kernel-apparmor.patch

   1 commit 09aa4788d6052c6dc423d939319334ebb5d00847
   2 Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
   3 Date:   Mon Oct 4 15:03:36 2010 -0700
   4
   5     UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
   6
   7     Base support for network mediation.
   8
   9     Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
  10
  11 diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
  12 index 9cdec70..d5b291e 100644
  13 --- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
  14 +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
  15 @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
  16  #
  17  # Generated include files
  18  #
  19 +net_names.h
  20  capability_names.h
  21  rlim_names.h
  22 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
  23 index d693df8..5dbb72f 100644
  24 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
  25 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
  26 @@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
  27
  28  apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
  29                path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
  30 -              resource.o sid.o file.o
  31 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
  32  apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
  33
  34 -clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
  35 +clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
  36
  37
  38  # Build a lower case string table of capability names
  39 @@ -25,6 +25,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
  40             -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/\L\1/p' | \
  41              tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
  42
  43 +# Build a lower case string table of address family names
  44 +# Transform lines from
  45 +#    define AF_LOCAL   1       /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX       */
  46 +#    #define AF_INET           2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
  47 +# to
  48 +#    [1] = "local",
  49 +#    [2] = "inet",
  50 +#
  51 +# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
  52 +# Transforms lines from
  53 +#    #define AF_INET           2       /* Internet IP Protocol         */
  54 +# to
  55 +#    #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
  56 +quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
  57 +cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
  58 +       sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
  59 +        's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
  60 +       echo "};" >> $@ ;\
  61 +       echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
  62 +       sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
  63 +        $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
  64 +
  65 +# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
  66 +# Transform lines from
  67 +#    SOCK_STREAM       = 1,
  68 +# to
  69 +#    [1] = "stream",
  70 +quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN     $@
  71 +cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
  72 +       sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
  73 +       -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
  74 +       echo "};" >> $@
  75
  76  # Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
  77  # Transforms lines from
  78 @@ -61,6 +93,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
  79             tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
  80
  81  $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
  82 +$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
  83  $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
  84  $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
  85                             $(src)/Makefile
  86 @@ -68,3 +101,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
  87  $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
  88                       $(src)/Makefile
  89         $(call cmd,make-rlim)
  90 +$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
  91 +                    $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
  92 +                    $(src)/Makefile
  93 +       $(call cmd,make-af)
  94 +       $(call cmd,make-sock)
  95 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
  96 index 729e595..181d961 100644
  97 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
  98 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
  99 @@ -807,6 +807,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 100         AA_FS_DIR("policy",                     aa_fs_entry_policy),
 101         AA_FS_DIR("domain",                     aa_fs_entry_domain),
 102         AA_FS_DIR("file",                       aa_fs_entry_file),
 103 +       AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 104         AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",            VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 105         AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",                     aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 106         AA_FS_DIR("caps",                       aa_fs_entry_caps),
 107 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 108 index ba3dfd1..5d3c419 100644
 109 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 110 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 111 @@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 112                         u32 denied;
 113                         kuid_t ouid;
 114                 } fs;
 115 +               struct {
 116 +                       int type, protocol;
 117 +                       struct sock *sk;
 118 +               } net;
 119         };
 120  };
 121
 122 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 123 new file mode 100644
 124 index 0000000..cb8a121
 125 --- /dev/null
 126 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
 127 @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
 128 +/*
 129 + * AppArmor security module
 130 + *
 131 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
 132 + *
 133 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 134 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 135 + *
 136 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 137 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 138 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 139 + * License.
