@ | |
92 | ||
93 | # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names. | |
94 | # Transforms lines from | |
95 | @@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \ | |
96 | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@ | |
97 | ||
98 | $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h | |
99 | +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h | |
100 | $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h | |
101 | $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ | |
102 | $(src)/Makefile | |
103 | @@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \ | |
104 | $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \ | |
105 | $(src)/Makefile | |
106 | $(call cmd,make-rlim) | |
107 | +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \ | |
108 | + $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \ | |
109 | + $(src)/Makefile | |
110 | + $(call cmd,make-af) | |
111 | + $(call cmd,make-sock) | |
112 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
113 | index 7db9954..18fc02c 100644 | |
114 | --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
115 | +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
116 | @@ -806,6 +806,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = { | |
117 | AA_FS_DIR("policy", aa_fs_entry_policy), | |
118 | AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain), | |
119 | AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file), | |
120 | + AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network), | |
121 | AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), | |
122 | AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit), | |
123 | AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps), | |
124 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
125 | index 30e8d76..61abec5 100644 | |
126 | --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
127 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
128 | @@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { | |
129 | u32 denied; | |
130 | kuid_t ouid; | |
131 | } fs; | |
132 | + struct { | |
133 | + int type, protocol; | |
134 | + struct sock *sk; | |
135 | + } net; | |
136 | }; | |
137 | }; | |
138 | ||
139 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h | |
140 | new file mode 100644 | |
141 | index 0000000..cb8a121 | |
142 | --- /dev/null | |
143 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h | |
144 | @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ | |
145 | +/* | |
146 | + * AppArmor security module | |
147 | + * | |
148 | + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions. | |
149 | + * | |
150 | + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE | |
151 | + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. | |
152 | + * | |
153 | + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
154 | + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | |
155 | + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | |
156 | + * License. | |
157 | + */ | |
158 | + | |
159 | +#ifndef __AA_NET_H | |
160 | +#define __AA_NET_H | |
161 | + | |
162 | +#include <net/sock.h> | |
163 | + | |
164 | +#include "apparmorfs.h" | |
165 | + | |
166 | +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data | |
167 | + * @allowed: basic network families permissions | |
168 | + * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit | |
169 | + * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects | |
170 | + */ | |
171 | +struct aa_net { | |
172 | + u16 allow[AF_MAX]; | |
173 | + u16 audit[AF_MAX]; | |
174 | + u16 quiet[AF_MAX]; | |
175 | +}; | |
176 | + | |
177 | +extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[]; | |
178 | + | |
179 | +extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, | |
180 | + int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk); | |
181 | +extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk); | |
182 | + | |
183 | +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new) | |
184 | +{ | |
185 | + /* NOP */ | |
186 | +} | |
187 | + | |
188 | +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */ | |
189 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h | |
190 | index c28b0f2..b524d88 100644 | |
191 | --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h | |
192 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h | |
193 | @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ | |
194 | #include "capability.h" | |
195 | #include "domain.h" | |
196 | #include "file.h" | |
197 | +#include "net.h" | |
198 | #include "resource.h" | |
199 | ||
200 | extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[]; | |
201 | @@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ struct aa_replacedby { | |
202 | * @policy: general match rules governing policy | |
203 | * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions | |
204 | * @caps: capabilities for the profile | |
205 | + * @net: network controls for the profile | |
206 | * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile | |
207 | * | |
208 | * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs | |
209 | @@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ struct aa_profile { | |
210 | struct aa_policydb policy; | |
211 | struct aa_file_rules file; | |
212 | struct aa_caps caps; | |
213 | + struct aa_net net; | |
214 | struct aa_rlimit rlimits; | |
215 | ||
216 | unsigned char *hash; | |
217 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
218 | index fb99e18..de55a7f 100644 | |
219 | --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
220 | +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
221 | @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ | |
222 | #include "include/context.h" | |
223 | #include "include/file.h" | |
224 | #include "include/ipc.h" | |
225 | +#include "include/net.h" | |
226 | #include "include/path.h" | |
227 | #include "include/policy.h" | |
228 | #include "include/procattr.h" | |
229 | @@ -615,6 +616,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, | |
230 | return error; | |
231 | } | |
232 | ||
233 | +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) | |
234 | +{ | |
235 | + struct aa_profile *profile; | |
236 | + int error = 0; | |
237 | + | |
238 | + if (kern) | |
239 | + return 0; | |
240 | + | |
241 | + profile = __aa_current_profile(); | |
242 | + if (!unconfined(profile)) | |
243 | + error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol, | |
244 | + NULL); | |
245 | + return error; | |
246 | +} | |
247 | + | |
248 | +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, | |
249 | + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
250 | +{ | |
251 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
252 | + | |
253 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk); | |
254 | +} | |
255 | + | |
256 | +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, | |
257 | + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) | |
258 | +{ | |
259 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
260 | + | |
261 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk); | |
262 | +} | |
263 | + | |
264 | +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) | |
265 | +{ | |
266 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
267 | + | |
268 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk); | |
269 | +} | |
270 | + | |
271 | +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) | |
272 | +{ | |
273 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
274 | + | |
275 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk); | |
276 | +} | |
277 | + | |
278 | +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, | |
279 | + struct msghdr *msg, int size) | |
280 | +{ | |
281 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
282 | + | |
283 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk); | |
284 | +} | |
285 | + | |
