-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt linux-2.6.31/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
---- linux-2.6.31.org/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt 2009-09-10 00:13:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ linux-2.6.31/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt 2009-09-10 22:17:58.000000000 +0200
-@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@
- A lot of drivers has their options described inside of
- Documentation/scsi/.
- SECURITY Different security models are enabled.
-+ SECURITY_DEFAULT set a default security module
- SELINUX SELinux support is enabled.
- SERIAL Serial support is enabled.
- SH SuperH architecture is enabled.
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/include/linux/audit.h linux-2.6.31/include/linux/audit.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/include/linux/audit.h 2009-09-10 00:13:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ linux-2.6.31/include/linux/audit.h 2009-09-10 22:18:05.000000000 +0200
-@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
- * 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
- * 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
- * 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use
-- * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
-+ * 1500 - 1599 AppArmor use
- * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
- * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
- * 1800 - 1899 kernel integrity events
-@@ -122,6 +122,14 @@
- #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCADD 1416 /* NetLabel: add a static label */
- #define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417 /* NetLabel: del a static label */
+commit 09aa4788d6052c6dc423d939319334ebb5d00847
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Mon Oct 4 15:03:36 2010 -0700
+
+ UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
+
+ Base support for network mediation.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+index 9cdec70..d5b291e 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
++++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
+ #
+ # Generated include files
+ #
++net_names.h
+ capability_names.h
+ rlim_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index d693df8..5dbb72f 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT 1501 /* AppArmor audited grants */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED 1502 /* Allowed Access for learning */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED 1503
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT 1504 /* Process Tracking information */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS 1505 /* Changes in config */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR 1506 /* Internal AppArmor Errors */
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL 1507 /* AppArmor killing processes */
-+
- #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
- #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
- #define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+- resource.o sid.o file.o
++ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+
+-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
++clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+
+
+ # Build a lower case string table of capability names
+@@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
+ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
++# Build a lower case string table of address family names
++# Transform lines from
++# define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
++# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
++# to
++# [1] = "local",
++# [2] = "inet",
++#
++# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
++# Transforms lines from
++# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
++# to
++# #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
++quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
++cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
++ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
++ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
++ echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
++ sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
++ $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
++
++# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
++# Transform lines from
++# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
++# to
++# [1] = "stream",
++quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
++cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
++ sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
++ -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
++ echo "};" >> $@
+
+ # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+ # Transforms lines from
+@@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+ tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+ $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
++$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
+ $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+@@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
+ $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-rlim)
++$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
++ $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
++ $(src)/Makefile
++ $(call cmd,make-af)
++ $(call cmd,make-sock)
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 729e595..181d961 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ AA_FS_DIR("policy", aa_fs_entry_policy),
+ AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
++ AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network),
+ AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index ba3dfd1..5d3c419 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ u32 denied;
+ kuid_t ouid;
+ } fs;
++ struct {
++ int type, protocol;
++ struct sock *sk;
++ } net;
+ };
+ };
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..cb8a121
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr interface functions
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * License.
+ */
+
-+#include <linux/security.h>
-+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-+#include <linux/module.h>
-+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/policy_interface.h"
-+
-+static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf,
-+ size_t alloc_size, size_t copy_size,
-+ loff_t *pos, const char *operation)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ char *data;
-+
-+ if (*pos != 0) {
-+ /* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */
-+ data = ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Don't allow confined processes to load/replace/remove profiles.
-+ * No sane person would add rules allowing this to a profile
-+ * but we enforce the restriction anyways.
-+ */
-+ cred = aa_current_policy(&profile);
-+ if (profile) {
-+ struct aa_audit sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.operation = operation;
-+ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.error = -EACCES;
-+ data = ERR_PTR(aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, profile, &sa,
-+ NULL));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ data = vmalloc(alloc_size);
-+ if (data == NULL) {
-+ data = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
++#ifndef __AA_NET_H
++#define __AA_NET_H
+
-+ if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
-+ vfree(data);
-+ data = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
++#include <net/sock.h>
+
-+out:
-+ return data;
-+}
++#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
-+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *parent;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
-+
-+ if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles))
-+ return list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles,
-+ struct aa_profile, base.list);
-+
-+ parent = profile->parent;
-+ while (parent) {
-+ list_for_each_entry_continue(profile, &parent->base.profiles,
-+ base.list)
-+ return profile;
-+ profile = parent;
-+ parent = parent->parent;
-+ }
++/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
++ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
++ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
++ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
++ */
++struct aa_net {
++ u16 allow[AF_MAX];
++ u16 audit[AF_MAX];
++ u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
++};
+
-+ list_for_each_entry_continue(profile, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
-+ return profile;
++extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
+
-+ read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &ns_list, base.list) {
-+ read_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles, struct aa_profile,
-+ base.list);
-+ read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ }
-+ return NULL;
-+}
++extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
++ int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
++extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
+
-+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
-+ __acquires(ns_list_lock)
++static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ loff_t l = *pos;
-+
-+ read_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ if (!list_empty(&ns_list)) {
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+ ns = list_first_entry(&ns_list, typeof(*ns), base.list);
-+ read_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles)) {
-+ profile = list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
-+ typeof(*profile), base.list);
-+ for ( ; profile && l > 0; l--)
-+ profile = next_profile(profile);
-+ return profile;
-+ } else
-+ read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ }
-+ return NULL;
++ /* NOP */
+}
+
-+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
++#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+index 52275f0..4fc4dac 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "capability.h"
+ #include "domain.h"
+ #include "file.h"
++#include "net.h"
+ #include "resource.h"
+
+ extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
+@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ struct aa_replacedby {
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
++ * @net: network controls for the profile
+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
+ *
+ * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
+@@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
+ struct aa_policydb policy;
+ struct aa_file_rules file;
+ struct aa_caps caps;
++ struct aa_net net;
+ struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
+
+ unsigned char *hash;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index 41b8cb1..d96b5f7 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include "include/context.h"
+ #include "include/file.h"
+ #include "include/ipc.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
+@@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
+ return error;
+ }
+
++static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *) p;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ int error = 0;
+
-+ (*pos)++;
-+ profile = next_profile(profile);
++ if (kern)
++ return 0;
+
-+ return profile;
++ profile = __aa_current_profile();
++ if (!unconfined(profile))
++ error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
++ NULL);
++ return error;
+}
+
-+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
-+ __releases(ns_list_lock)
++static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
++ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *) p;
-+
-+ if (profile)
-+ read_unlock(&profile->ns->base.lock);
-+ read_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+}
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+static void print_name(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ if (profile->parent) {
-+ print_name(f, profile->parent);
-+ seq_printf(f, "//");
-+ }
-+ seq_printf(f, "%s", profile->base.name);
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
+}
+
-+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
++static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
++ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
-+
-+ if (profile->ns != default_namespace)
-+ seq_printf(f, ":%s:", profile->ns->base.name);
-+ print_name(f, profile);
-+ seq_printf(f, " (%s)\n",
-+ PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return 0;
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
+}
+
-+/* Used in apparmorfs.c */
-+static struct seq_operations apparmorfs_profiles_op = {
-+ .start = p_start,
-+ .next = p_next,
-+ .stop = p_stop,
-+ .show = seq_show_profile,
-+};
-+
-+static int aa_profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
-+ return seq_open(file, &apparmorfs_profiles_op);
-+}
-+
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+static int aa_profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-+{
-+ return seq_release(inode, file);
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_profiles_fops = {
-+ .open = aa_profiles_open,
-+ .read = seq_read,
-+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
-+ .release = aa_profiles_release,
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/matching */
-+static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
++static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
-+ const char *matching = "pattern=aadfa audit perms=crwxamlk/ user::other";
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
-+ strlen(matching));
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_matching_fops = {
-+ .read = aa_matching_read,
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/features */
-+static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
-+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
++static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
++ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
-+ const char *features = "file=3.1 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
-+ "change_hat=1.5 change_profile=1.1 "
-+ "aanamespaces=1.1 rlimit=1.1";
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
-+ strlen(features));
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
+}
+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_features_fops = {
-+ .read = aa_features_read,
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/.load */
-+static ssize_t aa_profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
-+ size_t size, loff_t *pos)
++static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
++ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
-+ char *data;
-+ ssize_t error;
-+
-+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos, "profile_load");
-+
-+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
-+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
-+ error = aa_interface_add_profiles(data, size);
-+ vfree(data);
-+ }
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return error;
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
+}
+
-+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_profile_load = {
-+ .write = aa_profile_load
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/.replace */
-+static ssize_t aa_profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
-+ size_t size, loff_t *pos)
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
-+ char *data;
-+ ssize_t error;
-+
-+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, size, pos,
-+ "profile_replace");
-+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
-+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
-+ error = aa_interface_replace_profiles(data, size);
-+ vfree(data);
-+ }
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return error;
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
+}
+
-+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_profile_replace = {
-+ .write = aa_profile_replace
-+};
-+
-+/* apparmor/.remove */
-+static ssize_t aa_profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf,
-+ size_t size, loff_t *pos)
++static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
-+ char *data;
-+ ssize_t error;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * aa_remove_profile needs a null terminated string so 1 extra
-+ * byte is allocated and the copied data is null terminated.
-+ */
-+ data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size + 1, size, pos,
-+ "profile_remove");
-+
-+ error = PTR_ERR(data);
-+ if (!IS_ERR(data)) {
-+ data[size] = 0;
-+ error = aa_interface_remove_profiles(data, size);
-+ vfree(data);
-+ }
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ return error;
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
+}
+
-+static struct file_operations apparmorfs_profile_remove = {
-+ .write = aa_profile_remove
-+};
-+
-+static struct dentry *apparmorfs_dentry;
-+struct dentry *apparmorfs_null;
-+struct vfsmount *apparmorfs_mnt;
-+
-+static void aafs_remove(const char *name)
++static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++ int optname)
+{
-+ struct dentry *dentry;
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+ dentry = lookup_one_len(name, apparmorfs_dentry, strlen(name));
-+ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-+ securityfs_remove(dentry);
-+ dput(dentry);
-+ }
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
-+static int aafs_create(const char *name, int mask, struct file_operations *fops)
++static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
++ int optname)
+{
-+ struct dentry *dentry;
-+
-+ dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, apparmorfs_dentry,
-+ NULL, fops);
-+
-+ return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0;
-+}
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+void destroy_apparmorfs(void)
-+{
-+ if (apparmorfs_dentry) {
-+ aafs_remove(".remove");
-+ aafs_remove(".replace");
-+ aafs_remove(".load");
-+ aafs_remove("matching");
-+ aafs_remove("features");
-+ aafs_remove("profiles");
-+ securityfs_remove(apparmorfs_dentry);
-+ apparmorfs_dentry = NULL;
-+ }
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
-+int create_apparmorfs(void)
++static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
-+ int error;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_initialized)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (apparmorfs_dentry) {
-+ AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
-+ return -EEXIST;
-+ }
-+
-+ apparmorfs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL);
-+ if (IS_ERR(apparmorfs_dentry)) {
-+ error = PTR_ERR(apparmorfs_dentry);
-+ apparmorfs_dentry = NULL;
-+ goto error;
-+ }
-+ error = aafs_create("profiles", 0440, &apparmorfs_profiles_fops);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+ error = aafs_create("matching", 0444, &apparmorfs_matching_fops);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+ error = aafs_create("features", 0444, &apparmorfs_features_fops);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+ error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &apparmorfs_profile_load);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+ error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &apparmorfs_profile_replace);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+ error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &apparmorfs_profile_remove);
-+ if (error)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ /* TODO: add support for apparmorfs_null and apparmorfs_mnt */
-+
-+ /* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */
-+ info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled");
-+ return 0;
++ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
-+error:
-+ destroy_apparmorfs();
-+ AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n");
-+ apparmor_disable();
-+ return error;
++ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+}
+
-+fs_initcall(create_apparmorfs);
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/audit.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/audit.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/audit.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/audit.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+@@ -613,6 +712,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
++
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..003dd18
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions
++ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * License.
+ */
+
-+#include <linux/audit.h>
-+#include <linux/socket.h>
-+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
++#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
-+const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
-+ "normal",
-+ "quiet_denied",
-+ "quiet"
-+ "noquiet",
-+ "all"
-+};
++#include "net_names.h"
+
-+static char* aa_audit_type[] = {
-+ "APPARMOR_AUDIT",
-+ "APPARMOR_ALLOWED",
-+ "APPARMOR_DENIED",
-+ "APPARMOR_HINT",
-+ "APPARMOR_STATUS",
-+ "APPARMOR_ERROR",
-+ "APPARMOR_KILLED"
++struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
++ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
++ { }
+};
+
-+/*
-+ * TODO:
-+ * user auditing - netlink interface
-+ * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log
-+ */
-+static int aa_audit_base(int type, struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_audit *sa, struct audit_context *audit_cxt,
-+ void(*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *))
++/* audit callback for net specific fields */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
-+ struct audit_buffer *ab = NULL;
++ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
-+ if (profile && PROFILE_KILL(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_cxt, sa->gfp_mask, type);
-+
-+ if (!ab) {
-+ AA_ERROR("(%d) Unable to log event of type (%d)\n",
-+ -ENOMEM, type);
-+ /* don't fail operations in complain mode even if logging
-+ * fails */
-+ return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
++ audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
++ if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
++ audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
++ } else {
++ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
++ }
++ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
++ if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
++ audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
++ } else {
++ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
+ }
++ audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
++}
+
-+ if (g_apparmor_audit_header)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, "type=%s ",
-+ aa_audit_type[type - AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT]);
++/**
++ * audit_net - audit network access
++ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type: network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
++ * @error: error code for failure else 0
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
++ */
++static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
++ int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
++{
++ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++ struct common_audit_data sa;
++ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++ struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
++ if (sk) {
++ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
++ } else {
++ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++ }
++ /* todo fill in socket addr info */
++ sa.aad = &aad;
++ sa.u.net = &net;
++ sa.aad->op = op,
++ sa.u.net->family = family;
++ sa.u.net->sk = sk;
++ sa.aad->net.type = type;
++ sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
++ sa.aad->error = error;
++
++ if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
++ u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
++ if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
++ !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
++ return 0;
++ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++ } else {
++ u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
++ u16 kill_mask = 0;
++ u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+
-+ if (sa->operation)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, "operation=\"%s\"", sa->operation);
++ if (denied & kill_mask)
++ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
-+ if (sa->info) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", sa->info);
-+ if (sa->error)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->error);
++ if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
++ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+ }
+
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d", sa->task ?sa->task->pid : current->pid);
++ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
++}
++
++/**
++ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
++ * @family: network family
++ * @type: network type
++ * @protocol: network protocol
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
++ */
++int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
++ int protocol, struct sock *sk)
++{
++ u16 family_mask;
++ int error;
+
-+ if (profile) {
-+ pid_t pid = sa->task ? sa->task->real_parent->pid :
-+ current->real_parent->pid;
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid);
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " profile=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->fqname);
++ if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
++ return -EINVAL;
+
-+ if (profile->ns != default_namespace) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.name);
-+ }
-+ }
++ if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
++ return -EINVAL;
+
-+ if (cb)
-+ cb(ab, sa);
++ /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
++ if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
++ return 0;
+
-+ audit_log_end(ab);
++ family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
+
-+ if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
-+ (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
-+ sa->task ? sa->task : current);
++ error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+
-+ return type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED ? 0 : sa->error;
++ return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
+}
+
+/**
-+ * aa_audit - Log an audit event to the audit subsystem
-+ * @type: audit type for the message
-+ * @profile: profile to check against
-+ * @sa: audit event
++ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
++ * @op: operation being checked
++ * @sk: sock being revalidated (NOT NULL)
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
-+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
-+ void(*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *))
++int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+{
-+ struct audit_context *audit_cxt;
-+ audit_cxt = g_apparmor_logsyscall ? current->audit_context : NULL;
-+
-+ if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) {
-+ if (likely(!sa->error)) {
-+ if (PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+ return 0;
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+ } else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED;
-+ else
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED;
-+ }
-+ if (PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
-+ (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
-+ return sa->error;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ int error = 0;
+
-+ return aa_audit_base(type, profile, sa, audit_cxt, cb);
-+}
++ /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
++ * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
++ */
++ if (in_interrupt())
++ return 0;
+
-+/**
-+ * aa_audit_syscallreject - Log a syscall rejection to the audit subsystem
-+ * @profile: profile to check against
-+ * @gfp: memory allocation flags
-+ * @msg: string describing syscall being rejected
-+ */
-+int aa_audit_syscallreject(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
-+ const char *msg,
-+ void(*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *))
++ profile = __aa_current_profile();
++ if (!unconfined(profile))
++ error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
++ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
++
++ return error;
++}
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+index 179e68d..f1a8541 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
+@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
+
+ aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
+ aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
++ aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
+ aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
+
+ kzfree(profile->dirname);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+index 1381206..7dc15ff 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
-+ struct aa_audit sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.operation = "syscall";
-+ sa.info = msg;
-+ sa.gfp_mask = gfp;
-+ sa.error = -EACCES;
-+
-+ return aa_audit_base(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, profile, &sa,
-+ current->audit_context, NULL);
++ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
++ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
++ return 0;
++ if (data)
++ *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
++ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ return 0;
+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/capability.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/capability.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/capability.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/capability.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
++
+ static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
+ {
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
+@@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ {
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ const char *name = NULL;
++ size_t size = 0;
+ int i, error = -EPROTO;
+ kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
+ u32 tmp;
+@@ -576,6 +590,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
+ if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
+ goto fail;
+
++ size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
++ if (size) {
++
++ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
++ /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
++ * never request
++ */
++ if (i >= AF_MAX) {
++ u16 tmp;
++ if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
++ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
++ goto fail;
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
++ goto fail;
++ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
++ goto fail;
++ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
++ goto fail;
++ }
++ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
++ goto fail;
++ }
++ /*
++ * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
++ * by IPC
++ */
++ profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
++ profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
++
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+ /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+ profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+
+commit f5c5644745201b5b7d398e841e5045d0a5d14b18
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri Jun 29 17:34:00 2012 -0700
+
+ apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation
+
+ If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
+ either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
+ denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
+ 1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
+ tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
+ should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
+
+ 2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
+ This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
+ they had been specifically marked as quieted.
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
+index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ } else {
+ u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ u16 kill_mask = 0;
+- u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
++ u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
+
+ if (denied & kill_mask)
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+commit 0269f1631e1496798e5b0a319ff05b1133cfeaa3
+Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+Date: Wed May 16 10:58:05 2012 -0700
+
+ UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
+
+ Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
+ rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
+
+ The basic form of the rules are.
+
+ [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
+ [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
+ [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
+ [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
+
+ remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
+
+ where [conds] can be
+ fstype=<expr>
+ options=<expr>
+
+ Example mount commands
+ mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
+
+ mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere
+
+ mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount
+
+ mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
+
+ mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
+
+ mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
+
+ umount,
+
+ umount /m*,
+
+ See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
+
+ Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
+ Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
+
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
++++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
+
+ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
+ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
+- resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
++ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
+ apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
+
+ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+index 181d961..5fb67f6 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+@@ -800,7 +800,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1),
+- {}
++ { }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
++ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
++ { }
++};
++
++static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
++ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1),
++ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1),
++ { }
+ };
+
+ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+@@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+ AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
+ AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
+ AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network),
++ AA_FS_DIR("mount", aa_fs_entry_mount),
++ AA_FS_DIR("namespaces", aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
+ AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+ AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+ AA_FS_DIR("caps", aa_fs_entry_caps),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+index 3a7f1da..c2a8b8a 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
+ "file_mmap",
+ "file_mprotect",
+
++ "pivotroot",
++ "mount",
++ "umount",
++
+ "create",
+ "post_create",
+ "bind",
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+index fc3036b..f2a83b4 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
+@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+ {
+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+index 5d721e9..b57da7b 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
+ #define AA_CLASS_NET 4
+ #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5
+ #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6
++#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7
+
+-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
++#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_MOUNT
+
+ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
+ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+index 5d3c419..b9f1d57 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
+ OP_FMMAP,
+ OP_FMPROT,
+
++ OP_PIVOTROOT,
++ OP_MOUNT,
++ OP_UMOUNT,
++
+ OP_CREATE,
+ OP_POST_CREATE,
+ OP_BIND,
+@@ -120,6 +124,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
+ unsigned long max;
+ } rlim;
+ struct {
++ const char *src_name;
++ const char *type;
++ const char *trans;
++ const char *data;
++ unsigned long flags;
++ } mnt;
++ struct {
+ const char *target;
+ u32 request;
+ u32 denied;
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
+ char **table;
+ };
+
++struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
++
+ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..a43b1d6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions
++ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
++ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * License.