 140 + */
 141 +
 142 +#ifndef __AA_NET_H
 143 +#define __AA_NET_H
 144 +
 145 +#include <net/sock.h>
 146 +
 147 +#include "apparmorfs.h"
 148 +
 149 +/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
 150 + * @allowed: basic network families permissions
 151 + * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
 152 + * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
 153 + */
 154 +struct aa_net {
 155 +       u16 allow[AF_MAX];
 156 +       u16 audit[AF_MAX];
 157 +       u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
 158 +};
 159 +
 160 +extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
 161 +
 162 +extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
 163 +                      int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
 164 +extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
 165 +
 166 +static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
 167 +{
 168 +       /* NOP */
 169 +}
 170 +
 171 +#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
 172 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 173 index 52275f0..4fc4dac 100644
 174 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 175 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
 176 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 177  #include "capability.h"
 178  #include "domain.h"
 179  #include "file.h"
 180 +#include "net.h"
 181  #include "resource.h"
 182
 183  extern const char *const aa_profile_mode_names[];
 184 @@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ struct aa_replacedby {
 185   * @policy: general match rules governing policy
 186   * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
 187   * @caps: capabilities for the profile
 188 + * @net: network controls for the profile
 189   * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
 190   *
 191   * @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
 192 @@ -217,6 +219,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 193         struct aa_policydb policy;
 194         struct aa_file_rules file;
 195         struct aa_caps caps;
 196 +       struct aa_net net;
 197         struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 198
 199         unsigned char *hash;
 200 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 201 index 41b8cb1..d96b5f7 100644
 202 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 203 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 204 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 205  #include "include/context.h"
 206  #include "include/file.h"
 207  #include "include/ipc.h"
 208 +#include "include/net.h"
 209  #include "include/path.h"
 210  #include "include/policy.h"
 211  #include "include/procattr.h"
 212 @@ -584,6 +585,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 213         return error;
 214  }
 215
 216 +static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 217 +{
 218 +       struct aa_profile *profile;
 219 +       int error = 0;
 220 +
 221 +       if (kern)
 222 +               return 0;
 223 +
 224 +       profile = __aa_current_profile();
 225 +       if (!unconfined(profile))
 226 +               error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
 227 +                                   NULL);
 228 +       return error;
 229 +}
 230 +
 231 +static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
 232 +                               struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 233 +{
 234 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 235 +
 236 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
 237 +}
 238 +
 239 +static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
 240 +                                  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 241 +{
 242 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 243 +
 244 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
 245 +}
 246 +
 247 +static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
 248 +{
 249 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 250 +
 251 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
 252 +}
 253 +
 254 +static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
 255 +{
 256 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 257 +
 258 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
 259 +}
 260 +
 261 +static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 262 +                                  struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 263 +{
 264 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 265 +
 266 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
 267 +}
 268 +
 269 +static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
 270 +                                  struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
 271 +{
 272 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 273 +
 274 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
 275 +}
 276 +
 277 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
 278 +{
 279 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 280 +
 281 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
 282 +}
 283 +
 284 +static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
 285 +{
 286 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 287 +
 288 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
 289 +}
 290 +
 291 +static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 292 +                                     int optname)
 293 +{
 294 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 295 +
 296 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
 297 +}
 298 +
 299 +static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
 300 +                                     int optname)
 301 +{
 302 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 303 +
 304 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
 305 +}
 306 +
 307 +static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
 308 +{
 309 +       struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 310 +
 311 +       return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
 312 +}
 313 +
 314  static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
 315         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
 316         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
 317 @@ -613,6 +712,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
 318         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
 319         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
 320
 321 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
 322 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
 323 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
 324 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
 325 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
 326 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
 327 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
 328 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
 329 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
 330 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
 331 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
 332 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
 333 +
 334         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
 335         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
 336         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
 337 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 338 new file mode 100644
 339 index 0000000..003dd18
 340 --- /dev/null
 341 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
 342 @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
 343 +/*
 344 + * AppArmor security module
 345 + *
 346 + * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
 347 + *
 348 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 349 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 350 + *
 351 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 352 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 353 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 354 + * License.
