]> git.pld-linux.org Git - packages/kernel.git/blame - grsecurity-2.1.3-2.6.11-200503091157.patch
- fixed for PLD
[packages/kernel.git] / grsecurity-2.1.3-2.6.11-200503091157.patch
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c5c4582a 1diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/Makefile linux-2.6.11/Makefile
2--- linux-2.6.11/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
3+++ linux-2.6.11/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ export MODLIB
5
6
7 ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
8-core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/
9+core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/
10
11 vmlinux-dirs := $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
12 $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
13diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
14--- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
15+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16@@ -179,6 +179,11 @@ osf_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned lo
17 struct file *file = NULL;
18 unsigned long ret = -EBADF;
19
20+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
21+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
22+ return -EINVAL;
23+#endif
24+
25 #if 0
26 if (flags & (_MAP_HASSEMAPHORE | _MAP_INHERIT | _MAP_UNALIGNED))
27 printk("%s: unimplemented OSF mmap flags %04lx\n",
28@@ -1288,6 +1293,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
29 merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps
30 this feature should be incorporated into all ports? */
31
32+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
33+ if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
34+#endif
35+
36 if (addr) {
37 addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
38 if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
39@@ -1295,8 +1304,16 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
40 }
41
42 /* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE. */
43- addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE),
44- len, limit);
45+
46+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
47+
48+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
49+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
50+ addr += current->mm->delta_mmap;
51+#endif
52+
53+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
54+
55 if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
56 return addr;
57
58diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
59--- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
60+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
61@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
62 #include <linux/user.h>
63 #include <linux/slab.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
66
67 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
68 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
69@@ -289,6 +290,9 @@ do_sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, lo
70 if (!child)
71 goto out_notsk;
72
73+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
74+ goto out;
75+
76 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
77 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
78 goto out;
79diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
80--- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
81+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
82@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
83 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
84 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
85 #include <linux/module.h>
86+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
87
88 #include <asm/system.h>
89 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
90@@ -56,6 +57,142 @@ __load_new_mm_context(struct mm_struct *
91 __reload_thread(pcb);
92 }
93
94+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
95+/*
96+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
97+ *
98+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
99+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
100+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
101+ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
102+ */
103+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
104+{
105+
106+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
107+ int err;
108+#endif
109+
110+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
111+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
112+ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
113+ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
114+ {
115+ if (regs->r26 == regs->pc)
116+ return 1;
117+
118+ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
119+ return 4;
120+ }
121+ }
122+#endif
123+
124+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
125+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
126+ unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp;
127+
128+ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
129+ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
130+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
131+
132+ if (err)
133+ break;
134+
135+ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U &&
136+ (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
137+ jmp == 0x6BFB0000U)
138+ {
139+ unsigned long r27, addr;
140+ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
141+ unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
142+
143+ addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
144+ err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr);
145+ if (err)
146+ break;
147+
148+ regs->r27 = r27;
149+ regs->pc = r27;
150+ return 2;
151+ }
152+ } while (0);
153+
154+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
155+ unsigned int ldah, lda, br;
156+
157+ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
158+ err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
159+ err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
160+
161+ if (err)
162+ break;
163+
164+ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U &&
165+ (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
166+ (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U)
167+ {
168+ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL;
169+ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
170+ unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
171+
172+ regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
173+ regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
174+ return 2;
175+ }
176+ } while (0);
177+
178+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
179+ unsigned int br;
180+
181+ err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
182+
183+ if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) {
184+ unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp;
185+ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver;
186+
187+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
188+ err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr);
189+ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
190+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
191+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
192+ err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16));
193+
194+ if (err)
195+ break;
196+
197+ if (br2 == 0xC3600000U &&
198+ ldq == 0xA77B000CU &&
199+ nop == 0x47FF041FU &&
200+ jmp == 0x6B7B0000U)
201+ {
202+ regs->r28 = regs->pc+4;
203+ regs->r27 = addr+16;
204+ regs->pc = resolver;
205+ return 3;
206+ }
207+ }
208+ } while (0);
209+#endif
210+
211+ return 1;
212+}
213+
214+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
215+{
216+ unsigned long i;
217+
218+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
219+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
220+ unsigned int c;
221+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
222+ printk("<invalid address>.");
223+ break;
224+ }
225+ printk("%08x ", c);
226+ }
227+ printk("\n");
228+}
229+#endif
230
231 /*
232 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
233@@ -125,7 +262,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns
234 goto good_area;
235 if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
236 goto bad_area;
237- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
238+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
239 goto bad_area;
240
241 /* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
242@@ -133,8 +270,34 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns
243 good_area:
244 si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
245 if (cause < 0) {
246- if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
247+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
248+
249+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
250+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc)
251+ goto bad_area;
252+
253+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
254+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
255+
256+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
257+ case 2:
258+ case 3:
259+ return;
260+#endif
261+
262+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
263+ case 4:
264+ return;
265+#endif
266+
267+ }
268+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp());
269+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
270+#else
271 goto bad_area;
272+#endif
273+
274+ }
275 } else if (!cause) {
276 /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
277 if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
278diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
279--- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
280+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
281@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ survive:
282 goto survive;
283
284 check_stack:
285- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
286+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr))
287 goto good_area;
288 out:
289 return fault;
290diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
291--- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
292+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
293@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
294 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
295 return -ENOMEM;
296
297+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
298+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
299+#endif
300+
301 if (addr) {
302 if (do_align)
303 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
304@@ -88,8 +92,8 @@ full_search:
305 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
306 * some holes.
307 */
308- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
309- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
310+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
311+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
312 goto full_search;
313 }
314 return -ENOMEM;
315diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c
316--- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
317+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
318@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ survive:
319 goto survive;
320
321 check_stack:
322- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr))
323+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr))
324 goto good_area;
325 out:
326 return fault;
327diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c
328--- linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
329+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
330@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, str
331 if (address + PAGE_SIZE < rdusp())
332 goto bad_area;
333 }
334- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
335+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
336 goto bad_area;
337
338 /*
339diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig
340--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
341+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
342@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ config X86_POPAD_OK
343
344 config X86_ALIGNMENT_16
345 bool
346- depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2
347+ depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2
348 default y
349
350 config X86_GOOD_APIC
351diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c
352--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
353+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
354@@ -598,19 +598,39 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call(u32 func, u32 eb
355 int cpu;
356 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
357
358+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
359+ unsigned long cr3;
360+#endif
361+
362 cpus = apm_save_cpus();
363-
364 cpu = get_cpu();
365- save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8];
366- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
367
368+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
369+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
370+#endif
371+
372+ save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
373+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
374+
375+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
376 local_save_flags(flags);
377 APM_DO_CLI;
378+#endif
379+
380 APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
381 apm_bios_call_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi);
382 APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
383+
384+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
385 local_irq_restore(flags);
386- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
387+#endif
388+
389+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
390+
391+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
392+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
393+#endif
394+
395 put_cpu();
396 apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
397
398@@ -640,20 +660,39 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call_simple(u32 func,
399 int cpu;
400 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
401
402+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
403+ unsigned long cr3;
404+#endif
405
406 cpus = apm_save_cpus();
407-
408 cpu = get_cpu();
409- save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8];
410- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
411
412+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
413+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
414+#endif
415+
416+ save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
417+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
418+
419+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
420 local_save_flags(flags);
421 APM_DO_CLI;
422+#endif
423+
424 APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS;
425 error = apm_bios_call_simple_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax);
426 APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
427+
428+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
429 local_irq_restore(flags);
430- __get_cpu_var(cpu_gdt_table)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
431+#endif
432+
433+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
434+
435+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
436+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
437+#endif
438+
439 put_cpu();
440 apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
441 return error;
442@@ -2294,35 +2333,35 @@ static int __init apm_init(void)
443 apm_bios_entry.segment = APM_CS;
444
445 for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) {
446- set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3],
447+ set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3],
448 __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg << 4));
449- set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3],
450+ set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3],
451 __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg_16 << 4));
452- set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3],
453+ set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3],
454 __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.dseg << 4));
455 #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS
456 if (apm_info.bios.version == 0x100) {
457 #endif
458 /* For ASUS motherboard, Award BIOS rev 110 (and others?) */
459- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
460+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
461 /* For some unknown machine. */
462- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
463+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
464 /* For the DEC Hinote Ultra CT475 (and others?) */
465- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
466+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1);
467 #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS
468 } else {
469- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3],
470+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3],
471 (apm_info.bios.cseg_len - 1) & 0xffff);
472- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3],
473+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3],
474 (apm_info.bios.cseg_16_len - 1) & 0xffff);
475- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3],
476+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3],
477 (apm_info.bios.dseg_len - 1) & 0xffff);
478 /* workaround for broken BIOSes */
479 if (apm_info.bios.cseg_len <= apm_info.bios.offset)
480- _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 -1);
481+ _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 -1);
482 if (apm_info.bios.dseg_len <= 0x40) { /* 0x40 * 4kB == 64kB */
483 /* for the BIOS that assumes granularity = 1 */
484- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3].b |= 0x800000;
485+ cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3].b |= 0x800000;
486 printk(KERN_NOTICE "apm: we set the granularity of dseg.\n");
487 }
488 }
489diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c
490--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
491+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
492@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
493 #include <linux/delay.h>
494 #include <linux/smp.h>
495 #include <linux/module.h>
496-#include <linux/percpu.h>
497 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
498 #include <asm/processor.h>
499 #include <asm/i387.h>
500@@ -18,8 +17,7 @@
501
502 #include "cpu.h"
503
504-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_struct, cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES]);
505-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_gdt_table);
506+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_gdt_table);
507
508 static int cachesize_override __initdata = -1;
509 static int disable_x86_fxsr __initdata = 0;
510@@ -369,6 +367,10 @@ void __init identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_
511 if (this_cpu->c_init)
512 this_cpu->c_init(c);
513
514+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL)
515+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
516+#endif
517+
518 /* Disable the PN if appropriate */
519 squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
520
521@@ -555,7 +557,7 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
522 void __init cpu_init (void)
523 {
524 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
525- struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
526+ struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu;
527 struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
528
529 if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized)) {
530@@ -577,17 +579,16 @@ void __init cpu_init (void)
531 * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
532 * and set up the GDT descriptor:
533 */
534- memcpy(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu), cpu_gdt_table,
535- GDT_SIZE);
536- cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
537- cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address =
538- (unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu);
539+ if (cpu) {
540+ memcpy(cpu_gdt_table[cpu], cpu_gdt_table[0], GDT_SIZE);
541+ cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
542+ cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address = (unsigned long)cpu_gdt_table[cpu];
543+ }
544
545 /*
546 * Set up the per-thread TLS descriptor cache:
547 */
548- memcpy(thread->tls_array, &per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu),
549- GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
550+ memcpy(thread->tls_array, cpu_gdt_table[cpu], GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
551
552 __asm__ __volatile__("lgdt %0" : : "m" (cpu_gdt_descr[cpu]));
553 __asm__ __volatile__("lidt %0" : : "m" (idt_descr));
554@@ -609,7 +610,7 @@ void __init cpu_init (void)
555 load_esp0(t, thread);
556 set_tss_desc(cpu,t);
557 load_TR_desc();
558- load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
559+ _load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
560
561 /* Set up doublefault TSS pointer in the GDT */
562 __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS, &doublefault_tss);
563diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
564--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
565+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
566@@ -229,6 +229,15 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
567 movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
568 testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx
569 jne syscall_exit_work
570+
571+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
572+ pushl %eax
573+ call pax_randomize_kstack
574+ popl %eax
575+#endif
576+
577+ xorl %ebp,%ebp /* prevent info leak */
578+
579 /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */
580 movl EIP(%esp), %edx
581 movl OLDESP(%esp), %ecx
582@@ -257,6 +266,11 @@ syscall_exit:
583 movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
584 testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx # current->work
585 jne syscall_exit_work
586+
587+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
588+ call pax_randomize_kstack
589+#endif
590+
591 restore_all:
592 RESTORE_ALL
593
594@@ -571,7 +585,7 @@ ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug)
595 pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug
596 jmp error_code
597
598-.data
599+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
600 ENTRY(sys_call_table)
601 .long sys_restart_syscall /* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */
602 .long sys_exit
603diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S
604--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
605+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
606@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@
607
608
609 /*
610+ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
611+ */
612+ENTRY(stext)
613+ENTRY(_stext)
614+
615+/*
616 * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU. On entry,
617 * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer.
618 * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on
619@@ -78,6 +84,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
620 shrl $2,%ecx
621 rep ; stosl
622
623+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
624+ movl $ __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET,%eax
625+ movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 2)
626+ rorl $16,%eax
627+ movb %al,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 4)
628+ movb %ah,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 7)
629+
630+ movb %al,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 4)
631+ movb %ah,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 7)
632+ rorl $16,%eax
633+ movw %ax,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 2)
634+#endif
635+
636 /*
637 * Initialize page tables. This creates a PDE and a set of page
638 * tables, which are located immediately beyond _end. The variable
639@@ -88,24 +107,42 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
640 * Warning: don't use %esi or the stack in this code. However, %esp
641 * can be used as a GPR if you really need it...
642 */
643-page_pde_offset = (__PAGE_OFFSET >> 20);
644-
645+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
646+page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 21) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE));
647+#else
648+page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 22) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE));
649+#endif
650 movl $(pg0 - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edi
651+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
652+ movl $(swapper_pm_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx
653+#else
654 movl $(swapper_pg_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx
655- movl $0x007, %eax /* 0x007 = PRESENT+RW+USER */
656+#endif
657+ movl $0x063, %eax /* 0x063 = DIRTY+ACCESSED+PRESENT+RW */
658 10:
659- leal 0x007(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */
660+ leal 0x063(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */
661 movl %ecx,(%edx) /* Store identity PDE entry */
662 movl %ecx,page_pde_offset(%edx) /* Store kernel PDE entry */
663+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
664+ movl $0,4(%edx)
665+ movl $0,page_pde_offset+4(%edx)
666+ addl $8,%edx
667+ movl $512, %ecx
668+#else
669 addl $4,%edx
670 movl $1024, %ecx
671+#endif
672 11:
673 stosl
674+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
675+ movl $0,(%edi)
676+ addl $4,%edi
677+#endif
678 addl $0x1000,%eax
679 loop 11b
680 /* End condition: we must map up to and including INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END */
681- /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x007 is the attribute bits */
682- leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x007)(%edi),%ebp
683+ /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x063 is the attribute bits */
684+ leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x063)(%edi),%ebp
685 cmpl %ebp,%eax
686 jb 10b
687 movl %edi,(init_pg_tables_end - __PAGE_OFFSET)
688@@ -128,6 +165,11 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
689 movl %eax,%fs
690 movl %eax,%gs
691
692+ /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */
693+ xorl %ebx,%ebx
694+ incl %ebx
695+#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
696+
697 /*
698 * New page tables may be in 4Mbyte page mode and may
699 * be using the global pages.
700@@ -143,26 +185,27 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
701 * not yet offset PAGE_OFFSET..
702 */
703 #define cr4_bits mmu_cr4_features-__PAGE_OFFSET
704+3:
705 movl cr4_bits,%edx
706 andl %edx,%edx
707- jz 6f
708+ jz 5f
709 movl %cr4,%eax # Turn on paging options (PSE,PAE,..)
710 orl %edx,%eax
711 movl %eax,%cr4
712
713- btl $5, %eax # check if PAE is enabled
714- jnc 6f
715+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
716+ movl %ebx,%edi
717
718 /* Check if extended functions are implemented */
719 movl $0x80000000, %eax
720 cpuid
721 cmpl $0x80000000, %eax
722- jbe 6f
723+ jbe 4f
724 mov $0x80000001, %eax
725 cpuid
726 /* Execute Disable bit supported? */
727 btl $20, %edx
728- jnc 6f
729+ jnc 4f
730
731 /* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
732 movl $0xc0000080, %ecx
733@@ -172,13 +215,10 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
734 /* Make changes effective */
735 wrmsr
736
737-6:
738- /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */
739- xorl %ebx,%ebx
740- incl %ebx
741-
742-3:
743-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
744+4:
745+ movl %edi,%ebx
746+#endif
747+5:
748
749 /*
750 * Enable paging
751@@ -203,9 +243,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
752
753 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
754 andl %ebx,%ebx
755- jz 1f /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
756- jmp checkCPUtype
757-1:
758+ jnz checkCPUtype /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
759 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
760
761 /*
762@@ -402,32 +440,74 @@ ignore_int:
763 popl %eax
764 iret
765
766-/*
767- * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
768- */
769-ENTRY(stext)
770-ENTRY(_stext)
771-
772-/*
773- * BSS section
774- */
775-.section ".bss.page_aligned","w"
776+.section .data.swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits
777 ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
778+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
779+ .long swapper_pm_dir-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
780+ .long 0
781+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*8-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
782+ .long 0
783+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*16-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
784+ .long 0
785+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*24-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
786+ .long 0
787+#else
788+ .fill 1024,4,0
789+#endif
790+
791+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
792+ENTRY(kernexec_pg_dir)
793+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
794+ .long kernexec_pm_dir-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
795+ .long 0
796+ .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*8-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
797+ .long 0
798+ .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*16-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
799+ .long 0
800+ .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*24-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
801+ .long 0
802+#else
803 .fill 1024,4,0
804+#endif
805+#endif
806+
807+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
808+.section .data.swapper_pm_dir,"a",@progbits
809+ENTRY(swapper_pm_dir)
810+ .fill 512,8,0
811+ .fill 512,8,0
812+ .fill 512,8,0
813+ .fill 512,8,0
814+
815+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
816+ENTRY(kernexec_pm_dir)
817+ .fill 512,8,0
818+ .fill 512,8,0
819+ .fill 512,8,0
820+ .fill 512,8,0
821+#endif
822+#endif
823+
824+.section .rodata.empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits
825 ENTRY(empty_zero_page)
826 .fill 4096,1,0
827
828 /*
829- * This starts the data section.
830- */
831-.data
832+ * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
833+ * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
834+ * for this.
835+ */
836+.section .rodata.idt,"a",@progbits
837+ENTRY(idt_table)
838+ .fill 256,8,0
839+
840+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
841+ready: .byte 0
842
843 ENTRY(stack_start)
844 .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE
845 .long __BOOT_DS
846
847-ready: .byte 0
848-
849 int_msg:
850 .asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n"
851
852@@ -469,8 +549,8 @@ cpu_gdt_descr:
853 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES
854 ENTRY(boot_gdt_table)
855 .fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0
856- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
857- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
858+ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
859+ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
860
861 /*
862 * The Global Descriptor Table contains 28 quadwords, per-CPU.
863@@ -489,28 +569,27 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
864 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x4b reserved */
865 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x53 reserved */
866 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x5b reserved */
867-
868- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
869- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
870- .quad 0x00cffa000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
871- .quad 0x00cff2000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
872+ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
873+ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
874+ .quad 0x00cffb000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
875+ .quad 0x00cff3000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
876
877 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x80 TSS descriptor */
878 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x88 LDT descriptor */
879
880 /* Segments used for calling PnP BIOS */
881- .quad 0x00c09a0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */
882- .quad 0x00809a0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */
883- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */
884- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */
885- .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */
886+ .quad 0x00c09b0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */
887+ .quad 0x00809b0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */
888+ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */
889+ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */
890+ .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */
891 /*
892 * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
893 * and limits are set at run time.
894 */
895- .quad 0x00409a0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */
896- .quad 0x00009a0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
897- .quad 0x0040920000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */
898+ .quad 0x00409b0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */
899+ .quad 0x00009b0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
900+ .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */
901
902 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd0 - unused */
903 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd8 - unused */
904@@ -519,3 +598,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
905 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf0 - unused */
906 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf8 - GDT entry 31: double-fault TSS */
907
908+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
909+ .fill (NR_CPUS-1)*GDT_ENTRIES,8,0 /* other CPU's GDT */
910+#endif
911diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c
912--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
913+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
914@@ -42,5 +42,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
915 * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
916 * no more per-task TSS's.
917 */
918-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss) ____cacheline_maxaligned_in_smp = INIT_TSS;
919-
920+struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_maxaligned_in_smp = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INIT_TSS };
921diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c
922--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
923+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
924@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
925 #include <linux/stddef.h>
926 #include <linux/slab.h>
927 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
928+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
929
930 /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
931 static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base, unsigned int extent, int new_value)
932@@ -63,9 +64,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
933
934 if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
935 return -EINVAL;
936+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
937+ if (turn_on) {
938+ gr_handle_ioperm();
939+#else
940 if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
941+#endif
942 return -EPERM;
943-
944+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
945+ }
946+#endif
947 /*
948 * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the
949 * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(),
950@@ -87,7 +95,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
951 * because the ->io_bitmap_max value must match the bitmap
952 * contents:
953 */
954- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
955+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
956
957 set_bitmap(t->io_bitmap_ptr, from, num, !turn_on);
958
959@@ -137,8 +145,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_iopl(unsigned long u
960 return -EINVAL;
961 /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
962 if (level > old) {
963+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
964+ gr_handle_iopl();
965+ return -EPERM;
966+#else
967 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
968 return -EPERM;
969+#endif
970 }
971 regs->eflags = (regs->eflags &~ 0x3000UL) | (level << 12);
972 /* Make sure we return the long way (not sysenter) */
973diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c
974--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
975+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
976@@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ fastcall unsigned int do_IRQ(struct pt_r
977 * gcc's 3.0 and earlier don't handle that correctly.
978 */
979 static char softirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE]
980- __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE)));
981+ __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned")));
982
983 static char hardirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE]
984- __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE)));
985+ __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned")));
986
987 /*
988 * allocate per-cpu stacks for hardirq and for softirq processing
989diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c
990--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
991+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
992@@ -102,6 +102,19 @@ int init_new_context(struct task_struct
993 retval = copy_ldt(&mm->context, &old_mm->context);
994 up(&old_mm->context.sem);
995 }
996+
997+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
998+ if (!mm->context.user_cs_limit) {
999+ mm->context.user_cs_base = 0UL;
1000+ mm->context.user_cs_limit = ~0UL;
1001+
1002+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
1003+ cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
1004+#endif
1005+
1006+ }
1007+#endif
1008+
1009 return retval;
1010 }
1011
1012@@ -159,7 +172,7 @@ static int read_default_ldt(void __user
1013 {
1014 int err;
1015 unsigned long size;
1016- void *address;
1017+ const void *address;
1018
1019 err = 0;
1020 address = &default_ldt[0];
1021@@ -216,6 +229,13 @@ static int write_ldt(void __user * ptr,
1022 }
1023 }
1024
1025+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1026+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & 2)) {
1027+ error = -EINVAL;
1028+ goto out_unlock;
1029+ }
1030+#endif
1031+
1032 entry_1 = LDT_entry_a(&ldt_info);
1033 entry_2 = LDT_entry_b(&ldt_info);
1034 if (oldmode)
1035diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
1036--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
1037+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1038@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ void exit_thread(void)
1039 /* The process may have allocated an io port bitmap... nuke it. */
1040 if (unlikely(NULL != t->io_bitmap_ptr)) {
1041 int cpu = get_cpu();
1042- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1043+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1044
1045 kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr);
1046 t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
1047@@ -345,6 +345,9 @@ void flush_thread(void)
1048 {
1049 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1050
1051+ __asm__("movl %0,%%fs\n"
1052+ "movl %0,%%gs\n"
1053+ : : "r" (0) : "memory");
1054 memset(tsk->thread.debugreg, 0, sizeof(unsigned long)*8);
1055 memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
1056 /*
1057@@ -387,7 +390,7 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl
1058 struct task_struct *tsk;
1059 int err;
1060
1061- childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info)) - 1;
1062+ childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info - sizeof(unsigned long))) - 1;
1063 *childregs = *regs;
1064 childregs->eax = 0;
1065 childregs->esp = esp;
1066@@ -492,9 +495,8 @@ void dump_thread(struct pt_regs * regs,
1067 int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *tsk, elf_gregset_t *regs)
1068 {
1069 struct pt_regs ptregs;
1070-
1071- ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)
1072- ((unsigned long)tsk->thread_info+THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(ptregs));
1073+
1074+ ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)(tsk->thread.esp0 - sizeof(ptregs));
1075 ptregs.xcs &= 0xffff;
1076 ptregs.xds &= 0xffff;
1077 ptregs.xes &= 0xffff;
1078@@ -576,12 +578,20 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t
1079 struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread,
1080 *next = &next_p->thread;
1081 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
1082- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1083+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1084+
1085+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1086+ unsigned long flags, cr3;
1087+#endif
1088
1089 /* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
1090
1091 __unlazy_fpu(prev_p);
1092
1093+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1094+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
1095+#endif
1096+
1097 /*
1098 * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer:
1099 */
1100@@ -592,6 +602,10 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t
1101 */
1102 load_TLS(next, cpu);
1103
1104+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1105+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
1106+#endif
1107+
1108 /*
1109 * Save away %fs and %gs. No need to save %es and %ds, as
1110 * those are always kernel segments while inside the kernel.
1111@@ -740,6 +754,10 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc
1112 struct desc_struct *desc;
1113 int cpu, idx;
1114
1115+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1116+ unsigned long flags, cr3;
1117+#endif
1118+
1119 if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
1120 return -EFAULT;
1121 idx = info.entry_number;
1122@@ -773,8 +791,17 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc
1123 desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info);
1124 desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info);
1125 }
1126+
1127+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1128+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
1129+#endif
1130+
1131 load_TLS(t, cpu);
1132
1133+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1134+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
1135+#endif
1136+
1137 put_cpu();
1138
1139 return 0;
1140@@ -828,3 +855,29 @@ asmlinkage int sys_get_thread_area(struc
1141 return 0;
1142 }
1143
1144+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
1145+asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void)
1146+{
1147+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id();
1148+ unsigned long time;
1149+
1150+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
1151+ if (!pax_aslr)
1152+ return;
1153+#endif
1154+
1155+ rdtscl(time);
1156+
1157+ /* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */
1158+#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4
1159+ time &= 0x3EUL;
1160+ time <<= 1;
1161+#else
1162+ time &= 0x1FUL;
1163+ time <<= 2;
1164+#endif
1165+
1166+ tss->esp0 ^= time;
1167+ current->thread.esp0 = tss->esp0;
1168+}
1169+#endif
1170diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
1171--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
1172+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1173@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
1174 #include <linux/user.h>
1175 #include <linux/security.h>
1176 #include <linux/audit.h>
1177+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1178
1179 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1180 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
1181@@ -384,6 +385,9 @@ asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request,
1182 if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
1183 goto out_tsk;
1184
1185+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
1186+ goto out_tsk;
1187+
1188 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
1189 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
1190 goto out_tsk;
1191@@ -462,6 +466,17 @@ asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request,
1192 if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[5]) break;
1193 if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] &&
1194 ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break;
1195+
1196+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1197+ if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] &&
1198+ addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){
1199+ long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2;
1200+ long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3;
1201+ long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3;
1202+ if((type & 1) && (data & align))
1203+ break;
1204+ }
1205+#endif
1206
1207 /* Sanity-check data. Take one half-byte at once with
1208 * check = (val >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf. It contains the
1209diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c
1210--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
1211+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1212@@ -152,18 +152,18 @@ core_initcall(reboot_init);
1213 doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard. It is easy
1214 to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */
1215
1216-static unsigned long long
1217+static const unsigned long long
1218 real_mode_gdt_entries [3] =
1219 {
1220 0x0000000000000000ULL, /* Null descriptor */
1221- 0x00009a000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
1222- 0x000092000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
1223+ 0x00009b000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
1224+ 0x000093000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
1225 };
1226
1227 static struct
1228 {
1229 unsigned short size __attribute__ ((packed));
1230- unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
1231+ const unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
1232 }
1233 real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, real_mode_gdt_entries },
1234 real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, NULL },
1235diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c
1236--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
1237+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1238@@ -73,7 +73,11 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data __initda
1239 /* common cpu data for all cpus */
1240 struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data = { 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 1, 0, 0, -1 };
1241
1242+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1243+unsigned long mmu_cr4_features = X86_CR4_PAE;
1244+#else
1245 unsigned long mmu_cr4_features;
1246+#endif
1247 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmu_cr4_features);
1248
1249 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_INTERPRETER
1250@@ -1411,7 +1415,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
1251
1252 code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text);
1253 code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext)-1;
1254- data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_etext);
1255+ data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_data);
1256 data_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_edata)-1;
1257
1258 parse_cmdline_early(cmdline_p);
1259@@ -1481,6 +1485,15 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
1260 #endif
1261 }
1262
1263+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
1264+static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str)
1265+{
1266+ get_option (&str, &pax_softmode);
1267+ return 1;
1268+}
1269+__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode);
1270+#endif
1271+
1272 #include "setup_arch_post.h"
1273 /*
1274 * Local Variables:
1275diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c
1276--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
1277+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1278@@ -380,7 +380,17 @@ static void setup_frame(int sig, struct
1279 goto give_sigsegv;
1280 }
1281
1282+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1283+ restorer = frame->retcode;
1284+#else
1285 restorer = &__kernel_sigreturn;
1286+
1287+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1288+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1289+ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1290+#endif
1291+#endif
1292+
1293 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
1294 restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
1295
1296@@ -475,7 +485,18 @@ static void setup_rt_frame(int sig, stru
1297 goto give_sigsegv;
1298
1299 /* Set up to return from userspace. */
1300+
1301+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1302+ restorer = frame->retcode;
1303+#else
1304 restorer = &__kernel_rt_sigreturn;
1305+
1306+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1307+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1308+ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1309+#endif
1310+#endif
1311+
1312 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
1313 restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
1314 err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
1315diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
1316--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
1317+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1318@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ static inline long do_mmap2(
1319 int error = -EBADF;
1320 struct file * file = NULL;
1321
1322+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
1323+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
1324+ return -EINVAL;
1325+#endif
1326+
1327 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
1328 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
1329 file = fget(fd);
1330@@ -106,6 +111,182 @@ out:
1331 return err;
1332 }
1333
1334+unsigned long
1335+arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
1336+ unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
1337+{
1338+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
1339+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1340+ unsigned long start_addr, start_mmap, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
1341+
1342+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1343+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1344+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1345+#endif
1346+
1347+ if (len > task_size)
1348+ return -ENOMEM;
1349+
1350+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1351+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
1352+#endif
1353+
1354+ if (addr) {
1355+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
1356+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
1357+ if (task_size - len >= addr &&
1358+ (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
1359+ return addr;
1360+ }
1361+ start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
1362+ start_mmap = PAGE_ALIGN(task_size/3);
1363+
1364+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1365+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
1366+ start_mmap += mm->delta_mmap;
1367+#endif
1368+
1369+ if (!(flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr < start_mmap)
1370+ start_addr = addr = start_mmap;
1371+ else if ((flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr >= start_mmap)
1372+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
1373+
1374+full_search:
1375+ for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
1376+ /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
1377+ if (task_size - len < addr) {
1378+ /*
1379+ * Start a new search - just in case we missed
1380+ * some holes.
1381+ */
1382+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
1383+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
1384+ goto full_search;
1385+ }
1386+ return -ENOMEM;
1387+ }
1388+ if (!vma || (addr + len <= vma->vm_start && (addr + len <= mm->start_brk || start_mmap <= addr))) {
1389+ /*
1390+ * Remember the place where we stopped the search:
1391+ */
1392+ mm->free_area_cache = addr + len;
1393+ return addr;
1394+ }
1395+ if (addr < start_mmap && addr + len > mm->start_brk) {
1396+ addr = start_mmap;
1397+ goto full_search;
1398+ } else
1399+ addr = vma->vm_end;
1400+ }
1401+}
1402+
1403+unsigned long
1404+arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
1405+ const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
1406+ const unsigned long flags)
1407+{
1408+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1409+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
1410+ unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
1411+ int first_time = 1;
1412+
1413+ if (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) {
1414+ mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
1415+
1416+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1417+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
1418+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
1419+#endif
1420+
1421+ mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
1422+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
1423+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
1424+ mm->mmap_base = base;
1425+ return addr;
1426+ }
1427+
1428+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1429+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1430+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1431+#endif
1432+
1433+ /* requested length too big for entire address space */
1434+ if (len > task_size)
1435+ return -ENOMEM;
1436+
1437+ /* dont allow allocations above current base */
1438+ if (mm->free_area_cache > base)
1439+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
1440+
1441+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1442+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
1443+#endif
1444+
1445+ /* requesting a specific address */
1446+ if (addr) {
1447+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
1448+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
1449+ if (task_size - len >= addr &&
1450+ (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
1451+ return addr;
1452+ }
1453+
1454+try_again:
1455+ /* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */
1456+ if (mm->free_area_cache < len)
1457+ goto fail;
1458+
1459+ /* either no address requested or cant fit in requested address hole */
1460+ addr = (mm->free_area_cache - len) & PAGE_MASK;
1461+ do {
1462+ /*
1463+ * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address,
1464+ * i.e. return with success:
1465+ */
1466+ if (!(vma = find_vma(mm, addr)))
1467+ return addr;
1468+
1469+ /*
1470+ * new region fits between prev_vma->vm_end and
1471+ * vma->vm_start, use it:
1472+ */
1473+ if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start)
1474+ /* remember the address as a hint for next time */
1475+ return (mm->free_area_cache = addr);
1476+ else
1477+ /* pull free_area_cache down to the first hole */
1478+ if (mm->free_area_cache == vma->vm_end)
1479+ mm->free_area_cache = vma->vm_start;
1480+
1481+ /* try just below the current vma->vm_start */
1482+ addr = vma->vm_start-len;
1483+ } while (len <= vma->vm_start);
1484+
1485+fail:
1486+ /*
1487+ * if hint left us with no space for the requested
1488+ * mapping then try again:
1489+ */
1490+ if (first_time) {
1491+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
1492+ first_time = 0;
1493+ goto try_again;
1494+ }
1495+ /*
1496+ * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
1497+ * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
1498+ * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
1499+ * allocations.
1500+ */
1501+ mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
1502+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
1503+ /*
1504+ * Restore the topdown base:
1505+ */
1506+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
1507+
1508+ return addr;
1509+}
1510
1511 struct sel_arg_struct {
1512 unsigned long n;
1513diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c
1514--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
1515+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1516@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ extern asmlinkage void sysenter_entry(vo
1517 void enable_sep_cpu(void *info)
1518 {
1519 int cpu = get_cpu();
1520- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1521+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1522
1523 tss->ss1 = __KERNEL_CS;
1524 tss->esp1 = sizeof(struct tss_struct) + (unsigned long) tss;
1525@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ void enable_sep_cpu(void *info)
1526 extern const char vsyscall_int80_start, vsyscall_int80_end;
1527 extern const char vsyscall_sysenter_start, vsyscall_sysenter_end;
1528
1529+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1530 static int __init sysenter_setup(void)
1531 {
1532 void *page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
1533@@ -63,3 +64,4 @@ static int __init sysenter_setup(void)
1534 }
1535
1536 __initcall(sysenter_setup);
1537+#endif
1538diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
1539--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
1540+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1541@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
1542 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
1543 #include <linux/utsname.h>
1544 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
1545+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
1546
1547 #ifdef CONFIG_EISA
1548 #include <linux/ioport.h>
1549@@ -58,18 +59,13 @@
1550
1551 asmlinkage int system_call(void);
1552
1553-struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
1554+const struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
1555 { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 } };
1556
1557 /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */
1558 char ignore_fpu_irq = 0;
1559
1560-/*
1561- * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
1562- * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
1563- * for this.
1564- */
1565-struct desc_struct idt_table[256] __attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { {0, 0}, };
1566+extern struct desc_struct idt_table[256];
1567
1568 asmlinkage void divide_error(void);
1569 asmlinkage void debug(void);
1570@@ -115,6 +111,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex
1571 unsigned long *stack, unsigned long ebp)
1572 {
1573 unsigned long addr;
1574+ int i = kstack_depth_to_print;
1575
1576 #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
1577 while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, (void *)ebp)) {
1578@@ -123,6 +120,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex
1579 print_symbol("%s", addr);
1580 printk("\n");
1581 ebp = *(unsigned long *)ebp;
1582+ --i;
1583 }
1584 #else
1585 while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, stack)) {
1586@@ -131,6 +129,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex
1587 printk(" [<%08lx>]", addr);
1588 print_symbol(" %s", addr);
1589 printk("\n");
1590+ --i;
1591 }
1592 }
1593 #endif
1594@@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs
1595
1596 printk("Code: ");
1597
1598- eip = (u8 *)regs->eip - 43;
1599+ eip = (u8 *)regs->eip - 43 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1600 for (i = 0; i < 64; i++, eip++) {
1601 unsigned char c;
1602
1603@@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ static void handle_BUG(struct pt_regs *r
1604 if (regs->xcs & 3)
1605 goto no_bug; /* Not in kernel */
1606
1607- eip = regs->eip;
1608+ eip = regs->eip + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1609
1610 if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
1611 goto no_bug;
1612@@ -456,7 +455,7 @@ DO_ERROR_INFO(17, SIGBUS, "alignment che
1613 fastcall void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs * regs, long error_code)
1614 {
1615 int cpu = get_cpu();
1616- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1617+ struct tss_struct *tss = &init_tss[cpu];
1618 struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
1619
1620 /*
1621@@ -491,6 +490,24 @@ fastcall void do_general_protection(stru
1622 if (!(regs->xcs & 3))
1623 goto gp_in_kernel;
1624
1625+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
1626+ if (current->mm) {
1627+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
1628+ unsigned long limit;
1629+
1630+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
1631+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1632+ limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
1633+ if (limit < TASK_SIZE) {
1634+ track_exec_limit(mm, limit, TASK_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
1635+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1636+ return;
1637+ }
1638+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
1639+ }
1640+ }
1641+#endif
1642+
1643 current->thread.error_code = error_code;
1644 current->thread.trap_no = 13;
1645 force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
1646@@ -506,6 +523,13 @@ gp_in_kernel:
1647 if (notify_die(DIE_GPF, "general protection fault", regs,
1648 error_code, 13, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
1649 return;
1650+
1651+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1652+ if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS)
1653+ die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code);
1654+ else
1655+#endif
1656+
1657 die("general protection fault", regs, error_code);
1658 }
1659 }
1660@@ -932,6 +956,8 @@ asmlinkage void math_emulate(long arg)
1661 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
1662 void __init trap_init_f00f_bug(void)
1663 {
1664+
1665+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1666 __set_fixmap(FIX_F00F_IDT, __pa(&idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
1667
1668 /*
1669@@ -940,6 +966,8 @@ void __init trap_init_f00f_bug(void)
1670 */
1671 idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT);
1672 __asm__ __volatile__("lidt %0" : : "m" (idt_descr));
1673+#endif
1674+
1675 }
1676 #endif
1677
1678diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
1679--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
1680+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1681@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct pt_regs * fastcall save_v86_state
1682 do_exit(SIGSEGV);
1683 }
1684
1685- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
1686+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
1687 current->thread.esp0 = current->thread.saved_esp0;
1688 current->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
1689 load_esp0(tss, &current->thread);
1690@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm
1691 asm volatile("movl %%fs,%0":"=m" (tsk->thread.saved_fs));
1692 asm volatile("movl %%gs,%0":"=m" (tsk->thread.saved_gs));
1693
1694- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
1695+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
1696 tsk->thread.esp0 = (unsigned long) &info->VM86_TSS_ESP0;
1697 if (cpu_has_sep)
1698 tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = 0;
1699diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
1700--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
1701+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1702@@ -2,9 +2,12 @@
1703 * Written by Martin Mares <mj@atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>;
1704 */
1705
1706+#include <linux/config.h>
1707+
1708 #include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h>
1709 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
1710 #include <asm/page.h>
1711+#include <asm/segment.h>
1712
1713 OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
1714 OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
1715@@ -13,56 +16,15 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
1716 SECTIONS
1717 {
1718 . = __PAGE_OFFSET + 0x100000;
1719- /* read-only */
1720- _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
1721- .text : {
1722- *(.text)
1723- SCHED_TEXT
1724- LOCK_TEXT
1725- *(.fixup)
1726- *(.gnu.warning)
1727- } = 0x9090
1728-
1729- _etext = .; /* End of text section */
1730-
1731- . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */
1732- __start___ex_table = .;
1733- __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
1734- __stop___ex_table = .;
1735-
1736- RODATA
1737-
1738- /* writeable */
1739- .data : { /* Data */
1740- *(.data)
1741- CONSTRUCTORS
1742+ .text.startup : {
1743+ BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */
1744+ LONG(startup_32 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - __PAGE_OFFSET)
1745+ SHORT(__BOOT_CS)
1746 }
1747
1748- . = ALIGN(4096);
1749- __nosave_begin = .;
1750- .data_nosave : { *(.data.nosave) }
1751- . = ALIGN(4096);
1752- __nosave_end = .;
1753-
1754- . = ALIGN(4096);
1755- .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.idt) }
1756-
1757- . = ALIGN(32);
1758- .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) }
1759-
1760- _edata = .; /* End of data section */
1761-
1762- . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */
1763- .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) }
1764-
1765 /* will be freed after init */
1766 . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */
1767 __init_begin = .;
1768- .init.text : {
1769- _sinittext = .;
1770- *(.init.text)
1771- _einittext = .;
1772- }
1773 .init.data : { *(.init.data) }
1774 . = ALIGN(16);
1775 __setup_start = .;
1776@@ -88,9 +50,13 @@ SECTIONS
1777 .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) }
1778 __alt_instructions_end = .;
1779 .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) }
1780+
1781+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1782 /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
1783 from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
1784 .exit.text : { *(.exit.text) }
1785+#endif
1786+
1787 .exit.data : { *(.exit.data) }
1788 . = ALIGN(4096);
1789 __initramfs_start = .;
1790@@ -100,15 +66,107 @@ SECTIONS
1791 __per_cpu_start = .;
1792 .data.percpu : { *(.data.percpu) }
1793 __per_cpu_end = .;
1794+
1795+ /* read-only */
1796+
1797+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1798+ __init_text_start = .;
1799+ .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT (__init_text_start) {
1800+ _sinittext = .;
1801+ *(.init.text)
1802+ _einittext = .;
1803+ *(.exit.text)
1804+ . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024) - 1;
1805+ BYTE(0)
1806+ }
1807+ . = ALIGN(4096);
1808+ __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1809+ /* freed after init ends here */
1810+
1811+/*
1812+ * PaX: this must be kept in synch with the KERNEL_CS base
1813+ * in the GDTs in arch/i386/kernel/head.S
1814+ */
1815+ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
1816+ .text : AT (. + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
1817+#else
1818+ .init.text : {
1819+ _sinittext = .;
1820+ *(.init.text)
1821+ _einittext = .;
1822+ }
1823 . = ALIGN(4096);
1824 __init_end = .;
1825 /* freed after init ends here */
1826-
1827+
1828+ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
1829+ .text : {
1830+#endif
1831+
1832+ *(.text)
1833+ SCHED_TEXT
1834+ LOCK_TEXT
1835+ *(.fixup)
1836+ *(.gnu.warning)
1837+ } = 0x9090
1838+
1839+ _etext = .; /* End of text section */
1840+ . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1841+ . = ALIGN(4096); /* Exception table */
1842+ __start___ex_table = .;
1843+ __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) }
1844+ __stop___ex_table = .;
1845+
1846+ . = ALIGN(4096);
1847+ .rodata.page_aligned : {
1848+ *(.rodata.empty_zero_page)
1849+ *(.rodata.idt)
1850+ }
1851+
1852+ RODATA
1853+
1854+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1855+ . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024);
1856+#else
1857+ . = ALIGN(32);
1858+#endif
1859+
1860+ /* writeable */
1861+ _data = .;
1862+ .data : { /* Data */
1863+ *(.data)
1864+ CONSTRUCTORS
1865+ }
1866+
1867+ . = ALIGN(4096);
1868+ __nosave_begin = .;
1869+ .data_nosave : { *(.data.nosave) }
1870+ . = ALIGN(4096);
1871+ __nosave_end = .;
1872+
1873+ . = ALIGN(32);
1874+ .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) }
1875+
1876+ . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */
1877+ .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) }
1878+
1879+ . = ALIGN(4096);
1880+ .data.page_aligned : {
1881+
1882+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1883+ *(.data.swapper_pm_dir)
1884+#endif
1885+
1886+ *(.data.swapper_pg_dir)
1887+ }
1888+
1889+ _edata = .; /* End of data section */
1890+
1891 __bss_start = .; /* BSS */
1892 .bss : {
1893 *(.bss.page_aligned)
1894 *(.bss)
1895- }
1896+ }
1897 . = ALIGN(4);
1898 __bss_stop = .;
1899
1900diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c
1901--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
1902+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
1903@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
1904 #include <linux/vt_kern.h> /* For unblank_screen() */
1905 #include <linux/highmem.h>
1906 #include <linux/module.h>
1907+#include <linux/unistd.h>
1908+#include <linux/compiler.h>
1909+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
1910
1911 #include <asm/system.h>
1912 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1913@@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_
1914
1915 /* Unlikely, but must come before segment checks. */
1916 if (unlikely((regs->eflags & VM_MASK) != 0))
1917- return eip + (seg << 4);
1918+ return (eip & 0xFFFF) + (seg << 4);
1919
1920 /* By far the most common cases. */
1921 if (likely(seg == __USER_CS || seg == __KERNEL_CS))
1922@@ -107,7 +110,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_
1923 desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7);
1924 } else {
1925 /* Must disable preemption while reading the GDT. */
1926- desc = (u32 *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, get_cpu());
1927+ desc = (u32 *)&cpu_gdt_table[get_cpu()];
1928 desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7);
1929 }
1930
1931@@ -201,6 +204,31 @@ static inline int is_prefetch(struct pt_
1932
1933 fastcall void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
1934
1935+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
1936+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs);
1937+#endif
1938+
1939+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
1940+/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */
1941+static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
1942+{
1943+ pgd_t *pgd;
1944+ pud_t *pud;
1945+ pmd_t *pmd;
1946+
1947+ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
1948+ if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd))
1949+ return 0;
1950+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
1951+ if (!pud || !pud_present(*pud))
1952+ return 0;
1953+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
1954+ if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd))
1955+ return 0;
1956+ return pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
1957+}
1958+#endif
1959+
1960 /*
1961 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
1962 * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
1963@@ -217,10 +245,14 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re
1964 struct mm_struct *mm;
1965 struct vm_area_struct * vma;
1966 unsigned long address;
1967- unsigned long page;
1968 int write;
1969 siginfo_t info;
1970
1971+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
1972+ pte_t *pte;
1973+ unsigned char pte_mask1, pte_mask2;
1974+#endif
1975+
1976 /* get the address */
1977 __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
1978
1979@@ -232,6 +264,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re
1980 local_irq_enable();
1981
1982 tsk = current;
1983+ mm = tsk->mm;
1984
1985 info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
1986
1987@@ -258,14 +291,99 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re
1988 goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
1989 }
1990
1991- mm = tsk->mm;
1992-
1993 /*
1994 * If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running in an
1995 * atomic region then we must not take the fault..
1996 */
1997 if (in_atomic() || !mm)
1998- goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
1999+ goto bad_area_nopax;
2000+
2001+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2002+ if (unlikely((error_code & 5) != 5 ||
2003+ (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) ||
2004+ !(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)))
2005+ goto not_pax_fault;
2006+
2007+ /* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
2008+
2009+ /* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
2010+ if (unlikely(!(error_code & 2) && (regs->eip == address))) {
2011+ /* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
2012+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
2013+
2014+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2015+ case 3:
2016+ return;
2017+#endif
2018+
2019+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2020+ case 2:
2021+ return;
2022+#endif
2023+
2024+ }
2025+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2026+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2027+ }
2028+
2029+ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
2030+ pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
2031+ if (unlikely(!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte))) {
2032+ pte_unmap(pte);
2033+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
2034+ goto not_pax_fault;
2035+ }
2036+
2037+ if (unlikely((error_code & 2) && !pte_write(*pte))) {
2038+ /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
2039+ pte_unmap(pte);
2040+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
2041+ goto not_pax_fault;
2042+ }
2043+
2044+ pte_mask1 = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1));
2045+
2046+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
2047+ if (likely(cpu_isset(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask)) && address >= get_limit(regs->xcs))
2048+ pte_mask2 = 0;
2049+ else
2050+ pte_mask2 = _PAGE_USER;
2051+#else
2052+ pte_mask2 = (address >= get_limit(regs->xcs)) ? 0 : _PAGE_USER;
2053+#endif
2054+
2055+ /*
2056+ * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
2057+ */
2058+ __asm__ __volatile__ (
2059+ "orb %2,%1\n"
2060+#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC)
2061+/*
2062+ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's
2063+ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any*
2064+ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only
2065+ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will
2066+ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write
2067+ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs
2068+ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all.
2069+
2070+ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the
2071+ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we
2072+ * can no longer flush unintended entries.
2073+ */
2074+ "invlpg %0\n"
2075+#endif
2076+ "testb $0,%0\n"
2077+ "xorb %3,%1\n"
2078+ :
2079+ : "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte), "q" (pte_mask1), "q" (pte_mask2)
2080+ : "memory", "cc");
2081+ pte_unmap(pte);
2082+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
2083+ return;
2084+
2085+not_pax_fault:
2086+#endif
2087
2088 /* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
2089 * addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in the
2090@@ -285,7 +403,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re
2091 if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
2092 if ((error_code & 4) == 0 &&
2093 !search_exception_tables(regs->eip))
2094- goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
2095+ goto bad_area_nopax;
2096 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2097 }
2098
2099@@ -306,7 +424,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re
2100 if (address + 32 < regs->esp)
2101 goto bad_area;
2102 }
2103- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
2104+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
2105 goto bad_area;
2106 /*
2107 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
2108@@ -374,6 +492,45 @@ bad_area:
2109 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2110
2111 bad_area_nosemaphore:
2112+
2113+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2114+ if (mm && (error_code & 4) && !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
2115+
2116+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2117+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip == address)) {
2118+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2119+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2120+ }
2121+#endif
2122+
2123+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
2124+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) {
2125+
2126+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
2127+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
2128+
2129+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2130+ case 3:
2131+ return;
2132+#endif
2133+
2134+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2135+ case 2:
2136+ return;
2137+#endif
2138+
2139+ }
2140+#endif
2141+
2142+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2143+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2144+ }
2145+#endif
2146+
2147+ }
2148+#endif
2149+
2150+bad_area_nopax:
2151 /* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
2152 if (error_code & 4) {
2153 /*
2154@@ -441,28 +598,52 @@ no_context:
2155 #endif
2156 if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
2157 printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference");
2158+
2159+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2160+ else if (init_mm.start_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET <= address &&
2161+ address < init_mm.end_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
2162+ if (tsk->curr_ip)
2163+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
2164+ NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
2165+ else
2166+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
2167+ tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
2168+#endif
2169+
2170 else
2171 printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request");
2172 printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address);
2173 printk(KERN_ALERT " printing eip:\n");
2174 printk("%08lx\n", regs->eip);
2175- asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (page));
2176- page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> 22];
2177- printk(KERN_ALERT "*pde = %08lx\n", page);
2178- /*
2179- * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
2180- * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem.
2181- * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case
2182- * it's allocated already.
2183- */
2184+ {
2185+ unsigned long index = pgd_index(address);
2186+ unsigned long pgd_paddr;
2187+ pgd_t *pgd;
2188+ pud_t *pud;
2189+ pmd_t *pmd;
2190+ pte_t *pte;
2191+
2192+ asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (pgd_paddr));
2193+ pgd = index + (pgd_t *)__va(pgd_paddr);
2194+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pgd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pgd), (unsigned long long)pgd_val(*pgd));
2195+ if (pgd_present(*pgd)) {
2196+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
2197+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
2198+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pmd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pmd), (unsigned long long)pmd_val(*pmd));
2199+ /*
2200+ * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
2201+ * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem.
2202+ * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case
2203+ * it's allocated already.
2204+ */
2205 #ifndef CONFIG_HIGHPTE
2206- if (page & 1) {
2207- page &= PAGE_MASK;
2208- address &= 0x003ff000;
2209- page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> PAGE_SHIFT];
2210- printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %08lx\n", page);
2211- }
2212+ if (pmd_present(*pmd) && !pmd_large(*pmd)) {
2213+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
2214+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pte), (unsigned long long)pte_val(*pte));
2215+ }
2216 #endif
2217+ }
2218+ }
2219 die("Oops", regs, error_code);
2220 bust_spinlocks(0);
2221 do_exit(SIGKILL);
2222@@ -513,7 +694,7 @@ vmalloc_fault:
2223 * Do _not_ use "tsk" here. We might be inside
2224 * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
2225 */
2226- int index = pgd_index(address);
2227+ unsigned long index = pgd_index(address);
2228 unsigned long pgd_paddr;
2229 pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
2230 pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
2231@@ -550,3 +731,255 @@ vmalloc_fault:
2232 return;
2233 }
2234 }
2235+
2236+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
2237+/*
2238+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address)
2239+ *
2240+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
2241+ * 2 when gcc trampoline was detected
2242+ * 3 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
2243+ */
2244+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
2245+{
2246+
2247+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2248+ static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4};
2249+#endif
2250+
2251+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
2252+ int err;
2253+#endif
2254+
2255+ if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
2256+ return 1;
2257+
2258+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2259+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
2260+ unsigned long esp_4;
2261+
2262+ if (regs->eip >= current->mm->start_code &&
2263+ regs->eip < current->mm->end_code)
2264+ {
2265+ err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4UL));
2266+ if (err || esp_4 == regs->eip)
2267+ return 1;
2268+
2269+ regs->eip += current->mm->delta_exec;
2270+ return 3;
2271+ }
2272+ }
2273+#endif
2274+
2275+ if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
2276+ return 1;
2277+
2278+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2279+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
2280+ unsigned char mov1, mov2;
2281+ unsigned short jmp;
2282+ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
2283+ unsigned short call;
2284+
2285+ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
2286+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
2287+ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
2288+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
2289+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10));
2290+ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
2291+
2292+ if (err)
2293+ break;
2294+
2295+ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
2296+ if (err)
2297+ break;
2298+
2299+ if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2300+ (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2301+ (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) &&
2302+ (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF &&
2303+ (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) &&
2304+ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
2305+ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
2306+ {
2307+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1;
2308+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2;
2309+ regs->eip = addr2;
2310+ return 2;
2311+ }
2312+ } while (0);
2313+
2314+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
2315+ unsigned char mov, jmp;
2316+ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
2317+ unsigned short call;
2318+
2319+ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
2320+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
2321+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
2322+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
2323+ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
2324+
2325+ if (err)
2326+ break;
2327+
2328+ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
2329+ if (err)
2330+ break;
2331+
2332+ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2333+ jmp == 0xE9 &&
2334+ (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
2335+ regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]])
2336+ {
2337+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
2338+ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
2339+ return 2;
2340+ }
2341+ } while (0);
2342+
2343+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #3 */
2344+ unsigned char mov, jmp;
2345+ char offset;
2346+ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
2347+ unsigned short call;
2348+
2349+ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
2350+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
2351+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
2352+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
2353+ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
2354+
2355+ if (err)
2356+ break;
2357+
2358+ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-3));
2359+ err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1));
2360+ if (err)
2361+ break;
2362+
2363+ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2364+ jmp == 0xE9 &&
2365+ call == 0x55FF)
2366+ {
2367+ unsigned long addr;
2368+
2369+ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->ebp + (unsigned long)(long)offset));
2370+ if (err || regs->eip != addr)
2371+ break;
2372+
2373+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
2374+ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
2375+ return 2;
2376+ }
2377+ } while (0);
2378+
2379+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #4 */
2380+ unsigned char mov, jmp, sib;
2381+ char offset;
2382+ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
2383+ unsigned short call;
2384+
2385+ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
2386+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
2387+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
2388+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
2389+ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
2390+
2391+ if (err)
2392+ break;
2393+
2394+ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-4));
2395+ err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-2));
2396+ err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1));
2397+ if (err)
2398+ break;
2399+
2400+ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2401+ jmp == 0xE9 &&
2402+ call == 0x54FF &&
2403+ sib == 0x24)
2404+ {
2405+ unsigned long addr;
2406+
2407+ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + (unsigned long)(long)offset));
2408+ if (err || regs->eip != addr)
2409+ break;
2410+
2411+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
2412+ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
2413+ return 2;
2414+ }
2415+ } while (0);
2416+
2417+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #5 */
2418+ unsigned char mov, jmp, sib;
2419+ unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret, offset;
2420+ unsigned short call;
2421+
2422+ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
2423+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
2424+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
2425+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
2426+ err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
2427+
2428+ if (err)
2429+ break;
2430+
2431+ err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-7));
2432+ err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-5));
2433+ err |= get_user(offset, (unsigned long *)(ret-4));
2434+ if (err)
2435+ break;
2436+
2437+ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
2438+ jmp == 0xE9 &&
2439+ call == 0x94FF &&
2440+ sib == 0x24)
2441+ {
2442+ unsigned long addr;
2443+
2444+ err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + offset));
2445+ if (err || regs->eip != addr)
2446+ break;
2447+
2448+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
2449+ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
2450+ return 2;
2451+ }
2452+ } while (0);
2453+#endif
2454+
2455+ return 1; /* PaX in action */
2456+}
2457+#endif
2458+
2459+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2460+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
2461+{
2462+ unsigned long i;
2463+
2464+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
2465+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
2466+ unsigned char c;
2467+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) {
2468+ printk("<invalid address>.");
2469+ break;
2470+ }
2471+ printk("%02x ", c);
2472+ }
2473+ printk("\n");
2474+
2475+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP: ");
2476+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
2477+ unsigned long c;
2478+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned long*)sp+i)) {
2479+ printk("<invalid address>.");
2480+ break;
2481+ }
2482+ printk("%08lx ", c);
2483+ }
2484+ printk("\n");
2485+}
2486+#endif
2487diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c
2488--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
2489+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2490@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
2491 #include <asm/tlb.h>
2492 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
2493 #include <asm/sections.h>
2494+#include <asm/desc.h>
2495
2496 unsigned int __VMALLOC_RESERVE = 128 << 20;
2497
2498@@ -48,30 +49,6 @@ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn
2499 static int noinline do_test_wp_bit(void);
2500
2501 /*
2502- * Creates a middle page table and puts a pointer to it in the
2503- * given global directory entry. This only returns the gd entry
2504- * in non-PAE compilation mode, since the middle layer is folded.
2505- */
2506-static pmd_t * __init one_md_table_init(pgd_t *pgd)
2507-{
2508- pud_t *pud;
2509- pmd_t *pmd_table;
2510-
2511-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2512- pmd_table = (pmd_t *) alloc_bootmem_low_pages(PAGE_SIZE);
2513- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pmd_table) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
2514- pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
2515- if (pmd_table != pmd_offset(pud, 0))
2516- BUG();
2517-#else
2518- pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
2519- pmd_table = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
2520-#endif
2521-
2522- return pmd_table;
2523-}
2524-
2525-/*
2526 * Create a page table and place a pointer to it in a middle page
2527 * directory entry.
2528 */
2529@@ -114,8 +91,6 @@ static void __init page_table_range_init
2530 pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx;
2531
2532 for ( ; (pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD) && (vaddr != end); pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
2533- if (pgd_none(*pgd))
2534- one_md_table_init(pgd);
2535 pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr);
2536 pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
2537 for (; (pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD) && (vaddr != end); pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
2538@@ -144,6 +119,7 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
2539 {
2540 unsigned long pfn;
2541 pgd_t *pgd;
2542+ pud_t *pud;
2543 pmd_t *pmd;
2544 pte_t *pte;
2545 int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs;
2546@@ -153,7 +129,8 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
2547 pfn = 0;
2548
2549 for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD; pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
2550- pmd = one_md_table_init(pgd);
2551+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
2552+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
2553 if (pfn >= max_low_pfn)
2554 continue;
2555 for (pmd_idx = 0; pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD && pfn < max_low_pfn; pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
2556@@ -312,13 +289,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void)
2557 unsigned long vaddr;
2558 pgd_t *pgd_base = swapper_pg_dir;
2559
2560-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2561- int i;
2562- /* Init entries of the first-level page table to the zero page */
2563- for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++)
2564- set_pgd(pgd_base + i, __pgd(__pa(empty_zero_page) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
2565-#endif
2566-
2567 /* Enable PSE if available */
2568 if (cpu_has_pse) {
2569 set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PSE);
2570@@ -342,17 +312,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void)
2571 page_table_range_init(vaddr, 0, pgd_base);
2572
2573 permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base);
2574-
2575-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2576- /*
2577- * Add low memory identity-mappings - SMP needs it when
2578- * starting up on an AP from real-mode. In the non-PAE
2579- * case we already have these mappings through head.S.
2580- * All user-space mappings are explicitly cleared after
2581- * SMP startup.
2582- */
2583- pgd_base[0] = pgd_base[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD];
2584-#endif
2585 }
2586
2587 #if defined(CONFIG_PM_DISK) || defined(CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND)
2588@@ -386,11 +345,7 @@ void zap_low_mappings (void)
2589 * us, because pgd_clear() is a no-op on i386.
2590 */
2591 for (i = 0; i < USER_PTRS_PER_PGD; i++)
2592-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2593- set_pgd(swapper_pg_dir+i, __pgd(1 + __pa(empty_zero_page)));
2594-#else
2595 set_pgd(swapper_pg_dir+i, __pgd(0));
2596-#endif
2597 flush_tlb_all();
2598 }
2599
2600@@ -508,15 +463,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
2601
2602 load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir);
2603
2604+ __flush_tlb_all();
2605+
2606+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2607+
2608 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2609- /*
2610- * We will bail out later - printk doesn't work right now so
2611- * the user would just see a hanging kernel.