+ */
+
-+#include <linux/capability.h>
-+#include <linux/errno.h>
-+#include <linux/gfp.h>
++#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
++#define __AA_MOUNT_H
+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/capability.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/path.h>
+
-+/*
-+ * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h.
-+ */
-+#include "capability_names.h"
++#include "domain.h"
++#include "policy.h"
+
-+struct audit_cache {
-+ struct task_struct *task;
-+ kernel_cap_t caps;
-+};
++/* mount perms */
++#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01
++#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02
++#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04
++#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40
++#define AA_CONT_MATCH 0x40
+
-+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache);
++#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
-+struct aa_audit_caps {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
-+ int cap;
-+};
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_caps *sa = va;
+
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->cap]);
-+}
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ unsigned long flags);
+
-+static int aa_audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit_caps *sa)
-+{
-+ struct audit_cache *ent;
-+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ const char *old_name);
+
-+ if (likely(!sa->base.error)) {
-+ /* test if auditing is being forced */
-+ if (likely((PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-+ !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, sa->cap)))
-+ return 0;
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+ } else if (PROFILE_KILL(profile) ||
-+ cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, sa->cap)) {
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+ } else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, sa->cap) &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
-+ /* quiet auditing */
-+ return sa->base.error;
-+ }
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
++ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++ void *data);
+
-+ /* Do simple duplicate message elimination */
-+ ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache);
-+ if (sa->base.task == ent->task && cap_raised(ent->caps, sa->cap)) {
-+ if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
-+ return 0;
-+ return sa->base.error;
-+ } else {
-+ ent->task = sa->base.task;
-+ cap_raise(ent->caps, sa->cap);
-+ }
-+ put_cpu_var(audit_cache);
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
-+ return aa_audit(type, profile, &sa->base, audit_cb);
-+}
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path);
+
-+int aa_profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap)
++#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+index d96b5f7..7a02376 100644
+--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
++++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include "include/path.h"
+ #include "include/policy.h"
+ #include "include/procattr.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
+
+ /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
+@@ -469,6 +470,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+ }
+
++static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
++ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
-+ return cap_raised(profile->caps.allowed, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ int error = 0;
++
++ /* Discard magic */
++ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
++ flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
++
++ flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
++
++ profile = __aa_current_profile();
++ if (!unconfined(profile)) {
++ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++ error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
++ else if (flags & MS_BIND)
++ error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
++ else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++ MS_UNBINDABLE))
++ error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
++ else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++ error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
++ else
++ error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
++ flags, data);
++ }
++ return error;
+}
+
-+/**
-+ * aa_capable - test permission to use capability
-+ * @task: task doing capability test against
-+ * @profile: profile confining @task
-+ * @cap: capability to be tested
-+ * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated
-+ *
-+ * Look up capability in profile capability set.
-+ * Returns 0 on success, or else an error code.
-+ */
-+int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
-+ int audit)
++static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
-+ int error = aa_profile_capable(profile, cap);
-+ struct aa_audit_caps sa;
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ int error = 0;
+
-+ if (!audit) {
-+ if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
-+ return 0;
-+ return error;
-+ }
++ profile = __aa_current_profile();
++ if (!unconfined(profile))
++ error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
++
++ return error;
++}
++
++static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path)
++{
++ struct aa_profile *profile;
++ int error = 0;
+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = "capable";
-+ sa.base.task = task;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
-+ sa.base.error = error;
-+ sa.cap = cap;
++ profile = __aa_current_profile();
++ if (!unconfined(profile))
++ error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
+
-+ return aa_audit_caps(profile, &sa);
++ return error;
+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/context.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/context.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/context.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/context.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
++
+ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
+ char **value)
+ {
+@@ -689,6 +745,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
++ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
++
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..9cf9170
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
-+ * contexts.
++ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
++ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * License.
+ */
+
++#include <linux/fs.h>
++#include <linux/mount.h>
++#include <linux/namei.h>
++
++#include "include/apparmor.h"
++#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
++#include "include/domain.h"
++#include "include/file.h"
++#include "include/match.h"
++#include "include/mount.h"
++#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
-+
-+struct aa_task_context *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
++static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
-+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_context), flags);
++ if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
++ audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
++ else
++ audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
++ if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
++ if (flags & MS_NODEV)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
++ if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
++ if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
++ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
++ if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
++ if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
++ if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
++ if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
++ if (flags & MS_BIND)
++ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
++ if (flags & MS_MOVE)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
++ if (flags & MS_SILENT)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
++ if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
++ if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
++ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
++ ", unbindable");
++ if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
++ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
++ ", private");
++ if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
++ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
++ ", slave");
++ if (flags & MS_SHARED)
++ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
++ ", shared");
++ if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
++ if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
++ if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
++ if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
++ audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
-+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_context *cxt)
++/**
++ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
++ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
++ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
++ */
++static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
-+ if (cxt) {
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.previous);
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
++ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
-+ memset(cxt, 0, sizeof(*cxt));
-+ kfree(cxt);
++ if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
++ }
++ if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
++ }
++ if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
++ }
++ if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
++ audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
++ audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
++ }
++ if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
++ audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
++ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
+ }
+}
+
-+/*
-+ * duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
-+ */
-+struct aa_task_context *aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_context *old_cxt,
-+ gfp_t gfp)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
++/**
++ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
++ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
++ * @gfp: allocation flags
++ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
++ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
++ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
++ * @data: filesystem mount flags
++ * @request: permissions requested
++ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
++ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
++ *
++ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
++ */
++static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
++ const char *name, const char *src_name,
++ const char *type, const char *trans,
++ unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
++ struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
++{
++ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
++ struct common_audit_data sa = { };
++ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
++
++ if (likely(!error)) {
++ u32 mask = perms->audit;
++
++ if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
++ mask = 0xffff;
+
-+ cxt = kmemdup(old_cxt, sizeof(*cxt), gfp);
-+ if (!cxt)
-+ return NULL;
++ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
++ request &= mask;
+
-+ aa_get_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ aa_get_profile(cxt->sys.previous);
-+ aa_get_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
++ if (likely(!request))
++ return 0;
++ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
++ } else {
++ /* only report permissions that were denied */
++ request = request & ~perms->allow;
+
-+ return cxt;
-+}
++ if (request & perms->kill)
++ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
-+/**
-+ * aa_cred_policy - obtain cred's profiles
-+ * @cred: cred to obtain profiles from
-+ * @sys: return system profile
-+ * does NOT increment reference count
-+ */
-+void aa_cred_policy(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_profile **sys)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
-+ *sys = aa_filtered_profile(aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.profile));
++ /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
++ if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
++ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
++ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
++ request &= ~perms->quiet;
++
++ if (!request)
++ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
++ complain_error(error) : error;
++ }
++
++ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
++ sa.aad = &aad;
++ sa.aad->op = op;
++ sa.aad->name = name;
++ sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
++ sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
++ sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
++ sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
++ if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
++ sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
++ sa.aad->info = info;
++ sa.aad->error = error;
++
++ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
-+ * aa_get_task_policy - get the cred with the task policy, and current profiles
-+ * @task: task to get policy of
-+ * @sys: return - pointer to system profile
++ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against
++ * @state: state to start in
++ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
-+ * Only gets the cred ref count which has ref counts on the profiles returned
++ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
++ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
++ * on the flags.
++ *
++ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
-+struct cred *aa_get_task_policy(const struct task_struct *task,
-+ struct aa_profile **sys)
-+{
-+ struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-+ aa_cred_policy(cred, sys);
-+ return cred;
-+}
-+
-+void aa_put_task_policy(struct cred *cred)
++static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
++ unsigned long flags)
+{
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+}
++ unsigned int i;
+
-+static void replace_group(struct aa_task_cxt_group *cgrp,
-+ struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ if (cgrp->profile == profile)
-+ return;
-+
-+ if (!profile || (profile->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED) ||
-+ (cgrp->profile && cgrp->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
-+ aa_put_profile(cgrp->previous);
-+ aa_put_profile(cgrp->onexec);
-+ cgrp->previous = NULL;
-+ cgrp->onexec = NULL;
-+ cgrp->token = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
++ if ((1 << i) & flags)
++ state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+ }
-+ aa_put_profile(cgrp->profile);
-+ cgrp->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
++
++ return state;
+}
+
+/**
-+ * aa_replace_current_profiles - replace the current tasks profiles
-+ * @sys: new system profile
++ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
++ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
++ * @state: state match finished in
+ *
-+ * Returns: error on failure
++ * Returns: mount permissions
+ */
-+int aa_replace_current_profiles(struct aa_profile *sys)
++static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
++ unsigned int state)
+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-+ if (!new)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
++ struct file_perms perms;
+
-+ cxt = new->security;
-+ replace_group(&cxt->sys, sys);
++ perms.kill = 0;
++ perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
++ perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
++ perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
++ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+
-+ commit_creds(new);
-+ return 0;
++ return perms;
+}
+
-+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *sys)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-+ if (!new)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ cxt = new->security;
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
-+ cxt->sys.onexec = aa_get_profile(sys);
-+
-+ commit_creds(new);
-+ return 0;
-+}
++static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
++ "match succeeded",
++ "failed mntpnt match",
++ "failed srcname match",
++ "failed type match",
++ "failed flags match",
++ "failed data match"
++};
+
+/*
-+ * Do the actual cred switching of a changehat
-+ * profile must be valid
++ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
++ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
-+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
++static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
++ const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
++ const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++ void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-+ if (!new)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ cxt = new->security;
-+ if (!cxt->sys.previous) {
-+ cxt->sys.previous = cxt->sys.profile;
-+ cxt->sys.token = token;
-+ } else if (cxt->sys.token == token) {
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ } else {
-+ /* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */
-+ abort_creds(new);
-+ return -EACCES;
-+ }
-+ cxt->sys.profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
-+ /* clear exec on switching context */
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
-+ cxt->sys.onexec = NULL;
++ unsigned int state;
+
-+ commit_creds(new);
-+ return 0;
-+}
++ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++ if (!state)
++ return 1;
+
-+/*
-+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous profile
-+ */
-+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
-+ if (!new)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ cxt = new->security;
-+ if (cxt->sys.token != token) {
-+ abort_creds(new);
-+ return -EACCES;
-+ }
-+ /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
-+ if (!cxt->sys.previous) {
-+ abort_creds(new);
++ if (devname)
++ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++ if (!state)
++ return 2;
++
++ if (type)
++ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++ if (!state)
++ return 3;
++
++ state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
++ if (!state)
++ return 4;
++ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
-+ }
+
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ cxt->sys.profile = aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.previous);
-+ if (unlikely(cxt->sys.profile != cxt->sys.previous)) {
-+ aa_get_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.previous);
++ /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
++ if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
++ if (!state)
++ return 4;
++
++ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
++ if (!state)
++ return 5;
++ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
++ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
++ return 0;
+ }
-+ /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
-+ cxt->sys.previous = NULL;
-+ cxt->sys.token = 0;
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
-+ cxt->sys.onexec = NULL;
+
-+ commit_creds(new);
-+ return 0;
++ /* failed at end of flags match */
++ return 4;
+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/domain.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/domain.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/domain.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/domain.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/errno.h>
-+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
-+#include <linux/file.h>
-+#include <linux/mount.h>
-+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
-+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
-+#include <linux/personality.h>
-+
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/domain.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+#include "include/ipc.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/path.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+/**
-+ * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
-+ * @domain: the domain table to free
-+ */
-+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
-+{
-+ int i;
++ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
++ * @profile: the confining profile
++ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
++ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @flags: mount flags to match
++ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
++ * @binary: whether @data is binary
++ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
++ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
++ *
++ * Returns: 0 on success else error
++ */
++static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
++ const char *devname, const char *type,
++ unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
++ struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
++{
++ int pos;
++
++ if (!profile->policy.dfa)
++ return -EACCES;
+
-+ if (!domain->table)
-+ return;
++ pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
++ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++ mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
++ if (pos) {
++ *info = mnt_info_table[pos];
++ return -EACCES;
++ }
+
-+ for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
-+ kfree(domain->table[i]);
-+ kfree(domain->table);
++ return 0;
+}
+
-+/*
-+ * check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed
-+ * to trace the new domain
-+ */
-+static int aa_may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
-+ struct aa_profile *to_profile)
++static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
-+ struct task_struct *tracer;
-+ struct cred *cred = NULL;
-+ struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ rcu_read_lock();
-+ tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(task);
-+ if (tracer)
-+ cred = aa_get_task_policy(tracer, &tracerp);
-+ rcu_read_unlock();
++ return profile->path_flags |
++ S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
++}
+
-+ if (!tracerp)
-+ return error;
++int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ unsigned long flags, void *data)
++{
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ const char *name, *info = NULL;
++ char *buffer = NULL;
++ int binary, error;
+
-+ error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
-+ put_cred(cred);
++ binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
-+ return error;
-+}
++ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+/**
-+ * change_profile_perms
-+ */
-+static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *name,
-+ unsigned int *rstate)
-+{
-+ struct file_perms perms;
-+ struct path_cond cond = { 0, 0 };
-+ unsigned int state;
++ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
++ &perms, &info);
+
-+ if (!profile) {
-+ /* unconfined */
-+ perms.allowed = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
-+ perms.xindex = perms.dindex = 0;
-+ perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0;
-+ if (rstate)
-+ *rstate = 0;
-+ return perms;
-+ } else if (!profile->file.dfa) {
-+ return nullperms;
-+ } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) {
-+ /* try matching against rules with out namespace prependend */
-+ perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, name, &cond,
-+ rstate);
-+ if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE)
-+ return perms;
-+ }
++audit:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++ error);
++ kfree(buffer);
+
-+ /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
-+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, ns->base.name);
-+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
-+ return aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, rstate);
++ return error;
+}
+
-+/*
-+ * TODO: fix parser to detect unconfined, inherit,
-+ * check for next name in list of names that is double null terminated
-+ * The names list is a set of strings that \0 seperated with a double
-+ * \0 terminating the list
-+ * names that belong to namespaces begin with a :
-+ * and are followed by a name a \0 seperated name. If the name is
-+ * unspecified it is 0 length. This double \0\0 does not count as
-+ * the end of the list
-+ *
-+ * profile\0\0 # single profile
-+ * profile\0profile\0\0 # 2 profiles in list
-+ * :namespace\0profile\0\0 # profile & namespace
-+ * :namespace\0\0\0 # namespace without profile
-+ * :namespace\0\0profile\0\0 # namespace without profile followed by profile
-+*/
-+static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
++int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
-+/* TODO: fix parser and enable
-+ if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE) {
-+ name = name + strlen(name) + 1;
-+ if (*name != 0)
-+ return name;
-+ }
-+*/
-+ return NULL;
-+}
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ struct path old_path;
++ int error;
+
-+/*
-+ * get target profile for xindex
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ const char *name, u16 xindex)
++ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
++ return -EINVAL;
+
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
-+ u16 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
-+ int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
-+
-+ if (!profile)
-+ profile = ns->unconfined;
-+
-+ switch(xtype) {
-+ case AA_X_NONE:
-+ /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
-+ case AA_X_NAME:
-+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD)
-+ new_profile = aa_sys_find_attach(&profile->base, name);
-+ else
-+ new_profile = aa_sys_find_attach(&ns->base, name);
++ flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+
-+ goto out;
-+ case AA_X_TABLE:
-+ if (index > profile->file.trans.size) {
-+ AA_ERROR("Invalid named transition\n");
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
-+ }
-+ name = profile->file.trans.table[index];
-+ break;
-+ }
++ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+ for (; !new_profile && name; name = next_name(xtype, name)) {
-+ struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
-+ const char *xname = NULL;
-+
-+ new_ns = NULL;
-+ if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
-+ new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name);
-+ if (new_profile)
-+ return new_profile;
-+ continue;
-+ } else if (*name == ':') {
-+ /* switching namespace */
-+ const char *ns_name = name + 1;
-+ name = xname = ns_name + strlen(ns_name) + 1;
-+ if (!*xname)
-+ /* no name so use profile name */
-+ xname = profile->fqname;
-+ if (*ns_name == '@') {
-+ /* TODO: variable support */
-+ ;
-+ }
-+ new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
-+ if (!new_ns)
-+ continue;
-+ } else if (*name == '@') {
-+ /* TODO: variable support */
++ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+ } else {
-+ xname = name;
-+ }
++ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++ path_put(&old_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+ new_profile = aa_find_profile_by_fqname(new_ns ? new_ns : ns,
-+ xname);
-+ aa_put_namespace(new_ns);
-+ }
++ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
++ &perms, &info);
+
-+out:
-+ if (!new_profile)
-+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
++audit:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++ NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++ info, error);
++ kfree(buffer);
++ kfree(old_buffer);
+
-+ return new_profile;
++ return error;
+}
+
-+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ unsigned long flags)
+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL;
-+ unsigned int state = DFA_START;
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+ struct path_cond cond = { bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-+ bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode };
-+
-+ sa.base.error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
-+ if (sa.base.error)
-+ return sa.base.error;
++ const char *name, *info = NULL;
++ int error;
+
-+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
-+ return 0;
++ /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
++ flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
++ MS_UNBINDABLE);
+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = "exec";
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.request = MAY_EXEC;
-+ sa.cond = &cond;
-+
-+ cxt = bprm->cred->security;
-+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
-+
-+ profile = aa_filtered_profile(aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.profile));
-+ ns = cxt->sys.profile->ns;
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, 0, &buffer,
-+ (char **) &sa.name);
-+ if (sa.base.error) {
-+ if (profile || profile->flags & PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)
-+ sa.base.error = 0;
-+ sa.base.info = "Exec failed name resolution";
-+ sa.name = bprm->filename;
++ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!profile) {
-+ /* unconfined task - attach profile if one matches */
-+ new_profile = aa_sys_find_attach(&ns->base, sa.name);
-+ if (!new_profile)
-+ goto cleanup;
-+ goto apply;
-+ } else if (cxt->sys.onexec) {
-+ /*
-+ * onexec permissions are stored in a pair, rewalk the
-+ * dfa to get start of the exec path match.