 355 + */
 356 +
 357 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 358 +#include "include/audit.h"
 359 +#include "include/context.h"
 360 +#include "include/net.h"
 361 +#include "include/policy.h"
 362 +
 363 +#include "net_names.h"
 364 +
 365 +struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
 366 +       AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
 367 +       { }
 368 +};
 369 +
 370 +/* audit callback for net specific fields */
 371 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 372 +{
 373 +       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 374 +
 375 +       audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
 376 +       if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
 377 +               audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
 378 +       } else {
 379 +               audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
 380 +       }
 381 +       audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
 382 +       if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
 383 +               audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
 384 +       } else {
 385 +               audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
 386 +       }
 387 +       audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
 388 +}
 389 +
 390 +/**
 391 + * audit_net - audit network access
 392 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 393 + * @op: operation being checked
 394 + * @family: network family
 395 + * @type:   network type
 396 + * @protocol: network protocol
 397 + * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
 398 + * @error: error code for failure else 0
 399 + *
 400 + * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
 401 + */
 402 +static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 403 +                    int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
 404 +{
 405 +       int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 406 +       struct common_audit_data sa;
 407 +       struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
 408 +       struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
 409 +       if (sk) {
 410 +               sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 411 +       } else {
 412 +               sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
 413 +       }
 414 +       /* todo fill in socket addr info */
 415 +       sa.aad = &aad;
 416 +       sa.u.net = &net;
 417 +       sa.aad->op = op,
 418 +       sa.u.net->family = family;
 419 +       sa.u.net->sk = sk;
 420 +       sa.aad->net.type = type;
 421 +       sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
 422 +       sa.aad->error = error;
 423 +
 424 +       if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
 425 +               u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
 426 +               if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
 427 +                          !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
 428 +                       return 0;
 429 +               audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 430 +       } else {
 431 +               u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 432 +               u16 kill_mask = 0;
 433 +               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 434 +
 435 +               if (denied & kill_mask)
 436 +                       audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 437 +
 438 +               if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
 439 +                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 440 +                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
 441 +                       return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
 442 +       }
 443 +
 444 +       return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
 445 +}
 446 +
 447 +/**
 448 + * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
 449 + * @op: operation being checked
 450 + * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
 451 + * @family: network family
 452 + * @type:   network type
 453 + * @protocol: network protocol
 454 + *
 455 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 456 + */
 457 +int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
 458 +               int protocol, struct sock *sk)
 459 +{
 460 +       u16 family_mask;
 461 +       int error;
 462 +
 463 +       if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
 464 +               return -EINVAL;
 465 +
 466 +       if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
 467 +               return -EINVAL;
 468 +
 469 +       /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
 470 +       if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
 471 +               return 0;
 472 +
 473 +       family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
 474 +
 475 +       error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
 476 +
 477 +       return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
 478 +}
 479 +
 480 +/**
 481 + * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
 482 + * @op: operation being checked
 483 + * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
 484 + *
 485 + * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
 486 + */
 487 +int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
 488 +{
 489 +       struct aa_profile *profile;
 490 +       int error = 0;
 491 +
 492 +       /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
 493 +        * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
 494 +        */
 495 +       if (in_interrupt())
 496 +               return 0;
 497 +
 498 +       profile = __aa_current_profile();
 499 +       if (!unconfined(profile))
 500 +               error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
 501 +                                   sk->sk_protocol, sk);
 502 +
 503 +       return error;
 504 +}
 505 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 506 index 179e68d..f1a8541 100644
 507 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
 508 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
 509 @@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 510
 511         aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
 512         aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 513 +       aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
 514         aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 515
 516         kzfree(profile->dirname);
 517 diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 518 index 1381206..7dc15ff 100644
 519 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 520 +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
 521 @@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
 522         return 0;
 523  }
 524
 525 +static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
 526 +{
 527 +       if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
 528 +               if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
 529 +                       return 0;
 530 +               if (data)
 531 +                       *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
 532 +               e->pos += sizeof(u16);
 533 +               return 1;
 534 +       }
 535 +       return 0;
 536 +}
 537 +
 538  static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 539  {
 540         if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
 541 @@ -476,6 +489,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 542  {
 543         struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 544         const char *name = NULL;
 545 +       size_t size = 0;
 546         int i, error = -EPROTO;
