- up to 4.7.1

[packages/kernel.git] / kernel-apparmor.patch

commit 5ea33f587f5f7324c40c5986286d0f38307923bb
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon Apr 11 16:55:10 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix refcount bug in profile replacement
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 705c287..222052f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1189,12 +1189,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
                                aa_get_profile(newest);
                                aa_put_profile(parent);
                                rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
-                       } else
-                               aa_put_profile(newest);
+                       }
                        /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
                        rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
                                           aa_get_profile(ent->new));
                        __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
+                       aa_put_profile(newest);
                } else {
                        /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
                        rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,

commit f65b1c9b72442e6166332c04f332e4b4d4797887
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon Apr 11 16:57:19 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix replacement bug that adds new child to old parent
    
    When set atomic replacement is used and the parent is updated before the
    child, and the child did not exist in the old parent so there is no
    direct replacement then the new child is incorrectly added to the old
    parent. This results in the new parent not having the child(ren) that
    it should and the old parent when being destroyed asserting the
    following error.
    
    AppArmor: policy_destroy: internal error, policy '<profile/name>' still
    contains profiles
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 222052f..c92a9f6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
                        /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
                        rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
                                           aa_get_profile(ent->new));
-                       __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
+                       __list_add_profile(&newest->base.profiles, ent->new);
                        aa_put_profile(newest);
                } else {
                        /* aafs interface uses replacedby */

commit b6669bef20c9d934bc6498e79fffa220f6226518
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Sun Jun 8 11:20:54 2014 -0700

    apparmor: fix uninitialized lsm_audit member
    
    BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727
    
    The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if
    a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur
    
    BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08
    IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
    PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0
    Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc]
    CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF          O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu
    Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011
    task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000
    RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>]  [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50
    RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68  EFLAGS: 00010006
    RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08
    RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0
    R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f
    R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830
    FS:  00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Stack:
     ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009
     0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c
     0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80
     [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
     [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80
     [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30
     [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190
     [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130
     [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50
     [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530
     [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0
     [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300
     [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20
     [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130
     [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0
     [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0
     [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 89c7865..3a7f1da 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
 
        if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
                (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
-                                   sa->u.tsk ?  sa->u.tsk : current);
+                       sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
+                                   sa->u.tsk : current);
 
        if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
                return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index d186674..4d2af4b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
        int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
        struct common_audit_data sa;
        struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-       sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+       sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
+       sa.u.tsk = NULL;
        sa.aad = &aad;
        aad.op = op,
        aad.fs.request = request;

commit aeab4cbfb86d0faeeb709e8201672e0662aa2c6f
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 25 04:02:03 2014 -0700

    apparmor: exec should not be returning ENOENT when it denies
    
    The current behavior is confusing as it causes exec failures to report
    the executable is missing instead of identifying that apparmor
    caused the failure.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index dc0027b..67a7418 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                                new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
                                info = "ux fallback";
                        } else {
-                               error = -ENOENT;
+                               error = -EACCES;
                                info = "profile not found";
                                /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
                                perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;

commit 752e4263021d90cf23c262f2fd3ebfd6dbccd455
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 25 04:01:56 2014 -0700

    apparmor: fix update the mtime of the profile file on replacement
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index ad4fa49..45a6199 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
 
        for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
                new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
+               if (new->dents[i])
+                       new->dents[i]->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
                old->dents[i] = NULL;
        }
 }

commit 0c67233b18406dc7a8629faf8f9452feace6fb13
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 25 04:02:08 2014 -0700

    apparmor: fix disconnected bind mnts reconnection
    
    Bind mounts can fail to be properly reconnected when PATH_CONNECT is
    specified. Ensure that when PATH_CONNECT is specified the path has
    a root.
    
    BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1319984
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index edddc02..f261678 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -141,7 +141,10 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
                        error = -EACCES;
                        if (*res == '/')
                                *name = res + 1;
-               }
+               } else if (*res != '/')
+                       /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
+                       error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
+
        }
 
 out:

commit 30c2b759b4f456e97e859ca550666c8abe84ff3c
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri Jul 25 04:02:10 2014 -0700

    apparmor: internal paths should be treated as disconnected
    
    Internal mounts are not mounted anywhere and as such should be treated
    as disconnected paths.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index f261678..a8fc7d0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
-
 /* modified from dcache.c */
 static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
 {
@@ -39,6 +38,38 @@ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
 
 #define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
 
+/* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
+ * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+ * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+ * Unless
+ *     specifically directed to connect the path,
+ * OR
+ *     if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+ *     resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+ *     of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+ *     namespace root.
+ */
+static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name,
+                     int flags)
+{
+       int error = 0;
+
+       if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+           !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+             our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
+               /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+                * with '/'
+                */
+               error = -EACCES;
+               if (**name == '/')
+                       *name = *name + 1;
+       } else if (**name != '/')
+               /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
+               error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
 /**
  * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
  * @path: path to lookup  (NOT NULL)
@@ -74,7 +105,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
                         * control instead of hard coded /proc
                         */
                        return prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
-               }
+               } else
+                       return disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
                return 0;
        }
 
@@ -120,32 +152,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
                        goto out;
        }
 
-       /* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
-        * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
-        * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
-        * Unless
-        *     specifically directed to connect the path,
-        * OR
-        *     if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
-        *     resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
-        *     of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
-        *     namespace root.
-        */
-       if (!connected) {
-               if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
-                          !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
-                            our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
-                       /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
-                        * with '/'
-                        */
-                       error = -EACCES;
-                       if (*res == '/')
-                               *name = res + 1;
-               } else if (*res != '/')
-                       /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
-                       error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
-
-       }
+       if (!connected)
+               error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
 
 out:
        return error;

commit 35f89b597a40c870f93a068bc92a7ef4f9b16a66
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Sat Apr 16 13:59:02 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix put() parent ref after updating the active ref
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index c92a9f6..455c9f8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1187,8 +1187,8 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
                        /* parent replaced in this atomic set? */
                        if (newest != parent) {
                                aa_get_profile(newest);
-                               aa_put_profile(parent);
                                rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
+                               aa_put_profile(parent);
                        }
                        /* aafs interface uses replacedby */
                        rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,

commit 7b1ec6a04ca57fabe250f1102f2803dea7fbd03b
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Sat Apr 16 14:16:50 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix log failures for all profiles in a set
    
    currently only the profile that is causing the failure is logged. This
    makes it more confusing than necessary about which profiles loaded
    and which didn't. So make sure to log success and failure messages for
    all profiles in the set being loaded.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 455c9f8..db31bc5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname,
  */
 ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
 {
-       const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       const char *ns_name, *info = NULL;
        struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
        struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp;
        int op = OP_PROF_REPL;
@@ -1082,18 +1082,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
        /* released below */
        ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name);
        if (!ns) {
-               info = "failed to prepare namespace";
-               error = -ENOMEM;
-               name = ns_name;
-               goto fail;
+               error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name,
+                                    "failed to prepare namespace", -ENOMEM);
+               goto free;
        }
 
        mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
        /* setup parent and ns info */
        list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
                struct aa_policy *policy;
-
-               name = ent->new->base.hname;
                error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, noreplace,
                                         &ent->old, &info);
                if (error)
@@ -1121,7 +1118,6 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
                        if (!p) {
                                error = -ENOENT;
                                info = "parent does not exist";
-                               name = ent->new->base.hname;
                                goto fail_lock;
                        }
                        rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
@@ -1214,9 +1210,22 @@ out:
 
 fail_lock:
        mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
-fail:
-       error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
 
+       /* audit cause of failure */
+       op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+       audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ent->new->base.hname, info, error);
+       /* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
+       info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
+       list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lh, list) {
+               if (tmp == ent) {
+                       info = "unchecked profile in failed atomic policy load";
+                       /* skip entry that caused failure */
+                       continue;
+               }
+               op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+               audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
+       }
+free:
        list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
                list_del_init(&ent->list);
                aa_load_ent_free(ent);

commit 4c475747a31b0637f0d47cb9bddaf2c6efb02854
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Sat Apr 16 14:19:38 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix audit full profile hname on successful load
    