-+ */
-+ sa.perms = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->sys.onexec->ns,
-+ sa.name, &state);
-+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
-+ }
-+ sa.perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, sa.name, &cond,
-+ NULL);
-+ if (cxt->sys.onexec && sa.perms.allowed & AA_MAY_ONEXEC) {
-+ new_profile = cxt->sys.onexec;
-+ cxt->sys.onexec = NULL;
-+ sa.base.info = "change_profile onexec";
-+ } else if (sa.perms.allowed & MAY_EXEC) {
-+ new_profile = x_to_profile(ns, profile, sa.name,
-+ sa.perms.xindex);
-+ if (IS_ERR(new_profile)) {
-+ if (sa.perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
-+ /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile */
-+ sa.base.info = "ix fallback";
-+ goto x_clear;
-+ } else if (sa.perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
-+ new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined);
-+ sa.base.info = "ux fallback";
-+ } else {
-+ sa.base.error = PTR_ERR(new_profile);
-+ if (sa.base.error == -ENOENT)
-+ sa.base.info = "profile not found";
-+ new_profile = NULL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ } else if (PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile)) {
-+ new_profile = aa_alloc_null_profile(profile, 0);
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ if (!new_profile)
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOMEM;
-+ sa.name2 = new_profile->fqname;
-+ sa.perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
-+ } else {
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ }
+
-+ if (!new_profile)
-+ goto audit;
++ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
++ &info);
+
-+ if (profile == new_profile) {
-+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
++audit:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++ error);
++ kfree(buffer);
+
-+ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
-+ /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */
-+ ;
-+ }
++ return error;
++}
+
-+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
-+ sa.base.error = aa_may_change_ptraced_domain(current,
-+ new_profile);
-+ if (sa.base.error)
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
++int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
++ const char *orig_name)
++{
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
++ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ struct path old_path;
++ int error;
+
-+ /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
-+ * Can be at this point for the following reasons:
-+ * 1. unconfined switching to confined
-+ * 2. confined switching to different confinement
-+ * 3. confined switching to unconfined
-+ *
-+ * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec
-+ * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec")
-+ *
-+ * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission
-+ * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec
-+ */
-+ if (!(sa.perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE))
-+ bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
++ if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
++ return -EINVAL;
+
-+apply:
-+ sa.name2 = new_profile->fqname;
-+ /* When switching namespace ensure its part of audit message */
-+ if (new_profile->ns != ns)
-+ sa.name3 = new_profile->ns->base.name;
++ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+ /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
-+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
++ error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ cxt->sys.profile = new_profile;
++ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
++ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++ path_put(&old_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+x_clear:
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.previous);
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->sys.onexec);
-+ cxt->sys.previous = NULL;
-+ cxt->sys.onexec = NULL;
-+ cxt->sys.token = 0;
++ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
++ &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+
-+cleanup:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
++ NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
++ info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
++ kfree(old_buffer);
+
-+ return sa.base.error;
++ return error;
+}
+
-+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
++ const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
++ void *data)
+{
-+ int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
++ const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ int binary = 1;
++ int error;
+
-+ /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
-+ * and stored in bprm->unsafe. The AppArmor X_UNSAFE flag is
-+ * indicates don't
-+ */
-+ if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
-+ ret = 1;
++ dev_name = orig_dev_name;
++ if (type) {
++ int requires_dev;
++ struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
++ if (!fstype)
++ return -ENODEV;
+
-+ return ret;
-+}
++ binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
++ requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
++ put_filesystem(fstype);
+
++ if (requires_dev) {
++ struct path dev_path;
+
-+static int aa_revalidate_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
-+ char *buffer, int size)
-+{
-+ umode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
-+ char *name;
-+ int error;
++ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
++ error = -ENOENT;
++ goto out;
++ }
+
-+ error = aa_get_name_to_buffer(&file->f_path, S_ISDIR(mode), buffer,
-+ size, &name);
-+ return aa_file_common_perm(profile, "file_inherit", file,
-+ aa_map_file_to_perms(file), name,
-+ error);
-+}
++ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+
-+static void revalidate_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file,
-+ unsigned long i, char *buffer, int size,
-+ struct cred *cred)
-+{
-+ if (aa_revalidate_perm(profile, file, buffer, size)) {
-+ struct file *devnull = NULL;
-+ int fd = get_unused_fd();
-+ sys_close(i);
-+ if (fd != i) {
-+ if (fd >= 0)
-+ put_unused_fd(fd);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ if (devnull) {
-+ get_file(devnull);
-+ } else if (apparmorfs_null) {
-+ devnull = dentry_open(dget(apparmorfs_null),
-+ mntget(apparmorfs_mnt),
-+ O_RDWR, cred);
-+ if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
-+ devnull = NULL;
-+ put_unused_fd(fd);
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ } else {
-+ /* apparmorfs_null not setup */
-+ put_unused_fd(fd);
-+ return;
++ error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
++ path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
++ &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
++ path_put(&dev_path);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
+ }
-+ fd_install(fd, devnull);
+ }
-+}
+
-+/*
-+ * derived from security/selinux/hooks.c: flush_unauthorized_files &&
-+ * fs/exec.c:flush_old_files
-+ */
-+static int revalidate_files(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct files_struct *files, gfp_t gfp,
-+ struct cred *cred)
-+{
-+ struct file *file;
-+ struct fdtable *fdt;
-+ long j = -1;
-+ char *buffer = kmalloc(g_apparmor_path_max, gfp);
-+ if (!buffer)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
-+ for (;;) {
-+ unsigned long set, i;
-+
-+ j++;
-+ i = j * __NFDBITS;
-+ fdt = files_fdtable(files);
-+ if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
-+ break;
-+ set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
-+ if (!set)
-+ continue;
-+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
-+ for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
-+ if (set & 1) {
-+ file = fget(i);
-+ if (!file)
-+ continue;
-+ revalidate_file(profile, file, i, buffer,
-+ g_apparmor_path_max, cred);
-+ fput(file);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
-+ }
-+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
++ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
++
++ error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
++ &perms, &info);
++
++audit:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, dev_name,
++ type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
++ error);
+ kfree(buffer);
-+ return 0;
++ kfree(dev_buffer);
++
++out:
++ return error;
++
+}
+
-+int apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct cred *cred = aa_get_task_policy(current, &profile);
-+ struct aa_task_context *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ char *buffer = NULL;
++ const char *name, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
-+ if ((new_cxt->sys.profile == profile) ||
-+ (new_cxt->sys.profile->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED)) {
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+ return 0;
++ struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
++ error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
++ &info);
++ if (error)
++ goto audit;
++
++ if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
++ unsigned int state;
++ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++ name);
++ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ }
-+ put_cred(cred);
+
-+ error = revalidate_files(new_cxt->sys.profile, current->files,
-+ GFP_KERNEL, bprm->cred);
-+ if (error)
-+ return error;
++ if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
++ error = -EACCES;
+
-+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
++audit:
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
++ NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
++ kfree(buffer);
+
-+ /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */
-+ __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->sys.profile);
-+ return 0;
++ return error;
+}
+
-+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
++int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
++ const struct path *new_path)
+{
-+ /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
-+ return;
-+}
++ struct file_perms perms = { };
++ struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
++ char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
++ const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
++ int error;
+
-+/**
-+ * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile
-+ * @hat_name: hat to change to
-+ * @token: magic value to validate the hat change
-+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
-+ *
-+ * Change to new @hat_name, and store the @hat_magic in the current task
-+ * context. If the new @hat_name is %NULL and the @token matches that
-+ * stored in the current task context and is not 0, return to the top level
-+ * profile.
-+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
-+ */
-+int aa_change_hat(const char *hat_name, u64 token, int permtest)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred;
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL;
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.base.operation = "change_hat";
-+
-+ cred = aa_current_policy(&profile);
-+ cxt = cred->security;
-+ previous_profile = cxt->sys.previous;
-+ token = cxt->sys.token;
-+
-+ if (!profile) {
-+ sa.base.info = "unconfined";
-+ sa.base.error = -EPERM;
++ error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
++ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
++ if (error)
+ goto audit;
-+ }
+
-+ if (hat_name) {
-+ if (previous_profile)
-+ sa.name = previous_profile->fqname;
-+ else
-+ sa.name = profile->fqname;
-+
-+ sa.name2 = profile->ns->base.name;
-+
-+ if (PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile))
-+ hat = aa_find_child(profile->parent, hat_name);
-+ else
-+ hat = aa_find_child(profile, hat_name);
-+ if (!hat) {
-+ sa.base.info = "hat not found";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
-+ if (permtest || !PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
-+ goto audit;
-+ hat = aa_alloc_null_profile(profile, 1);
-+ if (!hat) {
-+ sa.base.info = "failed null profile create";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+ } else if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) {
-+ sa.base.info = "target not hat";
-+ sa.base.error = -EPERM;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat);
-+ if (sa.base.error) {
-+ sa.base.info = "ptraced";
-+ sa.base.error = -EPERM;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!permtest) {
-+ sa.base.error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token);
-+ if (sa.base.error == -EACCES) {
-+ (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, current);
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
-+ profile, &sa.base,
-+ file_audit_cb);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ } else if (previous_profile)
-+ sa.base.error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token);
-+ /* else
-+ ignore restores when there is no saved profile
-+ */
-+
-+audit:
-+ if (!permtest)
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+
-+
-+out:
-+ aa_put_profile(hat);
-+
-+ return sa.base.error;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition
-+ * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to
-+ * @fqname: name of profile to change to
-+ * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec
-+ * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test
-+ *
-+ * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way
-+ * to change back. If @onexec then the transition is delayed until
-+ * the next exec.
-+ *
-+ * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise.
-+ */
-+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *fqname, int onexec,
-+ int permtest)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred;
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+
-+ if (!fqname && !ns_name)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ if (onexec)
-+ sa.base.operation = "change_onexec";
-+ else
-+ sa.base.operation = "change_profile";
-+
-+ cred = aa_current_policy(&profile);
-+ cxt = cred->security;
-+
-+ if (ns_name) {
-+ sa.name2 = ns_name;
-+ ns = aa_find_namespace(ns_name);
-+ if (!ns) {
-+ /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */
-+ sa.base.info = "namespace not found";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+ } else {
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(cxt->sys.profile->ns);
-+ sa.name2 = ns->base.name;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */
-+ if (!fqname) {
-+ if (!profile)
-+ fqname = ns->unconfined->fqname;
-+ else
-+ fqname = profile->fqname;
-+ }
-+ sa.name = fqname;
-+
-+ sa.perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, fqname, NULL);
-+ if (!(sa.perms.allowed & AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE)) {
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ target = aa_find_profile_by_fqname(ns, fqname);
-+ if (!target) {
-+ sa.base.info = "profile not found";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
-+ if (permtest || !PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile))
-+ goto audit;
-+ target = aa_alloc_null_profile(profile, 0);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */
-+ sa.base.error = aa_may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target);
-+ if (sa.base.error) {
-+ sa.base.info = "ptrace prevents transition";
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (permtest)
++ error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
++ &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
++ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
-+ if (onexec)
-+ sa.base.error = aa_set_current_onexec(target);
-+ else
-+ sa.base.error = aa_replace_current_profiles(target);
-+
-+audit:
-+ if (!permtest)
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ aa_put_profile(target);
-+
-+ return sa.base.error;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/file.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/file.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/file.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/file.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/path.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+struct file_perms nullperms;
-+
-+static void aa_audit_file_sub_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *buffer,
-+ u16 mask, u16 xindex)
-+{
-+
-+ /* const char xchar[] = "PpCc";*/
-+
-+ char *m = buffer;
-+
-+ if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP)
-+ *m++ = 'm';
-+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
-+ *m++ = 'r';
-+ if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE))
-+ *m++ = 'w';
-+ else if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
-+ *m++ = 'a';
-+ if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK)
-+ *m++ = 'l';
-+ if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK)
-+ *m++ = 'k';
-+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC) {
-+ *m++ = 'x';
-+
-+/* FIXME: only want more advanced auditing of x if in audit/hint mode
-+ u16 index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
-+ u16 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
-+ if (xtype > AA_X_NONE)
-+ *m++ = xchar[(xindex >> 12) & 0x3];
-+ if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) {
-+ *m++ = 'i';
-+ } else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) {
-+ if (xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)
-+ *m++ = 'u';
++ if (profile->policy.dfa) {
++ unsigned int state;
++ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
++ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
++ new_name);
++ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
++ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
++ }
++
++ if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
++ if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
++ target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
++ if (!target)
++ error = -ENOENT;
+ else
-+ *m++ = 'U';
-+ }
-+ *m++ = 'x';
-+ / * at most 7 character including trailing \0 * /
-+ if (xtype == AA_X_VARIABLE) {
-+ m += sprintf(m, "->v%x", index);
-+ } else if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE) {
-+ m += sprintf(m, "->n%x", index);
-+ }
-+*/
-+ }
-+ *m++ = '\0';
-+}
-+
-+static void aa_audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *name,
-+ u16 mask, int xindex, int owner)
-+{
-+/* char str[18]; */
-+ char str[10];
-+
-+ aa_audit_file_sub_mask(ab, str, mask, xindex);
-+ if (owner)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"%s::\"", name, str);
-+ else
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"::%s\"", name, str);
-+}
-+
-+void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_file *sa = va;
-+ u16 denied = sa->request & ~sa->perms.allowed;
-+ uid_t fsuid;
-+
-+ if (sa->base.task)
-+ fsuid = task_uid(sa->base.task);
-+ else
-+ fsuid = current_fsuid();
-+
-+ if (sa->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK)
-+ aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "requested_mask", sa->request,
-+ AA_X_NONE, fsuid == sa->cond->uid);
-+
-+ if (denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK)
-+ aa_audit_file_mask(ab, "denied_mask", denied, sa->perms.xindex,
-+ fsuid == sa->cond->uid);
-+
-+ if (sa->request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid);
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->cond->uid);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sa->name) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sa->name2) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " name2=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name2);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (sa->name3) {
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " name3=");
-+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->name3);
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit_file *sa)
-+{
-+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-+
-+ if (likely(!sa->base.error)) {
-+ u16 mask = sa->perms.audit;
-+
-+ if (unlikely(PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
-+ mask = 0xffff;
-+
-+ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
-+ sa->request &= mask;
-+
-+ if (likely(!sa->request))
-+ return 0;
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+ } else {
-+ /* quiet auditing of specific known rejects */
-+ u16 mask = sa->perms.quiet;
-+ u16 denied = sa->request & ~sa->perms.allowed;
-+
-+ if (denied & sa->perms.kill)
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+ /* assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
-+ if ((denied & mask) &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+ sa->request &= ~mask;
-+
-+ if (!sa->request)
-+ return PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ? 0 : sa->base.error;
-+ }
-+ return aa_audit(type, profile, (struct aa_audit *)sa, file_audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+/* FIXME: convert from dfa + state to permission entry */
-+struct file_perms aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
-+ struct path_cond *cond)
-+{
-+ struct file_perms perms;
-+
-+ /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format */
-+ /* currently file perms are encoded in the dfa */
-+ perms.kill = 0;
-+ perms.dindex = 0;
-+
-+ if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) {
-+ perms.allowed = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
-+ perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
-+ perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
-+ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
-+ } else {
-+ perms.allowed = dfa_other_allow(dfa, state);
-+ perms.audit = dfa_other_audit(dfa, state);
-+ perms.quiet = dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state);
-+ perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
-+ }
-+ /* in the old mapping MAY_WRITE implies AA_MAY_CREATE */
-+ perms.allowed |= (perms.allowed & MAY_WRITE) << 6;
-+ perms.audit |= (perms.audit & MAY_WRITE) << 6;
-+ perms.quiet |= (perms.quiet & MAY_WRITE) << 6;
-+
-+ /* in the old mapping AA_MAY_LOCK and link subset are overlayed
-+ * and only determined by which part of a pair they are in
-+ */
-+ if (perms.allowed & AA_MAY_LOCK)
-+ perms.allowed |= AA_LINK_SUBSET;
-+
-+ /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
-+ if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
-+ perms.allowed |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE;
-+
-+ return perms;
-+}
-+
-+struct file_perms aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
-+ unsigned int *rstate)
-+{
-+ unsigned int state;
-+ if (!dfa)
-+ return nullperms;
-+
-+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name);
-+
-+ if (rstate)
-+ *rstate = state;
-+
-+ /* TODO: convert to new dfa format */
-+
-+ return aa_compute_perms(dfa, state, cond);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_pathstr_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
-+ const char *name, u16 request, struct path_cond *cond)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = op;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.request = request;
-+ sa.name = name;
-+ sa.cond = cond;
-+
-+ sa.perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, sa.name, cond,
-+ NULL);
-+ if (request & ~sa.perms.allowed)
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ return aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_path_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct path *path, u16 request, struct path_cond *cond)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+ char *buffer, *name;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = operation;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.request = request;
-+ sa.cond = cond;
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_get_name(path, S_ISDIR(cond->mode), &buffer,
-+ &name);
-+ sa.name = name;
-+ if (sa.base.error) {
-+ sa.perms = nullperms;
-+ if (sa.base.error == -ENOENT)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-+ else if (sa.base.error == -ESTALE)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
-+ else if (sa.base.error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
-+ else
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup";
-+ } else {
-+ sa.perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, sa.name,
-+ cond, NULL);
-+ if (request & ~sa.perms.allowed)
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ }
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+ kfree(buffer);
-+
-+ return sa.base.error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+{
-+ struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
-+ struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
-+ struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode };
-+ char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL;
-+ char *lname, *tname;
-+ struct file_perms perms;
-+ unsigned int state;
-+
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = "link";
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.request = AA_MAY_LINK;
-+ sa.cond = &cond;
-+ sa.perms = nullperms;
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_get_name(&link, 0, &buffer, &lname);
-+ sa.name = lname;
-+ if (sa.base.error)
-+ goto audit;
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_get_name(&target, 0, &buffer2, &tname);
-+ sa.name2 = tname;
-+ if (sa.base.error)
-+ goto audit;
-+
-+
-+ sa.perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, sa.name, &cond,
-+ &state);
-+ sa.perms.audit &= AA_MAY_LINK;
-+ sa.perms.quiet &= AA_MAY_LINK;
-+ sa.perms.kill &= AA_MAY_LINK;
-+
-+ if (!(sa.perms.allowed & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* test to see if target can be paired with link */
-+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
-+ perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, sa.name2, &cond, NULL);
-+ if (!(perms.allowed & AA_MAY_LINK)) {
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ sa.base.info = "target restricted";
-+ goto audit;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* done if link subset test is not required */
-+ if (!(perms.allowed & AA_LINK_SUBSET))
-+ goto audit;
-+
-+ /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a
-+ * subset of the allowed permissions on target.
-+ */
-+ perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, sa.name2, &cond,
-+ NULL);
-+
-+ /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */
-+ sa.request = sa.perms.allowed & ~AA_MAY_LINK;
-+ sa.perms.allowed &= perms.allowed | AA_MAY_LINK;
-+
-+ sa.request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (sa.perms.allowed & ~perms.allowed);
-+ if (sa.request & ~sa.perms.allowed)
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ else if (sa.perms.allowed & MAY_EXEC) {
-+ if (((sa.perms.xindex & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) !=
-+ (perms.xindex &~AA_X_UNSAFE)) ||
-+ ((sa.perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE) &&
-+ !(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE))) {
-+ sa.perms.allowed &= ~MAY_EXEC;
-+ sa.request |= MAY_EXEC;
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ sa.base.info = "link not subset of target";
++ error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+ }
-+ }
++ } else
++ error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+ kfree(buffer);
-+ kfree(buffer2);
-+
-+ return sa.base.error;
-+}
-+
-+
-+static inline int aa_is_deleted_file(struct dentry *dentry)
-+{
-+ if (d_unhashed(dentry) && dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0)
-+ return 1;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_file_common_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct file *file, u16 request, const char *name,
-+ int error)
-+{
-+ struct path_cond cond = { .uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-+ .mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode };
-+ struct aa_audit_file sa;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = operation;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.request = request;
-+ sa.base.error = error;
-+ sa.name = name;
-+ sa.cond = &cond;
-+
-+ if (sa.base.error) {
-+ sa.perms = nullperms;
-+ if (sa.base.error == -ENOENT &&
-+ aa_is_deleted_file(file->f_path.dentry)) {
-+ /* Access to open files that are deleted are
-+ * give a pass (implicit delegation
-+ */
-+ sa.base.error = 0;
-+ sa.perms.allowed = sa.request;
-+ } else if (sa.base.error == -ENOENT)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-+ else if (sa.base.error == -ESTALE)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
-+ else if (sa.base.error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
-+ else
-+ sa.base.info = "Failed name lookup";
-+ } else {
-+ sa.perms = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, DFA_START, sa.name,
-+ &cond, NULL);
-+ if (request & ~sa.perms.allowed)
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+ }
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_file(profile, &sa);
-+
-+ return sa.base.error;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_file_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct file *file, u16 request)
-+{
-+ char *buffer, *name;
-+ umode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
-+ int error = aa_get_name(&file->f_path, S_ISDIR(mode), &buffer, &name);
++ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
++ old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
++ 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
++ aa_put_profile(target);
++ kfree(old_buffer);
++ kfree(new_buffer);
+
-+ error = aa_file_common_perm(profile, operation, file, request, name,
-+ error);
-+ kfree(buffer);
+ return error;
+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor filesystem definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
-+#define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
-+
-+extern struct dentry *apparmorfs_null;
-+extern struct vfsmount *apparmorfs_mnt;
-+
-+extern int create_apparmorfs(void);
-+extern void destroy_apparmorfs(void);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor basic global and lib definitions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __APPARMOR_H
-+#define __APPARMOR_H
-+
-+#include <linux/fs.h>
-+
-+/* Control parameters settable thru module/boot flags or
-+ * via /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/control */
-+extern enum audit_mode g_apparmor_audit;
-+extern int g_apparmor_audit_header;
-+extern int g_apparmor_debug;
-+extern int g_apparmor_lock_policy;
-+extern int g_apparmor_logsyscall;
-+extern unsigned int g_apparmor_path_max;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl
-+ * which is not related to profile accesses.