286 | +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, | |
287 | + struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) | |
288 | +{ | |
289 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
290 | + | |
291 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk); | |
292 | +} | |
293 | + | |
294 | +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) | |
295 | +{ | |
296 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
297 | + | |
298 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk); | |
299 | +} | |
300 | + | |
301 | +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) | |
302 | +{ | |
303 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
304 | + | |
305 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk); | |
306 | +} | |
307 | + | |
308 | +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
309 | + int optname) | |
310 | +{ | |
311 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
312 | + | |
313 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk); | |
314 | +} | |
315 | + | |
316 | +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, | |
317 | + int optname) | |
318 | +{ | |
319 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
320 | + | |
321 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk); | |
322 | +} | |
323 | + | |
324 | +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) | |
325 | +{ | |
326 | + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; | |
327 | + | |
328 | + return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk); | |
329 | +} | |
330 | + | |
331 | static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { | |
332 | .name = "apparmor", | |
333 | ||
334 | @@ -647,6 +746,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { | |
335 | .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, | |
336 | .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, | |
337 | ||
338 | + .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create, | |
339 | + .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind, | |
340 | + .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect, | |
341 | + .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen, | |
342 | + .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept, | |
343 | + .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg, | |
344 | + .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg, | |
345 | + .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname, | |
346 | + .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername, | |
347 | + .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt, | |
348 | + .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt, | |
349 | + .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown, | |
350 | + | |
351 | .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, | |
352 | .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, | |
353 | .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, | |
354 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c | |
355 | new file mode 100644 | |
356 | index 0000000..003dd18 | |
357 | --- /dev/null | |
358 | +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c | |
359 | @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ | |
360 | +/* | |
361 | + * AppArmor security module | |
362 | + * | |
363 | + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation | |
364 | + * | |
365 | + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE | |
366 | + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. | |
367 | + * | |
368 | + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
369 | + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | |
370 | + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | |
371 | + * License. | |
372 | + */ | |
373 | + | |
374 | +#include "include/apparmor.h" | |
375 | +#include "include/audit.h" | |
376 | +#include "include/context.h" | |
377 | +#include "include/net.h" | |
378 | +#include "include/policy.h" | |
379 | + | |
380 | +#include "net_names.h" | |
381 | + | |
382 | +struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = { | |
383 | + AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK), | |
384 | + { } | |
385 | +}; | |
386 | + | |
387 | +/* audit callback for net specific fields */ | |
388 | +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) | |
389 | +{ | |
390 | + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; | |
391 | + | |
392 | + audit_log_format(ab, " family="); | |
393 | + if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) { | |
394 | + audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]); | |
395 | + } else { | |
396 | + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family); | |
397 | + } | |
398 | + audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type="); | |
399 | + if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) { | |
400 | + audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]); | |
401 | + } else { | |
402 | + audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type); | |
403 | + } | |
404 | + audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol); | |
405 | +} | |
406 | + | |
407 | +/** | |
408 | + * audit_net - audit network access | |
409 | + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) | |
410 | + * @op: operation being checked | |
411 | + * @family: network family | |
412 | + * @type: network type | |
413 | + * @protocol: network protocol | |
414 | + * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to | |
415 | + * @error: error code for failure else 0 | |
416 | + * | |
417 | + * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure | |
418 | + */ | |
419 | +static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type, | |
420 | + int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error) | |
421 | +{ | |
422 | + int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; | |
423 | + struct common_audit_data sa; | |
424 | + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { }; | |
425 | + struct lsm_network_audit net = { }; | |
426 | + if (sk) { | |
427 | + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; | |
428 | + } else { | |
429 | + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; | |
430 | + } | |
431 | + /* todo fill in socket addr info */ | |
432 | + sa.aad = &aad; | |
433 | + sa.u.net = &net; | |
434 | + sa.aad->op = op, | |
435 | + sa.u.net->family = family; | |
436 | + sa.u.net->sk = sk; | |
437 | + sa.aad->net.type = type; | |
438 | + sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol; | |
439 | + sa.aad->error = error; | |
440 | + | |
441 | + if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) { | |
442 | + u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family]; | |
443 | + if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) && | |
444 | + !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask))) | |
445 | + return 0; | |
446 | + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; | |
447 | + } else { | |
448 | + u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family]; | |
449 | + u16 kill_mask = 0; | |
450 | + u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask; | |
451 | + | |
452 | + if (denied & kill_mask) | |
453 | + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; | |
454 | + | |
455 | + if ((denied & quiet_mask) && | |
456 | + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && | |
457 | + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) | |
458 | + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error; | |
459 | + } | |
460 | + | |
461 | + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); | |
462 | +} | |
463 | + | |
464 | +/** | |
465 | + * aa_net_perm - very course network access check | |
466 | + * @op: operation being checked | |
467 | + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) | |
468 | + * @family: network family | |
