- remove from HEAD

[packages/kernel.git] / kernel-grsec_fixes.patch

netlink
cap_dac*
diff -upr a/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c c/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
--- a/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	2007-12-01 00:54:57.312774500 +0000
+++ c/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c	2007-12-01 01:09:34.923621750 +0000
@@ -110,3 +110,19 @@ gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
 	return 0;
 }

+void
+gr_log_cap_pid(const int cap, const pid_t pid)
+{
+	struct task_struct *p;
+
+	if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+		if (p) {
+			get_task_struct(p);
+			gr_log_cap(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, p, captab_log[cap]);
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+	}
+	return;
+}
--- a/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	2008-03-24 00:24:22.482633101 +0100
+++ c/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c	2008-03-24 00:27:01.971671763 +0100
@@ -247,23 +247,26 @@
 gr_cap_rtnetlink(struct sock *sock)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+	struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
+	kernel_cap_t cap_dropp = __cap_empty_set, cap_mask = __cap_empty_set;
+
 	if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
 		return current_cap();
-	else if (sock->sk_protocol == NETLINK_ISCSI &&
-		 cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
-		 gr_is_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return current_cap();
-	else if (sock->sk_protocol == NETLINK_AUDIT &&
-		 cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_AUDIT_WRITE) &&
-		 gr_is_capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE) &&
-		 cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) &&
-		 gr_is_capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
-		return current_cap();
-	else if (cap_raised(current_cap(), CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
-		 gr_is_capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return current_cap();
-	else
-		return __cap_empty_set;
+	else {
+		curracl = current->acl;
+
+		cap_dropp  = curracl->cap_lower;
+		cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
+
+		while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
+			cap_dropp = cap_combine(cap_dropp,
+					cap_intersect(curracl->cap_lower,
+						cap_drop(cap_mask, curracl->cap_mask)));
+			cap_mask = cap_combine(cap_mask, curracl->cap_mask);
+		}
+		return cap_drop(current_cap(),
+				cap_intersect(cap_dropp, cap_mask));
+	}
 #else
 	return current_cap();
 #endif
diff -upr a/include/linux/grsecurity.h c/include/linux/grsecurity.h
--- a/include/linux/grsecurity.h	2007-12-01 00:54:57.224769000 +0000
+++ c/include/linux/grsecurity.h	2007-12-01 01:09:34.923621750 +0000
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const
 void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
 void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
 void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+void gr_log_cap_pid(const int cap, pid_t pid);
 
 int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
 				 const struct inode *inode,
diff -upr a/security/commoncap.c c/security/commoncap.c
--- a/security/commoncap.c	2007-12-01 00:54:57.300773750 +0000
+++ c/security/commoncap.c	2007-12-01 01:09:34.923621750 +0000
@@ -55,8 +55,12 @@
 
 int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
 {
-	if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
+	if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+		gr_log_cap_pid(cap, NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid);
+#endif
 		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
===
=== cap_dac_ succession with capable_nolog
===
diff -upr a/fs./namei.c a/fs/namei.c
--- a/fs./namei.c	2008-04-05 01:23:49.741310000 +0200
+++ a/fs/namei.c	2008-04-05 14:36:39.350275977 +0200
@@ -215,6 +215,13 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
 
  check_capabilities:
 	/*
+	 * Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
+	 */
+	if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE)))
+		if (capable_nolog(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+			return 0;
+
+	/*
 	 * Read/write DACs are always overridable.
 	 * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set.
 	 */
@@ -223,13 +230,6 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *ino
 		if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 			return 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * Searching includes executable on directories, else just read.
-	 */
-	if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE)))
-		if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
-			return 0;
-
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int exec_permission_lite(struct i
 	if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
 		goto ok;
 
-	if ((inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO) && capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && capable_nolog(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 		goto ok;
 
-	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 		goto ok;
 
-	if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+	if ((inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO) && capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
 		goto ok;
 
 	return -EACCES;

--- linux-2.6.30/kernel/vserver/context.c~	2009-07-31 12:07:52.365267958 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.30/kernel/vserver/context.c	2009-07-31 12:43:04.991723596 +0200
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
 	// preconfig fs entries
 	for (index = 0; index < VX_SPACES; index++) {
 		write_lock(&init_fs.lock);
-		init_fs.users++;
+		atomic_inc(&init_fs.users);
 		write_unlock(&init_fs.lock);
 		new->vx_fs[index] = &init_fs;
 	}
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
 
 		fs = xchg(&vxi->vx_fs[index], NULL);
 		write_lock(&fs->lock);
-		kill = !--fs->users;
+		kill = !atomic_dec_return(&fs->users);
 		write_unlock(&fs->lock);
 		if (kill)
 			free_fs_struct(fs);
--- linux-2.6.30/kernel/vserver/space.c~	2009-07-31 12:07:52.398601243 +0200
+++ linux-2.6.30/kernel/vserver/space.c	2009-07-31 12:47:48.638394441 +0200
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@
 	if (mask & CLONE_FS) {
 		write_lock(&fs_cur->lock);
 		current->fs = fs;
-		kill = !--fs_cur->users;
+		kill = !atomic_dec_return(&fs_cur->users);
 		write_unlock(&fs_cur->lock);
 	}
 
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@
 	if (mask & CLONE_FS) {
 		write_lock(&fs_vxi->lock);
 		vxi->vx_fs[index] = fs;
-		kill = !--fs_vxi->users;
+		kill = !atomic_dec_return(&fs_vxi->users);
 		write_unlock(&fs_vxi->lock);
 	}