-+ */
-+
-+#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \
-+ do { \
-+ if (g_apparmor_debug && printk_ratelimit()) \
-+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \
-+ } while (0)
-+
-+#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \
-+ do { \
-+ if (printk_ratelimit()) \
-+ printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \
-+ } while (0)
-+
-+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-+extern int apparmor_initialized;
-+void apparmor_disable(void);
-+
-+/* fn's in lib */
-+void info_message(const char *str);
-+char *aa_split_name_from_ns(char *args, char **ns_name);
-+char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2);
-+int aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len);
-+char *strchrnul(const char *s, int c);
-+const char *fqname_subname(const char *name);
-+
-+static inline int mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode)
-+{
-+ return !(inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __APPARMOR_H */
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/audit.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/audit.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/audit.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H
-+#define __AA_AUDIT_H
-+
-+#include <linux/audit.h>
-+#include <linux/fs.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+
-+extern const char *audit_mode_names[];
-+#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
-+
-+#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0 /* auto choose audit message type */
-+
-+enum audit_mode {
-+ AUDIT_NORMAL, /* follow normal auditing of accesses */
-+ AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED, /* quiet all denied access messages */
-+ AUDIT_QUIET, /* quiet all messages */
-+ AUDIT_NOQUIET, /* do not quiet audit messages */
-+ AUDIT_ALL /* audit all accesses */
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * aa_audit - AppArmor auditing structure
-+ * Structure is populated by access control code and passed to aa_audit which
-+ * provides for a single point of logging.
-+ */
-+struct aa_audit {
-+ struct task_struct *task;
-+ gfp_t gfp_mask;
-+ int error;
-+ const char *operation;
-+ const char *info;
-+};
-+
-+int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit *sa,
-+ void(*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *));
-+
-+int aa_audit_syscallreject(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, const char *,
-+ void(*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *));
-+
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/capability.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/capability.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/capability.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/capability.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H
-+#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H
-+
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities
-+ * @set_caps: capabilities that are being set
-+ * @capabilities: capabilities mask
-+ * @audit_caps: caps that are to be audited
-+ * @quiet_caps: caps that should not be audited
-+ */
-+struct aa_caps {
-+ kernel_cap_t set;
-+ kernel_cap_t allowed;
-+ kernel_cap_t audit;
-+ kernel_cap_t quiet;
-+ kernel_cap_t kill;
-+};
-+
-+int aa_profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap);
-+int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
-+ int audit);
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps)
-+{
-+ /* NOP */
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/context.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/context.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/context.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/context.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
-+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
-+
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+
-+#include "policy.h"
-+
-+
-+/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
-+ * @profile: the profile the file was opened under
-+ * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
-+ */
-+struct aa_file_cxt {
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ u16 allowed;
-+};
-+
-+static inline struct aa_file_cxt *aa_alloc_file_context(gfp_t gfp)
-+{
-+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt), gfp);
-+}
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt)
-+{
-+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
-+ memset(cxt, 0, sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt));
-+ kfree(cxt);
-+}
-+
-+
-+
-+
-+
-+/* struct aa_task_cxt_group - a grouping label data for confined tasks
-+ * @profile: the current profile
-+ * @exec: profile to transition to on next exec
-+ * @previous: profile the task may return to
-+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
-+ *
-+ * Contains the task's current profile (which could change due to
-+ * change_hat). Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
-+ */
-+struct aa_task_cxt_group {
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct aa_profile *onexec;
-+ struct aa_profile *previous;
-+ u64 token;
-+};
-+
-+/**
-+ * struct aa_task_context - primary label for confined tasks
-+ * @sys: the system labeling for the task
-+ *
-+ * A task is confined by the intersection of its system and user profiles
-+ */
-+struct aa_task_context {
-+ struct aa_task_cxt_group sys;
-+};
-+
-+struct aa_task_context *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
-+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_context *cxt);
-+struct aa_task_context *aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_context *old_cxt,
-+ gfp_t gfp);
-+void aa_cred_policy(const struct cred *cred, struct aa_profile **sys);
-+struct cred *aa_get_task_policy(const struct task_struct *task,
-+ struct aa_profile **sys);
-+int aa_replace_current_profiles(struct aa_profile *sys);
-+void aa_put_task_policy(struct cred *cred);
-+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *sys);
-+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
-+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
-+
-+
-+static inline struct aa_task_context *__aa_task_cxt(struct task_struct *task)
-+{
-+ return __task_cred(task)->security;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
-+ * @task: task to check confinement of
-+ *
-+ * If @task != current needs to be in RCU safe critical section
-+ */
-+static inline int __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+ int rc = 1;
-+
-+ cxt = __aa_task_cxt(task);
-+ if (!cxt || (cxt->sys.profile->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
-+ rc = 0;
-+
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static inline const struct cred *aa_current_policy(struct aa_profile **sys)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
-+ *sys = aa_filtered_profile(aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.profile));
-+
-+ return cred;
-+}
-+
-+static inline const struct cred *aa_current_policy_wupd(struct aa_profile **sys)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
-+
-+ *sys = aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.profile);
-+ if (unlikely((cxt->sys.profile != *sys)))
-+ aa_replace_current_profiles(*sys);
-+ *sys = aa_filtered_profile(*sys);
-+
-+ return cred;
-+}
-+
-+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
-+{
-+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
-+ return aa_filtered_profile(aa_profile_newest(cxt->sys.profile));
-+}
-+
-+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile_wupd(void)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *p;
-+ aa_current_policy_wupd(&p);
-+ return p;
-+}
-+
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/domain.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/domain.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/domain.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
-+#include <linux/types.h>
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H
-+#define __AA_DOMAIN_H
-+
-+struct aa_domain {
-+ int size;
-+ char **table;
-+};
-+
-+int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-+int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-+int apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-+void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-+
-+void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain);
-+int aa_change_hat(const char *hat_name, u64 token, int permtest);
-+int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, int onexec,
-+ int permtest);
-+
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/file.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/file.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/file.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/file.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_FILE_H
-+#define __AA_FILE_H
-+
-+#include <linux/path.h>
-+
-+#include "audit.h"
-+#include "domain.h"
-+#include "match.h"
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+/*
-+ * We use MAY_EXEC, MAY_WRITE, MAY_READ, MAY_APPEND and the following flags
-+ * for profile permissions
-+ */
-+#define AA_MAY_LINK 0x0010
-+#define AA_MAY_LOCK 0x0020
-+#define AA_EXEC_MMAP 0x0040
-+
-+#define AA_MAY_CREATE 0x0080
-+#define AA_LINK_SUBSET 0x0100
-+#define AA_MAY_DELEGATE 0x0200
-+#define AA_EXEC_DELEGATE 0x0400 /*exec allows delegate*/
-+
-+#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT 0x2000 /* ctrl auditing only */
-+#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC 0x4000 /* exec allows onexec */
-+#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE 0x8000
-+
-+
-+#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\
-+ AA_MAY_LINK | AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_EXEC_MMAP | \
-+ AA_MAY_CREATE)
-+
-+/*
-+ * The xindex is broken into 3 parts
-+ * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table
-+ * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used
-+ * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied
-+ */
-+#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK 0x03ff
-+
-+#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK 0x0c00
-+#define AA_X_TYPE_SHIFT 10
-+#define AA_X_NONE 0x0000
-+#define AA_X_NAME 0x0400 /* use executable name px */
-+#define AA_X_TABLE 0x0800 /* use a specified name ->n# */
-+
-+#define AA_X_UNSAFE 0x1000
-+#define AA_X_CHILD 0x2000 /* make >AA_X_NONE apply to children */
-+#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000
-+#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000
-+
-+
-+/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */
-+#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000
-+
-+/* need to conditionalize which ones are being set */
-+struct path_cond {
-+ uid_t uid;
-+ umode_t mode;
-+};
-+
-+/* struct file_perms - file permission fo
-+ * @allowed: mask of permissions that are allowed
-+ * @audit: mask of permissions to force an audit message for
-+ * @quiet: mask of permissions to quiet audit messages for
-+ * @kill: mask of permissions that when matched will kill the task
-+ * @xindex: exec transition index if @allowed contains MAY_EXEC
-+ * @dindex: delegate table index if @allowed contain AA_MAY_DELEGATE
-+ *
-+ * The @audit and @queit mask should be mutually exclusive.
-+ */
-+struct file_perms {
-+ u16 allowed;
-+ u16 audit;
-+ u16 quiet;
-+ u16 kill;
-+ u16 xindex;
-+ u16 dindex;
-+};
-+
-+extern struct file_perms nullperms;
-+
-+#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allowed | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill)
-+
-+/* FIXME: split perms from dfa and match this to description
-+ * also add delegation info.
-+ */
-+static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
-+{
-+ u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf;
-+ u16 index = 0;
-+
-+//printk("mask x%x\n", mask);
-+ if (mask & 0x100)
-+ index |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
-+ if (mask & 0x200)
-+ index |= AA_X_INHERIT;
-+ if (mask & 0x80)
-+ index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
-+
-+ if (old_index == 1) {
-+ index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED;
-+ } else if (old_index == 2) {
-+ index |= AA_X_NAME;
-+ } else if (old_index == 3) {
-+ index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
-+ } else {
-+ index |= AA_X_TABLE;
-+ index |= old_index - 4;
-+ }
-+
-+ return index;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * map old dfa inline permissions to new format
-+ */
-+#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \
-+ (dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff))
-+
-+#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f)
-+#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \
-+ dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff)
-+
-+
-+struct aa_audit_file {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
-+
-+ const char *name;
-+ const char *name2;
-+ const char *name3;
-+ struct file_perms perms;
-+ u16 request;
-+ struct path_cond *cond;
-+};
-+
-+int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit_file *sa);
-+void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
-+
-+/**
-+ * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions
-+ * @dfa: dfa to match path names and conditionals against
-+ * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa
-+ * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions
-+ *
-+ * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then
-+ * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as
-+ * an index into @perms. If a named exec transition is required it is
-+ * looked up in the transition table.
-+ */
-+struct aa_file_rules {
-+ struct aa_dfa *dfa;
-+ /* struct perms perms; */
-+ struct aa_domain trans;
-+ /* TODO: add delegate table */
-+};
-+
-+struct file_perms aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *name, struct path_cond *cond,
-+ unsigned int *rstate);
-+
-+int aa_pathstr_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op,
-+ const char *name, u16 request, struct path_cond *cond);
-+
-+int aa_path_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct path *path, u16 request, struct path_cond *cond);
-+
-+int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
-+
-+int aa_file_common_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct file *file, u16 request, const char *name,
-+ int error);
-+
-+int aa_file_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *operation,
-+ struct file *file, u16 request);
-+
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
-+{
-+ aa_match_free(rules->dfa);
-+ aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
-+}
-+
-+#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
-+
-+/* from namei.c */
-+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
-+#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
-+/*
-+ * map file flags to AppArmor permissions
-+ */
-+static inline u16 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
-+{
-+ int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
-+ u16 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
-+
-+ if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
-+ perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
-+ /* trunc implies write permission */
-+ if (flags & O_TRUNC)
-+ perms |= MAY_WRITE;
-+ if (flags & O_CREAT)
-+ perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE;
-+
-+ return perms;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_IPC_H
-+#define __AA_IPC_H
-+
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
-+ struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode);
-+
-+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
-+ unsigned int mode);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/match.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/match.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/match.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/match.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_MATCH_H
-+#define __AA_MATCH_H
-+
-+#define DFA_NOMATCH 0
-+#define DFA_START 1
-+
-+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff
-+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
-+ * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
-+ * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
-+ * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D insted of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
-+ * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
-+ * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
-+ */
-+
-+#define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D
-+
-+struct table_set_header {
-+ u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */
-+ u32 th_hsize;
-+ u32 th_ssize;
-+ u16 th_flags;
-+ char th_version[];
-+};
-+
-+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT 1
-+#define YYTD_ID_BASE 2
-+#define YYTD_ID_CHK 3
-+#define YYTD_ID_DEF 4
-+#define YYTD_ID_EC 5
-+#define YYTD_ID_META 6
-+#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 7
-+#define YYTD_ID_NXT 8
-+
-+
-+#define YYTD_DATA8 1
-+#define YYTD_DATA16 2
-+#define YYTD_DATA32 4
-+
-+struct table_header {
-+ u16 td_id;
-+ u16 td_flags;
-+ u32 td_hilen;
-+ u32 td_lolen;
-+ char td_data[];
-+};
-+
-+#define DEFAULT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF - 1]->td_data))
-+#define BASE_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE - 1]->td_data))
-+#define NEXT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT - 1]->td_data))
-+#define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK - 1]->td_data))
-+#define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]->td_data))
-+#define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1]->td_data))
-+#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 - 1]->td_data))
-+
-+struct aa_dfa {
-+ struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_NXT];
-+};
-+
-+#define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
-+
-+#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TYPE, NTOHX) \
-+ do { \
-+ typeof(LEN) __i; \
-+ TYPE *__t = (TYPE *) TABLE; \
-+ TYPE *__b = (TYPE *) BLOB; \
-+ for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \
-+ __t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \
-+ } \
-+ } while (0)
-+
-+static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size)
-+{
-+ return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8);
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_dfa *aa_match_alloc(void);
-+void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa);
-+int unpack_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, void *blob, size_t size);
-+int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa);
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *str, int len);
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *str);
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/net.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/net.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/net.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/net.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
-+#define __AA_NET_H
-+
-+#include <net/sock.h>
-+
-+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
-+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
-+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
-+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
-+ */
-+struct aa_net {
-+ u16 allowed[AF_MAX];
-+ u16 audit[AF_MAX];
-+ u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
-+};
-+
-+extern int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, char *operation,
-+ int family, int type, int protocol);
-+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation);
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
-+{
-+ /* NOP */
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/path.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/path.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/path.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/path.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor basic path manipulation function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_PATH_H
-+#define __AA_PATH_H
-+
-+int aa_get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int is_dir, char *buffer, int size,
-+ char **name);
-+int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int is_dir, char **buffer, char **name);
-+int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, char **name);
-+char *sysctl_pathname(struct ctl_table *table, char *buffer, int buflen);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_PATH_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/policy.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/policy.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/policy.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_POLICY_H
-+#define __AA_POLICY_H
-+
-+#include <linux/capability.h>
-+#include <linux/cred.h>
-+#include <linux/kref.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/socket.h>
-+
-+#include "apparmor.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
-+#include "capability.h"
-+#include "domain.h"
-+#include "file.h"
-+#include "net.h"
-+#include "resource.h"
-+
-+extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
-+#define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
-+
-+#define PROFILE_COMPLAIN(_profile) \
-+ ((g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || ((_profile) && \
-+ (_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
-+
-+#define PROFILE_KILL(_profile) \
-+ ((g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || ((_profile) && \
-+ (_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
-+
-+#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) \
-+ ((_profile) && (_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a
-+ * set. It should be done at the namespace level.
-+ * Either, with a set of profiles loaded at the namespace level or via
-+ * a mark and remove marked interface.
-+ */
-+enum profile_mode {
-+ APPARMOR_ENFORCE, /* enforce access rules */
-+ APPARMOR_COMPLAIN, /* allow and log access violations */
-+ APPARMOR_KILL, /* kill task on access violation */
-+};
-+
-+enum profile_flags {
-+ PFLAG_HAT = 1, /* profile is a hat */
-+ PFLAG_UNCONFINED = 2, /* profile is the unconfined profile */
-+ PFLAG_NULL = 4, /* profile is null learning profile */
-+ PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR = 8, /* fallback to ix on name lookup fail */
-+ PFLAG_IMMUTABLE = 0x10, /* don't allow changes/replacement */
-+ PFLAG_USER_DEFINED = 0x20, /* user based profile */
-+ PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF = 0x40, /* list doesn't keep profile ref */
-+};
-+
-+#define AA_NEW_SID 0
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+/* struct aa_policy_common - common part of both namespaces and profiles
-+ * @name: name of the object
-+ * @count: reference count of the obj
-+ * lock: lock for modifying the object
-+ * @list: list object is on
-+ * @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object
-+ */
-+struct aa_policy_common {
-+ char *name;
-+ struct kref count;
-+ rwlock_t lock;
-+ struct list_head list;
-+ struct list_head profiles;
-+};
-+
-+/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace
-+ * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
-+ * @max_count: maximum number of profiles that can be in this namespace
-+ * @size: current size of profiles
-+ * @count: current count of profiles (includes null profiles)
-+ */
-+struct aa_ns_acct {
-+ int max_size;
-+ int max_count;
-+ int size;
-+ int count;
-+};
-+
-+/* struct aa_namespace - namespace for a set of profiles
-+ * @name: the name of the namespace
-+ * @list: list the namespace is on
-+ * @profiles: list of profile in the namespace
-+ * @acct: accounting for the namespace
-+ * @profile_count: count of profiles on @profiles list
-+ * @size: accounting of how much memory is consumed by the contained profiles
-+ * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
-+ * @count: reference count on the namespace
-+ * @lock: lock for adding/removing profile to the namespace
-+ *
-+ * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
-+ * which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between
-+ * aa_namespaces and profile names within a namespace are guarenteed to be
-+ * unique. When profiles in seperate namespaces have the same name they
-+ * are NOT considered to be equivalent.
-+ *
-+ * Namespace names must be unique and can not contain the characters :/\0
-+ *
-+ * FIXME TODO: add vserver support so a vserer gets a default namespace
-+ */
-+struct aa_namespace {
-+ struct aa_policy_common base;
-+ struct aa_ns_acct acct;
-+ int is_stale;
-+ struct aa_profile *unconfined;
-+};
-+
-+
-+/* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
-+ * @base - base componets of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
-+ * @fqname - The fully qualified profile name, less the namespace name
-+ * @ns: namespace the profile is in
-+ * @parent: parent profile of this profile, if one exists
-+ * @replacedby: is set profile that replaced this profile
-+ * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
-+ * @xmatch_plen: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
-+ * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
-+ * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
-+ * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
-+ * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
-+ * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
-+ * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
-+ * @caps: capabilities for the profile
-+ * @net: network controls for the profile
-+ * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
-+ *
-+ * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile
-+ * has a name, and exist in a namespace. The @name and @exec_match are
-+ * used to determine profile attachment against unconfined tasks. All other
-+ * attachments are determined by in profile X transition rules.