2612- */
2613- if (cpu_has_pae)
2614- set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PAE);
2615+ memcpy(kernexec_pm_dir, swapper_pm_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pm_dir));
2616+#else
2617+ memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir));
2618+#endif
2619+
2620 #endif
2621- __flush_tlb_all();
2622
2623 kmap_init();
2624 zone_sizes_init();
2625@@ -611,7 +568,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
2626 set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro);
2627
2628 codesize = (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text;
2629- datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext;
2630+ datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data;
2631 initsize = (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin;
2632
2633 kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
2634@@ -628,10 +585,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
2635 (unsigned long) (totalhigh_pages << (PAGE_SHIFT-10))
2636 );
2637
2638-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2639- if (!cpu_has_pae)
2640- panic("cannot execute a PAE-enabled kernel on a PAE-less CPU!");
2641-#endif
2642 if (boot_cpu_data.wp_works_ok < 0)
2643 test_wp_bit();
2644
2645@@ -702,6 +655,46 @@ void free_initmem(void)
2646 {
2647 unsigned long addr;
2648
2649+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2650+ /* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */
2651+ {
2652+ unsigned long limit;
2653+ int cpu;
2654+ pgd_t *pgd;
2655+ pud_t *pud;
2656+ pmd_t *pmd;
2657+
2658+ limit = (unsigned long)&_etext >> PAGE_SHIFT;
2659+ for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) {
2660+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL);
2661+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL);
2662+ }
2663+
2664+ /* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */
2665+ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
2666+ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
2667+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
2668+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
2669+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL));
2670+ }
2671+
2672+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2673+ memcpy(kernexec_pm_dir, swapper_pm_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pm_dir));
2674+#else
2675+ memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir));
2676+#endif
2677+
2678+ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
2679+ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
2680+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
2681+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
2682+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
2683+ }
2684+ flush_tlb_all();
2685+ }
2686+#endif
2687+
2688+ memset(__init_begin, 0, (unsigned long)&__init_end - (unsigned long)&__init_begin);
2689 addr = (unsigned long)(&__init_begin);
2690 for (; addr < (unsigned long)(&__init_end); addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
2691 ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
2692diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c
2693--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
2694+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2695@@ -38,13 +38,19 @@
2696 static inline unsigned long mmap_base(struct mm_struct *mm)
2697 {
2698 unsigned long gap = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur;
2699+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
2700+
2701+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
2702+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2703+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
2704+#endif
2705
2706 if (gap < MIN_GAP)
2707 gap = MIN_GAP;
2708 else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
2709 gap = MAX_GAP;
2710
2711- return TASK_SIZE - (gap & PAGE_MASK);
2712+ return task_size - (gap & PAGE_MASK);
2713 }
2714
2715 /*
2716@@ -61,10 +67,22 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
2717 (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) ||
2718 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) {
2719 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
2720+
2721+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
2722+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
2723+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
2724+#endif
2725+
2726 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
2727 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
2728 } else {
2729 mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(mm);
2730+
2731+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
2732+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
2733+ mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap;
2734+#endif
2735+
2736 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
2737 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
2738 }
2739diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c
2740--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500
2741+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2742@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
2743 #include <linux/init.h>
2744 #include "pci.h"
2745 #include "pci-functions.h"
2746-
2747+#include <asm/desc.h>
2748
2749 /* BIOS32 signature: "_32_" */
2750 #define BIOS32_SIGNATURE (('_' << 0) + ('3' << 8) + ('2' << 16) + ('_' << 24))
2751diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c
2752--- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500
2753+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2754@@ -83,10 +83,9 @@ do_fpu_end(void)
2755 static void fix_processor_context(void)
2756 {
2757 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
2758- struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
2759+ struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu;
2760
2761 set_tss_desc(cpu,t); /* This just modifies memory; should not be necessary. But... This is necessary, because 386 hardware has concept of busy TSS or some similar stupidity. */
2762- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_TSS].b &= 0xfffffdff;
2763
2764 load_TR_desc(); /* This does ltr */
2765 load_LDT(&current->active_mm->context); /* This does lldt */
2766diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c
2767--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
2768+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2769@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ static void elf32_set_personality (void)
2770
2771 #define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, have_pt_gnu_stack) (!(have_pt_gnu_stack))
2772
2773+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
2774+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
2775+
2776+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
2777+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
2778+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
2779+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
2780+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
2781+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
2782+#endif
2783+
2784 /* Ugly but avoids duplication */
2785 #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c"
2786
2787diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h
2788--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
2789+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2790@@ -326,10 +326,17 @@ struct old_linux32_dirent {
2791 #define ELF_ARCH EM_386
2792
2793 #define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET 0xc0000000
2794-#define IA32_STACK_TOP IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
2795 #define IA32_GATE_OFFSET IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
2796 #define IA32_GATE_END IA32_PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE
2797
2798+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
2799+#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
2800+#else
2801+#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL
2802+#endif
2803+
2804+#define IA32_STACK_TOP (IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK)
2805+
2806 /*
2807 * The system segments (GDT, TSS, LDT) have to be mapped below 4GB so the IA-32 engine can
2808 * access them.
2809diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c
2810--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
2811+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2812@@ -939,6 +939,11 @@ sys32_mmap (struct mmap_arg_struct __use
2813
2814 flags = a.flags;
2815
2816+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2817+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
2818+ return -EINVAL;
2819+#endif
2820+
2821 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
2822 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
2823 file = fget(a.fd);
2824@@ -960,6 +965,11 @@ sys32_mmap2 (unsigned int addr, unsigned
2825 struct file *file = NULL;
2826 unsigned long retval;
2827
2828+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2829+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
2830+ return -EINVAL;
2831+#endif
2832+
2833 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
2834 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
2835 file = fget(fd);
2836diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
2837--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
2838+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2839@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
2840 #include <linux/user.h>
2841 #include <linux/security.h>
2842 #include <linux/audit.h>
2843+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
2844
2845 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
2846 #include <asm/processor.h>
2847@@ -1424,6 +1425,9 @@ sys_ptrace (long request, pid_t pid, uns
2848 if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */
2849 goto out_tsk;
2850
2851+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
2852+ goto out_tsk;
2853+
2854 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
2855 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
2856 goto out_tsk;
2857diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
2858--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
2859+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2860@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
2861 unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
2862 {
2863 long map_shared = (flags & MAP_SHARED);
2864- unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
2865+ unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
2866 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2867 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
2868
2869@@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
2870 if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == REGION_HPAGE)
2871 addr = 0;
2872 #endif
2873+
2874+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
2875+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
2876+ task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
2877+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp)
2878+ addr = mm->free_area_cache;
2879+ else
2880+#endif
2881+
2882 if (!addr)
2883 addr = mm->free_area_cache;
2884
2885@@ -56,9 +65,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
2886 for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
2887 /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
2888 if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) {
2889- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
2890+ if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
2891 /* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes. */
2892- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
2893+ addr = task_unmapped_base;
2894 goto full_search;
2895 }
2896 return -ENOMEM;
2897@@ -184,6 +193,11 @@ do_mmap2 (unsigned long addr, unsigned l
2898 unsigned long roff;
2899 struct file *file = NULL;
2900
2901+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2902+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
2903+ return -EINVAL;
2904+#endif
2905+
2906 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
2907 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
2908 file = fget(fd);
2909diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
2910--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
2911+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
2912@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
2913 #include <linux/mm.h>
2914 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
2915 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
2916+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
2917
2918 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
2919 #include <asm/processor.h>
2920@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ expand_backing_store (struct vm_area_str
2921 if (address - vma->vm_start > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur
2922 || (((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur))
2923 return -ENOMEM;
2924+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) &&
2925+ ((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur &&
2926+ !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
2927+ return -ENOMEM;
2928 vma->vm_end += PAGE_SIZE;
2929 vma->vm_mm->total_vm += grow;
2930 if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
2931@@ -75,6 +80,54 @@ mapped_kernel_page_is_present (unsigned
2932 return pte_present(pte);
2933 }
2934
2935+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2936+/*
2937+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->cr_iip = fault address)
2938+ *
2939+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
2940+ * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
2941+ */
2942+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
2943+{
2944+
2945+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
2946+ int err;
2947+
2948+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
2949+ if (regs->cr_iip >= current->mm->start_code &&
2950+ regs->cr_iip < current->mm->end_code)
2951+ {
2952+#if 0
2953+ /* PaX: this needs fixing */
2954+ if (regs->b0 == regs->cr_iip)
2955+ return 1;
2956+#endif
2957+ regs->cr_iip += current->mm->delta_exec;
2958+ return 2;
2959+ }
2960+ }
2961+#endif
2962+
2963+ return 1;
2964+}
2965+
2966+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
2967+{
2968+ unsigned long i;
2969+
2970+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
2971+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2972+ unsigned int c;
2973+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
2974+ printk("<invalid address>.");
2975+ break;
2976+ }
2977+ printk("%08x ", c);
2978+ }
2979+ printk("\n");
2980+}
2981+#endif
2982+
2983 void
2984 ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs)
2985 {
2986@@ -130,9 +183,31 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres
2987 | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT)
2988 | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_R_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_READ_BIT));
2989
2990- if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask)
2991+ if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) {
2992+
2993+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2994+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) {
2995+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip)
2996+ goto bad_area;
2997+
2998+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2999+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
3000+
3001+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3002+ case 2:
3003+ return;
3004+#endif
3005+
3006+ }
3007+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->cr_iip, (void*)regs->r12);
3008+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
3009+ }
3010+#endif
3011+
3012 goto bad_area;
3013
3014+ }
3015+
3016 survive:
3017 /*
3018 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
3019@@ -169,7 +244,7 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres
3020 if (REGION_NUMBER(address) != REGION_NUMBER(vma->vm_start)
3021 || REGION_OFFSET(address) >= RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
3022 goto bad_area;
3023- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
3024+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
3025 goto bad_area;
3026 } else {
3027 vma = prev_vma;
3028diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c
3029--- linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
3030+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3031@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
3032 goto bad_area;
3033 }
3034 #endif
3035- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
3036+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
3037 goto bad_area;
3038 /*
3039 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
3040diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c
3041--- linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
3042+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3043@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
3044 if (address + 256 < rdusp())
3045 goto map_err;
3046 }
3047- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
3048+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
3049 goto map_err;
3050
3051 /*
3052diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c
3053--- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
3054+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3055@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
3056 #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
3057 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
3058
3059+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
3060+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
3061+
3062+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3063+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3064+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3065+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3066+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3067+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3068+#endif
3069+
3070 #include <asm/processor.h>
3071 #include <linux/module.h>
3072 #include <linux/config.h>
3073diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c
3074--- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500
3075+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3076@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
3077 #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
3078 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
3079
3080+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
3081+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
3082+
3083+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3084+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3085+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3086+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3087+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3088+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3089+#endif
3090+
3091 #include <asm/processor.h>
3092 #include <linux/module.h>
3093 #include <linux/config.h>
3094diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c
3095--- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500
3096+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3097@@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
3098 do_color_align = 0;
3099 if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
3100 do_color_align = 1;
3101+
3102+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3103+ if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
3104+#endif
3105+
3106 if (addr) {
3107 if (do_color_align)
3108 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
3109@@ -94,6 +99,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
3110 (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start))
3111 return addr;
3112 }
3113+
3114+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3115+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
3116+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
3117+ else
3118+#endif
3119+
3120 addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
3121 if (do_color_align)
3122 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
3123diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c
3124--- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
3125+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3126@@ -26,6 +26,24 @@
3127 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
3128 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
3129
3130+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3131+void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
3132+{
3133+ unsigned long i;
3134+
3135+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3136+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
3137+ unsigned int c;
3138+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
3139+ printk("<invalid address>.");
3140+ break;
3141+ }
3142+ printk("%08x ", c);
3143+ }
3144+ printk("\n");
3145+}
3146+#endif
3147+
3148 /*
3149 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
3150 * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
3151@@ -75,7 +93,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
3152 goto good_area;
3153 if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
3154 goto bad_area;
3155- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
3156+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
3157 goto bad_area;
3158 /*
3159 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
3160diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
3161--- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
3162+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3163@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
3164 #include <linux/personality.h>
3165 #include <linux/security.h>
3166 #include <linux/compat.h>
3167+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
3168
3169 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
3170 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
3171@@ -114,6 +115,9 @@ long sys_ptrace(long request, pid_t pid,
3172 if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */
3173 goto out_tsk;
3174
3175+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
3176+ goto out_tsk;
3177+
3178 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
3179 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
3180 goto out_tsk;
3181diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
3182--- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
3183+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3184@@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
3185 {
3186 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
3187 return -ENOMEM;
3188+
3189+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3190+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
3191+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
3192+ else
3193+#endif
3194+
3195 if (!addr)
3196 addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
3197
3198@@ -123,6 +130,12 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap2(unsigned l
3199 {
3200 struct file * file = NULL;
3201 unsigned long error = -EBADF;
3202+
3203+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3204+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
3205+ return -EINVAL;
3206+#endif
3207+
3208 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
3209 file = fget(fd);
3210 if (!file)
3211diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
3212--- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
3213+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3214@@ -680,9 +680,7 @@ void handle_interruption(int code, struc
3215
3216 down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3217 vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]);
3218- if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)
3219- && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3220-
3221+ if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) {
3222 fault_address = regs->iaoq[0];
3223 fault_space = regs->iasq[0];
3224
3225diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
3226--- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
3227+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3228@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
3229 #include <linux/sched.h>
3230 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
3231 #include <linux/module.h>
3232+#include <linux/unistd.h>
3233+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
3234
3235 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
3236 #include <asm/traps.h>
3237@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct exception_data, ex
3238 static unsigned long
3239 parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst)
3240 {
3241- if (code == 6 || code == 16)
3242+ if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16)
3243 return VM_EXEC;
3244
3245 switch (inst & 0xf0000000) {
3246@@ -143,6 +145,139 @@ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsign
3247 }
3248 #endif
3249
3250+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3251+/*
3252+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address)
3253+ *
3254+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
3255+ * 2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
3256+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
3257+ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
3258+ */
3259+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
3260+{
3261+
3262+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
3263+ int err;
3264+#endif
3265+
3266+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3267+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
3268+ if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= current->mm->start_code &&
3269+ instruction_pointer(regs) < current->mm->end_code)
3270+ {
3271+#if 0
3272+ /* PaX: this needs fixing */
3273+ if ((regs->gr[2] & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
3274+ return 1;
3275+#endif
3276+ regs->iaoq[0] += current->mm->delta_exec;
3277+ if ((regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) >= current->mm->start_code &&
3278+ (regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) < current->mm->end_code)
3279+ regs->iaoq[1] += current->mm->delta_exec;
3280+ return 4;
3281+ }
3282+ }
3283+#endif
3284+
3285+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
3286+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
3287+ unsigned int bl, depwi;
3288+
3289+ err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs));
3290+ err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
3291+
3292+ if (err)
3293+ break;
3294+
3295+ if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) {
3296+ unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12;
3297+
3298+ err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr);
3299+ err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
3300+ err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
3301+
3302+ if (err)
3303+ break;
3304+
3305+ if (ldw == 0x0E801096U &&
3306+ bv == 0xEAC0C000U &&
3307+ ldw2 == 0x0E881095U)
3308+ {
3309+ unsigned int resolver, map;
3310+
3311+ err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
3312+ err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
3313+ if (err)
3314+ break;
3315+
3316+ regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8;
3317+ regs->gr[21] = map;
3318+ regs->gr[22] = resolver;
3319+ regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL;
3320+ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
3321+ return 3;
3322+ }
3323+ }
3324+ } while (0);
3325+#endif
3326+
3327+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
3328+
3329+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
3330+ if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
3331+ return 1;
3332+#endif
3333+
3334+ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
3335+ unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop;
3336+
3337+ err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
3338+ err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
3339+ err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
3340+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
3341+
3342+ if (err)
3343+ break;
3344+
3345+ if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) &&
3346+ ldi2 == 0x3414015AU &&
3347+ bel == 0xE4008200U &&
3348+ nop == 0x08000240U)
3349+ {
3350+ regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1;
3351+ regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
3352+ regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16;
3353+ regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1];
3354+ regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL;
3355+ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
3356+ regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2];
3357+ regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2];
3358+ return 2;
3359+ }
3360+ } while (0);
3361+#endif
3362+
3363+ return 1;
3364+}
3365+
3366+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
3367+{
3368+ unsigned long i;
3369+
3370+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3371+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
3372+ unsigned int c;
3373+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
3374+ printk("<invalid address>.");
3375+ break;
3376+ }
3377+ printk("%08x ", c);
3378+ }
3379+ printk("\n");
3380+}
3381+#endif
3382+
3383 void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code,
3384 unsigned long address)
3385 {
3386@@ -168,8 +303,38 @@ good_area:
3387
3388 acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir);
3389
3390- if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type)
3391+ if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) {
3392+
3393+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3394+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) &&
3395+ (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
3396+ {
3397+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
3398+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
3399+
3400+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3401+ case 4:
3402+ return;
3403+#endif
3404+
3405+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
3406+ case 3:
3407+ return;
3408+#endif
3409+
3410+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
3411+ case 2:
3412+ return;
3413+#endif
3414+
3415+ }
3416+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]);
3417+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
3418+ }
3419+#endif
3420+
3421 goto bad_area;
3422+ }
3423
3424 /*
3425 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
3426@@ -199,7 +364,7 @@ good_area:
3427
3428 check_expansion:
3429 vma = prev_vma;
3430- if (vma && (expand_stack(vma, address) == 0))
3431+ if (vma && (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address) == 0))
3432 goto good_area;
3433
3434 /*
3435diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
3436--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
3437+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3438@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
3439 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
3440 #include <linux/user.h>
3441 #include <linux/security.h>
3442+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
3443
3444 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
3445 #include <asm/page.h>
3446@@ -267,6 +268,9 @@ int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, l
3447 if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
3448 goto out_tsk;
3449
3450+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
3451+ goto out_tsk;
3452+
3453 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
3454 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
3455 goto out_tsk;
3456diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c
3457--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
3458+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3459@@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ do_mmap2(unsigned long addr, size_t len,
3460 struct file * file = NULL;
3461 int ret = -EBADF;
3462
3463+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3464+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
3465+ return -EINVAL;
3466+#endif
3467+
3468 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
3469 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
3470 if (!(file = fget(fd)))
3471diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c
3472--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
3473+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3474@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
3475 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
3476 #include <linux/highmem.h>
3477 #include <linux/module.h>
3478+#include <linux/slab.h>
3479+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
3480+#include <linux/compiler.h>
3481+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
3482+#include <linux/unistd.h>
3483
3484 #include <asm/page.h>
3485 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
3486@@ -51,6 +56,363 @@ unsigned long pte_misses; /* updated by
3487 unsigned long pte_errors; /* updated by do_page_fault() */
3488 unsigned int probingmem;
3489
3490+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
3491+void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
3492+{
3493+ vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
3494+}
3495+
3496+static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
3497+{
3498+ struct page* page;
3499+ unsigned int *kaddr;
3500+
3501+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
3502+ if (!page)
3503+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
3504+
3505+ kaddr = kmap(page);
3506+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
3507+ kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
3508+ __flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
3509+ kunmap(page);
3510+ if (type)
3511+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
3512+ return page;
3513+}
3514+
3515+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
3516+ close: pax_syscall_close,
3517+ nopage: pax_syscall_nopage,
3518+};
3519+
3520+static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
3521+{
3522+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
3523+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
3524+ vma->vm_start = addr;
3525+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
3526+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
3527+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
3528+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
3529+ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
3530+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
3531+}
3532+#endif
3533+
3534+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3535+/*
3536+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
3537+ *
3538+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
3539+ * 2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
3540+ * 3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
3541+ * 4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
3542+ * 5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
3543+ * 6 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
3544+ * 7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
3545+ */
3546+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
3547+{
3548+
3549+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
3550+ int err;
3551+#endif
3552+
3553+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3554+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
3555+ if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code &&
3556+ regs->nip < current->mm->end_code)
3557+ {
3558+ if (regs->link == regs->nip)
3559+ return 1;
3560+
3561+ regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec;
3562+ return 5;
3563+ }
3564+ }
3565+#endif
3566+
3567+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
3568+ do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
3569+ unsigned int blrl;
3570+
3571+ err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip);
3572+
3573+ if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
3574+ unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
3575+
3576+ regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
3577+ regs->link = temp + 4UL;
3578+ return 2;
3579+ }
3580+ } while (0);
3581+
3582+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
3583+ unsigned int b;
3584+
3585+ err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3586+
3587+ if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
3588+ regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
3589+ return 3;
3590+ }
3591+ } while (0);
3592+
3593+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
3594+ unsigned int li, b;
3595+
3596+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3597+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
3598+
3599+ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
3600+ unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
3601+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
3602+
3603+ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
3604+ err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr);
3605+ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
3606+ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
3607+ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
3608+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
3609+ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
3610+ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
3611+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
3612+
3613+ if (err)
3614+ break;
3615+
3616+ if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
3617+ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
3618+ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
3619+ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
3620+ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
3621+ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
3622+ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
3623+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
3624+ {
3625+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3626+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3627+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
3628+ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3629+ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
3630+ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
3631+ return 4;
3632+ }
3633+ }
3634+ } while (0);
3635+
3636+#if 0
3637+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
3638+ unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
3639+
3640+ err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3641+ err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
3642+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
3643+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
3644+
3645+ if (err)
3646+ break;
3647+
3648+ if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
3649+ (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
3650+ (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
3651+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
3652+ {
3653+ unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
3654+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
3655+
3656+ addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
3657+ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
3658+ err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
3659+ err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
3660+ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
3661+ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
3662+ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
3663+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
3664+ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
3665+ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32));
3666+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36));
3667+
3668+ if (err)
3669+ break;
3670+
3671+ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
3672+ (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
3673+ rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
3674+ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
3675+ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
3676+ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
3677+ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
3678+ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
3679+ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
3680+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
3681+ {
3682+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] =
3683+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3684+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3685+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
3686+ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3687+ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
3688+ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
3689+ return 4;
3690+ }
3691+ }
3692+ } while (0);
3693+#endif
3694+
3695+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
3696+ unsigned int li, b;
3697+
3698+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3699+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
3700+
3701+ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
3702+ unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
3703+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
3704+
3705+ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
3706+ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
3707+ err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
3708+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
3709+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
3710+
3711+ if (err)
3712+ break;
3713+
3714+ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
3715+ (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
3716+ mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
3717+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
3718+ {
3719+ unsigned int r11;
3720+
3721+ addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3722+ addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
3723+
3724+ err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr);
3725+ if (err)
3726+ break;
3727+
3728+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
3729+ regs->ctr = r11;
3730+ regs->nip = r11;
3731+ return 4;
3732+ }
3733+ }
3734+ } while (0);
3735+#endif
3736+
3737+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
3738+ do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
3739+ unsigned int li, sc;
3740+
3741+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3742+ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
3743+
3744+ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
3745+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
3746+ unsigned long call_syscall;
3747+
3748+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3749+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
3750+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3751+ if (likely(call_syscall))
3752+ goto emulate;
3753+
3754+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
3755+
3756+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3757+ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
3758+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
3759+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3760+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
3761+ goto emulate;
3762+ }
3763+
3764+ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
3765+ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
3766+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3767+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
3768+ return 1;
3769+ }
3770+
3771+ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
3772+ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
3773+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3774+
3775+emulate:
3776+ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn;
3777+ regs->nip = call_syscall;
3778+ return 6;
3779+ }
3780+ } while (0);
3781+
3782+ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
3783+ unsigned int li, sc;
3784+
3785+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
3786+ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
3787+
3788+ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
3789+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
3790+ unsigned int call_syscall;
3791+
3792+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3793+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
3794+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3795+ if (likely(call_syscall))
3796+ goto rt_emulate;
3797+
3798+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
3799+
3800+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3801+ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
3802+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
3803+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3804+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
3805+ goto rt_emulate;
3806+ }
3807+
3808+ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
3809+ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
3810+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3811+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
3812+ return 1;
3813+ }
3814+
3815+ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall);
3816+ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
3817+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
3818+
3819+rt_emulate:
3820+ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
3821+ regs->nip = call_syscall;
3822+ return 7;
3823+ }
3824+ } while (0);
3825+#endif
3826+
3827+ return 1;
3828+}
3829+
3830+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
3831+{
3832+ unsigned long i;
3833+
3834+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3835+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
3836+ unsigned int c;
3837+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
3838+ printk("<invalid address>.");
3839+ break;
3840+ }
3841+ printk("%08x ", c);
3842+ }
3843+ printk("\n");
3844+}
3845+#endif
3846+
3847 /*
3848 * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
3849 * an update addressing form which will update r1.
3850@@ -111,7 +473,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
3851 * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
3852 */
3853 if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400)
3854- error_code &= 0x48200000;
3855+ error_code &= 0x58200000;
3856 else
3857 is_write = error_code & 0x02000000;
3858 #endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */
3859@@ -175,7 +537,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
3860 && (!user_mode(regs) || !store_updates_sp(regs)))
3861 goto bad_area;
3862 }
3863- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
3864+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
3865 goto bad_area;
3866
3867 good_area:
3868@@ -205,15 +567,14 @@ good_area:
3869 } else if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) {
3870 pte_t *ptep;
3871
3872-#if 0
3873+#if 1
3874 /* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute
3875 permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too
3876 much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions
3877 right, so we let any page be executed for now. */
3878 if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
3879 goto bad_area;
3880-#endif
3881-
3882+#else
3883 /* Since 4xx/Book-E supports per-page execute permission,
3884 * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */
3885 ptep = NULL;
3886@@ -233,6 +594,7 @@ good_area:
3887 if (ptep != NULL)
3888 pte_unmap(ptep);
3889 #endif
3890+#endif
3891 /* a read */
3892 } else {
3893 /* protection fault */
3894@@ -278,6 +640,38 @@ bad_area:
3895
3896 /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
3897 if (user_mode(regs)) {
3898+
3899+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3900+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
3901+ if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
3902+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
3903+
3904+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
3905+ case 2:
3906+ case 3:
3907+ case 4:
3908+ return 0;
3909+#endif
3910+
3911+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3912+ case 5:
3913+ return 0;
3914+#endif
3915+
3916+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
3917+ case 6:
3918+ case 7:
3919+ return 0;
3920+#endif
3921+
3922+ }
3923+
3924+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
3925+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
3926+ }
3927+ }
3928+#endif
3929+
3930 info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
3931 info.si_errno = 0;
3932 info.si_code = code;
3933diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c
3934--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
3935+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3936@@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ unsigned long sys_mmap(unsigned long add
3937 struct file * file = NULL;
3938 unsigned long ret = -EBADF;
3939
3940+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3941+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
3942+ return -EINVAL;
3943+#endif
3944+
3945 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
3946 if (!(file = fget(fd)))
3947 goto out;
3948diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c
3949--- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
3950+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
3951@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
3952 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
3953 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
3954 #include <linux/module.h>
3955+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
3956
3957 #include <asm/page.h>
3958 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
3959@@ -76,6 +77,54 @@ static int store_updates_sp(struct pt_re
3960 return 0;
3961 }
3962
3963+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3964+/*
3965+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
3966+ *
3967+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
3968+ * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
3969+ */
3970+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
3971+{
3972+
3973+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
3974+ int err;
3975+#endif
3976+
3977+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
3978+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
3979+ if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code &&
3980+ regs->nip < current->mm->end_code)
3981+ {
3982+ if (regs->link == regs->nip)
3983+ return 1;
3984+
3985+ regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec;
3986+ return 2;
3987+ }
3988+ }
3989+#endif
3990+
3991+ return 1;
3992+}
3993+
3994+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
3995+{
3996+ unsigned long i;
3997+
3998+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3999+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
4000+ unsigned int c;
4001+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
4002+ printk("<invalid address>.");
4003+ break;
4004+ }
4005+ printk("%08x ", c);
4006+ }
4007+ printk("\n");
4008+}
4009+#endif
4010+
4011 /*
4012 * The error_code parameter is
4013 * - DSISR for a non-SLB data access fault,
4014@@ -193,7 +242,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
4015 goto bad_area;
4016 }
4017
4018- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
4019+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
4020 goto bad_area;
4021
4022 good_area:
4023@@ -243,6 +292,25 @@ bad_area:
4024 bad_area_nosemaphore:
4025 /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
4026 if (user_mode(regs)) {
4027+
4028+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4029+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
4030+ if ((regs->trap == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
4031+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
4032+
4033+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4034+ case 2:
4035+ return;
4036+#endif
4037+
4038+ }
4039+
4040+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
4041+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
4042+ }
4043+ }
4044+#endif
4045+
4046 info.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
4047 info.si_errno = 0;
4048 info.si_code = code;
4049diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
4050--- linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
4051+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4052@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsig
4053 goto good_area;
4054 if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
4055 goto bad_area;
4056- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
4057+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
4058 goto bad_area;
4059 /*
4060 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
4061diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c
4062--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
4063+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4064@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
4065 goto good_area;
4066 if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
4067 goto bad_area;
4068- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
4069+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
4070 goto bad_area;
4071 /*
4072 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
4073diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c
4074--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
4075+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4076@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
4077 #endif
4078 goto bad_area;
4079 }
4080- if (expand_stack(vma, address)) {
4081+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) {
4082 #ifdef DEBUG_FAULT
4083 print_task(tsk);
4084 printk("%s:%d fault, address is 0x%08x PC %016Lx textaccess %d writeaccess %d\n",
4085diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile
4086--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
4087+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4088@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ libs-y += arch/sparc/prom/ arch/sparc/li
4089 # Renaming is done to avoid confusing pattern matching rules in 2.5.45 (multy-)
4090 INIT_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(init-y))
4091 CORE_Y := $(core-y)
4092-CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/
4093+CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/
4094 CORE_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(CORE_Y))
4095 DRIVERS_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(drivers-y))
4096 NET_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(net-y))
4097diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
4098--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
4099+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4100@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
4101 #include <linux/smp.h>
4102 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4103 #include <linux/security.h>
4104+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
4105
4106 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4107 #include <asm/system.h>
4108@@ -322,6 +323,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs
4109 goto out;
4110 }
4111
4112+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) {
4113+ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
4114+ goto out_tsk;
4115+ }
4116+
4117 if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
4118 || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
4119 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
4120diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
4121--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500
4122+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4123@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
4124 return -ENOMEM;
4125 if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000)
4126 return -ENOMEM;
4127+
4128+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
4129+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp))
4130+ addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap;
4131+ else
4132+#endif
4133+
4134 if (!addr)
4135 addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4136
4137@@ -227,6 +234,11 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap2(unsigned l
4138 struct file * file = NULL;
4139 unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
4140
4141+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4142+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
4143+ return -EINVAL;
4144+#endif
4145+
4146 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
4147 file = fget(fd);
4148 if (!file)
4149diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c
4150--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
4151+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4152@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sunos_mmap(unsi
4153 struct file * file = NULL;
4154 unsigned long retval, ret_type;
4155
4156+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4157+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
4158+ return -EINVAL;
4159+#endif
4160+
4161 if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
4162 static int cnt;
4163 if (cnt++ < 10)
4164diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c
4165--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
4166+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4167@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
4168 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4169 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
4170 #include <linux/module.h>
4171+#include <linux/slab.h>
4172+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
4173+#include <linux/compiler.h>
4174+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4175
4176 #include <asm/system.h>
4177 #include <asm/segment.h>
4178@@ -220,6 +224,269 @@ static unsigned long compute_si_addr(str
4179 return safe_compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
4180 }
4181
4182+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4183+void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
4184+{
4185+ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
4186+}
4187+
4188+static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
4189+{
4190+ struct page* page;
4191+ unsigned int *kaddr;
4192+
4193+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
4194+ if (!page)
4195+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
4196+
4197+ kaddr = kmap(page);
4198+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
4199+ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
4200+ flush_dcache_page(page);
4201+ kunmap(page);
4202+ if (type)
4203+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
4204+
4205+ return page;
4206+}
4207+
4208+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
4209+ close: pax_emuplt_close,
4210+ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage,
4211+};
4212+
4213+static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
4214+{
4215+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
4216+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
4217+ vma->vm_start = addr;
4218+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
4219+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
4220+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
4221+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
4222+ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
4223+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
4224+}
4225+
4226+/*
4227+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
4228+ *
4229+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
4230+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
4231+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
4232+ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
4233+ */
4234+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
4235+{
4236+
4237+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4238+ int err;
4239+#endif
4240+
4241+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4242+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
4243+ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code &&
4244+ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code)
4245+ {
4246+ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->pc)
4247+ return 1;
4248+
4249+ regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec;
4250+ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code &&
4251+ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code)
4252+ regs->npc += current->mm->delta_exec;
4253+ return 4;
4254+ }
4255+ if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
4256+ regs->pc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
4257+ {
4258+ regs->pc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
4259+ if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
4260+ regs->npc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
4261+ regs->npc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
4262+ }
4263+ }
4264+#endif
4265+
4266+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4267+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
4268+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
4269+
4270+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
4271+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
4272+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
4273+
4274+ if (err)
4275+ break;
4276+
4277+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4278+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4279+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
4280+ {
4281+ unsigned int addr;
4282+
4283+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4284+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
4285+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
4286+ regs->pc = addr;
4287+ regs->npc = addr+4;
4288+ return 2;
4289+ }
4290+ } while (0);
4291+
4292+ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
4293+ unsigned int ba;
4294+
4295+ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
4296+
4297+ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
4298+ unsigned int addr;
4299+
4300+ addr = regs->pc + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
4301+ regs->pc = addr;
4302+ regs->npc = addr+4;
4303+ return 2;
4304+ }
4305+ }
4306+
4307+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
4308+ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
4309+
4310+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
4311+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
4312+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
4313+
4314+ if (err)
4315+ break;
4316+
4317+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4318+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
4319+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4320+ {
4321+ unsigned int addr;
4322+
4323+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4324+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
4325+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
4326+ regs->pc = addr;
4327+ regs->npc = addr+4;
4328+ return 2;
4329+ }
4330+ } while (0);
4331+
4332+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
4333+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
4334+
4335+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
4336+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
4337+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
4338+
4339+ if (err)
4340+ break;
4341+
4342+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4343+ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
4344+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4345+ {
4346+ unsigned int addr, save, call;
4347+
4348+ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
4349+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
4350+ else
4351+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2);
4352+
4353+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
4354+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4355+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4356+ if (err)
4357+ break;
4358+
4359+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
4360+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
4361+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4362+ {
4363+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
4364+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
4365+
4366+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4367+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
4368+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4369+ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
4370+ goto emulate;
4371+
4372+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
4373+
4374+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4375+ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
4376+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
4377+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4378+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4379+ goto emulate;
4380+ }
4381+
4382+ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
4383+ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
4384+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4385+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4386+ return 1;
4387+ }
4388+
4389+ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
4390+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
4391+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4392+
4393+emulate:
4394+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4395+ regs->pc = call_dl_resolve;
4396+ regs->npc = addr+4;
4397+ return 3;
4398+ }
4399+ }
4400+ } while (0);
4401+
4402+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
4403+ unsigned int save, call, nop;
4404+
4405+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4));
4406+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
4407+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
4408+ if (err)
4409+ break;
4410+
4411+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
4412+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
4413+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4414+ {
4415+ unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2);
4416+
4417+ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc;
4418+ regs->pc = dl_resolve;
4419+ regs->npc = dl_resolve+4;
4420+ return 3;
4421+ }
4422+ } while (0);
4423+#endif
4424+
4425+ return 1;
4426+}
4427+
4428+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
4429+{
4430+ unsigned long i;
4431+
4432+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
4433+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
4434+ unsigned int c;
4435+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
4436+ printk("<invalid address>.");
4437+ break;
4438+ }
4439+ printk("%08x ", c);
4440+ }
4441+ printk("\n");
4442+}
4443+#endif
4444+
4445 asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
4446 unsigned long address)
4447 {
4448@@ -271,7 +538,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt
4449 goto good_area;
4450 if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
4451 goto bad_area;
4452- if(expand_stack(vma, address))
4453+ if(expand_stack(current, vma, address))
4454 goto bad_area;
4455 /*
4456 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
4457@@ -283,6 +550,29 @@ good_area:
4458 if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
4459 goto bad_area;
4460 } else {
4461+
4462+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4463+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
4464+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
4465+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
4466+
4467+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4468+ case 2:
4469+ case 3:
4470+ return;
4471+#endif
4472+
4473+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4474+ case 4:
4475+ return;
4476+#endif
4477+
4478+ }
4479+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]);
4480+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
4481+ }
4482+#endif
4483+
4484 /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
4485 if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
4486 goto bad_area;
4487@@ -525,7 +815,7 @@ inline void force_user_fault(unsigned lo
4488 goto good_area;
4489 if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
4490 goto bad_area;
4491- if(expand_stack(vma, address))
4492+ if(expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
4493 goto bad_area;
4494 good_area:
4495 info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
4496diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c
4497--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
4498+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4499@@ -337,17 +337,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
4500
4501 /* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */
4502 protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE;
4503- protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY;
4504- protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY;
4505- protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY;
4506+ protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
4507+ protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
4508+ protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
4509 protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY;
4510 protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY;
4511 protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY;
4512 protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY;
4513 protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE;
4514- protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY;
4515- protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED;
4516- protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED;
4517+ protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
4518+ protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
4519+ protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
4520 protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY;
4521 protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY;
4522 protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED;
4523diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c
4524--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
4525+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4526@@ -2147,6 +2147,13 @@ void __init ld_mmu_srmmu(void)
4527 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED));
4528 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY));
4529 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY));
4530+
4531+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4532+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC));
4533+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC));
4534+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC));
4535+#endif
4536+
4537 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL));
4538 page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL);
4539 pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF;
4540diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
4541--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
4542+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4543@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
4544 #include <linux/smp.h>
4545 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4546 #include <linux/security.h>
4547+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
4548
4549 #include <asm/asi.h>
4550 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4551@@ -173,6 +174,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs
4552 goto out;
4553 }
4554
4555+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) {
4556+ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
4557+ goto out_tsk;
4558+ }
4559+
4560 if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
4561 || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
4562 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
4563diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
4564--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
4565+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4566@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
4567 {
4568 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
4569 struct vm_area_struct * vma;
4570- unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
4571+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4572 unsigned long start_addr;
4573 int do_color_align;
4574
4575@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
4576 if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
4577 do_color_align = 1;
4578
4579+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
4580+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
4581+ task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap;
4582+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
4583+#endif
4584+
4585 if (addr) {
4586 if (do_color_align)
4587 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
4588@@ -101,8 +107,8 @@ full_search:
4589 vma = find_vma(mm, PAGE_OFFSET);
4590 }
4591 if (task_size < addr) {
4592- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
4593- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4594+ if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) {
4595+ start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base;
4596 goto full_search;
4597 }
4598 return -ENOMEM;
4599@@ -322,6 +328,11 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_mmap(unsign
4600 struct file * file = NULL;
4601 unsigned long retval = -EBADF;
4602
4603+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4604+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
4605+ return -EINVAL;
4606+#endif
4607+
4608 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
4609 file = fget(fd);
4610 if (!file)
4611diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c
4612--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
4613+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4614@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ asmlinkage u32 sunos_mmap(u32 addr, u32
4615 struct file *file = NULL;
4616 unsigned long retval, ret_type;
4617
4618+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4619+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
4620+ return -EINVAL;
4621+#endif
4622+
4623 if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
4624 static int cnt;
4625 if (cnt++ < 10)
4626diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
4627--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
4628+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
4629@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
4630 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4631 #include <linux/init.h>
4632 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
4633+#include <linux/slab.h>
4634+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
4635+#include <linux/compiler.h>
4636+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4637
4638 #include <asm/page.h>
4639 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4640@@ -318,6 +322,386 @@ cannot_handle:
4641 unhandled_fault (address, current, regs);
4642 }
4643
4644+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4645+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4646+static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
4647+{
4648+ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
4649+}
4650+
4651+static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
4652+{
4653+ struct page* page;
4654+ unsigned int *kaddr;
4655+
4656+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
4657+ if (!page)
4658+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
4659+
4660+ kaddr = kmap(page);
4661+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
4662+ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
4663+ flush_dcache_page(page);
4664+ kunmap(page);
4665+ if (type)
4666+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
4667+ return page;
4668+}
4669+
4670+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
4671+ close: pax_emuplt_close,
4672+ nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage,
4673+};
4674+
4675+static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
4676+{
4677+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
4678+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
4679+ vma->vm_start = addr;
4680+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
4681+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
4682+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
4683+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
4684+ insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
4685+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
4686+}
4687+#endif
4688+
4689+/*
4690+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address)
4691+ *
4692+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
4693+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
4694+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
4695+ * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
4696+ */
4697+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
4698+{
4699+
4700+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4701+ int err;
4702+#endif
4703+
4704+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
4705+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
4706+ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
4707+ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code)
4708+ {
4709+ if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->tpc)
4710+ return 1;
4711+
4712+ regs->tpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
4713+ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code &&
4714+ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code)
4715+ regs->tnpc += current->mm->delta_exec;
4716+ return 4;
4717+ }
4718+ if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
4719+ regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
4720+ {
4721+ regs->tpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
4722+ if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec &&
4723+ regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec)
4724+ regs->tnpc -= current->mm->delta_exec;
4725+ }
4726+ }
4727+#endif
4728+
4729+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4730+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
4731+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
4732+
4733+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4734+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4735+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4736+
4737+ if (err)
4738+ break;
4739+
4740+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4741+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4742+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
4743+ {
4744+ unsigned long addr;
4745+
4746+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4747+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
4748+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
4749+ regs->tpc = addr;
4750+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4751+ return 2;
4752+ }
4753+ } while (0);
4754+
4755+ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
4756+ unsigned int ba;
4757+
4758+ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4759+
4760+ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
4761+ unsigned long addr;
4762+
4763+ addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
4764+ regs->tpc = addr;
4765+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4766+ return 2;
4767+ }
4768+ }
4769+
4770+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
4771+ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
4772+
4773+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4774+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4775+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4776+
4777+ if (err)
4778+ break;
4779+
4780+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4781+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
4782+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4783+ {
4784+ unsigned long addr;
4785+
4786+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4787+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
4788+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
4789+ regs->tpc = addr;
4790+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4791+ return 2;
4792+ }
4793+ } while (0);
4794+
4795+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */
4796+ unsigned int mov1, call, mov2;
4797+
4798+ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4799+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4800+ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4801+
4802+ if (err)
4803+ break;
4804+
4805+ if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU &&
4806+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
4807+ mov2 == 0x9E100001U)
4808+ {
4809+ unsigned long addr;
4810+
4811+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC];
4812+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
4813+ regs->tpc = addr;
4814+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4815+ return 2;
4816+ }
4817+ } while (0);
4818+
4819+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */
4820+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop;
4821+
4822+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4823+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4824+ err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4825+ err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
4826+ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
4827+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
4828+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+24));
4829+
4830+ if (err)
4831+ break;
4832+
4833+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4834+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
4835+ (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U &&
4836+ (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
4837+ sllx == 0x83287020 &&
4838+ jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
4839+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4840+ {
4841+ unsigned long addr;
4842+
4843+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU);
4844+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
4845+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU);
4846+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
4847+ regs->tpc = addr;
4848+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4849+ return 2;
4850+ }
4851+ } while (0);
4852+
4853+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */
4854+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or, jmpl, nop;
4855+
4856+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4857+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4858+ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4859+ err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
4860+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
4861+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
4862+
4863+ if (err)
4864+ break;
4865+
4866+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4867+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
4868+ sllx == 0x83287020 &&
4869+ (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
4870+ jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
4871+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4872+ {
4873+ unsigned long addr;
4874+
4875+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4876+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
4877+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU);
4878+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
4879+ regs->tpc = addr;
4880+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4881+ return 2;
4882+ }
4883+ } while (0);
4884+
4885+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #7 */
4886+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
4887+
4888+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4889+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4890+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4891+
4892+ if (err)
4893+ break;
4894+
4895+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4896+ (ba & 0xFFF00000U) == 0x30600000U &&
4897+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4898+ {
4899+ unsigned long addr;
4900+
4901+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4902+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
4903+ addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
4904+ regs->tpc = addr;
4905+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4906+ return 2;
4907+ }
4908+ } while (0);
4909+
4910+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
4911+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
4912+
4913+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4914+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4915+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
4916+
4917+ if (err)
4918+ break;
4919+
4920+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
4921+ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
4922+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4923+ {
4924+ unsigned long addr;
4925+ unsigned int save, call;
4926+
4927+ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
4928+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
4929+ else
4930+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
4931+
4932+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
4933+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4934+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4935+ if (err)
4936+ break;
4937+
4938+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
4939+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
4940+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4941+ {
4942+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
4943+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
4944+
4945+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4946+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
4947+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4948+ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
4949+ goto emulate;
4950+
4951+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
4952+
4953+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4954+ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
4955+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
4956+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4957+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4958+ goto emulate;
4959+ }
4960+
4961+ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
4962+ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
4963+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4964+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4965+ return 1;
4966+ }
4967+
4968+ pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve);
4969+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
4970+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4971+
4972+emulate:
4973+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
4974+ regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve;
4975+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
4976+ return 3;
4977+ }
4978+ }
4979+ } while (0);
4980+
4981+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
4982+ unsigned int save, call, nop;
4983+
4984+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4));
4985+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
4986+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
4987+ if (err)
4988+ break;
4989+
4990+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
4991+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
4992+ nop == 0x01000000U)
4993+ {
4994+ unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
4995+
4996+ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc;
4997+ regs->tpc = dl_resolve;
4998+ regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4;
4999+ return 3;
5000+ }
5001+ } while (0);
5002+#endif
5003+
5004+ return 1;
5005+}
5006+
5007+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
5008+{
5009+ unsigned long i;
5010+
5011+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
5012+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
5013+ unsigned int c;
5014+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) {
5015+ printk("<invalid address>.");
5016+ break;
5017+ }
5018+ printk("%08x ", c);
5019+ }
5020+ printk("\n");
5021+}
5022+#endif
5023+
5024 asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
5025 {
5026 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
5027@@ -360,8 +744,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct
5028 goto intr_or_no_mm;
5029
5030 if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
5031- if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV))
5032+ if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
5033 regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
5034+ regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
5035+ }
5036 address &= 0xffffffff;
5037 }
5038
5039@@ -378,6 +764,34 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct
5040 if (!vma)
5041 goto bad_area;
5042
5043+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5044+ /* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */
5045+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address &&
5046+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB))
5047+ {
5048+ if (address != regs->tpc)
5049+ goto good_area;
5050+
5051+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
5052+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
5053+
5054+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5055+ case 2:
5056+ case 3:
5057+ goto fault_done;
5058+#endif
5059+
5060+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5061+ case 4:
5062+ goto fault_done;
5063+#endif
5064+
5065+ }
5066+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS));
5067+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
5068+ }
5069+#endif
5070+
5071 /* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
5072 * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
5073 * was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the
5074@@ -421,7 +835,7 @@ continue_fault:
5075 goto bad_area;
5076 }
5077 }
5078- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
5079+ if (expand_stack(current, vma, address))
5080 goto bad_area;
5081 /*
5082 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
5083diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c
5084--- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
5085+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5086@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ static u32 do_solaris_mmap(u32 addr, u32
5087 struct file *file = NULL;
5088 unsigned long retval, ret_type;
5089
5090+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5091+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
5092+ return -EINVAL;
5093+#endif
5094+
5095 /* Do we need it here? */
5096 set_personality(PER_SVR4);
5097 if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
5098diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c
5099--- linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
5100+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5101@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ int handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr
5102 goto out;
5103 else if(!ARCH_IS_STACKGROW(address))
5104 goto out;
5105- else if(expand_stack(vma, address))
5106+ else if(expand_stack(current, vma, address))
5107 goto out;
5108
5109 good_area:
5110diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c
5111--- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2005-03-02 02:37:46.000000000 -0500
5112+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5113@@ -186,6 +186,17 @@ struct elf_prpsinfo
5114 //#include <asm/ia32.h>
5115 #include <linux/elf.h>
5116
5117+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
5118+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL)
5119+
5120+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5121+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
5122+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5123+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
5124+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5125+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24)
5126+#endif
5127+
5128 typedef struct user_i387_ia32_struct elf_fpregset_t;
5129 typedef struct user32_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t;
5130
5131diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c
5132--- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
5133+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5134@@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ sys32_mmap(struct mmap_arg_struct __user
5135 if (a.offset & ~PAGE_MASK)
5136 return -EINVAL;
5137
5138+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5139+ if (a.flags & MAP_MIRROR)
5140+ return -EINVAL;
5141+#endif
5142+
5143 if (!(a.flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
5144 file = fget(a.fd);
5145 if (!file)
5146@@ -841,6 +846,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_mmap2(unsigned lon
5147 unsigned long error;
5148 struct file * file = NULL;
5149
5150+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5151+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
5152+ return -EINVAL;
5153+#endif
5154+
5155 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
5156 if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) {
5157 file = fget(fd);
5158diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
5159--- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:53.000000000 -0500
5160+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5161@@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request,
5162 if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */
5163 goto out_tsk;
5164
5165+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
5166+ goto out_tsk;
5167+
5168 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
5169 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
5170 goto out_tsk;
5171diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
5172--- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
5173+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5174@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ long sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsign
5175 if (off & ~PAGE_MASK)
5176 goto out;
5177
5178+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5179+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
5180+ goto out;
5181+#endif
5182+
5183 error = -EBADF;
5184 file = NULL;
5185 flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
5186@@ -102,6 +107,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
5187
5188 find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end);
5189
5190+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5191+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) {
5192+ if (begin == 0x40000000)
5193+ begin += mm->delta_mmap & 0x0FFFFFFFU;
5194+ else
5195+ begin += mm->delta_mmap;
5196+ }
5197+#endif
5198+
5199 if (len > end)
5200 return -ENOMEM;
5201
5202diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c
5203--- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500
5204+++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5205@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
5206 #include <linux/compiler.h>
5207 #include <linux/module.h>
5208 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
5209+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
5210
5211 #include <asm/system.h>
5212 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5213@@ -280,6 +281,63 @@ static int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long a
5214 return 0;
5215 }
5216
5217+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5218+/*
5219+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->rip = fault address)
5220+ *
5221+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
5222+ * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected
5223+ */
5224+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
5225+{
5226+
5227+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5228+ int err;
5229+
5230+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
5231+ if (regs->rip >= current->mm->start_code &&
5232+ regs->rip < current->mm->end_code)
5233+ {
5234+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
5235+ unsigned int esp_4;
5236+
5237+ err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned int*)(regs->rsp-4UL));
5238+ if (err || esp_4 == regs->rip)
5239+ return 1;
5240+ } else {
5241+ unsigned long esp_8;
5242+
5243+ err = get_user(esp_8, (unsigned long*)(regs->rsp-8UL));
5244+ if (err || esp_8 == regs->rip)
5245+ return 1;
5246+ }
5247+
5248+ regs->rip += current->mm->delta_exec;
5249+ return 2;
5250+ }
5251+ }
5252+#endif
5253+
5254+ return 1;
5255+}
5256+
5257+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
5258+{
5259+ unsigned long i;
5260+
5261+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
5262+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
5263+ unsigned int c;
5264+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) {
5265+ printk("<invalid address>.");
5266+ break;
5267+ }
5268+ printk("%08x ", c);
5269+ }
5270+ printk("\n");
5271+}
5272+#endif
5273+
5274 int page_fault_trace = 0;
5275 int exception_trace = 1;
5276
5277@@ -405,7 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
5278 if (address + 128 < regs->rsp)
5279 goto bad_area;
5280 }
5281- if (expand_stack(vma, address))
5282+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address))
5283 goto bad_area;
5284 /*
5285 * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so
5286@@ -414,6 +472,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_
5287 good_area:
5288 info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
5289 write = 0;
5290+ if ((error_code & 16) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
5291+ goto bad_area;
5292 switch (error_code & 3) {
5293 default: /* 3: write, present */
5294 /* fall through */
5295@@ -491,7 +551,22 @@ bad_area_nosemaphore:
5296 tsk->comm, tsk->pid, address, regs->rip,
5297 regs->rsp, error_code);
5298 }
5299-
5300+
5301+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5302+ if (mm && (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (error_code & 16)) {
5303+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
5304+
5305+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5306+ case 2:
5307+ return;
5308+#endif
5309+
5310+ }
5311+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->rip, (void*)regs->rsp);
5312+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
5313+ }
5314+#endif
5315+
5316 tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
5317 /* Kernel addresses are always protection faults */
5318 tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >= TASK_SIZE);
5319diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c
5320--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
5321+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5322@@ -606,6 +606,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u
5323 kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) &&
5324 value != KVAL(K_SAK))
5325 return; /* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */
5326+
5327+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP)
5328+ {
5329+ void *func = fn_handler[value];
5330+ if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs ||
5331+ func == fn_show_mem)
5332+ return;
5333+ }
5334+#endif
5335+
5336 fn_handler[value](vc, regs);
5337 }
5338
5339diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c
5340--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
5341+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5342@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
5343 #include <linux/devfs_fs_kernel.h>
5344 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
5345 #include <linux/device.h>
5346+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
5347
5348 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5349 #include <asm/io.h>
5350@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@
5351 extern void tapechar_init(void);
5352 #endif
5353
5354+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
5355+extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
5356+#endif
5357+
5358 /*
5359 * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses
5360 * outside of main memory.
5361@@ -187,6 +192,12 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file * f
5362
5363 if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, &count))
5364 return -EFAULT;
5365+
5366+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
5367+ gr_handle_mem_write();
5368+ return -EPERM;
5369+#endif
5370+
5371 return do_write_mem(__va(p), p, buf, count, ppos);
5372 }
5373
5374@@ -201,6 +212,11 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file * file,
5375 vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
5376 #endif
5377
5378+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
5379+ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma))
5380+ return -EPERM;
5381+#endif
5382+
5383 /* Remap-pfn-range will mark the range VM_IO and VM_RESERVED */
5384 if (remap_pfn_range(vma,
5385 vma->vm_start,
5386@@ -289,6 +305,11 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *
5387 ssize_t written;
5388 char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
5389
5390+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
5391+ gr_handle_kmem_write();
5392+ return -EPERM;
5393+#endif
5394+
5395 if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
5396
5397 wrote = count;
5398@@ -415,7 +436,23 @@ static inline size_t read_zero_pagealign
5399 count = size;
5400
5401 zap_page_range(vma, addr, count, NULL);
5402- zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, PAGE_COPY);
5403+ zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot);
5404+
5405+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
5406+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
5407+ unsigned long addr_m;
5408+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
5409+
5410+ addr_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
5411+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, addr_m);
5412+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == addr_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
5413+ addr_m = addr + vma->vm_mirror;
5414+ zap_page_range(vma_m, addr_m, count, NULL);
5415+ } else
5416+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: read_zero bug, %08lx, %08lx\n",
5417+ addr, vma->vm_start);
5418+ }
5419+#endif
5420
5421 size -= count;
5422 buf += count;
5423@@ -564,6 +601,16 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *
5424
5425 static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
5426 {
5427+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
5428+ gr_handle_open_port();
5429+ return -EPERM;
5430+#endif
5431+
5432+ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
5433+}
5434+
5435+static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
5436+{
5437 return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
5438 }
5439
5440@@ -572,7 +619,6 @@ static int open_port(struct inode * inod
5441 #define full_lseek null_lseek
5442 #define write_zero write_null
5443 #define read_full read_zero
5444-#define open_mem open_port
5445 #define open_kmem open_mem
5446
5447 static struct file_operations mem_fops = {
5448@@ -673,6 +719,11 @@ static int memory_open(struct inode * in
5449 case 11:
5450 filp->f_op = &kmsg_fops;
5451 break;
5452+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
5453+ case 12:
5454+ filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
5455+ break;
5456+#endif
5457 default:
5458 return -ENXIO;
5459 }
5460@@ -702,6 +753,9 @@ static const struct {
5461 {8, "random", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &random_fops},
5462 {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops},
5463 {11,"kmsg", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &kmsg_fops},
5464+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
5465+ {12,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops},
5466+#endif
5467 };
5468
5469 static struct class_simple *mem_class;
5470diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c
5471--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
5472+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5473@@ -256,9 +256,15 @@
5474 /*
5475 * Configuration information
5476 */
5477+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
5478+#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024
5479+#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256
5480+#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512
5481+#else
5482 #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
5483 #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
5484 #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
5485+#endif
5486 #define USE_SHA
5487
5488 /*
5489@@ -1965,7 +1971,7 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct en
5490 *
5491 ********************************************************************/
5492
5493-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
5494+#if defined(CONFIG_INET) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
5495 /*
5496 * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
5497 * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
5498@@ -2383,3 +2389,25 @@ __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie,
5499 }
5500 #endif
5501 #endif /* CONFIG_INET */
5502+
5503+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC)
5504+unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void)
5505+{
5506+ static time_t rekey_time;
5507+ static __u32 secret[12];
5508+ time_t t;
5509+
5510+ /*
5511+ * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
5512+ */
5513+ t = get_seconds();
5514+ if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
5515+ rekey_time = t;
5516+ get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
5517+ }
5518+
5519+ secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
5520+ secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret);
5521+ return *(unsigned long *)secret;
5522+}
5523+#endif
5524diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c
5525--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
5526+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5527@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ do_kdsk_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbentry __
5528 case KDSKBENT:
5529 if (!perm)
5530 return -EPERM;
5531+
5532+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
5533+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
5534+ return -EPERM;
5535+#endif
5536+
5537 if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) {
5538 /* disallocate map */
5539 key_map = key_maps[s];
5540@@ -233,6 +239,13 @@ do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbsentry
5541 goto reterr;
5542 }
5543
5544+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
5545+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
5546+ ret = -EPERM;
5547+ goto reterr;
5548+ }
5549+#endif
5550+
5551 q = func_table[i];
5552 first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft);
5553 for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++)
5554diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c
5555--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
5556+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5557@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan
5558 sdla_t* card = wandev->private;
5559 struct net_device* dev;
5560 volatile ppp_private_area_t *ppp_priv_area;
5561- ppp_flags_t *flags = card->flags;
5562+ ppp_flags_t *flags;
5563 unsigned long timeout;
5564
5565 /* sanity checks */
5566@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan
5567
5568 ppp_priv_area->update_comms_stats = 2;
5569 ppp_priv_area->timer_int_enabled |= TMR_INT_ENABLED_UPDATE;
5570+ flags = card->flags;
5571 flags->imask |= PPP_INTR_TIMER;
5572
5573 /* wait a maximum of 1 second for the statistics to be updated */
5574diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c
5575--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
5576+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5577@@ -565,7 +565,15 @@ static struct file_operations proc_pci_o
5578
5579 static void legacy_proc_init(void)
5580 {
5581+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
5582+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
5583+ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL);
5584+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
5585+ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
5586+#endif
5587+#else
5588 struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL);
5589+#endif
5590 if (entry)
5591 entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations;
5592 }
5593@@ -594,7 +602,15 @@ static int __init pci_proc_init(void)
5594 {
5595 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
5596 struct pci_dev *dev = NULL;
5597+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
5598+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
5599+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus);
5600+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
5601+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus);
5602+#endif
5603+#else
5604 proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus);
5605+#endif
5606 entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir);
5607 if (entry)
5608 entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations;
5609diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c
5610--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
5611+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5612@@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ __asm__(
5613
5614 #define Q_SET_SEL(cpu, selname, address, size) \
5615 do { \
5616-set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], __va((u32)(address))); \
5617-set_limit(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], size); \
5618+set_base(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], __va((u32)(address))); \
5619+set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \
5620 } while(0)
5621
5622 #define Q2_SET_SEL(cpu, selname, address, size) \
5623 do { \
5624-set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], (u32)(address)); \
5625-set_limit(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], size); \
5626+set_base(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], (u32)(address)); \
5627+set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \
5628 } while(0)
5629
5630-static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409200 };
5631+static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409300 };
5632
5633 /*
5634 * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind
5635@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
5636 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
5637 int cpu;
5638
5639+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
5640+ unsigned long cr3;
5641+#endif
5642+
5643 /*
5644 * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant.
5645 * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly.