 547         kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 548         u32 tmp;
 549 @@ -576,6 +590,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 550         if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
 551                 goto fail;
 552
 553 +       size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
 554 +       if (size) {
 555 +
 556 +               for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 557 +                       /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
 558 +                        * never request
 559 +                        */
 560 +                       if (i >= AF_MAX) {
 561 +                               u16 tmp;
 562 +                               if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 563 +                                   !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
 564 +                                   !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
 565 +                                       goto fail;
 566 +                               continue;
 567 +                       }
 568 +                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
 569 +                               goto fail;
 570 +                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
 571 +                               goto fail;
 572 +                       if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
 573 +                               goto fail;
 574 +               }
 575 +               if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
 576 +                       goto fail;
 577 +       }
 578 +       /*
 579 +        * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
 580 +        * by IPC
 581 +        */
 582 +       profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
 583 +       profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
 584 +
 585         if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
 586                 /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
 587                 profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
 588
 589 commit f5c5644745201b5b7d398e841e5045d0a5d14b18
 590 Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 591 Date:   Fri Jun 29 17:34:00 2012 -0700
 592
 593     apparmor: Fix quieting of audit messages for network mediation
 594
 595     If a profile specified a quieting of network denials for a given rule by
 596     either the quiet or deny rule qualifiers, the resultant quiet mask for
 597     denied requests was applied incorrectly, resulting in two potential bugs.
 598     1. The misapplied quiet mask would prevent denials from being correctly
 599        tested against the kill mask/mode. Thus network access requests that
 600        should have resulted in the application being killed did not.
 601
 602     2. The actual quieting of the denied network request was not being applied.
 603        This would result in network rejections always being logged even when
 604        they had been specifically marked as quieted.
 605
 606     Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 607
 608 diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
 609 index 003dd18..6e6e5c9 100644
 610 --- a/security/apparmor/net.c
 611 +++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
 612 @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
 613         } else {
 614                 u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
 615                 u16 kill_mask = 0;
 616 -               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
 617 +               u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type);
 618
 619                 if (denied & kill_mask)
 620                         audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
 621
 622 commit 0269f1631e1496798e5b0a319ff05b1133cfeaa3
 623 Author: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 624 Date:   Wed May 16 10:58:05 2012 -0700
 625
 626     UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate mount
 627
 628     Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
 629     rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
 630
 631     The basic form of the rules are.
 632
 633       [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
 634       [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
 635       [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
 636       [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
 637
 638       remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
 639
 640       where [conds] can be
 641         fstype=<expr>
 642         options=<expr>
 643
 644     Example mount commands
 645       mount,                # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
 646
 647       mount fstype=procfs,  # allow mounting procfs anywhere
 648
 649       mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar,  # readonly bind mount
 650
 651       mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
 652
 653       mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
 654
 655       mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
 656
 657       umount,
 658
 659       umount /m*,
 660
 661     See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
 662
 663     Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
 664     Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
 665
 666 diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 667 index 5dbb72f..89b3445 100644
 668 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
 669 +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
 670 @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 671
 672  apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
 673                path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
 674 -              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 675 +              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
 676  apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 677
 678  clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
 679 diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 680 index 181d961..5fb67f6 100644
 681 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 682 +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
 683 @@ -800,7 +800,18 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
 684
 685  static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_policy[] = {
 686         AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load",          1),
 687 -       {}
 688 +       { }
 689 +};
 690 +
 691 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
 692 +       AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
 693 +       { }
 694 +};
 695 +
 696 +static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
 697 +       AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile",           1),
 698 +       AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root",        1),
 699 +       { }
 700  };
 701
 702  static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 703 @@ -808,6 +819,8 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
 704         AA_FS_DIR("domain",                     aa_fs_entry_domain),
 705         AA_FS_DIR("file",                       aa_fs_entry_file),
 706         AA_FS_DIR("network",                    aa_fs_entry_network),
 707 +       AA_FS_DIR("mount",                      aa_fs_entry_mount),
 708 +       AA_FS_DIR("namespaces",                 aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
 709         AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",            VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
 710         AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",                     aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