469 | + * @type: network type | |
470 | + * @protocol: network protocol | |
471 | + * | |
472 | + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied | |
473 | + */ | |
474 | +int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type, | |
475 | + int protocol, struct sock *sk) | |
476 | +{ | |
477 | + u16 family_mask; | |
478 | + int error; | |
479 | + | |
480 | + if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX)) | |
481 | + return -EINVAL; | |
482 | + | |
483 | + if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX)) | |
484 | + return -EINVAL; | |
485 | + | |
486 | + /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */ | |
487 | + if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK) | |
488 | + return 0; | |
489 | + | |
490 | + family_mask = profile->net.allow[family]; | |
491 | + | |
492 | + error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES; | |
493 | + | |
494 | + return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error); | |
495 | +} | |
496 | + | |
497 | +/** | |
498 | + * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock | |
499 | + * @op: operation being checked | |
500 | + * @sk: sock being revalidated (NOT NULL) | |
501 | + * | |
502 | + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied | |
503 | + */ | |
504 | +int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk) | |
505 | +{ | |
506 | + struct aa_profile *profile; | |
507 | + int error = 0; | |
508 | + | |
509 | + /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context | |
510 | + * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related | |
511 | + */ | |
512 | + if (in_interrupt()) | |
513 | + return 0; | |
514 | + | |
515 | + profile = __aa_current_profile(); | |
516 | + if (!unconfined(profile)) | |
517 | + error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type, | |
518 | + sk->sk_protocol, sk); | |
519 | + | |
520 | + return error; | |
521 | +} | |
522 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c | |
523 | index 705c287..e2afe29 100644 | |
524 | --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c | |
525 | +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c | |
526 | @@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) | |
527 | ||
528 | aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file); | |
529 | aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps); | |
530 | + aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net); | |
531 | aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits); | |
532 | ||
533 | kzfree(profile->dirname); | |
534 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | |
535 | index a689f10..1a35e6b 100644 | |
536 | --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | |
537 | +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | |
538 | @@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail: | |
539 | return 0; | |
540 | } | |
541 | ||
542 | +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name) | |
543 | +{ | |
544 | + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) { | |
545 | + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) | |
546 | + return 0; | |
547 | + if (data) | |
548 | + *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos)); | |
549 | + e->pos += sizeof(u16); | |
550 | + return 1; | |
551 | + } | |
552 | + return 0; | |
553 | +} | |
554 | + | |
555 | static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) | |
556 | { | |
557 | if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { | |
558 | @@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) | |
559 | { | |
560 | struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; | |
561 | const char *name = NULL; | |
562 | + size_t size = 0; | |
563 | int i, error = -EPROTO; | |
564 | kernel_cap_t tmpcap; | |
565 | u32 tmp; | |
566 | @@ -576,6 +590,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) | |
567 | if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) | |
568 | goto fail; | |
569 | ||
570 | + size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af"); | |
571 | + if (size) { | |
572 | + | |
573 | + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { | |
574 | + /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will | |
575 | + * never request | |
576 | + */ | |
577 | + if (i >= AF_MAX) { | |
578 | + u16 tmp; | |
579 | + if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || | |
580 | + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) || | |
581 | + !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL)) | |
582 | + goto fail; | |
583 | + continue; | |
584 | + } | |
585 | + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL)) | |
586 | + goto fail; | |
587 | + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL)) | |
588 | + goto fail; | |
589 | + if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL)) | |
590 | + goto fail; | |
591 | + } | |
592 | + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) | |
593 | + goto fail; | |
594 | + } | |
595 | + /* | |
596 | + * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled | |
597 | + * by IPC | |
598 | + */ | |
599 | + profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff; | |
600 | + profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff; | |
601 | + | |
602 | if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { | |
603 | /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ | |
604 | profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); | |
605 | -- | |
606 | 1.8.3.2 | |
607 | ||
608 | From b452a37e97af826ba6c7548230e07c95bd13d9c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |
609 | From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
610 | Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2012 17:34:00 -0700 | |
611 | Subject: [PATCH 2/3] apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network | |
612 | mediation | |
613 | ||
614 | If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by | |
615 | either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for | |
616 | denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs. | |
617 | 1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly | |
618 | tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that | |
619 | should have resulted in the application being killed did not. | |
620 | ||
621 | 2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied. | |
622 | This would result in network rejections always being logged even when | |
623 | they had been specifically marked as quieted. | |
624 | ||
625 | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
626 | --- | |
627 | security/apparmor/net.c | 2 +- | |
628 | 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) | |
629 | ||
630 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c | |
631 | index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644 | |
632 | --- a/security/apparmor/net.c | |
633 | +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c | |
634 | @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type, | |
635 | } else { | |
636 | u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family]; | |
637 | u16 kill_mask = 0; | |
638 | - u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask; | |
639 | + u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type); | |
640 | ||
641 | if (denied & kill_mask) | |
642 | audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; | |
643 | -- | |
644 | 1.8.3.2 | |
645 | ||
646 | From 0f113c1f052be315f5097d8b7294a620b0adda87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 | |
647 | From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
648 | Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700 | |
649 | Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount | |
650 | ||
651 | Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount | |
652 | rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation. | |
653 | ||