5646@@ -115,12 +119,17 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
5647 return PNP_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
5648
5649 cpu = get_cpu();
5650- save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8];
5651- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
5652
5653 /* On some boxes IRQ's during PnP BIOS calls are deadly. */
5654 spin_lock_irqsave(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
5655
5656+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
5657+ pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3);
5658+#endif
5659+
5660+ save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8];
5661+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
5662+
5663 /* The lock prevents us bouncing CPU here */
5664 if (ts1_size)
5665 Q2_SET_SEL(smp_processor_id(), PNP_TS1, ts1_base, ts1_size);
5666@@ -156,9 +165,14 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
5667 "i" (0)
5668 : "memory"
5669 );
5670- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
5671
5672- per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
5673+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
5674+
5675+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
5676+ pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3);
5677+#endif
5678+
5679+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
5680 put_cpu();
5681
5682 /* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */
5683diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c
5684--- linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
5685+++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5686@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct de
5687 size_remap = size_total;
5688 vesafb_fix.smem_len = size_remap;
5689
5690-#ifndef __i386__
5691+#if !defined(__i386__) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
5692 screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0;
5693 #endif
5694
5695diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig
5696--- linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
5697+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5698@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ config PROC_FS
5699
5700 config PROC_KCORE
5701 bool "/proc/kcore support" if !ARM
5702- depends on PROC_FS && MMU
5703+ depends on PROC_FS && MMU && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
5704
5705 config SYSFS
5706 bool "sysfs file system support" if EMBEDDED
5707diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c
5708--- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
5709+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5710@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
5711 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
5712 #include <linux/personality.h>
5713 #include <linux/init.h>
5714+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
5715
5716 #include <asm/system.h>
5717 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5718@@ -125,10 +126,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st
5719 /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
5720 if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */
5721 #ifdef __sparc__
5722+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize, 1);
5723 if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) >
5724 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
5725 dump.u_dsize = 0;
5726 #else
5727+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
5728 if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
5729 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
5730 dump.u_dsize = 0;
5731@@ -136,10 +139,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st
5732
5733 /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
5734 #ifdef __sparc__
5735+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1);
5736 if ((dump.u_ssize) >
5737 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
5738 dump.u_ssize = 0;
5739 #else
5740+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
5741 if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
5742 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
5743 dump.u_ssize = 0;
5744@@ -289,6 +294,8 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
5745 rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
5746 if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
5747 rlim = ~0;
5748+
5749+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1);
5750 if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
5751 return -ENOMEM;
5752
5753@@ -317,10 +324,33 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
5754 (current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex));
5755 current->mm->free_area_cache = current->mm->mmap_base;
5756
5757+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5758+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
5759+ current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap;
5760+#endif
5761+
5762 current->mm->rss = 0;
5763 current->mm->mmap = NULL;
5764 compute_creds(bprm);
5765 current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
5766+
5767+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5768+ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
5769+ current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
5770+
5771+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
5772+ if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
5773+ current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
5774+#endif
5775+
5776+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
5777+ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))
5778+ current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
5779+#endif
5780+
5781+ }
5782+#endif
5783+
5784 #ifdef __sparc__
5785 if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
5786 loff_t pos = fd_offset;
5787@@ -416,7 +446,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
5788
5789 down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5790 error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
5791- PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
5792+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
5793 MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
5794 fd_offset + ex.a_text);
5795 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5796diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c
5797--- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
5798+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
5799@@ -37,11 +37,17 @@
5800 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
5801 #include <linux/security.h>
5802 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
5803+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
5804+#include <linux/random.h>
5805
5806 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5807 #include <asm/param.h>
5808 #include <asm/page.h>
5809
5810+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
5811+#include <asm/desc.h>
5812+#endif
5813+
5814 #include <linux/elf.h>
5815
5816 static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs);
5817@@ -89,18 +95,32 @@ static struct linux_binfmt elf_format =
5818
5819 static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
5820 {
5821+ unsigned long e = end, retval;
5822+
5823 start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
5824 end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
5825+
5826+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5827 if (end > start) {
5828- unsigned long addr;
5829- down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5830- addr = do_brk(start, end - start);
5831- up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5832- if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
5833- return addr;
5834+ retval = do_brk(start, end - start);
5835+ if (BAD_ADDR(retval))
5836+ goto out;
5837+
5838+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5839+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) {
5840+ retval = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGEALIGN(start + current->mm->delta_exec), 0UL, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, start);
5841+ if (BAD_ADDR(retval))
5842+ goto out;
5843+ }
5844+#endif
5845+
5846 }
5847- current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
5848- return 0;
5849+ current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = e;
5850+ retval = 0UL;
5851+
5852+out:
5853+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5854+ return retval;
5855 }
5856
5857
5858@@ -321,6 +341,7 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
5859 unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0;
5860 unsigned long error = ~0UL;
5861 int retval, i, size;
5862+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
5863
5864 /* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
5865 if (interp_elf_ex->e_type != ET_EXEC &&
5866@@ -358,6 +379,11 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
5867 goto out_close;
5868 }
5869
5870+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
5871+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
5872+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
5873+#endif
5874+
5875 eppnt = elf_phdata;
5876 for (i=0; i<interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
5877 if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
5878@@ -389,8 +415,8 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
5879 * <= p_memsize so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
5880 */
5881 k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr;
5882- if (k > TASK_SIZE || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
5883- eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE || TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
5884+ if (k > task_size || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
5885+ eppnt->p_memsz > task_size || task_size - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
5886 error = -ENOMEM;
5887 goto out_close;
5888 }
5889@@ -491,6 +517,227 @@ out:
5890 return elf_entry;
5891 }
5892
5893+#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE)
5894+static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
5895+{
5896+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
5897+
5898+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5899+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC)
5900+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
5901+#endif
5902+
5903+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
5904+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC)
5905+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
5906+#endif
5907+
5908+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
5909+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
5910+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
5911+#endif
5912+
5913+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
5914+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
5915+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
5916+#endif
5917+
5918+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
5919+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP)
5920+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
5921+#endif
5922+
5923+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
5924+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT)
5925+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
5926+#endif
5927+
5928+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
5929+
5930+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
5931+ if (pax_aslr)
5932+#endif
5933+
5934+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP)
5935+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
5936+#endif
5937+
5938+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5939+
5940+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
5941+ if (pax_aslr)
5942+#endif
5943+
5944+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC)
5945+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
5946+#endif
5947+
5948+ return pax_flags;
5949+}
5950+#endif
5951+
5952+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
5953+static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
5954+{
5955+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
5956+
5957+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5958+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC))
5959+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
5960+#endif
5961+
5962+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
5963+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC))
5964+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
5965+#endif
5966+
5967+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
5968+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
5969+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
5970+#endif
5971+
5972+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
5973+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
5974+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
5975+#endif
5976+
5977+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
5978+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP))
5979+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
5980+#endif
5981+
5982+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
5983+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))
5984+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
5985+#endif
5986+
5987+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
5988+
5989+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
5990+ if (pax_aslr)
5991+#endif
5992+
5993+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP))
5994+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
5995+#endif
5996+
5997+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
5998+
5999+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6000+ if (pax_aslr)
6001+#endif
6002+
6003+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC))
6004+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
6005+#endif
6006+
6007+ return pax_flags;
6008+}
6009+#endif
6010+
6011+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
6012+static int pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex)
6013+{
6014+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6015+
6016+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6017+ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
6018+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6019+#endif
6020+
6021+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6022+ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6023+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6024+#endif
6025+
6026+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
6027+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6028+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6029+#endif
6030+
6031+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
6032+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6033+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6034+#endif
6035+
6036+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6037+ if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
6038+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6039+#endif
6040+
6041+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6042+ if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
6043+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6044+#endif
6045+
6046+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6047+
6048+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6049+ if (pax_aslr)
6050+#endif
6051+
6052+ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
6053+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
6054+#endif
6055+
6056+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
6057+
6058+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6059+ if (pax_aslr)
6060+#endif
6061+
6062+ if ((elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC) && (pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT))
6063+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
6064+#endif
6065+
6066+ return pax_flags;
6067+}
6068+#endif
6069+
6070+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
6071+static int pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
6072+{
6073+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6074+
6075+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
6076+ unsigned long i;
6077+#endif
6078+
6079+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
6080+ pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex);
6081+#endif
6082+
6083+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
6084+ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++)
6085+ if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) {
6086+ if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) ||
6087+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) ||
6088+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) ||
6089+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) ||
6090+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) ||
6091+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) && ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) || elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || !(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT))) ||
6092+ (!(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))))
6093+ return -EINVAL;
6094+
6095+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6096+ if (pax_softmode)
6097+ pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
6098+ else
6099+#endif
6100+
6101+ pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
6102+ break;
6103+ }
6104+#endif
6105+
6106+ if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags))
6107+ return -EINVAL;
6108+
6109+ current->mm->flags |= pax_flags;
6110+ return 0;
6111+}
6112+#endif
6113+
6114 /*
6115 * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared
6116 * libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
6117@@ -527,6 +774,12 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6118 struct elfhdr interp_elf_ex;
6119 struct exec interp_ex;
6120 } *loc;
6121+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
6122+
6123+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
6124+ unsigned long load_addr_random = 0UL;
6125+ unsigned long load_bias_random = 0UL;
6126+#endif
6127
6128 loc = kmalloc(sizeof(*loc), GFP_KERNEL);
6129 if (!loc) {
6130@@ -752,11 +1005,78 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6131 current->mm->end_code = 0;
6132 current->mm->mmap = NULL;
6133 current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
6134+
6135+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
6136+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
6137+#endif
6138+
6139+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
6140+ current->mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
6141+#endif
6142+
6143+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6144+ current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL;
6145+ current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL;
6146+ current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL;
6147+#endif
6148+
6149 current->mm->def_flags = def_flags;
6150
6151+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
6152+ if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&loc->elf_ex, elf_phdata)) {
6153+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6154+ goto out_free_dentry;
6155+ }
6156+#endif
6157+
6158+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
6159+ pax_set_initial_flags(bprm);
6160+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
6161+ if (pax_set_initial_flags_func)
6162+ (pax_set_initial_flags_func)(bprm);
6163+#endif
6164+
6165+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
6166+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6167+ current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
6168+#endif
6169+
6170+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6171+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
6172+ int cpu = get_cpu();
6173+
6174+ current->mm->context.user_cs_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6175+ current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = -SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6176+ set_user_cs(current->mm, cpu);
6177+ put_cpu();
6178+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6179+ }
6180+#endif
6181+
6182+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6183+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
6184+#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb))
6185+
6186+ current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current));
6187+ current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current));
6188+ current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current));
6189+ }
6190+#endif
6191+
6192+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6193+ if (current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6194+ executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT;
6195+#endif
6196+
6197 /* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages
6198 may depend on the personality. */
6199 SET_PERSONALITY(loc->elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter);
6200+
6201+
6202+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6203+ if (!(current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)))
6204+#endif
6205+
6206 if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))
6207 current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
6208
6209@@ -828,12 +1148,93 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6210 base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec. This
6211 is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable. */
6212 load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
6213+
6214+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
6215+ /* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
6216+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
6217+ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec);
6218+ elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
6219+ }
6220+#endif
6221+
6222 }
6223
6224- error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
6225- if (BAD_ADDR(error)) {
6226- send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6227- goto out_free_dentry;
6228+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
6229+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC)) {
6230+ error = -ENOMEM;
6231+
6232+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6233+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6234+ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot & ~PROT_EXEC, elf_flags);
6235+#endif
6236+
6237+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6238+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
6239+ unsigned long addr, len;
6240+
6241+ addr = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr);
6242+ len = elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr);
6243+ if (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len) {
6244+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6245+ goto out_free_dentry;
6246+ }
6247+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6248+ error = __do_mmap_pgoff(bprm->file, addr, len, elf_prot, elf_flags, (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
6249+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6250+ }
6251+#endif
6252+
6253+ if (BAD_ADDR(error)) {
6254+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6255+ goto out_free_dentry;
6256+ }
6257+
6258+ /* PaX: mirror at a randomized base */
6259+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6260+
6261+ if (!load_addr_set) {
6262+ load_addr_random = get_unmapped_area(bprm->file, 0UL, elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAP_PRIVATE);
6263+ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
6264+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6265+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6266+ goto out_free_dentry;
6267+ }
6268+ load_bias_random = load_addr_random - vaddr;
6269+ }
6270+
6271+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6272+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6273+ load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
6274+#endif
6275+
6276+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6277+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
6278+ if (elf_prot & PROT_EXEC) {
6279+ load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), elf_ppnt->p_memsz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, 0UL);
6280+ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
6281+ load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
6282+ if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random))
6283+ load_addr_random -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6284+ }
6285+ } else
6286+ load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error);
6287+ }
6288+#endif
6289+
6290+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6291+ if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) {
6292+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6293+ goto out_free_dentry;
6294+ }
6295+ } else
6296+#endif
6297+
6298+ {
6299+ error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
6300+ if (BAD_ADDR(error)) {
6301+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6302+ goto out_free_dentry;
6303+ }
6304 }
6305
6306 if (!load_addr_set) {
6307@@ -845,6 +1246,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6308 load_addr += load_bias;
6309 reloc_func_desc = load_bias;
6310 }
6311+
6312+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
6313+ current->mm->delta_exec = load_addr_random - load_addr;
6314+#endif
6315+
6316 }
6317 k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
6318 if (k < start_code) start_code = k;
6319@@ -855,9 +1261,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6320 * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
6321 * <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
6322 */
6323- if (k > TASK_SIZE || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
6324- elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
6325- TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
6326+ if (k > task_size || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
6327+ elf_ppnt->p_memsz > task_size ||
6328+ task_size - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
6329 /* set_brk can never work. Avoid overflows. */
6330 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6331 goto out_free_dentry;
6332@@ -884,6 +1290,16 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6333 start_data += load_bias;
6334 end_data += load_bias;
6335
6336+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
6337+
6338+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6339+ if (pax_aslr)
6340+#endif
6341+
6342+ elf_brk += PAGE_SIZE + pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT);
6343+#undef pax_delta_mask
6344+#endif
6345+
6346 /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
6347 * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before
6348 * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
6349@@ -1126,9 +1542,11 @@ static int maydump(struct vm_area_struct
6350 if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_SHARED | VM_RESERVED))
6351 return 0;
6352
6353+#if 0
6354 /* If it hasn't been written to, don't write it out */
6355 if (!vma->anon_vma)
6356 return 0;
6357+#endif
6358
6359 return 1;
6360 }
6361@@ -1181,8 +1599,11 @@ static int writenote(struct memelfnote *
6362 #undef DUMP_SEEK
6363
6364 #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \
6365+ do { \
6366+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \
6367 if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
6368- goto end_coredump;
6369+ goto end_coredump; \
6370+ } while (0);
6371 #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \
6372 if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
6373 goto end_coredump;
6374diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c
6375--- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
6376+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6377@@ -540,7 +540,9 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
6378 realdatastart = (unsigned long) -ENOMEM;
6379 printk("Unable to allocate RAM for process data, errno %d\n",
6380 (int)-datapos);
6381+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6382 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
6383+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6384 return realdatastart;
6385 }
6386 datapos = realdatastart + MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long);
6387@@ -561,8 +563,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
6388 }
6389 if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
6390 printk("Unable to read data+bss, errno %d\n", (int)-result);
6391+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6392 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
6393 do_munmap(current->mm, realdatastart, data_len + extra);
6394+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6395 return result;
6396 }
6397
6398@@ -624,8 +628,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
6399 }
6400 if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
6401 printk("Unable to read code+data+bss, errno %d\n",(int)-result);
6402+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6403 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len + data_len + extra +
6404 MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long));
6405+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6406 return result;
6407 }
6408 }
6409diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c
6410--- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500
6411+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6412@@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux
6413 struct files_struct *files = NULL;
6414
6415 retval = -ENOEXEC;
6416- if (!enabled)
6417+ if (!enabled || bprm->misc)
6418 goto _ret;
6419
6420+ bprm->misc++;
6421+
6422 /* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
6423 read_lock(&entries_lock);
6424 fmt = check_file(bprm);
6425diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c
6426--- linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
6427+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6428@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
6429 #include <linux/notifier.h>
6430 #include <linux/cpu.h>
6431 #include <linux/bitops.h>
6432+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6433
6434 static int fsync_buffers_list(spinlock_t *lock, struct list_head *list);
6435 static void invalidate_bh_lrus(void);
6436@@ -2167,6 +2168,7 @@ int generic_cont_expand(struct inode *in
6437
6438 err = -EFBIG;
6439 limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
6440+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1);
6441 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
6442 send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
6443 goto out;
6444diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c
6445--- linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
6446+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6447@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
6448 #include <linux/nfsd/syscall.h>
6449 #include <linux/personality.h>
6450 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
6451+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6452
6453 #include <net/sock.h> /* siocdevprivate_ioctl */
6454
6455@@ -1427,6 +1428,11 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
6456 struct file *file;
6457 int retval;
6458 int i;
6459+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6460+ struct file *old_exec_file;
6461+ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
6462+ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
6463+#endif
6464
6465 retval = -ENOMEM;
6466 bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
6467@@ -1445,6 +1451,15 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
6468 bprm->file = file;
6469 bprm->filename = filename;
6470 bprm->interp = filename;
6471+
6472+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
6473+ retval = -EAGAIN;
6474+ if (gr_handle_nproc())
6475+ goto out_file;
6476+ retval = -EACCES;
6477+ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt))
6478+ goto out_file;
6479+
6480 bprm->mm = mm_alloc();
6481 retval = -ENOMEM;
6482 if (!bprm->mm)
6483@@ -1483,16 +1498,52 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
6484 if (retval < 0)
6485 goto out;
6486
6487+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
6488+ retval = -EACCES;
6489+ goto out;
6490+ }
6491+
6492+ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
6493+ retval = -EACCES;
6494+ goto out;
6495+ }
6496+
6497+ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
6498+
6499+ gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv);
6500+
6501+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6502+ old_acl = current->acl;
6503+ memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
6504+ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
6505+ get_file(file);
6506+ current->exec_file = file;
6507+#endif
6508+
6509+ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
6510+
6511 retval = search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
6512 if (retval >= 0) {
6513 free_arg_pages(bprm);
6514
6515+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6516+ if (old_exec_file)
6517+ fput(old_exec_file);
6518+#endif
6519+
6520 /* execve success */
6521 security_bprm_free(bprm);
6522 kfree(bprm);
6523 return retval;
6524 }
6525
6526+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6527+ current->acl = old_acl;
6528+ memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
6529+ fput(current->exec_file);
6530+ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
6531+#endif
6532+
6533 out:
6534 /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
6535 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
6536diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c
6537--- linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
6538+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6539@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ already_unhashed:
6540 *
6541 * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock.
6542 */
6543-static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
6544+char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
6545 struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
6546 char *buffer, int buflen)
6547 {
6548diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c
6549--- linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c 2005-03-02 02:38:06.000000000 -0500
6550+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6551@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
6552 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
6553 #include <linux/rmap.h>
6554 #include <linux/acct.h>
6555+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6556
6557 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
6558 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
6559@@ -63,6 +64,20 @@ char core_pattern[65] = "core";
6560 static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
6561 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
6562
6563+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6564+
6565+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
6566+unsigned int pax_aslr=1;
6567+#endif
6568+
6569+unsigned int pax_softmode;
6570+#endif
6571+
6572+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
6573+void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
6574+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_initial_flags_func);
6575+#endif
6576+
6577 int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
6578 {
6579 struct linux_binfmt ** tmp = &formats;
6580@@ -309,6 +324,10 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str
6581 if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
6582 goto out_sig;
6583
6584+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6585+ if (page_count(page) == 1)
6586+#endif
6587+
6588 flush_dcache_page(page);
6589 pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
6590
6591@@ -327,6 +346,11 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str
6592 goto out;
6593 }
6594 mm->rss++;
6595+
6596+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6597+ if (page_count(page) == 1)
6598+#endif
6599+
6600 lru_cache_add_active(page);
6601 set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(
6602 page, vma->vm_page_prot))));
6603@@ -355,6 +379,10 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
6604 int i, ret;
6605 long arg_size;
6606
6607+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6608+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL;
6609+#endif
6610+
6611 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
6612 /* Move the argument and environment strings to the bottom of the
6613 * stack space.
6614@@ -416,8 +444,24 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
6615 if (!mpnt)
6616 return -ENOMEM;
6617
6618+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6619+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
6620+ mpnt_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
6621+ if (!mpnt_m) {
6622+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
6623+ return -ENOMEM;
6624+ }
6625+ }
6626+#endif
6627+
6628 if (security_vm_enough_memory(arg_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
6629 kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
6630+
6631+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6632+ if (mpnt_m)
6633+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m);
6634+#endif
6635+
6636 return -ENOMEM;
6637 }
6638
6639@@ -443,6 +487,13 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
6640 else
6641 mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
6642 mpnt->vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
6643+
6644+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6645+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
6646+ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(mpnt->vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x7];
6647+ else
6648+#endif
6649+
6650 mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[mpnt->vm_flags & 0x7];
6651 if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt))) {
6652 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
6653@@ -450,6 +501,30 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
6654 return ret;
6655 }
6656 mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = vma_pages(mpnt);
6657+
6658+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6659+ if (mpnt_m) {
6660+ *mpnt_m = *mpnt;
6661+ if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
6662+ mpnt_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
6663+ mpnt_m->vm_page_prot = PAGE_NONE;
6664+ }
6665+ mpnt_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6666+ mpnt_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6667+ mpnt_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
6668+ mpnt->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
6669+ mpnt_m->vm_mirror = mpnt->vm_start - mpnt_m->vm_start;
6670+ mpnt->vm_mirror = mpnt_m->vm_start - mpnt->vm_start;
6671+ if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt_m))) {
6672+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
6673+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m);
6674+ return ret;
6675+ }
6676+ mpnt_m->vm_pgoff = mpnt->vm_pgoff;
6677+ mm->total_vm += (mpnt_m->vm_end - mpnt_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
6678+ }
6679+#endif
6680+
6681 }
6682
6683 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
6684@@ -457,6 +532,14 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
6685 if (page) {
6686 bprm->page[i] = NULL;
6687 install_arg_page(mpnt, page, stack_base);
6688+
6689+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6690+ if (mpnt_m) {
6691+ page_cache_get(page);
6692+ install_arg_page(mpnt_m, page, stack_base + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
6693+ }
6694+#endif
6695+
6696 }
6697 stack_base += PAGE_SIZE;
6698 }
6699@@ -1128,6 +1211,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
6700 struct file *file;
6701 int retval;
6702 int i;
6703+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6704+ struct file *old_exec_file;
6705+ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
6706+ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
6707+#endif
6708
6709 retval = -ENOMEM;
6710 bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
6711@@ -1140,10 +1228,33 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
6712 if (IS_ERR(file))
6713 goto out_kfree;
6714
6715+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
6716+
6717+ if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
6718+ allow_write_access(file);
6719+ fput(file);
6720+ return -EAGAIN;
6721+ }
6722+
6723+ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
6724+ allow_write_access(file);
6725+ fput(file);
6726+ return -EACCES;
6727+ }
6728+
6729 sched_exec();
6730
6731 bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
6732
6733+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
6734+
6735+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6736+ if (pax_aslr)
6737+#endif
6738+
6739+ bprm->p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
6740+#endif
6741+
6742 bprm->file = file;
6743 bprm->filename = filename;
6744 bprm->interp = filename;
6745@@ -1185,8 +1296,38 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
6746 if (retval < 0)
6747 goto out;
6748
6749+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
6750+ retval = -EACCES;
6751+ goto out;
6752+ }
6753+
6754+ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
6755+ retval = -EACCES;
6756+ goto out;
6757+ }
6758+
6759+ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
6760+
6761+ gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv);
6762+
6763+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6764+ old_acl = current->acl;
6765+ memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
6766+ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
6767+ get_file(file);
6768+ current->exec_file = file;
6769+#endif
6770+
6771+ retval = gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
6772+ if (retval < 0)
6773+ goto out_fail;
6774+
6775 retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs);
6776 if (retval >= 0) {
6777+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6778+ if (old_exec_file)
6779+ fput(old_exec_file);
6780+#endif
6781 free_arg_pages(bprm);
6782
6783 /* execve success */
6784@@ -1197,6 +1338,14 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
6785 return retval;
6786 }
6787
6788+out_fail:
6789+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6790+ current->acl = old_acl;
6791+ memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
6792+ fput(current->exec_file);
6793+ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
6794+#endif
6795+
6796 out:
6797 /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
6798 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
6799@@ -1357,6 +1506,126 @@ static void format_corename(char *corena
6800 *out_ptr = 0;
6801 }
6802
6803+int pax_check_flags(unsigned long * flags)
6804+{
6805+ int retval = 0;
6806+
6807+#if !defined(__i386__) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6808+ if (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6809+ {
6810+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6811+ retval = -EINVAL;
6812+ }
6813+#endif
6814+
6815+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6816+
6817+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6818+ && (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6819+#endif
6820+
6821+ )
6822+ {
6823+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6824+ retval = -EINVAL;
6825+ }
6826+
6827+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
6828+
6829+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6830+ && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6831+#endif
6832+
6833+ )
6834+ {
6835+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6836+ retval = -EINVAL;
6837+ }
6838+
6839+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
6840+
6841+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6842+ && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6843+#endif
6844+
6845+ )
6846+ {
6847+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6848+ retval = -EINVAL;
6849+ }
6850+
6851+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC)
6852+
6853+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
6854+ && !(*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
6855+#endif
6856+
6857+ )
6858+ {
6859+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDEXEC;
6860+ retval = -EINVAL;
6861+ }
6862+
6863+ return retval;
6864+}
6865+
6866+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags);
6867+
6868+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6869+void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp)
6870+{
6871+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
6872+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
6873+ char* buffer_exec = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
6874+ char* buffer_fault = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
6875+ char* path_exec=NULL;
6876+ char* path_fault=NULL;
6877+ unsigned long start=0UL, end=0UL, offset=0UL;
6878+
6879+ if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) {
6880+ struct vm_area_struct* vma, * vma_exec=NULL, * vma_fault=NULL;
6881+
6882+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
6883+ vma = mm->mmap;
6884+ while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) {
6885+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file)
6886+ vma_exec = vma;
6887+ if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end)
6888+ vma_fault = vma;
6889+ vma = vma->vm_next;
6890+ }
6891+ if (vma_exec) {
6892+ path_exec = d_path(vma_exec->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_exec->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE);
6893+ if (IS_ERR(path_exec))
6894+ path_exec = "<path too long>";
6895+ }
6896+ if (vma_fault) {
6897+ start = vma_fault->vm_start;
6898+ end = vma_fault->vm_end;
6899+ offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
6900+ if (vma_fault->vm_file) {
6901+ path_fault = d_path(vma_fault->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_fault->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE);
6902+ if (IS_ERR(path_fault))
6903+ path_fault = "<path too long>";
6904+ } else
6905+ path_fault = "<anonymous mapping>";
6906+ }
6907+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
6908+ }
6909+ if (tsk->curr_ip)
6910+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset);
6911+ else
6912+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
6913+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
6914+ "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, tsk->pid,
6915+ tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
6916+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec);
6917+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault);
6918+ pax_report_insns(pc, sp);
6919+ do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs);
6920+}
6921+#endif
6922+
6923 static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm)
6924 {
6925 struct task_struct *g, *p;
6926@@ -1455,6 +1724,9 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod
6927 current->signal->group_stop_count = 0;
6928 clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
6929
6930+ if (signr == SIGKILL || signr == SIGILL)
6931+ gr_handle_brute_attach(current);
6932+
6933 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump)
6934 goto fail_unlock;
6935
6936@@ -1480,7 +1752,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod
6937 goto close_fail;
6938 if (!file->f_op->write)
6939 goto close_fail;
6940- if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0)
6941+ if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0)
6942 goto close_fail;
6943
6944 retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file);
6945diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c
6946--- linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
6947+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6948@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
6949 #include <linux/module.h>
6950 #include <linux/security.h>
6951 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
6952+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6953
6954 #include <asm/poll.h>
6955 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
6956@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static int locate_fd(struct files_struct
6957 int error;
6958
6959 error = -EINVAL;
6960+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0);
6961 if (orig_start >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
6962 goto out;
6963
6964@@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ repeat:
6965 }
6966
6967 error = -EMFILE;
6968+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
6969 if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
6970 goto out;
6971
6972@@ -123,6 +126,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int ol
6973 struct file * file, *tofree;
6974 struct files_struct * files = current->files;
6975
6976+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
6977+
6978 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
6979 if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
6980 goto out_unlock;
6981@@ -404,7 +409,8 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task
6982 return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
6983 (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
6984 (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
6985- !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
6986+ !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig) &&
6987+ !gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p));
6988 }
6989
6990 static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
6991diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c
6992--- linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500
6993+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
6994@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
6995 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
6996 #include <linux/mount.h>
6997 #include <linux/audit.h>
6998+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6999 #include <asm/namei.h>
7000 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
7001
7002@@ -519,6 +520,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct
7003 err = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
7004 if (err)
7005 goto loop;
7006+
7007+ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
7008+ dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7009+ err = -EACCES;
7010+ goto loop;
7011+ }
7012+
7013 current->link_count++;
7014 current->total_link_count++;
7015 nd->depth++;
7016@@ -871,11 +879,18 @@ return_reval:
7017 break;
7018 }
7019 return_base:
7020+ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7021+ path_release(nd);
7022+ return -ENOENT;
7023+ }
7024 return 0;
7025 out_dput:
7026 dput(next.dentry);
7027 break;
7028 }
7029+ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt))
7030+ err = -ENOENT;
7031+
7032 path_release(nd);
7033 return_err:
7034 return err;
7035@@ -1325,7 +1340,7 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a
7036 if (!error) {
7037 DQUOT_INIT(inode);
7038
7039- error = do_truncate(dentry, 0);
7040+ error = do_truncate(dentry, 0, nd->mnt);
7041 }
7042 put_write_access(inode);
7043 if (error)
7044@@ -1376,6 +1391,17 @@ int open_namei(const char * pathname, in
7045 error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, nd);
7046 if (error)
7047 return error;
7048+
7049+ if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) {
7050+ error = -EPERM;
7051+ goto exit;
7052+ }
7053+
7054+ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
7055+ error = -EACCES;
7056+ goto exit;
7057+ }
7058+
7059 goto ok;
7060 }
7061
7062@@ -1409,9 +1435,19 @@ do_last:
7063
7064 /* Negative dentry, just create the file */
7065 if (!dentry->d_inode) {
7066+ if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) {
7067+ error = -EACCES;
7068+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7069+ goto exit_dput;
7070+ }
7071+
7072 if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
7073 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7074 error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd);
7075+
7076+ if (!error)
7077+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt);
7078+
7079 up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7080 dput(nd->dentry);
7081 nd->dentry = dentry;
7082@@ -1426,6 +1462,25 @@ do_last:
7083 /*
7084 * It already exists.
7085 */
7086+
7087+ if (gr_handle_rawio(dentry->d_inode)) {
7088+ error = -EPERM;
7089+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7090+ goto exit_dput;
7091+ }
7092+
7093+ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
7094+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7095+ error = -EACCES;
7096+ goto exit_dput;
7097+ }
7098+
7099+ if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
7100+ up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7101+ error = -EACCES;
7102+ goto exit_dput;
7103+ }
7104+
7105 up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem);
7106
7107 error = -EEXIST;
7108@@ -1479,6 +1534,13 @@ do_link:
7109 error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
7110 if (error)
7111 goto exit_dput;
7112+
7113+ if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode,
7114+ dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7115+ error = -EACCES;
7116+ goto exit_dput;
7117+ }
7118+
7119 error = __do_follow_link(dentry, nd);
7120 dput(dentry);
7121 if (error)
7122@@ -1585,6 +1647,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __u
7123 if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
7124 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7125 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7126+ if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7127+ error = -EPERM;
7128+ dput(dentry);
7129+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7130+ path_release(&nd);
7131+ goto out;
7132+ }
7133+
7134+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7135+ error = -EACCES;
7136+ dput(dentry);
7137+ up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7138+ path_release(&nd);
7139+ goto out;
7140+ }
7141+
7142 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
7143 case 0: case S_IFREG:
7144 error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
7145@@ -1602,6 +1680,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __u
7146 default:
7147 error = -EINVAL;
7148 }
7149+
7150+ if (!error)
7151+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7152+
7153 dput(dentry);
7154 }
7155 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7156@@ -1653,9 +1735,19 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdir(const char __u
7157 dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1);
7158 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7159 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7160+ error = 0;
7161 if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
7162 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7163- error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
7164+
7165+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
7166+ error = -EACCES;
7167+
7168+ if (!error)
7169+ error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
7170+
7171+ if (!error)
7172+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7173+
7174 dput(dentry);
7175 }
7176 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7177@@ -1739,6 +1831,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __u
7178 char * name;
7179 struct dentry *dentry;
7180 struct nameidata nd;
7181+ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
7182+ dev_t saved_dev = 0;
7183
7184 name = getname(pathname);
7185 if(IS_ERR(name))
7186@@ -1763,7 +1857,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __u
7187 dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
7188 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7189 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7190- error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7191+ error = 0;
7192+ if (dentry->d_inode) {
7193+ if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
7194+ saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
7195+ saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
7196+ }
7197+
7198+ if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt))
7199+ error = -EACCES;
7200+ }
7201+
7202+ if (!error)
7203+ error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7204+ if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
7205+ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
7206 dput(dentry);
7207 }
7208 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7209@@ -1817,6 +1925,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __
7210 struct dentry *dentry;
7211 struct nameidata nd;
7212 struct inode *inode = NULL;
7213+ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
7214+ dev_t saved_dev = 0;
7215
7216 name = getname(pathname);
7217 if(IS_ERR(name))
7218@@ -1832,13 +1942,26 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __
7219 dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
7220 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7221 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7222+ error = 0;
7223 /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
7224 if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
7225 goto slashes;
7226 inode = dentry->d_inode;
7227- if (inode)
7228+ if (inode) {
7229+ if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
7230+ saved_ino = inode->i_ino;
7231+ saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
7232+ }
7233+
7234+ if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt))
7235+ error = -EACCES;
7236+
7237 atomic_inc(&inode->i_count);
7238- error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7239+ }
7240+ if (!error)
7241+ error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7242+ if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
7243+ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
7244 exit2:
7245 dput(dentry);
7246 }
7247@@ -1901,7 +2024,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlink(const char _
7248 dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
7249 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7250 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7251- error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
7252+ error = 0;
7253+ if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from))
7254+ error = -EACCES;
7255+
7256+ if (!error)
7257+ error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
7258+
7259+ if (!error)
7260+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7261 dput(dentry);
7262 }
7263 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7264@@ -1985,7 +2116,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_link(const char __us
7265 new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
7266 error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
7267 if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
7268- error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
7269+ error = 0;
7270+ if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt,
7271+ old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
7272+ old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to))
7273+ error = -EPERM;
7274+ if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt,
7275+ old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to))
7276+ error = -EACCES;
7277+ if (!error)
7278+ error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
7279+
7280+ if (!error)
7281+ gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt);
7282+
7283 dput(new_dentry);
7284 }
7285 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
7286@@ -2207,8 +2351,16 @@ static inline int do_rename(const char *
7287 if (new_dentry == trap)
7288 goto exit5;
7289
7290- error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
7291+ error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt,
7292+ old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt,
7293+ newname);
7294+
7295+ if (!error)
7296+ error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
7297 new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
7298+ if (!error)
7299+ gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry,
7300+ new_dentry, oldnd.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0);
7301 exit5:
7302 dput(new_dentry);
7303 exit4:
7304diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c
7305--- linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
7306+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7307@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
7308 #include <linux/namei.h>
7309 #include <linux/security.h>
7310 #include <linux/mount.h>
7311+#include <linux/sched.h>
7312+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7313 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
7314 #include <asm/unistd.h>
7315
7316@@ -426,6 +428,8 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
7317 DQUOT_OFF(sb);
7318 retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0);
7319 unlock_kernel();
7320+
7321+ gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
7322 }
7323 up_write(&sb->s_umount);
7324 return retval;
7325@@ -454,6 +458,9 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
7326 if (retval)
7327 security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
7328 up_write(&current->namespace->sem);
7329+
7330+ gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
7331+
7332 return retval;
7333 }
7334
7335@@ -1044,6 +1051,11 @@ long do_mount(char * dev_name, char * di
7336 if (retval)
7337 goto dput_out;
7338
7339+ if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) {
7340+ retval = -EPERM;
7341+ goto dput_out;
7342+ }
7343+
7344 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
7345 retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
7346 data_page);
7347@@ -1056,6 +1068,9 @@ long do_mount(char * dev_name, char * di
7348 dev_name, data_page);
7349 dput_out:
7350 path_release(&nd);
7351+
7352+ gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
7353+
7354 return retval;
7355 }
7356
7357@@ -1276,6 +1291,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pivot_root(const cha
7358 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
7359 return -EPERM;
7360
7361+ if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
7362+ return -EPERM;
7363+
7364 lock_kernel();
7365
7366 error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd);
7367diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c
7368--- linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
7369+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7370@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
7371 #include <linux/fs.h>
7372 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
7373 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
7374+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7375
7376 #include <asm/unistd.h>
7377
7378@@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ out:
7379 return error;
7380 }
7381
7382-int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length)
7383+int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt)
7384 {
7385 int err;
7386 struct iattr newattrs;
7387@@ -201,6 +202,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, l
7388 if (length < 0)
7389 return -EINVAL;
7390
7391+ if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt))
7392+ return -EACCES;
7393+
7394 newattrs.ia_size = length;
7395 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME;
7396
7397@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ static inline long do_sys_truncate(const
7398 error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
7399 if (!error) {
7400 DQUOT_INIT(inode);
7401- error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length);
7402+ error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt);
7403 }
7404 put_write_access(inode);
7405
7406@@ -312,7 +316,7 @@ static inline long do_sys_ftruncate(unsi
7407
7408 error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
7409 if (!error)
7410- error = do_truncate(dentry, length);
7411+ error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt);
7412 out_putf:
7413 fput(file);
7414 out:
7415@@ -391,6 +395,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_utime(char __user *
7416 (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0)
7417 goto dput_and_out;
7418 }
7419+ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
7420+ error = -EACCES;
7421+ goto dput_and_out;
7422+ }
7423+
7424 down(&inode->i_sem);
7425 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
7426 up(&inode->i_sem);
7427@@ -444,6 +453,12 @@ long do_utimes(char __user * filename, s
7428 (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0)
7429 goto dput_and_out;
7430 }
7431+
7432+ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
7433+ error = -EACCES;
7434+ goto dput_and_out;
7435+ }
7436+
7437 down(&inode->i_sem);
7438 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
7439 up(&inode->i_sem);
7440@@ -505,6 +520,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_access(const char __
7441 if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
7442 && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
7443 res = -EROFS;
7444+
7445+ if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode))
7446+ res = -EACCES;
7447+
7448 path_release(&nd);
7449 }
7450
7451@@ -528,6 +547,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __u
7452 if (error)
7453 goto dput_and_out;
7454
7455+ gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
7456+
7457 set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
7458
7459 dput_and_out:
7460@@ -558,6 +579,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int
7461 goto out_putf;
7462
7463 error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL);
7464+
7465+ if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt))
7466+ error = -EPERM;
7467+
7468+ if (!error)
7469+ gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt);
7470+
7471 if (!error)
7472 set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
7473 out_putf:
7474@@ -583,8 +611,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __
7475 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
7476 goto dput_and_out;
7477
7478+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
7479+ goto dput_and_out;
7480+
7481 set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
7482 set_fs_altroot();
7483+
7484+ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
7485+
7486+ gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
7487+
7488 error = 0;
7489 dput_and_out:
7490 path_release(&nd);
7491@@ -613,9 +649,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int
7492 err = -EPERM;
7493 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
7494 goto out_putf;
7495+
7496+ if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
7497+ err = -EACCES;
7498+ goto out_putf;
7499+ }
7500+
7501 down(&inode->i_sem);
7502 if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
7503 mode = inode->i_mode;
7504+
7505+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
7506+ err = -EPERM;
7507+ up(&inode->i_sem);
7508+ goto out_putf;
7509+ }
7510+
7511 newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
7512 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
7513 err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
7514@@ -647,9 +696,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u
7515 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
7516 goto dput_and_out;
7517
7518+ if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7519+ error = -EACCES;
7520+ goto dput_and_out;
7521+ }
7522+
7523 down(&inode->i_sem);
7524 if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
7525 mode = inode->i_mode;
7526+
7527+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7528+ error = -EACCES;
7529+ up(&inode->i_sem);
7530+ goto dput_and_out;
7531+ }
7532+
7533 newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
7534 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
7535 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
7536@@ -661,7 +722,7 @@ out:
7537 return error;
7538 }
7539
7540-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
7541+static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
7542 {
7543 struct inode * inode;
7544 int error;
7545@@ -678,6 +739,12 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry *
7546 error = -EPERM;
7547 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
7548 goto out;
7549+
7550+ if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
7551+ error = -EACCES;
7552+ goto out;
7553+ }
7554+
7555 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME;
7556 if (user != (uid_t) -1) {
7557 newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID;
7558@@ -703,7 +770,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u
7559
7560 error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
7561 if (!error) {
7562- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
7563+ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
7564 path_release(&nd);
7565 }
7566 return error;
7567@@ -716,7 +783,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __
7568
7569 error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
7570 if (!error) {
7571- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
7572+ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
7573 path_release(&nd);
7574 }
7575 return error;
7576@@ -730,7 +797,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int
7577
7578 file = fget(fd);
7579 if (file) {
7580- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
7581+ error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user,
7582+ group, file->f_vfsmnt);
7583 fput(file);
7584 }
7585 return error;
7586@@ -852,6 +920,7 @@ repeat:
7587 * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
7588 * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
7589 */
7590+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0);
7591 if (fd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
7592 goto out;
7593
7594diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c
7595--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
7596+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7597@@ -281,6 +281,22 @@ static inline char *task_cap(struct task
7598 cap_t(p->cap_effective));
7599 }
7600
7601+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
7602+static inline char *task_pax(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
7603+{
7604+ if (p->mm)
7605+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
7606+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p',
7607+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e',
7608+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm',
7609+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r',
7610+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC ? 'X' : 'x',
7611+ p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's');
7612+ else
7613+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t------\n");
7614+}
7615+#endif
7616+
7617 int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
7618 {
7619 char * orig = buffer;
7620@@ -298,9 +314,20 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *
7621 #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390)
7622 buffer = task_show_regs(task, buffer);
7623 #endif
7624+
7625+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
7626+ buffer = task_pax(task, buffer);
7627+#endif
7628+
7629 return buffer - orig;
7630 }
7631
7632+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
7633+#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->mm && (task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
7634+ task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \
7635+ task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC))
7636+#endif
7637+
7638 static int do_task_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer, int whole)
7639 {
7640 unsigned long vsize, eip, esp, wchan = ~0UL;
7641@@ -385,6 +412,19 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru
7642 stime = task->stime;
7643 }
7644
7645+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
7646+ if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS) {
7647+ eip = 0;
7648+ esp = 0;
7649+ wchan = 0;
7650+ }
7651+#endif
7652+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
7653+ wchan = 0;
7654+ eip =0;
7655+ esp =0;
7656+#endif
7657+
7658 /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
7659 /* to make it look like a "normal" Unix priority/nice value */
7660 priority = task_prio(task);
7661@@ -425,9 +465,15 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru
7662 vsize,
7663 mm ? mm->rss : 0, /* you might want to shift this left 3 */
7664 rsslim,
7665+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
7666+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0),
7667+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0),
7668+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0),
7669+#else
7670 mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
7671 mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
7672 mm ? mm->start_stack : 0,
7673+#endif
7674 esp,
7675 eip,
7676 /* The signal information here is obsolete.
7677@@ -473,3 +519,14 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *t
7678 return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n",
7679 size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0);
7680 }
7681+
7682+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
7683+int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
7684+{
7685+ int len;
7686+
7687+ len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
7688+ return len;
7689+}
7690+#endif
7691+
7692diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c
7693--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
7694+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7695@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
7696 #include <linux/mount.h>
7697 #include <linux/security.h>
7698 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
7699+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7700 #include "internal.h"
7701
7702 /*
7703@@ -74,6 +75,9 @@ enum pid_directory_inos {
7704 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
7705 PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
7706 #endif
7707+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
7708+ PROC_TGID_IPADDR,
7709+#endif
7710 PROC_TGID_FD_DIR,
7711 PROC_TGID_OOM_SCORE,
7712 PROC_TGID_OOM_ADJUST,
7713@@ -134,6 +138,9 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[
7714 E(PROC_TGID_ROOT, "root", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
7715 E(PROC_TGID_EXE, "exe", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
7716 E(PROC_TGID_MOUNTS, "mounts", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
7717+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
7718+ E(PROC_TGID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
7719+#endif
7720 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
7721 E(PROC_TGID_ATTR, "attr", S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO),
7722 #endif
7723@@ -269,7 +276,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *
7724 (task->parent == current && \
7725 (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
7726 (task->state == TASK_STOPPED || task->state == TASK_TRACED) && \
7727- security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
7728+ security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)))
7729
7730 static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
7731 {
7732@@ -284,13 +291,15 @@ static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task
7733 (current->uid != task->uid) ||
7734 (current->gid != task->egid) ||
7735 (current->gid != task->sgid) ||
7736- (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
7737+ (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
7738 goto out;
7739 rmb();
7740- if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
7741+ if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
7742 goto out;
7743 if (security_ptrace(current, task))
7744 goto out;
7745+ if (gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task))
7746+ goto out;
7747
7748 retval = 1;
7749 out:
7750@@ -464,9 +473,25 @@ out:
7751
7752 static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
7753 {
7754+ int ret = -EACCES;
7755+ struct task_struct *task;
7756+
7757 if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
7758- return -EACCES;
7759- return proc_check_root(inode);
7760+ goto out;
7761+
7762+ ret = proc_check_root(inode);
7763+ if (ret)
7764+ goto out;
7765+
7766+ task = proc_task(inode);
7767+
7768+ if (!task)
7769+ goto out;
7770+
7771+ ret = gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task);
7772+
7773+out:
7774+ return ret;
7775 }
7776
7777 extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op;
7778@@ -1067,6 +1092,9 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode
7779 inode->i_uid = task->euid;
7780 inode->i_gid = task->egid;
7781 }
7782+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7783+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
7784+#endif
7785 security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
7786
7787 out:
7788@@ -1095,7 +1123,9 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry
7789 if (pid_alive(task)) {
7790 if (proc_type(inode) == PROC_TGID_INO || proc_type(inode) == PROC_TID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
7791 inode->i_uid = task->euid;
7792+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7793 inode->i_gid = task->egid;
7794+#endif
7795 } else {
7796 inode->i_uid = 0;
7797 inode->i_gid = 0;
7798@@ -1416,6 +1446,12 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup
7799 inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
7800 ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_status;
7801 break;
7802+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
7803+ case PROC_TGID_IPADDR:
7804+ inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
7805+ ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr;
7806+ break;
7807+#endif
7808 case PROC_TID_STAT:
7809 inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
7810 ei->op.proc_read = proc_tid_stat;
7811@@ -1692,6 +1728,22 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in
7812 if (!task)
7813 goto out;
7814
7815+ if (gr_check_hidden_task(task)) {
7816+ put_task_struct(task);
7817+ goto out;
7818+ }
7819+
7820+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
7821+ if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid)
7822+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7823+ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
7824+#endif
7825+ ) {
7826+ put_task_struct(task);
7827+ goto out;
7828+ }
7829+#endif
7830+
7831 inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_TGID_INO);
7832
7833
7834@@ -1699,7 +1751,15 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in
7835 put_task_struct(task);
7836 goto out;
7837 }
7838+
7839+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
7840+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
7841+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7842+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
7843+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
7844+#else
7845 inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
7846+#endif
7847 inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
7848 inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
7849 inode->i_nlink = 3;
7850@@ -1783,6 +1843,9 @@ out:
7851 static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsigned long version, unsigned int *tgids)
7852 {
7853 struct task_struct *p;
7854+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
7855+ struct task_struct *tmp = current;
7856+#endif
7857 int nr_tgids = 0;
7858
7859 index--;
7860@@ -1803,6 +1866,18 @@ static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsi
7861 int tgid = p->pid;
7862 if (!pid_alive(p))
7863 continue;
7864+ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
7865+ continue;
7866+ if (gr_check_hidden_task(p))
7867+ continue;
7868+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
7869+ if (tmp->uid && (p->uid != tmp->uid)
7870+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7871+ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
7872+#endif
7873+ )
7874+ continue;
7875+#endif
7876 if (--index >= 0)
7877 continue;
7878 tgids[nr_tgids] = tgid;
7879diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c
7880--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
7881+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7882@@ -209,7 +209,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe
7883 if (de->mode) {
7884 inode->i_mode = de->mode;
7885 inode->i_uid = de->uid;
7886+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7887+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
7888+#else
7889 inode->i_gid = de->gid;
7890+#endif
7891 }
7892 if (de->size)
7893 inode->i_size = de->size;
7894diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h
7895--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
7896+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7897@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ extern int proc_tid_stat(struct task_str
7898 extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct task_struct *, char *);
7899 extern int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *, char *);
7900 extern int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *, char *);
7901+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
7902+extern int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
7903+#endif
7904
7905 static inline struct task_struct *proc_task(struct inode *inode)
7906 {
7907diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
7908--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
7909+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7910@@ -547,6 +547,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t
7911 void __init proc_misc_init(void)
7912 {
7913 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
7914+ int gr_mode = 0;
7915+
7916 static struct {
7917 char *name;
7918 int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
7919@@ -561,9 +563,13 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
7920 #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC
7921 {"stram", stram_read_proc},
7922 #endif
7923+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7924 {"devices", devices_read_proc},
7925+#endif
7926 {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
7927+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7928 {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc},
7929+#endif
7930 {"locks", locks_read_proc},
7931 {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
7932 {NULL,}
7933@@ -571,6 +577,16 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
7934 for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
7935 create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
7936
7937+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
7938+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
7939+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7940+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
7941+#endif
7942+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7943+ create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL);
7944+ create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
7945+#endif
7946+
7947 proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
7948
7949 /* And now for trickier ones */
7950@@ -581,17 +597,21 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
7951 create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
7952 create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
7953 create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);
7954+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7955+ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
7956+#else
7957 create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
7958+#endif
7959 create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO, &fragmentation_file_operations);
7960 create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations);
7961 create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations);
7962 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
7963- create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations);
7964+ create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations);
7965 #endif
7966 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
7967 create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations);
7968 #endif
7969-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE
7970+#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
7971 proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
7972 if (proc_root_kcore) {
7973 proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
7974diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c
7975--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
7976+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
7977@@ -52,7 +52,13 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
7978 return;
7979 }
7980 proc_misc_init();
7981+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
7982+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
7983+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7984+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL);
7985+#else
7986 proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", NULL);
7987+#endif
7988 proc_net_stat = proc_mkdir("net/stat", NULL);
7989
7990 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
7991@@ -76,7 +82,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
7992 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
7993 proc_device_tree_init();
7994 #endif
7995+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7996+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
7997+ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
7998+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
7999+ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL);
8000+#endif
8001+#else
8002 proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
8003+#endif
8004 }
8005
8006 static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
8007diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
8008--- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
8009+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
8010@@ -21,13 +21,25 @@ char *task_mem(struct mm_struct *mm, cha
8011 "VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n"
8012 "VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n"
8013 "VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n"
8014- "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n",
8015- (mm->total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8016+ "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n"
8017+
8018+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
8019+ "CsBase:\t%8lx\nCsLim:\t%8lx\n"
8020+#endif
8021+
8022+ ,(mm->total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8023 mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8024 mm->rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8025 data << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8026 mm->stack_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), text, lib,
8027- (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10);
8028+ (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10
8029+
8030+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
8031+ , mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit
8032+#endif
8033+
8034+ );
8035+
8036 return buffer;
8037 }
8038
8039@@ -77,8 +89,17 @@ out:
8040 return result;
8041 }
8042
8043+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8044+#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->mm && (task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
8045+ task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \
8046+ task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC))
8047+#endif
8048+
8049 static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
8050 {
8051+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8052+ struct task_struct *task = m->private;
8053+#endif
8054 struct vm_area_struct *map = v;
8055 struct file *file = map->vm_file;
8056 int flags = map->vm_flags;
8057@@ -93,13 +114,23 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m,
8058 }
8059
8060 seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n",
8061+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8062+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_start,
8063+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_end,
8064+#else
8065 map->vm_start,
8066 map->vm_end,
8067+#endif
8068+
8069 flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
8070 flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
8071 flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
8072 flags & VM_MAYSHARE ? 's' : 'p',
8073+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8074+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
8075+#else
8076 map->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
8077+#endif
8078 MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), ino, &len);
8079
8080 if (map->vm_file) {
8081diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c
8082--- linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
8083+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
8084@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
8085 #include <linux/security.h>
8086 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
8087 #include <linux/unistd.h>
8088+#include <linux/namei.h>
8089+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8090
8091 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
8092
8093@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ struct old_linux_dirent {
8094
8095 struct readdir_callback {
8096 struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent;
8097+ struct file * file;
8098 int result;
8099 };
8100
8101@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, cons
8102
8103 if (buf->result)
8104 return -EINVAL;
8105+
8106+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8107+ return 0;
8108+
8109 buf->result++;
8110 dirent = buf->dirent;
8111 if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent,
8112@@ -107,6 +114,7 @@ asmlinkage long old_readdir(unsigned int
8113
8114 buf.result = 0;
8115 buf.dirent = dirent;
8116+ buf.file = file;
8117
8118 error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
8119 if (error >= 0)
8120@@ -133,6 +141,7 @@ struct linux_dirent {
8121 struct getdents_callback {
8122 struct linux_dirent __user * current_dir;
8123 struct linux_dirent __user * previous;
8124+ struct file * file;
8125 int count;
8126 int error;
8127 };
8128@@ -147,6 +156,10 @@ static int filldir(void * __buf, const c
8129 buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
8130 if (reclen > buf->count)
8131 return -EINVAL;
8132+
8133+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8134+ return 0;
8135+
8136 dirent = buf->previous;
8137 if (dirent) {
8138 if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
8139@@ -191,6 +204,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents(unsigned in
8140
8141 buf.current_dir = dirent;
8142 buf.previous = NULL;
8143+ buf.file = file;
8144 buf.count = count;
8145 buf.error = 0;
8146
8147@@ -217,6 +231,7 @@ out:
8148 struct getdents_callback64 {
8149 struct linux_dirent64 __user * current_dir;
8150 struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous;
8151+ struct file * file;
8152 int count;
8153 int error;
8154 };
8155@@ -231,6 +246,10 @@ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const
8156 buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
8157 if (reclen > buf->count)
8158 return -EINVAL;
8159+
8160+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8161+ return 0;
8162+
8163 dirent = buf->previous;
8164 if (dirent) {
8165 if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
8166@@ -277,6 +296,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents64(unsigned
8167
8168 buf.current_dir = dirent;
8169 buf.previous = NULL;
8170+ buf.file = file;
8171 buf.count = count;
8172 buf.error = 0;
8173
8174diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c
8175--- linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
8176+++ linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
8177@@ -407,6 +407,11 @@ linvfs_file_mmap(
8178 return error;
8179 }
8180
8181+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
8182+ if (vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
8183+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
8184+#endif
8185+
8186 vma->vm_ops = &linvfs_file_vm_ops;
8187
8188 VOP_SETATTR(vp, &va, XFS_AT_UPDATIME, NULL, error);
8189diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig
8190--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8191+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
8192@@ -0,0 +1,866 @@
8193+#
8194+# grecurity configuration
8195+#
8196+
8197+menu "Grsecurity"
8198+
8199+config GRKERNSEC
8200+ bool "Grsecurity"
8201+ select CRYPTO
8202+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
8203+ help
8204+ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features
8205+ that will enhance the security of your system. It is highly
8206+ recommended that you say Y here and read through the help
8207+ for each option so that you fully understand the features and
8208+ can evaluate their usefulness for your machine.
8209+
8210+choice
8211+ prompt "Security Level"
8212+ depends GRKERNSEC
8213+ default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
8214+
8215+config GRKERNSEC_LOW
8216+ bool "Low"
8217+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
8218+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8219+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8220+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8221+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
8222+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
8223+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
8224+ help
8225+ If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
8226+ be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
8227+ of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
8228+ conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot
8229+ of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher
8230+ security levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the
8231+ following features are enabled:
8232+
8233+ - Linking restrictions
8234+ - FIFO restrictions
8235+ - Randomized PIDs
8236+ - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve
8237+ - Restricted dmesg
8238+ - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot
8239+
8240+config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM
8241+ bool "Medium"
8242+ select PAX
8243+ select PAX_EI_PAX
8244+ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
8245+ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
8246+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
8247+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
8248+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
8249+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8250+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8251+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8252+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
8253+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
8254+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
8255+ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
8256+ select GRKERNSEC_TIME
8257+ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
8258+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8259+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
8260+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
8261+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
8262+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
8263+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
8264+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
8265+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC
8266+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8267+ select PAX_RANDUSTACK
8268+ select PAX_ASLR
8269+ select PAX_RANDMMAP
8270+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64)
8271+
8272+ help
8273+ If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included
8274+ in the low additional security level will be enabled. These
8275+ features provide even more security to your system, though in rare
8276+ cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written
8277+ software. If you enable this option, make sure that your auth
8278+ service (identd) is running as gid 1001. With this option,
8279+ the following features (in addition to those provided in the
8280+ low additional security level) will be enabled:
8281+
8282+ - Randomized TCP source ports
8283+ - Failed fork logging
8284+ - Time change logging
8285+ - Signal logging
8286+ - Deny mounts in chroot
8287+ - Deny double chrooting
8288+ - Deny sysctl writes in chroot
8289+ - Deny mknod in chroot
8290+ - Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
8291+ - Deny pivot_root in chroot
8292+ - Denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
8293+ - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel)
8294+ - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
8295+
8296+config GRKERNSEC_HIGH
8297+ bool "High"
8298+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
8299+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8300+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8301+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8302+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
8303+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
8304+ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
8305+ select GRKERNSEC_TIME
8306+ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
8307+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
8308+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
8309+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
8310+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
8311+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
8312+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
8313+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
8314+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
8315+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
8316+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
8317+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
8318+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC
8319+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
8320+ select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
8321+ select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
8322+ select GRKERNSEC_SHM if (SYSVIPC)
8323+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8324+ select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
8325+ select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
8326+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
8327+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8328+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
8329+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
8330+ select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8331+ select PAX
8332+ select PAX_RANDUSTACK
8333+ select PAX_ASLR
8334+ select PAX_RANDMMAP
8335+ select PAX_NOEXEC
8336+ select PAX_MPROTECT
8337+ select PAX_EI_PAX
8338+ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
8339+ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
8340+ select PAX_KERNEXEC if (!X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS)
8341+ select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && !X86_64)
8342+ select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86 && !X86_64)
8343+ select PAX_PAGEEXEC if (!X86)
8344+ select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
8345+ select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
8346+ select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32)
8347+ select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
8348+ select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
8349+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64)
8350+ select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
8351+ help
8352+ If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be
8353+ enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks
8354+ against your system. The heightened security comes at a cost
8355+ of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software
8356+ on your machine. Since this security level enables PaX, you should
8357+ view <http://pax.grsecurity.net> and read about the PaX
8358+ project. While you are there, download chpax and run it on
8359+ binaries that cause problems with PaX. Also remember that
8360+ since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your
8361+ identd as gid 1001. This security level enables the following
8362+ features in addition to those listed in the low and medium
8363+ security levels:
8364+
8365+ - Additional /proc restrictions
8366+ - Chmod restrictions in chroot
8367+ - No signals, ptrace, or viewing of processes outside of chroot
8368+ - Capability restrictions in chroot
8369+ - Deny fchdir out of chroot
8370+ - Priority restrictions in chroot
8371+ - Segmentation-based implementation of PaX
8372+ - Mprotect restrictions
8373+ - Removal of addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]
8374+ - Kernel stack randomization
8375+ - Mount/unmount/remount logging
8376+ - Kernel symbol hiding
8377+ - Destroy unused shared memory
8378+config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
8379+ bool "Custom"
8380+ help
8381+ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
8382+ option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
8383+ covered in the basic security levels. These additional features
8384+ include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for
8385+ grsecurity. It is advised that you read through the help for
8386+ each option to determine its usefulness in your situation.
8387+
8388+endchoice
8389+
8390+menu "Address Space Protection"
8391+depends on GRKERNSEC
8392+
8393+config GRKERNSEC_KMEM
8394+ bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port"
8395+ help
8396+ If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
8397+ be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
8398+ /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
8399+ support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
8400+ currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
8401+ Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
8402+ you use the RBAC system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
8403+ modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
8404+ If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
8405+ case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
8406+ legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
8407+ but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
8408+ case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
8409+ not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
8410+ It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
8411+ conditions above.
8412+
8413+config GRKERNSEC_IO
8414+ bool "Disable privileged I/O"
8415+ depends on X86
8416+ select RTC
8417+ help
8418+ If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
8419+ Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
8420+ Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
8421+ the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
8422+ remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
8423+ enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
8424+ correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
8425+ enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86
8426+ and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
8427+ use the RBAC system.
8428+
8429+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8430+ bool "Remove addresses from /proc/<pid>/[maps|stat]"
8431+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR
8432+ help
8433+ If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will
8434+ give no information about the addresses of its mappings if
8435+ PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task.
8436+ If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it
8437+ closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid
8438+ binaries.
8439+
8440+config GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
8441+ bool "Deter exploit bruteforcing"
8442+ help
8443+ If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
8444+ daemons such as apache or sshd will be deterred. When a child of a
8445+ forking daemon is killed by PaX or crashes due to an illegal
8446+ instruction, the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every
8447+ subsequent fork until the administrator is able to assess the
8448+ situation and restart the daemon. It is recommended that you also
8449+ enable signal logging in the auditing section so that logs are
8450+ generated when a process performs an illegal instruction.
8451+
8452+config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
8453+ bool "Hide kernel symbols"
8454+ help
8455+ If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
8456+ displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
8457+ to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective
8458+ provided the following conditions are met:
8459+ 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
8460+ 2) You are using the RBAC system and hiding other files such as your
8461+ kernel image and System.map
8462+ 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
8463+ /proc/kcore
8464+ If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
8465+ useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
8466+ overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
8467+
8468+endmenu
8469+menu "Role Based Access Control Options"
8470+depends on GRKERNSEC
8471+
8472+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
8473+ bool "Hide kernel processes"
8474+ help
8475+ If you say Y here, all kernel threads will be hidden to all
8476+ processes but those whose subject has the "view hidden processes"
8477+ flag.
8478+
8479+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
8480+ int "Maximum tries before password lockout"
8481+ default 3
8482+ help
8483+ This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
8484+ to authorize themselves with the grsecurity RBAC system before being
8485+ denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
8486+ The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
8487+
8488+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
8489+ int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds"
8490+ default 30
8491+ help
8492+ This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
8493+ authorize to the RBAC system with the maximum number of invalid
8494+ passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
8495+ a password.
8496+
8497+endmenu
8498+menu "Filesystem Protections"
8499+depends on GRKERNSEC
8500+
8501+config GRKERNSEC_PROC
8502+ bool "Proc restrictions"
8503+ help
8504+ If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
8505+ will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. You MUST
8506+ choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction.
8507+ Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to
8508+ see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
8509+ view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
8510+ the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as
8511+ a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
8512+
8513+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8514+ bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
8515+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
8516+ help
8517+ If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
8518+ processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
8519+ and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
8520+
8521+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8522+ bool "Allow special group"
8523+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8524+ help
8525+ If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
8526+ able to view all processes, network-related information, and
8527+ kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want
8528+ to run identd as a non-root user.
8529+
8530+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
8531+ int "GID for special group"
8532+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8533+ default 1001
8534+
8535+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8536+ bool "Additional restrictions"
8537+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8538+ help
8539+ If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
8540+ /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and
8541+ slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits.
8542+
8543+config GRKERNSEC_LINK
8544+ bool "Linking restrictions"
8545+ help
8546+ If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
8547+ will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
8548+ world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
8549+ symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
8550+ able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
8551+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
8552+
8553+config GRKERNSEC_FIFO
8554+ bool "FIFO restrictions"
8555+ help
8556+ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
8557+ own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
8558+ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
8559+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
8560+ created.
8561+
8562+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8563+ bool "Chroot jail restrictions"
8564+ help
8565+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
8566+ make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you
8567+ encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
8568+ is recommended that you enable each one.
8569+
8570+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
8571+ bool "Deny mounts"
8572+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8573+ help
8574+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
8575+ mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
8576+ sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
8577+
8578+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
8579+ bool "Deny double-chroots"
8580+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8581+ help
8582+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
8583+ again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
8584+ out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
8585+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8586+ "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
8587+
8588+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
8589+ bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot"
8590+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8591+ help
8592+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
8593+ a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
8594+ works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
8595+ function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
8596+ of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
8597+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
8598+ created.
8599+
8600+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
8601+ bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots"
8602+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8603+ help
8604+ If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
8605+ applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
8606+ The man page on chroot(2) states:
8607+ Note that this call does not change the current working
8608+ directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
8609+ `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
8610+ `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
8611+
8612+ It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
8613+ any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
8614+ name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
8615+
8616+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
8617+ bool "Deny (f)chmod +s"
8618+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8619+ help
8620+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
8621+ or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
8622+ against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
8623+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
8624+ created.