-+ *
-+ * The @replacedby field is write protected by the profile lock. Reads
-+ * are assumed to be atomic, and are done without locking.
-+ *
-+ * Profiles have a hierachy where hats and children profiles keep
-+ * a reference to their parent.
-+ *
-+ * Profile names can not begin with a : and can not contain the \0
-+ * character. If a profile name begins with / it will be considered when
-+ * determining profile attachment on "unconfined" tasks.
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile {
-+ struct aa_policy_common base;
-+ char *fqname;
-+
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ struct aa_profile *parent;
-+ struct aa_profile *replacedby;
-+
-+ struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
-+ int xmatch_len;
-+ u32 sid;
-+ enum audit_mode audit;
-+ enum profile_mode mode;
-+ u32 flags;
-+ int size;
-+
-+ struct aa_file_rules file;
-+ struct aa_caps caps;
-+ struct aa_net net;
-+ struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
-+};
-+
-+
-+extern struct list_head ns_list;
-+extern rwlock_t ns_list_lock;
-+
-+extern struct aa_namespace *default_namespace;
-+extern enum profile_mode g_profile_mode;
-+
-+
-+void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy_common *common,
-+ struct aa_profile *profile);
-+
-+int alloc_default_namespace(void);
-+void free_default_namespace(void);
-+struct aa_namespace *alloc_aa_namespace(const char *name);
-+void free_aa_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref);
-+void free_aa_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns);
-+struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *name);
-+
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(const char *name);
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_prepare_namespace(const char *name);
-+void aa_remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns);
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_prepare_namespace(const char *name);
-+void aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head);
-+void aa_profile_ns_list_release(void);
-+void __aa_remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns);
-+
-+
-+static inline struct aa_policy_common *aa_get_common(struct aa_policy_common *c)
-+{
-+ if (c)
-+ kref_get(&c->count);
-+
-+ return c;
-+}
-+
-+static inline struct aa_namespace *aa_get_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+ if (ns)
-+ kref_get(&(ns->base.count));
-+
-+ return ns;
-+}
-+
-+static inline void aa_put_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+ if (ns)
-+ kref_put(&ns->base.count, free_aa_namespace_kref);
-+}
-+
-+
-+
-+struct aa_profile *alloc_aa_profile(const char *name);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat);
-+void free_aa_profile_kref(struct kref *kref);
-+void free_aa_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
-+struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile(struct list_head *head, const char *name);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name);
-+struct aa_policy_common *__aa_find_parent_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *fqname);
-+struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *fqname);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_find_profile_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *name);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_profile_newest(struct aa_profile *profile);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_sys_find_attach(struct aa_policy_common *base,
-+ const char *name);
-+void __aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy_common *common,
-+ struct aa_profile *profile);
-+void __aa_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_profile *replacement);
-+void __aa_replace_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_profile *replacement);
-+void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head);
-+
-+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_filtered_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ if (profile->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED)
-+ return NULL;
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
-+ * @p: profile
-+ */
-+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
-+{
-+ if (p)
-+ kref_get(&(p->base.count));
-+
-+ return p;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_put_profile - decrement refcount on profile @p
-+ * @p: profile
-+ */
-+static inline void aa_put_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
-+{
-+ if (p)
-+ kref_put(&p->base.count, free_aa_profile_kref);
-+}
-+
-+static inline int PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ if (g_apparmor_audit != AUDIT_NORMAL)
-+ return g_apparmor_audit;
-+ if (profile)
-+ return profile->audit;
-+ return AUDIT_NORMAL;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/policy_interface.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/policy_interface.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/policy_interface.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/policy_interface.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
-+#define __POLICY_INTERFACE_H
-+
-+ssize_t aa_interface_add_profiles(void *data, size_t size);
-+ssize_t aa_interface_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size);
-+ssize_t aa_interface_remove_profiles(char *name, size_t size);
-+
-+#endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface function defintions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
-+#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-+
-+#define AA_DO_TEST 1
-+
-+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ char **string);
-+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, int test);
-+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *args, int onexec, int test);
-+int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *args);
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/resource.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/resource.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/resource.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor resource limits function defintions.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_RESOURCE_H
-+#define __AA_RESOURCE_H
-+
-+#include <linux/resource.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimits settings for the profile
-+ * @mask: which hard limits to set
-+ * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits
-+ *
-+ * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits. Only the
-+ * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor.
-+ */
-+struct aa_rlimit {
-+ unsigned int mask;
-+ struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
-+};
-+
-+
-+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-+ struct rlimit *new_rlim);
-+
-+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new);
-+
-+static inline void aa_free_rlimit_rules(struct aa_rlimit *rlims)
-+{
-+ /* NOP */
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_RESOURCE_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/sid.h linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/include/sid.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/include/sid.h 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) definitions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef __AA_SID_H
-+#define __AA_SID_H
-+
-+#include <linux/types.h>
-+
-+struct aa_profile;
-+
-+#define AA_ALLOC_USR_SID 1
-+#define AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID 0
-+
-+u32 aa_alloc_sid(int is_usr);
-+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);
-+int aa_add_sid_profile(u32 sid, struct aa_profile *profile);
-+int aa_replace_sid_profile(u32 sid, struct aa_profile *profile);
-+struct aa_profile *aa_get_sid_profile(u32 sid);
-+
-+
-+static inline u32 aa_compound_sid(u32 sys, u32 usr)
-+{
-+ return sys | usr;
-+}
-+
-+static inline u32 aa_usr_sid(u32 sid)
-+{
-+ return sid & 0xffff0000;
-+}
-+
-+static inline u32 aa_sys_sid(u32 sid)
-+{
-+ return sid & 0xffff;
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* __AA_SID_H */
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/ipc.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/ipc.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/ipc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/ipc.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/gfp.h>
-+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-+
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/capability.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+
-+struct aa_audit_ptrace {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
-+
-+ pid_t tracer, tracee;
-+};
-+
-+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_ptrace *sa = va;
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " tracer=%d tracee=%d", sa->tracer, sa->tracee);
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_audit_ptrace *sa)
-+{
-+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, (struct aa_audit *)sa,
-+ audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer,
-+ struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode)
-+{
-+ /* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace
-+ * rules,
-+ * Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
-+ */
-+
-+ if (!tracer || tracer == tracee)
-+ return 0;
-+ /* log this capability request */
-+ return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
-+ unsigned int mode)
-+{
-+ /*
-+ * tracer can ptrace tracee when
-+ * - tracer is unconfined ||
-+ * - tracer & tracee are in the same namespace &&
-+ * - tracer is in complain mode
-+ * - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is:
-+ * - confined by the same profile ||
-+ * - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
-+ */
-+
-+ struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
-+ const struct cred *cred = aa_get_task_policy(tracer, &tracer_p);
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (tracer_p) {
-+ struct aa_audit_ptrace sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = "ptrace";
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_ATOMIC;
-+ sa.tracer = tracer->pid;
-+ sa.tracee = tracee->pid;
-+ /* FIXME: different namespace restriction can be lifted
-+ * if, namespace are matched to AppArmor namespaces
-+ */
-+ if (tracer->nsproxy != tracee->nsproxy) {
-+ sa.base.info = "different namespaces";
-+ sa.base.error = -EPERM;
-+ aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, tracer_p, &sa.base,
-+ audit_cb);
-+ } else {
-+ struct aa_profile *tracee_p;
-+ struct cred *lcred = aa_get_task_policy(tracee,
-+ &tracee_p);
-+
-+ sa.base.error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p,
-+ tracee_p, mode);
-+ sa.base.error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, &sa);
-+
-+ put_cred(lcred);
-+ }
-+ error = sa.base.error;
-+ }
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/Kconfig linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/Kconfig
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/Kconfig 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/Kconfig 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+ bool "AppArmor support"
-+ depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_NETWORK && NET && INET
-+ select AUDIT
-+ select SECURITY_PATH
-+ select SECURITYFS
-+ default n
-+ help
-+ This enables the AppArmor security module.
-+ Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your
-+ distribution) and further information may be found at
-+ <http://forge.novell.com/modules/xfmod/project/?apparmor>
-+
-+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_NETWORK
-+ bool "AppArmor network support"
-+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+ default n
-+ help
-+ This enables AppArmor to mediate applications network use.
-+ This will enable the SECURITY_NETWORK hooks.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
-+ int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
-+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+ range 0 1
-+ default 1
-+ help
-+ This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
-+ 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
-+ at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
-+ kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
-+ bootup. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
-+ kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
-+ bootup.
-+
-+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-+
-+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_DISABLE
-+ bool "AppArmor runtime disable"
-+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
-+ default n
-+ help
-+ This option enables writing to a apparmorfs node 'disable', which
-+ allows AppArmor to be disabled at runtime prior to the policy load.
-+ AppArmor will then remain disabled until the next boot.
-+ This option is similar to the apparmor.enabled=0 boot parameter,
-+ but is to support runtime disabling of AppArmor, e.g. from
-+ /sbin/init, for portability across platforms where boot
-+ parameters are difficult to employ.
-+
-+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/lib.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/lib.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/lib.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/lib.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains basic common functions used in AppArmor
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/string.h>
-+
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+
-+void info_message(const char *str)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.info = str;
-+ printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str);
-+ if (audit_enabled)
-+ aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, NULL, &sa, NULL);
-+}
-+
-+char *strchrnul(const char *s, int c)
-+{
-+ for (; *s != (char)c && *s != '\0'; ++s)
-+ ;
-+ return (char *)s;
-+}
-+
-+char *aa_split_name_from_ns(char *args, char **ns_name)
-+{
-+ char *name = strstrip(args);
-+
-+ *ns_name = NULL;
-+ if (args[0] == ':') {
-+ char *split = strstrip(strchr(&args[1], ':'));
-+
-+ if (!split)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ *split = 0;
-+ *ns_name = &args[1];
-+ name = strstrip(split + 1);
-+ }
-+ if (*name == 0)
-+ name = NULL;
-+
-+ return name;
-+}
-+
-+char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2)
-+{
-+ char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (name)
-+ sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2);
-+ return name;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
-+ * @str: a null terminated string
-+ * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated
-+ * @len: length of @sub to compare
-+ *
-+ * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match
-+ */
-+int aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len)
-+{
-+ int res = strncmp(str, sub, len);
-+ if (res)
-+ return 0;
-+ if (str[len] == 0)
-+ return 1;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+const char *fqname_subname(const char *name)
-+{
-+ char *split;
-+ /* check for namespace which begins with a : and ends with : or \0 */
-+ name = strstrip((char *) name);
-+ if (*name == ':') {
-+ split = strchrnul(name + 1, ':');
-+ if (*split == '\0')
-+ return NULL;
-+ name = strstrip(split + 1);
-+ }
-+ for (split = strstr(name, "//"); split; split = strstr(name, "//")) {
-+ name = split + 2;
-+ }
-+ return name;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/lsm.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/lsm.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/lsm.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/lsm.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,1063 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/security.h>
-+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-+#include <linux/mm.h>
-+#include <linux/mman.h>
-+#include <linux/mount.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-+#include <linux/ctype.h>
-+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-+#include <linux/audit.h>
-+#include <net/sock.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/capability.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+#include "include/ipc.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
-+#include "include/path.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/procattr.h"
-+
-+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
-+int apparmor_initialized;
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * LSM hook functions
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * prepare new aa_task_context for modification by prepare_cred block
-+ */
-+static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
-+ gfp_t gfp)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = aa_dup_task_context(old->security, gfp);
-+ if (!cxt)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ new->security = cxt;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * free the associated aa_task_context and put its profiles
-+ */
-+static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-+{
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ cred->security = NULL;
-+ aa_free_task_context(cxt);
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int apparmor_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
-+ unsigned int mode)
-+{
-+ return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
-+}
-+
-+
-+static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
-+{
-+ return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
-+}
-+
-+/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
-+static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
-+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ const struct cred *cred;
-+
-+ rcu_read_lock();
-+ cred = __task_cred(target);
-+ aa_cred_policy(cred, &profile);
-+
-+ *effective = cred->cap_effective;
-+ *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
-+ *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
-+
-+ if (profile) {
-+ *effective = cap_combine(*effective, profile->caps.set);
-+ *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allowed);
-+ }
-+ rcu_read_unlock();
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
-+ int cap, int audit)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-+ int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
-+
-+ aa_cred_policy(cred, &profile);
-+ if (profile && (!error || cap_raised(profile->caps.set, cap)))
-+ error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
-+{
-+ int error = 0;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+
-+ if (profile) {
-+ char *buffer, *name;
-+ int mask;
-+
-+ mask = 0;
-+ if (op & 4)
-+ mask |= MAY_READ;
-+ if (op & 2)
-+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+
-+ error = -ENOMEM;
-+ buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!buffer)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * TODO: convert this over to using a global or per
-+ * namespace control instead of a hard coded /proc
-+ */
-+ name = sysctl_pathname(table, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
-+ if (name && name - buffer >= 5) {
-+ struct path_cond cond = { 0, S_IFREG };
-+ name -= 5;
-+ memcpy(name, "/proc", 5);
-+ error = aa_pathstr_perm(profile, "sysctl", name, mask,
-+ &cond);
-+ }
-+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
-+ }
-+
-+out:
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int common_perm(const char *op, struct path *path, u16 mask,
-+ struct path_cond *cond)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile();
-+ if (profile)
-+ error = aa_path_perm(profile, op, path, mask, cond);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int common_perm_dentry(const char *op, struct path *dir,
-+ struct dentry *dentry, u16 mask,
-+ struct path_cond *cond)
-+{
-+ struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry };
-+
-+ return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
-+}
-+
-+static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, struct path *dir,
-+ struct dentry *dentry, u16 mask)
-+{
-+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-+ struct path_cond cond = {};
-+
-+ if (!dir->mnt || !inode || !mediated_filesystem(inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
-+ cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
-+
-+ return common_perm_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
-+}
-+
-+static int common_perm_create(const char *op, struct path *dir,
-+ struct dentry *dentry, u16 mask, umode_t mode)
-+{
-+ struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
-+
-+ if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ return common_perm_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+{
-+ return common_perm_rm("unlink", dir, dentry, MAY_WRITE);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+ int mode)
-+{
-+ return common_perm_create("mkdir", dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, S_IFDIR);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-+{
-+ return common_perm_rm("rmdir", dir, dentry, MAY_WRITE);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+ int mode, unsigned int dev)
-+{
-+ return common_perm_create("mknod", dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
-+ unsigned int time_attrs)
-+{
-+ struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-+ path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode };
-+
-+ if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+ return common_perm("truncate", path, MAY_WRITE, &cond);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
-+ const char *old_name)
-+{
-+ return common_perm_create("symlink_create", dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
-+ S_IFLNK);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
-+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+ if (profile)
-+ error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
-+ struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+ if (profile) {
-+ struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
-+ struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
-+ struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
-+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode };
-+
-+ error = aa_path_perm(profile, "rename_src", &old_path,
-+ MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, &cond);
-+ if (!error)
-+ error = aa_path_perm(profile, "rename_dest", &new_path,
-+ AA_MAY_CREATE | MAY_WRITE, &cond);
-+
-+ }
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ /* If in exec permission is handled by bprm hooks */
-+ if (current->in_execve ||
-+ !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ aa_cred_policy(cred, &profile);
-+ if (profile) {
-+ struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
-+ struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-+ struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
-+
-+ error = aa_path_perm(profile, "open", &file->f_path,
-+ aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
-+ fcxt->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
-+ /* todo cache actual allowed permissions */
-+ fcxt->allowed = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
-+{
-+ file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!file->f_security)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+ return 0;
-+
-+}
-+
-+static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-+{
-+ struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security;
-+
-+ aa_free_file_context(cxt);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
-+{
-+ /*
-+ * Most basic (rw) file access is revalidated at exec.
-+ * The revalidation done here is for parent/child hat
-+ * file accesses.
-+ *
-+ * Currently profile replacement does not cause revalidation
-+ * or file revocation.
-+ *
-+ * TODO: cache profiles that have revalidated?
-+ */
-+ struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = fcxt->profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (!fprofile || !file->f_path.mnt ||
-+ !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile();
-+ /* TODO: Enable at exec time revalidation of files
-+ if (profile && (fprofile != profile) &&
-+ ((PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) && (profile->parent == fprofile)) ||
-+ (PROFILE_IS_HAT(fprofile) && (fprofile->parent == profile))))
-+ error = aa_file_perm(profile, "file_perm", file, mask);
-+ */
-+ if (profile && ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allowed)))
-+ error = aa_file_perm(profile, "file_perm", file, mask);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u16 mask)
-+{
-+ const struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = fcxt->profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (!fprofile || !file->f_path.mnt ||
-+ !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+ if (profile && ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allowed)))
-+ error = aa_file_perm(profile, op, file, mask);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
-+{
-+ u16 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
-+
-+ if (cmd == F_WRLCK)
-+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+
-+ return common_file_perm("file_lock", file, mask);
-+}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor doesn't current use the fcntl hook.
-+ *
-+ * FIXME - these are not implemented yet - REMOVE file_fcntl hook
-+ * NOTE: some of the file control commands are further mediated
-+ * by other hooks
-+ * F_SETOWN - security_file_set_fowner
-+ * F_SETLK - security_file_lock
-+ * F_SETLKW - security_file_lock
-+ * O_APPEND - AppArmor mediates append as a subset of full write
-+ * so changing from full write to appending write is
-+ * dropping priviledge and not restricted.