654 | The basic form of the rules are. | |
655 | ||
656 | [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path], | |
657 | [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path], | |
658 | [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path], | |
659 | [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path> | |
660 | ||
661 | remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount | |
662 | ||
663 | where [conds] can be | |
664 | fstype=<expr> | |
665 | options=<expr> | |
666 | ||
667 | Example mount commands | |
668 | mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot | |
669 | ||
670 | mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere | |
671 | ||
672 | mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount | |
673 | ||
674 | mount /dev/sda -> /mnt, | |
675 | ||
676 | mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**, | |
677 | ||
678 | mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/ | |
679 | ||
680 | umount, | |
681 | ||
682 | umount /m*, | |
683 | ||
684 | See the apparmor userspace for full documentation | |
685 | ||
686 | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | |
687 | Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> | |
688 | ||
689 | Conflicts: | |
690 | security/apparmor/Makefile | |
691 | security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
692 | --- | |
693 | security/apparmor/Makefile | 2 +- | |
694 | security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 15 +- | |
695 | security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 + | |
696 | security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +- | |
697 | security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- | |
698 | security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 11 + | |
699 | security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 2 + | |
700 | security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 54 +++ | |
701 | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 59 ++++ | |
702 | security/apparmor/mount.c | 620 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ | |
703 | 10 files changed, 768 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) | |
704 | create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h | |
705 | create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c | |
706 | ||
707 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
708 | index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644 | |
709 | --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
710 | +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile | |
711 | @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o | |
712 | ||
713 | apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ | |
714 | path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ | |
715 | - resource.o sid.o file.o net.o | |
716 | + resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o | |
717 | apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o | |
718 | ||
719 | clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h | |
720 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
721 | index 18fc02c..e709030 100644 | |
722 | --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
723 | +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | |
724 | @@ -799,7 +799,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = { | |
725 | ||
726 | static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = { | |
727 | AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1), | |
728 | - {} | |
729 | + { } | |
730 | +}; | |
731 | + | |
732 | +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = { | |
733 | + AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"), | |
734 | + { } | |
735 | +}; | |
736 | + | |
737 | +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = { | |
738 | + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), | |
739 | + AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1), | |
740 | + { } | |
741 | }; | |
742 | ||
743 | static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = { | |
744 | @@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = { | |
745 | AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain), | |
746 | AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file), | |
747 | AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network), | |
748 | + AA_FS_DIR("mount", aa_fs_entry_mount), | |
749 | + AA_FS_DIR("namespaces", aa_fs_entry_namespaces), | |
750 | AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), | |
751 | AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit), | |
752 | AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps), | |
753 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c | |
754 | index 031d2d9..02d804c 100644 | |
755 | --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c | |
756 | +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c | |
757 | @@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = { | |
758 | "file_mmap", | |
759 | "file_mprotect", | |
760 | ||
761 | + "pivotroot", | |
762 | + "mount", | |
763 | + "umount", | |
764 | + | |
765 | "create", | |
766 | "post_create", | |
767 | "bind", | |
768 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c | |
769 | index 26c607c..23936c5 100644 | |
770 | --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c | |
771 | +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c | |
772 | @@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) | |
773 | * | |
774 | * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) | |
775 | */ | |
776 | -static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) | |
777 | +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) | |
778 | { | |
779 | struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; | |
780 | struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; | |
781 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | |
782 | index 8fb1488..22b172c 100644 | |
783 | --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | |
784 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | |
785 | @@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ | |
786 | #define AA_CLASS_NET 4 | |
787 | #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 | |
788 | #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 | |
789 | +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7 | |
790 | ||
791 | -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN | |
792 | +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_MOUNT | |
793 | ||
794 | /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ | |
795 | extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; | |
796 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
797 | index 61abec5..a9835c3 100644 | |
798 | --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
799 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h | |
800 | @@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ enum aa_ops { | |
801 | OP_FMMAP, | |
802 | OP_FMPROT, | |
803 | ||
804 | + OP_PIVOTROOT, | |
805 | + OP_MOUNT, | |
806 | + OP_UMOUNT, | |
807 | + | |
808 | OP_CREATE, | |
809 | OP_POST_CREATE, | |
810 | OP_BIND, | |
811 | @@ -121,6 +125,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { | |
812 | unsigned long max; | |
813 | } rlim; | |
814 | struct { | |
815 | + const char *src_name; | |
816 | + const char *type; | |
817 | + const char *trans; | |
818 | + const char *data; | |
819 | + unsigned long flags; | |
820 | + } mnt; | |
821 | + struct { | |
822 | const char *target; | |
823 | u32 request; | |
824 | u32 denied; | |
825 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h | |
826 | index de04464..a3f70c5 100644 | |
827 | --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h | |
828 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h | |
829 | @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain { | |
830 | char **table; | |
831 | }; | |
832 | ||
833 | +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex); | |
834 | + | |
835 | int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); | |
836 | int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); | |
837 | void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); | |
838 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h | |
839 | new file mode 100644 | |
840 | index 0000000..bc17a53 | |
841 | --- /dev/null | |
842 | +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h | |
843 | @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ | |
844 | +/* | |
845 | + * AppArmor security module | |
846 | + * | |
847 | + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions. | |
848 | + * | |
849 | + * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd. | |
850 | + * | |
851 | + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
852 | + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | |
853 | + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | |
854 | + * License. | |
855 | + */ | |
856 | + | |
857 | +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H | |
858 | +#define __AA_MOUNT_H | |
859 | + | |
860 | +#include <linux/fs.h> | |
861 | +#include <linux/path.h> | |
862 | + | |
863 | +#include "domain.h" | |
864 | +#include "policy.h" | |
865 | + | |
866 | +/* mount perms */ | |
867 | +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01 | |
868 | +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02 | |
869 | +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04 | |
870 | +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40 | |
871 | +#define AA_CONT_MATCH 0x40 | |
872 | + | |
873 | +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN) | |
874 | + | |
875 | +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
876 | + unsigned long flags, void *data); | |
877 | + | |
878 | +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
879 | + const char *old_name, unsigned long flags); | |
880 | + | |
881 | + | |
882 | +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
883 | + unsigned long flags); | |
884 | + | |
885 | +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
886 | + const char *old_name); | |
887 | + | |
888 | +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name, | |
889 | + struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, | |
890 | + void *data); | |
891 | + | |
892 | +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); | |
893 | + | |
894 | +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path, | |
895 | + struct path *new_path); | |
896 | + | |
897 | +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */ | |
898 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
899 | index de55a7f..e0dd95f 100644 | |
900 | --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
901 | +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c | |
902 | @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ | |
903 | #include "include/path.h" | |
904 | #include "include/policy.h" | |
905 | #include "include/procattr.h" | |
906 | +#include "include/mount.h" | |
907 | ||
908 | /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ | |
909 | int apparmor_initialized __initdata; | |
910 | @@ -502,6 +503,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, | |
911 | !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); | |
912 | } | |
913 | ||
914 | +static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, | |
915 | + unsigned long flags, void *data) | |
916 | +{ | |
917 | + struct aa_profile *profile; | |
918 | + int error = 0; | |
919 | + | |
920 | + /* Discard magic */ | |
921 | + if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) | |
922 | + flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; | |
923 | + | |
924 | + flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; | |
925 | + | |
926 | + profile = __aa_current_profile(); | |
927 | + if (!unconfined(profile)) { | |
928 | + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
929 | + error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data); | |
930 | + else if (flags & MS_BIND) | |
931 | + error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags); | |
932 | + else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | | |
933 | + MS_UNBINDABLE)) | |
934 | + error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags); | |
935 | + else if (flags & MS_MOVE) | |
936 | + error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name); | |
937 | + else | |
938 | + error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type, | |
939 | + flags, data); | |
940 | + } | |
941 | + return error; | |
942 | +} | |
943 | + | |
944 | +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
945 | +{ | |
946 | + struct aa_profile *profile; | |
947 | + int error = 0; | |
948 | + | |
949 | + profile = __aa_current_profile(); | |
950 | + if (!unconfined(profile)) | |
951 | + error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags); | |
952 | + | |
953 | + return error; | |
954 | +} | |
955 | + | |
956 | +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) | |
957 | +{ | |
958 | + struct aa_profile *profile; | |
959 | + int error = 0; | |
960 | + | |
961 | + profile = __aa_current_profile(); | |
962 | + if (!unconfined(profile)) | |
963 | + error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path); | |
964 | + | |
965 | + return error; | |
966 | +} | |
967 | + | |
968 | static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, | |
969 | char **value) | |
970 | { | |
971 | @@ -722,6 +777,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { | |
972 | .capget = apparmor_capget, | |
973 | .capable = apparmor_capable, | |
974 | ||
975 | + .sb_mount = apparmor_sb_mount, | |
976 | + .sb_umount = apparmor_sb_umount, | |
977 | + .sb_pivotroot = apparmor_sb_pivotroot, | |
978 | + | |
979 | .path_link = apparmor_path_link, | |
980 | .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, | |
981 | .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, | |
982 | diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c | |
983 | new file mode 100644 | |
984 | index 0000000..478aa4d | |
985 | --- /dev/null | |
986 | +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c | |
987 | @@ -0,0 +1,620 @@ | |
988 | +/* | |
989 | + * AppArmor security module | |
990 | + * | |
991 | + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files | |
992 | + * | |
993 | + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE | |
994 | + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. | |
995 | + * | |
996 | + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or | |
997 | + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as | |
998 | + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the | |
999 | + * License. | |
1000 | + */ | |
1001 | + | |
1002 | +#include <linux/fs.h> | |
1003 | +#include <linux/mount.h> | |
1004 | +#include <linux/namei.h> | |
1005 | + | |
1006 | +#include "include/apparmor.h" | |
1007 | +#include "include/audit.h" | |
1008 | +#include "include/context.h" | |
1009 | +#include "include/domain.h" | |
1010 | +#include "include/file.h" | |
1011 | +#include "include/match.h" | |
1012 | +#include "include/mount.h" | |
1013 | +#include "include/path.h" | |
1014 | +#include "include/policy.h" | |
1015 | + | |
1016 | + | |
1017 | +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) | |
1018 | +{ | |
1019 | + if (flags & MS_RDONLY) | |
1020 | + audit_log_format(ab, "ro"); | |
1021 | + else | |
1022 | + audit_log_format(ab, "rw"); | |
1023 | + if (flags & MS_NOSUID) | |
1024 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid"); | |
1025 | + if (flags & MS_NODEV) | |
1026 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev"); | |
1027 | + if (flags & MS_NOEXEC) | |
1028 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec"); | |