8625+
8626+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
8627+ bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
8628+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8629+ help
8630+ If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
8631+ to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
8632+ outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
8633+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
8634+
8635+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
8636+ bool "Deny mknod"
8637+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8638+ help
8639+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
8640+ mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
8641+ would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
8642+ as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
8643+ anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
8644+ they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
8645+ that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
8646+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8647+ "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
8648+
8649+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
8650+ bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot"
8651+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8652+ help
8653+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
8654+ to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
8655+ It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
8656+ a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
8657+
8658+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
8659+ bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot"
8660+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8661+ help
8662+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
8663+ connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
8664+ domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
8665+ that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
8666+ with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
8667+
8668+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
8669+ bool "Protect outside processes"
8670+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8671+ help
8672+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
8673+ kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid,
8674+ getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
8675+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
8676+ created.
8677+
8678+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
8679+ bool "Restrict priority changes"
8680+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8681+ help
8682+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
8683+ the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
8684+ processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
8685+ removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
8686+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
8687+ is created.
8688+
8689+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
8690+ bool "Deny sysctl writes"
8691+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8692+ help
8693+ If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
8694+ write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
8695+ interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
8696+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8697+ "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
8698+
8699+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
8700+ bool "Capability restrictions"
8701+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
8702+ help
8703+ If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
8704+ chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
8705+ system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
8706+ files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
8707+ This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
8708+ if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
8709+ tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
8710+ name "chroot_caps" is created.
8711+
8712+endmenu
8713+menu "Kernel Auditing"
8714+depends on GRKERNSEC
8715+
8716+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
8717+ bool "Single group for auditing"
8718+ help
8719+ If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
8720+ will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended
8721+ if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
8722+ amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled,
8723+ a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
8724+
8725+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
8726+ int "GID for auditing"
8727+ depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
8728+ default 1007
8729+
8730+config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
8731+ bool "Exec logging"
8732+ help
8733+ If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
8734+ other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
8735+ will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
8736+ of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
8737+ name "exec_logging" is created.
8738+ WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
8739+ on an active system.
8740+
8741+config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
8742+ bool "Resource logging"
8743+ help
8744+ If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
8745+ be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
8746+ limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here.
8747+
8748+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
8749+ bool "Log execs within chroot"
8750+ help
8751+ If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
8752+ to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
8753+ applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
8754+ is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
8755+ sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
8756+
8757+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
8758+ bool "Chdir logging"
8759+ help
8760+ If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl
8761+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
8762+
8763+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
8764+ bool "(Un)Mount logging"
8765+ help
8766+ If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
8767+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
8768+ created.
8769+
8770+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
8771+ bool "IPC logging"
8772+ help
8773+ If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
8774+ and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
8775+ sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
8776+
8777+config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
8778+ bool "Signal logging"
8779+ help
8780+ If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
8781+ SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
8782+ occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
8783+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8784+ "signal_logging" is created.
8785+
8786+config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
8787+ bool "Fork failure logging"
8788+ help
8789+ If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
8790+ This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
8791+ their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
8792+ with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
8793+
8794+config GRKERNSEC_TIME
8795+ bool "Time change logging"
8796+ help
8797+ If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
8798+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8799+ "timechange_logging" is created.
8800+
8801+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8802+ bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support"
8803+ help
8804+ If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
8805+ directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
8806+ The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
8807+ This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
8808+ to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the
8809+ process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
8810+ the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
8811+
8812+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
8813+ bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)'
8814+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT
8815+ help
8816+ If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename
8817+ of the offending library or binary. The purpose of the feature is
8818+ to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and
8819+ binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress
8820+ of PaX. Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and
8821+ never on a production machine, as this option creates an information
8822+ leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of
8823+ a single memory region. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
8824+ option with name "audit_textrel" is created.
8825+
8826+endmenu
8827+
8828+menu "Executable Protections"
8829+depends on GRKERNSEC
8830+
8831+config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
8832+ bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs"
8833+ help
8834+ If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
8835+ have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system
8836+ only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option
8837+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
8838+
8839+config GRKERNSEC_SHM
8840+ bool "Destroy unused shared memory"
8841+ depends on SYSVIPC
8842+ help
8843+ If you say Y here, shared memory will be destroyed when no one is
8844+ attached to it. Otherwise, resources involved with the shared
8845+ memory can be used up and not be associated with any process (as the
8846+ shared memory still exists, and the creating process has exited). If
8847+ the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8848+ "destroy_unused_shm" is created.
8849+
8850+config GRKERNSEC_DMESG
8851+ bool "Dmesg(8) restriction"
8852+ help
8853+ If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
8854+ to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
8855+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
8856+ created.
8857+
8858+config GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
8859+ bool "Randomized PIDs"
8860+ help
8861+ If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
8862+ pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along
8863+ with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
8864+ pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part
8865+ of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
8866+ those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code
8867+ to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl
8868+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created.
8869+
8870+config GRKERNSEC_TPE
8871+ bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)"
8872+ help
8873+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
8874+ supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
8875+ These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
8876+ root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
8877+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
8878+
8879+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
8880+ bool "Partially restrict non-root users"
8881+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
8882+ help
8883+ If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
8884+ group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
8885+ execute files in directories they own that are not group or
8886+ world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
8887+ root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8888+ "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
8889+
8890+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
8891+ int "GID for untrusted users"
8892+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
8893+ default 1005
8894+ help
8895+ Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for.
8896+ Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID
8897+ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
8898+ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
8899+ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
8900+ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
8901+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created.
8902+
8903+endmenu
8904+menu "Network Protections"
8905+depends on GRKERNSEC
8906+
8907+config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
8908+ bool "Larger entropy pools"
8909+ help
8910+ If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
8911+ and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity
8912+ features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
8913+ here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
8914+ /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
8915+
8916+config GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
8917+ bool "Randomized TCP source ports"
8918+ default n if GRKERNSEC_LOW || GRKERNSEC_MID
8919+ default y if GRKERNSEC_HIGH
8920+ help
8921+ If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the
8922+ fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that
8923+ the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing
8924+ algorithm. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
8925+ "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created.
8926+
8927+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
8928+ bool "Socket restrictions"
8929+ help
8930+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
8931+ If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
8932+ groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
8933+ will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
8934+
8935+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
8936+ bool "Deny any sockets to group"
8937+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
8938+ help
8939+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
8940+ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
8941+ applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
8942+ sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
8943+
8944+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
8945+ int "GID to deny all sockets for"
8946+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
8947+ default 1004
8948+ help
8949+ Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
8950+ add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
8951+ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose
8952+ here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
8953+ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
8954+ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
8955+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
8956+
8957+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
8958+ bool "Deny client sockets to group"
8959+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
8960+ help
8961+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
8962+ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
8963+ able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
8964+ you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
8965+ from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
8966+ sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
8967+
8968+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
8969+ int "GID to deny client sockets for"
8970+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
8971+ default 1003
8972+ help
8973+ Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
8974+ Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
8975+ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
8976+ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
8977+ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
8978+ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
8979+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
8980+
8981+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
8982+ bool "Deny server sockets to group"
8983+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
8984+ help
8985+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
8986+ be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl
8987+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
8988+
8989+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
8990+ int "GID to deny server sockets for"
8991+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
8992+ default 1002
8993+ help
8994+ Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
8995+ Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
8996+ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you
8997+ choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup
8998+ script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help
8999+ on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is
9000+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
9001+
9002+endmenu
9003+menu "Sysctl support"
9004+depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL
9005+
9006+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
9007+ bool "Sysctl support"
9008+ help
9009+ If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
9010+ grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
9011+ kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
9012+ to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries
9013+ are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
9014+ All features enabled in the kernel configuration are disabled at boot
9015+ if you do not say Y to the "Turn on features by default" option.
9016+ All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock entry should
9017+ be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
9018+ *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
9019+
9020+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
9021+ bool "Turn on features by default"
9022+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
9023+ help
9024+ If you say Y here, instead of having all features enabled in the
9025+ kernel configuration disabled at boot time, the features will be
9026+ enabled at boot time. It is recommended you say Y here unless
9027+ there is some reason you would want all sysctl-tunable features to
9028+ be disabled by default. As mentioned elsewhere, it is important
9029+ to enable the grsec_lock entry once you have finished modifying
9030+ the sysctl entries.
9031+
9032+endmenu
9033+menu "Logging Options"
9034+depends on GRKERNSEC
9035+
9036+config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
9037+ int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)"
9038+ default 10
9039+ help
9040+ This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
9041+ grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most
9042+ people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
9043+ to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
9044+ prevent flooding.
9045+
9046+config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
9047+ int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)"
9048+ default 4
9049+ help
9050+ This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
9051+ within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The
9052+ default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
9053+ many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
9054+ raise this value.
9055+
9056+endmenu
9057+
9058+endmenu
9059diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile
9060--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9061+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
9062@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
9063+# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
9064+# during 2001-2005 it has been completely redesigned by Brad Spengler
9065+# into an RBAC system
9066+#
9067+# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
9068+# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL v2 or higher
9069+
9070+obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
9071+ grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
9072+ grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o
9073+
9074+obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o \
9075+ gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
9076+ gracl_learn.o grsec_log.o
9077+obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
9078+
9079+ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
9080+obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
9081+endif
9082+
9083diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c
9084--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9085+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
9086@@ -0,0 +1,3550 @@
9087+#include <linux/kernel.h>
9088+#include <linux/module.h>
9089+#include <linux/sched.h>
9090+#include <linux/mm.h>
9091+#include <linux/file.h>
9092+#include <linux/fs.h>
9093+#include <linux/namei.h>
9094+#include <linux/mount.h>
9095+#include <linux/tty.h>
9096+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
9097+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
9098+#include <linux/slab.h>
9099+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
9100+#include <linux/types.h>
9101+#include <linux/capability.h>
9102+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
9103+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
9104+#include <linux/gracl.h>
9105+#include <linux/gralloc.h>
9106+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
9107+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
9108+#include <linux/percpu.h>
9109+
9110+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
9111+#include <asm/errno.h>
9112+#include <asm/mman.h>
9113+
9114+static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
9115+static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head;
9116+static struct name_db name_set;
9117+static struct name_db inodev_set;
9118+
9119+/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we
9120+ can share references in the kernel as well
9121+*/
9122+
9123+static struct dentry *real_root;
9124+static struct vfsmount *real_root_mnt;
9125+
9126+static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set;
9127+
9128+static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
9129+
9130+static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
9131+
9132+extern char *gr_shared_page[4];
9133+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem);
9134+rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
9135+
9136+struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
9137+
9138+static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
9139+
9140+extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
9141+extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void);
9142+
9143+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
9144+extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
9145+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
9146+#endif
9147+
9148+extern char * __d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9149+ struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
9150+ char *buffer, int buflen);
9151+
9152+unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
9153+unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
9154+
9155+static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
9156+static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
9157+
9158+static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
9159+
9160+/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move
9161+ entries around. They can be replaced during insert. */
9162+
9163+static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject;
9164+static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object;
9165+static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev;
9166+
9167+/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since
9168+ nested subject parsing is tricky
9169+*/
9170+static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL;
9171+static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL;
9172+
9173+static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
9174+static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
9175+
9176+extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
9177+extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
9178+extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
9179+extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
9180+
9181+__inline__ int
9182+gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
9183+{
9184+ return (gr_status & GR_READY);
9185+}
9186+
9187+char gr_roletype_to_char(void)
9188+{
9189+ switch (current->role->roletype &
9190+ (GR_ROLE_DEFAULT | GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP |
9191+ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
9192+ case GR_ROLE_DEFAULT:
9193+ return 'D';
9194+ case GR_ROLE_USER:
9195+ return 'U';
9196+ case GR_ROLE_GROUP:
9197+ return 'G';
9198+ case GR_ROLE_SPECIAL:
9199+ return 'S';
9200+ }
9201+
9202+ return 'X';
9203+}
9204+
9205+__inline__ int
9206+gr_acl_tpe_check(void)
9207+{
9208+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
9209+ return 0;
9210+ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE)
9211+ return 1;
9212+ else
9213+ return 0;
9214+}
9215+
9216+int
9217+gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
9218+{
9219+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
9220+ if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) &&
9221+ grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
9222+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
9223+ return 1;
9224+#endif
9225+ return 0;
9226+}
9227+
9228+static int
9229+gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb)
9230+{
9231+ int i;
9232+ unsigned long *l1;
9233+ unsigned long *l2;
9234+ unsigned char *c1;
9235+ unsigned char *c2;
9236+ int num_longs;
9237+
9238+ if (likely(lena != lenb))
9239+ return 0;
9240+
9241+ l1 = (unsigned long *)a;
9242+ l2 = (unsigned long *)b;
9243+
9244+ num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long);
9245+
9246+ for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) {
9247+ if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2))
9248+ return 0;
9249+ }
9250+
9251+ c1 = (unsigned char *) l1;
9252+ c2 = (unsigned char *) l2;
9253+
9254+ i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long));
9255+
9256+ for (; i--; c1++, c2++) {
9257+ if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2))
9258+ return 0;
9259+ }
9260+
9261+ return 1;
9262+}
9263+
9264+static char *
9265+__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9266+ char *buf, int buflen)
9267+{
9268+ char *res;
9269+ struct dentry *l_dentry = (struct dentry *)dentry;
9270+
9271+ /* we can use real_root, real_root_mnt, because this is only called
9272+ by the RBAC system */
9273+ res = __d_path(l_dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, real_root, real_root_mnt, buf, buflen);
9274+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res)))
9275+ res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
9276+ else if (!IS_ROOT(l_dentry) && d_unhashed(l_dentry)) {
9277+ unsigned int len;
9278+
9279+ /* strip off (deleted) */
9280+ len = strlen(res);
9281+ *(res + len - 10) = '\0';
9282+ }
9283+
9284+ return res;
9285+}
9286+
9287+static char *
9288+d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9289+ char *buf, int buflen)
9290+{
9291+ char *res;
9292+ struct dentry *l_dentry = (struct dentry *)dentry;
9293+ struct dentry *root;
9294+ struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
9295+
9296+ /* we can't use real_root, real_root_mnt, because they belong only to the RBAC system */
9297+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9298+ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
9299+ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
9300+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9301+
9302+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
9303+ res = __d_path(l_dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
9304+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res)))
9305+ res = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
9306+ else if (!IS_ROOT(l_dentry) && d_unhashed(l_dentry)) {
9307+ unsigned int len;
9308+
9309+ /* strip off (deleted) */
9310+ len = strlen(res);
9311+ *(res + len - 10) = '\0';
9312+ }
9313+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
9314+
9315+ dput(root);
9316+ mntput(rootmnt);
9317+ return res;
9318+}
9319+
9320+char *
9321+gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9322+{
9323+ return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()),
9324+ PAGE_SIZE);
9325+}
9326+
9327+char *
9328+gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9329+{
9330+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
9331+ PAGE_SIZE);
9332+}
9333+
9334+char *
9335+gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9336+{
9337+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()),
9338+ PAGE_SIZE);
9339+}
9340+
9341+char *
9342+gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9343+{
9344+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()),
9345+ PAGE_SIZE);
9346+}
9347+
9348+char *
9349+gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9350+{
9351+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()),
9352+ PAGE_SIZE);
9353+}
9354+
9355+__inline__ __u32
9356+to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
9357+{
9358+ /* masks off auditable permission flags, then shifts them to create
9359+ auditing flags, and adds the special case of append auditing if
9360+ we're requesting write */
9361+ return (((reqmode & GR_AUDIT_READ) << 10) | ((reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0));
9362+}
9363+
9364+struct acl_subject_label *
9365+lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp)
9366+{
9367+ unsigned long index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size);
9368+ struct subject_map *match;
9369+ unsigned int i = 0;
9370+
9371+ match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9372+
9373+ while (match && match->user != userp) {
9374+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size;
9375+ match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9376+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9377+ }
9378+
9379+ if (match != NULL)
9380+ return match->kernel;
9381+ else
9382+ return NULL;
9383+}
9384+
9385+static void
9386+insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap)
9387+{
9388+ unsigned long index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size);
9389+ struct subject_map **curr;
9390+ unsigned int i = 0;
9391+
9392+ curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9393+
9394+ while (*curr) {
9395+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size;
9396+ curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9397+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9398+ }
9399+
9400+ *curr = subjmap;
9401+
9402+ return;
9403+}
9404+
9405+static struct acl_role_label *
9406+lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
9407+ const gid_t gid)
9408+{
9409+ unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
9410+ struct acl_role_label *match;
9411+ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
9412+ int x;
9413+ unsigned int i = 0;
9414+
9415+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9416+
9417+ while (match) {
9418+ if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) {
9419+ for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
9420+ if (match->domain_children[x] == uid)
9421+ goto found;
9422+ }
9423+ } else if (match->uidgid == uid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)
9424+ break;
9425+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
9426+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9427+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9428+ }
9429+found:
9430+ if (match == NULL) {
9431+ try_group:
9432+ index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
9433+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9434+ i = 0;
9435+
9436+ while (match) {
9437+ if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) {
9438+ for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
9439+ if (match->domain_children[x] == gid)
9440+ goto found2;
9441+ }
9442+ } else if (match->uidgid == gid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP)
9443+ break;
9444+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
9445+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9446+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9447+ }
9448+found2:
9449+ if (match == NULL)
9450+ match = default_role;
9451+ if (match->allowed_ips == NULL)
9452+ return match;
9453+ else {
9454+ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
9455+ if (likely
9456+ ((ntohl(task->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
9457+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
9458+ return match;
9459+ }
9460+ match = default_role;
9461+ }
9462+ } else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) {
9463+ return match;
9464+ } else {
9465+ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
9466+ if (likely
9467+ ((ntohl(task->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
9468+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
9469+ return match;
9470+ }
9471+ goto try_group;
9472+ }
9473+
9474+ return match;
9475+}
9476+
9477+struct acl_subject_label *
9478+lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9479+ const struct acl_role_label *role)
9480+{
9481+ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
9482+ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
9483+ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size);
9484+ struct acl_subject_label *match;
9485+ unsigned int i = 0;
9486+
9487+ match = s_hash[index];
9488+
9489+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9490+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9491+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
9492+ match = s_hash[index];
9493+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9494+ }
9495+
9496+ if (match && (match != deleted_subject) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9497+ return match;
9498+ else
9499+ return NULL;
9500+}
9501+
9502+static struct acl_object_label *
9503+lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9504+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9505+{
9506+ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
9507+ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
9508+ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
9509+ struct acl_object_label *match;
9510+ unsigned int i = 0;
9511+
9512+ match = o_hash[index];
9513+
9514+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9515+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9516+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
9517+ match = o_hash[index];
9518+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9519+ }
9520+
9521+ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9522+ return match;
9523+ else
9524+ return NULL;
9525+}
9526+
9527+static struct acl_object_label *
9528+lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9529+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9530+{
9531+ unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size;
9532+ struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash;
9533+ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
9534+ struct acl_object_label *match;
9535+ unsigned int i = 0;
9536+
9537+ match = o_hash[index];
9538+
9539+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9540+ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9541+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
9542+ match = o_hash[index];
9543+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9544+ }
9545+
9546+ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && (match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9547+ return match;
9548+
9549+ i = 0;
9550+ index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size);
9551+ match = o_hash[index];
9552+
9553+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9554+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9555+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size;
9556+ match = o_hash[index];
9557+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9558+ }
9559+
9560+ if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9561+ return match;
9562+ else
9563+ return NULL;
9564+}
9565+
9566+static struct name_entry *
9567+lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
9568+{
9569+ __u16 len = strlen(name);
9570+ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
9571+ struct name_entry *match;
9572+ unsigned int i = 0;
9573+
9574+ match = name_set.n_hash[index];
9575+
9576+ while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) {
9577+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
9578+ match = name_set.n_hash[index];
9579+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9580+ }
9581+
9582+ return match;
9583+}
9584+
9585+static struct name_entry *
9586+lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
9587+{
9588+ unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size);
9589+ struct name_entry *match;
9590+ unsigned int i = 0;
9591+
9592+ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
9593+
9594+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) {
9595+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
9596+ match = inodev_set.n_hash[index];
9597+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9598+ }
9599+
9600+ if (match && (match != deleted_inodev))
9601+ return match;
9602+ else
9603+ return NULL;
9604+}
9605+
9606+static void
9607+insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry)
9608+{
9609+ unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device,
9610+ inodev_set.n_size);
9611+ struct name_entry **curr;
9612+ unsigned int i = 0;
9613+
9614+ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
9615+
9616+ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) {
9617+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
9618+ curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
9619+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9620+ }
9621+
9622+ *curr = nentry;
9623+
9624+ return;
9625+}
9626+
9627+static void
9628+__insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role, uid_t uidgid)
9629+{
9630+ unsigned long index =
9631+ rhash(uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
9632+ struct acl_role_label **curr;
9633+ unsigned int i = 0;
9634+
9635+ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9636+
9637+ while (*curr) {
9638+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size;
9639+ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9640+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9641+ }
9642+
9643+ *curr = role;
9644+
9645+ return;
9646+}
9647+
9648+static void
9649+insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
9650+{
9651+ int i;
9652+
9653+ if (role->roletype & GR_ROLE_DOMAIN) {
9654+ for (i = 0; i < role->domain_child_num; i++)
9655+ __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->domain_children[i]);
9656+ } else
9657+ __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->uidgid);
9658+}
9659+
9660+static int
9661+insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device)
9662+{
9663+ struct name_entry **curr;
9664+ unsigned int i = 0;
9665+ __u16 len = strlen(name);
9666+ unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size);
9667+
9668+ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
9669+
9670+ while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) {
9671+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size;
9672+ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
9673+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9674+ }
9675+
9676+ if (!(*curr)) {
9677+ struct name_entry *nentry =
9678+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
9679+ if (!nentry)
9680+ return 0;
9681+ nentry->name = name;
9682+ nentry->inode = inode;
9683+ nentry->device = device;
9684+ nentry->len = len;
9685+ *curr = nentry;
9686+ /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
9687+ insert_inodev_entry(nentry);
9688+ }
9689+
9690+ return 1;
9691+}
9692+
9693+static void
9694+insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
9695+ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9696+{
9697+ unsigned long index =
9698+ fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
9699+ struct acl_object_label **curr;
9700+ unsigned int i = 0;
9701+
9702+ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
9703+
9704+ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) {
9705+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
9706+ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
9707+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9708+ }
9709+
9710+ *curr = obj;
9711+
9712+ return;
9713+}
9714+
9715+static void
9716+insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
9717+ struct acl_role_label *role)
9718+{
9719+ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
9720+ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
9721+ unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size);
9722+ struct acl_subject_label **curr;
9723+ unsigned int i = 0;
9724+
9725+ curr = &s_hash[index];
9726+
9727+ while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) {
9728+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
9729+ curr = &s_hash[index];
9730+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
9731+ }
9732+
9733+ *curr = obj;
9734+
9735+ return;
9736+}
9737+
9738+static void *
9739+create_table(__u32 * len, int elementsize)
9740+{
9741+ unsigned long table_sizes[] = {
9742+ 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
9743+ 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
9744+ 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
9745+ 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
9746+ };
9747+ void *newtable = NULL;
9748+ unsigned int pwr = 0;
9749+
9750+ while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
9751+ table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
9752+ pwr++;
9753+
9754+ if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len)))
9755+ return newtable;
9756+
9757+ if ((table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9758+ newtable =
9759+ kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize, GFP_KERNEL);
9760+ else
9761+ newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize);
9762+
9763+ *len = table_sizes[pwr];
9764+
9765+ return newtable;
9766+}
9767+
9768+static int
9769+init_variables(const struct gr_arg *arg)
9770+{
9771+ unsigned long stacksize;
9772+
9773+ subj_map_set.s_size = arg->role_db.num_subjects;
9774+ acl_role_set.r_size = arg->role_db.num_roles + arg->role_db.num_domain_children;
9775+ name_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
9776+ inodev_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
9777+
9778+ if (!gr_init_uidset())
9779+ return 1;
9780+
9781+ /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
9782+
9783+ stacksize = arg->role_db.num_pointers + 5;
9784+
9785+ if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
9786+ return 1;
9787+
9788+ /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */
9789+ deleted_subject =
9790+ (struct acl_subject_label *)
9791+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
9792+ deleted_object =
9793+ (struct acl_object_label *)
9794+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
9795+ deleted_inodev =
9796+ (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
9797+
9798+ if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev)
9799+ return 1;
9800+
9801+ memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label));
9802+ memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
9803+ memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry));
9804+
9805+ /* grab reference for the real root dentry and vfsmount */
9806+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9807+ real_root_mnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
9808+ real_root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
9809+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9810+
9811+
9812+ /* We only want 50% full tables for now */
9813+
9814+ subj_map_set.s_hash =
9815+ (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size, sizeof(void *));
9816+ acl_role_set.r_hash =
9817+ (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size, sizeof(void *));
9818+ name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size, sizeof(void *));
9819+ inodev_set.n_hash =
9820+ (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size, sizeof(void *));
9821+
9822+ if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash ||
9823+ !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash)
9824+ return 1;
9825+
9826+ memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0,
9827+ sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size);
9828+ memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
9829+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
9830+ memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
9831+ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
9832+ memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0,
9833+ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size);
9834+
9835+ return 0;
9836+}
9837+
9838+/* free information not needed after startup
9839+ currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects
9840+*/
9841+
9842+static void
9843+free_init_variables(void)
9844+{
9845+ __u32 i;
9846+
9847+ if (subj_map_set.s_hash) {
9848+ for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) {
9849+ if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) {
9850+ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]);
9851+ subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL;
9852+ }
9853+ }
9854+
9855+ if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <=
9856+ PAGE_SIZE)
9857+ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
9858+ else
9859+ vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
9860+ }
9861+
9862+ return;
9863+}
9864+
9865+static void
9866+free_variables(void)
9867+{
9868+ struct acl_subject_label *s;
9869+ struct acl_role_label *r;
9870+ struct task_struct *task, *task2;
9871+
9872+ gr_clear_learn_entries();
9873+
9874+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
9875+ do_each_thread(task2, task) {
9876+ task->acl_sp_role = 0;
9877+ task->acl_role_id = 0;
9878+ task->acl = NULL;
9879+ task->role = NULL;
9880+ } while_each_thread(task2, task);
9881+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
9882+
9883+ /* release the reference to the real root dentry and vfsmount */
9884+ if (real_root)
9885+ dput(real_root);
9886+ real_root = NULL;
9887+ if (real_root_mnt)
9888+ mntput(real_root_mnt);
9889+ real_root_mnt = NULL;
9890+
9891+ /* free all object hash tables */
9892+
9893+ if (role_list_head) {
9894+ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
9895+ if (!r->subj_hash)
9896+ break;
9897+ for (s = r->hash->first; s; s = s->next) {
9898+ if (!s->obj_hash)
9899+ break;
9900+ if ((s->obj_hash_size *
9901+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <=
9902+ PAGE_SIZE)
9903+ kfree(s->obj_hash);
9904+ else
9905+ vfree(s->obj_hash);
9906+ }
9907+ if ((r->subj_hash_size *
9908+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9909+ kfree(r->subj_hash);
9910+ else
9911+ vfree(r->subj_hash);
9912+ }
9913+ }
9914+
9915+ acl_free_all();
9916+
9917+ if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
9918+ if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
9919+ PAGE_SIZE)
9920+ kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
9921+ else
9922+ vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
9923+ }
9924+ if (name_set.n_hash) {
9925+ if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
9926+ PAGE_SIZE)
9927+ kfree(name_set.n_hash);
9928+ else
9929+ vfree(name_set.n_hash);
9930+ }
9931+
9932+ if (inodev_set.n_hash) {
9933+ if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
9934+ PAGE_SIZE)
9935+ kfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
9936+ else
9937+ vfree(inodev_set.n_hash);
9938+ }
9939+
9940+ gr_free_uidset();
9941+
9942+ memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
9943+ memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
9944+ memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
9945+ memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db));
9946+
9947+ role_list_head = NULL;
9948+ default_role = NULL;
9949+
9950+ return;
9951+}
9952+
9953+static __u32
9954+count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
9955+{
9956+ struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
9957+ __u32 num = 0;
9958+
9959+ while (userp) {
9960+ if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
9961+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
9962+ break;
9963+
9964+ userp = o_tmp.prev;
9965+ num++;
9966+ }
9967+
9968+ return num;
9969+}
9970+
9971+static struct acl_subject_label *
9972+do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
9973+
9974+static int
9975+copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj)
9976+{
9977+ struct acl_object_label **guser, *g_tmp, *glast = NULL;
9978+ unsigned int len;
9979+ char *tmp;
9980+
9981+ if (obj->globbed == NULL)
9982+ return 0;
9983+
9984+ guser = &obj->globbed;
9985+ while (*guser) {
9986+ g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
9987+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
9988+ if (g_tmp == NULL)
9989+ return -ENOMEM;
9990+
9991+ if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser,
9992+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
9993+ return -EFAULT;
9994+
9995+ len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
9996+
9997+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
9998+ return -EINVAL;
9999+
10000+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10001+ return -ENOMEM;
10002+
10003+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len))
10004+ return -EFAULT;
10005+
10006+ g_tmp->filename = tmp;
10007+
10008+ if (glast)
10009+ glast->next = g_tmp;
10010+ g_tmp->prev = glast;
10011+ *guser = g_tmp;
10012+ glast = g_tmp;
10013+ guser = &((*guser)->next);
10014+ }
10015+
10016+ return 0;
10017+}
10018+
10019+static int
10020+copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
10021+ struct acl_role_label *role)
10022+{
10023+ struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
10024+ unsigned int len;
10025+ int ret;
10026+ char *tmp;
10027+
10028+ while (userp) {
10029+ if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
10030+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
10031+ return -ENOMEM;
10032+
10033+ if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
10034+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
10035+ return -EFAULT;
10036+
10037+ userp = o_tmp->prev;
10038+
10039+ len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
10040+
10041+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
10042+ return -EINVAL;
10043+
10044+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10045+ return -ENOMEM;
10046+
10047+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
10048+ return -EFAULT;
10049+
10050+ o_tmp->filename = tmp;
10051+
10052+ insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
10053+ if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
10054+ o_tmp->device))
10055+ return -ENOMEM;
10056+
10057+ ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp);
10058+ if (ret)
10059+ return ret;
10060+
10061+ if (o_tmp->nested) {
10062+ o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
10063+ if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
10064+ return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
10065+
10066+ s_final = o_tmp->nested;
10067+ }
10068+ }
10069+
10070+ return 0;
10071+}
10072+
10073+static __u32
10074+count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
10075+{
10076+ struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
10077+ __u32 num = 0;
10078+
10079+ while (userp) {
10080+ if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
10081+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
10082+ break;
10083+
10084+ userp = s_tmp.prev;
10085+ /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
10086+ they are not included in the hash table, but are
10087+ attached to objects. We have already counted
10088+ the subjects in userspace for the allocation
10089+ stack
10090+ */
10091+ if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED))
10092+ num++;
10093+ }
10094+
10095+ return num;
10096+}
10097+
10098+static int
10099+copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
10100+{
10101+ struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
10102+
10103+ ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
10104+
10105+ while (ruserip) {
10106+ rlast = rtmp;
10107+
10108+ if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
10109+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
10110+ return -ENOMEM;
10111+
10112+ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
10113+ sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
10114+ return -EFAULT;
10115+
10116+ ruserip = rtmp->prev;
10117+
10118+ if (!rlast) {
10119+ rtmp->prev = NULL;
10120+ rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
10121+ } else {
10122+ rlast->next = rtmp;
10123+ rtmp->prev = rlast;
10124+ }
10125+
10126+ if (!ruserip)
10127+ rtmp->next = NULL;
10128+ }
10129+
10130+ return 0;
10131+}
10132+
10133+static int
10134+copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
10135+{
10136+ struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
10137+
10138+ unsigned int len;
10139+ char *tmp;
10140+
10141+ rusertp = rolep->transitions;
10142+
10143+ while (rusertp) {
10144+ rlast = rtmp;
10145+
10146+ if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
10147+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
10148+ return -ENOMEM;
10149+
10150+ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
10151+ sizeof (struct role_transition)))
10152+ return -EFAULT;
10153+
10154+ rusertp = rtmp->prev;
10155+
10156+ len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10157+
10158+ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
10159+ return -EINVAL;
10160+
10161+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10162+ return -ENOMEM;
10163+
10164+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
10165+ return -EFAULT;
10166+
10167+ rtmp->rolename = tmp;
10168+
10169+ if (!rlast) {
10170+ rtmp->prev = NULL;
10171+ rolep->transitions = rtmp;
10172+ } else {
10173+ rlast->next = rtmp;
10174+ rtmp->prev = rlast;
10175+ }
10176+
10177+ if (!rusertp)
10178+ rtmp->next = NULL;
10179+ }
10180+
10181+ return 0;
10182+}
10183+
10184+static struct acl_subject_label *
10185+do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
10186+{
10187+ struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2;
10188+ unsigned int len;
10189+ char *tmp;
10190+ __u32 num_objs;
10191+ struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
10192+ struct gr_hash_struct ghash;
10193+ struct subject_map *subjmap;
10194+ unsigned long i_num;
10195+ int err;
10196+
10197+ s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp);
10198+
10199+ /* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return
10200+ the reference to it, and don't copy it over again
10201+ */
10202+ if (s_tmp)
10203+ return(s_tmp);
10204+
10205+ if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
10206+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
10207+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10208+
10209+ subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL);
10210+ if (subjmap == NULL)
10211+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10212+
10213+ subjmap->user = userp;
10214+ subjmap->kernel = s_tmp;
10215+ insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap);
10216+
10217+ if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
10218+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
10219+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10220+
10221+ if (!s_last) {
10222+ s_tmp->prev = NULL;
10223+ role->hash->first = s_tmp;
10224+ } else {
10225+ s_last->next = s_tmp;
10226+ s_tmp->prev = s_last;
10227+ }
10228+
10229+ s_last = s_tmp;
10230+
10231+ len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
10232+
10233+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
10234+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
10235+
10236+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10237+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10238+
10239+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
10240+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10241+
10242+ s_tmp->filename = tmp;
10243+
10244+ if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
10245+ role->root_label = s_tmp;
10246+
10247+ if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct)))
10248+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10249+
10250+ /* copy user and group transition tables */
10251+
10252+ if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) {
10253+ uid_t *uidlist;
10254+
10255+ uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t));
10256+ if (uidlist == NULL)
10257+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10258+ if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)))
10259+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10260+
10261+ s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist;
10262+ }
10263+
10264+ if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) {
10265+ gid_t *gidlist;
10266+
10267+ gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t));
10268+ if (gidlist == NULL)
10269+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10270+ if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)))
10271+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10272+
10273+ s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist;
10274+ }
10275+
10276+ /* set up object hash table */
10277+ num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first);
10278+
10279+ s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
10280+ s_tmp->obj_hash =
10281+ (struct acl_object_label **)
10282+ create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
10283+
10284+ if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
10285+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10286+
10287+ memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
10288+ s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
10289+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
10290+
10291+ /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested
10292+ acl could be found and be the final subject
10293+ copied
10294+ */
10295+
10296+ s_final = s_tmp;
10297+
10298+ /* add in objects */
10299+ err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role);
10300+
10301+ if (err)
10302+ return ERR_PTR(err);
10303+
10304+ /* set pointer for parent subject */
10305+ if (s_tmp->parent_subject) {
10306+ s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role);
10307+
10308+ if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2))
10309+ return s_tmp2;
10310+
10311+ s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2;
10312+ }
10313+
10314+ /* add in ip acls */
10315+
10316+ if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
10317+ s_tmp->ips = NULL;
10318+ goto insert;
10319+ }
10320+
10321+ i_tmp =
10322+ (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
10323+ sizeof (struct
10324+ acl_ip_label *));
10325+
10326+ if (!i_tmp)
10327+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10328+
10329+ for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
10330+ *(i_tmp + i_num) =
10331+ (struct acl_ip_label *)
10332+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
10333+ if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
10334+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10335+
10336+ if (copy_from_user
10337+ (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
10338+ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
10339+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10340+
10341+ if (copy_from_user
10342+ (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
10343+ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
10344+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10345+ }
10346+
10347+ s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
10348+
10349+insert:
10350+ if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
10351+ s_tmp->device))
10352+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10353+
10354+ return s_tmp;
10355+}
10356+
10357+static int
10358+copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
10359+{
10360+ struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
10361+ struct acl_subject_label * ret;
10362+ int err;
10363+
10364+ while (userp) {
10365+ if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
10366+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
10367+ return -EFAULT;
10368+
10369+ /* do not add nested subjects here, add
10370+ while parsing objects
10371+ */
10372+
10373+ if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) {
10374+ userp = s_pre.prev;
10375+ continue;
10376+ }
10377+
10378+ ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
10379+
10380+ err = PTR_ERR(ret);
10381+ if (IS_ERR(ret))
10382+ return err;
10383+
10384+ insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
10385+
10386+ userp = s_pre.prev;
10387+ }
10388+
10389+ s_final->next = NULL;
10390+
10391+ return 0;
10392+}
10393+
10394+static int
10395+copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
10396+{
10397+ struct acl_role_label **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_tmp = NULL, *r_last;
10398+ struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
10399+ struct gr_hash_struct *ghash;
10400+ uid_t *domainlist;
10401+ unsigned long r_num;
10402+ unsigned int len;
10403+ char *tmp;
10404+ int err = 0;
10405+ __u16 i;
10406+ __u32 num_subjs;
10407+
10408+ /* we need a default and kernel role */
10409+ if (arg->role_db.num_roles < 2)
10410+ return -EINVAL;
10411+
10412+ /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
10413+
10414+ num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
10415+ acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
10416+
10417+ if (!acl_special_roles) {
10418+ err = -ENOMEM;
10419+ goto cleanup;
10420+ }
10421+
10422+ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
10423+ sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
10424+ if (!sptmp) {
10425+ err = -ENOMEM;
10426+ goto cleanup;
10427+ }
10428+ if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
10429+ sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
10430+ err = -EFAULT;
10431+ goto cleanup;
10432+ }
10433+
10434+ len =
10435+ strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10436+
10437+ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
10438+ err = -EINVAL;
10439+ goto cleanup;
10440+ }
10441+
10442+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
10443+ err = -ENOMEM;
10444+ goto cleanup;
10445+ }
10446+
10447+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
10448+ err = -EFAULT;
10449+ goto cleanup;
10450+ }
10451+
10452+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
10453+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
10454+#endif
10455+ sptmp->rolename = tmp;
10456+ acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
10457+ }
10458+
10459+ r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
10460+
10461+ for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.num_roles; r_num++) {
10462+ r_last = r_tmp;
10463+
10464+ r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
10465+
10466+ if (!r_tmp) {
10467+ err = -ENOMEM;
10468+ goto cleanup;
10469+ }
10470+
10471+ if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
10472+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
10473+ err = -EFAULT;
10474+ goto cleanup;
10475+ }
10476+
10477+ if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
10478+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
10479+ err = -EFAULT;
10480+ goto cleanup;
10481+ }
10482+
10483+ if (!r_last) {
10484+ r_tmp->prev = NULL;
10485+ role_list_head = r_tmp;
10486+ } else {
10487+ r_last->next = r_tmp;
10488+ r_tmp->prev = r_last;
10489+ }
10490+
10491+ if (r_num == (arg->role_db.num_roles - 1))
10492+ r_tmp->next = NULL;
10493+
10494+ len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10495+
10496+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
10497+ err = -EINVAL;
10498+ goto cleanup;
10499+ }
10500+
10501+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
10502+ err = -ENOMEM;
10503+ goto cleanup;
10504+ }
10505+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
10506+ err = -EFAULT;
10507+ goto cleanup;
10508+ }
10509+ r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
10510+
10511+ if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
10512+ && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
10513+ default_role = r_tmp;
10514+ } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
10515+ kernel_role = r_tmp;
10516+ }
10517+
10518+ if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) {
10519+ err = -ENOMEM;
10520+ goto cleanup;
10521+ }
10522+ if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) {
10523+ err = -EFAULT;
10524+ goto cleanup;
10525+ }
10526+
10527+ r_tmp->hash = ghash;
10528+
10529+ num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first);
10530+
10531+ r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
10532+ r_tmp->subj_hash =
10533+ (struct acl_subject_label **)
10534+ create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
10535+
10536+ if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
10537+ err = -ENOMEM;
10538+ goto cleanup;
10539+ }
10540+
10541+ err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
10542+ if (err)
10543+ goto cleanup;
10544+
10545+ /* copy domain info */
10546+ if (r_tmp->domain_children != NULL) {
10547+ domainlist = acl_alloc(r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t));
10548+ if (domainlist == NULL) {
10549+ err = -ENOMEM;
10550+ goto cleanup;
10551+ }
10552+ if (copy_from_user(domainlist, r_tmp->domain_children, r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t))) {
10553+ err = -EFAULT;
10554+ goto cleanup;
10555+ }
10556+ r_tmp->domain_children = domainlist;
10557+ }
10558+
10559+ err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
10560+ if (err)
10561+ goto cleanup;
10562+
10563+ memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
10564+ r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
10565+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
10566+
10567+ s_last = NULL;
10568+
10569+ err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp);
10570+
10571+ if (err)
10572+ goto cleanup;
10573+
10574+ insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
10575+ }
10576+
10577+ goto return_err;
10578+ cleanup:
10579+ free_variables();
10580+ return_err:
10581+ return err;
10582+
10583+}
10584+
10585+static int
10586+gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
10587+{
10588+ int error = 0;
10589+
10590+ memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
10591+ memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN);
10592+
10593+ if (init_variables(args)) {
10594+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
10595+ error = -ENOMEM;
10596+ free_variables();
10597+ goto out;
10598+ }
10599+
10600+ error = copy_user_acl(args);
10601+ free_init_variables();
10602+ if (error) {
10603+ free_variables();
10604+ goto out;
10605+ }
10606+
10607+ if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
10608+ free_variables();
10609+ goto out;
10610+ }
10611+
10612+ gr_status |= GR_READY;
10613+ out:
10614+ return error;
10615+}
10616+
10617+/* derived from glibc fnmatch() 0: match, 1: no match*/
10618+
10619+static int
10620+glob_match(const char *p, const char *n)
10621+{
10622+ char c;
10623+
10624+ while ((c = *p++) != '\0') {
10625+ switch (c) {
10626+ case '?':
10627+ if (*n == '\0')
10628+ return 1;
10629+ else if (*n == '/')
10630+ return 1;
10631+ break;
10632+ case '\\':
10633+ if (*n != c)
10634+ return 1;
10635+ break;
10636+ case '*':
10637+ for (c = *p++; c == '?' || c == '*'; c = *p++) {
10638+ if (*n == '/')
10639+ return 1;
10640+ else if (c == '?') {
10641+ if (*n == '\0')
10642+ return 1;
10643+ else
10644+ ++n;
10645+ }
10646+ }
10647+ if (c == '\0') {
10648+ return 0;
10649+ } else {
10650+ const char *endp;
10651+
10652+ if ((endp = strchr(n, '/')) == NULL)
10653+ endp = n + strlen(n);
10654+
10655+ if (c == '[') {
10656+ for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
10657+ if (!glob_match(p, n))
10658+ return 0;
10659+ } else if (c == '/') {
10660+ while (*n != '\0' && *n != '/')
10661+ ++n;
10662+ if (*n == '/' && !glob_match(p, n + 1))
10663+ return 0;
10664+ } else {
10665+ for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
10666+ if (*n == c && !glob_match(p, n))
10667+ return 0;
10668+ }
10669+
10670+ return 1;
10671+ }
10672+ case '[':
10673+ {
10674+ int not;
10675+ char cold;
10676+
10677+ if (*n == '\0' || *n == '/')
10678+ return 1;
10679+
10680+ not = (*p == '!' || *p == '^');
10681+ if (not)
10682+ ++p;
10683+
10684+ c = *p++;
10685+ for (;;) {
10686+ unsigned char fn = (unsigned char)*n;
10687+
10688+ if (c == '\0')
10689+ return 1;
10690+ else {
10691+ if (c == fn)
10692+ goto matched;
10693+ cold = c;
10694+ c = *p++;
10695+
10696+ if (c == '-' && *p != ']') {
10697+ unsigned char cend = *p++;
10698+
10699+ if (cend == '\0')
10700+ return 1;
10701+
10702+ if (cold <= fn && fn <= cend)
10703+ goto matched;
10704+
10705+ c = *p++;
10706+ }
10707+ }
10708+
10709+ if (c == ']')
10710+ break;
10711+ }
10712+ if (!not)
10713+ return 1;
10714+ break;
10715+ matched:
10716+ while (c != ']') {
10717+ if (c == '\0')
10718+ return 1;
10719+
10720+ c = *p++;
10721+ }
10722+ if (not)
10723+ return 1;
10724+ }
10725+ break;
10726+ default:
10727+ if (c != *n)
10728+ return 1;
10729+ }
10730+
10731+ ++n;
10732+ }
10733+
10734+ if (*n == '\0')
10735+ return 0;
10736+
10737+ if (*n == '/')
10738+ return 0;
10739+
10740+ return 1;
10741+}
10742+
10743+static struct acl_object_label *
10744+chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed,
10745+ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path)
10746+{
10747+ struct acl_object_label *tmp;
10748+
10749+ if (*path == NULL)
10750+ *path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt);
10751+
10752+ tmp = globbed;
10753+
10754+ while (tmp) {
10755+ if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path))
10756+ return tmp;
10757+ tmp = tmp->next;
10758+ }
10759+
10760+ return NULL;
10761+}
10762+
10763+static struct acl_object_label *
10764+__full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
10765+ const ino_t curr_ino, const dev_t curr_dev,
10766+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
10767+{
10768+ struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj;
10769+ struct acl_object_label *retval;
10770+ struct acl_object_label *retval2;
10771+
10772+ tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj;
10773+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10774+ do {
10775+ retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_ino, curr_dev, tmpsubj);
10776+ if (retval) {
10777+ if (retval->globbed) {
10778+ retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry,
10779+ (struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path);
10780+ if (retval2)
10781+ retval = retval2;
10782+ }
10783+ break;
10784+ }
10785+ } while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject));
10786+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10787+
10788+ return retval;
10789+}
10790+
10791+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10792+full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
10793+ const struct dentry *curr_dentry,
10794+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
10795+{
10796+ return __full_lookup(orig_dentry, orig_mnt,
10797+ curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10798+ curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj, path);
10799+}
10800+
10801+static struct acl_object_label *
10802+__chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10803+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
10804+{
10805+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
10806+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
10807+ struct acl_object_label *retval;
10808+
10809+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
10810+
10811+ for (;;) {
10812+ if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
10813+ break;
10814+
10815+ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
10816+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
10817+ break;
10818+
10819+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10820+ if (retval != NULL)
10821+ goto out;
10822+
10823+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
10824+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
10825+ continue;
10826+ }
10827+
10828+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10829+ if (retval != NULL)
10830+ goto out;
10831+
10832+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
10833+ }
10834+
10835+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10836+
10837+ if (retval == NULL)
10838+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, real_root, subj, &path);
10839+out:
10840+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
10841+ return retval;
10842+}
10843+
10844+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10845+chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10846+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
10847+{
10848+ char *path = NULL;
10849+ return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
10850+}
10851+
10852+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10853+chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10854+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
10855+{
10856+ return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
10857+}
10858+
10859+static struct acl_subject_label *
10860+chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10861+ const struct acl_role_label *role)
10862+{
10863+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
10864+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
10865+ struct acl_subject_label *retval;
10866+
10867+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
10868+
10869+ for (;;) {
10870+ if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
10871+ break;
10872+ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
10873+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
10874+ break;
10875+
10876+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10877+ retval =
10878+ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10879+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10880+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10881+ if (retval != NULL)
10882+ goto out;
10883+
10884+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
10885+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
10886+ continue;
10887+ }
10888+
10889+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10890+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10891+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10892+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10893+ if (retval != NULL)
10894+ goto out;
10895+
10896+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
10897+ }
10898+
10899+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10900+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10901+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10902+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10903+
10904+ if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
10905+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10906+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(real_root->d_inode->i_ino,
10907+ real_root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10908+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10909+ }
10910+out:
10911+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
10912+
10913+ return retval;
10914+}
10915+
10916+static void
10917+gr_log_learn(const struct task_struct *task, const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode)
10918+{
10919+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
10920+ task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
10921+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
10922+ 1, 1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
10923+
10924+ return;
10925+}
10926+
10927+static void
10928+gr_log_learn_id_change(const struct task_struct *task, const char type, const unsigned int real,
10929+ const unsigned int effective, const unsigned int fs)
10930+{
10931+ security_learn(GR_ID_LEARN_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
10932+ task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
10933+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
10934+ type, real, effective, fs, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
10935+
10936+ return;
10937+}
10938+
10939+__u32
10940+gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
10941+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
10942+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
10943+ const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
10944+{
10945+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
10946+ __u32 oldmode, newmode;
10947+ __u32 needmode;
10948+
10949+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
10950+ return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10951+
10952+ obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
10953+ oldmode = obj->mode;
10954+
10955+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
10956+ oldmode |= (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10957+
10958+ needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS;
10959+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
10960+ needmode |= GR_SETID | GR_AUDIT_SETID;
10961+
10962+ newmode =
10963+ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
10964+ oldmode | needmode);
10965+
10966+ needmode = newmode & (GR_FIND | GR_APPEND | GR_WRITE | GR_EXEC |
10967+ GR_SETID | GR_READ | GR_FIND | GR_DELETE |
10968+ GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
10969+
10970+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID) && !(newmode & GR_SETID))
10971+ goto bad;
10972+
10973+ if ((oldmode & needmode) != needmode)
10974+ goto bad;
10975+
10976+ needmode = oldmode & (GR_NOPTRACE | GR_PTRACERD | GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDITS);
10977+ if ((newmode & needmode) != needmode)
10978+ goto bad;
10979+
10980+ if ((newmode & (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK)) == (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK))
10981+ return newmode;
10982+bad:
10983+ needmode = oldmode;
10984+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
10985+ needmode |= GR_SETID;
10986+
10987+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
10988+ gr_log_learn(current, old_dentry, old_mnt, needmode);
10989+ return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10990+ } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
10991+ return GR_SUPPRESS;
10992+ else
10993+ return 0;
10994+}
10995+
10996+__u32
10997+gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
10998+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
10999+{
11000+ __u32 retval = mode;
11001+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
11002+ struct acl_object_label *currobj;
11003+
11004+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11005+ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
11006+
11007+ curracl = current->acl;
11008+
11009+ currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
11010+ retval = currobj->mode & mode;
11011+
11012+ if (unlikely
11013+ ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE)
11014+ && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
11015+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
11016+
11017+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
11018+
11019+ retval = new_mode;
11020+
11021+ if (new_mode & GR_EXEC && curracl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN)
11022+ new_mode |= GR_INHERIT;
11023+
11024+ if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
11025+ gr_log_learn(current, dentry, mnt, new_mode);
11026+ }
11027+
11028+ return retval;
11029+}
11030+
11031+__u32
11032+gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
11033+ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
11034+{
11035+ struct name_entry *match;
11036+ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
11037+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
11038+ char *path;
11039+ __u32 retval;
11040+
11041+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11042+ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
11043+
11044+ preempt_disable();
11045+ path = gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt);
11046+ match = lookup_name_entry(path);
11047+
11048+ if (!match)
11049+ goto check_parent;
11050+
11051+ curracl = current->acl;
11052+
11053+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11054+ matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
11055+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11056+
11057+ if (matchpo) {
11058+ if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
11059+ (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
11060+ && curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
11061+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
11062+
11063+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
11064+
11065+ gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
11066+
11067+ preempt_enable();
11068+ return new_mode;
11069+ }
11070+ preempt_enable();
11071+ return (matchpo->mode & mode);
11072+ }
11073+
11074+ check_parent:
11075+ curracl = current->acl;
11076+
11077+ matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path);
11078+ retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
11079+
11080+ if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
11081+ && (curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) {
11082+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
11083+
11084+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
11085+
11086+ gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
11087+ preempt_enable();
11088+ return new_mode;
11089+ }
11090+
11091+ preempt_enable();
11092+ return retval;
11093+}
11094+
11095+int
11096+gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
11097+{
11098+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11099+ return 0;
11100+
11101+ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCFIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
11102+ return 1;
11103+
11104+ return 0;
11105+}
11106+
11107+int
11108+gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
11109+{
11110+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
11111+ return 0;
11112+
11113+ if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL) &&
11114+ task->acl != current->acl)
11115+ return 1;
11116+
11117+ return 0;
11118+}
11119+
11120+void
11121+gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
11122+{
11123+ tsk->used_accept = 0;
11124+ tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
11125+ tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
11126+ tsk->acl = current->acl;
11127+ tsk->role = current->role;
11128+ tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip;
11129+ if (current->exec_file)
11130+ get_file(current->exec_file);
11131+ tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
11132+ tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
11133+ if (unlikely(current->used_accept))
11134+ current->curr_ip = 0;
11135+
11136+ return;
11137+}
11138+
11139+static void
11140+gr_set_proc_res(struct task_struct *task)
11141+{
11142+ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
11143+ unsigned short i;
11144+
11145+ proc = task->acl;
11146+
11147+ if (proc->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11148+ return;
11149+
11150+ for (i = 0; i < (GR_NLIMITS - 1); i++) {
11151+ if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
11152+ continue;
11153+
11154+ task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
11155+ task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
11156+ }
11157+
11158+ return;
11159+}
11160+
11161+int
11162+gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
11163+{
11164+ unsigned int i;
11165+ __u16 num;
11166+ uid_t *uidlist;
11167+ int curuid;
11168+ int realok = 0;
11169+ int effectiveok = 0;
11170+ int fsok = 0;
11171+
11172+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11173+ return 0;
11174+
11175+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11176+ gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'u', real, effective, fs);
11177+
11178+ num = current->acl->user_trans_num;
11179+ uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions;
11180+
11181+ if (uidlist == NULL)
11182+ return 0;
11183+
11184+ if (real == -1)
11185+ realok = 1;
11186+ if (effective == -1)
11187+ effectiveok = 1;
11188+ if (fs == -1)
11189+ fsok = 1;
11190+
11191+ if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
11192+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11193+ curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
11194+ if (real == curuid)
11195+ realok = 1;
11196+ if (effective == curuid)
11197+ effectiveok = 1;
11198+ if (fs == curuid)
11199+ fsok = 1;
11200+ }
11201+ } else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
11202+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11203+ curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
11204+ if (real == curuid)
11205+ break;
11206+ if (effective == curuid)
11207+ break;
11208+ if (fs == curuid)
11209+ break;
11210+ }
11211+ /* not in deny list */
11212+ if (i == num) {
11213+ realok = 1;
11214+ effectiveok = 1;
11215+ fsok = 1;
11216+ }
11217+ }
11218+
11219+ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
11220+ return 0;
11221+ else {
11222+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
11223+ return 1;
11224+ }
11225+}
11226+
11227+int
11228+gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
11229+{
11230+ unsigned int i;
11231+ __u16 num;
11232+ gid_t *gidlist;
11233+ int curgid;
11234+ int realok = 0;
11235+ int effectiveok = 0;
11236+ int fsok = 0;
11237+
11238+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11239+ return 0;
11240+
11241+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11242+ gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'g', real, effective, fs);
11243+
11244+ num = current->acl->group_trans_num;
11245+ gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions;
11246+
11247+ if (gidlist == NULL)
11248+ return 0;
11249+
11250+ if (real == -1)
11251+ realok = 1;
11252+ if (effective == -1)
11253+ effectiveok = 1;
11254+ if (fs == -1)
11255+ fsok = 1;
11256+
11257+ if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
11258+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11259+ curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
11260+ if (real == curgid)
11261+ realok = 1;
11262+ if (effective == curgid)
11263+ effectiveok = 1;
11264+ if (fs == curgid)
11265+ fsok = 1;
11266+ }
11267+ } else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
11268+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11269+ curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
11270+ if (real == curgid)
11271+ break;
11272+ if (effective == curgid)
11273+ break;
11274+ if (fs == curgid)
11275+ break;
11276+ }
11277+ /* not in deny list */
11278+ if (i == num) {
11279+ realok = 1;
11280+ effectiveok = 1;
11281+ fsok = 1;
11282+ }
11283+ }
11284+
11285+ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
11286+ return 0;
11287+ else {
11288+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
11289+ return 1;
11290+ }
11291+}
11292+
11293+void
11294+gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
11295+{
11296+ struct acl_role_label *role = task->role;
11297+ struct acl_subject_label *subj = NULL;
11298+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11299+ struct file *filp;
11300+
11301+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11302+ return;
11303+
11304+ filp = task->exec_file;
11305+
11306+ /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
11307+ if (unlikely(!filp)) {
11308+ task->role = kernel_role;
11309+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
11310+ return;
11311+ } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
11312+ role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
11313+
11314+ /* perform subject lookup in possibly new role
11315+ we can use this result below in the case where role == task->role
11316+ */
11317+ subj = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, role);
11318+
11319+ /* if we changed uid/gid, but result in the same role
11320+ and are using inheritance, don't lose the inherited subject
11321+ if current subject is other than what normal lookup
11322+ would result in, we arrived via inheritance, don't
11323+ lose subject
11324+ */
11325+ if (role != task->role || (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
11326+ (subj == task->acl)))
11327+ task->acl = subj;
11328+
11329+ task->role = role;
11330+
11331+ task->is_writable = 0;
11332+
11333+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11334+ by the default ACL */
11335+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
11336+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11337+ task->is_writable = 1;
11338+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
11339+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11340+ task->is_writable = 1;
11341+
11342+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11343+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
11344+#endif
11345+
11346+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
11347+
11348+ return;
11349+}
11350+
11351+int
11352+gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11353+{
11354+ struct task_struct *task = current;
11355+ struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
11356+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11357+ __u32 retmode;
11358+
11359+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11360+ return 0;
11361+
11362+ newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role);
11363+
11364+ task_lock(task);
11365+ if (((task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(task->acl->mode &
11366+ GR_POVERRIDE) && (task->acl != newacl) &&
11367+ !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
11368+ !gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt) &&
11369+ !(task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) ||
11370+ (atomic_read(&task->fs->count) > 1 ||
11371+ atomic_read(&task->files->count) > 1 ||
11372+ atomic_read(&task->sighand->count) > 1)) {
11373+ task_unlock(task);
11374+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
11375+ return -EACCES;
11376+ }
11377+ task_unlock(task);
11378+
11379+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
11380+ retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
11381+
11382+ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
11383+ ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT))) {
11384+ if (obj->nested)
11385+ task->acl = obj->nested;
11386+ else
11387+ task->acl = newacl;
11388+ } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT)
11389+ gr_log_str_fs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, task->acl->filename, dentry, mnt);
11390+
11391+ task->is_writable = 0;
11392+
11393+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11394+ by the default ACL */
11395+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
11396+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11397+ task->is_writable = 1;
11398+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role->root_label);
11399+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11400+ task->is_writable = 1;
11401+
11402+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
11403+
11404+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11405+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
11406+#endif
11407+ return 0;
11408+}
11409+
11410+static void
11411+do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
11412+{
11413+ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
11414+ struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
11415+ struct acl_subject_label *i;
11416+ struct acl_role_label *role;
11417+
11418+ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
11419+ for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) {
11420+ if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) &&
11421+ (i->inode == ino) &&
11422+ (i->device == dev)))
11423+ i->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11424+ if (unlikely((matchpo =
11425+ lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL))
11426+ matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11427+ }
11428+
11429+ if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL))
11430+ matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11431+ }
11432+
11433+ return;
11434+}
11435+
11436+void
11437+gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
11438+{
11439+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11440+ return;
11441+
11442+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11443+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev)))
11444+ do_handle_delete(ino, dev);
11445+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11446+
11447+ return;
11448+}
11449+
11450+static void
11451+update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11452+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
11453+ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
11454+{
11455+ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
11456+ struct acl_object_label **match;
11457+ struct acl_object_label *tmp;
11458+ unsigned int i = 0;
11459+
11460+ match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
11461+
11462+ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
11463+ (*match)->device != olddevice ||
11464+ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
11465+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size;
11466+ match = &subj->obj_hash[index];
11467+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
11468+ }
11469+
11470+ if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object)
11471+ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
11472+ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
11473+ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
11474+ tmp = *match;
11475+ tmp->inode = newinode;
11476+ tmp->device = newdevice;
11477+ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
11478+
11479+ *match = deleted_object;
11480+
11481+ insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj);
11482+ }
11483+
11484+ return;
11485+}
11486+
11487+static void
11488+update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11489+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
11490+ struct acl_role_label *role)
11491+{
11492+ struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash;
11493+ unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size;
11494+ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size);
11495+ struct acl_subject_label **match;
11496+ struct acl_subject_label *tmp;
11497+ unsigned int i = 0;
11498+
11499+ match = &s_hash[index];
11500+
11501+ while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode ||
11502+ (*match)->device != olddevice ||
11503+ !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
11504+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size;
11505+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
11506+ match = &s_hash[index];
11507+ }
11508+
11509+ if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject)
11510+ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
11511+ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)
11512+ && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
11513+ tmp = *match;
11514+
11515+ tmp->inode = newinode;
11516+ tmp->device = newdevice;
11517+ tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
11518+
11519+ *match = deleted_subject;
11520+
11521+ insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role);
11522+ }
11523+
11524+ return;
11525+}
11526+
11527+static void
11528+update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11529+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice)
11530+{
11531+ unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size);
11532+ struct name_entry **match;
11533+ struct name_entry *tmp;
11534+ unsigned int i = 0;
11535+
11536+ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
11537+
11538+ while (*match
11539+ && ((*match)->inode != oldinode
11540+ || (*match)->device != olddevice)) {
11541+ index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size;
11542+ i = (i + 1) % 32;
11543+ match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index];
11544+ }
11545+
11546+ if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev)
11547+ && ((*match)->inode == oldinode)
11548+ && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) {
11549+ tmp = *match;
11550+
11551+ tmp->inode = newinode;
11552+ tmp->device = newdevice;
11553+
11554+ *match = deleted_inodev;
11555+
11556+ insert_inodev_entry(tmp);
11557+ }
11558+
11559+ return;
11560+}
11561+
11562+static void
11563+do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
11564+ const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11565+{
11566+ struct acl_subject_label *i;
11567+ struct acl_role_label *role;
11568+
11569+ for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) {
11570+ update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11571+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11572+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
11573+
11574+ for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) {
11575+ if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) &&
11576+ (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
11577+ (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev))) {
11578+ i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
11579+ i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
11580+ }
11581+ update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11582+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11583+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, i);
11584+ }
11585+ }
11586+
11587+ update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11588+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11589+
11590+ return;
11591+}
11592+
11593+void
11594+gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11595+{
11596+ struct name_entry *matchn;
11597+
11598+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11599+ return;
11600+
11601+ preempt_disable();
11602+ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
11603+ preempt_enable();
11604+
11605+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
11606+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11607+ do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
11608+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11609+ }
11610+
11611+ return;
11612+}
11613+
11614+void
11615+gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
11616+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
11617+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
11618+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
11619+{
11620+ struct name_entry *matchn;
11621+
11622+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11623+ return;
11624+
11625+ preempt_disable();
11626+ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt));
11627+ preempt_enable();
11628+
11629+ /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
11630+ NFS silly-renaming
11631+ */
11632+
11633+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11634+ if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
11635+ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11636+ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
11637+ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
11638+ do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11639+ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11640+ }
11641+
11642+ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11643+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
11644+ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
11645+ do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11646+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11647+
11648+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
11649+ do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
11650+
11651+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11652+
11653+ return;
11654+}
11655+
11656+static int
11657+lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
11658+ unsigned char **sum)
11659+{
11660+ struct acl_role_label *r;
11661+ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
11662+ struct role_transition *trans;
11663+ __u16 i;
11664+ int found = 0;
11665+
11666+ /* check transition table */
11667+
11668+ for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
11669+ if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
11670+ found = 1;
11671+ break;
11672+ }
11673+ }
11674+
11675+ if (!found)
11676+ return 0;
11677+
11678+ /* handle special roles that do not require authentication
11679+ and check ip */
11680+
11681+ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) {
11682+ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
11683+ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
11684+ found = 0;
11685+ if (r->allowed_ips != NULL) {
11686+ for (ipp = r->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
11687+ if ((ntohl(current->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
11688+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask))
11689+ found = 1;
11690+ }
11691+ } else
11692+ found = 2;
11693+ if (!found)
11694+ return 0;
11695+
11696+ if (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW) {
11697+ *salt = NULL;
11698+ *sum = NULL;
11699+ return 1;
11700+ }
11701+ }
11702+ }
11703+
11704+ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
11705+ if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
11706+ *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
11707+ *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
11708+ return 1;
11709+ }
11710+ }
11711+
11712+ return 0;
11713+}
11714+
11715+static void
11716+assign_special_role(char *rolename)
11717+{
11718+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11719+ struct acl_role_label *r;
11720+ struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
11721+ struct task_struct *tsk;
11722+ struct file *filp;
11723+
11724+ for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next)
11725+ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
11726+ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
11727+ assigned = r;
11728+
11729+ if (!assigned)
11730+ return;
11731+
11732+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11733+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11734+
11735+ tsk = current->parent;
11736+ if (tsk == NULL) {
11737+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11738+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11739+ return;
11740+ }
11741+
11742+ filp = tsk->exec_file;
11743+ if (filp == NULL) {
11744+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11745+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11746+ return;
11747+ }
11748+
11749+ tsk->is_writable = 0;
11750+
11751+ acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1;
11752+ tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
11753+ tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value;
11754+ tsk->role = assigned;
11755+ tsk->acl = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role);
11756+
11757+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11758+ by the default ACL */
11759+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
11760+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11761+ tsk->is_writable = 1;
11762+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label);
11763+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11764+ tsk->is_writable = 1;
11765+
11766+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11767+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
11768+#endif
11769+
11770+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11771+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11772+ return;
11773+}
11774+
11775+int gr_check_secure_terminal(struct task_struct *task)
11776+{
11777+ struct task_struct *p, *p2, *p3;
11778+ struct files_struct *files;
11779+ struct file *our_file = NULL, *file;
11780+ int i;
11781+
11782+ if (task->signal->tty == NULL)
11783+ return 1;
11784+
11785+ task_lock(task);
11786+ files = task->files;
11787+ if (files != NULL) {
11788+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
11789+ for (i=0; i < files->max_fds; i++) {
11790+ file = fcheck_files(files, i);
11791+ if (file && (our_file == NULL) && (file->private_data == task->signal->tty)) {
11792+ get_file(file);
11793+ our_file = file;
11794+ }
11795+ }
11796+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
11797+ }
11798+ task_unlock(task);
11799+
11800+ if (our_file == NULL)
11801+ return 1;
11802+
11803+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11804+ do_each_thread(p2, p) {
11805+ task_lock(p);
11806+ files = p->files;
11807+ if (files == NULL ||
11808+ (p->signal && p->signal->tty == task->signal->tty)) {
11809+ task_unlock(p);
11810+ continue;
11811+ }
11812+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
11813+ for (i=0; i < files->max_fds; i++) {
11814+ file = fcheck_files(files, i);
11815+ if (file && S_ISCHR(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
11816+ file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev == our_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev) {
11817+ p3 = task;
11818+ while (p3->pid > 0) {
11819+ if (p3 == p)
11820+ break;
11821+ p3 = p3->parent;
11822+ }
11823+ if (p3 == p)
11824+ break;
11825+ gr_log_ttysniff(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG, p);
11826+ gr_handle_alertkill(p);
11827+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
11828+ task_unlock(p);
11829+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11830+ fput(our_file);
11831+ return 0;
11832+ }
11833+ }
11834+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
11835+ task_unlock(p);
11836+ } while_each_thread(p2, p);
11837+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11838+
11839+ fput(our_file);
11840+ return 1;
11841+}
11842+
11843+ssize_t
11844+write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
11845+{
11846+ struct gr_arg_wrapper uwrap;
11847+ unsigned char *sprole_salt;
11848+ unsigned char *sprole_sum;
11849+ int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper);
11850+ int error2 = 0;
11851+
11852+ down(&gr_dev_sem);
11853+
11854+ if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper)) {
11855+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, (int)count, (int)sizeof(struct gr_arg_wrapper));
11856+ error = -EINVAL;
11857+ goto out;
11858+ }
11859+
11860+
11861+ if (gr_auth_expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), gr_auth_expires)) {
11862+ gr_auth_expires = 0;
11863+ gr_auth_attempts = 0;
11864+ }
11865+
11866+ if (copy_from_user(&uwrap, buf, sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper))) {
11867+ error = -EFAULT;
11868+ goto out;
11869+ }
11870+
11871+ if ((uwrap.version != (GRSECURITY_VERSION | (6 << 16))) || (uwrap.size != sizeof(struct gr_arg))) {
11872+ error = -EINVAL;
11873+ goto out;
11874+ }
11875+
11876+ if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, uwrap.arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
11877+ error = -EFAULT;
11878+ goto out;
11879+ }
11880+
11881+ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
11882+ time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) {
11883+ error = -EBUSY;
11884+ goto out;
11885+ }
11886+
11887+ /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
11888+ do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
11889+ locking
11890+ */
11891+
11892+ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != STATUS &&
11893+ gr_usermode->mode != UNSPROLE && current->uid) {
11894+ error = -EPERM;
11895+ goto out;
11896+ }
11897+
11898+ /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
11899+
11900+ gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
11901+ gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
11902+
11903+ /* Okay.