    Currently logging of a successful profile load only logs the basename
    of the profile. This can result in confusion when a child profile has
    the same name as the another profile in the set. Logging the hname
    will ensure there is no confusion.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index db31bc5..ca402d0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1159,7 +1159,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
                list_del_init(&ent->list);
                op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
 
-               audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.name, NULL, error);
+               audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error);
 
                if (ent->old) {
                        __replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);

commit 430741dd766291d2e618b04e918ee6da844c230a
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed Apr 20 14:18:18 2016 -0700

    apparmor: ensure the target profile name is always audited
    
    The target profile name was not being correctly audited in a few
    cases because the target variable was not being set and gotos
    passed the code to set it at apply:
    
    Since it is always based on new_profile just drop the target var
    and conditionally report based on new_profile.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 67a7418..fc3036b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
                file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
        };
-       const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
        int error = 0;
 
        if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        if (cxt->onexec) {
                struct file_perms cp;
                info = "change_profile onexec";
+               new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
                if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
                        goto audit;
 
@@ -413,7 +414,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
                if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
                        goto audit;
-               new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
                goto apply;
        }
 
@@ -445,10 +445,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                if (!new_profile) {
                        error = -ENOMEM;
                        info = "could not create null profile";
-               } else {
+               } else
                        error = -EACCES;
-                       target = new_profile->base.hname;
-               }
                perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
        } else
                /* fail exec */
@@ -459,7 +457,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         * fail the exec.
         */
        if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
-               aa_put_profile(new_profile);
                error = -EPERM;
                goto cleanup;
        }
@@ -474,10 +471,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 
        if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
                error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
-               if (error) {
-                       aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+               if (error)
                        goto audit;
-               }
        }
 
        /* Determine if secure exec is needed.
@@ -498,7 +493,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
        }
 apply:
-       target = new_profile->base.hname;
        /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
        bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
 
@@ -506,15 +500,19 @@ x_clear:
        aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
        /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
        cxt->profile = new_profile;
+       new_profile = NULL;
 
        /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
        aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
 
 audit:
        error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
-                             name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
+                             name,
+                             new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL,
+                             cond.uid, info, error);
 
 cleanup:
+       aa_put_profile(new_profile);
        aa_put_profile(profile);
        kfree(buffer);
 

commit 06763d057300b3d5bbe1894acfe236cf193bab78
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Thu Mar 17 12:02:54 2016 -0700

    apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index a689f10..c841b12 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size)
        int index, xtype;
        xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
        index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
-       if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size)
+       if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index >= table_size)
                return 0;
        return 1;
 }

commit e13f968d154ba9d6a2c4f82f33d3312a63430b54
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed Dec 16 18:09:10 2015 -0800

    apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile
    
    When finding a child profile via an rcu critical section, the profile
    may be put and scheduled for deletion after the child is found but
    before its refcount is incremented.
    
    Protect against this by repeating the lookup if the profiles refcount
    is 0 and is one its way to deletion.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index ca402d0..7807125 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -766,7 +766,9 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
        struct aa_profile *profile;
 
        rcu_read_lock();
-       profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name));
+       do {
+               profile = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name);
+       } while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
        rcu_read_unlock();
 
        /* refcount released by caller */

commit 5833ccff1227fbc8f1bab64351f6747a6c71bdeb
Author: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Date:   Mon Nov 16 21:46:33 2015 +0800

    apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next
    
    list_next_entry has been defined in list.h, so I replace list_entry_next
    with it.
    
    Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
    Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 0d8dd71..729e595 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -553,8 +553,6 @@ fail2:
 }
 
 
-#define list_entry_next(pos, member) \
-       list_entry(pos->member.next, typeof(*pos), member)
 #define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head))
 
 /**
@@ -585,7 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
        parent = ns->parent;
        while (ns != root) {
                mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
-               next = list_entry_next(ns, base.list);
+               next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list);
                if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) {
                        mutex_lock(&next->lock);
                        return next;
@@ -639,7 +637,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
        parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
                                           mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
        while (parent) {
-               p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+               p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
                if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list))
                        return p;
                p = parent;
@@ -648,7 +646,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
        }
 
        /* is next another profile in the namespace */
-       p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+       p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
        if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list))
                return p;
 

commit 645801f1ddd183109c011e5ecee23ed3fdcae244
Author: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Date:   Fri Nov 6 15:17:30 2015 -0500

    apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task
    
    While using AppArmor, SYS_CAP_RESOURCE is insufficient to call prlimit
    on another task. The only other example of a AppArmor mediating access to
    another, already running, task (ignoring fork+exec) is ptrace.
    
    The AppArmor model for ptrace is that one of the following must be true:
    1) The tracer is unconfined
    2) The tracer is in complain mode
    3) The tracer and tracee are confined by the same profile
    4) The tracer is confined but has SYS_CAP_PTRACE
    
    1), 2, and 3) are already true for setrlimit.
    
    We can match the ptrace model just by allowing CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
    
    We still test the values of the rlimit since it can always be overridden
    using a value that means unlimited for a particular resource.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 748bf0c..67a6072 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -101,9 +101,11 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
        /* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
         * profiles.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
         * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
-        * the same profile.
+        * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another
+        * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
         */
-       if (profile != task_profile ||
+       if ((profile != task_profile &&
+            aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) ||
            (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
             new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
                error = -EACCES;

commit 2be4aed1f3332d87273eb593944332054f3cffac
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Thu Jun 2 02:37:02 2016 -0700

    apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index 001c43a..a1c04fe 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
 #define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
 #define YYTD_ID_NXT    7
 #define YYTD_ID_TSIZE  8
+#define YYTD_ID_MAX    8
 
 #define YYTD_DATA8     1
 #define YYTD_DATA16    2
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 727eb42..f9f57c6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
         * it every time we use td_id as an index
         */
        th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1;
+       if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX)
+               goto out;
        th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
        th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
        blob += sizeof(struct table_header);

commit c7f87d3c3363b1a0c4724e627e5c8e640a883c89
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed Jun 15 09:57:55 2016 +0300

    apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index f9f57c6..32b72eb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -75,14 +75,14 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
                                     u32, be32_to_cpu);
                else
                        goto fail;
+               /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+                * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+                */
+               if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+                       vm_unmap_aliases();
        }
 
 out:
-       /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
-        * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
-        */
-       if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
-               vm_unmap_aliases();
        return table;
 fail:
        kvfree(table);

commit 0f7e61013dd1e67ebb54d58eee11ab009ceb5ef3
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed Jun 15 10:00:55 2016 +0300

    apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present
    
    BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1592547
    
    If unpack_dfa() returns NULL due to the dfa not being present,
    profile_unpack() is not checking if the dfa is not present (NULL).
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index c841b12..dac2121 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -583,6 +583,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
                        error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
                        profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
                        goto fail;
+               } else if (!profile->policy.dfa) {
+                       error = -EPROTO;
+                       goto fail;
                }
                if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
                        /* default start state */

commit de4ca46ec035283928e8fa40797897cefcf6ec3e
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed Jun 22 18:01:08 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked
    
    the policy_lock parameter is a one way switch that prevents policy
    from being further modified. Unfortunately some of the module parameters
    can effectively modify policy by turning off enforcement.
    
    split policy_admin_capable into a view check and a full admin check,
    and update the admin check to test the policy_lock parameter.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index c28b0f2..52275f0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
        return profile->audit;
 }
 
+bool policy_view_capable(void);
+bool policy_admin_capable(void);
 bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op);
 
 #endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 7798e16..e83eefb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -728,51 +728,49 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
-       if (aa_g_lock_policy)
-               return -EACCES;
        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_view_capable())
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
        return param_set_bool(val, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_view_capable())
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
        return param_set_uint(val, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_view_capable())
                return -EPERM;
        return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
 }
 