1029 | + if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS) | |
1030 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", sync"); | |
1031 | + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) | |
1032 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", remount"); | |
1033 | + if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK) | |
1034 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", mand"); | |
1035 | + if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC) | |
1036 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync"); | |
1037 | + if (flags & MS_NOATIME) | |
1038 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime"); | |
1039 | + if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME) | |
1040 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime"); | |
1041 | + if (flags & MS_BIND) | |
1042 | + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind"); | |
1043 | + if (flags & MS_MOVE) | |
1044 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", move"); | |
1045 | + if (flags & MS_SILENT) | |
1046 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", silent"); | |
1047 | + if (flags & MS_POSIXACL) | |
1048 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", acl"); | |
1049 | + if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) | |
1050 | + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" : | |
1051 | + ", unbindable"); | |
1052 | + if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) | |
1053 | + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" : | |
1054 | + ", private"); | |
1055 | + if (flags & MS_SLAVE) | |
1056 | + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" : | |
1057 | + ", slave"); | |
1058 | + if (flags & MS_SHARED) | |
1059 | + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" : | |
1060 | + ", shared"); | |
1061 | + if (flags & MS_RELATIME) | |
1062 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime"); | |
1063 | + if (flags & MS_I_VERSION) | |
1064 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion"); | |
1065 | + if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME) | |
1066 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime"); | |
1067 | + if (flags & MS_NOUSER) | |
1068 | + audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser"); | |
1069 | +} | |
1070 | + | |
1071 | +/** | |
1072 | + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields | |
1073 | + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) | |
1074 | + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) | |
1075 | + */ | |
1076 | +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) | |
1077 | +{ | |
1078 | + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; | |
1079 | + | |
1080 | + if (sa->aad->mnt.type) { | |
1081 | + audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); | |
1082 | + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type); | |
1083 | + } | |
1084 | + if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) { | |
1085 | + audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); | |
1086 | + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name); | |
1087 | + } | |
1088 | + if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) { | |
1089 | + audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); | |
1090 | + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans); | |
1091 | + } | |
1092 | + if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) { | |
1093 | + audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\""); | |
1094 | + audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags); | |
1095 | + audit_log_format(ab, "\""); | |
1096 | + } | |
1097 | + if (sa->aad->mnt.data) { | |
1098 | + audit_log_format(ab, " options="); | |
1099 | + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data); | |
1100 | + } | |
1101 | +} | |
1102 | + | |
1103 | +/** | |
1104 | + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations | |
1105 | + * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) | |
1106 | + * @gfp: allocation flags | |
1107 | + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL) | |
1108 | + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) | |
1109 | + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL) | |
1110 | + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL) | |
1111 | + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL) | |
1112 | + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags | |
1113 | + * @data: filesystem mount flags | |
1114 | + * @request: permissions requested | |
1115 | + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) | |
1116 | + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL) | |
1117 | + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code | |
1118 | + * | |
1119 | + * Returns: %0 or error on failure | |
1120 | + */ | |
1121 | +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op, | |
1122 | + const char *name, const char *src_name, | |
1123 | + const char *type, const char *trans, | |
1124 | + unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request, | |
1125 | + struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) | |
1126 | +{ | |
1127 | + int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; | |
1128 | + struct common_audit_data sa = { }; | |
1129 | + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { }; | |
1130 | + | |
1131 | + if (likely(!error)) { | |
1132 | + u32 mask = perms->audit; | |
1133 | + | |
1134 | + if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) | |
1135 | + mask = 0xffff; | |
1136 | + | |
1137 | + /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ | |
1138 | + request &= mask; | |
1139 | + | |
1140 | + if (likely(!request)) | |
1141 | + return 0; | |
1142 | + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; | |
1143 | + } else { | |
1144 | + /* only report permissions that were denied */ | |
1145 | + request = request & ~perms->allow; | |
1146 | + | |
1147 | + if (request & perms->kill) | |
1148 | + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; | |
1149 | + | |
1150 | + /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ | |
1151 | + if ((request & perms->quiet) && | |
1152 | + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && | |
1153 | + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) | |
1154 | + request &= ~perms->quiet; | |
1155 | + | |
1156 | + if (!request) | |
1157 | + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? | |
1158 | + complain_error(error) : error; | |
1159 | + } | |
1160 | + | |
1161 | + sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE; | |
1162 | + sa.aad = &aad; | |
1163 | + sa.aad->op = op; | |
1164 | + sa.aad->name = name; | |
1165 | + sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name; | |
1166 | + sa.aad->mnt.type = type; | |
1167 | + sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans; | |
1168 | + sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags; | |
1169 | + if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) | |
1170 | + sa.aad->mnt.data = data; | |
1171 | + sa.aad->info = info; | |
1172 | + sa.aad->error = error; | |
1173 | + | |
1174 | + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb); | |
1175 | +} | |
1176 | + | |
1177 | +/** | |
1178 | + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags | |
1179 | + * @dfa: dfa to match against | |
1180 | + * @state: state to start in | |
1181 | + * @flags: mount flags to match against | |
1182 | + * | |
1183 | + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of | |
1184 | + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations | |
1185 | + * on the flags. | |
1186 | + * | |
1187 | + * Returns: next state after flags match | |
1188 | + */ | |
1189 | +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, | |
1190 | + unsigned long flags) | |
1191 | +{ | |