-+
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
-+ unsigned long arg)
-+{
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+*/
-+
-+static int common_mmap(struct file *file, const char *operation,
-+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
-+{
-+ struct dentry *dentry;
-+ int mask = 0;
-+
-+ if (!file || !file->f_security)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (prot & PROT_READ)
-+ mask |= MAY_READ;
-+ /* Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
-+ * write back to the files */
-+ if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
-+ mask |= MAY_WRITE;
-+ if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-+ mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
-+
-+ dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
-+ return common_file_perm(operation, file, mask);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
-+{
-+ if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) {
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+ if (profile)
-+ /* future control check here */
-+ return -EACCES;
-+ else
-+ return -EACCES;
-+ }
-+
-+ return common_mmap(file, "file_mmap", prot, flags);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
-+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
-+{
-+ return common_mmap(vma->vm_file, "file_mprotect", prot,
-+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
-+ char **value)
-+{
-+ int error = -ENOENT;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *onexec, *prev;
-+ const struct cred *cred = aa_get_task_policy(task, &profile);
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt = cred->security;
-+ ns = cxt->sys.profile->ns;
-+ onexec = cxt->sys.onexec;
-+ prev = cxt->sys.previous;
-+
-+ /* task must be either querying itself, unconfined or can ptrace */
-+ if (current != task && profile && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) {
-+ error = -EPERM;
-+ } else {
-+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_getprocattr(ns, profile, value);
-+ } else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0) {
-+ if (prev)
-+ error = aa_getprocattr(ns, prev, value);
-+ } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
-+ if (onexec)
-+ error = aa_getprocattr(ns, onexec, value);
-+ } else {
-+ error = -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
-+ void *value, size_t size)
-+{
-+ char *command, *args;
-+ int error;
-+
-+ if (size == 0 || size >= PAGE_SIZE)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ /* task can only write its own attributes */
-+ if (current != task)
-+ return -EACCES;
-+
-+ args = value;
-+ args[size] = '\0';
-+ args = strstrip(args);
-+ command = strsep(&args, " ");
-+ if (!args)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ while (isspace(*args))
-+ args++;
-+ if (!*args)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
-+ if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, !AA_DO_TEST);
-+ } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, AA_DO_TEST);
-+ } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, 0,
-+ !AA_DO_TEST);
-+ } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, 0,
-+ AA_DO_TEST);
-+ } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
-+ } else {
-+ struct aa_audit sa;
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.operation = "setprocattr";
-+ sa.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.info = name;
-+ sa.error = -EINVAL;
-+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, &sa, NULL);
-+ }
-+ } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
-+ error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(strstrip(args), 1,
-+ !AA_DO_TEST);
-+ } else {
-+ /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+ if (!error)
-+ error = size;
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource,
-+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile_wupd();
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (profile) {
-+ error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim);
-+ }
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_NETWORK
-+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern){
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ if (kern)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ profile = aa_current_profile();
-+ if (profile)
-+ error = aa_net_perm(profile, "socket_create", family,
-+ type, protocol);
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
-+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ if (kern)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_post_create");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
-+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_bind");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
-+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_connect");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_listen");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_accept");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_sendmsg");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
-+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_recvmsg");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getsockname");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getpeername");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+ int optname)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_getsockopt");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
-+ int optname)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_setsockopt");
-+}
-+
-+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-+{
-+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-+
-+ return aa_revalidate_sk(sk, "socket_shutdown");
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
-+ .name = "apparmor",
-+
-+ .ptrace_may_access = apparmor_ptrace_may_access,
-+ .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
-+ .capget = apparmor_capget,
-+ .sysctl = apparmor_sysctl,
-+ .capable = apparmor_capable,
-+/*
-+ .inode_create = apparmor_inode_create,
-+ .inode_setattr = apparmor_inode_setattr,
-+ .inode_setxattr = apparmor_inode_setxattr,
-+ .inode_getxattr = apparmor_inode_getxattr,
-+ .inode_listxattr = apparmor_inode_listxattr,
-+ .inode_removexattr = apparmor_inode_removexattr,
-+ .inode_permission = ??? use to mediate owner access to non-mediated fs
-+*/
-+
-+ .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
-+ .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
-+ .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
-+ .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
-+ .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
-+ .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
-+ .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
-+ .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
-+ .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open,
-+
-+ .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
-+ .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
-+ .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
-+ .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
-+ .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
-+ .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
-+
-+/* .file_fcntl = apparmor_file_fcntl, */
-+
-+ .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
-+ .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
-+
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_NETWORK
-+ .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create,
-+ .socket_post_create = apparmor_socket_post_create,
-+ .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind,
-+ .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect,
-+ .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen,
-+ .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept,
-+ .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
-+ .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
-+ .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname,
-+ .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername,
-+ .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
-+ .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
-+ .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown,
-+#endif
-+
-+ .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
-+ .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
-+
-+ .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
-+ // .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
-+ .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
-+ .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-+
-+ .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
-+};
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
-+ */
-+
-+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
-+
-+/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
-+ * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
-+ */
-+
-+/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
-+enum profile_mode g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
-+module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
-+ &g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Debug mode */
-+int g_apparmor_debug;
-+module_param_named(debug, g_apparmor_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Audit mode */
-+enum audit_mode g_apparmor_audit;
-+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
-+ &g_apparmor_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
-+ * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
-+ */
-+int g_apparmor_audit_header;
-+module_param_named(audit_header, g_apparmor_audit_header, aabool,
-+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* lock out loading/removal of policy
-+ * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
-+ * load policy, if lock_policy is set
-+ */
-+int g_apparmor_lock_policy;
-+module_param_named(lock_policy, g_apparmor_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
-+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Syscall logging mode */
-+int g_apparmor_logsyscall;
-+module_param_named(logsyscall, g_apparmor_logsyscall, aabool,
-+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
-+unsigned int g_apparmor_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
-+module_param_named(path_max, g_apparmor_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
-+
-+/* Boot time disable flag */
-+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DISABLE
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0600
-+#else
-+#define AA_ENABLED_PERMS 0400
-+#endif
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
-+static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-+module_param_call(enabled, param_set_aa_enabled, param_get_aauint,
-+ &apparmor_enabled, AA_ENABLED_PERMS);
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
-+{
-+ apparmor_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
-+
-+static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ if (g_apparmor_lock_policy)
-+ return -EACCES;
-+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ return param_set_bool(val, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ return param_set_uint(val, kp);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+ return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
-+}
-+
-+/* allow run time disabling of apparmor */
-+static int param_set_aa_enabled(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ unsigned long l;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_initialized) {
-+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (!val)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (strict_strtoul(val, 0, &l) || l != 0)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+ apparmor_disable();
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[g_apparmor_audit]);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (!val)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
-+ if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
-+ g_apparmor_audit = i;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[g_profile_mode]);
-+}
-+
-+static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+ if (__aa_task_is_confined(current))
-+ return -EPERM;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if (!val)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
-+ if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
-+ g_profile_mode = i;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor init functions
-+ */
-+
-+static int set_init_cxt(void)
-+{
-+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
-+ struct aa_task_context *cxt;
-+
-+ cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!cxt)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ cxt->sys.profile = aa_get_profile(default_namespace->unconfined);
-+ cred->security = cxt;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int __init apparmor_init(void)
-+{
-+ int error;
-+
-+ if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
-+ info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter\n");
-+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Activated with fs_initcall
-+ error = create_apparmorfs();
-+ if (error) {
-+ AA_ERROR("Unable to activate AppArmor filesystem\n");
-+ goto createfs_out;
-+ }
-+ */
-+
-+ error = alloc_default_namespace();
-+ if (error) {
-+ AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
-+ goto alloc_out;
-+ }
-+
-+ error = set_init_cxt();
-+ if (error) {
-+ AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
-+ goto alloc_out;
-+ }
-+
-+ error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
-+ if (error) {
-+ AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-+ goto register_security_out;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
-+ apparmor_initialized = 1;
-+ if (g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
-+ info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
-+ else if (g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
-+ info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
-+ else
-+ info_message("AppArmor initialized");
-+
-+ return error;
-+
-+register_security_out:
-+ free_default_namespace();
-+
-+alloc_out:
-+ destroy_apparmorfs();
-+
-+/*createfs_out:*/
-+ apparmor_enabled = 0;
-+ return error;
-+
-+}
-+
-+security_initcall(apparmor_init);
-+
-+void apparmor_disable(void)
-+{
-+ /* Remove and release all the profiles on the profile list. */
-+ aa_profile_ns_list_release();
-+
-+ /* FIXME: cleanup profiles references on files */
-+ free_default_namespace();
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Delay for an rcu cycle to make sure that all active task
-+ * context readers have finished, and all profiles have been
-+ * freed by their rcu callbacks.
-+ */
-+ synchronize_rcu();
-+ destroy_apparmorfs();
-+ apparmor_initialized = 0;
-+
-+ info_message("AppArmor protection disabled");
-+}
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/Makefile linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/Makefile
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/Makefile 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/Makefile 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
-+# Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module
-+#
-+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
-+
-+apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
-+ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_interface.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-+ resource.o sid.o file.o
-+
-+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_NETWORK) += net.o
-+
-+clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
-+
-+quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@
-+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
-+
-+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
-+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+AF_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
-+
-+$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
-+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/af_names.h
-+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
-+ $(call cmd,make-caps)
-+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
-+ $(call cmd,make-af)
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/match.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/match.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/match.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/match.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/kernel.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/errno.h>
-+
-+/* TODO: remove !!!! */
-+// #include <linux/fs.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+
-+static struct table_header *unpack_table(void *blob, size_t bsize)
-+{
-+ struct table_header *table = NULL;
-+ struct table_header th;
-+ size_t tsize;
-+
-+ if (bsize < sizeof(struct table_header))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob));
-+ th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
-+ th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
-+ blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
-+
-+ if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 ||
-+ th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags);
-+ if (bsize < tsize)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ table = kmalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (table) {
-+ *table = th;
-+ if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
-+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
-+ u8, byte_to_byte);
-+ else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16)
-+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
-+ u16, be16_to_cpu);
-+ else
-+ UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
-+ u32, be32_to_cpu);
-+ }
-+
-+out:
-+ return table;
-+}
-+
-+int unpack_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, void *blob, size_t size)
-+{
-+ int hsize, i;
-+ int error = -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ /* get dfa table set header */
-+ if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ if (ntohl(*(u32 *)blob) != YYTH_MAGIC)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ hsize = ntohl(*(u32 *)(blob + 4));
-+ if (size < hsize)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ blob += hsize;
-+ size -= hsize;
-+
-+ error = -EPROTO;
-+ while (size > 0) {
-+ struct table_header *table;
-+ table = unpack_table(blob, size);
-+ if (!table)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ switch (table->td_id) {
-+ case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT:
-+ case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2:
-+ case YYTD_ID_BASE:
-+ dfa->tables[table->td_id - 1] = table;
-+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32)
-+ goto fail;
-+ break;
-+ case YYTD_ID_DEF:
-+ case YYTD_ID_NXT:
-+ case YYTD_ID_CHK:
-+ dfa->tables[table->td_id - 1] = table;
-+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA16)
-+ goto fail;
-+ break;
-+ case YYTD_ID_EC:
-+ dfa->tables[table->td_id - 1] = table;
-+ if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA8)
-+ goto fail;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ kfree(table);
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ blob += table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
-+ size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags);
-+ }
-+
-+ return 0;
-+
-+fail:
-+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++) {
-+ kfree(dfa->tables[i]);
-+ dfa->tables[i] = NULL;
-+ }
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * verify_dfa - verify that all the transitions and states in the dfa tables
-+ * are in bounds.
-+ * @dfa: dfa to test
-+ *
-+ * assumes dfa has gone through the verification done by unpacking
-+ */
-+int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
-+{
-+ size_t i, state_count, trans_count;
-+ int error = -EPROTO;
-+
-+ /* check that required tables exist */
-+ if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK - 1]))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* accept.size == default.size == base.size */
-+ state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE - 1]->td_lolen;
-+ if (!(state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF - 1]->td_lolen &&
-+ state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT - 1]->td_lolen &&
-+ state_count == dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 - 1]->td_lolen))
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* next.size == chk.size */
-+ trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT - 1]->td_lolen;
-+ if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK - 1]->td_lolen)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ /* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */
-+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1] &&
-+ dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]->td_lolen != 256)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-+ if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-+ goto out;
-+ if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= trans_count + 256)
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < trans_count ; i++) {
-+ if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-+ goto out;
-+ if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* verify accept permissions */
-+ for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
-+ int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i];
-+
-+ if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK)
-+ goto out;
-+ if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK)
-+ goto out;
-+
-+ }
-+
-+ error = 0;
-+out:
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_dfa *aa_match_alloc(void)
-+{
-+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_dfa), GFP_KERNEL);
-+}
-+
-+void aa_match_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
-+{
-+ if (dfa) {
-+ int i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++)
-+ kfree(dfa->tables[i]);
-+ }
-+ kfree(dfa);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa
-+ * @len: length of the string of bytes to match
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
-+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
-+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
-+ *
-+ * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes
-+ * when @len input is consumed.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *str, int len)
-+{
-+ u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
-+ u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
-+ u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
-+ u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
-+ unsigned int state = start, pos;
-+
-+ if (state == 0)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
-+ if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC - 1]) {
-+ u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
-+ for (; len; len--) {
-+ pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8)*str++];
-+ if (check[pos] == state)
-+ state = next[pos];
-+ else
-+ state = def[state];
-+ }
-+ } else {
-+ for (; len; len--) {
-+ pos = base[state] + (u8)*str++;
-+ if (check[pos] == state)
-+ state = next[pos];
-+ else
-+ state = def[state];
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return state;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
-+ * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
-+ * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
-+ const char *str)
-+{
-+ return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str));
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character
-+ * @dfa: the dfa to match against
-+ * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
-+ *
-+ * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null
-+ * character which is not used in standard matching and is only
-+ * used to seperate pairs.
-+ */
-+unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start)
-+{
-+ return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1);
-+}
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/net.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/net.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/net.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/net.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/net.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+#include "af_names.h"
-+
-+static const char *sock_type_names[] = {
-+ "unknown(0)",
-+ "stream",
-+ "dgram",
-+ "raw",
-+ "rdm",
-+ "seqpacket",
-+ "dccp",
-+ "unknown(7)",
-+ "unknown(8)",
-+ "unknown(9)",
-+ "packet",
-+};
-+
-+struct aa_audit_net {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
-+
-+ int family, type, protocol;
-+
-+};
-+
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_net *sa = va;
-+
-+ if (sa->family || sa->type) {
-+ if (address_family_names[sa->family])
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
-+ address_family_names[sa->family]);
-+ else
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-+ sa->family);
-+
-+ if (sock_type_names[sa->type])
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
-+ sock_type_names[sa->type]);
-+ else
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-+ sa->type);
-+
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->protocol);
-+ }
-+
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_audit_net *sa)
-+{
-+ int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
-+
-+ if (likely(!sa->base.error)) {
-+ u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa->family];
-+ if (likely((PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-+ !(1 << sa->type & audit_mask)))
-+ return 0;
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
-+ } else {
-+ u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa->family];
-+ u16 kill_mask = 0;
-+ u16 denied = (1 << sa->type) & ~quiet_mask;
-+
-+ if (denied & kill_mask)
-+ type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-+
-+ if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
-+ PROFILE_AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
-+ return PROFILE_COMPLAIN(profile) ? 0 : sa->base.error;
-+ }
-+
-+ return aa_audit(type, profile, (struct aa_audit *)sa, audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_net_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, char *operation,
-+ int family, int type, int protocol)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_net sa;
-+ u16 family_mask;
-+
-+ if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
-+ if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ family_mask = profile->net.allowed[family];
-+
-+ sa.base.error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = operation;
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.family = family;
-+ sa.type = type;
-+ sa.protocol = protocol;
-+
-+ return aa_audit_net(profile, &sa);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_revalidate_sk(struct sock *sk, char *operation)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct cred *cred;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ /* this is some debugging code to flush out the network hooks that
-+ that are called in interrupt context */
-+ if (in_interrupt()) {
-+ printk(KERN_WARNING "AppArmor Debug: Hook being called from interrupt context\n");
-+ dump_stack();
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ cred = aa_get_task_policy(current, &profile);
-+ if (profile)
-+ error = aa_net_perm(profile, operation,
-+ sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
-+ sk->sk_protocol);
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/path.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/path.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/path.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/path.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor function for pathnames
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
-+#include <linux/mount.h>
-+#include <linux/namei.h>
-+#include <linux/path.h>
-+#include <linux/sched.h>
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/path.h"
-+
-+int aa_get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int is_dir, char *buffer, int size,
-+ char **name)
-+{
-+ int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - is_dir, name);
-+
-+ if (!error && is_dir && (*name)[1] != '\0')
-+ /*
-+ * Append "/" to the pathname. The root directory is a special
-+ * case; it already ends in slash.
-+ */
-+ strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/");
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
-+ * @path: path the file
-+ * @is_dir: set if the file is a directory
-+ * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated
-+ * @name: the error code indicating whether aa_get_name failed
-+ *
-+ * Returns an error code if the there was a failure in obtaining the
-+ * name.
-+ *
-+ * @name is apointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
-+ * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL. If there is an error @name
-+ * may contain a partial or invalid name (in the case of a deleted file), that
-+ * can be used for audit purposes, but it can not be used for mediation.
-+ *
-+ * We need @is_dir to indicate whether the file is a directory or not because
-+ * the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's file type.
-+ */
-+int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int is_dir, char **buffer, char **name)
-+{
-+ char *buf, *str = NULL;
-+ int size = 256;
-+ int error;
-+
-+ *name = NULL;
-+ *buffer = NULL;
-+ for (;;) {
-+ buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!buf)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ error = aa_get_name_to_buffer(path, is_dir, buf, size, &str);
-+ if (!error || (error == -ENOENT) || (error == -ESTALE))
-+ break;
-+
-+ kfree(buf);
-+ size <<= 1;
-+ if (size > g_apparmor_path_max)
-+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-+ }
-+ *buffer = buf;
-+ *name = str;
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, char **name)
-+{
-+ struct path root, tmp, ns_root = { };
-+ char *res;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
-+ root = current->fs->root;
-+ path_get(¤t->fs->root);
-+ read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
-+ spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
-+ if (root.mnt && root.mnt->mnt_ns)
-+ ns_root.mnt = mntget(root.mnt->mnt_ns->root);
-+ if (ns_root.mnt)
-+ ns_root.dentry = dget(ns_root.mnt->mnt_root);
-+ spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
-+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
-+ tmp = ns_root;
-+ res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen);
-+
-+ *name = res;
-+ /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
-+ * be returned */
-+ if (IS_ERR(res)) {
-+ error = PTR_ERR(res);
-+ *name = buf;
-+ } else if (!IS_ROOT(path->dentry) && d_unhashed(path->dentry)) {
-+ error = -ENOENT;
-+#if 0
-+ } else if (tmp.dentry != ns_root.dentry && tmp.mnt != ns_root.mnt) {
-+ /* disconnected path don return pathname starting with '/' */
-+ error = -ESTALE;
-+ if (*res == '/')
-+ *name = res + 1;
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
-+ path_put(&root);
-+ path_put(&ns_root);
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+char *sysctl_pathname(struct ctl_table *table, char *buffer, int buflen)
-+{
-+ if (buflen < 1)
-+ return NULL;
-+ buffer += --buflen;
-+ *buffer = '\0';
-+
-+ while (table) {
-+ int namelen = strlen(table->procname);
-+
-+ if (buflen < namelen + 1)
-+ return NULL;
-+ buflen -= namelen + 1;
-+ buffer -= namelen;
-+ memcpy(buffer, table->procname, namelen);
-+ *--buffer = '/';
-+ table = table->parent;
-+ }
-+ if (buflen < 4)
-+ return NULL;
-+ buffer -= 4;
-+ memcpy(buffer, "/sys", 4);
-+
-+ return buffer;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/policy.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/policy.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/policy.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/policy.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor policy manipulation functions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * AppArmor policy is based around profiles, which contain the rules a
-+ * task is confined by. Every task in the sytem has a profile attached
-+ * to it determined either by matching "unconfined" tasks against the
-+ * visible set of profiles or by following a profiles attachment rules.
-+ *
-+ * Each profile exists in an AppArmor profile namespace which is a
-+ * container of related profiles. Each namespace contains a special
-+ * "unconfined" profile, which doesn't efforce any confinement on
-+ * a task beyond DAC.
-+ *
-+ * Namespace and profile names can be written together in either
-+ * of two syntaxes.