 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_view_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -784,7 +782,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
        int i;
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -805,7 +803,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
 
 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -817,7 +815,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
 {
        int i;
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+       if (!policy_admin_capable())
                return -EPERM;
 
        if (!apparmor_enabled)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 7807125..179e68d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -918,6 +918,22 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
                        &sa, NULL);
 }
 
+bool policy_view_capable(void)
+{
+       struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+       bool response = false;
+
+       if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+               response = true;
+
+       return response;
+}
+
+bool policy_admin_capable(void)
+{
+       return policy_view_capable() && !aa_g_lock_policy;
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
  * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done
@@ -932,7 +948,7 @@ bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op)
                return 0;
        }
 
-       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+       if (!policy_admin_capable()) {
                audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES);
                return 0;
        }

commit 46c339f46b83e4cf8098f599cd182e65e9d054fc
Author: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Date:   Fri Jun 10 23:34:26 2016 +0200

    apparmor: do not expose kernel stack
    
    Do not copy uninitalized fields th.td_hilen, th.td_data.
    
    Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 32b72eb..3f900fc 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 
        table = kvzalloc(tsize);
        if (table) {
-               *table = th;
+               table->td_id = th.td_id;
+               table->td_flags = th.td_flags;
+               table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen;
                if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
                        UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
                                     u8, byte_to_byte);

commit 7e65e8142b2ea4891581173d6e92fc337b02ff8b
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Sat Jul 9 23:46:33 2016 -0700

    apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index e83eefb..ba8207b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
        if (!*args)
                goto out;
 
-       arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
+       arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
        if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
                if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
                        error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,

commit b661b13237991be6b5cdf0849f137c5ec58217bf
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Mon Oct 4 15:03:36 2010 -0700

    UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
    
    Base support for network mediation.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 9cdec70..d5b291e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #
 # Generated include files
 #
+net_names.h
 capability_names.h
 rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index d693df8..5dbb72f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o sid.o file.o
+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
            -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
             tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+#    define AF_LOCAL   1       /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX       */
+#    #define AF_INET           2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
+# to
+#    [1] = "local",
+#    [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define AF_INET           2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
+# to
+#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+       sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
+        's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+       echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+       echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+       sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+        $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+#    SOCK_STREAM       = 1,
+# to
+#    [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+       sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+       -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+       echo "};" >> $@
 
 # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
 # Transforms lines from
@@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
            tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
                            $(src)/Makefile
@@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
                      $(src)/Makefile
        $(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+                    $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+                    $(src)/Makefile
+       $(call cmd,make-af)
+       $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 729e595..181d961 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
        AA_FS_DIR("policy",                     aa_fs_entry_policy),
        AA_FS_DIR("domain",                     aa_fs_entry_domain),
        AA_FS_DIR("file",                       aa_fs_entry_file),
+       AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
        AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",            VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
        AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",                     aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
        AA_FS_DIR("caps",                       aa_fs_entry_caps),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index ba3dfd1..5d3c419 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
                        u32 denied;
                        kuid_t ouid;
                } fs;
+               struct {
+                       int type, protocol;
+                       struct sock *sk;
+               } net;
        };
 };
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb8a121
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+       u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+       u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+       u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
+
+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
+                      int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+       /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 52275f0..4fc4dac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "capability.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "file.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
 extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ struct aa_replacedby {
  * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
  *
  * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
@@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
        struct aa_policydb policy;
        struct aa_file_rules file;
        struct aa_caps caps;
+       struct aa_net net;
        struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
        unsigned char *hash;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ba8207b..88d3b0a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
        return error;
 }
 