1192 | + unsigned int i; | |
1193 | + | |
1194 | + for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) { | |
1195 | + if ((1 << i) & flags) | |
1196 | + state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1); | |
1197 | + } | |
1198 | + | |
1199 | + return state; | |
1200 | +} | |
1201 | + | |
1202 | +/** | |
1203 | + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state | |
1204 | + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL) | |
1205 | + * @state: state match finished in | |
1206 | + * | |
1207 | + * Returns: mount permissions | |
1208 | + */ | |
1209 | +static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, | |
1210 | + unsigned int state) | |
1211 | +{ | |
1212 | + struct file_perms perms; | |
1213 | + | |
1214 | + perms.kill = 0; | |
1215 | + perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); | |
1216 | + perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); | |
1217 | + perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); | |
1218 | + perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); | |
1219 | + | |
1220 | + return perms; | |
1221 | +} | |
1222 | + | |
1223 | +static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = { | |
1224 | + "match succeeded", | |
1225 | + "failed mntpnt match", | |
1226 | + "failed srcname match", | |
1227 | + "failed type match", | |
1228 | + "failed flags match", | |
1229 | + "failed data match" | |
1230 | +}; | |
1231 | + | |
1232 | +/* | |
1233 | + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the | |
1234 | + * index into the mnt_info_table above | |
1235 | + */ | |
1236 | +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, | |
1237 | + const char *mntpnt, const char *devname, | |
1238 | + const char *type, unsigned long flags, | |
1239 | + void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms) | |
1240 | +{ | |
1241 | + unsigned int state; | |
1242 | + | |
1243 | + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt); | |
1244 | + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); | |
1245 | + if (!state) | |
1246 | + return 1; | |
1247 | + | |
1248 | + if (devname) | |
1249 | + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname); | |
1250 | + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); | |
1251 | + if (!state) | |
1252 | + return 2; | |
1253 | + | |
1254 | + if (type) | |
1255 | + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type); | |
1256 | + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); | |
1257 | + if (!state) | |
1258 | + return 3; | |
1259 | + | |
1260 | + state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags); | |
1261 | + if (!state) | |
1262 | + return 4; | |
1263 | + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); | |
1264 | + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) | |
1265 | + return 0; | |
1266 | + | |
1267 | + /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */ | |
1268 | + if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) { | |
1269 | + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); | |
1270 | + if (!state) | |
1271 | + return 4; | |
1272 | + | |
1273 | + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data); | |
1274 | + if (!state) | |
1275 | + return 5; | |
1276 | + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); | |
1277 | + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) | |
1278 | + return 0; | |
1279 | + } | |
1280 | + | |
1281 | + /* failed at end of flags match */ | |
1282 | + return 4; | |
1283 | +} | |
1284 | + | |
1285 | +/** | |
1286 | + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount | |
1287 | + * @profile: the confining profile | |
1288 | + * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) | |
1289 | + * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL) | |
1290 | + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) | |
1291 | + * @flags: mount flags to match | |
1292 | + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) | |
1293 | + * @binary: whether @data is binary | |
1294 | + * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match | |
1295 | + * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging | |
1296 | + * | |
1297 | + * Returns: 0 on success else error | |
1298 | + */ | |
1299 | +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt, | |
1300 | + const char *devname, const char *type, | |
1301 | + unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary, | |
1302 | + struct file_perms *perms, const char **info) | |
1303 | +{ | |
1304 | + int pos; | |
1305 | + | |
1306 | + if (!profile->policy.dfa) | |
1307 | + return -EACCES; | |
1308 | + | |
1309 | + pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa, | |
1310 | + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], | |
1311 | + mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms); | |
1312 | + if (pos) { | |
1313 | + *info = mnt_info_table[pos]; | |
1314 | + return -EACCES; | |
1315 | + } | |
1316 | + | |
1317 | + return 0; | |
1318 | +} | |
1319 | + | |
1320 | +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path) | |
1321 | +{ | |
1322 | + return profile->path_flags | | |
1323 | + S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0; | |
1324 | +} | |
1325 | + | |
1326 | +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
1327 | + unsigned long flags, void *data) | |
1328 | +{ | |
1329 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1330 | + const char *name, *info = NULL; | |
1331 | + char *buffer = NULL; | |
1332 | + int binary, error; | |
1333 | + | |
1334 | + binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; | |
1335 | + | |
1336 | + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, | |
1337 | + &info); | |
1338 | + if (error) | |
1339 | + goto audit; | |
1340 | + | |
1341 | + error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary, | |
1342 | + &perms, &info); | |
1343 | + | |
1344 | +audit: | |
1345 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, | |
1346 | + NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, | |
1347 | + error); | |
1348 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1349 | + | |
1350 | + return error; | |
1351 | +} | |
1352 | + | |
1353 | +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
1354 | + const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags) | |
1355 | +{ | |
1356 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1357 | + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; | |
1358 | + const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL; | |
1359 | + struct path old_path; | |
1360 | + int error; | |
1361 | + | |
1362 | + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) | |
1363 | + return -EINVAL; | |
1364 | + | |
1365 | + flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND; | |
1366 | + | |
1367 | + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, | |
1368 | + &info); | |
1369 | + if (error) | |
1370 | + goto audit; | |
1371 | + | |
1372 | + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path); | |
1373 | + if (error) | |
1374 | + goto audit; | |
1375 | + | |
1376 | + error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path), | |
1377 | + &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); | |
1378 | + path_put(&old_path); | |
1379 | + if (error) | |
1380 | + goto audit; | |
1381 | + | |
1382 | + error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, | |
1383 | + &perms, &info); | |
1384 | + | |
1385 | +audit: | |
1386 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name, | |
1387 | + NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, | |
1388 | + info, error); | |
1389 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1390 | + kfree(old_buffer); | |
1391 | + | |
1392 | + return error; | |
1393 | +} | |
1394 | + | |
1395 | +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
1396 | + unsigned long flags) | |
1397 | +{ | |