-+ * :namespace:profile - used by kernel interfaces for easy detection
-+ * namespace://profile - used by policy
-+ *
-+ * Profile names name not start with : or @ and may not contain \0
-+ * a // in a profile name indicates a compound name with the name before
-+ * the // being the parent profile and the name after the child
-+ *
-+ * Reserved profile names
-+ * unconfined - special automatically generated unconfined profile
-+ * inherit - special name to indicate profile inheritance
-+ * null-XXXX-YYYY - special automically generated learning profiles
-+ *
-+ * Namespace names may not start with / or @ and may not contain \0 or //
-+ * it is recommend that they do not contain any '/' characters
-+ * Reserved namespace namespace
-+ * default - the default namespace setup by AppArmor
-+ * user-XXXX - user defined profiles
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/slab.h>
-+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-+#include <linux/string.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/capability.h"
-+#include "include/file.h"
-+#include "include/ipc.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/resource.h"
-+#include "include/sid.h"
-+
-+/* list of profile namespaces and lock */
-+LIST_HEAD(ns_list);
-+DEFINE_RWLOCK(ns_list_lock);
-+
-+struct aa_namespace *default_namespace;
-+
-+const char *profile_mode_names[] = {
-+ "enforce",
-+ "complain",
-+ "kill",
-+};
-+
-+#define AA_SYS_SID 0
-+#define AA_USR_SID 1
-+
-+
-+static int common_init(struct aa_policy_common *common, const char *name)
-+{
-+ common->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!common->name)
-+ return 0;
-+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&common->list);
-+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&common->profiles);
-+ kref_init(&common->count);
-+ rwlock_init(&common->lock);
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static void common_free(struct aa_policy_common *common)
-+{
-+ /* still contains profiles -- invalid */
-+ if (!list_empty(&common->profiles)) {
-+ AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, "
-+ "policy '%s' still contains profiles\n",
-+ __func__, common->name);
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+ if (!list_empty(&common->list)) {
-+ AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, policy '%s' still on list\n",
-+ __func__, common->name);
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+
-+ kfree(common->name);
-+}
-+
-+static struct aa_policy_common *__common_find(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *name)
-+
-+{
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+
-+ list_for_each_entry(common, head, list) {
-+ if (!strcmp(common->name, name))
-+ return common;
-+ }
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static struct aa_policy_common *__common_find_strn(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *str, int len)
-+{
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+
-+ list_for_each_entry(common, head, list) {
-+ if (aa_strneq(common->name, str, len))
-+ return common;
-+ }
-+
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Routines for AppArmor namespaces
-+ */
-+
-+int alloc_default_namespace(void)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ ns = alloc_aa_namespace("default");
-+ if (!ns)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ default_namespace = aa_get_namespace(ns);
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ list_add(&ns->base.list, &ns_list);
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void free_default_namespace(void)
-+{
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ list_del_init(&default_namespace->base.list);
-+ aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ aa_put_namespace(default_namespace);
-+ default_namespace = NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * alloc_aa_namespace - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace
-+ * @name: a preallocated name
-+ * Returns NULL on failure.
-+ */
-+struct aa_namespace *alloc_aa_namespace(const char *name)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+
-+ ns = kzalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
-+ AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns);
-+ if (!ns)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ if (!common_init(&ns->base, name))
-+ goto fail_ns;
-+
-+ /* null profile is not added to the profile list */
-+ ns->unconfined = alloc_aa_profile("unconfined");
-+ if (!ns->unconfined)
-+ goto fail_unconfined;
-+
-+ ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
-+ ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
-+ PFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
-+ ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
-+
-+ return ns;
-+
-+fail_unconfined:
-+ if (ns->base.name)
-+ kfree(ns->base.name);
-+fail_ns:
-+ kfree(ns);
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * free_aa_namespace_kref - free aa_namespace by kref (see aa_put_namespace)
-+ * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a namespace
-+ */
-+void free_aa_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref)
-+{
-+ free_aa_namespace(container_of(kref, struct aa_namespace, base.count));
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * free_aa_namespace - free a profile namespace
-+ * @namespace: the namespace to free
-+ *
-+ * Free a namespace. All references to the namespace must have been put.
-+ * If the namespace was referenced by a profile confining a task,
-+ */
-+void free_aa_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+ if (!ns)
-+ return;
-+
-+ common_free(&ns->base);
-+
-+ if (ns->unconfined && ns->unconfined->ns == ns)
-+ ns->unconfined->ns = NULL;
-+
-+ aa_put_profile(ns->unconfined);
-+ memset(ns, 0, sizeof(*ns));
-+ kfree(ns);
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *name)
-+
-+{
-+ return (struct aa_namespace *) __common_find(head, name);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_find_namespace - look up a profile namespace on the namespace list
-+ * @name: name of namespace to find
-+ *
-+ * Returns a pointer to the namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace
-+ * called @name exists.
-+ */
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(const char *name)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
-+
-+ read_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&ns_list, name));
-+ read_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+
-+ return ns;
-+}
-+
-+static struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace_by_strn(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *name,
-+ int len)
-+{
-+ return (struct aa_namespace *) __common_find_strn(head, name, len);
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace_by_strn(const char *name, int len)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
-+
-+ read_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace_by_strn(&ns_list, name, len));
-+ read_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+
-+ return ns;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_prepare_namespace - find an existing or create a new namespace of @name
-+ * @name: the namespace to find or add
-+ */
-+struct aa_namespace *aa_prepare_namespace(const char *name)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ if (name)
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&ns_list, name));
-+ else
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(default_namespace);
-+ if (!ns) {
-+ struct aa_namespace *new_ns;
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ new_ns = alloc_aa_namespace(name);
-+ if (!new_ns)
-+ return NULL;
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ ns = __aa_find_namespace(&ns_list, name);
-+ if (!ns) {
-+ list_add(&new_ns->base.list, &ns_list);
-+ ns = new_ns;
-+ } else {
-+ /* raced so free the new one */
-+ free_aa_namespace(new_ns);
-+ aa_get_namespace(ns);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+
-+ return ns;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * requires profile->ns set first, takes profiles refcount
-+ * TODO: add accounting
-+ */
-+void __aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy_common *common,
-+ struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ list_add(&profile->base.list, &common->profiles);
-+ if (!(profile->flags & PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF))
-+ aa_get_profile(profile);
-+}
-+
-+void __aa_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_profile *replacement)
-+{
-+ if (replacement)
-+ profile->replacedby = aa_get_profile(replacement);
-+ else
-+ profile->replacedby = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-+ list_del_init(&profile->base.list);
-+ if (!(profile->flags & PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF))
-+ aa_put_profile(profile);
-+}
-+
-+/* TODO: add accounting */
-+void __aa_replace_profile(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_profile *replacement)
-+{
-+ if (replacement) {
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+
-+ if (profile->parent)
-+ common = &profile->parent->base;
-+ else
-+ common = &profile->ns->base;
-+
-+ __aa_remove_profile(profile, replacement);
-+ __aa_add_profile(common, replacement);
-+ } else
-+ __aa_remove_profile(profile, NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * __aa_profile_list_release - remove all profiles on the list and put refs
-+ * @head: list of profiles
-+ */
-+void __aa_profile_list_release(struct list_head *head)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *tmp;
-+ list_for_each_entry_safe(profile, tmp, head, base.list) {
-+ __aa_profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles);
-+ __aa_remove_profile(profile, NULL);
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+void __aa_remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *unconfined = ns->unconfined;
-+ list_del_init(&ns->base.list);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * break the ns, unconfined profile cyclic reference and forward
-+ * all new unconfined profiles requests to the default namespace
-+ */
-+ ns->unconfined = aa_get_profile(default_namespace->unconfined);
-+ __aa_profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles);
-+ aa_put_profile(unconfined);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_remove_namespace = Remove namespace from the list
-+ * @ns: namespace to remove
-+ */
-+void aa_remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns)
-+{
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ __aa_remove_namespace(ns);
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_profilelist_release - remove all namespaces and all associated profiles
-+ */
-+void aa_profile_ns_list_release(void)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns, *tmp;
-+
-+ /* Remove and release all the profiles on namespace profile lists. */
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ list_for_each_entry_safe(ns, tmp, &ns_list, base.list) {
-+ write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ __aa_remove_namespace(ns);
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ }
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * alloc_aa_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
-+ * @fqname: name of the profile
-+ *
-+ * Returns NULL on failure.
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *alloc_aa_profile(const char *fqname)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+ profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ if (!common_init(&profile->base, fqname)) {
-+ kfree(profile);
-+ return NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ profile->fqname = profile->base.name;
-+ profile->base.name = (char *) fqname_subname((const char *) profile->fqname);
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
-+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created
-+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
-+ *
-+ * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of
-+ * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid.
-+ *
-+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
-+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
-+ * not in use.
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+ char *name;
-+ u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
-+
-+ name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->fqname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!name)
-+ goto fail;
-+ sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->fqname, sid);
-+
-+ profile = alloc_aa_profile(name);
-+ kfree(name);
-+ if (!profile)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
-+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
-+ profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL | PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF;
-+ if (hat)
-+ profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
-+
-+ profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
-+ profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
-+
-+ write_lock(&profile->ns->base.lock);
-+ __aa_add_profile(&parent->base, profile);
-+ write_unlock(&profile->ns->base.lock);
-+
-+ return profile;
-+
-+fail:
-+ aa_free_sid(sid);
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * free_aa_profile_kref - free aa_profile by kref (called by aa_put_profile)
-+ * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a profile
-+ */
-+void free_aa_profile_kref(struct kref *kref)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *p = container_of(kref, struct aa_profile,
-+ base.count);
-+
-+ free_aa_profile(p);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * free_aa_profile - free a profile
-+ * @profile: the profile to free
-+ *
-+ * Free a profile, its hats and null_profile. All references to the profile,
-+ * its hats and null_profile must have been put.
-+ *
-+ * If the profile was referenced from a task context, free_aa_profile() will
-+ * be called from an rcu callback routine, so we must not sleep here.
-+ */
-+void free_aa_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile);
-+
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * profile can still be on the list if the list doesn't hold a
-+ * reference. There is no race as NULL profiles can't be attached
-+ */
-+ if (!list_empty(&profile->base.list)) {
-+ if ((profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL) && profile->ns) {
-+ write_lock(&profile->ns->base.lock);
-+ list_del_init(&profile->base.list);
-+ write_unlock(&profile->ns->base.lock);
-+ } else {
-+ AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, "
-+ "profile '%s' still on ns list\n",
-+ __func__, profile->base.name);
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* profile->name is a substring of fqname */
-+ profile->base.name = NULL;
-+ common_free(&profile->base);
-+
-+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles));
-+
-+ kfree(profile->fqname);
-+
-+ aa_put_namespace(profile->ns);
-+ aa_put_profile(profile->parent);
-+
-+ aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
-+ aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
-+ aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
-+ aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
-+
-+ aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
-+ aa_match_free(profile->xmatch);
-+
-+ if (profile->replacedby && !PTR_ERR(profile->replacedby))
-+ aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
-+
-+ memset(profile, 0, sizeof(profile));
-+ kfree(profile);
-+}
-+
-+
-+/* TODO: profile count accounting - setup in remove */
-+
-+
-+struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile(struct list_head *head, const char *name)
-+{
-+ return (struct aa_profile *) __common_find(head, name);
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile_by_strn(struct list_head *head,
-+ const char *name, int len)
-+{
-+ return (struct aa_profile *) __common_find_strn(head, name, len);
-+}
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_find_child - find a profile by @name in @parent
-+ * @parent: profile to search
-+ * @name: profile name to search for
-+ *
-+ * Returns a ref counted profile or NULL if not found
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+ read_lock(&parent->ns->base.lock);
-+ profile = aa_get_profile(__aa_find_profile(&parent->base.profiles,
-+ name));
-+ read_unlock(&parent->ns->base.lock);
-+
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+
-+struct aa_policy_common *__aa_find_parent_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *fqname)
-+{
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+ char *split;
-+
-+ common = &ns->base;
-+
-+
-+ for (split = strstr(fqname, "//"); split; ) {
-+ profile = __aa_find_profile_by_strn(&common->profiles, fqname,
-+ split - fqname);
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return NULL;
-+ common = &profile->base;
-+ fqname = split + 2;
-+ split = strstr(fqname, "//");
-+ }
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return &ns->base;
-+ return &profile->base;
-+}
-+
-+struct aa_profile *__aa_find_profile_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *fqname)
-+{
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+ char *split;
-+
-+ common = &ns->base;
-+ for (split = strstr(fqname, "//"); split; ) {
-+ profile = __aa_find_profile_by_strn(&common->profiles, fqname,
-+ split - fqname);
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ common = &profile->base;
-+ fqname = split + 2;
-+ split = strstr(fqname, "//");
-+ }
-+
-+ profile = __aa_find_profile(&common->profiles, fqname);
-+
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_find_profile_by_name - find a profile by its full or partial name
-+ * @ns: the namespace to start from
-+ * @fqname: name to do lookup on. Does not contain namespace prefix
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_find_profile_by_fqname(struct aa_namespace *ns,
-+ const char *fqname)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+ read_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ profile = aa_get_profile(__aa_find_profile_by_fqname(ns, fqname));
-+ read_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/* __aa_attach_match_ - find an attachment match
-+ * @name - to match against
-+ * @head - profile list to walk
-+ *
-+ * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching
-+ * preference where an exact match is prefered over a name which uses
-+ * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest
-+ * xmatch_len are prefered.
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *__aa_attach_match(const char *name,
-+ struct list_head *head)
-+{
-+ int len = 0;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL;
-+
-+ list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) {
-+ if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL)
-+ continue;
-+ if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) {
-+ unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch,
-+ DFA_START, name);
-+ u16 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
-+ /* any accepting state means a valid match. */
-+ if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
-+ candidate = profile;
-+ len = profile->xmatch_len;
-+ }
-+ } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name))
-+ /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */
-+ return profile;
-+ }
-+
-+ return candidate;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_sys_find_attach - do attachment search for sys unconfined processes
-+ * @base: the base to search
-+ * name: the executable name to match against
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_sys_find_attach(struct aa_policy_common *base,
-+ const char *name)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+
-+ read_lock(&base->lock);
-+ profile = aa_get_profile(__aa_attach_match(name, &base->profiles));
-+ read_unlock(&base->lock);
-+
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_profile_newest - find the newest version of @profile
-+ * @profile: the profile to check for newer versions of
-+ *
-+ * Find the newest version of @profile, if @profile is the newest version
-+ * return @profile. If @profile has been removed return NULL.
-+ *
-+ * NOTE: the profile returned is not refcounted, The refcount on @profile
-+ * must be held until the caller decides what to do with the returned newest
-+ * version.
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_profile_newest(struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ if (unlikely(profile && profile->replacedby)) {
-+ for (;profile->replacedby; profile = profile->replacedby) {
-+ if (IS_ERR(profile->replacedby)) {
-+ /* profile has been removed */
-+ profile = NULL;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return profile;
-+}
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/policy_interface.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/policy_interface.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/policy_interface.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/policy_interface.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,852 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded from
-+ * userspace.
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ *
-+ * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy.
-+ * The policy format is documented in Documentation/???
-+ * All policy is validated all before it is used.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-+#include <linux/errno.h>
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/context.h"
-+#include "include/match.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/policy_interface.h"
-+#include "include/sid.h"
-+
-+/* FIXME: convert profiles to internal hieracy, accounting
-+ * FIXME: have replacement routines set replaced_by profile instead of error
-+ * FIXME: name mapping to hierarchy
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
-+ * actual data. The interface has the notion of a a named entry
-+ * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by
-+ * the entries typecode and data. Named types allow for optional
-+ * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking
-+ * backwards compatability.
-+ */
-+
-+enum aa_code {
-+ AA_U8,
-+ AA_U16,
-+ AA_U32,
-+ AA_U64,
-+ AA_NAME, /* same as string except it is items name */
-+ AA_STRING,
-+ AA_BLOB,
-+ AA_STRUCT,
-+ AA_STRUCTEND,
-+ AA_LIST,
-+ AA_LISTEND,
-+ AA_ARRAY,
-+ AA_ARRAYEND,
-+};
-+
-+/*
-+ * aa_ext is the read of the buffer containing the serialized profile. The
-+ * data is copied into a kernel buffer in apparmorfs and then handed off to
-+ * the unpack routines.
-+ */
-+struct aa_ext {
-+ void *start;
-+ void *end;
-+ void *pos; /* pointer to current position in the buffer */
-+ u32 version;
-+ char *ns_name;
-+};
-+
-+
-+struct aa_audit_iface {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
-+
-+ const char *name;
-+ const char *name2;
-+ const struct aa_ext *e;
-+};
-+
-+static void aa_audit_init(struct aa_audit_iface *sa, const char *operation,
-+ struct aa_ext *e)
-+{
-+ memset(sa, 0, sizeof(*sa));
-+ sa->base.operation = operation;
-+ sa->base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa->e = e;
-+}
-+
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_iface *sa = va;
-+
-+ if (sa->name)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s", sa->name);
-+ if (sa->name2)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " namespace=%s", sa->name2);
-+ if (sa->base.error && sa->e) {
-+ long len = sa->e->pos - sa->e->start;
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", len);
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_audit_iface(struct aa_audit_iface *sa)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct cred *cred = aa_get_task_policy(current, &profile);
-+ int error = aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, &sa->base,
-+ audit_cb);
-+ put_cred(cred);
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size)
-+{
-+ return (size <= e->end - e->pos);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk
-+ * @e: serialized data read head
-+ * @chunk: start address for chunk of data
-+ *
-+ * return the size of chunk found with the read head at the end of
-+ * the chunk.
-+ */
-+static size_t aa_is_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ size_t size = 0;
-+
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, size))
-+ goto fail;
-+ *chunk = e->pos;
-+ e->pos += size;
-+ return size;
-+
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code)
-+{
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, 1))
-+ return 0;
-+ if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code)
-+ return 0;
-+ e->pos++;
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_is_nameX - check is the next element is of type X with a name of @name
-+ * @e: serialized data extent information
-+ * @code: type code
-+ * @name: name to match to the serialized element.
-+ *
-+ * check that the next serialized data element is of type X and has a tag
-+ * name @name. If @name is specified then there must be a matching
-+ * name element in the stream. If @name is NULL any name element will be
-+ * skipped and only the typecode will be tested.
-+ * returns 1 on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read
-+ * head is advanced past the headers
-+ * returns %0 if either match failes, the read head does not move
-+ */
-+static int aa_is_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ /*
-+ * Check for presence of a tagname, and if present name size
-+ * AA_NAME tag value is a u16.
-+ */
-+ if (aa_is_X(e, AA_NAME)) {
-+ char *tag = NULL;
-+ size_t size = aa_is_u16_chunk(e, &tag);
-+ /* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */
-+ if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ } else if (name) {
-+ /* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* now check if type code matches */
-+ if (aa_is_X(e, code))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (data)
-+ *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (data)
-+ *data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u32);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) {
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u64)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (data)
-+ *data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u64 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u64);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static size_t aa_is_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAY, name)) {
-+ int size;
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ size = (int) le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
-+ return size;
-+ }
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static size_t aa_is_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_BLOB, name)) {
-+ u32 size;
-+ if (!aa_inbounds(e, sizeof(u32)))
-+ goto fail;
-+ size = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *)e->pos));
-+ e->pos += sizeof(u32);
-+ if (aa_inbounds(e, (size_t) size)) {
-+ *blob = e->pos;
-+ e->pos += size;
-+ return size;
-+ }
-+ }
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_string(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
-+{
-+ char *src_str;
-+ size_t size = 0;
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ *string = NULL;
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRING, name) &&
-+ (size = aa_is_u16_chunk(e, &src_str))) {
-+ /* strings are null terminated, length is size - 1 */
-+ if (src_str[size - 1] != 0)
-+ goto fail;
-+ *string = src_str;
-+ }
-+
-+ return size;
-+
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_is_dynstring(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
-+{
-+ char *tmp;
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+ int res = aa_is_string(e, &tmp, name);
-+ *string = NULL;
-+
-+ if (!res)
-+ return res;
-+
-+ *string = kstrdup(tmp, GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!*string) {
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return res;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa
-+ * @e: serialized data extent information
-+ *
-+ * returns dfa or ERR_PTR
-+ */
-+static struct aa_dfa *aa_unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e)
-+{
-+ char *blob = NULL;
-+ size_t size, error = 0;
-+ struct aa_dfa *dfa = NULL;
-+
-+ size = aa_is_blob(e, &blob, "aadfa");
-+ if (size) {
-+ dfa = aa_match_alloc();
-+ if (dfa) {
-+ /*
-+ * The dfa is aligned with in the blob to 8 bytes
-+ * from the beginning of the stream.