11904+ * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
11905+ * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
11906+ * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
11907+
11908+ switch (gr_usermode->mode) {
11909+ case STATUS:
11910+ if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
11911+ error = 1;
11912+ if (!gr_check_secure_terminal(current))
11913+ error = 3;
11914+ } else
11915+ error = 2;
11916+ goto out;
11917+ case SHUTDOWN:
11918+ if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
11919+ && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11920+ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
11921+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG);
11922+ free_variables();
11923+ memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
11924+ memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN);
11925+ memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN);
11926+ } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
11927+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG);
11928+ error = -EPERM;
11929+ } else {
11930+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG);
11931+ error = -EAGAIN;
11932+ }
11933+ break;
11934+ case ENABLE:
11935+ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode)))
11936+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11937+ else {
11938+ if (gr_status & GR_READY)
11939+ error = -EAGAIN;
11940+ else
11941+ error = error2;
11942+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11943+ }
11944+ break;
11945+ case RELOAD:
11946+ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
11947+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11948+ error = -EAGAIN;
11949+ } else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11950+ lock_kernel();
11951+ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
11952+ free_variables();
11953+ if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) {
11954+ unlock_kernel();
11955+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11956+ } else {
11957+ unlock_kernel();
11958+ error = error2;
11959+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11960+ }
11961+ } else {
11962+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11963+ error = -EPERM;
11964+ }
11965+ break;
11966+ case SEGVMOD:
11967+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
11968+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG);
11969+ error = -EAGAIN;
11970+ break;
11971+ }
11972+
11973+ if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11974+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG);
11975+ if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) {
11976+ struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
11977+ segvacl =
11978+ lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode,
11979+ gr_usermode->segv_device,
11980+ current->role);
11981+ if (segvacl) {
11982+ segvacl->crashes = 0;
11983+ segvacl->expires = 0;
11984+ }
11985+ } else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) {
11986+ gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid);
11987+ }
11988+ } else {
11989+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG);
11990+ error = -EPERM;
11991+ }
11992+ break;
11993+ case SPROLE:
11994+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
11995+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
11996+ error = -EAGAIN;
11997+ break;
11998+ }
11999+
12000+ if (current->role->expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), current->role->expires)) {
12001+ current->role->expires = 0;
12002+ current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
12003+ }
12004+
12005+ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
12006+ time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) {
12007+ error = -EBUSY;
12008+ goto out;
12009+ }
12010+
12011+ if (lookup_special_role_auth
12012+ (gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
12013+ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
12014+ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
12015+ char *p = "";
12016+ assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role);
12017+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12018+ if (current->parent)
12019+ p = current->parent->role->rolename;
12020+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12021+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
12022+ p, acl_sp_role_value);
12023+ } else {
12024+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role);
12025+ error = -EPERM;
12026+ if(!(current->role->auth_attempts++))
12027+ current->role->expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
12028+
12029+ goto out;
12030+ }
12031+ break;
12032+ case UNSPROLE:
12033+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
12034+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
12035+ error = -EAGAIN;
12036+ break;
12037+ }
12038+
12039+ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) {
12040+ char *p = "";
12041+ int i = 0;
12042+
12043+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12044+ if (current->parent) {
12045+ p = current->parent->role->rolename;
12046+ i = current->parent->acl_role_id;
12047+ }
12048+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12049+
12050+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG, p, i);
12051+ gr_set_acls(1);
12052+ } else {
12053+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename);
12054+ error = -EPERM;
12055+ goto out;
12056+ }
12057+ break;
12058+ default:
12059+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode);
12060+ error = -EINVAL;
12061+ break;
12062+ }
12063+
12064+ if (error != -EPERM)
12065+ goto out;
12066+
12067+ if(!(gr_auth_attempts++))
12068+ gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
12069+
12070+ out:
12071+ up(&gr_dev_sem);
12072+ return error;
12073+}
12074+
12075+int
12076+gr_set_acls(const int type)
12077+{
12078+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
12079+ struct task_struct *task, *task2;
12080+ struct file *filp;
12081+
12082+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12083+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12084+ do_each_thread(task2, task) {
12085+ /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
12086+ if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
12087+ ACL */
12088+
12089+ if (type && (task->role != current->role ||
12090+ task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id))
12091+ continue;
12092+
12093+ task->acl_role_id = 0;
12094+ task->acl_sp_role = 0;
12095+
12096+ if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
12097+ task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
12098+
12099+ task->acl =
12100+ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
12101+ task->role);
12102+ if (task->acl) {
12103+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
12104+ curr = task->acl;
12105+
12106+ task->is_writable = 0;
12107+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
12108+ by the default ACL */
12109+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
12110+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
12111+ task->is_writable = 1;
12112+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
12113+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
12114+ task->is_writable = 1;
12115+
12116+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
12117+
12118+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
12119+ printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
12120+#endif
12121+ } else {
12122+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12123+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12124+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, task->pid);
12125+ return 1;
12126+ }
12127+ } else {
12128+ // it's a kernel process
12129+ task->role = kernel_role;
12130+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
12131+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
12132+ task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND;
12133+#endif
12134+ }
12135+ } while_each_thread(task2, task);
12136+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12137+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12138+ return 0;
12139+}
12140+
12141+void
12142+gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
12143+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
12144+{
12145+ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
12146+
12147+ if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
12148+ task->acl && (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))))
12149+ goto skip_reslog;
12150+
12151+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
12152+ gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt);
12153+#endif
12154+ skip_reslog:
12155+
12156+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
12157+ return;
12158+
12159+ acl = task->acl;
12160+
12161+ if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) ||
12162+ !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
12163+ return;
12164+
12165+ if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
12166+ unsigned long res_add;
12167+
12168+ res_add = wanted;
12169+ switch (res) {
12170+ case RLIMIT_CPU:
12171+ res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
12172+ break;
12173+ case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
12174+ res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
12175+ break;
12176+ case RLIMIT_DATA:
12177+ res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
12178+ break;
12179+ case RLIMIT_STACK:
12180+ res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
12181+ break;
12182+ case RLIMIT_CORE:
12183+ res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
12184+ break;
12185+ case RLIMIT_RSS:
12186+ res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
12187+ break;
12188+ case RLIMIT_NPROC:
12189+ res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
12190+ break;
12191+ case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
12192+ res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
12193+ break;
12194+ case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
12195+ res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
12196+ break;
12197+ case RLIMIT_AS:
12198+ res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
12199+ break;
12200+ case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
12201+ res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
12202+ break;
12203+ }
12204+
12205+ acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
12206+
12207+ if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
12208+ acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
12209+
12210+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
12211+ task->role->roletype, acl->filename,
12212+ acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
12213+ "", (unsigned long) res);
12214+ }
12215+
12216+ return;
12217+}
12218+
12219+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
12220+void
12221+pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
12222+{
12223+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12224+ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
12225+ unsigned long flags;
12226+
12227+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12228+ return;
12229+
12230+ flags = pax_get_flags(task);
12231+
12232+ proc = task->acl;
12233+
12234+ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXPAGE)
12235+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
12236+ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXSEGM)
12237+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
12238+ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXGCC)
12239+ flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
12240+ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXMPROTECT)
12241+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
12242+ if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDMMAP)
12243+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
12244+
12245+ pax_set_flags(task, flags);
12246+
12247+ return;
12248+}
12249+#endif
12250+
12251+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
12252+extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
12253+
12254+/* the following function is called under the BKL */
12255+
12256+__u32
12257+gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
12258+ const void *newval)
12259+{
12260+ struct proc_dir_entry *tmp;
12261+ struct nameidata nd;
12262+ const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
12263+ char *path;
12264+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
12265+ unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
12266+ __u32 err = 0;
12267+ __u32 mode = 0;
12268+
12269+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12270+ return 1;
12271+
12272+ path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id());
12273+
12274+ if (oldval)
12275+ mode |= GR_READ;
12276+ if (newval)
12277+ mode |= GR_WRITE;
12278+
12279+ /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
12280+
12281+ for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) {
12282+ len += strlen(tmp->name);
12283+ len++;
12284+ depth++;
12285+ }
12286+
12287+ if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE)
12288+ return 0; /* deny */
12289+
12290+ memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
12291+
12292+ memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
12293+
12294+ pos += strlen(proc_sys);
12295+
12296+ for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
12297+ path[pos] = '/';
12298+ pos++;
12299+ for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root;
12300+ tmp = tmp->parent) {
12301+ if (depth == i) {
12302+ memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name,
12303+ strlen(tmp->name));
12304+ pos += strlen(tmp->name);
12305+ }
12306+ i++;
12307+ }
12308+ }
12309+
12310+ err = path_lookup(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
12311+
12312+ if (err)
12313+ goto out;
12314+
12315+ obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl);
12316+ err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
12317+
12318+ if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) &&
12319+ ((err & mode) != mode))) {
12320+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
12321+
12322+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
12323+
12324+ err = new_mode;
12325+ gr_log_learn(current, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, new_mode);
12326+ } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
12327+ gr_log_str4(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied",
12328+ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
12329+ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
12330+ err = 0;
12331+ } else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
12332+ err = 0;
12333+ } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
12334+ gr_log_str4(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
12335+ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
12336+ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
12337+ }
12338+
12339+ path_release(&nd);
12340+
12341+ out:
12342+ return err;
12343+}
12344+#endif
12345+
12346+int
12347+gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
12348+{
12349+ struct file *filp;
12350+ struct task_struct *tmp = task;
12351+ struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
12352+ __u32 retmode;
12353+
12354+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12355+ return 0;
12356+
12357+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12358+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12359+ filp = task->exec_file;
12360+
12361+ while (tmp->pid > 0) {
12362+ if (tmp == curtemp)
12363+ break;
12364+ tmp = tmp->parent;
12365+ }
12366+
12367+ if (!filp || (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE))) {
12368+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12369+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12370+ return 1;
12371+ }
12372+
12373+ retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt);
12374+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12375+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12376+
12377+ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE)
12378+ return 1;
12379+
12380+ if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
12381+ && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
12382+ && current->pid != task->pid)))
12383+ return 1;
12384+
12385+ return 0;
12386+}
12387+
12388+int
12389+gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
12390+{
12391+ struct task_struct *tmp = task;
12392+ struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
12393+ __u32 retmode;
12394+
12395+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12396+ return 0;
12397+
12398+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12399+ while (tmp->pid > 0) {
12400+ if (tmp == curtemp)
12401+ break;
12402+ tmp = tmp->parent;
12403+ }
12404+
12405+ if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) {
12406+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12407+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12408+ return 1;
12409+ }
12410+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12411+
12412+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12413+ if (unlikely(!task->exec_file)) {
12414+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12415+ return 0;
12416+ }
12417+
12418+ retmode = gr_search_file(task->exec_file->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt);
12419+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12420+
12421+ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) {
12422+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12423+ return 1;
12424+ }
12425+
12426+ if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
12427+ switch (request) {
12428+ case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
12429+ case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
12430+ case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
12431+#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) && !defined(CONFIG_IA64)
12432+ case PTRACE_SETREGS:
12433+ case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
12434+#endif
12435+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
12436+ case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
12437+#endif
12438+#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
12439+ case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
12440+#endif
12441+ return 1;
12442+ default:
12443+ return 0;
12444+ }
12445+ } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) &&
12446+ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
12447+ (current->acl != task->acl)) {
12448+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12449+ return 1;
12450+ }
12451+
12452+ return 0;
12453+}
12454+
12455+int is_writable_mmap(const struct file *filp)
12456+{
12457+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12458+ struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
12459+
12460+ if (gr_status & GR_READY && !(task->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
12461+ !task->is_writable) {
12462+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
12463+ obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
12464+ task->role->root_label);
12465+ if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
12466+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt);
12467+ return 1;
12468+ }
12469+ }
12470+ return 0;
12471+}
12472+
12473+int
12474+gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
12475+{
12476+ __u32 mode;
12477+
12478+ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
12479+ return 1;
12480+
12481+ if (is_writable_mmap(file))
12482+ return 0;
12483+
12484+ mode =
12485+ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
12486+ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
12487+ file->f_vfsmnt);
12488+
12489+ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
12490+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12491+ return 0;
12492+ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
12493+ return 0;
12494+ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
12495+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12496+ return 1;
12497+ }
12498+
12499+ return 1;
12500+}
12501+
12502+int
12503+gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
12504+{
12505+ __u32 mode;
12506+
12507+ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
12508+ return 1;
12509+
12510+ if (is_writable_mmap(file))
12511+ return 0;
12512+
12513+ mode =
12514+ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
12515+ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
12516+ file->f_vfsmnt);
12517+
12518+ if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) {
12519+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12520+ return 0;
12521+ } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
12522+ return 0;
12523+ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
12524+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12525+ return 1;
12526+ }
12527+
12528+ return 1;
12529+}
12530+
12531+void
12532+gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
12533+{
12534+ unsigned long runtime;
12535+ unsigned long cputime;
12536+ unsigned int wday, cday;
12537+ __u8 whr, chr;
12538+ __u8 wmin, cmin;
12539+ __u8 wsec, csec;
12540+
12541+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
12542+ !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
12543+ return;
12544+
12545+ runtime = xtime.tv_sec - task->start_time.tv_sec;
12546+ wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
12547+ runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
12548+ whr = runtime / 3600;
12549+ runtime -= whr * 3600;
12550+ wmin = runtime / 60;
12551+ runtime -= wmin * 60;
12552+ wsec = runtime;
12553+
12554+ cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ;
12555+ cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
12556+ cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
12557+ chr = cputime / 3600;
12558+ cputime -= chr * 3600;
12559+ cmin = cputime / 60;
12560+ cputime -= cmin * 60;
12561+ csec = cputime;
12562+
12563+ gr_log_procacct(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, code);
12564+
12565+ return;
12566+}
12567+
12568+void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
12569+{
12570+ if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
12571+ task->role = kernel_role;
12572+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
12573+ }
12574+ return;
12575+}
12576+
12577+int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino)
12578+{
12579+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12580+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
12581+ struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
12582+ struct acl_object_label *obj, *tmp;
12583+ struct acl_subject_label *subj;
12584+ unsigned int cnt;
12585+ char *path;
12586+
12587+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12588+ return 1;
12589+
12590+ if (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
12591+ return 1;
12592+
12593+ subj = task->acl;
12594+ do {
12595+ obj = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj);
12596+ if (obj != NULL)
12597+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12598+ } while ((subj = subj->parent_subject));
12599+
12600+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
12601+ if (obj->globbed == NULL)
12602+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12603+
12604+ preempt_disable();
12605+ path = d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
12606+ PAGE_SIZE);
12607+ cnt = strlen(path);
12608+ if ((cnt + namelen + 2) <= PAGE_SIZE) {
12609+ *(path + cnt) = '/';
12610+
12611+ memcpy(path + cnt + 1, name, namelen);
12612+ *(path + cnt + namelen + 1) = '\0';
12613+
12614+ tmp = obj->globbed;
12615+ while (tmp) {
12616+ if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, path)) {
12617+ preempt_enable();
12618+ return (tmp->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12619+ }
12620+ tmp = tmp->next;
12621+ }
12622+ preempt_enable();
12623+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12624+ }
12625+ preempt_enable();
12626+
12627+ return 1;
12628+}
12629+
12630+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
12631+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
12632+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
12633+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
12634+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
12635+#endif
12636+
12637diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
12638--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
12639+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
12640@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
12641+#include <linux/kernel.h>
12642+#include <linux/mm.h>
12643+#include <linux/slab.h>
12644+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
12645+#include <linux/gracl.h>
12646+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12647+
12648+static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
12649+static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
12650+static void **alloc_stack;
12651+
12652+static __inline__ int
12653+alloc_pop(void)
12654+{
12655+ if (alloc_stack_next == 1)
12656+ return 0;
12657+
12658+ kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]);
12659+
12660+ alloc_stack_next--;
12661+
12662+ return 1;
12663+}
12664+
12665+static __inline__ void
12666+alloc_push(void *buf)
12667+{
12668+ if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
12669+ BUG();
12670+
12671+ alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf;
12672+
12673+ alloc_stack_next++;
12674+
12675+ return;
12676+}
12677+
12678+void *
12679+acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
12680+{
12681+ void *ret;
12682+
12683+ if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
12684+ BUG();
12685+
12686+ ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
12687+
12688+ if (ret)
12689+ alloc_push(ret);
12690+
12691+ return ret;
12692+}
12693+
12694+void
12695+acl_free_all(void)
12696+{
12697+ if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
12698+ return;
12699+
12700+ while (alloc_pop()) ;
12701+
12702+ if (alloc_stack) {
12703+ if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
12704+ kfree(alloc_stack);
12705+ else
12706+ vfree(alloc_stack);
12707+ }
12708+
12709+ alloc_stack = NULL;
12710+ alloc_stack_size = 1;
12711+ alloc_stack_next = 1;
12712+
12713+ return;
12714+}
12715+
12716+int
12717+acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
12718+{
12719+ if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
12720+ alloc_stack =
12721+ (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
12722+ else
12723+ alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
12724+
12725+ alloc_stack_size = size;
12726+
12727+ if (!alloc_stack)
12728+ return 0;
12729+ else
12730+ return 1;
12731+}
12732diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
12733--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
12734+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
12735@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
12736+#include <linux/kernel.h>
12737+#include <linux/module.h>
12738+#include <linux/sched.h>
12739+#include <linux/capability.h>
12740+#include <linux/gracl.h>
12741+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12742+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
12743+
12744+static const char *captab_log[29] = {
12745+ "CAP_CHOWN",
12746+ "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
12747+ "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
12748+ "CAP_FOWNER",
12749+ "CAP_FSETID",
12750+ "CAP_KILL",
12751+ "CAP_SETGID",
12752+ "CAP_SETUID",
12753+ "CAP_SETPCAP",
12754+ "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
12755+ "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
12756+ "CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
12757+ "CAP_NET_ADMIN",
12758+ "CAP_NET_RAW",
12759+ "CAP_IPC_LOCK",
12760+ "CAP_IPC_OWNER",
12761+ "CAP_SYS_MODULE",
12762+ "CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
12763+ "CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
12764+ "CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
12765+ "CAP_SYS_PACCT",
12766+ "CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
12767+ "CAP_SYS_BOOT",
12768+ "CAP_SYS_NICE",
12769+ "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
12770+ "CAP_SYS_TIME",
12771+ "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
12772+ "CAP_MKNOD",
12773+ "CAP_LEASE"
12774+};
12775+
12776+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
12777+
12778+int
12779+gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
12780+{
12781+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
12782+ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
12783+
12784+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
12785+ return 1;
12786+
12787+ curracl = task->acl;
12788+
12789+ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
12790+ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
12791+
12792+ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
12793+ if (!(cap_mask & (1 << cap)) && (curracl->cap_mask & (1 << cap)))
12794+ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (1 << cap);
12795+ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
12796+ }
12797+
12798+ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
12799+ return 1;
12800+
12801+ curracl = task->acl;
12802+
12803+ if ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
12804+ && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) {
12805+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
12806+ task->role->roletype, task->uid,
12807+ task->gid, task->exec_file ?
12808+ gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
12809+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename,
12810+ curracl->filename, 0UL,
12811+ 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip));
12812+ return 1;
12813+ }
12814+
12815+ if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap))
12816+ gr_log_cap(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, task, captab_log[cap]);
12817+
12818+ return 0;
12819+}
12820+
12821+int
12822+gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
12823+{
12824+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
12825+ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
12826+
12827+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
12828+ return 1;
12829+
12830+ curracl = current->acl;
12831+
12832+ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
12833+ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
12834+
12835+ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
12836+ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask);
12837+ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
12838+ }
12839+
12840+ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
12841+ return 1;
12842+
12843+ return 0;
12844+}
12845+
12846diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
12847--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
12848+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
12849@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
12850+#include <linux/kernel.h>
12851+#include <linux/sched.h>
12852+#include <linux/types.h>
12853+#include <linux/fs.h>
12854+#include <linux/file.h>
12855+#include <linux/stat.h>
12856+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12857+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
12858+#include <linux/gracl.h>
12859+
12860+__u32
12861+gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
12862+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
12863+{
12864+ __u32 mode;
12865+
12866+ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
12867+ return GR_FIND;
12868+
12869+ mode =
12870+ gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
12871+
12872+ if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
12873+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
12874+ return mode;
12875+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12876+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
12877+ return 0;
12878+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
12879+ return 0;
12880+
12881+ return GR_FIND;
12882+}
12883+
12884+__u32
12885+gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
12886+ const int fmode)
12887+{
12888+ __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
12889+ __u32 mode;
12890+
12891+ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
12892+ return reqmode;
12893+
12894+ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
12895+ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
12896+ else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
12897+ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
12898+ if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
12899+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12900+
12901+ mode =
12902+ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
12903+ mnt);
12904+
12905+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12906+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12907+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12908+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12909+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12910+ return reqmode;
12911+ } else
12912+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12913+ {
12914+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12915+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12916+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12917+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12918+ return 0;
12919+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12920+ return 0;
12921+
12922+ return reqmode;
12923+}
12924+
12925+__u32
12926+gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
12927+ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
12928+ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
12929+ const int imode)
12930+{
12931+ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
12932+ __u32 mode;
12933+
12934+ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
12935+ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
12936+ if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
12937+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12938+ if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
12939+ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
12940+
12941+ mode =
12942+ gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
12943+ reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
12944+
12945+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12946+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
12947+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12948+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12949+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12950+ return reqmode;
12951+ } else
12952+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12953+ {
12954+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
12955+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12956+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12957+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12958+ return 0;
12959+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12960+ return 0;
12961+
12962+ return reqmode;
12963+}
12964+
12965+__u32
12966+gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
12967+ const int fmode)
12968+{
12969+ __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
12970+
12971+ if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
12972+ reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
12973+ if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
12974+ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
12975+ if (fmode & S_IROTH)
12976+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12977+
12978+ mode =
12979+ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
12980+ mnt);
12981+
12982+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12983+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12984+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12985+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
12986+ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
12987+ return reqmode;
12988+ } else
12989+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12990+ {
12991+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12992+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12993+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
12994+ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
12995+ return 0;
12996+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12997+ return 0;
12998+
12999+ return reqmode;
13000+}
13001+
13002+static __u32 generic_fs_handler(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
13003+{
13004+ __u32 mode;
13005+
13006+ mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
13007+
13008+ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
13009+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
13010+ return mode;
13011+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
13012+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
13013+ return 0;
13014+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
13015+ return 0;
13016+
13017+ return (reqmode);
13018+}
13019+
13020+__u32
13021+gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
13022+{
13023+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
13024+}
13025+
13026+__u32
13027+gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13028+{
13029+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
13030+}
13031+
13032+__u32
13033+gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13034+{
13035+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
13036+}
13037+
13038+__u32
13039+gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13040+{
13041+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
13042+}
13043+
13044+__u32
13045+gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
13046+ mode_t mode)
13047+{
13048+ if (unlikely(dentry->d_inode && S_ISSOCK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
13049+ return 1;
13050+
13051+ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
13052+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
13053+ GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
13054+ } else {
13055+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
13056+ }
13057+}
13058+
13059+__u32
13060+gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
13061+ mode_t mode)
13062+{
13063+ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
13064+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
13065+ GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
13066+ } else {
13067+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
13068+ }
13069+}
13070+
13071+__u32
13072+gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13073+{
13074+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
13075+}
13076+
13077+__u32
13078+gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13079+{
13080+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
13081+}
13082+
13083+__u32
13084+gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
13085+{
13086+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
13087+ GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
13088+}
13089+
13090+/* hardlinks require at minimum create permission,
13091+ any additional privilege required is based on the
13092+ privilege of the file being linked to
13093+*/
13094+__u32
13095+gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
13096+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
13097+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
13098+ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
13099+ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
13100+{
13101+ __u32 mode;
13102+ __u32 needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_LINK;
13103+ __u32 needaudit = GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_LINK;
13104+
13105+ mode =
13106+ gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
13107+ old_mnt);
13108+
13109+ if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && (mode & needaudit))) {
13110+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
13111+ return mode;
13112+ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
13113+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
13114+ return 0;
13115+ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
13116+ return 0;
13117+
13118+ return 1;
13119+}
13120+
13121+__u32
13122+gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
13123+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
13124+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
13125+{
13126+ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
13127+ __u32 mode;
13128+
13129+ mode =
13130+ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13131+ GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
13132+ GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
13133+
13134+ if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
13135+ gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
13136+ return mode;
13137+ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
13138+ gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
13139+ return 0;
13140+ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
13141+ return 0;
13142+
13143+ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
13144+}
13145+
13146+static __u32 generic_fs_create_handler(const struct dentry *new_dentry, const struct dentry *parent_dentry, const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
13147+{
13148+ __u32 mode;
13149+
13150+ mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
13151+
13152+ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
13153+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
13154+ return mode;
13155+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
13156+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
13157+ return 0;
13158+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
13159+ return 0;
13160+
13161+ return (reqmode);
13162+}
13163+
13164+__u32
13165+gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
13166+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
13167+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
13168+ const int mode)
13169+{
13170+ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
13171+ if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
13172+ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
13173+
13174+ return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13175+ reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
13176+}
13177+
13178+__u32
13179+gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
13180+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
13181+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
13182+{
13183+ return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13184+ GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
13185+}
13186+
13187+#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
13188+ (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
13189+ ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
13190+
13191+int
13192+gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
13193+ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
13194+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
13195+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
13196+ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
13197+ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
13198+{
13199+ __u32 comp1, comp2;
13200+ int error = 0;
13201+
13202+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13203+ return 0;
13204+
13205+ if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
13206+ comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13207+ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
13208+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
13209+ comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
13210+ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13211+ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
13212+ GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
13213+ } else {
13214+ comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
13215+ GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
13216+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13217+ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
13218+ GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
13219+ comp2 =
13220+ gr_search_file(old_dentry,
13221+ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
13222+ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13223+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
13224+ }
13225+
13226+ if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
13227+ ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
13228+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
13229+ else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
13230+ && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
13231+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
13232+ error = -EACCES;
13233+ } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
13234+ error = -EACCES;
13235+
13236+ return error;
13237+}
13238+
13239+void
13240+gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
13241+{
13242+ u16 id;
13243+ char *rolename;
13244+ struct file *exec_file;
13245+
13246+ if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
13247+ id = current->acl_role_id;
13248+ rolename = current->role->rolename;
13249+ gr_set_acls(1);
13250+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, rolename, id);
13251+ }
13252+
13253+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
13254+ exec_file = current->exec_file;
13255+ current->exec_file = NULL;
13256+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
13257+
13258+ if (exec_file)
13259+ fput(exec_file);
13260+}
13261+
13262+int
13263+gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
13264+{
13265+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13266+ return 0;
13267+
13268+ if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
13269+ return -EACCES;
13270+
13271+ return 0;
13272+}
13273diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
13274--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13275+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
13276@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
13277+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13278+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
13279+#include <asm/errno.h>
13280+#include <net/sock.h>
13281+#include <linux/file.h>
13282+#include <linux/fs.h>
13283+#include <linux/net.h>
13284+#include <linux/in.h>
13285+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
13286+#include <linux/ip.h>
13287+#include <linux/udp.h>
13288+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13289+#include <linux/types.h>
13290+#include <linux/sched.h>
13291+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13292+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
13293+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13294+
13295+#define GR_BIND 0x01
13296+#define GR_CONNECT 0x02
13297+
13298+static const char * gr_protocols[256] = {
13299+ "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt",
13300+ "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet",
13301+ "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1",
13302+ "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp",
13303+ "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++",
13304+ "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre",
13305+ "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile",
13306+ "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63",
13307+ "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv",
13308+ "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak",
13309+ "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf",
13310+ "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp",
13311+ "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim",
13312+ "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip",
13313+ "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp",
13314+ "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup",
13315+ "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135",
13316+ "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143",
13317+ "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151",
13318+ "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159",
13319+ "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167",
13320+ "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175",
13321+ "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183",
13322+ "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191",
13323+ "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199",
13324+ "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207",
13325+ "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215",
13326+ "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223",
13327+ "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231",
13328+ "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239",
13329+ "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247",
13330+ "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255",
13331+ };
13332+
13333+static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = {
13334+ "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6",
13335+ "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet"
13336+ };
13337+
13338+const char *
13339+gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto)
13340+{
13341+ return gr_protocols[proto];
13342+}
13343+
13344+const char *
13345+gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type)
13346+{
13347+ return gr_socktypes[type];
13348+}
13349+
13350+int
13351+gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
13352+{
13353+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13354+
13355+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13356+ goto exit;
13357+
13358+ if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
13359+ || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
13360+ goto exit; // let the kernel handle it
13361+
13362+ curr = current->acl;
13363+
13364+ if (!curr->ips)
13365+ goto exit;
13366+
13367+ if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
13368+ (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
13369+ goto exit;
13370+
13371+ if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
13372+ /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
13373+ dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
13374+ bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
13375+ if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
13376+ __u32 fakeip = 0;
13377+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13378+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13379+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13380+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13381+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13382+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13383+ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
13384+ protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
13385+ } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
13386+ __u32 fakeip = 0;
13387+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13388+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13389+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13390+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13391+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13392+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13393+ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
13394+ protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
13395+ }
13396+ /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
13397+ goto exit;
13398+ }
13399+
13400+ gr_log_str3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet",
13401+ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
13402+
13403+ return 0;
13404+ exit:
13405+ return 1;
13406+}
13407+
13408+static __inline__ int
13409+gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
13410+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
13411+{
13412+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13413+ struct acl_ip_label *ip;
13414+ unsigned long i;
13415+ __u32 ip_addr = 0;
13416+ __u16 ip_port = 0;
13417+
13418+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET))
13419+ return 1;
13420+
13421+ curr = current->acl;
13422+
13423+ if (!curr->ips)
13424+ return 1;
13425+
13426+ ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
13427+ ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
13428+
13429+ for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
13430+ ip = *(curr->ips + i);
13431+ if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
13432+ (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
13433+ (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
13434+ ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) ==
13435+ (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask))
13436+ && (ip->
13437+ proto[sk->sk_protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->sk_protocol % 32)))
13438+ && (ip->type & (1 << type)))
13439+ return 1;
13440+ }
13441+
13442+ if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
13443+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13444+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13445+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13446+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13447+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13448+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13449+ NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
13450+ sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
13451+ return 1;
13452+ }
13453+
13454+ if (mode == GR_BIND)
13455+ gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
13456+ else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
13457+ gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
13458+
13459+ return 0;
13460+}
13461+
13462+int
13463+gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13464+{
13465+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
13466+}
13467+
13468+int
13469+gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13470+{
13471+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
13472+}
13473+
13474+int gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
13475+{
13476+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
13477+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
13478+
13479+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
13480+ addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
13481+
13482+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
13483+}
13484+
13485+int gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
13486+{
13487+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
13488+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
13489+
13490+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
13491+ addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
13492+
13493+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
13494+}
13495+
13496+int
13497+gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13498+{
13499+ if (addr)
13500+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
13501+ else {
13502+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
13503+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
13504+
13505+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr;
13506+ sin.sin_port = inet->dport;
13507+
13508+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
13509+ }
13510+}
13511+
13512+int
13513+gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
13514+{
13515+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
13516+
13517+ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
13518+ return 1; // skip this packet
13519+
13520+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
13521+ sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source;
13522+
13523+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
13524+}
13525diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
13526--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13527+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
13528@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
13529+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13530+#include <linux/mm.h>
13531+#include <linux/sched.h>
13532+#include <linux/poll.h>
13533+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13534+#include <linux/string.h>
13535+#include <linux/file.h>
13536+#include <linux/types.h>
13537+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
13538+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13539+
13540+extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
13541+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
13542+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
13543+
13544+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
13545+static int gr_learn_attached;
13546+
13547+/* use a 512k buffer */
13548+#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024)
13549+
13550+static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
13551+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem);
13552+
13553+/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn
13554+ uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts
13555+ use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep
13556+*/
13557+static char *learn_buffer;
13558+static char *learn_buffer_user;
13559+static int learn_buffer_len;
13560+static int learn_buffer_user_len;
13561+
13562+static ssize_t
13563+read_learn(struct file *file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
13564+{
13565+ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
13566+ ssize_t retval = 0;
13567+
13568+ add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
13569+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
13570+ do {
13571+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13572+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13573+ if (learn_buffer_len)
13574+ break;
13575+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13576+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13577+ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
13578+ retval = -EAGAIN;
13579+ goto out;
13580+ }
13581+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
13582+ retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
13583+ goto out;
13584+ }
13585+
13586+ schedule();
13587+ } while (1);
13588+
13589+ memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len);
13590+ learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len;
13591+ retval = learn_buffer_len;
13592+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13593+
13594+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13595+
13596+ if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len))
13597+ retval = -EFAULT;
13598+
13599+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13600+out:
13601+ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
13602+ remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
13603+ return retval;
13604+}
13605+
13606+static unsigned int
13607+poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
13608+{
13609+ poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
13610+
13611+ if (learn_buffer_len)
13612+ return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
13613+
13614+ return 0;
13615+}
13616+
13617+void
13618+gr_clear_learn_entries(void)
13619+{
13620+ char *tmp;
13621+
13622+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13623+ if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
13624+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13625+ tmp = learn_buffer;
13626+ learn_buffer = NULL;
13627+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13628+ vfree(learn_buffer);
13629+ }
13630+ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
13631+ vfree(learn_buffer_user);
13632+ learn_buffer_user = NULL;
13633+ }
13634+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13635+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13636+
13637+ return;
13638+}
13639+
13640+void
13641+gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
13642+{
13643+ va_list args;
13644+ unsigned int len;
13645+
13646+ if (!gr_learn_attached)
13647+ return;
13648+
13649+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13650+
13651+ /* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to
13652+ compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append
13653+ */
13654+ if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) {
13655+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13656+ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
13657+ return;
13658+ }
13659+ if (learn_buffer == NULL) {
13660+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13661+ return;
13662+ }
13663+
13664+ va_start(args, fmt);
13665+ len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args);
13666+ va_end(args);
13667+
13668+ learn_buffer_len += len + 1;
13669+
13670+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13671+ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
13672+
13673+ return;
13674+}
13675+
13676+static int
13677+open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
13678+{
13679+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached)
13680+ return -EBUSY;
13681+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
13682+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13683+ if (learn_buffer == NULL)
13684+ learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
13685+ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
13686+ learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
13687+ if (learn_buffer == NULL)
13688+ return -ENOMEM;
13689+ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
13690+ return -ENOMEM;
13691+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13692+ learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
13693+ gr_learn_attached = 1;
13694+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13695+ }
13696+ return 0;
13697+}
13698+
13699+static int
13700+close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
13701+{
13702+ char *tmp;
13703+
13704+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
13705+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13706+ if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
13707+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13708+ tmp = learn_buffer;
13709+ learn_buffer = NULL;
13710+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13711+ vfree(tmp);
13712+ }
13713+ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
13714+ vfree(learn_buffer_user);
13715+ learn_buffer_user = NULL;
13716+ }
13717+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13718+ learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
13719+ gr_learn_attached = 0;
13720+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13721+ }
13722+
13723+ return 0;
13724+}
13725+
13726+struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
13727+ .read = read_learn,
13728+ .write = write_grsec_handler,
13729+ .open = open_learn,
13730+ .release = close_learn,
13731+ .poll = poll_learn,
13732+};
13733diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
13734--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13735+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
13736@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
13737+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13738+#include <linux/sched.h>
13739+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13740+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13741+
13742+static const char *restab_log[11] = {
13743+ "RLIMIT_CPU",
13744+ "RLIMIT_FSIZE",
13745+ "RLIMIT_DATA",
13746+ "RLIMIT_STACK",
13747+ "RLIMIT_CORE",
13748+ "RLIMIT_RSS",
13749+ "RLIMIT_NPROC",
13750+ "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
13751+ "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
13752+ "RLIMIT_AS",
13753+ "RLIMIT_LOCKS"
13754+};
13755+
13756+void
13757+gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
13758+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
13759+{
13760+ if (res == RLIMIT_NPROC &&
13761+ (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
13762+ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)))
13763+ return;
13764+ else if (res == RLIMIT_MEMLOCK &&
13765+ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
13766+ return;
13767+
13768+ preempt_disable();
13769+
13770+ if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur) ||
13771+ (!gt && wanted >= task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) &&
13772+ task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
13773+ gr_log_res_ulong2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RESOURCE_MSG, task, wanted, restab_log[res], task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur);
13774+
13775+ preempt_enable_no_resched();
13776+
13777+ return;
13778+}
13779diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
13780--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13781+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
13782@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
13783+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13784+#include <linux/mm.h>
13785+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
13786+#include <asm/errno.h>
13787+#include <asm/mman.h>
13788+#include <net/sock.h>
13789+#include <linux/file.h>
13790+#include <linux/fs.h>
13791+#include <linux/net.h>
13792+#include <linux/in.h>
13793+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13794+#include <linux/slab.h>
13795+#include <linux/types.h>
13796+#include <linux/sched.h>
13797+#include <linux/timer.h>
13798+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13799+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
13800+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13801+
13802+static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
13803+static unsigned short uid_used;
13804+static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
13805+extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
13806+extern struct acl_subject_label *
13807+ lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev,
13808+ struct acl_role_label *role);
13809+extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t);
13810+
13811+int
13812+gr_init_uidset(void)
13813+{
13814+ uid_set =
13815+ kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
13816+ uid_used = 0;
13817+
13818+ return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
13819+}
13820+
13821+void
13822+gr_free_uidset(void)
13823+{
13824+ if (uid_set)
13825+ kfree(uid_set);
13826+
13827+ return;
13828+}
13829+
13830+int
13831+gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
13832+{
13833+ struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
13834+ uid_t buid;
13835+ int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
13836+
13837+ while (high >= low) {
13838+ mid = (low + high) >> 1;
13839+ buid = tmp[mid].uid;
13840+ if (buid == uid)
13841+ return mid;
13842+ if (buid > uid)
13843+ high = mid - 1;
13844+ if (buid < uid)
13845+ low = mid + 1;
13846+ }
13847+
13848+ return -1;
13849+}
13850+
13851+static __inline__ void
13852+gr_insertsort(void)
13853+{
13854+ unsigned short i, j;
13855+ struct crash_uid index;
13856+
13857+ for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
13858+ index = uid_set[i];
13859+ j = i;
13860+ while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
13861+ uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
13862+ j--;
13863+ }
13864+ uid_set[j] = index;
13865+ }
13866+
13867+ return;
13868+}
13869+
13870+static __inline__ void
13871+gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
13872+{
13873+ int loc;
13874+
13875+ if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
13876+ return;
13877+
13878+ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
13879+
13880+ if (loc >= 0) {
13881+ uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
13882+ return;
13883+ }
13884+
13885+ uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
13886+ uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
13887+ uid_used++;
13888+
13889+ gr_insertsort();
13890+
13891+ return;
13892+}
13893+
13894+void
13895+gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
13896+{
13897+ unsigned short i;
13898+
13899+ for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
13900+ uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i];
13901+
13902+ uid_used--;
13903+
13904+ return;
13905+}
13906+
13907+int
13908+gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
13909+{
13910+ int loc;
13911+
13912+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13913+ return 0;
13914+
13915+ read_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
13916+ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
13917+ read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13918+
13919+ if (loc < 0)
13920+ return 0;
13921+
13922+ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
13923+ if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds()))
13924+ gr_remove_uid(loc);
13925+ else {
13926+ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13927+ return 1;
13928+ }
13929+
13930+ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13931+ return 0;
13932+}
13933+
13934+static __inline__ int
13935+proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
13936+{
13937+ if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
13938+ task->uid != task->fsuid)
13939+ return 1;
13940+ if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
13941+ task->gid != task->fsgid)
13942+ return 1;
13943+
13944+ return 0;
13945+}
13946+static __inline__ int
13947+gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
13948+{
13949+ unsigned long int flags;
13950+ int ret;
13951+
13952+ spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
13953+ if (sigismember(&t->blocked, sig) || t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) {
13954+ t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
13955+ sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
13956+ recalc_sigpending_tsk(t);
13957+ }
13958+ ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t);
13959+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
13960+
13961+ return ret;
13962+}
13963+
13964+void
13965+gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
13966+{
13967+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13968+ struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
13969+ struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2;
13970+
13971+ if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
13972+ return;
13973+
13974+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13975+ return;
13976+
13977+ curr = task->acl;
13978+
13979+ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
13980+ return;
13981+
13982+ if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
13983+ curr->expires = 0;
13984+ curr->crashes = 0;
13985+ }
13986+
13987+ curr->crashes++;
13988+
13989+ if (!curr->expires)
13990+ curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
13991+
13992+ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
13993+ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
13994+ if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
13995+ gr_log_crash1(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
13996+ write_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
13997+ gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
13998+ write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13999+ curr->expires = 0;
14000+ curr->crashes = 0;
14001+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14002+ do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
14003+ if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid)
14004+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
14005+ } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
14006+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14007+ } else {
14008+ gr_log_crash2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
14009+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14010+ do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
14011+ if (likely(tsk != task)) {
14012+ curr2 = tsk->acl;
14013+
14014+ if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
14015+ curr2->inode == curr->inode)
14016+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
14017+ }
14018+ } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
14019+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14020+ }
14021+ }
14022+
14023+ return;
14024+}
14025+
14026+int
14027+gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
14028+{
14029+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
14030+
14031+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
14032+ return 0;
14033+
14034+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
14035+ curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
14036+ filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev,
14037+ current->role);
14038+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
14039+
14040+ if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
14041+ (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
14042+ return 0;
14043+
14044+ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
14045+ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds()))
14046+ return 1;
14047+ else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
14048+ curr->crashes = 0;
14049+ curr->expires = 0;
14050+ }
14051+
14052+ return 0;
14053+}
14054+
14055+void
14056+gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
14057+{
14058+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
14059+ __u32 curr_ip;
14060+ struct task_struct *p, *p2;
14061+
14062+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
14063+ return;
14064+
14065+ curracl = task->acl;
14066+ curr_ip = task->curr_ip;
14067+
14068+ if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip) {
14069+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14070+ do_each_thread(p2, p) {
14071+ if (p->curr_ip == curr_ip)
14072+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, p);
14073+ } while_each_thread(p2, p);
14074+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14075+ } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
14076+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
14077+
14078+ return;
14079+}
14080diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
14081--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14082+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14083@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
14084+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14085+#include <linux/mm.h>
14086+#include <linux/sched.h>
14087+#include <linux/file.h>
14088+#include <linux/ipc.h>
14089+#include <linux/gracl.h>
14090+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
14091+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14092+
14093+int
14094+gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
14095+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
14096+{
14097+ struct task_struct *task;
14098+
14099+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
14100+ return 1;
14101+
14102+ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
14103+
14104+ if (unlikely(!task))
14105+ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
14106+
14107+ if (unlikely(task && (time_before((unsigned long)task->start_time.tv_sec, (unsigned long)shm_createtime) ||
14108+ (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
14109+ (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
14110+ (task->acl != current->acl))) {
14111+ gr_log_int3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid);
14112+ return 0;
14113+ }
14114+
14115+ return 1;
14116+}
14117diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
14118--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14119+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14120@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
14121+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14122+#include <linux/sched.h>
14123+#include <linux/fs.h>
14124+#include <linux/file.h>
14125+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
14126+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14127+
14128+void
14129+gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14130+{
14131+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
14132+ if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
14133+ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
14134+ !grsec_enable_group)) {
14135+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14136+ }
14137+#endif
14138+ return;
14139+}
14140diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
14141--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14142+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14143@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
14144+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14145+#include <linux/module.h>
14146+#include <linux/sched.h>
14147+#include <linux/file.h>
14148+#include <linux/fs.h>
14149+#include <linux/mount.h>
14150+#include <linux/types.h>
14151+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14152+
14153+int
14154+gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
14155+{
14156+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
14157+ struct pid *spid = NULL;
14158+
14159+ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
14160+ return 1;
14161+
14162+ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
14163+ return 1;
14164+
14165+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14166+
14167+ spid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
14168+ if (spid) {
14169+ struct task_struct *p;
14170+ p = pid_task(&spid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14171+ task_lock(p);
14172+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
14173+ task_unlock(p);
14174+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14175+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG);
14176+ return 0;
14177+ }
14178+ task_unlock(p);
14179+ }
14180+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14181+#endif
14182+ return 1;
14183+}
14184+
14185+int
14186+gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
14187+{
14188+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
14189+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14190+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG);
14191+ return -EPERM;
14192+ }
14193+#endif
14194+ return 0;
14195+}
14196+
14197+int
14198+gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval)
14199+{
14200+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
14201+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (niceval < task_nice(p))
14202+ && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14203+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid);
14204+ return -EACCES;
14205+ }
14206+#endif
14207+ return 0;
14208+}
14209+
14210+int
14211+gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
14212+{
14213+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
14214+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
14215+ inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
14216+ return 1;
14217+#endif
14218+ return 0;
14219+}
14220+
14221+int
14222+gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p)
14223+{
14224+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
14225+ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || !current->fs ||
14226+ !proc_is_chrooted(current) || !p)
14227+ return 0;
14228+
14229+ task_lock(p);
14230+ if ((p->exit_state & (EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD)) ||
14231+ (p->fs && !have_same_root(current, p))) {
14232+ task_unlock(p);
14233+ return 1;
14234+ }
14235+ task_unlock(p);
14236+#endif
14237+ return 0;
14238+}
14239+
14240+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
14241+
14242+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR)
14243+int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
14244+{
14245+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry;
14246+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt;
14247+ struct dentry *realroot;
14248+ struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
14249+ struct dentry *currentroot;
14250+ struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
14251+
14252+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
14253+ realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
14254+ realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
14255+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
14256+
14257+ read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
14258+ currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
14259+ currentroot = dget(current->fs->root);
14260+ read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
14261+
14262+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
14263+ for (;;) {
14264+ if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
14265+ || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
14266+ break;
14267+ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
14268+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
14269+ break;
14270+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
14271+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
14272+ continue;
14273+ }
14274+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
14275+ }
14276+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
14277+
14278+ dput(currentroot);
14279+ mntput(currentmnt);
14280+
14281+ if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) {
14282+ /* access is outside of chroot */
14283+ dput(realroot);
14284+ mntput(realrootmnt);
14285+ return 0;
14286+ }
14287+
14288+ dput(realroot);
14289+ mntput(realrootmnt);
14290+ return 1;
14291+}
14292+#endif
14293+
14294+int
14295+gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
14296+{
14297+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
14298+ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
14299+ return 1;
14300+
14301+ if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
14302+ return 1;
14303+ else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) {
14304+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, u_dentry, u_mnt);
14305+ return 0;
14306+ }
14307+#endif
14308+ return 1;
14309+}
14310+
14311+int
14312+gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
14313+ const time_t shm_createtime)
14314+{
14315+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
14316+ struct pid *pid = NULL;
14317+ time_t starttime;
14318+
14319+ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
14320+ return 1;
14321+
14322+ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
14323+ return 1;
14324+
14325+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14326+
14327+ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_cprid);
14328+ if (pid) {
14329+ struct task_struct *p;
14330+ p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14331+ task_lock(p);
14332+ starttime = p->start_time.tv_sec;
14333+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) &&
14334+ time_before((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) {
14335+ task_unlock(p);
14336+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14337+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
14338+ return 0;
14339+ }
14340+ task_unlock(p);
14341+ } else {
14342+ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_lapid);
14343+ if (pid) {
14344+ struct task_struct *p;
14345+ p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14346+ task_lock(p);
14347+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
14348+ task_unlock(p);
14349+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14350+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
14351+ return 0;
14352+ }
14353+ task_unlock(p);
14354+ }
14355+ }
14356+
14357+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14358+#endif
14359+ return 1;
14360+}
14361+
14362+void
14363+gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14364+{
14365+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
14366+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
14367+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14368+#endif
14369+ return;
14370+}
14371+
14372+int
14373+gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
14374+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
14375+{
14376+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
14377+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) &&
14378+ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14379+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14380+ return -EPERM;
14381+ }
14382+#endif
14383+ return 0;
14384+}
14385+
14386+int
14387+gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
14388+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
14389+{
14390+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
14391+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14392+ gr_log_str_fs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, dentry, mnt);
14393+ return -EPERM;
14394+ }
14395+#endif
14396+ return 0;
14397+}
14398+
14399+int
14400+gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
14401+{
14402+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
14403+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14404+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG);
14405+ return -EPERM;
14406+ }
14407+#endif
14408+ return 0;
14409+}
14410+
14411+int
14412+gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14413+{
14414+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
14415+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
14416+ !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) {
14417+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14418+ return -EPERM;
14419+ }
14420+#endif
14421+ return 0;
14422+}
14423+
14424+void
14425+gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
14426+{
14427+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
14428+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
14429+ task->cap_permitted =
14430+ cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14431+ task->cap_inheritable =
14432+ cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14433+ task->cap_effective =
14434+ cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14435+ }
14436+#endif
14437+ return;
14438+}
14439+
14440+int
14441+gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
14442+{
14443+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
14444+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
14445+ && (op & 002))
14446+ return -EACCES;
14447+#endif
14448+ return 0;
14449+}
14450+
14451+void
14452+gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
14453+{
14454+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
14455+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
14456+ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
14457+#endif
14458+ return;
14459+}
14460+
14461+int
14462+gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
14463+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
14464+{
14465+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
14466+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
14467+ ((mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))) &&
14468+ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14469+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14470+ return -EPERM;
14471+ }
14472+#endif
14473+ return 0;
14474+}
14475+
14476+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
14477+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_caps);
14478+#endif
14479diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
14480--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14481+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14482@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
14483+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14484+#include <linux/module.h>
14485+#include <linux/config.h>
14486+#include <linux/sched.h>
14487+#include <linux/file.h>
14488+#include <linux/fs.h>
14489+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
14490+#include <linux/net.h>
14491+#include <linux/in.h>
14492+#include <linux/ip.h>
14493+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
14494+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
14495+
14496+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
14497+void
14498+pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
14499+{
14500+ return;
14501+}
14502+#endif
14503+
14504+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
14505+__u32
14506+gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode)
14507+{
14508+ return mode;
14509+}
14510+#endif
14511+
14512+int
14513+gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
14514+{
14515+ return 0;
14516+}
14517+
14518+int
14519+gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
14520+{
14521+ return 0;
14522+}
14523+
14524+void
14525+gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
14526+{
14527+ return;
14528+}
14529+
14530+int
14531+gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
14532+{
14533+ return 0;
14534+}
14535+
14536+int
14537+gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
14538+{
14539+ return 0;
14540+}
14541+
14542+void
14543+gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
14544+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
14545+{
14546+ return;
14547+}
14548+
14549+int
14550+gr_set_acls(const int type)
14551+{
14552+ return 0;
14553+}
14554+
14555+int
14556+gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
14557+{
14558+ return 0;
14559+}
14560+
14561+int
14562+gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
14563+{
14564+ return 0;
14565+}
14566+
14567+void
14568+gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
14569+{
14570+ return;
14571+}
14572+
14573+void
14574+gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
14575+{
14576+ return;
14577+}
14578+
14579+int
14580+gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14581+{
14582+ return 0;
14583+}
14584+
14585+void
14586+gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
14587+{
14588+ return;
14589+}
14590+
14591+void
14592+gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14593+{
14594+ return;
14595+}
14596+
14597+void
14598+gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
14599+{
14600+ return;
14601+}
14602+
14603+int
14604+gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
14605+{
14606+ return 0;
14607+}
14608+
14609+int
14610+gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
14611+{
14612+ return 0;
14613+}
14614+
14615+void
14616+gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
14617+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
14618+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
14619+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
14620+{
14621+ return;
14622+}
14623+
14624+int
14625+gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
14626+{
14627+ return 1;
14628+}
14629+
14630+int
14631+gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
14632+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14633+{
14634+ return 1;
14635+}
14636+
14637+int
14638+gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
14639+{
14640+ return 1;
14641+}
14642+
14643+int
14644+gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
14645+{
14646+ return 1;
14647+}
14648+
14649+void
14650+gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
14651+{
14652+ return;
14653+}
14654+
14655+__u32
14656+gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14657+{
14658+ return 1;
14659+}
14660+
14661+__u32
14662+gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
14663+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14664+{
14665+ return 1;
14666+}
14667+
14668+__u32
14669+gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14670+ const int fmode)
14671+{
14672+ return 1;
14673+}
14674+
14675+__u32
14676+gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14677+{
14678+ return 1;
14679+}
14680+
14681+__u32
14682+gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14683+{
14684+ return 1;
14685+}
14686+
14687+int
14688+gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
14689+ unsigned int *vm_flags)
14690+{
14691+ return 1;
14692+}
14693+
14694+__u32
14695+gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
14696+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14697+{
14698+ return 1;
14699+}
14700+
14701+__u32
14702+gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14703+{
14704+ return 1;
14705+}
14706+
14707+__u32
14708+gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
14709+ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
14710+{
14711+ return 1;
14712+}
14713+
14714+__u32
14715+gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14716+ mode_t mode)
14717+{
14718+ return 1;
14719+}
14720+
14721+__u32
14722+gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14723+ mode_t mode)
14724+{
14725+ return 1;
14726+}
14727+
14728+__u32
14729+gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14730+{
14731+ return 1;
14732+}
14733+
14734+void
14735+grsecurity_init(void)
14736+{
14737+ return;
14738+}
14739+
14740+__u32
14741+gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14742+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14743+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
14744+ const int mode)
14745+{
14746+ return 1;
14747+}
14748+
14749+__u32
14750+gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14751+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14752+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
14753+{
14754+ return 1;
14755+}
14756+
14757+__u32
14758+gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14759+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14760+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
14761+{
14762+ return 1;
14763+}
14764+
14765+__u32
14766+gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14767+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14768+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
14769+ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
14770+ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
14771+{
14772+ return 1;
14773+}
14774+
14775+int
14776+gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
14777+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
14778+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
14779+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
14780+ const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
14781+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
14782+{
14783+ return 0;
14784+}
14785+
14786+int
14787+gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
14788+ const int namelen, const ino_t ino)
14789+{
14790+ return 1;
14791+}
14792+
14793+int
14794+gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
14795+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
14796+{
14797+ return 1;
14798+}
14799+
14800+int
14801+gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14802+{
14803+ return 1;
14804+}
14805+
14806+int
14807+gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
14808+{
14809+ return 1;
14810+}
14811+
14812+int
14813+gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
14814+{
14815+ return 1;
14816+}
14817+
14818+int
14819+gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14820+{
14821+ return 1;
14822+}
14823+
14824+__u32
14825+gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14826+{
14827+ return 1;
14828+}
14829+
14830+__u32
14831+gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
14832+ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
14833+ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
14834+ const int imode)
14835+{
14836+ return 1;
14837+}
14838+
14839+void
14840+gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
14841+{
14842+ return;
14843+}
14844+
14845+int
14846+gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
14847+{
14848+ return 1;
14849+}
14850+
14851+void
14852+gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
14853+{
14854+ return;
14855+}
14856+
14857+int
14858+gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
14859+{
14860+ return 0;
14861+}
14862+
14863+int
14864+gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
14865+{
14866+ return 1;
14867+}
14868+
14869+int
14870+gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14871+{
14872+ return 1;
14873+}
14874+
14875+void
14876+gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
14877+{
14878+ return;
14879+}
14880+
14881+int
14882+gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
14883+{
14884+ return 0;
14885+}
14886+
14887+int
14888+gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
14889+{
14890+ return 0;
14891+}
14892+
14893+
14894+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
14895+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
14896+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
14897+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
14898+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
14899+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
14900+#endif
14901diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
14902--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14903+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14904@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
14905+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14906+#include <linux/sched.h>
14907+#include <linux/file.h>
14908+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
14909+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
14910+#include <linux/fs.h>
14911+#include <linux/types.h>
14912+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
14913+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14914+#include <linux/capability.h>
14915+
14916+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
14917+
14918+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
14919+static char gr_exec_arg_buf[132];
14920+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_exec_arg_sem);
14921+#endif
14922+
14923+int
14924+gr_handle_nproc(void)
14925+{
14926+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
14927+ if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
14928+ (atomic_read(&current->user->processes) >
14929+ current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
14930+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
14931+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NPROC_MSG);
14932+ return -EAGAIN;
14933+ }
14934+#endif
14935+ return 0;
14936+}
14937+
14938+void
14939+gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char __user *__user *argv)
14940+{
14941+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
14942+ char *grarg = gr_exec_arg_buf;
14943+ unsigned int i, x, execlen = 0;
14944+ char c;
14945+
14946+ if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
14947+ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
14948+ || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
14949+ return;
14950+
14951+ down(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
14952+ memset(grarg, 0, sizeof(gr_exec_arg_buf));
14953+
14954+ if (unlikely(argv == NULL))
14955+ goto log;
14956+
14957+ for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 128; i++) {
14958+ const char __user *p;
14959+ unsigned int len;
14960+
14961+ if (copy_from_user(&p, argv + i, sizeof(p)))
14962+ goto log;
14963+ if (!p)
14964+ goto log;
14965+ len = strnlen_user(p, 128 - execlen);
14966+ if (len > 128 - execlen)
14967+ len = 128 - execlen;
14968+ else if (len > 0)
14969+ len--;
14970+ if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
14971+ goto log;
14972+
14973+ /* rewrite unprintable characters */
14974+ for (x = 0; x < len; x++) {
14975+ c = *(grarg + execlen + x);
14976+ if (c < 32 || c > 126)
14977+ *(grarg + execlen + x) = ' ';
14978+ }
14979+
14980+ execlen += len;
14981+ *(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
14982+ *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
14983+ execlen++;
14984+ }
14985+
14986+ log:
14987+ gr_log_fs_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, bprm->file->f_dentry,
14988+ bprm->file->f_vfsmnt, grarg);
14989+ up(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
14990+#endif
14991+ return;
14992+}
14993diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
14994--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14995+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
14996@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
14997+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14998+#include <linux/sched.h>
14999+#include <linux/fs.h>
15000+#include <linux/file.h>
15001+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15002+
15003+int
15004+gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
15005+ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
15006+{
15007+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
15008+ if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
15009+ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
15010+ (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
15011+ (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
15012+ if (!generic_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode, NULL))
15013+ gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FIFO_MSG, dentry, mnt, dentry->d_inode->i_uid, dentry->d_inode->i_gid);
15014+ return -EACCES;
15015+ }
15016+#endif
15017+ return 0;
15018+}
15019diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
15020--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15021+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15022@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
15023+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15024+#include <linux/sched.h>
15025+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15026+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15027+
15028+void
15029+gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
15030+{
15031+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
15032+ if (grsec_enable_forkfail)
15033+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval);
15034+#endif
15035+ return;
15036+}
15037diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
15038--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15039+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15040@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
15041+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15042+#include <linux/sched.h>
15043+#include <linux/mm.h>
15044+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
15045+#include <linux/gracl.h>
15046+#include <linux/slab.h>
15047+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
15048+#include <linux/percpu.h>
15049+
15050+int grsec_enable_shm;
15051+int grsec_enable_link;
15052+int grsec_enable_dmesg;
15053+int grsec_enable_fifo;
15054+int grsec_enable_execve;
15055+int grsec_enable_execlog;
15056+int grsec_enable_signal;
15057+int grsec_enable_forkfail;
15058+int grsec_enable_time;
15059+int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
15060+int grsec_enable_group;
15061+int grsec_audit_gid;
15062+int grsec_enable_chdir;
15063+int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
15064+int grsec_enable_mount;
15065+int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
15066+int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
15067+int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
15068+int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
15069+int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
15070+int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
15071+int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
15072+int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
15073+int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
15074+int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
15075+int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
15076+int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
15077+int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
15078+int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
15079+int grsec_enable_tpe;
15080+int grsec_tpe_gid;
15081+int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
15082+int grsec_enable_randpid;
15083+int grsec_enable_randsrc;
15084+int grsec_enable_socket_all;
15085+int grsec_socket_all_gid;
15086+int grsec_enable_socket_client;
15087+int grsec_socket_client_gid;
15088+int grsec_enable_socket_server;
15089+int grsec_socket_server_gid;
15090+int grsec_lock;
15091+
15092+spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
15093+unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
15094+unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
15095+
15096+spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
15097+
15098+rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
15099+
15100+char *gr_shared_page[4];
15101+
15102+char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
15103+char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
15104+char *gr_alert_log_buf;
15105+char *gr_audit_log_buf;
15106+
15107+extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
15108+extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
15109+extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
15110+
15111+void
15112+grsecurity_init(void)
15113+{
15114+ int j;
15115+ /* create the per-cpu shared pages */
15116+
15117+ preempt_disable();
15118+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
15119+ gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE, __alignof__(char *));
15120+ if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) {
15121+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
15122+ return;
15123+ }
15124+ }
15125+ preempt_enable();
15126+
15127+ /* allocate log buffers */
15128+ gr_alert_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
15129+ if (!gr_alert_log_fmt) {
15130+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log format buffer");
15131+ return;
15132+ }
15133+ gr_audit_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
15134+ if (!gr_audit_log_fmt) {
15135+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log format buffer");
15136+ return;
15137+ }
15138+ gr_alert_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
15139+ if (!gr_alert_log_buf) {
15140+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log buffer");
15141+ return;
15142+ }
15143+ gr_audit_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
15144+ if (!gr_audit_log_buf) {
15145+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log buffer");
15146+ return;
15147+ }
15148+
15149+ /* allocate memory for authentication structure */
15150+ gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL);
15151+ gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
15152+ gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
15153+
15154+ if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) {
15155+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure");
15156+ return;
15157+ }
15158+
15159+#if !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON)
15160+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
15161+ grsec_lock = 1;
15162+#endif
15163+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
15164+ grsec_enable_shm = 1;
15165+#endif
15166+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
15167+ grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1;
15168+#endif
15169+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
15170+ grsec_enable_group = 1;
15171+ grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
15172+#endif
15173+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
15174+ grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
15175+#endif
15176+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15177+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
15178+#endif
15179+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15180+ grsec_enable_mount = 1;
15181+#endif
15182+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15183+ grsec_enable_link = 1;
15184+#endif
15185+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
15186+ grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
15187+#endif
15188+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
15189+ grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
15190+#endif
15191+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
15192+ grsec_enable_execve = 1;
15193+#endif
15194+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
15195+ grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
15196+#endif
15197+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
15198+ grsec_enable_signal = 1;
15199+#endif
15200+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
15201+ grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
15202+#endif
15203+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
15204+ grsec_enable_time = 1;
15205+#endif
15206+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
15207+ grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
15208+#endif
15209+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
15210+ grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
15211+#endif
15212+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
15213+ grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
15214+#endif
15215+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
15216+ grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
15217+#endif
15218+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
15219+ grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
15220+#endif
15221+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
15222+ grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
15223+#endif
15224+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
15225+ grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
15226+#endif
15227+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
15228+ grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
15229+#endif
15230+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
15231+ grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
15232+#endif
15233+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
15234+ grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
15235+#endif
15236+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
15237+ grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
15238+#endif
15239+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
15240+ grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
15241+#endif
15242+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
15243+ grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
15244+#endif
15245+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
15246+ grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
15247+#endif
15248+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
15249+ grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
15250+ grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
15251+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
15252+ grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
15253+#endif
15254+#endif
15255+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
15256+ grsec_enable_randpid = 1;
15257+#endif
15258+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
15259+ grsec_enable_randsrc = 1;
15260+#endif
15261+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
15262+ grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
15263+ grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
15264+#endif
15265+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
15266+ grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
15267+ grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
15268+#endif
15269+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
15270+ grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
15271+ grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
15272+#endif
15273+#endif
15274+
15275+ return;
15276+}
15277diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
15278--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15279+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15280@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
15281+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15282+#include <linux/sched.h>
15283+#include <linux/types.h>
15284+#include <linux/ipc.h>
15285+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15286+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15287+
15288+void
15289+gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
15290+{
15291+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15292+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15293+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15294+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
15295+ && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
15296+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG);
15297+#endif
15298+ return;
15299+}
15300+
15301+void
15302+gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15303+{
15304+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15305+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15306+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15307+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15308+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15309+#endif
15310+ return;
15311+}
15312+
15313+void
15314+gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
15315+{
15316+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15317+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15318+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15319+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
15320+ && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
15321+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG);
15322+#endif
15323+ return;
15324+}
15325+
15326+void
15327+gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15328+{
15329+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15330+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15331+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15332+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15333+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15334+#endif
15335+ return;
15336+}
15337+
15338+void
15339+gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
15340+{
15341+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15342+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15343+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15344+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
15345+ && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
15346+ gr_log_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size);
15347+#endif
15348+ return;
15349+}
15350+
15351+void
15352+gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15353+{
15354+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15355+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15356+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15357+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15358+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15359+#endif
15360+ return;
15361+}
15362diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
15363--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15364+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15365@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
15366+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15367+#include <linux/sched.h>
15368+#include <linux/fs.h>
15369+#include <linux/file.h>
15370+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15371+
15372+int
15373+gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
15374+ const struct inode *inode,
15375+ const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
15376+{
15377+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15378+ if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
15379+ (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
15380+ (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
15381+ gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid);
15382+ return -EACCES;
15383+ }
15384+#endif
15385+ return 0;
15386+}
15387+
15388+int
15389+gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
15390+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
15391+ struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
15392+{
15393+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15394+ if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
15395+ (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
15396+ ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
15397+ (generic_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, NULL))) &&
15398+ !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
15399+ gr_log_fs_int2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HARDLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to);
15400+ return -EPERM;
15401+ }
15402+#endif
15403+ return 0;
15404+}
15405diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c
15406--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15407+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15408@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
15409+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15410+#include <linux/sched.h>
15411+#include <linux/file.h>
15412+#include <linux/tty.h>
15413+#include <linux/fs.h>
15414+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15415+
15416+#define BEGIN_LOCKS(x) \
15417+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \
15418+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
15419+ if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
15420+ spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
15421+ else \
15422+ spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock)
15423+
15424+#define END_LOCKS(x) \
15425+ if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
15426+ spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
15427+ else \
15428+ spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
15429+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
15430+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \
15431+ if (x == GR_DONT_AUDIT) \
15432+ gr_handle_alertkill(current)
15433+
15434+enum {
15435+ FLOODING,
15436+ NO_FLOODING
15437+};
15438+
15439+extern char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
15440+extern char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
15441+extern char *gr_alert_log_buf;
15442+extern char *gr_audit_log_buf;
15443+
15444+static int gr_log_start(int audit)
15445+{
15446+ char *loglevel = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? KERN_INFO : KERN_ALERT;
15447+ char *fmt = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_fmt : gr_alert_log_fmt;
15448+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15449+
15450+ if (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT)
15451+ goto set_fmt;
15452+
15453+ if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) {
15454+ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
15455+ grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
15456+ } else if ((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) {
15457+ grsec_alert_fyet++;
15458+ } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) {
15459+ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
15460+ grsec_alert_fyet++;
15461+ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for %d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME);
15462+ return FLOODING;
15463+ } else return FLOODING;
15464+
15465+set_fmt:
15466+ memset(buf, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
15467+ if (current->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
15468+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
15469+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
15470+ } else if (current->curr_ip) {
15471+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: ");
15472+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip));
15473+ } else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
15474+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
15475+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
15476+ } else {
15477+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: ");
15478+ strcpy(buf, fmt);
15479+ }
15480+
15481+ return NO_FLOODING;
15482+}
15483+
15484+static void gr_log_middle(int audit, const char *msg, va_list ap)
15485+{
15486+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15487+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15488+
15489+ vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
15490+
15491+ return;
15492+}
15493+
15494+static void gr_log_middle_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, ...)