 711         AA_FS_DIR("caps",                       aa_fs_entry_caps),
 712 diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
 713 index 3a7f1da..c2a8b8a 100644
 714 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
 715 +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
 716 @@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
 717         "file_mmap",
 718         "file_mprotect",
 719
 720 +       "pivotroot",
 721 +       "mount",
 722 +       "umount",
 723 +
 724         "create",
 725         "post_create",
 726         "bind",
 727 diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
 728 index fc3036b..f2a83b4 100644
 729 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
 730 +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
 731 @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
 732   *
 733   * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
 734   */
 735 -static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 736 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
 737  {
 738         struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
 739         struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
 740 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 741 index 5d721e9..b57da7b 100644
 742 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 743 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
 744 @@ -30,8 +30,9 @@
 745  #define AA_CLASS_NET           4
 746  #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS       5
 747  #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN                6
 748 +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT         7
 749
 750 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST          AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
 751 +#define AA_CLASS_LAST          AA_CLASS_MOUNT
 752
 753  /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 754  extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 755 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 756 index 5d3c419..b9f1d57 100644
 757 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 758 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
 759 @@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
 760         OP_FMMAP,
 761         OP_FMPROT,
 762
 763 +       OP_PIVOTROOT,
 764 +       OP_MOUNT,
 765 +       OP_UMOUNT,
 766 +
 767         OP_CREATE,
 768         OP_POST_CREATE,
 769         OP_BIND,
 770 @@ -120,6 +124,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 771                         unsigned long max;
 772                 } rlim;
 773                 struct {
 774 +                       const char *src_name;
 775 +                       const char *type;
 776 +                       const char *trans;
 777 +                       const char *data;
 778 +                       unsigned long flags;
 779 +               } mnt;
 780 +               struct {
 781                         const char *target;
 782                         u32 request;
 783                         u32 denied;
 784 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 785 index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
 786 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 787 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
 788 @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
 789         char **table;
 790  };
 791
 792 +struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
 793 +
 794  int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 795  int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 796  void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 797 diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 798 new file mode 100644
 799 index 0000000..a43b1d6
 800 --- /dev/null
 801 +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
 802 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
 803 +/*
 804 + * AppArmor security module
 805 + *
 806 + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
 807 + *
 808 + * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
 809 + *
 810 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 811 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 812 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 813 + * License.
 814 + */
 815 +
 816 +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
 817 +#define __AA_MOUNT_H
 818 +
 819 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 820 +#include <linux/path.h>
 821 +
 822 +#include "domain.h"
 823 +#include "policy.h"
 824 +
 825 +/* mount perms */
 826 +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT       0x01
 827 +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT           0x02
 828 +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT          0x04
 829 +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA          0x40
 830 +#define AA_CONT_MATCH          0x40
 831 +
 832 +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
 833 +
 834 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 835 +              unsigned long flags, void *data);
 836 +
 837 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 838 +                 const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
 839 +
 840 +
 841 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 842 +                        unsigned long flags);
 843 +
 844 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
 845 +                 const char *old_name);
 846 +
 847 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
 848 +                const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
 849 +                void *data);
 850 +
 851 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
 852 +
 853 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
 854 +                const struct path *new_path);
 855 +
 856 +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
 857 diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 858 index d96b5f7..7a02376 100644
 859 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 860 +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
 861 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 862  #include "include/path.h"
 863  #include "include/policy.h"
 864  #include "include/procattr.h"
 865 +#include "include/mount.h"
 866
 867  /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
 868  int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
 869 @@ -469,6 +470,61 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 870                            !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 871  }
 872
 873 +static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
 874 +                            const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 875 +{
 876 +       struct aa_profile *profile;
 877 +       int error = 0;
 878 +
 879 +       /* Discard magic */
 880 +       if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
 881 +               flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
 882 +
 883 +       flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
 884 +
 885 +       profile = __aa_current_profile();
 886 +       if (!unconfined(profile)) {
 887 +               if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 888 +                       error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
 889 +               else if (flags & MS_BIND)
 890 +                       error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
 891 +               else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
 892 +                                 MS_UNBINDABLE))
 893 +                       error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
 894 +               else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