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       if (kern)
+               return 0;
+
+       profile = __aa_current_profile();
+       if (!unconfined(profile))
+               error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
+                                   NULL);
+       return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+                               struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+                                  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+                                  struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+                                  struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+                                     int optname)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+                                     int optname)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -613,6 +712,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
+
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..003dd18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
+       AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
+       { }
+};
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+       audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+       if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
+               audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+       } else {
+               audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+       }
+       audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+       if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
+               audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
+       } else {
+               audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
+       }
+       audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_net - audit network access
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type:   network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
+ */
+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+                    int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
+{
+       int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+       struct common_audit_data sa;
+       struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
+       struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
+       if (sk) {
+               sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+       } else {
+               sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+       }
+       /* todo fill in socket addr info */
+       sa.aad = &aad;
+       sa.u.net = &net;
+       sa.aad->op = op,
+       sa.u.net->family = family;
+       sa.u.net->sk = sk;
+       sa.aad->net.type = type;
+       sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
+       sa.aad->error = error;
+
+       if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+               u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
+               if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+                          !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
+                       return 0;
+               audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+       } else {
+               u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+               u16 kill_mask = 0;
+               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+
+               if (denied & kill_mask)
+                       audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+               if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
+                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+                       return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+       }
+
+       return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type:   network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
+               int protocol, struct sock *sk)
+{
+       u16 family_mask;
+       int error;
+
+       if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
+       if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
+               return 0;
+
+       family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
+
+       error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+
+       return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
+        * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
+        */
+       if (in_interrupt())
+               return 0;
+
+       profile = __aa_current_profile();
+       if (!unconfined(profile))
+               error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+                                   sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+
+       return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 179e68d..f1a8541 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 
        aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
        aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
+       aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
        aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
        kzfree(profile->dirname);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index dac2121..0107bc4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
        return 0;
 }
 
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+       if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+               if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+                       return 0;
+               if (data)
+                       *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+               e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+               return 1;
+       }
+       return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 {
        if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
        struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
        const char *name = NULL;
+       size_t size = 0;
        int i, error = -EPROTO;
        kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
        u32 tmp;
@@ -576,6 +590,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
        if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
                goto fail;
 
+       size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+       if (size) {
+
+               for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+                       /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+                        * never request
+                        */
+                       if (i >= AF_MAX) {
+                               u16 tmp;
+                               if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+                                   !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+                                   !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+                                       goto fail;
+                               continue;
+                       }
+                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+                               goto fail;
+                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+                               goto fail;
+                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+                               goto fail;
+               }
+               if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+                       goto fail;
+       }
+       /*
+        * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
+        * by IPC
+        */
+       profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+       profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+
        if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
                /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
                profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);

commit 64c5e24470a219c79c2870c63f18f6bd55648b1b
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Fri Jun 29 17:34:00 2012 -0700

    apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation
    
    If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
    either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
    denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
    1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
       tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
       should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
    
    2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
       This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
       they had been specifically marked as quieted.
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
        } else {
                u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
                u16 kill_mask = 0;
-               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
 
                if (denied & kill_mask)
                        audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;

commit f7cef61751a2382fb4ea26c18736d7552ffdb24a
Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date:   Wed May 16 10:58:05 2012 -0700

    UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
    
    Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
    rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
    
    The basic form of the rules are.
    
      [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
      [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
      [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
      [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
    
      remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
    
      where [conds] can be
        fstype=<expr>
        options=<expr>
    
    Example mount commands
      mount,                # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
    
      mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
    
      mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
    
      mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
    
      mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
    
      mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
    
      umount,
    
      umount /m*,
    
    See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
    
    Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
    Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 181d961..5fb67f6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -800,7 +800,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
        AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",          1),
-       {}
+       { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
+       AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
+       { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
+       AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
+       AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
+       { }
 };
 
 static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
@@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
        AA_FS_DIR("domain",                     aa_fs_entry_domain),
        AA_FS_DIR("file",                       aa_fs_entry_file),
        AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
+       AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
+       AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
        AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",            VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
        AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",                     aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
        AA_FS_DIR("caps",                       aa_fs_entry_caps),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 3a7f1da..c2a8b8a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
        "file_mmap",
        "file_mprotect",
 