15495+{
15496+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15497+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15498+ va_list ap;
15499+
15500+ va_start(ap, msg);
15501+ vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
15502+ va_end(ap);
15503+
15504+ return;
15505+}
15506+
15507+static void gr_log_end(int audit)
15508+{
15509+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15510+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15511+
15512+ snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, DEFAULTSECMSG, DEFAULTSECARGS(current));
15513+ printk("%s\n", buf);
15514+
15515+ return;
15516+}
15517+
15518+void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...)
15519+{
15520+ int logtype;
15521+ char *result = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? "successful" : "denied";
15522+ char *str1, *str2, *str3;
15523+ int num1, num2;
15524+ unsigned long ulong1, ulong2;
15525+ struct dentry *dentry;
15526+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
15527+ struct file *file;
15528+ struct task_struct *task;
15529+ va_list ap;
15530+
15531+ BEGIN_LOCKS(audit);
15532+ logtype = gr_log_start(audit);
15533+ if (logtype == FLOODING) {
15534+ END_LOCKS(audit);
15535+ return;
15536+ }
15537+ va_start(ap, argtypes);
15538+ switch (argtypes) {
15539+ case GR_TTYSNIFF:
15540+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15541+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid);
15542+ break;
15543+ case GR_RBAC:
15544+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15545+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15546+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15547+ break;
15548+ case GR_RBAC_STR:
15549+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15550+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15551+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15552+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
15553+ break;
15554+ case GR_STR_RBAC:
15555+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15556+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15557+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15558+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15559+ break;
15560+ case GR_RBAC_MODE2:
15561+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15562+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15563+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15564+ str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15565+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2);
15566+ break;
15567+ case GR_RBAC_MODE3:
15568+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15569+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15570+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15571+ str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15572+ str3 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15573+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2, str3);
15574+ break;
15575+ case GR_FILENAME:
15576+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15577+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15578+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15579+ break;
15580+ case GR_STR_FILENAME:
15581+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15582+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15583+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15584+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15585+ break;
15586+ case GR_FILENAME_STR:
15587+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15588+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15589+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15590+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
15591+ break;
15592+ case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT:
15593+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15594+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15595+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15596+ num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
15597+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2);
15598+ break;
15599+ case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR:
15600+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15601+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15602+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15603+ num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
15604+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15605+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2, str1);
15606+ break;
15607+ case GR_TEXTREL:
15608+ file = va_arg(ap, struct file *);
15609+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15610+ ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15611+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, file ? gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt) : "<anonymous mapping>", ulong1, ulong2);
15612+ break;
15613+ case GR_PTRACE:
15614+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15615+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid);
15616+ break;
15617+ case GR_RESOURCE:
15618+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15619+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15620+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15621+ ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15622+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, ulong1, str1, ulong2, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15623+ break;
15624+ case GR_CAP:
15625+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15626+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15627+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15628+ break;
15629+ case GR_SIG:
15630+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15631+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15632+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, num1, gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15633+ break;
15634+ case GR_CRASH1:
15635+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15636+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15637+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, task->uid, ulong1);
15638+ break;
15639+ case GR_CRASH2:
15640+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15641+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15642+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ulong1);
15643+ break;
15644+ case GR_PSACCT:
15645+ {
15646+ unsigned int wday, cday;
15647+ __u8 whr, chr;
15648+ __u8 wmin, cmin;
15649+ __u8 wsec, csec;
15650+ char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
15651+ char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
15652+
15653+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15654+ wday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
15655+ cday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
15656+ whr = va_arg(ap, int);
15657+ chr = va_arg(ap, int);
15658+ wmin = va_arg(ap, int);
15659+ cmin = va_arg(ap, int);
15660+ wsec = va_arg(ap, int);
15661+ csec = va_arg(ap, int);
15662+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15663+
15664+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->signal->tty, cur_tty), task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", ulong1, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, NIPQUAD(task->parent->curr_ip), tty_name(task->parent->signal->tty, parent_tty), task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15665+ }
15666+ break;
15667+ default:
15668+ gr_log_middle(audit, msg, ap);
15669+ }
15670+ va_end(ap);
15671+ gr_log_end(audit);
15672+ END_LOCKS(audit);
15673+}
15674diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
15675--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15676+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15677@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
15678+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15679+#include <linux/sched.h>
15680+#include <linux/mm.h>
15681+#include <linux/mman.h>
15682+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15683+
15684+void
15685+gr_handle_ioperm(void)
15686+{
15687+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPERM_MSG);
15688+ return;
15689+}
15690+
15691+void
15692+gr_handle_iopl(void)
15693+{
15694+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPL_MSG);
15695+ return;
15696+}
15697+
15698+void
15699+gr_handle_mem_write(void)
15700+{
15701+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG);
15702+ return;
15703+}
15704+
15705+void
15706+gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
15707+{
15708+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_KMEM_MSG);
15709+ return;
15710+}
15711+
15712+void
15713+gr_handle_open_port(void)
15714+{
15715+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG);
15716+ return;
15717+}
15718+
15719+int
15720+gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
15721+{
15722+ if (offset + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start <= offset) {
15723+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
15724+ return -EPERM;
15725+ }
15726+
15727+ if (offset < __pa(high_memory) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
15728+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
15729+ && !(offset == 0xf0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x10000))
15730+ && !(offset == 0xa0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x20000))
15731+#endif
15732+ ) {
15733+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
15734+ return -EPERM;
15735+ } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory))
15736+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
15737+
15738+ return 0;
15739+}
15740diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
15741--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15742+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15743@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
15744+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15745+#include <linux/sched.h>
15746+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15747+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15748+
15749+void
15750+gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
15751+{
15752+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15753+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15754+ gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
15755+#endif
15756+ return;
15757+}
15758+
15759+void
15760+gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
15761+{
15762+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15763+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15764+ gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
15765+#endif
15766+ return;
15767+}
15768+
15769+void
15770+gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
15771+{
15772+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15773+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15774+ gr_log_str_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to);
15775+#endif
15776+ return;
15777+}
15778diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c
15779--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15780+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15781@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
15782+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15783+#include <linux/sched.h>
15784+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
15785+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15786+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15787+
15788+extern int pid_max;
15789+
15790+int
15791+gr_random_pid(void)
15792+{
15793+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
15794+ int pid;
15795+
15796+ if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) {
15797+ /* return a pid in the range 1 ... pid_max - 1
15798+ optimize this so we don't have to do a real division
15799+ */
15800+ pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % pid_max);
15801+ if (pid == pid_max)
15802+ pid = pid_max - 1;
15803+ return pid;
15804+ }
15805+#endif
15806+ return 0;
15807+}
15808diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
15809--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15810+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15811@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
15812+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15813+#include <linux/sched.h>
15814+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15815+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15816+
15817+void
15818+gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
15819+{
15820+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
15821+ if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
15822+ (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
15823+ if (t->pid == current->pid) {
15824+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig);
15825+ } else {
15826+ gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, t, sig);
15827+ }
15828+ }
15829+#endif
15830+ return;
15831+}
15832+
15833+int
15834+gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
15835+{
15836+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15837+ if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
15838+ gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, p, sig);
15839+ return -EPERM;
15840+ } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted((struct task_struct *)p)) {
15841+ return -EPERM;
15842+ }
15843+#endif
15844+ return 0;
15845+}
15846+
15847+void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p)
15848+{
15849+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
15850+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
15851+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
15852+ if (p->parent && p->parent->exec_file == p->exec_file)
15853+ p->parent->brute = 1;
15854+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
15855+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
15856+#endif
15857+ return;
15858+}
15859+
15860+void gr_handle_brute_check(void)
15861+{
15862+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
15863+ if (current->brute) {
15864+ set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
15865+ schedule_timeout(30 * HZ);
15866+ }
15867+#endif
15868+ return;
15869+}
15870+
15871diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
15872--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15873+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
15874@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
15875+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15876+#include <linux/module.h>
15877+#include <linux/sched.h>
15878+#include <linux/file.h>
15879+#include <linux/net.h>
15880+#include <linux/in.h>
15881+#include <linux/ip.h>
15882+#include <net/sock.h>
15883+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15884+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15885+#include <linux/gracl.h>
15886+
15887+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
15888+extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
15889+EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup);
15890+#endif
15891+
15892+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
15893+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_get_random_long);
15894+EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc);
15895+#endif
15896+
15897+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
15898+
15899+extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
15900+extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
15901+
15902+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
15903+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
15904+
15905+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
15906+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
15907+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
15908+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
15909+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
15910+#endif
15911+
15912+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15913+#define gr_conn_table_size 65521
15914+struct task_struct *gr_conn_table[gr_conn_table_size];
15915+struct task_struct *deleted_conn = (struct task_struct *)~0;
15916+spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
15917+
15918+extern const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type);
15919+extern const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto);
15920+
15921+static __inline__ int
15922+conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size)
15923+{
15924+ return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size);
15925+}
15926+
15927+static __inline__ int
15928+conn_match(const struct task_struct *task, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
15929+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
15930+{
15931+ if (unlikely(task != deleted_conn && task->gr_saddr == saddr &&
15932+ task->gr_daddr == daddr && task->gr_sport == sport &&
15933+ task->gr_dport == dport))
15934+ return 1;
15935+ else
15936+ return 0;
15937+}
15938+
15939+void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
15940+{
15941+ unsigned int index;
15942+
15943+ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
15944+ return;
15945+
15946+ if (!thread_group_leader(task))
15947+ task = task->group_leader;
15948+
15949+ index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr,
15950+ task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport,
15951+ gr_conn_table_size);
15952+
15953+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15954+
15955+ while (gr_conn_table[index] && gr_conn_table[index] != deleted_conn) {
15956+ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
15957+ }
15958+
15959+ gr_conn_table[index] = task;
15960+
15961+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15962+
15963+ return;
15964+}
15965+
15966+void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct task_struct *task)
15967+{
15968+ unsigned int index;
15969+
15970+ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
15971+ return;
15972+
15973+ if (!thread_group_leader(task))
15974+ task = task->group_leader;
15975+
15976+ index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr,
15977+ task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport,
15978+ gr_conn_table_size);
15979+
15980+ while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index],
15981+ task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, task->gr_sport,
15982+ task->gr_dport)) {
15983+ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
15984+ }
15985+
15986+ if (gr_conn_table[index]) {
15987+ if (gr_conn_table[(index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size])
15988+ gr_conn_table[index] = deleted_conn;
15989+ else
15990+ gr_conn_table[index] = NULL;
15991+ }
15992+
15993+ return;
15994+}
15995+
15996+struct task_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
15997+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
15998+{
15999+ unsigned int index;
16000+
16001+ if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL))
16002+ return NULL;
16003+
16004+ index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size);
16005+
16006+ while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index],
16007+ saddr, daddr, sport, dport)) {
16008+ index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size;
16009+ }
16010+
16011+ return gr_conn_table[index];
16012+}
16013+
16014+#endif
16015+
16016+void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
16017+{
16018+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16019+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
16020+ if (!thread_group_leader(task))
16021+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->group_leader);
16022+ else
16023+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task);
16024+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
16025+#endif
16026+ return;
16027+}
16028+
16029+void
16030+gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
16031+{
16032+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16033+ struct task_struct *p;
16034+ struct task_struct *set;
16035+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
16036+
16037+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
16038+ return;
16039+
16040+ set = current;
16041+ if (!thread_group_leader(set))
16042+ set = set->group_leader;
16043+
16044+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
16045+ p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr,
16046+ inet->dport, inet->sport);
16047+ if (unlikely(p != NULL)) {
16048+ set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
16049+ set->used_accept = 1;
16050+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p);
16051+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
16052+ return;
16053+ }
16054+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
16055+
16056+ set->curr_ip = inet->daddr;
16057+ set->used_accept = 1;
16058+#endif
16059+ return;
16060+}
16061+
16062+int
16063+gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
16064+{
16065+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
16066+ if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
16067+ (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16068+ gr_log_int_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
16069+ return -EACCES;
16070+ }
16071+#endif
16072+ return 0;
16073+}
16074+
16075+int
16076+gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
16077+{
16078+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
16079+ if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
16080+ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
16081+ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
16082+ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16083+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
16084+ return -EACCES;
16085+ }
16086+#endif
16087+ return 0;
16088+}
16089+
16090+int
16091+gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct sock *sck)
16092+{
16093+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
16094+ if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
16095+ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
16096+ sck && (sck->sk_family != AF_UNIX) &&
16097+ (sck->sk_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16098+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
16099+ return -EACCES;
16100+ }
16101+#endif
16102+ return 0;
16103+}
16104+
16105+int
16106+gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
16107+{
16108+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
16109+ if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
16110+ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
16111+ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16112+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_MSG);
16113+ return -EACCES;
16114+ }
16115+#endif
16116+ return 0;
16117+}
16118+
16119+__u32
16120+gr_cap_rtnetlink(void)
16121+{
16122+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16123+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
16124+ return current->cap_effective;
16125+ else if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
16126+ gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
16127+ return current->cap_effective;
16128+ else
16129+ return 0;
16130+#else
16131+ return current->cap_effective;
16132+#endif
16133+}
16134diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
16135--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16136+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16137@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
16138+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16139+#include <linux/sched.h>
16140+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
16141+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
16142+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16143+
16144+int
16145+gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
16146+{
16147+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
16148+ if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
16149+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name);
16150+ return -EACCES;
16151+ }
16152+#endif
16153+ return 0;
16154+}
16155+
16156+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
16157+enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL,
16158+GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT,
16159+GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM,
16160+GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
16161+GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS,
16162+GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
16163+GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID,
16164+GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG,
16165+GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_SHM, GS_LOCK};
16166+
16167+
16168+ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
16169+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
16170+ {
16171+ .ctl_name = GS_LINK,
16172+ .procname = "linking_restrictions",
16173+ .data = &grsec_enable_link,
16174+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16175+ .mode = 0600,
16176+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16177+ },
16178+#endif
16179+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
16180+ {
16181+ .ctl_name = GS_FIFO,
16182+ .procname = "fifo_restrictions",
16183+ .data = &grsec_enable_fifo,
16184+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16185+ .mode = 0600,
16186+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16187+ },
16188+#endif
16189+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
16190+ {
16191+ .ctl_name = GS_EXECVE,
16192+ .procname = "execve_limiting",
16193+ .data = &grsec_enable_execve,
16194+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16195+ .mode = 0600,
16196+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16197+ },
16198+#endif
16199+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
16200+ {
16201+ .ctl_name = GS_EXECLOG,
16202+ .procname = "exec_logging",
16203+ .data = &grsec_enable_execlog,
16204+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16205+ .mode = 0600,
16206+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16207+ },
16208+#endif
16209+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
16210+ {
16211+ .ctl_name = GS_SIGNAL,
16212+ .procname = "signal_logging",
16213+ .data = &grsec_enable_signal,
16214+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16215+ .mode = 0600,
16216+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16217+ },
16218+#endif
16219+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
16220+ {
16221+ .ctl_name = GS_FORKFAIL,
16222+ .procname = "forkfail_logging",
16223+ .data = &grsec_enable_forkfail,
16224+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16225+ .mode = 0600,
16226+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16227+ },
16228+#endif
16229+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
16230+ {
16231+ .ctl_name = GS_TIME,
16232+ .procname = "timechange_logging",
16233+ .data = &grsec_enable_time,
16234+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16235+ .mode = 0600,
16236+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16237+ },
16238+#endif
16239+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
16240+ {
16241+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SHMAT,
16242+ .procname = "chroot_deny_shmat",
16243+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat,
16244+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16245+ .mode = 0600,
16246+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16247+ },
16248+#endif
16249+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
16250+ {
16251+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_UNIX,
16252+ .procname = "chroot_deny_unix",
16253+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_unix,
16254+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16255+ .mode = 0600,
16256+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16257+ },
16258+#endif
16259+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
16260+ {
16261+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MNT,
16262+ .procname = "chroot_deny_mount",
16263+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mount,
16264+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16265+ .mode = 0600,
16266+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16267+ },
16268+#endif
16269+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
16270+ {
16271+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR,
16272+ .procname = "chroot_deny_fchdir",
16273+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir,
16274+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16275+ .mode = 0600,
16276+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16277+ },
16278+#endif
16279+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
16280+ {
16281+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_DBL,
16282+ .procname = "chroot_deny_chroot",
16283+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_double,
16284+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16285+ .mode = 0600,
16286+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16287+ },
16288+#endif
16289+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
16290+ {
16291+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_PVT,
16292+ .procname = "chroot_deny_pivot",
16293+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot,
16294+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16295+ .mode = 0600,
16296+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16297+ },
16298+#endif
16299+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
16300+ {
16301+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CD,
16302+ .procname = "chroot_enforce_chdir",
16303+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir,
16304+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16305+ .mode = 0600,
16306+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16307+ },
16308+#endif
16309+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
16310+ {
16311+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CM,
16312+ .procname = "chroot_deny_chmod",
16313+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod,
16314+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16315+ .mode = 0600,
16316+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16317+ },
16318+#endif
16319+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
16320+ {
16321+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MK,
16322+ .procname = "chroot_deny_mknod",
16323+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod,
16324+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16325+ .mode = 0600,
16326+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16327+ },
16328+#endif
16329+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
16330+ {
16331+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_NI,
16332+ .procname = "chroot_restrict_nice",
16333+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_nice,
16334+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16335+ .mode = 0600,
16336+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16337+ },
16338+#endif
16339+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
16340+ {
16341+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG,
16342+ .procname = "chroot_execlog",
16343+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog,
16344+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16345+ .mode = 0600,
16346+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16347+ },
16348+#endif
16349+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
16350+ {
16351+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
16352+ .procname = "chroot_caps",
16353+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_caps,
16354+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16355+ .mode = 0600,
16356+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16357+ },
16358+#endif
16359+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
16360+ {
16361+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL,
16362+ .procname = "chroot_deny_sysctl",
16363+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl,
16364+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16365+ .mode = 0600,
16366+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16367+ },
16368+#endif
16369+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
16370+ {
16371+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE,
16372+ .procname = "tpe",
16373+ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe,
16374+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16375+ .mode = 0600,
16376+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16377+ },
16378+ {
16379+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_GID,
16380+ .procname = "tpe_gid",
16381+ .data = &grsec_tpe_gid,
16382+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16383+ .mode = 0600,
16384+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16385+ },
16386+#endif
16387+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
16388+ {
16389+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_ALL,
16390+ .procname = "tpe_restrict_all",
16391+ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe_all,
16392+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16393+ .mode = 0600,
16394+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16395+ },
16396+#endif
16397+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
16398+ {
16399+ .ctl_name = GS_RANDPID,
16400+ .procname = "rand_pids",
16401+ .data = &grsec_enable_randpid,
16402+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16403+ .mode = 0600,
16404+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16405+ },
16406+#endif
16407+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
16408+ {
16409+ .ctl_name = GS_RANDSRC,
16410+ .procname = "rand_tcp_src_ports",
16411+ .data = &grsec_enable_randsrc,
16412+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16413+ .mode = 0600,
16414+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16415+ },
16416+#endif
16417+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
16418+ {
16419+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL,
16420+ .procname = "socket_all",
16421+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_all,
16422+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16423+ .mode = 0600,
16424+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16425+ },
16426+ {
16427+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID,
16428+ .procname = "socket_all_gid",
16429+ .data = &grsec_socket_all_gid,
16430+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16431+ .mode = 0600,
16432+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16433+ },
16434+#endif
16435+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
16436+ {
16437+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
16438+ .procname = "socket_client",
16439+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_client,
16440+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16441+ .mode = 0600,
16442+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16443+ },
16444+ {
16445+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID,
16446+ .procname = "socket_client_gid",
16447+ .data = &grsec_socket_client_gid,
16448+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16449+ .mode = 0600,
16450+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16451+ },
16452+#endif
16453+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
16454+ {
16455+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER,
16456+ .procname = "socket_server",
16457+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_server,
16458+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16459+ .mode = 0600,
16460+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16461+ },
16462+ {
16463+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID,
16464+ .procname = "socket_server_gid",
16465+ .data = &grsec_socket_server_gid,
16466+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16467+ .mode = 0600,
16468+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16469+ },
16470+#endif
16471+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
16472+ {
16473+ .ctl_name = GS_GROUP,
16474+ .procname = "audit_group",
16475+ .data = &grsec_enable_group,
16476+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16477+ .mode = 0600,
16478+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16479+ },
16480+ {
16481+ .ctl_name = GS_GID,
16482+ .procname = "audit_gid",
16483+ .data = &grsec_audit_gid,
16484+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16485+ .mode = 0600,
16486+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16487+ },
16488+#endif
16489+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
16490+ {
16491+ .ctl_name = GS_ACHDIR,
16492+ .procname = "audit_chdir",
16493+ .data = &grsec_enable_chdir,
16494+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16495+ .mode = 0600,
16496+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16497+ },
16498+#endif
16499+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
16500+ {
16501+ .ctl_name = GS_AMOUNT,
16502+ .procname = "audit_mount",
16503+ .data = &grsec_enable_mount,
16504+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16505+ .mode = 0600,
16506+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16507+ },
16508+#endif
16509+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
16510+ {
16511+ .ctl_name = GS_AIPC,
16512+ .procname = "audit_ipc",
16513+ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_ipc,
16514+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16515+ .mode = 0600,
16516+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16517+ },
16518+#endif
16519+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
16520+ {
16521+ .ctl_name = GS_TEXTREL,
16522+ .procname = "audit_textrel",
16523+ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_textrel,
16524+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16525+ .mode = 0600,
16526+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16527+ },
16528+#endif
16529+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
16530+ {
16531+ .ctl_name = GS_DMSG,
16532+ .procname = "dmesg",
16533+ .data = &grsec_enable_dmesg,
16534+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16535+ .mode = 0600,
16536+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16537+ },
16538+#endif
16539+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
16540+ {
16541+ .ctl_name = GS_FINDTASK,
16542+ .procname = "chroot_findtask",
16543+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
16544+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16545+ .mode = 0600,
16546+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16547+ },
16548+#endif
16549+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
16550+ {
16551+ .ctl_name = GS_SHM,
16552+ .procname = "destroy_unused_shm",
16553+ .data = &grsec_enable_shm,
16554+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16555+ .mode = 0600,
16556+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16557+ },
16558+#endif
16559+ {
16560+ .ctl_name = GS_LOCK,
16561+ .procname = "grsec_lock",
16562+ .data = &grsec_lock,
16563+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16564+ .mode = 0600,
16565+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16566+ },
16567+ { .ctl_name = 0 }
16568+};
16569+#endif
16570diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c
16571--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16572+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16573@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
16574+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16575+#include <linux/sched.h>
16576+#include <linux/mm.h>
16577+#include <linux/file.h>
16578+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16579+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
16580+
16581+void
16582+gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
16583+{
16584+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
16585+ if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel)
16586+ gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff);
16587+#endif
16588+ return;
16589+}
16590diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
16591--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16592+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16593@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
16594+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16595+#include <linux/sched.h>
16596+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16597+
16598+void
16599+gr_log_timechange(void)
16600+{
16601+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
16602+ if (grsec_enable_time)
16603+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TIME_MSG);
16604+#endif
16605+ return;
16606+}
16607diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
16608--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16609+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16610@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
16611+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16612+#include <linux/sched.h>
16613+#include <linux/file.h>
16614+#include <linux/fs.h>
16615+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16616+
16617+extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void);
16618+
16619+int
16620+gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
16621+{
16622+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16623+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
16624+
16625+ if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) &&
16626+ (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
16627+ (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
16628+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
16629+ return 0;
16630+ }
16631+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
16632+ if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
16633+ ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
16634+ (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
16635+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
16636+ return 0;
16637+ }
16638+#endif
16639+#endif
16640+ return 1;
16641+}
16642diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c
16643--- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16644+++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16645@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
16646+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16647+#include <linux/sched.h>
16648+#include <linux/mm.h>
16649+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
16650+#include <linux/crypto.h>
16651+#include <linux/gracl.h>
16652+
16653+
16654+#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE)
16655+#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel"
16656+#endif
16657+
16658+int
16659+chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
16660+{
16661+ char *p;
16662+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
16663+ unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
16664+ struct scatterlist sg[2];
16665+ volatile int retval = 0;
16666+ volatile int dummy = 0;
16667+ unsigned int i;
16668+
16669+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0);
16670+ if (tfm == NULL) {
16671+ /* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */
16672+ return 1;
16673+ }
16674+
16675+ crypto_digest_init(tfm);
16676+
16677+ p = salt;
16678+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
16679+ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
16680+ sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN;
16681+
16682+ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
16683+
16684+ p = entry->pw;
16685+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
16686+ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
16687+ sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw);
16688+
16689+ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
16690+
16691+ crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum);
16692+
16693+ memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
16694+
16695+ for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
16696+ if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
16697+ retval = 1;
16698+ else
16699+ dummy = 1; // waste a cycle
16700+
16701+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
16702+
16703+ return retval;
16704+}
16705diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h
16706--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
16707+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16708@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct exec
16709 set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000L \
16710 ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4))
16711
16712-#define STACK_TOP \
16713+#define __STACK_TOP \
16714 (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL)
16715
16716 #endif
16717diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h
16718--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
16719+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16720@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
16721
16722 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000)
16723
16724+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
16725+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL)
16726+
16727+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16728+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
16729+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16730+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
16731+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16732+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19)
16733+#endif
16734+
16735 /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be
16736 registered using atexit. This provides a mean for the dynamic
16737 linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have
16738diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h
16739--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500
16740+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16741@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
16742 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x20000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
16743 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x40000 /* do not block on IO */
16744
16745+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
16746+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000
16747+#endif
16748+
16749 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
16750 #define MS_SYNC 2 /* synchronous memory sync */
16751 #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */
16752diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h
16753--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
16754+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16755@@ -110,6 +110,15 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
16756 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
16757 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
16758
16759+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
16760+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
16761+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
16762+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
16763+#else
16764+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
16765+#endif
16766+#endif
16767+
16768 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
16769
16770 #endif /* _ALPHA_PAGE_H */
16771diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h
16772--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500
16773+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16774@@ -98,6 +98,17 @@
16775 #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS)
16776 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
16777 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
16778+
16779+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
16780+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE)
16781+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
16782+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
16783+#else
16784+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
16785+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
16786+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
16787+#endif
16788+
16789 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE)
16790
16791 #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x))
16792diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h
16793--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:46.000000000 -0500
16794+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16795@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct exec
16796 #define M_ARM 103
16797
16798 #ifdef __KERNEL__
16799-#define STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \
16800+#define __STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \
16801 TASK_SIZE : TASK_SIZE_26)
16802 #endif
16803
16804diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h
16805--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
16806+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16807@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ typedef struct user_fp elf_fpregset_t;
16808
16809 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
16810
16811+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
16812+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x00008000UL
16813+
16814+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16815+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
16816+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16817+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
16818+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
16819+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
16820+#endif
16821+
16822 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be
16823 registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI. A value of 0 means we
16824 have no such handler. */
16825diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h
16826--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
16827+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16828@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ typedef struct { pgd_t pgd; } pud_t;
16829 */
16830 static inline int pgd_none(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
16831 static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
16832-static inline int pgd_present(pgd_t pgd) { return 1; }
16833+#define pgd_present(x) (pgd_val(x) & _PAGE_PRESENT)
16834 static inline void pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd) { }
16835 #define pud_ERROR(pud) (pgd_ERROR((pud).pgd))
16836
16837diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h
16838--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
16839+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16840@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ struct exec
16841
16842 #ifdef __KERNEL__
16843
16844-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
16845+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
16846+#define __STACK_TOP ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE)
16847+#else
16848+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
16849+#endif
16850
16851 #endif
16852
16853diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h
16854--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
16855+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
16856@@ -8,12 +8,70 @@
16857
16858 #include <linux/preempt.h>
16859 #include <linux/smp.h>
16860-#include <linux/percpu.h>
16861+#include <linux/sched.h>
16862
16863 #include <asm/mmu.h>
16864+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
16865+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
16866
16867-extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES];
16868-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct desc_struct, cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES]);
16869+extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][GDT_ENTRIES];
16870+
16871+#define pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3) \
16872+do { \
16873+ typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \
16874+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \
16875+ local_irq_save(flags); \
16876+ asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3)); \
16877+ load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir); \
16878+} while(0)
16879+
16880+#define pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3) \
16881+do { \
16882+ typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \
16883+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \
16884+ asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3)); \
16885+ local_irq_restore(flags); \
16886+} while(0)
16887+
16888+#define pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3) \
16889+do { \
16890+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \
16891+ asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3)); \
16892+ load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir); \
16893+} while(0)
16894+
16895+#define pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3) \
16896+do { \
16897+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \
16898+ asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3)); \
16899+} while(0)
16900+
16901+static inline void set_user_cs(struct mm_struct *mm, int cpu)
16902+{
16903+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
16904+ unsigned long base = mm->context.user_cs_base;
16905+ unsigned long limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
16906+
16907+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
16908+ unsigned long flags, cr3;
16909+
16910+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
16911+#endif
16912+
16913+ if (limit) {
16914+ limit -= 1UL;
16915+ limit >>= 12;
16916+ }
16917+
16918+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].a = (limit & 0xFFFFUL) | (base << 16);
16919+ cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].b = (limit & 0xF0000UL) | 0xC0FB00UL | (base & 0xFF000000UL) | ((base >> 16) & 0xFFUL);
16920+
16921+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
16922+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
16923+#endif
16924+
16925+#endif
16926+}
16927
16928 struct Xgt_desc_struct {
16929 unsigned short size;
16930@@ -30,7 +88,7 @@ extern struct Xgt_desc_struct idt_descr,
16931 * This is the ldt that every process will get unless we need
16932 * something other than this.
16933 */
16934-extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
16935+extern const struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
16936 extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr);
16937
16938 #define _set_tssldt_desc(n,addr,limit,type) \
16939@@ -44,17 +102,34 @@ __asm__ __volatile__ ("movw %w3,0(%2)\n\
16940 "rorl $16,%%eax" \
16941 : "=m"(*(n)) : "a" (addr), "r"(n), "ir"(limit), "i"(type))
16942
16943-static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, void *addr)
16944+static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, const void *addr)
16945 {
16946- _set_tssldt_desc(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[entry], (int)addr,
16947+ _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][entry], (int)addr,
16948 offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1, 0x89);
16949 }
16950
16951 #define set_tss_desc(cpu,addr) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, addr)
16952
16953-static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, void *addr, unsigned int size)
16954+static inline void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
16955 {
16956- _set_tssldt_desc(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
16957+ _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
16958+}
16959+
16960+static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
16961+{
16962+
16963+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
16964+ unsigned long flags, cr3;
16965+
16966+ pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3);
16967+#endif
16968+
16969+ _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
16970+
16971+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
16972+ pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3);
16973+#endif
16974+
16975 }
16976
16977 #define LDT_entry_a(info) \
16978@@ -70,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned
16979 ((info)->seg_32bit << 22) | \
16980 ((info)->limit_in_pages << 23) | \
16981 ((info)->useable << 20) | \
16982- 0x7000)
16983+ 0x7100)
16984
16985 #define LDT_empty(info) (\
16986 (info)->base_addr == 0 && \
16987@@ -88,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned
16988
16989 static inline void load_TLS(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
16990 {
16991-#define C(i) per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i]
16992+#define C(i) cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i]
16993 C(0); C(1); C(2);
16994 #undef C
16995 }
16996@@ -107,7 +182,7 @@ static inline void clear_LDT(void)
16997 */
16998 static inline void load_LDT_nolock(mm_context_t *pc, int cpu)
16999 {
17000- void *segments = pc->ldt;
17001+ const void *segments = pc->ldt;
17002 int count = pc->size;
17003
17004 if (likely(!count)) {
17005@@ -135,6 +210,22 @@ static inline unsigned long get_desc_bas
17006 return base;
17007 }
17008
17009+static inline void _load_LDT(mm_context_t *pc)
17010+{
17011+ int cpu = get_cpu();
17012+ const void *segments = pc->ldt;
17013+ int count = pc->size;
17014+
17015+ if (likely(!count)) {
17016+ segments = &default_ldt[0];
17017+ count = 5;
17018+ }
17019+
17020+ __set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count);
17021+ load_LDT_desc();
17022+ put_cpu();
17023+}
17024+
17025 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
17026
17027 #endif
17028diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h
17029--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
17030+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17031@@ -72,6 +72,17 @@ typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxr
17032
17033 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
17034
17035+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17036+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL
17037+
17038+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17039+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15
17040+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17041+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15
17042+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17043+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
17044+#endif
17045+
17046 /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
17047 now struct_user_regs, they are different) */
17048
17049@@ -113,8 +124,11 @@ typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxr
17050 * Architecture-neutral AT_ values in 0-17, leave some room
17051 * for more of them, start the x86-specific ones at 32.
17052 */
17053+
17054+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
17055 #define AT_SYSINFO 32
17056 #define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 33
17057+#endif
17058
17059 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17060 #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) do { } while (0)
17061@@ -135,7 +149,14 @@ extern int dump_task_extended_fpu (struc
17062
17063 #define VSYSCALL_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL))
17064 #define VSYSCALL_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VSYSCALL_BASE)
17065+
17066+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
17067+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17068+#define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE : (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
17069+#else
17070 #define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
17071+#endif
17072+
17073 extern void __kernel_vsyscall;
17074
17075 #define ARCH_DLINFO \
17076@@ -191,3 +212,5 @@ do { \
17077 #endif
17078
17079 #endif
17080+
17081+#endif
17082diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h
17083--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
17084+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17085@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32
17086 __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
17087 "pushl %%edi\n\t"
17088 "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
17089- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17090+ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17091 "setc %%al\n\t"
17092 "popl %%ebp\n\t"
17093 "popl %%edi\n\t"
17094@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_as
17095 __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
17096 "pushl %%edi\n\t"
17097 "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
17098- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17099+ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17100 "setc %%bl\n\t"
17101 "popl %%ebp\n\t"
17102 "popl %%edi\n\t"
17103diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h
17104--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
17105+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17106@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
17107 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
17108 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */
17109
17110+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
17111+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000
17112+#endif
17113+
17114 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
17115 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
17116 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
17117diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h
17118--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
17119+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17120@@ -12,6 +12,17 @@ typedef struct {
17121 int size;
17122 struct semaphore sem;
17123 void *ldt;
17124+
17125+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17126+ unsigned long user_cs_base;
17127+ unsigned long user_cs_limit;
17128+
17129+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
17130+ cpumask_t cpu_user_cs_mask;
17131+#endif
17132+
17133+#endif
17134+
17135 } mm_context_t;
17136
17137 #endif
17138diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h
17139--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500
17140+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17141@@ -46,6 +46,13 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
17142 */
17143 if (unlikely(prev->context.ldt != next->context.ldt))
17144 load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
17145+
17146+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
17147+ cpu_clear(cpu, prev->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17148+ cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17149+#endif
17150+
17151+ set_user_cs(next, cpu);
17152 }
17153 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
17154 else {
17155@@ -58,6 +65,12 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
17156 */
17157 load_cr3(next->pgd);
17158 load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
17159+
17160+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17161+ cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17162+#endif
17163+
17164+ set_user_cs(next, cpu);
17165 }
17166 }
17167 #endif
17168diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h
17169--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
17170+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17171@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ struct mod_arch_specific
17172 #define MODULE_STACKSIZE ""
17173 #endif
17174
17175-#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE
17176+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
17177+#define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY "
17178+#else
17179+#define MODULE_GRSEC ""
17180+#endif
17181+
17182+#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE MODULE_GRSEC
17183
17184 #endif /* _ASM_I386_MODULE_H */
17185diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h
17186--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
17187+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17188@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@
17189 #define LARGE_PAGE_MASK (~(LARGE_PAGE_SIZE-1))
17190 #define LARGE_PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PMD_SHIFT)
17191
17192+#include <linux/config.h>
17193+
17194 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17195 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
17196
17197-#include <linux/config.h>
17198-
17199 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW
17200
17201 #include <asm/mmx.h>
17202@@ -127,6 +127,23 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
17203 #define __PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000UL)
17204 #endif
17205
17206+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17207+
17208+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17209+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
17210+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000)
17211+#else
17212+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000UL)
17213+#endif
17214+#else
17215+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
17216+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0)
17217+#else
17218+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0x0UL)
17219+#endif
17220+#endif
17221+
17222+#ifdef __KERNEL__
17223
17224 #define PAGE_OFFSET ((unsigned long)__PAGE_OFFSET)
17225 #define VMALLOC_RESERVE ((unsigned long)__VMALLOC_RESERVE)
17226@@ -148,6 +165,19 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
17227 ((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \
17228 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17229
17230+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17231+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17232+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17233+ ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
17234+#else
17235+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
17236+#endif
17237+#endif
17238+
17239+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17240+#define CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT 1
17241+#endif
17242+
17243 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17244
17245 #endif /* _I386_PAGE_H */
17246diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h
17247--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
17248+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17249@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
17250 #include <linux/mm.h> /* for struct page */
17251
17252 #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
17253- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
17254+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
17255
17256 #define pmd_populate(mm, pmd, pte) \
17257 set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + \
17258diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h
17259--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
17260+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17261@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@
17262 */
17263 #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page))
17264 extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024];
17265-extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024];
17266 extern kmem_cache_t *pgd_cache;
17267 extern kmem_cache_t *pmd_cache;
17268 extern spinlock_t pgd_lock;
17269@@ -42,6 +41,7 @@ void pgd_ctor(void *, kmem_cache_t *, un
17270 void pgd_dtor(void *, kmem_cache_t *, unsigned long);
17271 void pgtable_cache_init(void);
17272 void paging_init(void);
17273+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
17274
17275 /*
17276 * The Linux x86 paging architecture is 'compile-time dual-mode', it
17277@@ -56,6 +56,23 @@ void paging_init(void);
17278 # include <asm/pgtable-2level-defs.h>
17279 #endif
17280
17281+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
17282+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
17283+extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
17284+extern pmd_t swapper_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD];
17285+
17286+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17287+extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
17288+extern pmd_t kernexec_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD];
17289+#endif
17290+#else
17291+extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
17292+
17293+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17294+extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
17295+#endif
17296+#endif
17297+
17298 #define PGDIR_SIZE (1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT)
17299 #define PGDIR_MASK (~(PGDIR_SIZE-1))
17300
17301@@ -138,17 +155,26 @@ void paging_init(void);
17302
17303 #define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC \
17304 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17305-#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \
17306- __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
17307 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC \
17308 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17309-#define PAGE_COPY \
17310- PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17311 #define PAGE_READONLY \
17312 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
17313 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC \
17314 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17315
17316+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17317+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17318+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17319+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17320+#else
17321+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17322+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \
17323+ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
17324+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17325+#endif
17326+
17327+#define PAGE_COPY \
17328+ PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17329 #define _PAGE_KERNEL \
17330 (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
17331 #define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \
17332@@ -173,18 +199,18 @@ extern unsigned long long __PAGE_KERNEL,
17333 * This is the closest we can get..
17334 */
17335 #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
17336-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
17337-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
17338-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
17339+#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17340+#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17341+#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17342 #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
17343 #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
17344 #define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
17345 #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
17346
17347 #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
17348-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
17349-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
17350-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
17351+#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17352+#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17353+#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17354 #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
17355 #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
17356 #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
17357@@ -396,6 +422,9 @@ extern void noexec_setup(const char *str
17358
17359 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
17360
17361+#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA
17362+#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN
17363+
17364 #ifndef CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM
17365 #define kern_addr_valid(addr) (1)
17366 #endif /* !CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM */
17367diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h
17368--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
17369+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17370@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
17371 #include <linux/cache.h>
17372 #include <linux/config.h>
17373 #include <linux/threads.h>
17374-#include <asm/percpu.h>
17375
17376 /* flag for disabling the tsc */
17377 extern int tsc_disable;
17378@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ struct desc_struct {
17379 };
17380
17381 #define desc_empty(desc) \
17382- (!((desc)->a + (desc)->b))
17383+ (!((desc)->a | (desc)->b))
17384
17385 #define desc_equal(desc1, desc2) \
17386 (((desc1)->a == (desc2)->a) && ((desc1)->b == (desc2)->b))
17387@@ -87,7 +86,10 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
17388 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
17389 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
17390 extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
17391+#if 0
17392 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
17393+#endif
17394+extern struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS];
17395
17396 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
17397 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 cpu_data[];
17398@@ -301,10 +303,23 @@ extern int bootloader_type;
17399 */
17400 #define TASK_SIZE (PAGE_OFFSET)
17401
17402+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17403+#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE ((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2)
17404+#endif
17405+
17406 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
17407 * space during mmap's.
17408 */
17409+
17410+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17411+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3))
17412+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
17413+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : TASK_SIZE/3))
17414+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17415+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3))
17416+#else
17417 #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3))
17418+#endif
17419
17420 #define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
17421
17422@@ -509,16 +524,12 @@ void show_trace(struct task_struct *task
17423 unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
17424
17425 #define THREAD_SIZE_LONGS (THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long))
17426-#define KSTK_TOP(info) \
17427-({ \
17428- unsigned long *__ptr = (unsigned long *)(info); \
17429- (unsigned long)(&__ptr[THREAD_SIZE_LONGS]); \
17430-})
17431+#define KSTK_TOP(info) ((info)->task.thread.esp0)
17432
17433 #define task_pt_regs(task) \
17434 ({ \
17435 struct pt_regs *__regs__; \
17436- __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)KSTK_TOP((task)->thread_info); \
17437+ __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)((task)->thread.esp0); \
17438 __regs__ - 1; \
17439 })
17440
17441@@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void rep_nop(void)
17442 extern inline void prefetch(const void *x)
17443 {
17444 alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
17445- "prefetchnta (%1)",
17446+ "prefetchnta (%2)",
17447 X86_FEATURE_XMM,
17448 "r" (x));
17449 }
17450@@ -656,7 +667,7 @@ extern inline void prefetch(const void *
17451 extern inline void prefetchw(const void *x)
17452 {
17453 alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
17454- "prefetchw (%1)",
17455+ "prefetchw (%2)",
17456 X86_FEATURE_3DNOW,
17457 "r" (x));
17458 }
17459diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h
17460--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
17461+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17462@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
17463 #include <linux/kernel.h>
17464 #include <asm/segment.h>
17465 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
17466+#include <asm/page.h>
17467 #include <linux/bitops.h> /* for LOCK_PREFIX */
17468
17469 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17470@@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ struct alt_instr {
17471 asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \
17472 ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \
17473 " .align 4\n" \
17474- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \
17475+ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \
17476 " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \
17477 " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \
17478 " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \
17479@@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ struct alt_instr {
17480 ".previous\n" \
17481 ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \
17482 "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \
17483- ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory")
17484+ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : "memory")
17485
17486 /*
17487 * Alternative inline assembly with input.
17488@@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ struct alt_instr {
17489 asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \
17490 ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \
17491 " .align 4\n" \
17492- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \
17493+ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \
17494 " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \
17495 " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \
17496 " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \
17497@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ struct alt_instr {
17498 ".previous\n" \
17499 ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \
17500 "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \
17501- ".previous" :: "i" (feature), ##input)
17502+ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET), ##input)
17503
17504 /*
17505 * Force strict CPU ordering.
17506diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h
17507--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
17508+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17509@@ -162,6 +162,16 @@ typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t[ELF_NGR
17510 typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t;
17511 typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG];
17512
17513+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17514+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
17515+
17516+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17517+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
17518+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17519+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
17520+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17521+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
17522+#endif
17523
17524
17525 struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration... */
17526diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h
17527--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
17528+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17529@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
17530 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x08000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
17531 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */
17532
17533+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
17534+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x40000
17535+#endif
17536+
17537 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
17538 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
17539 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
17540diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h
17541--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
17542+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17543@@ -204,4 +204,13 @@ get_order (unsigned long size)
17544 (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) != 0) \
17545 ? VM_EXEC : 0))
17546
17547+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17548+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17549+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17550+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17551+#else
17552+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17553+#endif
17554+#endif
17555+
17556 #endif /* _ASM_IA64_PAGE_H */
17557diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h
17558--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:37:53.000000000 -0500
17559+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17560@@ -121,6 +121,17 @@
17561 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
17562 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
17563 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
17564+
17565+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17566+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW)
17567+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
17568+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
17569+#else
17570+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17571+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17572+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
17573+#endif
17574+
17575 #define PAGE_GATE __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX)
17576 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX)
17577 #define PAGE_KERNELRX __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
17578diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h
17579--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2005-03-02 02:37:58.000000000 -0500
17580+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17581@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
17582 .on_ustack = 0, \
17583 .ksp = 0, \
17584 .map_base = DEFAULT_MAP_BASE, \
17585- .rbs_bot = STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \
17586+ .rbs_bot = __STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \
17587 .task_size = DEFAULT_TASK_SIZE, \
17588 .last_fph_cpu = -1, \
17589 INIT_THREAD_IA32 \
17590diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h
17591--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
17592+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17593@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@
17594 #define MAX_USER_STACK_SIZE (RGN_MAP_LIMIT/2)
17595 /* Make a default stack size of 2GB */
17596 #define DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE (1UL << 31)
17597-#define STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
17598+#define __STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
17599
17600 #endif /* _ASM_IA64_USTACK_H */
17601diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h
17602--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500
17603+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17604@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ struct exec
17605 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17606
17607 #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32
17608-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17609+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17610 #endif
17611 #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64
17612-#define STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
17613+#define __STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
17614 #endif
17615
17616 #endif
17617diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h
17618--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
17619+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17620@@ -279,4 +279,15 @@ extern int dump_task_fpu(struct task_str
17621 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
17622 #endif
17623
17624+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17625+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
17626+
17627+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17628+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
17629+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17630+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
17631+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17632+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
17633+#endif
17634+
17635 #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */
17636diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h
17637--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:01.000000000 -0500
17638+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17639@@ -139,6 +139,15 @@ static __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
17640 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
17641 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17642
17643+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17644+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17645+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17646+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17647+#else
17648+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17649+#endif
17650+#endif
17651+
17652 #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE)
17653 #define CAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - UNCAC_BASE + PAGE_OFFSET)
17654
17655diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h
17656--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
17657+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17658@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct exec
17659 /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc.
17660 * prumpf */
17661
17662-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17663+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17664
17665 #endif
17666
17667diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h
17668--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
17669+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17670@@ -337,6 +337,17 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration..
17671
17672 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000)
17673
17674+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17675+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
17676+
17677+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17678+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
17679+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17680+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
17681+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17682+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
17683+#endif
17684+
17685 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
17686 instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
17687 but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */
17688diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h
17689--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
17690+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17691@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
17692 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x10000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
17693 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x20000 /* do not block on IO */
17694
17695+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
17696+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
17697+#endif
17698+
17699 #define MS_SYNC 1 /* synchronous memory sync */
17700 #define MS_ASYNC 2 /* sync memory asynchronously */
17701 #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */
17702diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h
17703--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
17704+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17705@@ -157,6 +157,15 @@ extern int npmem_ranges;
17706 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
17707 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17708
17709+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17710+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17711+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17712+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17713+#else
17714+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17715+#endif
17716+#endif
17717+
17718 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17719
17720 #endif /* _PARISC_PAGE_H */
17721diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h
17722--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
17723+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17724@@ -210,6 +210,17 @@ extern void *vmalloc_start;
17725 #define PAGE_EXECREAD __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
17726 #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_EXECREAD
17727 #define PAGE_RWX __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
17728+
17729+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17730+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17731+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17732+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17733+#else
17734+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17735+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
17736+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17737+#endif
17738+
17739 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
17740 #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
17741 #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE)
17742diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h
17743--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
17744+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17745@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
17746 #define __PPC_A_OUT_H__
17747
17748 /* grabbed from the intel stuff */
17749-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17750+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17751
17752
17753 struct exec
17754diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h
17755--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
17756+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17757@@ -90,6 +90,17 @@ struct task_struct;
17758
17759 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000)
17760
17761+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17762+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL
17763+
17764+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17765+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15
17766+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17767+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15
17768+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17769+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 15
17770+#endif
17771+
17772 #define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP
17773 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096
17774
17775diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h
17776--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500
17777+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17778@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
17779 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
17780 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */
17781
17782+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
17783+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200
17784+#endif
17785+
17786 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
17787 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
17788 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
17789diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h
17790--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
17791+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17792@@ -163,5 +163,14 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
17793 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
17794 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17795
17796+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17797+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17798+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17799+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17800+#else
17801+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17802+#endif
17803+#endif
17804+
17805 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17806 #endif /* _PPC_PAGE_H */
17807diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h
17808--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
17809+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17810@@ -389,11 +389,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
17811
17812 #define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE)
17813 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
17814-#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
17815+#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
17816 #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW)
17817-#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
17818+#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
17819 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
17820-#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
17821+#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
17822+
17823+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x)
17824+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17825+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17826+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17827+#else
17828+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17829+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
17830+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17831+#endif
17832
17833 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_RAM)
17834 #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(_PAGE_IO)
17835@@ -405,21 +415,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
17836 * This is the closest we can get..
17837 */
17838 #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
17839-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X
17840-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
17841-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X
17842-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
17843+#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17844+#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17845+#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17846+#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X
17847 #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X
17848-#define __P110 PAGE_COPY
17849+#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X
17850 #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X
17851
17852 #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
17853-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X
17854-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
17855-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X
17856-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
17857+#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17858+#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17859+#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17860+#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X
17861 #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X
17862-#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
17863+#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X
17864 #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X
17865
17866 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
17867diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h
17868--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500
17869+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17870@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ struct exec
17871 /* Give 32-bit user space a full 4G address space to live in. */
17872 #define STACK_TOP_USER32 (TASK_SIZE_USER32)
17873
17874-#define STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \
17875+#define __STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \
17876 (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? \
17877 STACK_TOP_USER32 : STACK_TOP_USER64)
17878
17879diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h
17880--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
17881+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17882@@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ typedef elf_vrreg_t elf_vrregset_t32[ELF
17883
17884 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000)
17885
17886+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17887+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (0x10000000UL)
17888+
17889+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17890+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
17891+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17892+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
17893+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17894+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24)
17895+#endif
17896+
17897 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17898
17899 /* Common routine for both 32-bit and 64-bit processes */
17900diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h
17901--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
17902+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17903@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
17904 #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
17905 #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
17906
17907+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
17908+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200
17909+#endif
17910+
17911 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
17912 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
17913 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
17914diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h
17915--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
17916+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17917@@ -235,5 +235,14 @@ extern u64 ppc64_pft_size; /* Log 2 of
17918 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
17919 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17920
17921+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17922+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17923+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17924+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17925+#else
17926+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17927+#endif
17928+#endif
17929+
17930 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17931 #endif /* _PPC64_PAGE_H */
17932diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h
17933--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
17934+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17935@@ -115,6 +115,17 @@
17936 #define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
17937 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
17938 #define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
17939+
17940+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17941+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17942+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17943+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17944+#else
17945+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17946+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
17947+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17948+#endif
17949+
17950 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRENABLE)
17951 #define PAGE_KERNEL_CI __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \
17952 _PAGE_WRENABLE | _PAGE_NO_CACHE | _PAGE_GUARDED)
17953@@ -126,21 +137,21 @@
17954 * This is the closest we can get..