 895 +                       error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
 896 +               else
 897 +                       error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
 898 +                                            flags, data);
 899 +       }
 900 +       return error;
 901 +}
 902 +
 903 +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
 904 +{
 905 +       struct aa_profile *profile;
 906 +       int error = 0;
 907 +
 908 +       profile = __aa_current_profile();
 909 +       if (!unconfined(profile))
 910 +               error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
 911 +
 912 +       return error;
 913 +}
 914 +
 915 +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
 916 +                                const struct path *new_path)
 917 +{
 918 +       struct aa_profile *profile;
 919 +       int error = 0;
 920 +
 921 +       profile = __aa_current_profile();
 922 +       if (!unconfined(profile))
 923 +               error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
 924 +
 925 +       return error;
 926 +}
 927 +
 928  static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 929                                 char **value)
 930  {
 931 @@ -689,6 +745,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
 932         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
 933         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
 934
 935 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
 936 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
 937 +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
 938 +
 939         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
 940         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
 941         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
 942 diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
 943 new file mode 100644
 944 index 0000000..9cf9170
 945 --- /dev/null
 946 +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
 947 @@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
 948 +/*
 949 + * AppArmor security module
 950 + *
 951 + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
 952 + *
 953 + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
 954 + * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
 955 + *
 956 + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 957 + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
 958 + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
 959 + * License.
 960 + */
 961 +
 962 +#include <linux/fs.h>
 963 +#include <linux/mount.h>
 964 +#include <linux/namei.h>
 965 +
 966 +#include "include/apparmor.h"
 967 +#include "include/audit.h"
 968 +#include "include/context.h"
 969 +#include "include/domain.h"
 970 +#include "include/file.h"
 971 +#include "include/match.h"
 972 +#include "include/mount.h"
 973 +#include "include/path.h"
 974 +#include "include/policy.h"
 975 +
 976 +
 977 +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
 978 +{
 979 +       if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
 980 +               audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
 981 +       else
 982 +               audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
 983 +       if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
 984 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
 985 +       if (flags & MS_NODEV)
 986 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
 987 +       if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
 988 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
 989 +       if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
 990 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
 991 +       if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 992 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
 993 +       if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
 994 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
 995 +       if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
 996 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
 997 +       if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
 998 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
 999 +       if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
1000 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
1001 +       if (flags & MS_BIND)
1002 +               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
1003 +       if (flags & MS_MOVE)
1004 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
1005 +       if (flags & MS_SILENT)
1006 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
1007 +       if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
1008 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
1009 +       if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
1010 +               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
1011 +                                ", unbindable");
1012 +       if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
1013 +               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
1014 +                                ", private");
1015 +       if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
1016 +               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
1017 +                                ", slave");
1018 +       if (flags & MS_SHARED)
1019 +               audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
1020 +                                ", shared");
1021 +       if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
1022 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
1023 +       if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
1024 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
1025 +       if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
1026 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
1027 +       if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
1028 +               audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
1029 +}
1030 +
1031 +/**
1032 + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
1033 + * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
1034 + * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
1035 + */
1036 +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
1037 +{
1038 +       struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
1039 +
1040 +       if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
1041 +               audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
1042 +               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
1043 +       }
1044 +       if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
1045 +               audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
1046 +               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
1047 +       }
1048 +       if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
1049 +               audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
1050 +               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
1051 +       }
1052 +       if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
1053 +               audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
1054 +               audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
1055 +               audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
1056 +       }
1057 +       if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
1058 +               audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
1059 +               audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
1060 +       }
1061 +}
1062 +
1063 +/**
1064 + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
1065 + * @profile: the profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
1066 + * @gfp: allocation flags