1398 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1399 | + char *buffer = NULL; | |
1400 | + const char *name, *info = NULL; | |
1401 | + int error; | |
1402 | + | |
1403 | + /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */ | |
1404 | + flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | | |
1405 | + MS_UNBINDABLE); | |
1406 | + | |
1407 | + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, | |
1408 | + &info); | |
1409 | + if (error) | |
1410 | + goto audit; | |
1411 | + | |
1412 | + error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms, | |
1413 | + &info); | |
1414 | + | |
1415 | +audit: | |
1416 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, | |
1417 | + NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, | |
1418 | + error); | |
1419 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1420 | + | |
1421 | + return error; | |
1422 | +} | |
1423 | + | |
1424 | +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, | |
1425 | + const char *orig_name) | |
1426 | +{ | |
1427 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1428 | + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; | |
1429 | + const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL; | |
1430 | + struct path old_path; | |
1431 | + int error; | |
1432 | + | |
1433 | + if (!orig_name || !*orig_name) | |
1434 | + return -EINVAL; | |
1435 | + | |
1436 | + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, | |
1437 | + &info); | |
1438 | + if (error) | |
1439 | + goto audit; | |
1440 | + | |
1441 | + error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path); | |
1442 | + if (error) | |
1443 | + goto audit; | |
1444 | + | |
1445 | + error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path), | |
1446 | + &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); | |
1447 | + path_put(&old_path); | |
1448 | + if (error) | |
1449 | + goto audit; | |
1450 | + | |
1451 | + error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0, | |
1452 | + &perms, &info); | |
1453 | + | |
1454 | +audit: | |
1455 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name, | |
1456 | + NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, | |
1457 | + info, error); | |
1458 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1459 | + kfree(old_buffer); | |
1460 | + | |
1461 | + return error; | |
1462 | +} | |
1463 | + | |
1464 | +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name, | |
1465 | + struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, | |
1466 | + void *data) | |
1467 | +{ | |
1468 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1469 | + char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL; | |
1470 | + const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL; | |
1471 | + int binary = 1; | |
1472 | + int error; | |
1473 | + | |
1474 | + dev_name = orig_dev_name; | |
1475 | + if (type) { | |
1476 | + int requires_dev; | |
1477 | + struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type); | |
1478 | + if (!fstype) | |
1479 | + return -ENODEV; | |
1480 | + | |
1481 | + binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; | |
1482 | + requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV; | |
1483 | + put_filesystem(fstype); | |
1484 | + | |
1485 | + if (requires_dev) { | |
1486 | + struct path dev_path; | |
1487 | + | |
1488 | + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) { | |
1489 | + error = -ENOENT; | |
1490 | + goto out; | |
1491 | + } | |
1492 | + | |
1493 | + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path); | |
1494 | + if (error) | |
1495 | + goto audit; | |
1496 | + | |
1497 | + error = aa_path_name(&dev_path, | |
1498 | + path_flags(profile, &dev_path), | |
1499 | + &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info); | |
1500 | + path_put(&dev_path); | |
1501 | + if (error) | |
1502 | + goto audit; | |
1503 | + } | |
1504 | + } | |
1505 | + | |
1506 | + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, | |
1507 | + &info); | |
1508 | + if (error) | |
1509 | + goto audit; | |
1510 | + | |
1511 | + error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary, | |
1512 | + &perms, &info); | |
1513 | + | |
1514 | +audit: | |
1515 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, dev_name, | |
1516 | + type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, | |
1517 | + error); | |
1518 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1519 | + kfree(dev_buffer); | |
1520 | + | |
1521 | +out: | |
1522 | + return error; | |
1523 | + | |
1524 | +} | |
1525 | + | |
1526 | +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) | |
1527 | +{ | |
1528 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1529 | + char *buffer = NULL; | |
1530 | + const char *name, *info = NULL; | |
1531 | + int error; | |
1532 | + | |
1533 | + struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root }; | |
1534 | + error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name, | |
1535 | + &info); | |
1536 | + if (error) | |
1537 | + goto audit; | |
1538 | + | |
1539 | + if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) { | |
1540 | + unsigned int state; | |
1541 | + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, | |
1542 | + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], | |
1543 | + name); | |
1544 | + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); | |
1545 | + } | |
1546 | + | |
1547 | + if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow) | |
1548 | + error = -EACCES; | |
1549 | + | |
1550 | +audit: | |
1551 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, | |
1552 | + NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error); | |
1553 | + kfree(buffer); | |
1554 | + | |
1555 | + return error; | |
1556 | +} | |
1557 | + | |
1558 | +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path, | |
1559 | + struct path *new_path) | |
1560 | +{ | |
1561 | + struct file_perms perms = { }; | |
1562 | + struct aa_profile *target = NULL; | |
1563 | + char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL; | |
1564 | + const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL; | |
1565 | + int error; | |
1566 | + | |
1567 | + error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path), | |
1568 | + &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); | |
1569 | + if (error) | |
1570 | + goto audit; | |
1571 | + | |
1572 | + error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path), | |
1573 | + &new_buffer, &new_name, &info); | |
1574 | + if (error) | |
1575 | + goto audit; | |
1576 | + | |
1577 | + if (profile->policy.dfa) { | |
1578 | + unsigned int state; | |
1579 | + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, | |
1580 | + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], | |
1581 | + new_name); | |
1582 | + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state); | |
1583 | + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name); | |
1584 | + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); | |
1585 | + } | |
1586 | + | |
1587 | + if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) { | |
1588 | + if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) { | |
1589 | + target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex); | |
1590 | + if (!target) | |
1591 | + error = -ENOENT; | |
1592 | + else | |
1593 | + error = aa_replace_current_profile(target); | |
1594 | + } | |
1595 | + } else | |
1596 | + error = -EACCES; | |
1597 | + | |
1598 | +audit: | |
1599 | + error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, | |
1600 | + old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL, | |
1601 | + 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error); | |
1602 | + aa_put_profile(target); | |
1603 | + kfree(old_buffer); | |
1604 | + kfree(new_buffer); | |
1605 | + | |
1606 | + return error; | |
1607 | +} | |
1608 | -- | |
1609 | 1.8.3.2 | |
1610 |