-+ */
-+ size_t sz = blob - (char *) e->start;
-+ size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz;
-+ error = unpack_dfa(dfa, blob + pad, size - pad);
-+ if (!error)
-+ error = verify_dfa(dfa);
-+ } else {
-+ error = -ENOMEM;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (error) {
-+ aa_match_free(dfa);
-+ dfa = ERR_PTR(error);
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ return dfa;
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+
-+ /* exec table is optional */
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) {
-+ int i, size;
-+
-+ size = aa_is_array(e, NULL);
-+ /* currently 4 exec bits and entries 0-3 are reserved iupcx */
-+ if (size > 16 - 4)
-+ goto fail;
-+ profile->file.trans.table = kzalloc(sizeof(char *) * size,
-+ GFP_KERNEL);
-+ if (!profile->file.trans.table)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+ char *tmp;
-+ if (!aa_is_dynstring(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ /* note: strings beginning with a : have an embedded
-+ \0 seperating the profile ns name from the profile
-+ name */
-+ profile->file.trans.table[i] = tmp;
-+ }
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ profile->file.trans.size = size;
-+ }
-+ return 1;
-+
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ void *pos = e->pos;
-+
-+ /* rlimits are optional */
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) {
-+ int i, size;
-+ u32 tmp = 0;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ profile->rlimits.mask = tmp;
-+
-+ size = aa_is_array(e, NULL);
-+ if (size > RLIM_NLIMITS)
-+ goto fail;
-+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+ u64 tmp = 0;
-+ if (!aa_is_u64(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ profile->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max = tmp;
-+ }
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ return 1;
-+
-+fail:
-+ e->pos = pos;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile
-+ * @e: serialized data extent information
-+ * @sa: audit struct for the operation
-+ */
-+static struct aa_profile *aa_unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e,
-+ struct aa_audit_iface *sa)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-+ char *name;
-+ size_t size = 0;
-+ int i, error = -EPROTO;
-+ u32 tmp;
-+
-+ /* check that we have the right struct being passed */
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "profile"))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_string(e, &name, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ profile = alloc_aa_profile(name);
-+ if (!profile)
-+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-+
-+ /* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */
-+ profile->xmatch = aa_unpack_dfa(e);
-+ if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) {
-+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch);
-+ profile->xmatch = NULL;
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ /* xmatch_len is not optional is xmatch is set */
-+ if (profile->xmatch && !aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ profile->xmatch_len = tmp;
-+
-+ /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags"))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (tmp)
-+ profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (tmp)
-+ profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &tmp, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (tmp)
-+ profile->audit = AUDIT_ALL;
-+
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allowed.cap[0]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.set.cap[0]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ if (aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) {
-+ /* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allowed.cap[1]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &(profile->caps.set.cap[1]), NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!aa_unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ size = aa_is_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
-+ if (size) {
-+ if (size > AF_MAX)
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+ if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->net.allowed[i], NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ if (!aa_is_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+ /* allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
-+ * by IPC
-+ */
-+ }
-+ profile->net.allowed[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
-+ profile->net.allowed[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
-+
-+ /* get file rules */
-+ profile->file.dfa = aa_unpack_dfa(e);
-+ if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
-+ error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa);
-+ profile->file.dfa = NULL;
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!aa_unpack_trans_table(e, profile))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ if (!aa_is_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
-+ goto fail;
-+
-+ return profile;
-+
-+fail:
-+ sa->name = profile && profile->base.name ? profile->base.name :
-+ "unknown";
-+ if (!sa->base.info)
-+ sa->base.info = "failed to unpack profile";
-+ aa_audit_iface(sa);
-+
-+ free_aa_profile(profile);
-+
-+ return ERR_PTR(error);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_verify_head - unpack serialized stream header
-+ * @e: serialized data read head
-+ * @operation: operation header is being verified for
-+ *
-+ * returns error or 0 if header is good
-+ */
-+static int aa_verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_audit_iface *sa)
-+{
-+ /* get the interface version */
-+ if (!aa_is_u32(e, &e->version, "version")) {
-+ sa->base.info = "invalid profile format";
-+ aa_audit_iface(sa);
-+ return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* check that the interface version is currently supported */
-+ if (e->version != 5) {
-+ sa->base.info = "unsupported interface version";
-+ aa_audit_iface(sa);
-+ return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* read the namespace if present */
-+ if (!aa_is_string(e, &e->ns_name, "namespace"))
-+ e->ns_name = NULL;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_interface_add_profiles - Unpack and add new profile(s) to the profile list
-+ * @data: serialized data stream
-+ * @size: size of the serialized data stream
-+ */
-+ssize_t aa_interface_add_profiles(void *data, size_t size)
-+{
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+ struct aa_ext e = {
-+ .start = data,
-+ .end = data + size,
-+ .pos = data,
-+ .ns_name = NULL
-+ };
-+ ssize_t error;
-+ struct aa_audit_iface sa;
-+ aa_audit_init(&sa, "profile_load", &e);
-+
-+ error = aa_verify_header(&e, &sa);
-+ if (error)
-+ return error;
-+
-+ profile = aa_unpack_profile(&e, &sa);
-+ if (IS_ERR(profile))
-+ return PTR_ERR(profile);
-+
-+ sa.name2 = e.ns_name;
-+ ns = aa_prepare_namespace(e.ns_name);
-+ if (IS_ERR(ns)) {
-+ sa.base.info = "failed to prepare namespace";
-+ sa.base.error = PTR_ERR(ns);
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ /* profiles are currently loaded flat with fqnames */
-+ sa.name = profile->fqname;
-+
-+ write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+
-+ common = __aa_find_parent_by_fqname(ns, sa.name);
-+ if (!common) {
-+ sa.base.info = "parent does not exist";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
-+ goto fail2;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (common != &ns->base)
-+ profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) common);
-+
-+ if (__aa_find_profile(&common->profiles, profile->base.name)) {
-+ /* A profile with this name exists already. */
-+ sa.base.info = "profile already exists";
-+ sa.base.error = -EEXIST;
-+ goto fail2;
-+ }
-+ profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
-+ profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
-+
-+ __aa_add_profile(common, profile);
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+
-+ aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ kfree(e.ns_name);
-+ return size;
-+
-+fail2:
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+
-+fail:
-+ error = aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ aa_put_profile(profile);
-+ kfree(e.ns_name);
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_interface_replace_profiles - replace profile(s) on the profile list
-+ * @udata: serialized data stream
-+ * @size: size of the serialized data stream
-+ *
-+ * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile
-+ * by any aa_task_context. If the profile does not exist on the profile list
-+ * it is added. Return %0 or error.
-+ */
-+ssize_t aa_interface_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size)
-+{
-+ struct aa_policy_common *common;
-+ struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL, *new_profile;
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ struct aa_ext e = {
-+ .start = udata,
-+ .end = udata + size,
-+ .pos = udata,
-+ .ns_name = NULL
-+ };
-+ ssize_t error;
-+ struct aa_audit_iface sa;
-+ aa_audit_init(&sa, "profile_replace", &e);
-+
-+ if (g_apparmor_lock_policy)
-+ return -EACCES;
-+
-+ error = aa_verify_header(&e, &sa);
-+ if (error)
-+ return error;
-+
-+ new_profile = aa_unpack_profile(&e, &sa);
-+ if (IS_ERR(new_profile))
-+ return PTR_ERR(new_profile);
-+
-+ sa.name2 = e.ns_name;
-+ ns = aa_prepare_namespace(e.ns_name);
-+ if (!ns) {
-+ sa.base.info = "failed to prepare namespace";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOMEM;
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+
-+ sa.name = new_profile->fqname;
-+
-+ write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ common = __aa_find_parent_by_fqname(ns, sa.name);
-+
-+ if (!common) {
-+ sa.base.info = "parent does not exist";
-+ sa.base.error = -ENOENT;
-+ goto fail2;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (common != &ns->base)
-+ new_profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *)
-+ common);
-+
-+ old_profile = __aa_find_profile(&common->profiles,
-+ new_profile->base.name);
-+ aa_get_profile(old_profile);
-+ if (old_profile && old_profile->flags & PFLAG_IMMUTABLE) {
-+ sa.base.info = "cannot replace immutible profile";
-+ sa.base.error = -EPERM;
-+ goto fail2;
-+ } else if (old_profile) {
-+ // __aa_profile_list_release(&old_profile->base.profiles);
-+ /* TODO: remove for new interface
-+ * move children profiles over to the new profile so
-+ * that replacement behaves correctly
-+ */
-+ // list_replace_init(&old_profile->base.profiles,
-+ // &new_profile->base.profiles);
-+ struct aa_profile *profile, *tmp;
-+ list_for_each_entry_safe(profile, tmp, &old_profile->base.profiles,
-+ base.list) {
-+ aa_put_profile(profile->parent);
-+ list_del(&profile->base.list);
-+ profile->parent = aa_get_profile(new_profile);
-+ list_add(&profile->base.list,
-+ &new_profile->base.profiles);
-+ }
-+ __aa_replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile);
-+ new_profile->sid = old_profile->sid;
-+ } else {
-+ __aa_add_profile(common, new_profile);
-+ new_profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(AA_ALLOC_SYS_SID);
-+ }
-+
-+ new_profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
-+
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+
-+ if (!old_profile)
-+ sa.base.operation = "profile_load";
-+
-+ aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ aa_put_profile(old_profile);
-+ kfree(e.ns_name);
-+ return size;
-+
-+fail2:
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+fail:
-+ error = aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ aa_put_profile(old_profile);
-+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
-+ kfree(e.ns_name);
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_interface_remove_profiles - remove profile(s) from the system
-+ * @name: name of the profile to remove
-+ * @size: size of the name
-+ *
-+ * remove a profile from the profile list and all aa_task_context references
-+ * to said profile.
-+ * NOTE: removing confinement does not restore rlimits to preconfinemnet values
-+ */
-+ssize_t aa_interface_remove_profiles(char *name, size_t size)
-+{
-+ struct aa_namespace *ns;
-+ struct aa_profile *profile;
-+ struct aa_audit_iface sa;
-+ aa_audit_init(&sa, "profile_remove", NULL);
-+
-+ if (g_apparmor_lock_policy)
-+ return -EACCES;
-+
-+ write_lock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ if (name[0] == ':') {
-+ char *ns_name;
-+ name = aa_split_name_from_ns(name, &ns_name);
-+ ns = __aa_find_namespace(&ns_list, ns_name);
-+ } else {
-+ ns = aa_get_namespace(default_namespace);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!ns) {
-+ sa.base.info = "failed: namespace does not exist";
-+ goto fail_ns_list_lock;
-+ }
-+
-+ sa.name2 = ns->base.name;
-+ write_lock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ if (!name) {
-+ /* remove namespace */
-+ // __aa_remove_namespace(ns);
-+ } else {
-+ /* remove profile */
-+ profile = __aa_find_profile_by_fqname(ns, name);
-+ if (!profile) {
-+ sa.name = name;
-+ sa.base.info = "failed: profile does not exist";
-+ goto fail_ns_lock;
-+ }
-+ sa.name = profile->fqname;
-+ __aa_profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles);
-+ __aa_remove_profile(profile, profile->ns->unconfined);
-+ }
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+
-+ aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ aa_put_namespace(ns);
-+ return size;
-+
-+fail_ns_lock:
-+ write_unlock(&ns->base.lock);
-+
-+fail_ns_list_lock:
-+ write_unlock(&ns_list_lock);
-+ aa_audit_iface(&sa);
-+ return -ENOENT;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/procattr.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/procattr.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/procattr.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/procattr.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface functions
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "include/apparmor.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+#include "include/domain.h"
-+
-+/* FIXME show profile multiplexing */
-+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ char **string)
-+{
-+ char *str;
-+ int len = 0;
-+
-+ if (profile) {
-+ int mode_len, name_len, ns_len = 0;
-+ const char *mode_str = profile_mode_names[profile->mode];
-+ char *s;
-+
-+ mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3; /* _(mode_str)\n */
-+ name_len = strlen(profile->fqname);
-+ if (ns != default_namespace)
-+ ns_len = strlen(ns->base.name) + 3;
-+ len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1;
-+ s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
-+ if (!str)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ if (ns_len) {
-+ sprintf(s, "%s://", ns->base.name);
-+ s += ns_len;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(s, profile->fqname, name_len);
-+ s += name_len;
-+ sprintf(s, " (%s)\n", mode_str);
-+ } else {
-+ const char *unconfined_str = "unconfined\n";
-+
-+ len = strlen(unconfined_str);
-+ if (ns != default_namespace)
-+ len += strlen(ns->base.name) + 1;
-+
-+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
-+ if (!str)
-+ return -ENOMEM;
-+
-+ if (ns != default_namespace)
-+ sprintf(str, "%s://%s", ns->base.name, unconfined_str);
-+ else
-+ memcpy(str, unconfined_str, len);
-+ }
-+ *string = str;
-+
-+ return len;
-+}
-+
-+static char *split_token_from_name(const char *op, char *args, u64 *token)
-+{
-+ char *name;
-+
-+ *token = simple_strtoull(args, &name, 16);
-+ if ((name == args) || *name != '^') {
-+ AA_ERROR("%s: Invalid input '%s'", op, args);
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-+ }
-+
-+ name++; /* skip ^ */
-+ if (!*name)
-+ name = NULL;
-+ return name;
-+}
-+
-+int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, int test)
-+{
-+ char *hat;
-+ u64 token;
-+
-+ hat = split_token_from_name("change_hat", args, &token);
-+ if (IS_ERR(hat))
-+ return PTR_ERR(hat);
-+
-+ if (!hat && !token) {
-+ AA_ERROR("change_hat: Invalid input, NULL hat and NULL magic");
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+ }
-+
-+ AA_DEBUG("%s: Magic 0x%llx Hat '%s'\n",
-+ __func__, token, hat ? hat : NULL);
-+
-+ return aa_change_hat(hat, token, test);
-+}
-+
-+int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *args, int onexec, int test)
-+{
-+ char *name, *ns_name;
-+
-+ name = aa_split_name_from_ns(args, &ns_name);
-+ return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
-+}
-+
-+
-+int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *args)
-+{
-+ /* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
-+ return -ENOTSUPP;
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/resource.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/resource.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/resource.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/resource.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment
-+ *
-+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/audit.h>
-+
-+#include "include/audit.h"
-+#include "include/resource.h"
-+#include "include/policy.h"
-+
-+struct aa_audit_resource {
-+ struct aa_audit base;
-+
-+ int rlimit;
-+};
-+
-+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_resource *sa = va;
-+
-+ if (sa->rlimit)
-+ audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%d", sa->rlimit - 1);
-+}
-+
-+static int aa_audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile,
-+ struct aa_audit_resource *sa)
-+{
-+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, (struct aa_audit *)sa,
-+ audit_cb);
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit
-+ * @profile - profile confining the task
-+ * @resource - the resource being set
-+ * @new_rlim - the new resource limit
-+ *
-+ * Control raising the processes hard limit.
-+ */
-+int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource,
-+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-+{
-+ struct aa_audit_resource sa;
-+ int error = 0;
-+
-+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-+ sa.base.operation = "setrlimit";
-+ sa.base.gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
-+ sa.rlimit = resource + 1;
-+
-+ if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
-+ new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) {
-+ sa.base.error = -EACCES;
-+
-+ error = aa_audit_resource(profile, &sa);
-+ }
-+
-+ return error;
-+}
-+
-+void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
-+{
-+ unsigned int mask = 0;
-+ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
-+ int i;
-+
-+ /* for any rlimits the profile controlled reset the soft limit
-+ * to the less of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit
-+ */
-+ if (old && old->rlimits.mask) {
-+ for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<=1) {
-+ if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) {
-+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
-+ initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
-+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,
-+ initrlim->rlim_cur);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */
-+ if (!(new && new->rlimits.mask))
-+ return;
-+ for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<=1) {
-+ if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask))
-+ continue;
-+
-+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
-+ rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max,
-+ new->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max);
-+ /* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */
-+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max);
-+ }
-+}
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/sid.c linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/sid.c
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/apparmor/sid.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/apparmor/sid.c 2009-09-10 22:18:06.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+/*
-+ * AppArmor security module
-+ *
-+ * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) manipulation fns
-+ *
-+ * Copyright 2009 Canonical Ltd.
-+ *
-+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
-+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
-+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
-+ * License.
-+ *
-+ *
-+ * AppArmor allocates a unique sid for every profile loaded. If a profile
-+ * is replaced it receive the sid of the profile it is replacing. Each sid
-+ * is a u32 with the lower u16 being sids of system profiles and the
-+ * upper u16 being user profile sids.
-+ *
-+ * The sid value of 0 is invalid for system sids and is used to indicate
-+ * unconfined for user sids.
-+ *
-+ * A compound sid is a pair of user and system sids that is used to identify
-+ * both profiles confining a task.
-+ *
-+ * Both system and user sids are globally unique with all users pulling
-+ * from the same sid pool. User sid allocation is limited by the
-+ * user controls, that can limit how many profiles are loaded by a user.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-+#include <linux/errno.h>
-+#include <linux/err.h>
-+
-+#include "include/sid.h"
-+
-+/* global counter from which sids are allocated */
-+static u16 global_sys_sid;
-+static u16 global_usr_sid;
-+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sid_lock);
-+
-+
-+/* TODO FIXME: add sid to profile mapping, and sid recycling */
-+
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_alloc_sid - allocate a new sid for a profile
-+ * @is_usr: true if the new sid is a user based sid
-+ */
-+u32 aa_alloc_sid(int is_usr)
-+{
-+ u32 sid;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * TODO FIXME: sid recycling - part of profile mapping table
-+ */
-+ spin_lock(&sid_lock);
-+ if (is_usr) {
-+ sid = (++global_usr_sid) << 16;
-+
-+ } else {
-+ sid = ++global_sys_sid;
-+ }
-+ spin_unlock(&sid_lock);
-+ return sid;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_free_sid - free a sid
-+ * @sid: sid to free
-+ */
-+void aa_free_sid(u32 sid)
-+{
-+ ; /* NOP ATM */
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_add_sid_profile - associate a profile to a sid for sid -> profile lookup
-+ * @sid: sid of te profile
-+ * @profile: profile to associate
-+ *
-+ * return 0 or error
-+ */
-+int aa_add_sid_profile(u32 sid, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ /* NOP ATM */
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_replace_sid_profile - replace the profile associated with a sid
-+ * @sid: sid to associate a new profile with
-+ * @profile: profile to associate with side
-+ *
-+ * return 0 or error
-+ */
-+int aa_replace_sid_profile(u32 sid, struct aa_profile *profile)
-+{
-+ /* NOP ATM */
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * aa_get_sid_profile - get the profile associated with the sid
-+ * @sid: sid to lookup
-+ *
-+ * returns - the profile, or NULL for unconfined user.
-+ * - if there is an error -ENOENT, -EINVAL
-+ */
-+struct aa_profile *aa_get_sid_profile(u32 sid)
-+{
-+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-+}
-+
-diff -urN linux-2.6.31.org/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.31/security/Kconfig
---- linux-2.6.31.org/security/Kconfig 2009-09-10 00:13:59.000000000 +0200
-+++ linux-2.6.31/security/Kconfig 2009-09-11 08:37:07.888942907 +0200
-@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
- source security/selinux/Kconfig
- source security/smack/Kconfig
- source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
-+source security/apparmor/Kconfig
-
- source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
-
+
+
projects / packages / kernel.git / blobdiff