17955 */
17956 #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
17957-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X
17958-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
17959-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X
17960-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
17961+#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17962+#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17963+#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
17964+#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X
17965 #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X
17966-#define __P110 PAGE_COPY
17967+#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X
17968 #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X
17969
17970 #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
17971-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X
17972-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
17973-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X
17974-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
17975+#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
17976+#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17977+#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
17978+#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X
17979 #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X
17980-#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
17981+#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X
17982 #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X
17983
17984 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
17985diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h
17986--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
17987+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
17988@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head
17989
17990 #include <asm/page.h>
17991
17992-#define STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
17993+#define __STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
17994
17995 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17996
17997diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h
17998--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500
17999+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18000@@ -145,6 +145,17 @@ typedef struct {
18001
18002 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE)
18003
18004+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18005+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
18006+
18007+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18008+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
18009+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18010+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
18011+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18012+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
18013+#endif
18014+
18015 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
18016 instruction set this cpu supports. This can NOT be done in userspace
18017 on Sparc. */
18018diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h
18019--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500
18020+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18021@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
18022 #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
18023 #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
18024
18025+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
18026+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
18027+#endif
18028+
18029 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
18030 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
18031 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
18032diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h
18033--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500
18034+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18035@@ -176,6 +176,15 @@ extern unsigned long pfn_base;
18036 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18037 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18038
18039+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18040+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18041+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18042+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18043+#else
18044+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18045+#endif
18046+#endif
18047+
18048 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18049
18050 #endif /* _SPARC_PAGE_H */
18051diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h
18052--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
18053+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18054@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_none)
18055 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared)
18056 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy)
18057 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly)
18058+
18059+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18060+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec)
18061+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec)
18062+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec)
18063+#endif
18064+
18065 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
18066
18067 #define PMD_SHIFT SUN4C_PMD_SHIFT
18068@@ -71,6 +78,16 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
18069 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy))
18070 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly))
18071
18072+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18073+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec))
18074+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec))
18075+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec))
18076+#else
18077+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18078+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
18079+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18080+#endif
18081+
18082 extern unsigned long page_kernel;
18083
18084 #ifdef MODULE
18085diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h
18086--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500
18087+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18088@@ -115,6 +115,16 @@
18089 SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
18090 #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18091 SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
18092+
18093+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18094+#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18095+ SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF)
18096+#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18097+ SRMMU_REF)
18098+#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18099+ SRMMU_REF)
18100+#endif
18101+
18102 #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \
18103 SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF)
18104
18105diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h
18106--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
18107+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18108@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
18109 * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting
18110 * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions.
18111 */
18112-#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < STACK_TOP)
18113+#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < __STACK_TOP)
18114 #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
18115 #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size)))
18116 #define access_ok(type,addr,size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size))
18117diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h
18118--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
18119+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18120@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head
18121
18122 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18123
18124-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
18125+#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
18126
18127 #endif
18128
18129diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h
18130--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500
18131+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18132@@ -140,6 +140,16 @@ typedef struct {
18133 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x0000010000000000UL
18134 #endif
18135
18136+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18137+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL)
18138+
18139+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
18140+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
18141+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
18142+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
18143+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18144+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 )
18145+#endif
18146
18147 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
18148 instruction set this cpu supports. */
18149diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h
18150--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
18151+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18152@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
18153 #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */
18154 #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */
18155
18156+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
18157+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400
18158+#endif
18159+
18160 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
18161 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
18162 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
18163diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h
18164--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
18165+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18166@@ -156,6 +156,15 @@ static __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
18167 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18168 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18169
18170+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18171+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18172+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18173+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18174+#else
18175+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18176+#endif
18177+#endif
18178+
18179 #endif /* !(__KERNEL__) */
18180
18181 #endif /* !(_SPARC64_PAGE_H) */
18182diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h
18183--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
18184+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18185@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct exec
18186
18187 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18188 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
18189-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE)
18190+#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE)
18191 #endif
18192
18193 #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */
18194diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h
18195--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500
18196+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18197@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ typedef struct user_i387_struct elf_fpre
18198
18199 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
18200
18201+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18202+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL)
18203+
18204+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18205+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18206+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18207+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18208+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18209+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18210+#endif
18211+
18212 /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
18213 now struct_user_regs, they are different). Assumes current is the process
18214 getting dumped. */
18215diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h
18216--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
18217+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18218@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
18219 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
18220 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */
18221
18222+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
18223+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x8000
18224+#endif
18225+
18226 #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */
18227 #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */
18228 #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */
18229diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h
18230--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
18231+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18232@@ -136,6 +136,15 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
18233 (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \
18234 VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18235
18236+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18237+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18238+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18239+ ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18240+#else
18241+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18242+#endif
18243+#endif
18244+
18245 #define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
18246
18247 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18248diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h
18249--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
18250+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18251@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
18252 #include <linux/mm.h>
18253
18254 #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
18255- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
18256+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
18257 #define pud_populate(mm, pud, pmd) \
18258 set_pud(pud, __pud(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd)))
18259 #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pud) \
18260diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h
18261--- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
18262+++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18263@@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ extern inline void pgd_clear (pgd_t * pg
18264 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18265 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18266 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18267+
18268+#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18269+#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18270+
18271 #define __PAGE_KERNEL \
18272 (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18273 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \
18274diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h
18275--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
18276+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18277@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@
18278
18279 #include <asm/a.out.h>
18280
18281+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
18282+#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
18283+#else
18284+#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL
18285+#endif
18286+
18287+#ifndef STACK_TOP
18288+#define STACK_TOP (__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK)
18289+#endif
18290+
18291 #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */
18292
18293 /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */
18294@@ -37,6 +47,14 @@ enum machine_type {
18295 M_MIPS2 = 152 /* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
18296 };
18297
18298+/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
18299+#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
18300+#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
18301+#define F_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
18302+#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
18303+#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
18304+#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
18305+
18306 #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
18307 #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
18308 #endif
18309diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h
18310--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
18311+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18312@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
18313 unsigned interp_flags;
18314 unsigned interp_data;
18315 unsigned long loader, exec;
18316+ int misc;
18317 };
18318
18319 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0
18320@@ -83,5 +84,8 @@ extern void compute_creds(struct linux_b
18321 extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs);
18322 extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
18323
18324+void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp);
18325+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp);
18326+
18327 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18328 #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */
18329diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h
18330--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
18331+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18332@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@
18333 #include <linux/types.h>
18334 #include <asm/elf.h>
18335
18336+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
18337+#undef elf_read_implies_exec
18338+#endif
18339+
18340 #ifndef elf_read_implies_exec
18341 /* Executables for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will
18342 have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically.
18343@@ -45,6 +49,16 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword;
18344
18345 #define PT_GNU_STACK (PT_LOOS + 0x474e551)
18346
18347+#define PT_PAX_FLAGS (PT_LOOS + 0x5041580)
18348+
18349+/* Constants for the e_flags field */
18350+#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
18351+#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
18352+#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
18353+#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
18354+#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
18355+#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
18356+
18357 /* These constants define the different elf file types */
18358 #define ET_NONE 0
18359 #define ET_REL 1
18360@@ -137,6 +151,8 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword;
18361 #define DT_DEBUG 21
18362 #define DT_TEXTREL 22
18363 #define DT_JMPREL 23
18364+#define DT_FLAGS 30
18365+ #define DF_TEXTREL 0x00000004
18366 #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000
18367 #define DT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff
18368
18369@@ -287,6 +303,19 @@ typedef struct elf64_hdr {
18370 #define PF_W 0x2
18371 #define PF_X 0x1
18372
18373+#define PF_PAGEEXEC (1 << 4) /* Enable PAGEEXEC */
18374+#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC (1 << 5) /* Disable PAGEEXEC */
18375+#define PF_SEGMEXEC (1 << 6) /* Enable SEGMEXEC */
18376+#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC (1 << 7) /* Disable SEGMEXEC */
18377+#define PF_MPROTECT (1 << 8) /* Enable MPROTECT */
18378+#define PF_NOMPROTECT (1 << 9) /* Disable MPROTECT */
18379+#define PF_RANDEXEC (1 << 10) /* Enable RANDEXEC */
18380+#define PF_NORANDEXEC (1 << 11) /* Disable RANDEXEC */
18381+#define PF_EMUTRAMP (1 << 12) /* Enable EMUTRAMP */
18382+#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP (1 << 13) /* Disable EMUTRAMP */
18383+#define PF_RANDMMAP (1 << 14) /* Enable RANDMMAP */
18384+#define PF_NORANDMMAP (1 << 15) /* Disable RANDMMAP */
18385+
18386 typedef struct elf32_phdr{
18387 Elf32_Word p_type;
18388 Elf32_Off p_offset;
18389@@ -379,6 +408,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {
18390 #define EI_OSABI 7
18391 #define EI_PAD 8
18392
18393+#define EI_PAX 14
18394+
18395 #define ELFMAG0 0x7f /* EI_MAG */
18396 #define ELFMAG1 'E'
18397 #define ELFMAG2 'L'
18398@@ -435,6 +466,7 @@ extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
18399 #define elfhdr elf32_hdr
18400 #define elf_phdr elf32_phdr
18401 #define elf_note elf32_note
18402+#define elf_dyn Elf32_Dyn
18403
18404 #else
18405
18406@@ -442,6 +474,7 @@ extern Elf64_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
18407 #define elfhdr elf64_hdr
18408 #define elf_phdr elf64_phdr
18409 #define elf_note elf64_note
18410+#define elf_dyn Elf64_Dyn
18411
18412 #endif
18413
18414diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h
18415--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
18416+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18417@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ static inline int break_lease(struct ino
18418
18419 /* fs/open.c */
18420
18421-extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start);
18422+extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *);
18423 extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
18424 extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
18425 extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);
18426diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h
18427--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
18428+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18429@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
18430+#ifndef GR_ACL_H
18431+#define GR_ACL_H
18432+
18433+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
18434+#include <linux/resource.h>
18435+#include <linux/dcache.h>
18436+#include <asm/resource.h>
18437+
18438+/* Major status information */
18439+
18440+#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.1.3"
18441+#define GRSECURITY_VERSION 0x213
18442+
18443+enum {
18444+
18445+ SHUTDOWN = 0,
18446+ ENABLE = 1,
18447+ SPROLE = 2,
18448+ RELOAD = 3,
18449+ SEGVMOD = 4,
18450+ STATUS = 5,
18451+ UNSPROLE = 6
18452+};
18453+
18454+/* Password setup definitions
18455+ * kernel/grhash.c */
18456+enum {
18457+ GR_PW_LEN = 128,
18458+ GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
18459+ GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
18460+};
18461+
18462+enum {
18463+ GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
18464+};
18465+
18466+#define GR_NLIMITS (RLIMIT_LOCKS + 2)
18467+
18468+/* Begin Data Structures */
18469+
18470+struct sprole_pw {
18471+ unsigned char *rolename;
18472+ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
18473+ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
18474+};
18475+
18476+struct name_entry {
18477+ ino_t inode;
18478+ dev_t device;
18479+ char *name;
18480+ __u16 len;
18481+};
18482+
18483+struct acl_role_db {
18484+ struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
18485+ __u32 r_size;
18486+};
18487+
18488+struct name_db {
18489+ struct name_entry **n_hash;
18490+ __u32 n_size;
18491+};
18492+
18493+struct crash_uid {
18494+ uid_t uid;
18495+ unsigned long expires;
18496+};
18497+
18498+struct gr_hash_struct {
18499+ void **table;
18500+ void **nametable;
18501+ void *first;
18502+ __u32 table_size;
18503+ __u32 used_size;
18504+ int type;
18505+};
18506+
18507+/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
18508+
18509+struct acl_subject_label {
18510+ char *filename;
18511+ ino_t inode;
18512+ dev_t device;
18513+ __u32 mode;
18514+ __u32 cap_mask;
18515+ __u32 cap_lower;
18516+
18517+ struct rlimit res[GR_NLIMITS];
18518+ __u16 resmask;
18519+
18520+ __u8 user_trans_type;
18521+ __u8 group_trans_type;
18522+ uid_t *user_transitions;
18523+ gid_t *group_transitions;
18524+ __u16 user_trans_num;
18525+ __u16 group_trans_num;
18526+
18527+ __u32 ip_proto[8];
18528+ __u32 ip_type;
18529+ struct acl_ip_label **ips;
18530+ __u32 ip_num;
18531+
18532+ __u32 crashes;
18533+ unsigned long expires;
18534+
18535+ struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
18536+ struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
18537+ struct acl_subject_label *prev;
18538+ struct acl_subject_label *next;
18539+
18540+ struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
18541+ __u32 obj_hash_size;
18542+};
18543+
18544+struct role_allowed_ip {
18545+ __u32 addr;
18546+ __u32 netmask;
18547+
18548+ struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
18549+ struct role_allowed_ip *next;
18550+};
18551+
18552+struct role_transition {
18553+ char *rolename;
18554+
18555+ struct role_transition *prev;
18556+ struct role_transition *next;
18557+};
18558+
18559+struct acl_role_label {
18560+ char *rolename;
18561+ uid_t uidgid;
18562+ __u16 roletype;
18563+
18564+ __u16 auth_attempts;
18565+ unsigned long expires;
18566+
18567+ struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
18568+ struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
18569+
18570+ struct acl_role_label *prev;
18571+ struct acl_role_label *next;
18572+
18573+ struct role_transition *transitions;
18574+ struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
18575+ uid_t *domain_children;
18576+ __u16 domain_child_num;
18577+
18578+ struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
18579+ __u32 subj_hash_size;
18580+};
18581+
18582+struct user_acl_role_db {
18583+ struct acl_role_label **r_table;
18584+ __u32 num_pointers; /* Number of allocations to track */
18585+ __u32 num_roles; /* Number of roles */
18586+ __u32 num_domain_children; /* Number of domain children */
18587+ __u32 num_subjects; /* Number of subjects */
18588+ __u32 num_objects; /* Number of objects */
18589+};
18590+
18591+struct acl_object_label {
18592+ char *filename;
18593+ ino_t inode;
18594+ dev_t device;
18595+ __u32 mode;
18596+
18597+ struct acl_subject_label *nested;
18598+ struct acl_object_label *globbed;
18599+
18600+ /* next two structures not used */
18601+
18602+ struct acl_object_label *prev;
18603+ struct acl_object_label *next;
18604+};
18605+
18606+struct acl_ip_label {
18607+ __u32 addr;
18608+ __u32 netmask;
18609+ __u16 low, high;
18610+ __u8 mode;
18611+ __u32 type;
18612+ __u32 proto[8];
18613+
18614+ /* next two structures not used */
18615+
18616+ struct acl_ip_label *prev;
18617+ struct acl_ip_label *next;
18618+};
18619+
18620+struct gr_arg {
18621+ struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
18622+ unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
18623+ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
18624+ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
18625+ unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
18626+ struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
18627+ dev_t segv_device;
18628+ ino_t segv_inode;
18629+ uid_t segv_uid;
18630+ __u16 num_sprole_pws;
18631+ __u16 mode;
18632+};
18633+
18634+struct gr_arg_wrapper {
18635+ struct gr_arg *arg;
18636+ __u32 version;
18637+ __u32 size;
18638+};
18639+
18640+struct subject_map {
18641+ struct acl_subject_label *user;
18642+ struct acl_subject_label *kernel;
18643+};
18644+
18645+struct acl_subj_map_db {
18646+ struct subject_map **s_hash;
18647+ __u32 s_size;
18648+};
18649+
18650+/* End Data Structures Section */
18651+
18652+/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
18653+ Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times
18654+ in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match.
18655+ Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
18656+
18657+static __inline__ unsigned long
18658+chash(const void *dentry, const void *mnt, const struct acl_subject_label *subj,
18659+ const unsigned long sz)
18660+{
18661+ return (((const unsigned long)subj + (const unsigned long)mnt +
18662+ (const unsigned long)dentry) % sz);
18663+}
18664+
18665+static __inline__ unsigned long
18666+rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz)
18667+{
18668+ return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
18669+}
18670+
18671+ static __inline__ unsigned long
18672+shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned long sz)
18673+{
18674+ return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz);
18675+}
18676+
18677+static __inline__ unsigned long
18678+fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned long sz)
18679+{
18680+ return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
18681+}
18682+
18683+static __inline__ unsigned long
18684+nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz)
18685+{
18686+ return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz;
18687+}
18688+
18689+#endif
18690+
18691diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h
18692--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
18693+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18694@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
18695+#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
18696+#define __GRALLOC_H
18697+
18698+void acl_free_all(void);
18699+int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
18700+void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
18701+
18702+#endif
18703diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h
18704--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
18705+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18706@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
18707+#ifndef GRDEFS_H
18708+#define GRDEFS_H
18709+
18710+/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
18711+
18712+enum {
18713+ GR_READY = 0x01,
18714+ GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state
18715+};
18716+
18717+/* Begin ACL declarations */
18718+
18719+/* Role flags */
18720+
18721+enum {
18722+ GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
18723+ GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
18724+ GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
18725+ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
18726+ GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
18727+ GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
18728+ GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040,
18729+ GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080,
18730+ GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100,
18731+ GR_ROLE_DOMAIN = 0x0200
18732+};
18733+
18734+/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
18735+enum {
18736+ GR_DELETED = 0x80000000
18737+};
18738+
18739+/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
18740+enum {
18741+ GR_READ = 0x00000001,
18742+ GR_APPEND = 0x00000002,
18743+ GR_WRITE = 0x00000004,
18744+ GR_EXEC = 0x00000008,
18745+ GR_FIND = 0x00000010,
18746+ GR_INHERIT = 0x00000020,
18747+ GR_SETID = 0x00000040,
18748+ GR_CREATE = 0x00000080,
18749+ GR_DELETE = 0x00000100,
18750+ GR_LINK = 0x00000200,
18751+ GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00000400,
18752+ GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00000800,
18753+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x00001000,
18754+ GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00002000,
18755+ GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00004000,
18756+ GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00008000,
18757+ GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00010000,
18758+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00020000,
18759+ GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00040000,
18760+ GR_AUDIT_LINK = 0x00080000,
18761+ GR_PTRACERD = 0x00100000,
18762+ GR_NOPTRACE = 0x00200000,
18763+ GR_SUPPRESS = 0x00400000,
18764+ GR_NOLEARN = 0x00800000
18765+};
18766+
18767+#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
18768+ GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
18769+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_LINK)
18770+
18771+/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
18772+enum {
18773+ GR_KILL = 0x00000001,
18774+ GR_VIEW = 0x00000002,
18775+ GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000004,
18776+ GR_LEARN = 0x00000008,
18777+ GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000010,
18778+ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
18779+ GR_DUMMY = 0x00000020,
18780+ GR_PAXPAGE = 0x00000040,
18781+ GR_PAXSEGM = 0x00000080,
18782+ GR_PAXGCC = 0x00000100,
18783+ GR_PAXRANDMMAP = 0x00000200,
18784+ GR_PAXMPROTECT = 0x00000400,
18785+ GR_PROTSHM = 0x00000800,
18786+ GR_KILLPROC = 0x00001000,
18787+ GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00002000,
18788+ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
18789+ GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00004000,
18790+ GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00008000,
18791+ GR_PROCACCT = 0x00010000,
18792+ GR_RELAXPTRACE = 0x00020000,
18793+ GR_NESTED = 0x00040000,
18794+ GR_INHERITLEARN = 0x00080000,
18795+ GR_PROCFIND = 0x00100000,
18796+ GR_POVERRIDE = 0x00200000
18797+};
18798+
18799+enum {
18800+ GR_ID_USER = 0x01,
18801+ GR_ID_GROUP = 0x02,
18802+};
18803+
18804+enum {
18805+ GR_ID_ALLOW = 0x01,
18806+ GR_ID_DENY = 0x02,
18807+};
18808+
18809+#define GR_CRASH_RES 11
18810+#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
18811+
18812+/* begin resource learning section */
18813+enum {
18814+ GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
18815+ GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
18816+ GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
18817+ GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
18818+ GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
18819+ GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
18820+ GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
18821+ GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
18822+ GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
18823+ GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
18824+ GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
18825+};
18826+
18827+#endif
18828diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h
18829--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
18830+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
18831@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
18832+#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
18833+#define __GRINTERNAL_H
18834+
18835+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
18836+
18837+#include <linux/fs.h>
18838+#include <linux/gracl.h>
18839+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
18840+#include <linux/grmsg.h>
18841+
18842+extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
18843+extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
18844+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
18845+extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
18846+ const struct dentry *parent,
18847+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
18848+extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
18849+extern __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
18850+extern int gr_set_acls(const int type);
18851+
18852+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
18853+extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
18854+
18855+extern void gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task);
18856+extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
18857+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
18858+extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry,
18859+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
18860+extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry,
18861+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
18862+extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry,
18863+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
18864+
18865+extern int grsec_enable_link;
18866+extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
18867+extern int grsec_enable_execve;
18868+extern int grsec_enable_shm;
18869+extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
18870+extern int grsec_enable_signal;
18871+extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
18872+extern int grsec_enable_time;
18873+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
18874+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
18875+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
18876+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
18877+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
18878+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
18879+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
18880+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
18881+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
18882+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
18883+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
18884+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
18885+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
18886+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
18887+extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
18888+extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
18889+extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
18890+extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
18891+extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
18892+extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
18893+extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
18894+extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
18895+extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
18896+extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
18897+extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
18898+extern int grsec_audit_gid;
18899+extern int grsec_enable_group;
18900+extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
18901+extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
18902+extern int grsec_enable_mount;
18903+extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
18904+extern int grsec_lock;
18905+
18906+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
18907+
18908+extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
18909+extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
18910+extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
18911+
18912+extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
18913+
18914+extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
18915+
18916+#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
18917+ gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
18918+ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
18919+
18920+#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
18921+ gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
18922+ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
18923+
18924+#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
18925+ gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
18926+ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
18927+
18928+#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
18929+ gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
18930+ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
18931+
18932+#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \
18933+ ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \
18934+ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \
18935+ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \
18936+ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)))
18937+
18938+#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \
18939+ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \
18940+ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \
18941+ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))
18942+
18943+#define DEFAULTSECARGS(task) gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, \
18944+ task->pid, task->uid, \
18945+ task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, \
18946+ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), \
18947+ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, \
18948+ task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, \
18949+ task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid
18950+
18951+#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \
18952+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
18953+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
18954+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
18955+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
18956+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
18957+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
18958+
18959+#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
18960+({ \
18961+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
18962+ gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
18963+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
18964+})
18965+
18966+enum {
18967+ GR_DO_AUDIT,
18968+ GR_DONT_AUDIT,
18969+ GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD
18970+};
18971+
18972+enum {
18973+ GR_TTYSNIFF,
18974+ GR_RBAC,
18975+ GR_RBAC_STR,
18976+ GR_STR_RBAC,
18977+ GR_RBAC_MODE2,
18978+ GR_RBAC_MODE3,
18979+ GR_FILENAME,
18980+ GR_NOARGS,
18981+ GR_ONE_INT,
18982+ GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR,
18983+ GR_ONE_STR,
18984+ GR_STR_INT,
18985+ GR_TWO_INT,
18986+ GR_THREE_INT,
18987+ GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR,
18988+ GR_TWO_STR,
18989+ GR_THREE_STR,
18990+ GR_FOUR_STR,
18991+ GR_STR_FILENAME,
18992+ GR_FILENAME_STR,
18993+ GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT,
18994+ GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR,
18995+ GR_TEXTREL,
18996+ GR_PTRACE,
18997+ GR_RESOURCE,
18998+ GR_CAP,
18999+ GR_SIG,
19000+ GR_CRASH1,
19001+ GR_CRASH2,
19002+ GR_PSACCT
19003+};
19004+
19005+#define gr_log_ttysniff(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TTYSNIFF, task)
19006+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC, dentry, mnt)
19007+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
19008+#define gr_log_fs_str_rbac(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_RBAC, str, dentry, mnt)
19009+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE2, dentry, mnt, str1, str2)
19010+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE3, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3)
19011+#define gr_log_fs_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME, dentry, mnt)
19012+#define gr_log_noargs(audit, msg) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_NOARGS)
19013+#define gr_log_int(audit, msg, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT, num)
19014+#define gr_log_int_str2(audit, msg, num, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR, num, str1, str2)
19015+#define gr_log_str(audit, msg, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_STR, str)
19016+#define gr_log_str_int(audit, msg, str, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_INT, str, num)
19017+#define gr_log_int_int(audit, msg, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_INT, num1, num2)
19018+#define gr_log_int3(audit, msg, num1, num2, num3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_INT, num1, num2, num3)
19019+#define gr_log_int5_str2(audit, msg, num1, num2, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR, num1, num2, str1, str2)
19020+#define gr_log_str_str(audit, msg, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_STR, str1, str2)
19021+#define gr_log_str3(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_STR, str1, str2, str3)
19022+#define gr_log_str4(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3, str4) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FOUR_STR, str1, str2, str3, str4)
19023+#define gr_log_str_fs(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_FILENAME, str, dentry, mnt)
19024+#define gr_log_fs_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
19025+#define gr_log_fs_int2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT, dentry, mnt, num1, num2)
19026+#define gr_log_fs_int2_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str)
19027+#define gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(audit, msg, file, ulong1, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TEXTREL, file, ulong1, ulong2)
19028+#define gr_log_ptrace(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PTRACE, task)
19029+#define gr_log_res_ulong2_str(audit, msg, task, ulong1, str, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RESOURCE, task, ulong1, str, ulong2)
19030+#define gr_log_cap(audit, msg, task, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CAP, task, str)
19031+#define gr_log_sig(audit, msg, task, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_SIG, task, num)
19032+#define gr_log_crash1(audit, msg, task, ulong) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH1, task, ulong)
19033+#define gr_log_crash2(audit, msg, task, ulong1) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH2, task, ulong1)
19034+#define gr_log_procacct(audit, msg, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PSACCT, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9)
19035+
19036+extern void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...);
19037+
19038+#endif
19039+
19040+#endif
19041diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h
19042--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19043+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19044@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
19045+#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
19046+#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d"
19047+#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by "
19048+#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by "
19049+#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by "
19050+#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by "
19051+#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect() to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by "
19052+#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by "
19053+#define GR_KMEM_MSG "denied write of /dev/kmem by "
19054+#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "denied open of /dev/port by "
19055+#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "denied write of /dev/mem by "
19056+#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "denied mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by "
19057+#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by "
19058+#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19059+#define GR_ID_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%c\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19060+#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by "
19061+#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by "
19062+#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by "
19063+#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by "
19064+#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied mknod of %.950s from chroot by "
19065+#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by "
19066+#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect() to the unix domain socket %.950s by "
19067+#define GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG "terminal being sniffed by IP:%u.%u.%u.%u %.480s[%.16s:%d], parent %.480s[%.16s:%d] against "
19068+#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by "
19069+#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by "
19070+#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by "
19071+#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by "
19072+#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for "
19073+#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by "
19074+#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by "
19075+#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by "
19076+#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by "
19077+#define GR_NPROC_MSG "denied overstep of process limit by "
19078+#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by "
19079+#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by "
19080+#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
19081+#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning execution for %lu seconds"
19082+#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied mount of %.30s as %.930s from chroot by "
19083+#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied pivot_root from chroot by "
19084+#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by "
19085+#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by "
19086+#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by "
19087+#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied double chroot to %.950s by "
19088+#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by "
19089+#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by "
19090+#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by "
19091+#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by "
19092+#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by "
19093+#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by "
19094+#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s by "
19095+#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
19096+#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: %d bytes sent %d required, being fed garbaged by "
19097+#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for "
19098+#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for "
19099+#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for "
19100+#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for "
19101+#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for "
19102+#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for "
19103+#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system loaded by "
19104+#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "unable to load %s for "
19105+#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
19106+#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system reloaded by "
19107+#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "failed reload of %s for "
19108+#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for "
19109+#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by "
19110+#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by "
19111+#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for "
19112+#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for "
19113+#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by "
19114+#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for "
19115+#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "invalid mode %d by "
19116+#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by "
19117+#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by "
19118+#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change by "
19119+#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to "
19120+#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
19121+#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "denied send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
19122+#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "denied modification of grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by "
19123+#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by "
19124+#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by "
19125+#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "fatal: unable to find subject for (%.16s:%d), loaded by "
19126+#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by "
19127+#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by "
19128+#define GR_SOCK_MSG "denied socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by "
19129+#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "denied socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by "
19130+#define GR_BIND_MSG "denied bind() by "
19131+#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "denied connect() by "
19132+#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "denied bind() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
19133+#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "denied connect() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
19134+#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19135+#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process "
19136+#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for "
19137+#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %d denied for "
19138+#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %d denied for "
19139+#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by "
19140+#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by "
19141+#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount of %.30s to %.64s by "
19142+#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by "
19143+#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.128s) by "
19144+#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by "
19145+#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by "
19146+#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by "
19147+#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by "
19148+#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by "
19149+#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by "
19150+#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "denied resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu for "
19151+#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by "
19152diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h
19153--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19154+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19155@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
19156+#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
19157+#define GR_SECURITY_H
19158+#include <linux/fs.h>
19159+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
19160+#include <linux/gracl.h>
19161+
19162+extern void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p);
19163+extern void gr_handle_brute_check(void);
19164+
19165+extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
19166+
19167+extern int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
19168+extern int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
19169+
19170+extern void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
19171+extern void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
19172+
19173+extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p);
19174+extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
19175+extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
19176+extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
19177+ const int niceval);
19178+extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
19179+extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
19180+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19181+extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
19182+extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
19183+extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
19184+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
19185+extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
19186+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
19187+extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
19188+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
19189+ const char *dev_name);
19190+extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
19191+extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
19192+
19193+extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode);
19194+extern int gr_handle_nproc(void);
19195+
19196+extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
19197+extern void gr_handle_iopl(void);
19198+
19199+extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
19200+
19201+extern int gr_random_pid(void);
19202+
19203+extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
19204+extern void gr_log_timechange(void);
19205+extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
19206+extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
19207+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19208+extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
19209+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19210+extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
19211+extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
19212+extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
19213+extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
19214+extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
19215+extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
19216+extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
19217+extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
19218+extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
19219+extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
19220+extern void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
19221+
19222+extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
19223+ const struct inode *inode,
19224+ const struct dentry *dentry,
19225+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19226+extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
19227+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
19228+ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
19229+ const int acc_mode);
19230+extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
19231+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
19232+ struct inode *inode,
19233+ const int mode, const char *to);
19234+
19235+extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
19236+extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
19237+extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
19238+ const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
19239+extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
19240+extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
19241+extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
19242+extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
19243+extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
19244+extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
19245+ const unsigned long prot);
19246+extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
19247+ const unsigned long prot);
19248+extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
19249+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
19250+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19251+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
19252+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19253+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
19254+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
19255+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
19256+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
19257+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
19258+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
19259+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
19260+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19261+extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
19262+extern int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task);
19263+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
19264+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19265+extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
19266+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
19267+extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
19268+extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
19269+ const gid_t gid);
19270+extern int gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
19271+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19272+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
19273+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19274+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
19275+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
19276+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
19277+ const struct dentry *p_dentry,
19278+ const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
19279+ const int imode);
19280+extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
19281+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19282+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19283+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19284+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
19285+ const int mode);
19286+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19287+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19288+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
19289+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
19290+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19291+extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev);
19292+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
19293+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19294+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19295+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19296+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
19297+ const char *from);
19298+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19299+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19300+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
19301+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
19302+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
19303+extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
19304+ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19305+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
19306+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
19307+ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
19308+ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
19309+extern void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
19310+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
19311+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
19312+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
19313+extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19314+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
19315+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
19316+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
19317+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
19318+extern int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
19319+ const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino);
19320+
19321+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
19322+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19323+extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
19324+extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
19325+extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
19326+extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void);
19327+
19328+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
19329+extern void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task);
19330+#else
19331+static inline void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task)
19332+{
19333+ return;
19334+}
19335+#endif
19336+
19337+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19338+extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
19339+extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
19340+extern void gr_handle_open_port(void);
19341+extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
19342+ struct vm_area_struct *vma);
19343+
19344+extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void);
19345+#define get_random_long() pax_get_random_long()
19346+
19347+extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
19348+extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
19349+extern int grsec_enable_shm;
19350+#endif
19351+
19352+#endif
19353diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h
19354--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
19355+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19356@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
19357 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
19358 #include <asm/processor.h>
19359 #include <asm/atomic.h>
19360+#include <asm/mman.h>
19361
19362 #ifndef MM_VM_SIZE
19363 #define MM_VM_SIZE(mm) ((TASK_SIZE + PGDIR_SIZE - 1) & PGDIR_MASK)
19364@@ -113,8 +114,49 @@ struct vm_area_struct {
19365 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
19366 struct mempolicy *vm_policy; /* NUMA policy for the VMA */
19367 #endif
19368+
19369+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
19370+ unsigned long vm_mirror; /* PaX: mirror distance */
19371+#endif
19372+
19373 };
19374
19375+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
19376+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
19377+extern unsigned int pax_aslr;
19378+#endif
19379+
19380+extern unsigned int pax_softmode;
19381+#endif
19382+
19383+extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *);
19384+
19385+/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
19386+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
19387+static inline unsigned long pax_get_flags(struct task_struct *tsk)
19388+{
19389+ if (likely(tsk->mm))
19390+ return tsk->mm->flags;
19391+ else
19392+ return 0UL;
19393+}
19394+
19395+/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
19396+static inline long pax_set_flags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags)
19397+{
19398+ if (likely(tsk->mm)) {
19399+ tsk->mm->flags = flags;
19400+ return 0;
19401+ }
19402+ return -EINVAL;
19403+}
19404+#endif
19405+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
19406+extern void pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
19407+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
19408+extern void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
19409+#endif
19410+
19411 /*
19412 * This struct defines the per-mm list of VMAs for uClinux. If CONFIG_MMU is
19413 * disabled, then there's a single shared list of VMAs maintained by the
19414@@ -165,6 +207,18 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void
19415 #define VM_HUGETLB 0x00400000 /* Huge TLB Page VM */
19416 #define VM_NONLINEAR 0x00800000 /* Is non-linear (remap_file_pages) */
19417
19418+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
19419+#define VM_MIRROR 0x01000000 /* vma is mirroring another */
19420+#endif
19421+
19422+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
19423+#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE 0x02000000 /* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */
19424+#endif
19425+
19426+#ifdef __VM_STACK_FLAGS
19427+#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS (0x00000033 | __VM_STACK_FLAGS)
19428+#endif
19429+
19430 #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */
19431 #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
19432 #endif
19433@@ -734,6 +788,10 @@ extern unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struc
19434 unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
19435 unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff);
19436
19437+extern unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
19438+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
19439+ unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff);
19440+
19441 static inline unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
19442 unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
19443 unsigned long flag, unsigned long offset)
19444@@ -783,7 +841,7 @@ void handle_ra_miss(struct address_space
19445 unsigned long max_sane_readahead(unsigned long nr);
19446
19447 /* Do stack extension */
19448-extern int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address);
19449+extern int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address);
19450
19451 /* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */
19452 extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr);
19453@@ -806,7 +864,7 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_pages(st
19454 return (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
19455 }
19456
19457-extern struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr);
19458+extern struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr);
19459
19460 extern struct page * vmalloc_to_page(void *addr);
19461 extern unsigned long vmalloc_to_pfn(void *addr);
19462@@ -856,5 +914,11 @@ int in_gate_area_no_task(unsigned long a
19463 #define in_gate_area(task, addr) ({(void)task; in_gate_area_no_task(addr);})
19464 #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA */
19465
19466+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
19467+extern void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
19468+#else
19469+static inline void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) {}
19470+#endif
19471+
19472 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
19473 #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
19474diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h
19475--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
19476+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19477@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ static inline unsigned long
19478 calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
19479 {
19480 return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN ) |
19481+
19482+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
19483+ _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) |
19484+#endif
19485+
19486 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE ) |
19487 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE) |
19488 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED, VM_LOCKED );
19489diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h
19490--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
19491+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19492@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ extern __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32
19493 extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
19494 __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
19495
19496+extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void);
19497+
19498 #ifndef MODULE
19499 extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
19500 #endif
19501diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h
19502--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
19503+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19504@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
19505 #include <linux/topology.h>
19506
19507 struct exec_domain;
19508+struct linux_binprm;
19509
19510 /*
19511 * cloning flags:
19512@@ -256,8 +257,34 @@ struct mm_struct {
19513
19514 unsigned long hiwater_rss; /* High-water RSS usage */
19515 unsigned long hiwater_vm; /* High-water virtual memory usage */
19516+
19517+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
19518+ unsigned long flags;
19519+#endif
19520+
19521+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
19522+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
19523+#endif
19524+
19525+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
19526+ unsigned long call_syscall;
19527+#endif
19528+
19529+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
19530+ unsigned long delta_mmap; /* randomized offset */
19531+ unsigned long delta_exec; /* randomized offset */
19532+ unsigned long delta_stack; /* randomized offset */
19533+#endif
19534+
19535 };
19536
19537+#define MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 0x01000000 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
19538+#define MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 0x02000000 /* Emulate trampolines */
19539+#define MF_PAX_MPROTECT 0x04000000 /* Restrict mprotect() */
19540+#define MF_PAX_RANDMMAP 0x08000000 /* Randomize mmap() base */
19541+#define MF_PAX_RANDEXEC 0x10000000 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
19542+#define MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 0x20000000 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
19543+
19544 struct sighand_struct {
19545 atomic_t count;
19546 struct k_sigaction action[_NSIG];
19547@@ -685,6 +712,23 @@ struct task_struct {
19548 struct mempolicy *mempolicy;
19549 short il_next;
19550 #endif
19551+
19552+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19553+ /* grsecurity */
19554+ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
19555+ struct acl_role_label *role;
19556+ struct file *exec_file;
19557+ u32 curr_ip;
19558+ u32 gr_saddr;
19559+ u32 gr_daddr;
19560+ u16 gr_sport;
19561+ u16 gr_dport;
19562+ u16 acl_role_id;
19563+ u8 acl_sp_role:1;
19564+ u8 used_accept:1;
19565+ u8 is_writable:1;
19566+ u8 brute:1;
19567+#endif
19568 };
19569
19570 static inline pid_t process_group(struct task_struct *tsk)
19571@@ -918,14 +962,29 @@ static inline int sas_ss_flags(unsigned
19572 : on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0);
19573 }
19574
19575+extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
19576+extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
19577
19578 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
19579 /* code is in security.c */
19580 extern int capable(int cap);
19581+static inline int capable_nolog(int cap)
19582+{
19583+ return capable(cap);
19584+}
19585 #else
19586 static inline int capable(int cap)
19587 {
19588- if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
19589+ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(current, cap)) {
19590+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
19591+ return 1;
19592+ }
19593+ return 0;
19594+}
19595+
19596+static inline int capable_nolog(int cap)
19597+{
19598+ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) {
19599 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
19600 return 1;
19601 }
19602@@ -1172,6 +1231,12 @@ extern void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct
19603 static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
19604 {
19605 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
19606+
19607+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
19608+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
19609+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
19610+#endif
19611+
19612 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
19613 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
19614 }
19615diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h
19616--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500
19617+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19618@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ struct shmid_kernel /* private to the ke
19619 pid_t shm_cprid;
19620 pid_t shm_lprid;
19621 struct user_struct *mlock_user;
19622+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19623+ time_t shm_createtime;
19624+ pid_t shm_lapid;
19625+#endif
19626 };
19627
19628 /* shm_mode upper byte flags */
19629diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h
19630--- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
19631+++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19632@@ -135,8 +135,20 @@ enum
19633 KERN_UNKNOWN_NMI_PANIC=66, /* int: unknown nmi panic flag */
19634 KERN_BOOTLOADER_TYPE=67, /* int: boot loader type */
19635 KERN_FBSPLASH=68, /* string: path to fbsplash helper */
19636+ KERN_GRSECURITY=69, /* grsecurity */
19637+
19638+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
19639+ KERN_PAX=70, /* PaX control */
19640+#endif
19641+
19642 };
19643
19644+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
19645+enum {
19646+ PAX_ASLR=1, /* PaX: disable/enable all randomization features */
19647+ PAX_SOFTMODE=2 /* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */
19648+};
19649+#endif
19650
19651 /* CTL_VM names: */
19652 enum
19653diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig
19654--- linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500
19655+++ linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19656@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ menuconfig EMBEDDED
19657 config KALLSYMS
19658 bool "Load all symbols for debugging/kksymoops" if EMBEDDED
19659 default y
19660+ depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
19661 help
19662 Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and
19663 symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel
19664diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/init/main.c linux-2.6.11/init/main.c
19665--- linux-2.6.11/init/main.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
19666+++ linux-2.6.11/init/main.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19667@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ extern void acpi_early_init(void);
19668 #else
19669 static inline void acpi_early_init(void) { }
19670 #endif
19671+extern void grsecurity_init(void);
19672
19673 #ifdef CONFIG_TC
19674 extern void tc_init(void);
19675@@ -660,6 +661,7 @@ static int init(void * unused)
19676 execute_command = "/init";
19677 else
19678 prepare_namespace();
19679+ grsecurity_init();
19680
19681 /*
19682 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
19683diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c
19684--- linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
19685+++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19686@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
19687 #include <linux/security.h>
19688 #include <linux/sched.h>
19689 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
19690+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19691 #include <asm/current.h>
19692 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19693 #include "util.h"
19694@@ -229,6 +230,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgget (key_t key, i
19695 msg_unlock(msq);
19696 }
19697 up(&msg_ids.sem);
19698+
19699+ gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg);
19700+
19701 return ret;
19702 }
19703
19704@@ -478,6 +482,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, i
19705 break;
19706 }
19707 case IPC_RMID:
19708+ gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
19709+
19710 freeque (msq, msqid);
19711 break;
19712 }
19713diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c
19714--- linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c 2005-03-02 02:38:03.000000000 -0500
19715+++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19716@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
19717 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
19718 #include <linux/security.h>
19719 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
19720+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19721 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19722 #include "util.h"
19723
19724@@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_semget (key_t key, i
19725 }
19726
19727 up(&sem_ids.sem);
19728+
19729+ gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
19730+
19731 return err;
19732 }
19733
19734@@ -826,6 +830,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int se
19735
19736 switch(cmd){
19737 case IPC_RMID:
19738+ gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
19739+
19740 freeary(sma, semid);
19741 err = 0;
19742 break;
19743diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c
19744--- linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500
19745+++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19746@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
19747 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
19748 #include <linux/security.h>
19749 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
19750+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19751 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19752
19753 #include "util.h"
19754@@ -51,6 +52,14 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st
19755 static int sysvipc_shm_read_proc(char *buffer, char **start, off_t offset, int length, int *eof, void *data);
19756 #endif
19757
19758+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19759+extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
19760+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
19761+ const int shmid);
19762+extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
19763+ const time_t shm_createtime);
19764+#endif
19765+
19766 size_t shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX;
19767 size_t shm_ctlall = SHMALL;
19768 int shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI;
19769@@ -143,6 +152,17 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st
19770 shp->shm_lprid = current->tgid;
19771 shp->shm_dtim = get_seconds();
19772 shp->shm_nattch--;
19773+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
19774+ if (grsec_enable_shm) {
19775+ if (shp->shm_nattch == 0) {
19776+ shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
19777+ shm_destroy(shp);
19778+ } else
19779+ shm_unlock(shp);
19780+ up(&shm_ids.sem);
19781+ return;
19782+ }
19783+#endif
19784 if(shp->shm_nattch == 0 &&
19785 shp->shm_flags & SHM_DEST)
19786 shm_destroy (shp);
19787@@ -224,6 +244,9 @@ static int newseg (key_t key, int shmflg
19788 shp->shm_lprid = 0;
19789 shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
19790 shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
19791+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19792+ shp->shm_createtime = get_seconds();
19793+#endif
19794 shp->shm_segsz = size;
19795 shp->shm_nattch = 0;
19796 shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq);
19797@@ -278,6 +301,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, s
19798 }
19799 up(&shm_ids.sem);
19800
19801+ gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
19802+
19803 return err;
19804 }
19805
19806@@ -583,6 +608,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, i
19807 if (err)
19808 goto out_unlock_up;
19809
19810+ gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
19811+
19812 if (shp->shm_nattch){
19813 shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
19814 /* Do not find it any more */
19815@@ -725,9 +752,27 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
19816 return err;
19817 }
19818
19819+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19820+ if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
19821+ shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) {
19822+ shm_unlock(shp);
19823+ return -EACCES;
19824+ }
19825+
19826+ if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
19827+ shm_unlock(shp);
19828+ return -EACCES;
19829+ }
19830+#endif
19831+
19832 file = shp->shm_file;
19833 size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
19834 shp->shm_nattch++;
19835+
19836+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19837+ shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
19838+#endif
19839+
19840 shm_unlock(shp);
19841
19842 down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
19843@@ -912,3 +957,24 @@ done:
19844 return len;
19845 }
19846 #endif
19847+
19848+void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task)
19849+{
19850+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
19851+ int i;
19852+ struct shmid_kernel *shp;
19853+
19854+ if (!grsec_enable_shm)
19855+ return;
19856+
19857+ for (i = 0; i <= shm_ids.max_id; i++) {
19858+ shp = shm_get(i);
19859+ if (shp && (shp->shm_cprid == task->pid) &&
19860+ (shp->shm_nattch <= 0)) {
19861+ shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST;
19862+ shm_destroy(shp);
19863+ }
19864+ }
19865+#endif
19866+ return;
19867+}
19868diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c
19869--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
19870+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19871@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
19872 #include <linux/module.h>
19873 #include <linux/security.h>
19874 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
19875+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19876 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19877
19878 unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
19879diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c
19880--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500
19881+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19882@@ -89,8 +89,16 @@ static int __init ikconfig_init(void)
19883 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
19884
19885 /* create the current config file */
19886+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
19887+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
19888+ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
19889+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
19890+ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root);
19891+#endif
19892+#else
19893 entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO,
19894 &proc_root);
19895+#endif
19896 if (!entry)
19897 return -ENOMEM;
19898
19899diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c
19900--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
19901+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19902@@ -26,6 +26,11 @@
19903 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
19904 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
19905 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
19906+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19907+
19908+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19909+extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
19910+#endif
19911
19912 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
19913 #include <asm/unistd.h>
19914@@ -223,6 +228,15 @@ void reparent_to_init(void)
19915 {
19916 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
19917
19918+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19919+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
19920+ if (current->exec_file) {
19921+ fput(current->exec_file);
19922+ current->exec_file = NULL;
19923+ }
19924+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
19925+#endif
19926+
19927 ptrace_unlink(current);
19928 /* Reparent to init */
19929 REMOVE_LINKS(current);
19930@@ -230,6 +244,8 @@ void reparent_to_init(void)
19931 current->real_parent = child_reaper;
19932 SET_LINKS(current);
19933
19934+ gr_set_kernel_label(current);
19935+
19936 /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
19937 current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
19938
19939@@ -324,6 +340,17 @@ void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
19940 vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
19941 va_end(args);
19942
19943+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19944+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
19945+ if (current->exec_file) {
19946+ fput(current->exec_file);
19947+ current->exec_file = NULL;
19948+ }
19949+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
19950+#endif
19951+
19952+ gr_set_kernel_label(current);
19953+
19954 /*
19955 * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
19956 * user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
19957@@ -811,9 +838,15 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long co
19958 group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live);
19959 if (group_dead)
19960 acct_process(code);
19961+
19962+ gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
19963+ gr_acl_handle_exit();
19964+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk);
19965+
19966 exit_mm(tsk);
19967
19968 exit_sem(tsk);
19969+ gr_shm_exit(tsk);
19970 __exit_files(tsk);
19971 __exit_fs(tsk);
19972 exit_namespace(tsk);
19973diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c
19974--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
19975+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
19976@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
19977 #include <linux/profile.h>
19978 #include <linux/rmap.h>
19979 #include <linux/acct.h>
19980+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
19981
19982 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
19983 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
19984@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int dup_mmap(struct mm_str
19985 mm->locked_vm = 0;
19986 mm->mmap = NULL;
19987 mm->mmap_cache = NULL;
19988- mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->mmap_base;
19989+ mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache;
19990 mm->map_count = 0;
19991 mm->rss = 0;
19992 mm->anon_rss = 0;
19993@@ -300,7 +301,6 @@ static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct
19994 rwlock_init(&mm->ioctx_list_lock);
19995 mm->ioctx_list = NULL;
19996 mm->default_kioctx = (struct kioctx)INIT_KIOCTX(mm->default_kioctx, *mm);
19997- mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
19998
19999 if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) {
20000 mm->def_flags = 0;
20001@@ -822,6 +822,9 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon
20002 goto fork_out;
20003
20004 retval = -EAGAIN;
20005+
20006+ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0);
20007+
20008 if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
20009 p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
20010 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
20011@@ -927,6 +930,8 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon
20012 if (retval)
20013 goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace;
20014
20015+ gr_copy_label(p);
20016+
20017 p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
20018 /*
20019 * Clear TID on mm_release()?
20020@@ -1077,6 +1082,9 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
20021 free_uid(p->user);
20022 bad_fork_free:
20023 free_task(p);
20024+
20025+ gr_log_forkfail(retval);
20026+
20027 goto fork_out;
20028 }
20029
20030@@ -1134,6 +1142,9 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
20031
20032 if (pid < 0)
20033 return -EAGAIN;
20034+
20035+ gr_handle_brute_check();
20036+
20037 if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) {
20038 trace = fork_traceflag (clone_flags);
20039 if (trace)
20040diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c
20041--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
20042+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20043@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ static int get_futex_key(unsigned long u
20044 struct page *page;
20045 int err;
20046
20047+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20048+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (uaddr >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE))
20049+ return -EFAULT;
20050+#endif
20051+
20052 /*
20053 * The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
20054 */
20055@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ static int get_futex_key(unsigned long u
20056 * The futex is hashed differently depending on whether
20057 * it's in a shared or private mapping. So check vma first.
20058 */
20059- vma = find_extend_vma(mm, uaddr);
20060+ vma = find_extend_vma(current, mm, uaddr);
20061 if (unlikely(!vma))
20062 return -EFAULT;
20063
20064diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c
20065--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500
20066+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20067@@ -388,7 +388,15 @@ int __init kallsyms_init(void)
20068 {
20069 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
20070
20071+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
20072+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
20073+ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL);
20074+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
20075+ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
20076+#endif
20077+#else
20078 entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL);
20079+#endif
20080 if (entry)
20081 entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations;
20082 return 0;
20083diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c
20084--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
20085+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20086@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
20087 #include <linux/init.h>
20088 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
20089 #include <linux/hash.h>
20090+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20091
20092 #define pid_hashfn(nr) hash_long((unsigned long)nr, pidhash_shift)
20093 static struct hlist_head *pid_hash[PIDTYPE_MAX];
20094@@ -76,7 +77,9 @@ int alloc_pidmap(void)
20095 int i, offset, max_scan, pid, last = last_pid;
20096 pidmap_t *map;
20097
20098- pid = last + 1;
20099+ pid = gr_random_pid();
20100+ if (!pid)
20101+ pid = last_pid + 1;
20102 if (pid >= pid_max)
20103 pid = RESERVED_PIDS;
20104 offset = pid & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
20105@@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ void fastcall detach_pid(task_t *task, e
20106 task_t *find_task_by_pid_type(int type, int nr)
20107 {
20108 struct pid *pid;
20109+ task_t *task = NULL;
20110
20111 pid = find_pid(type, nr);
20112 if (!pid)
20113 return NULL;
20114
20115- return pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type);
20116+ task = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type);
20117+
20118+ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task))
20119+ return NULL;
20120+
20121+ return task;
20122 }
20123
20124 EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid_type);
20125diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c
20126--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
20127+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20128@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
20129 #include <linux/security.h>
20130 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
20131 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20132+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20133
20134 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20135
20136@@ -253,6 +254,11 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user * bu
20137 char c;
20138 int error = 0;
20139
20140+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
20141+ if (grsec_enable_dmesg && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
20142+ return -EPERM;
20143+#endif
20144+
20145 error = security_syslog(type);
20146 if (error)
20147 return error;
20148diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c
20149--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
20150+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20151@@ -136,10 +136,27 @@ static int __init ioresources_init(void)
20152 {
20153 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
20154
20155+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
20156+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
20157+ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL);
20158+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
20159+ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
20160+#endif
20161+#else
20162 entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL);
20163+#endif
20164 if (entry)
20165 entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations;
20166+
20167+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
20168+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
20169+ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL);
20170+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
20171+ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
20172+#endif
20173+#else
20174 entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL);
20175+#endif
20176 if (entry)
20177 entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations;
20178 return 0;
20179diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c
20180--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500
20181+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20182@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
20183 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
20184 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20185 #include <linux/times.h>
20186+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20187 #include <asm/tlb.h>
20188
20189 #include <asm/unistd.h>
20190@@ -2309,6 +2310,7 @@ static void check_rlimit(struct task_str
20191
20192 total = cputime_add(p->utime, p->stime);
20193 secs = cputime_to_secs(total);
20194+ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, secs, 1);
20195 if (unlikely(secs >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur)) {
20196 /* Send SIGXCPU every second. */
20197 tmp = cputime_sub(total, cputime);
20198@@ -3297,6 +3299,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment)
20199 return -EPERM;
20200 if (increment < -40)
20201 increment = -40;
20202+ if (gr_handle_chroot_nice())
20203+ return -EPERM;
20204 }
20205 if (increment > 40)
20206 increment = 40;
20207diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c
20208--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
20209+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20210@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
20211 #include <linux/security.h>
20212 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20213 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
20214+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20215 #include <asm/param.h>
20216 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20217 #include <asm/unistd.h>
20218@@ -642,7 +643,12 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
20219 && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
20220 && !capable(CAP_KILL))
20221 return error;
20222- return security_task_kill(t, info, sig);
20223+ if (gr_handle_signal(t, sig))
20224+ return error;
20225+ error = security_task_kill(t, info, sig);
20226+ if (!error)
20227+ gr_log_signal(sig, t);
20228+ return error;
20229 }
20230
20231 /* forward decl */
20232@@ -840,7 +846,7 @@ out_set:
20233 (((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&(sigptr)->signal, (sig)))
20234
20235
20236-static int
20237+int
20238 specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
20239 {
20240 int ret = 0;
20241@@ -892,6 +898,9 @@ force_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *
20242 ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
20243 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
20244
20245+ gr_log_signal(sig, t);
20246+ gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
20247+
20248 return ret;
20249 }
20250
20251diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c
20252--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
20253+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20254@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
20255 #include <linux/dcookies.h>
20256 #include <linux/suspend.h>
20257 #include <linux/tty.h>
20258+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20259
20260 #include <linux/compat.h>
20261 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20262@@ -229,6 +230,12 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_stru
20263 error = -EACCES;
20264 goto out;
20265 }
20266+
20267+ if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
20268+ error = -EACCES;
20269+ goto out;
20270+ }
20271+
20272 no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
20273 if (no_nice) {
20274 error = no_nice;
20275@@ -528,6 +535,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid,
20276 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
20277 (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
20278 current->sgid = new_egid;
20279+
20280+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
20281+
20282 current->fsgid = new_egid;
20283 current->egid = new_egid;
20284 current->gid = new_rgid;
20285@@ -556,6 +566,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
20286 current->mm->dumpable=0;
20287 wmb();
20288 }
20289+
20290+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
20291+
20292 current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
20293 }
20294 else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
20295@@ -596,6 +609,9 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int
20296 current->mm->dumpable = 0;
20297 wmb();
20298 }
20299+
20300+ gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
20301+
20302 current->uid = new_ruid;
20303 return 0;
20304 }
20305@@ -698,6 +714,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
20306 } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
20307 return -EPERM;
20308
20309+ if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
20310+ return -EPERM;
20311+
20312 if (old_euid != uid)
20313 {
20314 current->mm->dumpable = 0;
20315@@ -801,8 +820,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid
20316 current->egid = egid;
20317 }
20318 current->fsgid = current->egid;
20319- if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
20320+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
20321+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
20322 current->gid = rgid;
20323+ }
20324 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
20325 current->sgid = sgid;
20326
20327diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c
20328--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500
20329+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20330@@ -50,6 +50,14 @@
20331 #endif
20332
20333 #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
20334+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20335+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
20336+
20337+extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
20338+ const void *newval);
20339+extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name,
20340+ const int op);
20341+extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
20342
20343 /* External variables not in a header file. */
20344 extern int C_A_D;
20345@@ -147,6 +155,32 @@ extern ctl_table pty_table[];
20346 #ifdef HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
20347 int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
20348 #endif
20349+extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
20350+
20351+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20352+static ctl_table pax_table[] = {
20353+
20354+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK)
20355+ {
20356+ .ctl_name = PAX_ASLR,
20357+ .procname = "aslr",
20358+ .data = &pax_aslr,
20359+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
20360+ .mode = 0600,
20361+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
20362+ },
20363+#endif
20364+
20365+ {
20366+ .ctl_name = PAX_SOFTMODE,
20367+ .procname = "softmode",
20368+ .data = &pax_softmode,
20369+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
20370+ .mode = 0600,
20371+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
20372+ }
20373+};
20374+#endif
20375
20376 /* /proc declarations: */
20377
20378@@ -632,6 +666,24 @@ static ctl_table kern_table[] = {
20379 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
20380 },
20381 #endif
20382+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
20383+ {
20384+ .ctl_name = KERN_GRSECURITY,
20385+ .procname = "grsecurity",
20386+ .mode = 0500,
20387+ .child = grsecurity_table,
20388+ },
20389+#endif
20390+
20391+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20392+ {
20393+ .ctl_name = KERN_PAX,
20394+ .procname = "pax",
20395+ .mode = 0500,
20396+ .child = pax_table,
20397+ },
20398+#endif
20399+
20400 { .ctl_name = 0 }
20401 };
20402
20403@@ -1023,6 +1075,10 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
20404 static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
20405 {
20406 int error;
20407+ if (table->de && gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op))
20408+ return -EACCES;
20409+ if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
20410+ return -EACCES;
20411 error = security_sysctl(table, op);
20412 if (error)
20413 return error;
20414@@ -1059,6 +1115,10 @@ repeat:
20415 table = table->child;
20416 goto repeat;
20417 }
20418+
20419+ if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval))
20420+ return -EACCES;
20421+
20422 error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
20423 oldval, oldlenp,
20424 newval, newlen, context);
20425diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c
20426--- linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
20427+++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20428@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
20429 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20430 #include <linux/security.h>
20431 #include <linux/fs.h>
20432+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20433
20434 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20435 #include <asm/unistd.h>
20436@@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_stime(time_t __user
20437 return err;
20438
20439 do_settimeofday(&tv);
20440+
20441+ gr_log_timechange();
20442+
20443 return 0;
20444 }
20445
20446@@ -194,6 +198,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_settimeofday(struct
20447 return -EFAULT;
20448 }
20449
20450+ gr_log_timechange();
20451+
20452 return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL);
20453 }
20454
20455diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c
20456--- linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
20457+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20458@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
20459 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
20460 #include <linux/security.h>
20461 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20462+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20463+
20464 /*
20465 * This is needed for the following functions:
20466 * - try_to_release_page
20467@@ -1516,6 +1518,12 @@ int generic_file_mmap(struct file * file
20468
20469 if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage)
20470 return -ENOEXEC;
20471+
20472+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
20473+ if (vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
20474+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
20475+#endif
20476+
20477 file_accessed(file);
20478 vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
20479 return 0;
20480@@ -1815,6 +1823,7 @@ inline int generic_write_checks(struct f
20481 *pos = i_size_read(inode);
20482
20483 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
20484+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0);
20485 if (*pos >= limit) {
20486 send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
20487 return -EFBIG;
20488diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c
20489--- linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
20490+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20491@@ -14,8 +14,42 @@
20492 * We can potentially split a vm area into separate
20493 * areas, each area with its own behavior.