+       "pivotroot",
+       "mount",
+       "umount",
+
        "create",
        "post_create",
        "bind",
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index fc3036b..f2a83b4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
  *
  * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
  */
-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 {
        struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
        struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index e4ea626..ce6ff6a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_NET           4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS       5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN                6
+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT         7
 
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST          AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST          AA_CLASS_MOUNT
 
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 5d3c419..b9f1d57 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
        OP_FMMAP,
        OP_FMPROT,
 
+       OP_PIVOTROOT,
+       OP_MOUNT,
+       OP_UMOUNT,
+
        OP_CREATE,
        OP_POST_CREATE,
        OP_BIND,
@@ -120,6 +124,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
                        unsigned long max;
                } rlim;
                struct {
+                       const char *src_name;
+                       const char *type;
+                       const char *trans;
+                       const char *data;
+                       unsigned long flags;
+               } mnt;
+               struct {
                        const char *target;
                        u32 request;
                        u32 denied;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
        char **table;
 };
 
+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
+
 int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a43b1d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
+#define __AA_MOUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* mount perms */
+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT       0x01
+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT           0x02
+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT          0x04
+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA          0x40
+#define AA_CONT_MATCH          0x40
+
+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+              unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                 const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                        unsigned long flags);
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                 const char *old_name);
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
+                const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+                void *data);
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
+                const struct path *new_path);
+
+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 88d3b0a..432cbd3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
 
 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
@@ -469,6 +470,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                           !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 }
 
+static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
+                            const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       /* Discard magic */
+       if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+               flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+
+       flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+
+       profile = __aa_current_profile();
+       if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+               if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+                       error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
+               else if (flags & MS_BIND)
+                       error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
+               else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+                                 MS_UNBINDABLE))
+                       error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
+               else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+                       error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
+               else
+                       error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
+                                            flags, data);
+       }
+       return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       profile = __aa_current_profile();
+       if (!unconfined(profile))
+               error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
+                                const struct path *new_path)
+{
+       struct aa_profile *profile;
+       int error = 0;
+
+       profile = __aa_current_profile();
+       if (!unconfined(profile))
+               error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
                                char **value)
 {
@@ -689,6 +745,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
 
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
+       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
+       
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
        LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cf9170
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
+       if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
+               audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
+       else
+               audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
+       if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
+       if (flags & MS_NODEV)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
+       if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
+       if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
+       if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
+       if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
+       if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
+       if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
+       if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
+       if (flags & MS_BIND)
+               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
+       if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
+       if (flags & MS_SILENT)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
+       if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
+       if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
+               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
+                                ", unbindable");
+       if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
+               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
+                                ", private");
+       if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
+               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
+                                ", slave");
+       if (flags & MS_SHARED)
+               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
+                                ", shared");
+       if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
+       if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
+       if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
+       if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
+               audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+       if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
+               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
+       }
+       if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
+               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
+       }
+       if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
+               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
+       }
+       if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
+               audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
+               audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+       }
+       if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
+               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
+       }
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
+ * @data: filesystem mount flags
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
+                      const char *name, const char *src_name,
+                      const char *type, const char *trans,
+                      unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
+                      struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
+{
+       int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+       struct common_audit_data sa = { };
+       struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
+
+       if (likely(!error)) {
+               u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+               if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+                       mask = 0xffff;
+
+               /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+               request &= mask;
+
+               if (likely(!request))
+                       return 0;
+               audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+       } else {
+               /* only report permissions that were denied */
+               request = request & ~perms->allow;
+
+               if (request & perms->kill)
+                       audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+               /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+               if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
+                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+                       request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+               if (!request)
+                       return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
+                               complain_error(error) : error;
+       }
+
+       sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+       sa.aad = &aad;
+       sa.aad->op = op;
+       sa.aad->name = name;
+       sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
+       sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
+       sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
+       sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
+       if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
+               sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
+       sa.aad->info = info;
+       sa.aad->error = error;
+
+       return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
+ * on the flags.
+ *
+ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
+static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+                                   unsigned long flags)
+{
+       unsigned int i;
+
+       for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
+               if ((1 << i) & flags)
+                       state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+       }
+
+       return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state match finished in
+ *
+ * Returns: mount permissions
+ */
+static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+                                          unsigned int state)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms;
+
+       perms.kill = 0;
+       perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
+       perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
+       perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
+       perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+
+       return perms;
+}
+
+static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
+       "match succeeded",
+       "failed mntpnt match",
+       "failed srcname match",
+       "failed type match",
+       "failed flags match",
+       "failed data match"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+                       const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
+                       const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+                       void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
+{
+       unsigned int state;
+
+       state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
+       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+       if (!state)
+               return 1;
+
+       if (devname)
+               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
+       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+       if (!state)
+               return 2;
+
+       if (type)
+               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
+       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+       if (!state)
+               return 3;
+
+       state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
+       if (!state)
+               return 4;
+       *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+       if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+               return 0;
+
+       /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
+       if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
+               state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+               if (!state)
+                       return 4;
+
+               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
+               if (!state)
+                       return 5;
+               *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+               if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+                       return 0;
+       }
+
+       /* failed at end of flags match */
+       return 4;
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
+ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
+                    const char *devname, const char *type,
+                    unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
+                    struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
+{
+       int pos;
+
+       if (!profile->policy.dfa)
+               return -EACCES;
+
+       pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
+                          profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+                          mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
+       if (pos) {
+               *info = mnt_info_table[pos];
+               return -EACCES;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
+{
+       return profile->path_flags |
+               S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
+}
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+              unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       const char *name, *info = NULL;
+       char *buffer = NULL;
+       int binary, error;
+
+       binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
+                         &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+                           NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+                           error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                 const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+       const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       struct path old_path;
+       int error;
+
+       if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
+                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+       path_put(&old_path);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
+                         &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
+                           NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
+                           info, error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+       kfree(old_buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                        unsigned long flags)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       char *buffer = NULL;
+       const char *name, *info = NULL;
+       int error;
+
+       /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
+       flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+                 MS_UNBINDABLE);
+
+       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
+                         &info);
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+                           NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+                           error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
+                 const char *orig_name)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+       const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       struct path old_path;
+       int error;
+
+       if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
+                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+       path_put(&old_path);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
+                         &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
+                           NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
+                           info, error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+       kfree(old_buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
+                const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+                void *data)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+       const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       int binary = 1;
+       int error;
+
+       dev_name = orig_dev_name;
+       if (type) {
+               int requires_dev;
+               struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+               if (!fstype)
+                       return -ENODEV;
+
+               binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+               requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
+               put_filesystem(fstype);
+
+               if (requires_dev) {
+                       struct path dev_path;
+
+                       if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
+                               error = -ENOENT;
+                               goto out;
+                       }
+
+                       error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
+                       if (error)
+                               goto audit;
+
+                       error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
+                                            path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
+                                            &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
+                       path_put(&dev_path);
+                       if (error)
+                               goto audit;
+               }
+       }
+
+       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
+                         &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
+                           type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+                           error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+       kfree(dev_buffer);
+
+out:
+       return error;
+
+}
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       char *buffer = NULL;
+       const char *name, *info = NULL;
+       int error;
+
+       struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
+       error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
+                            &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
+               unsigned int state;
+               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+                                    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+                                    name);
+               perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+       }
+
+       if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
+               error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+                           NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+       kfree(buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
+                const struct path *new_path)
+{
+       struct file_perms perms = { };
+       struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
+       char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
+       const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+       int error;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
+                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
+                            &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
+       if (error)
+               goto audit;
+
+       if (profile->policy.dfa) {
+               unsigned int state;
+               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+                                    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+                                    new_name);
+               state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
+               perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+       }
+
+       if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
+               if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
+                       target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
+                       if (!target)
+                               error = -ENOENT;
+                       else
+                               error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+               }
+       } else
+               error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
+                           old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
+                           0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
+       aa_put_profile(target);
+       kfree(old_buffer);
+       kfree(new_buffer);
+
+       return error;
+}