20494 */
20495+
20496+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20497+static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
20498+ unsigned long end, int behavior);
20499+
20500+static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
20501+ unsigned long end, int behavior)
20502+{
20503+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
20504+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
20505+ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
20506+ int error;
20507+
20508+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
20509+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
20510+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
20511+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
20512+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
20513+ error = __madvise_behavior(vma_m, start_m, end_m, behavior);
20514+ if (error)
20515+ return error;
20516+ } else {
20517+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: madvise bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
20518+ return -ENOMEM;
20519+ }
20520+ }
20521+
20522+ return __madvise_behavior(vma, start, end, behavior);
20523+}
20524+
20525+static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
20526+ unsigned long end, int behavior)
20527+#else
20528 static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start,
20529 unsigned long end, int behavior)
20530+#endif
20531 {
20532 struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
20533 int error = 0;
20534diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c
20535--- linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500
20536+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20537@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
20538 #include <linux/acct.h>
20539 #include <linux/module.h>
20540 #include <linux/init.h>
20541+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20542
20543 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
20544 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20545@@ -873,7 +874,7 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *t
20546 do {
20547 struct vm_area_struct * vma;
20548
20549- vma = find_extend_vma(mm, start);
20550+ vma = find_extend_vma(tsk, mm, start);
20551 if (!vma && in_gate_area(tsk, start)) {
20552 unsigned long pg = start & PAGE_MASK;
20553 struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma = get_gate_vma(tsk);
20554@@ -1254,6 +1255,85 @@ static inline void break_cow(struct vm_a
20555 update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
20556 }
20557
20558+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20559+/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE
20560+ *
20561+ * mm->page_table_lock is held on entry and is not released on exit or inside
20562+ * to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc)
20563+ */
20564+static void pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20565+ unsigned long address, pte_t *pte)
20566+{
20567+ unsigned long address_m;
20568+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
20569+ pte_t * pte_m, entry_m;
20570+ struct page * page_m;
20571+
20572+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
20573+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
20574+ BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m);
20575+
20576+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
20577+
20578+ {
20579+ pgd_t *pgd_m;
20580+ pud_t *pud_m;
20581+ pmd_t *pmd_m;
20582+
20583+ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
20584+ pud_m = pud_offset(pgd_m, address_m);
20585+ pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_m, address_m);
20586+ pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
20587+ }
20588+
20589+ if (pte_present(*pte_m)) {
20590+ flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m);
20591+ flush_icache_page(vma_m, pte_page(*pte_m));
20592+ }
20593+ entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(pte_m);
20594+ if (pte_present(entry_m))
20595+ flush_tlb_page(vma_m, address_m);
20596+
20597+ if (pte_none(entry_m)) {
20598+ ++mm->rss;
20599+ } else if (pte_present(entry_m)) {
20600+ page_m = pte_page(entry_m);
20601+ if (PageAnon(page_m))
20602+ --mm->anon_rss;
20603+ if (PageReserved(page_m))
20604+ ++mm->rss;
20605+ else
20606+ page_remove_rmap(page_m);
20607+ page_cache_release(page_m);
20608+ } else if (!pte_file(entry_m)) {
20609+ free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m));
20610+ ++mm->rss;
20611+ } else {
20612+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: bug in mirror_fault: %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
20613+ address, vma->vm_start, address_m, vma_m->vm_start);
20614+ }
20615+
20616+ page_m = pte_page(*pte);
20617+ entry_m = mk_pte(page_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot);
20618+ if (pte_write(*pte))
20619+ entry_m = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry_m), vma_m);
20620+ if (!PageReserved(page_m)) {
20621+ page_cache_get(page_m);
20622+ /*
20623+ * we can test PG_anon without holding page_map_lock because
20624+ * we hold the page table lock and have a reference to page_m
20625+ */
20626+ if (PageAnon(page_m))
20627+ page_add_anon_rmap(page_m, vma_m, address_m);
20628+ else
20629+ page_add_file_rmap(page_m);
20630+ }
20631+ ptep_establish(vma_m, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
20632+ update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m);
20633+ pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
20634+}
20635+#endif
20636+
20637 /*
20638 * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write
20639 * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address
20640@@ -1350,6 +1430,12 @@ static int do_wp_page(struct mm_struct *
20641
20642 /* Free the old page.. */
20643 new_page = old_page;
20644+
20645+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20646+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
20647+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
20648+#endif
20649+
20650 }
20651 pte_unmap(page_table);
20652 page_cache_release(new_page);
20653@@ -1605,6 +1691,7 @@ int vmtruncate(struct inode * inode, lof
20654
20655 do_expand:
20656 limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
20657+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1);
20658 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
20659 goto out_sig;
20660 if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
20661@@ -1770,6 +1857,12 @@ static int do_swap_page(struct mm_struct
20662
20663 /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
20664 update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
20665+
20666+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20667+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
20668+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
20669+#endif
20670+
20671 pte_unmap(page_table);
20672 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20673 out:
20674@@ -1825,10 +1918,16 @@ do_anonymous_page(struct mm_struct *mm,
20675 }
20676
20677 set_pte(page_table, entry);
20678- pte_unmap(page_table);
20679
20680 /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
20681 update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry);
20682+
20683+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20684+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
20685+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, addr, page_table);
20686+#endif
20687+
20688+ pte_unmap(page_table);
20689 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20690 out:
20691 return VM_FAULT_MINOR;
20692@@ -1945,6 +2044,15 @@ retry:
20693 page_add_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address);
20694 } else
20695 page_add_file_rmap(new_page);
20696+
20697+ /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
20698+ update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
20699+
20700+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20701+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
20702+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
20703+#endif
20704+
20705 pte_unmap(page_table);
20706 } else {
20707 /* One of our sibling threads was faster, back out. */
20708@@ -1954,8 +2062,6 @@ retry:
20709 goto out;
20710 }
20711
20712- /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
20713- update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
20714 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20715 out:
20716 return ret;
20717@@ -2066,6 +2172,11 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm
20718 pmd_t *pmd;
20719 pte_t *pte;
20720
20721+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20722+ unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
20723+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
20724+#endif
20725+
20726 __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
20727
20728 inc_page_state(pgfault);
20729@@ -2080,6 +2191,45 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm
20730 pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
20731 spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20732
20733+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20734+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
20735+ pgd_t *pgd_m;
20736+ pud_t *pud_m;
20737+ pmd_t *pmd_m = NULL;
20738+ pte_t *pte_m = NULL;
20739+
20740+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
20741+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
20742+
20743+ /* PaX: sanity checks */
20744+ if (!vma_m) {
20745+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20746+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n",
20747+ address, vma, address_m, vma_m);
20748+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
20749+ } else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
20750+ vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
20751+ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start)
20752+ {
20753+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
20754+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
20755+ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
20756+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
20757+ }
20758+
20759+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
20760+ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
20761+ pud_m = pud_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m);
20762+ if (pud_m)
20763+ pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pud_m, address_m);
20764+ if (pmd_m)
20765+ pte_m = pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd_m, address_m);
20766+ if (!pud_m || !pmd_m || !pte_m)
20767+ goto oom;
20768+ pte_unmap(pte_m);
20769+ }
20770+#endif
20771+
20772 pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
20773 if (!pud)
20774 goto oom;
20775diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c
20776--- linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500
20777+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20778@@ -293,6 +293,12 @@ check_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsign
20779 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
20780 if (prev && prev->vm_end < vma->vm_start)
20781 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
20782+
20783+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20784+ if (vma-vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
20785+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
20786+#endif
20787+
20788 if ((flags & MPOL_MF_STRICT) && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
20789 err = verify_pages(vma->vm_mm,
20790 vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, nodes);
20791diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c
20792--- linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500
20793+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20794@@ -8,13 +8,62 @@
20795 #include <linux/mman.h>
20796 #include <linux/mm.h>
20797 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20798+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20799
20800+static int __mlock_fixup1(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20801+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
20802+
20803+static int __mlock_fixup2(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20804+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
20805
20806 static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20807 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
20808 {
20809+ int error;
20810+
20811+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20812+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
20813+ unsigned long start_m = 0UL, end_m = 0UL, newflags_m = 0UL;
20814+
20815+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
20816+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
20817+ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, start_m);
20818+ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != start_m || !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
20819+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
20820+ return -ENOMEM;
20821+ }
20822+
20823+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
20824+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
20825+ if (newflags & VM_LOCKED)
20826+ newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
20827+ else
20828+ newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags & ~VM_LOCKED;
20829+ error = __mlock_fixup1(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags_m);
20830+ if (error)
20831+ return error;
20832+ }
20833+#endif
20834+
20835+ error = __mlock_fixup1(vma, start, end, newflags);
20836+ if (error)
20837+ return error;
20838+
20839+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20840+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
20841+ error = __mlock_fixup2(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags_m);
20842+ if (error)
20843+ return error;
20844+ }
20845+#endif
20846+
20847+ return __mlock_fixup2(vma, start, end, newflags);
20848+}
20849+
20850+static int __mlock_fixup1(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20851+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
20852+{
20853 struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
20854- int pages;
20855 int ret = 0;
20856
20857 if (newflags == vma->vm_flags)
20858@@ -26,11 +75,20 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st
20859 goto out;
20860 }
20861
20862- if (end != vma->vm_end) {
20863+ if (end != vma->vm_end)
20864 ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
20865- if (ret)
20866- goto out;
20867- }
20868+
20869+out:
20870+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
20871+ ret = -EAGAIN;
20872+ return ret;
20873+}
20874+
20875+static int __mlock_fixup2(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
20876+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
20877+{
20878+ int pages;
20879+ int ret = 0;
20880
20881 /*
20882 * vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode.
20883@@ -48,9 +106,8 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st
20884 if (!(newflags & VM_IO))
20885 ret = make_pages_present(start, end);
20886 }
20887-
20888 vma->vm_mm->locked_vm -= pages;
20889-out:
20890+
20891 if (ret == -ENOMEM)
20892 ret = -EAGAIN;
20893 return ret;
20894@@ -68,6 +125,17 @@ static int do_mlock(unsigned long start,
20895 return -EINVAL;
20896 if (end == start)
20897 return 0;
20898+
20899+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20900+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
20901+ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
20902+ return -EINVAL;
20903+ } else
20904+#endif
20905+
20906+ if (end > TASK_SIZE)
20907+ return -EINVAL;
20908+
20909 vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
20910 if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
20911 return -ENOMEM;
20912@@ -121,6 +189,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlock(unsigned long
20913 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
20914
20915 /* check against resource limits */
20916+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
20917 if ((locked <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
20918 error = do_mlock(start, len, 1);
20919 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
20920@@ -153,6 +222,16 @@ static int do_mlockall(int flags)
20921 for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
20922 unsigned int newflags;
20923
20924+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20925+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
20926+ if (vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
20927+ break;
20928+ } else
20929+#endif
20930+
20931+ if (vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE)
20932+ break;
20933+
20934 newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
20935 if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT))
20936 newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED;
20937@@ -182,6 +261,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlockall(int flags)
20938 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
20939
20940 ret = -ENOMEM;
20941+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1);
20942 if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT) || (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) ||
20943 capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
20944 ret = do_mlockall(flags);
20945diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c
20946--- linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
20947+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
20948@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
20949 #include <linux/mount.h>
20950 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
20951 #include <linux/rmap.h>
20952+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20953
20954 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20955 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
20956@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_overcommit_ratio);
20957 EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_map_count);
20958 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_committed_space);
20959 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vm_enough_memory);
20960+EXPORT_SYMBOL(protection_map);
20961
20962 /*
20963 * Requires inode->i_mapping->i_mmap_lock
20964@@ -227,6 +229,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigne
20965
20966 /* Check against rlimit.. */
20967 rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
20968+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data, 1);
20969 if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim)
20970 goto out;
20971
20972@@ -605,7 +608,11 @@ again: remove_next = 1 + (end > next->
20973 * If the vma has a ->close operation then the driver probably needs to release
20974 * per-vma resources, so we don't attempt to merge those.
20975 */
20976+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
20977+#define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED | VM_MIRROR)
20978+#else
20979 #define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED)
20980+#endif
20981
20982 static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
20983 struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags)
20984@@ -865,6 +872,42 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
20985 unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
20986 unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
20987 {
20988+ unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
20989+
20990+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20991+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
20992+ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr && addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)))
20993+ return ret;
20994+#endif
20995+
20996+ ret = __do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
20997+
20998+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20999+ if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ret < TASK_SIZE && ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
21000+
21001+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21002+ && (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) || ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE)))
21003+#endif
21004+
21005+ )
21006+ {
21007+ unsigned long ret_m;
21008+ prot = prot & PROT_EXEC ? prot : PROT_NONE;
21009+ ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flags | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret);
21010+ if (ret_m >= TASK_SIZE) {
21011+ do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len);
21012+ ret = ret_m;
21013+ }
21014+ }
21015+#endif
21016+
21017+ return ret;
21018+}
21019+
21020+unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
21021+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
21022+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
21023+{
21024 struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
21025 struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
21026 struct inode *inode;
21027@@ -875,6 +918,28 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21028 int accountable = 1;
21029 unsigned long charged = 0;
21030
21031+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21032+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
21033+
21034+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
21035+ /* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */
21036+ if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE))
21037+ return -EINVAL;
21038+
21039+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff);
21040+
21041+ if (!vma_m || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma_m) ||
21042+ vma_m->vm_start != pgoff ||
21043+ (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
21044+ (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))
21045+ return -EINVAL;
21046+
21047+ file = vma_m->vm_file;
21048+ pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff;
21049+ len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start;
21050+ }
21051+#endif
21052+
21053 if (file) {
21054 if (is_file_hugepages(file))
21055 accountable = 0;
21056@@ -915,7 +980,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21057 /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
21058 * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
21059 */
21060- addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
21061+ addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags | ((prot & PROT_EXEC) ? MAP_EXECUTABLE : 0));
21062 if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
21063 return addr;
21064
21065@@ -926,6 +991,30 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21066 vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
21067 mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
21068
21069+ if (file && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))
21070+ vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
21071+
21072+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
21073+ if (mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
21074+
21075+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21076+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
21077+ if ((prot & (PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_EXEC)
21078+ vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
21079+ else
21080+ vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE);
21081+
21082+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC
21083+ if (file && (flags & MAP_MIRROR) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
21084+ vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
21085+#endif
21086+
21087+ }
21088+#endif
21089+
21090+ }
21091+#endif
21092+
21093 if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) {
21094 if (!can_do_mlock())
21095 return -EPERM;
21096@@ -937,6 +1026,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21097 locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
21098 lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
21099 locked += len;
21100+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1);
21101 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
21102 return -EAGAIN;
21103 }
21104@@ -984,6 +1074,11 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21105 /*
21106 * Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
21107 */
21108+
21109+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21110+ if (!(flags & MAP_MIRROR))
21111+#endif
21112+
21113 pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21114 break;
21115 default:
21116@@ -995,17 +1090,21 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
21117 if (error)
21118 return error;
21119
21120+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
21121+ return -EACCES;
21122+
21123 /* Clear old maps */
21124 error = -ENOMEM;
21125-munmap_back:
21126 vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
21127 if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
21128 if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
21129 return -ENOMEM;
21130- goto munmap_back;
21131+ vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
21132+ BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
21133 }
21134
21135 /* Check against address space limit. */
21136+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
21137 if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
21138 > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
21139 return -ENOMEM;
21140@@ -1052,6 +1151,13 @@ munmap_back:
21141 vma->vm_start = addr;
21142 vma->vm_end = addr + len;
21143 vma->vm_flags = vm_flags;
21144+
21145+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
21146+ if ((file || !(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
21147+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
21148+ else
21149+#endif
21150+
21151 vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f];
21152 vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
21153
21154@@ -1076,6 +1182,14 @@ munmap_back:
21155 goto free_vma;
21156 }
21157
21158+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21159+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
21160+ vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
21161+ vma_m->vm_mirror = vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start;
21162+ vma->vm_mirror = vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start;
21163+ }
21164+#endif
21165+
21166 /* We set VM_ACCOUNT in a shared mapping's vm_flags, to inform
21167 * shmem_zero_setup (perhaps called through /dev/zero's ->mmap)
21168 * that memory reservation must be checked; but that reservation
21169@@ -1111,6 +1225,7 @@ munmap_back:
21170 out:
21171 mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21172 __vm_stat_account(mm, vm_flags, file, len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
21173+ track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, vm_flags);
21174 if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
21175 mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21176 make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
21177@@ -1142,6 +1257,7 @@ unacct_error:
21178 }
21179
21180 EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_mmap_pgoff);
21181+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__do_mmap_pgoff);
21182
21183 /* Get an address range which is currently unmapped.
21184 * For shmat() with addr=0.
21185@@ -1166,6 +1282,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
21186 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
21187 return -ENOMEM;
21188
21189+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
21190+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
21191+#endif
21192+
21193 if (addr) {
21194 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
21195 vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
21196@@ -1221,7 +1341,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
21197 const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
21198 const unsigned long flags)
21199 {
21200- struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma;
21201+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
21202 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
21203 unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
21204 int first_time = 1;
21205@@ -1234,6 +1354,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
21206 if (mm->free_area_cache > base)
21207 mm->free_area_cache = base;
21208
21209+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
21210+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
21211+#endif
21212+
21213 /* requesting a specific address */
21214 if (addr) {
21215 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
21216@@ -1255,15 +1379,14 @@ try_again:
21217 * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address,
21218 * i.e. return with success:
21219 */
21220- if (!(vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev_vma)))
21221+ if (!(vma = find_vma(mm, addr)))
21222 return addr;
21223
21224 /*
21225 * new region fits between prev_vma->vm_end and
21226 * vma->vm_start, use it:
21227 */
21228- if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start &&
21229- (!prev_vma || (addr >= prev_vma->vm_end)))
21230+ if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start)
21231 /* remember the address as a hint for next time */
21232 return (mm->free_area_cache = addr);
21233 else
21234@@ -1428,12 +1551,16 @@ out:
21235 * update accounting. This is shared with both the
21236 * grow-up and grow-down cases.
21237 */
21238-static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long size, unsigned long grow)
21239+static int acct_stack_growth(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long size, unsigned long grow)
21240 {
21241 struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
21242- struct rlimit *rlim = current->signal->rlim;
21243+ struct rlimit *rlim = tsk->signal->rlim;
21244+
21245+ BUG_ON(mm != tsk->mm);
21246
21247 /* address space limit tests */
21248+ gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
21249+ gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_STACK, size, 1);
21250 if (mm->total_vm + grow > rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT)
21251 return -ENOMEM;
21252
21253@@ -1447,6 +1574,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
21254 unsigned long limit;
21255 locked = mm->locked_vm + grow;
21256 limit = rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21257+ gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
21258 if (locked > limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
21259 return -ENOMEM;
21260 }
21261@@ -1472,7 +1600,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
21262 /*
21263 * vma is the first one with address > vma->vm_end. Have to extend vma.
21264 */
21265-int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address)
21266+int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address)
21267 {
21268 int error;
21269
21270@@ -1503,7 +1631,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *
21271 size = address - vma->vm_start;
21272 grow = (address - vma->vm_end) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21273
21274- error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
21275+ error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, grow);
21276 if (!error)
21277 vma->vm_end = address;
21278 }
21279@@ -1512,7 +1640,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *
21280 }
21281
21282 struct vm_area_struct *
21283-find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
21284+find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr)
21285 {
21286 struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
21287
21288@@ -1520,7 +1648,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un
21289 vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev);
21290 if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr))
21291 return vma;
21292- if (!prev || expand_stack(prev, addr))
21293+ if (!prev || expand_stack(tsk, prev, addr))
21294 return NULL;
21295 if (prev->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
21296 make_pages_present(addr, prev->vm_end);
21297@@ -1531,7 +1659,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un
21298 /*
21299 * vma is the first one with address < vma->vm_start. Have to extend vma.
21300 */
21301-int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
21302+int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
21303 {
21304 int error;
21305
21306@@ -1555,13 +1683,50 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *
21307 if (address < vma->vm_start) {
21308 unsigned long size, grow;
21309
21310+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21311+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
21312+ unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
21313+
21314+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
21315+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
21316+ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m);
21317+ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
21318+ !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
21319+ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start !=
21320+ vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start ||
21321+ vma->anon_vma != vma_m->anon_vma) {
21322+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
21323+ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
21324+ anon_vma_unlock(vma);
21325+ return -EFAULT;
21326+ }
21327+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
21328+ }
21329+#endif
21330+
21331 size = vma->vm_end - address;
21332 grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21333
21334- error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
21335+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21336+ if (vma_m)
21337+ error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, 2*grow);
21338+ else
21339+#endif
21340+
21341+ error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, grow);
21342 if (!error) {
21343 vma->vm_start = address;
21344 vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
21345+ track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
21346+
21347+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21348+ if (vma_m) {
21349+ vma_m->vm_start = address_m;
21350+ vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow;
21351+ track_exec_limit(vma_m->vm_mm, vma_m->vm_start, vma_m->vm_end, vma_m->vm_flags);
21352+ }
21353+#endif
21354+
21355 }
21356 }
21357 anon_vma_unlock(vma);
21358@@ -1569,7 +1734,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *
21359 }
21360
21361 struct vm_area_struct *
21362-find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr)
21363+find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr)
21364 {
21365 struct vm_area_struct * vma;
21366 unsigned long start;
21367@@ -1583,7 +1748,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, u
21368 if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
21369 return NULL;
21370 start = vma->vm_start;
21371- if (expand_stack(vma, addr))
21372+ if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr))
21373 return NULL;
21374 if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
21375 make_pages_present(addr, start);
21376@@ -1606,7 +1771,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, u
21377 * we just free'd - but there's no telling how much before.
21378 */
21379 static void free_pgtables(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *prev,
21380- unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
21381+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
21382 {
21383 unsigned long first = start & PGDIR_MASK;
21384 unsigned long last = end + PGDIR_SIZE - 1;
21385@@ -1641,6 +1806,14 @@ static void free_pgtables(struct mmu_gat
21386 break;
21387 }
21388 no_mmaps:
21389+ while (mpnt && first < last) {
21390+ if ((mpnt->vm_end > first) &&(last > mpnt->vm_start)) {
21391+ first = mpnt->vm_end + PGDIR_SIZE - 1;
21392+ last = mpnt->vm_start;
21393+ }
21394+ mpnt = mpnt->vm_next;
21395+ }
21396+
21397 if (last < first) /* for arches with discontiguous pgd indices */
21398 return;
21399 if (first < FIRST_USER_PGD_NR * PGDIR_SIZE)
21400@@ -1663,11 +1836,11 @@ static void unmap_vma(struct mm_struct *
21401 {
21402 size_t len = area->vm_end - area->vm_start;
21403
21404- area->vm_mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21405+ mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21406 if (area->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
21407- area->vm_mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21408+ mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21409 vm_stat_unaccount(area);
21410- area->vm_mm->unmap_area(area);
21411+ mm->unmap_area(area);
21412 remove_vm_struct(area);
21413 }
21414
21415@@ -1696,6 +1869,7 @@ static void unmap_vma_list(struct mm_str
21416 static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm,
21417 struct vm_area_struct *vma,
21418 struct vm_area_struct *prev,
21419+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt,
21420 unsigned long start,
21421 unsigned long end)
21422 {
21423@@ -1710,31 +1884,93 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struc
21424 if (is_hugepage_only_range(start, end - start))
21425 hugetlb_free_pgtables(tlb, prev, start, end);
21426 else
21427- free_pgtables(tlb, prev, start, end);
21428+ free_pgtables(tlb, prev, mpnt, start, end);
21429 tlb_finish_mmu(tlb, start, end);
21430 }
21431
21432+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21433+static void unmap_mirror_region(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *mpnt)
21434+{
21435+
21436+ while (mpnt) {
21437+ struct vm_area_struct *next;
21438+
21439+ next = mpnt->vm_next;
21440+ mpnt->vm_next = NULL;
21441+ unmap_region(mm, mpnt, NULL, next, mpnt->vm_start, mpnt->vm_end);
21442+ mpnt->vm_next = next;
21443+ mpnt = next;
21444+ }
21445+}
21446+#endif
21447+
21448 /*
21449 * Create a list of vma's touched by the unmap, removing them from the mm's
21450 * vma list as we go..
21451 */
21452 static void
21453 detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
21454- struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end)
21455+ struct vm_area_struct *prev, struct vm_area_struct **mpnt_m, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
21456 {
21457 struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point;
21458 struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL;
21459
21460+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21461+ unsigned long start_m;
21462+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, *head_vma = vma, *mirrors = NULL;
21463+#endif
21464+
21465 insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap);
21466 do {
21467 rb_erase(&vma->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
21468 mm->map_count--;
21469+
21470+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21471+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) &&
21472+ vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror >= start &&
21473+ vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror < end)
21474+ {
21475+ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */
21476+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
21477+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, start_m);
21478+ if (vma_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && vma_m->vm_start == start_m) {
21479+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR;
21480+ vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR;
21481+ } else
21482+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: munmap bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
21483+ }
21484+#endif
21485+
21486 tail_vma = vma;
21487 vma = vma->vm_next;
21488 } while (vma && vma->vm_start < end);
21489 *insertion_point = vma;
21490 tail_vma->vm_next = NULL;
21491 mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */
21492+
21493+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21494+ for (; head_vma; head_vma = head_vma->vm_next) {
21495+ struct vm_area_struct *prev_m;
21496+
21497+ if (!(head_vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
21498+ continue;
21499+
21500+ start_m = head_vma->vm_start + head_vma->vm_mirror;
21501+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(mm, start_m, &prev_m);
21502+ rb_erase(&vma_m->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb);
21503+ mm->map_count--;
21504+ insertion_point = prev_m ? &prev_m->vm_next : &mm->mmap;
21505+ *insertion_point = vma_m->vm_next;
21506+ if (*mpnt_m) {
21507+ mirrors->vm_next = vma_m;
21508+ mirrors = vma_m;
21509+ } else
21510+ *mpnt_m = mirrors = vma_m;
21511+ mirrors->vm_next = NULL;
21512+ mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */
21513+ }
21514+#endif
21515+
21516 }
21517
21518 /*
21519@@ -1797,7 +2033,11 @@ int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, str
21520 int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
21521 {
21522 unsigned long end;
21523- struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last;
21524+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last, *mpnt_m = NULL;
21525+
21526+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21527+ struct vm_area_struct *last_m;
21528+#endif
21529
21530 if ((start & ~PAGE_MASK) || start > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-start)
21531 return -EINVAL;
21532@@ -1824,7 +2064,23 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
21533 * places tmp vma above, and higher split_vma places tmp vma below.
21534 */
21535 if (start > mpnt->vm_start) {
21536- int error = split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0);
21537+ int error;
21538+
21539+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21540+ if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
21541+ unsigned long start_m = mpnt->vm_start + mpnt->vm_mirror;
21542+
21543+ mpnt_m = find_vma(mm, start_m);
21544+ if (!mpnt_m || (!mpnt_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || mpnt_m->vm_start != start_m)
21545+ return -EINVAL;
21546+ start_m = start + mpnt->vm_mirror;
21547+ error = split_vma(mm, mpnt_m, start_m, 0);
21548+ if (error)
21549+ return error;
21550+ }
21551+#endif
21552+
21553+ error = split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0);
21554 if (error)
21555 return error;
21556 prev = mpnt;
21557@@ -1833,7 +2089,22 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
21558 /* Does it split the last one? */
21559 last = find_vma(mm, end);
21560 if (last && end > last->vm_start) {
21561- int error = split_vma(mm, last, end, 1);
21562+ int error;
21563+
21564+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21565+ if (last->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
21566+ unsigned long end_m = last->vm_start + last->vm_mirror;
21567+
21568+ last_m = find_vma(mm, end_m);
21569+ if (!last_m || (!last_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || last_m->vm_start != end_m)
21570+ return -EINVAL;
21571+ end_m = end + last->vm_mirror;
21572+ if (split_vma(mm, last_m, end_m, 1))
21573+ return -ENOMEM;
21574+ }
21575+#endif
21576+
21577+ error = split_vma(mm, last, end, 1);
21578 if (error)
21579 return error;
21580 }
21581@@ -1842,14 +2113,28 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
21582 /*
21583 * Remove the vma's, and unmap the actual pages
21584 */
21585- detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, end);
21586+
21587+ mpnt_m = NULL;
21588+ detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, &mpnt_m, start, end);
21589 spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
21590- unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, start, end);
21591+ unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, NULL, start, end);
21592+
21593+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21594+ unmap_mirror_region(mm, mpnt_m);
21595+#endif
21596+
21597 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
21598
21599 /* Fix up all other VM information */
21600 unmap_vma_list(mm, mpnt);
21601
21602+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21603+ if (mpnt_m)
21604+ unmap_vma_list(mm, mpnt_m);
21605+#endif
21606+
21607+ track_exec_limit(mm, start, end, 0UL);
21608+
21609 return 0;
21610 }
21611
21612@@ -1862,6 +2147,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long
21613
21614 profile_munmap(addr);
21615
21616+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21617+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
21618+ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))
21619+ return -EINVAL;
21620+#endif
21621+
21622 down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
21623 ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
21624 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
21625@@ -1883,8 +2174,32 @@ static inline void verify_mm_writelocked
21626 * anonymous maps. eventually we may be able to do some
21627 * brk-specific accounting here.
21628 */
21629+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21630+unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
21631+
21632 unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
21633 {
21634+ unsigned long ret;
21635+
21636+ ret = __do_brk(addr, len);
21637+ if (ret == addr && (current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | MF_PAX_MPROTECT)) == MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
21638+ unsigned long ret_m;
21639+
21640+ ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, addr);
21641+ if (ret_m > TASK_SIZE) {
21642+ do_munmap(current->mm, addr, len);
21643+ ret = ret_m;
21644+ }
21645+ }
21646+
21647+ return ret;
21648+}
21649+
21650+unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
21651+#else
21652+unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
21653+#endif
21654+{
21655 struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
21656 struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
21657 unsigned long flags;
21658@@ -1895,6 +2210,13 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
21659 if (!len)
21660 return addr;
21661
21662+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21663+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
21664+ if ((addr + len) > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
21665+ return -EINVAL;
21666+ } else
21667+#endif
21668+
21669 if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
21670 return -EINVAL;
21671
21672@@ -1906,6 +2228,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
21673 locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
21674 lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
21675 locked += len;
21676+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1);
21677 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
21678 return -EAGAIN;
21679 }
21680@@ -1919,15 +2242,16 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
21681 /*
21682 * Clear old maps. this also does some error checking for us
21683 */
21684- munmap_back:
21685 vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
21686 if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
21687 if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
21688 return -ENOMEM;
21689- goto munmap_back;
21690+ vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
21691+ BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
21692 }
21693
21694 /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
21695+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
21696 if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len
21697 > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)
21698 return -ENOMEM;
21699@@ -1940,6 +2264,18 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
21700
21701 flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
21702
21703+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
21704+ if (mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
21705+ flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
21706+
21707+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21708+ if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
21709+ flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
21710+#endif
21711+
21712+ }
21713+#endif
21714+
21715 /* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
21716 if (vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
21717 NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL))
21718@@ -1960,6 +2296,13 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
21719 vma->vm_end = addr + len;
21720 vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
21721 vma->vm_flags = flags;
21722+
21723+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
21724+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
21725+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
21726+ else
21727+#endif
21728+
21729 vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f];
21730 vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
21731 out:
21732@@ -1968,6 +2311,7 @@ out:
21733 mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21734 make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
21735 }
21736+ track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, flags);
21737 acct_update_integrals();
21738 update_mem_hiwater();
21739 return addr;
21740diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c
21741--- linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500
21742+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
21743@@ -19,11 +19,18 @@
21744 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
21745 #include <linux/personality.h>
21746 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
21747+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21748+
21749+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21750+#include <linux/elf.h>
21751+#include <linux/fs.h>
21752+#endif
21753
21754 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21755 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
21756 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
21757 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
21758+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
21759
21760 static inline void
21761 change_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address,
21762@@ -138,6 +145,97 @@ change_protection(struct vm_area_struct
21763 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
21764 }
21765
21766+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
21767+/* called while holding the mmap semaphor for writing */
21768+static inline void establish_user_cs_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
21769+{
21770+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, start);
21771+
21772+ for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next)
21773+ change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot);
21774+
21775+}
21776+
21777+void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot)
21778+{
21779+ unsigned long oldlimit, newlimit = 0UL;
21780+
21781+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
21782+ return;
21783+
21784+ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
21785+ oldlimit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
21786+ if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && oldlimit < end)
21787+ /* USER_CS limit moved up */
21788+ newlimit = end;
21789+ else if (!(prot & VM_EXEC) && start < oldlimit && oldlimit <= end)
21790+ /* USER_CS limit moved down */
21791+ newlimit = start;
21792+
21793+ if (newlimit) {
21794+ mm->context.user_cs_limit = newlimit;
21795+
21796+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
21797+ wmb();
21798+ cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
21799+ cpu_set(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
21800+#endif
21801+
21802+ set_user_cs(mm, smp_processor_id());
21803+ }
21804+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
21805+ if (newlimit == end)
21806+ establish_user_cs_limit(mm, oldlimit, end);
21807+}
21808+#endif
21809+
21810+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
21811+static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
21812+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
21813+
21814+static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
21815+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
21816+{
21817+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
21818+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
21819+ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
21820+ int error;
21821+
21822+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
21823+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
21824+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
21825+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
21826+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
21827+
21828+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21829+ if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma_m->vm_start >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) && !(newflags & VM_EXEC))
21830+ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC));
21831+ else
21832+#endif
21833+
21834+ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
21835+ if (error)
21836+ return error;
21837+ } else {
21838+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
21839+ return -ENOMEM;
21840+ }
21841+ }
21842+
21843+ return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
21844+}
21845+
21846+static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
21847+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
21848+{
21849+ struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
21850+ unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags;
21851+ long nrpages = (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
21852+ unsigned long charged = 0;
21853+ pgprot_t newprot;
21854+ pgoff_t pgoff;
21855+ int error;
21856+#else
21857 static int
21858 mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
21859 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
21860@@ -154,6 +252,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
21861 *pprev = vma;
21862 return 0;
21863 }
21864+#endif
21865
21866 /*
21867 * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit;
21868@@ -172,6 +271,12 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
21869 }
21870 }
21871
21872+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
21873+ if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
21874+ newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf];
21875+ else
21876+#endif
21877+
21878 newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf];
21879
21880 /*
21881@@ -219,6 +324,69 @@ fail:
21882 return error;
21883 }
21884
21885+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21886+/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments
21887+ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life.
21888+ *
21889+ * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment
21890+ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones.
21891+ */
21892+static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start)
21893+{
21894+ struct elfhdr elf_h;
21895+ struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn;
21896+ elf_dyn dyn;
21897+ unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
21898+
21899+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
21900+ if ((vma->vm_start != start) ||
21901+ !vma->vm_file ||
21902+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) ||
21903+ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
21904+#endif
21905+
21906+ return;
21907+
21908+ if (sizeof(elf_h) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) ||
21909+ memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
21910+
21911+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
21912+ (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) ||
21913+#else
21914+ elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN ||
21915+#endif
21916+
21917+ !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) ||
21918+ elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) ||
21919+ elf_h.e_phnum > j)
21920+ return;
21921+
21922+ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) {
21923+ if (sizeof(elf_p) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p)))
21924+ return;
21925+ if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) {
21926+ p_dyn = elf_p;
21927+ j = i;
21928+ }
21929+ }
21930+ if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j)
21931+ return;
21932+
21933+ i = 0UL;
21934+ do {
21935+ if (sizeof(dyn) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn)))
21936+ return;
21937+ if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) {
21938+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE;
21939+ gr_log_textrel(vma);
21940+ return;
21941+ }
21942+ i++;
21943+ } while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL);
21944+ return;
21945+}
21946+#endif
21947+
21948 asmlinkage long
21949 sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot)
21950 {
21951@@ -236,6 +404,17 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
21952 end = start + len;
21953 if (end < start)
21954 return -ENOMEM;
21955+
21956+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21957+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
21958+ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
21959+ return -EINVAL;
21960+ } else
21961+#endif
21962+
21963+ if (end > TASK_SIZE)
21964+ return -EINVAL;
21965+
21966 if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM))
21967 return -EINVAL;
21968 if (end == start)
21969@@ -276,6 +455,16 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
21970 if (start > vma->vm_start)
21971 prev = vma;
21972
21973+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
21974+ error = -EACCES;
21975+ goto out;
21976+ }
21977+
21978+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21979+ if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
21980+ pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start);
21981+#endif
21982+
21983 for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
21984 unsigned long newflags;
21985
21986@@ -293,6 +482,12 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
21987 goto out;
21988 }
21989
21990+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
21991+ /* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
21992+ if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
21993+ newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
21994+#endif
21995+
21996 error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
21997 if (error)
21998 goto out;
21999@@ -316,6 +511,9 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
22000 goto out;
22001 }
22002 }
22003+
22004+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, start, end, vm_flags);
22005+
22006 out:
22007 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
22008 return error;
22009diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c
22010--- linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500
22011+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22012@@ -150,6 +150,12 @@ move_one_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma
22013 if (dst) {
22014 pte_t pte;
22015 pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, old_addr, src);
22016+
22017+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
22018+ if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
22019+ pte_exprotect(pte);
22020+#endif
22021+
22022 set_pte(dst, pte);
22023 } else
22024 error = -ENOMEM;
22025@@ -293,6 +299,18 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22026 if (!new_len)
22027 goto out;
22028
22029+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22030+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22031+ if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len ||
22032+ old_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-old_len)
22033+ goto out;
22034+ } else
22035+#endif
22036+
22037+ if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-new_len ||
22038+ old_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-old_len)
22039+ goto out;
22040+
22041 /* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */
22042 if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
22043 if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
22044@@ -300,6 +318,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22045 if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
22046 goto out;
22047
22048+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22049+ if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22050+ if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || new_addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len)
22051+ goto out;
22052+ } else
22053+#endif
22054+
22055 if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
22056 goto out;
22057
22058@@ -343,6 +368,16 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22059 ret = -EINVAL;
22060 goto out;
22061 }
22062+
22063+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
22064+ if ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | MF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) &&
22065+ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR))
22066+ {
22067+ ret = -EINVAL;
22068+ goto out;
22069+ }
22070+#endif
22071+
22072 /* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
22073 if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
22074 goto out;
22075@@ -397,6 +432,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22076 acct_update_integrals();
22077 update_mem_hiwater();
22078 ret = addr;
22079+ track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len, vma->vm_flags);
22080 goto out;
22081 }
22082 }
22083@@ -407,8 +443,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22084 */
22085 ret = -ENOMEM;
22086 if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
22087+ unsigned long map_flags = 0;
22088 if (!(flags & MREMAP_FIXED)) {
22089- unsigned long map_flags = 0;
22090 if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
22091 map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
22092
22093@@ -418,7 +454,12 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
22094 if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
22095 goto out;
22096 }
22097+ map_flags = vma->vm_flags;
22098 ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
22099+ if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
22100+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, addr, addr + old_len, 0UL);
22101+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, new_addr, new_addr + new_len, map_flags);
22102+ }
22103 }
22104 out:
22105 if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
22106diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c
22107--- linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500
22108+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22109@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ struct page * follow_page(struct mm_stru
22110 return NULL;
22111 }
22112
22113-struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)
22114+struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr)
22115 {
22116 return NULL;
22117 }
22118diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c
22119--- linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500
22120+++ linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22121@@ -109,6 +109,19 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_stru
22122 list_add(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
22123 allocated = NULL;
22124 }
22125+
22126+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC)
22127+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
22128+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
22129+
22130+ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
22131+ BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
22132+ BUG_ON(vma_m->anon_vma || vma->vm_pgoff != vma_m->vm_pgoff);
22133+ vma_m->anon_vma = anon_vma;
22134+ __anon_vma_link(vma_m);
22135+ }
22136+#endif
22137+
22138 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
22139
22140 if (locked)
22141diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
22142--- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:20.000000000 -0500
22143+++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22144@@ -256,6 +256,21 @@ config IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS
22145
22146 To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N.
22147
22148+config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
22149+ tristate "stealth match support"
22150+ depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES
22151+ help
22152+ Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
22153+ ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you
22154+ are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
22155+ you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
22156+ drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
22157+ machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
22158+ destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
22159+ instance.
22160+
22161+ To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N.
22162+
22163 config IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER
22164 tristate "Helper match support"
22165 depends on IP_NF_CONNTRACK && IP_NF_IPTABLES
22166diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
22167--- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
22168+++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22169@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM) += ipt_r
22170 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o
22171 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_PHYSDEV) += ipt_physdev.o
22172 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_COMMENT) += ipt_comment.o
22173+obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
22174
22175 # targets
22176 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT) += ipt_REJECT.o
22177diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
22178--- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
22179+++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22180@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
22181+/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
22182+ *
22183+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
22184+ *
22185+ */
22186+
22187+#include <linux/kernel.h>
22188+#include <linux/module.h>
22189+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
22190+#include <linux/net.h>
22191+#include <linux/sched.h>
22192+#include <linux/inet.h>
22193+#include <linux/stddef.h>
22194+
22195+#include <net/ip.h>
22196+#include <net/sock.h>
22197+#include <net/tcp.h>
22198+#include <net/udp.h>
22199+#include <net/route.h>
22200+#include <net/inet_common.h>
22201+
22202+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
22203+
22204+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
22205+
22206+extern struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr, unsigned short hnum, int dif);
22207+extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
22208+
22209+static int
22210+match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
22211+ const struct net_device *in,
22212+ const struct net_device *out,
22213+ const void *matchinfo,
22214+ int offset,
22215+ int *hotdrop)
22216+{
22217+ struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph;
22218+ struct tcphdr th;
22219+ struct udphdr uh;
22220+ struct sock *sk = NULL;
22221+
22222+ if (!ip || offset) return 0;
22223+
22224+ switch(ip->protocol) {
22225+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
22226+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) {
22227+ *hotdrop = 1;
22228+ return 0;
22229+ }
22230+ if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return 0;
22231+ sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th.dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif);
22232+ break;
22233+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
22234+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) {
22235+ *hotdrop = 1;
22236+ return 0;
22237+ }
22238+ sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
22239+ break;
22240+ default:
22241+ return 0;
22242+ }
22243+
22244+ if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
22245+ return 1;
22246+ else {
22247+ sock_put(sk);
22248+ return 0;
22249+ }
22250+}
22251+
22252+/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
22253+static int
22254+checkentry(const char *tablename,
22255+ const struct ipt_ip *ip,
22256+ void *matchinfo,
22257+ unsigned int matchsize,
22258+ unsigned int hook_mask)
22259+{
22260+ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0))
22261+ return 0;
22262+
22263+ if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
22264+ ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
22265+ && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)))
22266+ return 1;
22267+
22268+ printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
22269+
22270+ return 0;
22271+}
22272+
22273+
22274+static struct ipt_match stealth_match = {
22275+ .name = "stealth",
22276+ .match = &match,
22277+ .checkentry = &checkentry,
22278+ .destroy = NULL,
22279+ .me = THIS_MODULE
22280+};
22281+
22282+static int __init init(void)
22283+{
22284+ return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match);
22285+}
22286+
22287+static void __exit fini(void)
22288+{
22289+ ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
22290+}
22291+
22292+module_init(init);
22293+module_exit(fini);
22294diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
22295--- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500
22296+++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22297@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
22298 #include <linux/jhash.h>
22299 #include <linux/init.h>
22300 #include <linux/times.h>
22301+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22302
22303 #include <net/icmp.h>
22304 #include <net/tcp.h>
22305@@ -223,6 +224,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_get_port(struct sock *
22306
22307 spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
22308 rover = tcp_port_rover;
22309+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
22310+ if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low))
22311+ rover = low + (get_random_long() % remaining);
22312+#endif
22313 do {
22314 rover++;
22315 if (rover < low || rover > high)
22316@@ -448,7 +453,7 @@ static struct sock *__tcp_v4_lookup_list
22317 }
22318
22319 /* Optimize the common listener case. */
22320-static inline struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr,
22321+struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr,
22322 unsigned short hnum, int dif)
22323 {
22324 struct sock *sk = NULL;
22325@@ -474,6 +479,8 @@ sherry_cache:
22326 return sk;
22327 }
22328
22329+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_v4_lookup_listener);
22330+
22331 /* Sockets in TCP_CLOSE state are _always_ taken out of the hash, so
22332 * we need not check it for TCP lookups anymore, thanks Alexey. -DaveM
22333 *
22334@@ -665,7 +672,12 @@ static inline int tcp_v4_hash_connect(st
22335 struct hlist_node *node;
22336 struct tcp_tw_bucket *tw = NULL;
22337
22338- local_bh_disable();
22339+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
22340+ if (grsec_enable_randsrc)
22341+ offset = get_random_long();
22342+#endif
22343+
22344+ local_bh_disable();
22345 for (i = 1; i <= range; i++) {
22346 port = low + (i + offset) % range;
22347 head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(port)];
22348@@ -714,6 +726,15 @@ ok:
22349 }
22350 spin_unlock(&head->lock);
22351
22352+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
22353+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table(current);
22354+ current->gr_saddr = inet_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr;
22355+ current->gr_daddr = inet_sk(sk)->daddr;
22356+ current->gr_sport = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
22357+ current->gr_dport = inet_sk(sk)->dport;
22358+ gr_add_to_task_ip_table(current);
22359+#endif
22360+
22361 if (tw) {
22362 tcp_tw_deschedule(tw);
22363 tcp_tw_put(tw);
22364diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c
22365--- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500
22366+++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22367@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
22368 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
22369 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
22370 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
22371+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22372 #include <net/sock.h>
22373 #include <net/udp.h>
22374 #include <net/icmp.h>
22375@@ -108,6 +109,12 @@
22376 #include <net/checksum.h>
22377 #include <net/xfrm.h>
22378
22379+extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
22380+ const struct sk_buff *skb);
22381+extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
22382+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
22383+
22384+
22385 /*
22386 * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
22387 */
22388@@ -264,8 +271,7 @@ static struct sock *udp_v4_lookup_longwa
22389 return result;
22390 }
22391
22392-static __inline__ struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport,
22393- u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif)
22394+struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif)
22395 {
22396 struct sock *sk;
22397
22398@@ -540,9 +546,16 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, stru
22399 dport = usin->sin_port;
22400 if (dport == 0)
22401 return -EINVAL;
22402+
22403+ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
22404+ return -EPERM;
22405 } else {
22406 if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
22407 return -EDESTADDRREQ;
22408+
22409+ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
22410+ return -EPERM;
22411+
22412 daddr = inet->daddr;
22413 dport = inet->dport;
22414 /* Open fast path for connected socket.
22415@@ -795,6 +808,11 @@ try_again:
22416 if (!skb)
22417 goto out;
22418
22419+ if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
22420+ err = -EPERM;
22421+ goto out_free;
22422+ }
22423+
22424 copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
22425 if (copied > len) {
22426 copied = len;
22427diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c
22428--- linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c 2005-03-02 02:37:58.000000000 -0500
22429+++ linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22430@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
22431 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
22432 #include <linux/compat.h>
22433 #include <linux/kmod.h>
22434+#include <linux/in.h>
22435
22436 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO
22437 #include <linux/wireless.h> /* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */
22438@@ -94,6 +95,21 @@
22439 #include <net/sock.h>
22440 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
22441
22442+extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
22443+extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
22444+ const int protocol);
22445+extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
22446+extern int gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct socket *sck);
22447+extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
22448+extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
22449+ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
22450+extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
22451+ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
22452+extern int gr_search_listen(const struct socket * sock);
22453+extern int gr_search_accept(const struct socket * sock);
22454+extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
22455+ const int protocol);
22456+
22457 static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
22458 static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, char __user *buf,
22459 size_t size, loff_t pos);
22460@@ -1184,6 +1200,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socket(int family, i
22461 int retval;
22462 struct socket *sock;
22463
22464+ if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
22465+ retval = -EACCES;
22466+ goto out;
22467+ }
22468+
22469+ if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
22470+ retval = -EACCES;
22471+ goto out;
22472+ }
22473+
22474 retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
22475 if (retval < 0)
22476 goto out;
22477@@ -1279,11 +1305,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_bind(int fd, struct
22478 {
22479 struct socket *sock;
22480 char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
22481+ struct sockaddr *sck;
22482 int err;
22483
22484 if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
22485 {
22486 if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) {
22487+ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
22488+ if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
22489+ sockfd_put(sock);
22490+ return -EACCES;
22491+ }
22492+
22493+ if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) {
22494+ sockfd_put(sock);
22495+ return -EACCES;
22496+ }
22497+
22498 err = security_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
22499 if (err) {
22500 sockfd_put(sock);
22501@@ -1320,6 +1358,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_listen(int fd, int b
22502 return err;
22503 }
22504
22505+ if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) {
22506+ sockfd_put(sock);
22507+ return -EPERM;
22508+ }
22509+
22510+ if(!gr_search_listen(sock)) {
22511+ sockfd_put(sock);
22512+ return -EPERM;
22513+ }
22514+
22515 err=sock->ops->listen(sock, backlog);
22516 sockfd_put(sock);
22517 }
22518@@ -1360,6 +1408,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
22519 if (err)
22520 goto out_release;
22521
22522+ if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) {
22523+ err = -EPERM;
22524+ goto out_release;
22525+ }
22526+
22527+ if(!gr_search_accept(sock)) {
22528+ err = -EPERM;
22529+ goto out_release;
22530+ }
22531+
22532 /*
22533 * We don't need try_module_get here, as the listening socket (sock)
22534 * has the protocol module (sock->ops->owner) held.
22535@@ -1386,6 +1444,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
22536 goto out_release;
22537
22538 security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
22539+ gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
22540
22541 out_put:
22542 sockfd_put(sock);
22543@@ -1413,6 +1472,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
22544 {
22545 struct socket *sock;
22546 char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
22547+ struct sockaddr *sck;
22548 int err;
22549
22550 sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
22551@@ -1422,6 +1482,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
22552 if (err < 0)
22553 goto out_put;
22554
22555+ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
22556+
22557+ if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
22558+ err = -EACCES;
22559+ goto out_put;
22560+ }
22561+
22562+ if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
22563+ err = -EACCES;
22564+ goto out_put;
22565+ }
22566+
22567 err = security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
22568 if (err)
22569 goto out_put;
22570@@ -1675,6 +1747,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shutdown(int fd, int
22571 err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
22572 sockfd_put(sock);
22573 }
22574+
22575 return err;
22576 }
22577
22578diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c
22579--- linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
22580+++ linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22581@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
22582 #include <linux/file.h>
22583 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
22584 #include <linux/random.h>
22585+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22586
22587 #include <net/sock.h>
22588 #include <net/checksum.h>
22589diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c
22590--- linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500
22591+++ linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22592@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
22593 #include <linux/mount.h>
22594 #include <net/checksum.h>
22595 #include <linux/security.h>
22596+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22597
22598 int sysctl_unix_max_dgram_qlen = 10;
22599
22600@@ -672,6 +673,11 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
22601 if (err)
22602 goto put_fail;
22603
22604+ if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
22605+ err = -EACCES;
22606+ goto put_fail;
22607+ }
22608+
22609 err = -ECONNREFUSED;
22610 if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
22611 goto put_fail;
22612@@ -695,6 +701,13 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
22613 if (u) {
22614 struct dentry *dentry;
22615 dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry;
22616+
22617+ if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) {
22618+ err = -EPERM;
22619+ sock_put(u);
22620+ goto fail;
22621+ }
22622+
22623 if (dentry)
22624 touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry);
22625 } else
22626@@ -794,9 +807,18 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
22627 */
22628 mode = S_IFSOCK |
22629 (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
22630+
22631+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
22632+ err = -EACCES;
22633+ goto out_mknod_dput;
22634+ }
22635+
22636 err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
22637 if (err)
22638 goto out_mknod_dput;
22639+
22640+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
22641+
22642 up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
22643 dput(nd.dentry);
22644 nd.dentry = dentry;
22645@@ -814,6 +836,10 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
22646 goto out_unlock;
22647 }
22648
22649+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
22650+ sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid;
22651+#endif
22652+
22653 list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
22654 } else {
22655 list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
22656diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig
22657--- linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500
22658+++ linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
22659@@ -4,6 +4,407 @@
22660
22661 menu "Security options"
22662
22663+source grsecurity/Kconfig
22664+
22665+menu "PaX"
22666+
22667+config PAX
22668+ bool "Enable various PaX features"
22669+ depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
22670+ help
22671+ This allows you to enable various PaX features. PaX adds
22672+ intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
22673+ the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs.
22674+
22675+menu "PaX Control"
22676+ depends on PAX
22677+
22678+config PAX_SOFTMODE
22679+ bool 'Support soft mode'
22680+ help
22681+ Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that
22682+ is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables
22683+ marked explicitly. You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it
22684+ is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use.
22685+
22686+ Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command
22687+ line option on boot. Furthermore you can control various PaX features
22688+ at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax.
22689+
22690+config PAX_EI_PAX
22691+ bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking'
22692+ help
22693+ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
22694+ a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at
22695+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from
22696+ an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header. This marking has
22697+ numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not
22698+ know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it
22699+ has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support.
22700+
22701+ If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
22702+ program header then you MUST enable this option otherwise they
22703+ will not get any protection.
22704+
22705+ Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well,
22706+ the PT_PAX_FLAG marks will override the legacy EI_PAX marks.
22707+
22708+config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
22709+ bool 'Use ELF program header marking'
22710+ help
22711+ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
22712+ a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at
22713+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from
22714+ a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS). This marking
22715+ has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully
22716+ integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available
22717+ from http://pax.grsecurity.net).
22718+
22719+ If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
22720+ program header then you MUST enable the EI_PAX marking support
22721+ otherwise they will not get any protection.
22722+
22723+ Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well,
22724+ the EI_PAX marks will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marks.
22725+
22726+choice
22727+ prompt 'MAC system integration'
22728+ default PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
22729+ help
22730+ Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling
22731+ PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported
22732+ by your particular system.
22733+
22734+ - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX,
22735+ - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_flags() itself,
22736+ - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_flags_func callback.
22737+
22738+ NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only.
22739+
22740+config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS
22741+ bool 'none'
22742+
22743+config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
22744+ bool 'direct'
22745+
22746+config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
22747+ bool 'hook'
22748+endchoice
22749+
22750+endmenu
22751+
22752+menu "Non-executable pages"
22753+ depends on PAX
22754+
22755+config PAX_NOEXEC
22756+ bool "Enforce non-executable pages"
22757+ depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
22758+ help
22759+ By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory
22760+ pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make
22761+ use of this feature. In practice this means that if a page is
22762+ readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable.
22763+
22764+ There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this
22765+ fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can
22766+ introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's
22767+ memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.
22768+
22769+ If the attacked program was running with different (typically
22770+ higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate
22771+ his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
22772+ which he does not have write access to, etc).
22773+
22774+ Enabling this option will let you choose from various features
22775+ that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in
22776+ a program.
22777+
22778+ This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and
22779+ expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family
22780+ of functions is executable (which it is not). Notable examples
22781+ are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine.
22782+
22783+config PAX_PAGEEXEC
22784+ bool "Paging based non-executable pages"
22785+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && (!X86 || X86_64 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMM || MPENTIUM4 || MK7 || MK8)
22786+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if X86 && !X86_64
22787+ help
22788+ This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU.
22789+ On i386 and ppc there is a variable but usually low performance
22790+ impact on applications. On alpha, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64
22791+ and x86_64 there is no performance impact.
22792+
22793+config PAX_SEGMEXEC
22794+ bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages"
22795+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64
22796+ help
22797+ This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the
22798+ CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will
22799+ be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB.
22800+
22801+choice
22802+ prompt "Default non-executable page method"
22803+ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PAX_SEGMEXEC
22804+ default PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
22805+ help
22806+ Select the default non-executable page method applied to applications
22807+ that do not select one themselves.
22808+
22809+config PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
22810+ bool "PAGEEXEC"
22811+
22812+config PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
22813+ bool "SEGMEXEC"
22814+endchoice
22815+
22816+config PAX_EMUTRAMP
22817+ bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC32 || X86) && !X86_64
22818+ default y if PARISC || PPC32
22819+ help
22820+ There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
22821+ another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
22822+ non-executable memory pages. Most notable examples are the
22823+ signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
22824+ the GCC trampolines.
22825+
22826+ If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then
22827+ such programs will no longer work under your kernel.
22828+
22829+ As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
22830+ utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs
22831+ yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages.
22832+
22833+ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as
22834+ well, otherwise your system will not even boot.
22835+
22836+ Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
22837+ utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22838+ for the affected files.
22839+
22840+ NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
22841+ protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker
22842+ could abuse. Therefore the best solution is to not have any
22843+ files on your system that would require this option. This can
22844+ be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
22845+ signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
22846+ that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
22847+ Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
22848+ nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
22849+
22850+config PAX_EMUSIGRT
22851+ bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines"
22852+ depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC32)
22853+ default y
22854+ help
22855+ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
22856+ and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack
22857+ that would otherwise lead to task termination.
22858+
22859+ This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with
22860+ legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17,
22861+ Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically
22862+ everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in
22863+ normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does.
22864+
22865+ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your
22866+ system will not even boot.
22867+
22868+ NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis
22869+ and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided
22870+ by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any
22871+ files on your system that would require this option.
22872+
22873+config PAX_MPROTECT
22874+ bool "Restrict mprotect()"
22875+ depends on (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !PPC64
22876+ help
22877+ Enabling this option will prevent programs from
22878+ - changing the executable status of memory pages that were
22879+ not originally created as executable,
22880+ - making read-only executable pages writable again,
22881+ - creating executable pages from anonymous memory.
22882+
22883+ You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
22884+ the enforcement of non-executable pages.
22885+
22886+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
22887+ this feature on a per file basis.
22888+
22889+config PAX_NOELFRELOCS
22890+ bool "Disallow ELF text relocations"
22891+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64)
22892+ help
22893+ Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective
22894+ in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an
22895+ attacked task's address space. There remain only two venues
22896+ for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already
22897+ existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it
22898+ create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap()
22899+ an already existing ELF library that does not have position
22900+ independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it
22901+ writable and copy his code there. While protecting against
22902+ the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented
22903+ by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not
22904+ need to relocate their code). If you are sure this is your case,
22905+ then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even
22906+ be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM
22907+ modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default).
22908+
22909+ NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested
22910+ when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked
22911+ your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package
22912+ referenced there has already been updated to support this).
22913+
22914+config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
22915+ bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations"
22916+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
22917+ default y
22918+ help
22919+ On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications
22920+ that require text relocations and would not work without enabling
22921+ this option. If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should
22922+ enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that
22923+ none of your applications need it.
22924+
22925+config PAX_EMUPLT
22926+ bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT"
22927+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
22928+ default y
22929+ help
22930+ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
22931+ and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files.
22932+ On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and
22933+ become non-executable leading to task termination. Therefore
22934+ it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc,
22935+ sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot.
22936+
22937+ NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection
22938+ provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper
22939+ solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does
22940+ not need to be writable.
22941+
22942+config PAX_DLRESOLVE
22943+ bool
22944+ depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
22945+ default y
22946+
22947+config PAX_SYSCALL
22948+ bool
22949+ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC32
22950+ default y
22951+
22952+config PAX_KERNEXEC
22953+ bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
22954+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS
22955+ help
22956+ This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
22957+ that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
22958+ and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself.
22959+
22960+endmenu
22961+
22962+menu "Address Space Layout Randomization"
22963+ depends on PAX
22964+
22965+config PAX_ASLR
22966+ bool "Address Space Layout Randomization"
22967+ depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
22968+ help
22969+ Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of
22970+ certain addresses in the attacked program. The following options
22971+ will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization
22972+ to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to
22973+ guess them in most cases. Any failed guess will most likely crash
22974+ the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts
22975+ and react on them. PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms,
22976+ instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's
22977+ segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's
22978+ (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or
22979+ develop one yourself.
22980+
22981+ By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas:
22982+ - top of the task's kernel stack
22983+ - top of the task's userland stack
22984+ - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one
22985+ (this includes all libraries)
22986+ - base address of the main executable
22987+
22988+ It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout
22989+ randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides
22990+ a very effective protection.
22991+
22992+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
22993+ this feature on a per file basis.
22994+
22995+config PAX_RANDKSTACK
22996+ bool "Randomize kernel stack base"
22997+ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && !X86_64
22998+ help
22999+ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel
23000+ stack on every system call. This will not only force an attacker
23001+ to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible
23002+ leaked information about it.
23003+
23004+ Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization
23005+ may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very
23006+ carefully test your system. Note that once enabled in the kernel
23007+ configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis.
23008+
23009+config PAX_RANDUSTACK
23010+ bool "Randomize user stack base"
23011+ depends on PAX_ASLR
23012+ help
23013+ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland
23014+ stack. The randomization is done in two steps where the second
23015+ one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and
23016+ cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more
23017+ than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is).
23018+ For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or
23019+ 'paxctl' on a per file basis.
23020+
23021+config PAX_RANDMMAP
23022+ bool "Randomize mmap() base"
23023+ depends on PAX_ASLR
23024+ help
23025+ By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for
23026+ mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves. As a result
23027+ all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses
23028+ and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker
23029+ attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a
23030+ shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated
23031+ privilege level).
23032+
23033+ Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
23034+ base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
23035+ randomization of the address space layout. Attacking such programs
23036+ becomes a guess game. You can find an example of doing this at
23037+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at
23038+ http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz .
23039+
23040+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this
23041+ feature on a per file basis.
23042+
23043+config PAX_NOVSYSCALL
23044+ bool "Disable the vsyscall page"
23045+ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86 && !X86_64
23046+ help
23047+ The Linux 2.6 kernel introduced a new feature that speeds up or
23048+ simplifies certain operations, such as system calls or returns
23049+ from signal handlers.
23050+
23051+ Unfortunately the implementation also gives a powerful instrument
23052+ into the hands of exploit writers: the so-called vsyscall page exists
23053+ in every task at the same fixed address and it contains machine code
23054+ that is very useful in performing the return-to-libc style attack.
23055+
23056+ Since this exploit technique cannot in general be protected against
23057+ via kernel solutions, this option will allow you to disable the use
23058+ of the vsyscall page and revert back to the old behaviour.
23059+
23060+endmenu
23061+
23062+endmenu
23063+
23064 config KEYS
23065 bool "Enable access key retention support"
23066 help
23067diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c
23068--- linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500
23069+++ linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
23070@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
23071 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
23072 #include <linux/xattr.h>
23073 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
23074+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23075
23076 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
23077 {
23078@@ -44,7 +45,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
23079 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
23080 {
23081 /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
23082- if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
23083+ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(tsk, cap))
23084+ return 0;
23085+ return -EPERM;
23086+}
23087+
23088+int cap_capable_nolog (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
23089+{
23090+ /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
23091+ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
23092 return 0;
23093 return -EPERM;
23094 }
23095@@ -60,7 +69,7 @@ int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *pare
23096 {
23097 /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
23098 if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
23099- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
23100+ !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
23101 return -EPERM;
23102 return 0;
23103 }
23104@@ -163,8 +172,11 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
23105 }
23106 }
23107
23108- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23109- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23110+ if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
23111+ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23112+
23113+ if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
23114+ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23115
23116 /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
23117 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
23118@@ -175,6 +187,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
23119 cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
23120 }
23121
23122+ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
23123+
23124 /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
23125
23126 current->keep_capabilities = 0;
23127@@ -320,12 +334,13 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
23128 {
23129 int cap_sys_admin = 0;
23130
23131- if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
23132+ if (cap_capable_nolog(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
23133 cap_sys_admin = 1;
23134 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
23135 }
23136
23137 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable);
23138+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable_nolog);
23139 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_settime);
23140 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_ptrace);
23141 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capget);
23142diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c
23143--- linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500
23144+++ linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
23145@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
23146 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
23147 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
23148 #include <linux/file.h>
23149+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23150
23151 static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
23152 {
23153@@ -138,8 +139,11 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru
23154 }
23155 }
23156
23157- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23158- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23159+ if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
23160+ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23161+
23162+ if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
23163+ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23164
23165 dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
23166 }
23167diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/security.c linux-2.6.11/security/security.c
23168--- linux-2.6.11/security/security.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500
23169+++ linux-2.6.11/security/security.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500
23170@@ -200,4 +200,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_security);
23171 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security);
23172 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security);
23173 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
23174+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
23175 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops);
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