1067 + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
1068 + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
1069 + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
1070 + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
1071 + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
1072 + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
1073 + * @data: filesystem mount flags
1074 + * @request: permissions requested
1075 + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
1076 + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
1077 + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
1078 + *
1079 + * Returns: %0 or error on failure
1080 + */
1081 +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
1082 +                      const char *name, const char *src_name,
1083 +                      const char *type, const char *trans,
1084 +                      unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
1085 +                      struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
1086 +{
1087 +       int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
1088 +       struct common_audit_data sa = { };
1089 +       struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
1090 +
1091 +       if (likely(!error)) {
1092 +               u32 mask = perms->audit;
1093 +
1094 +               if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
1095 +                       mask = 0xffff;
1096 +
1097 +               /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
1098 +               request &= mask;
1099 +
1100 +               if (likely(!request))
1101 +                       return 0;
1102 +               audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
1103 +       } else {
1104 +               /* only report permissions that were denied */
1105 +               request = request & ~perms->allow;
1106 +
1107 +               if (request & perms->kill)
1108 +                       audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
1109 +
1110 +               /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
1111 +               if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
1112 +                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
1113 +                   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
1114 +                       request &= ~perms->quiet;
1115 +
1116 +               if (!request)
1117 +                       return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
1118 +                               complain_error(error) : error;
1119 +       }
1120 +
1121 +       sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
1122 +       sa.aad = &aad;
1123 +       sa.aad->op = op;
1124 +       sa.aad->name = name;
1125 +       sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
1126 +       sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
1127 +       sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
1128 +       sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
1129 +       if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
1130 +               sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
1131 +       sa.aad->info = info;
1132 +       sa.aad->error = error;
1133 +
1134 +       return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
1135 +}
1136 +
1137 +/**
1138 + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
1139 + * @dfa: dfa to match against
1140 + * @state: state to start in
1141 + * @flags: mount flags to match against
1142 + *
1143 + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
1144 + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
1145 + * on the flags.
1146 + *
1147 + * Returns: next state after flags match
1148 + */
1149 +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
1150 +                                   unsigned long flags)
1151 +{
1152 +       unsigned int i;
1153 +
1154 +       for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
1155 +               if ((1 << i) & flags)
1156 +                       state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
1157 +       }
1158 +
1159 +       return state;
1160 +}
1161 +
1162 +/**
1163 + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
1164 + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
1165 + * @state: state match finished in
1166 + *
1167 + * Returns: mount permissions
1168 + */
1169 +static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
1170 +                                          unsigned int state)
1171 +{
1172 +       struct file_perms perms;
1173 +
1174 +       perms.kill = 0;
1175 +       perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
1176 +       perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
1177 +       perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
1178 +       perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
1179 +
1180 +       return perms;
1181 +}
1182 +
1183 +static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
1184 +       "match succeeded",
1185 +       "failed mntpnt match",
1186 +       "failed srcname match",
1187 +       "failed type match",
1188 +       "failed flags match",
1189 +       "failed data match"
1190 +};
1191 +
1192 +/*
1193 + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
1194 + * index into the mnt_info_table above
1195 + */
1196 +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
1197 +                       const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
1198 +                       const char *type, unsigned long flags,
1199 +                       void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
1200 +{
1201 +       unsigned int state;
1202 +
1203 +       state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
1204 +       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
1205 +       if (!state)
1206 +               return 1;
1207 +
1208 +       if (devname)
1209 +               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
1210 +       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
1211 +       if (!state)
1212 +               return 2;
1213 +
1214 +       if (type)
1215 +               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
1216 +       state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
1217 +       if (!state)
1218 +               return 3;
1219 +
1220 +       state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
1221 +       if (!state)
1222 +               return 4;
1223 +       *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
1224 +       if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
1225 +               return 0;
1226 +
1227 +       /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
1228 +       if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
1229 +               state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
1230 +               if (!state)
1231 +                       return 4;
1232 +
1233 +               state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
1234 +               if (!state)
1235 +                       return 5;
1236 +               *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
1237 +               if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
1238 +                       return 0;
1239 +       }
1240 +
1241 +       /* failed at end of flags match */
1242 +       return 4;
1243 +}
1244 +
1245 +/**
1246 + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
1247 + * @profile: the confining profile
1248 + * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
1249 + * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
1250 + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
1251 + * @flags: mount flags to match
1252 + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
1253 + * @binary: whether @data is binary
1254 + * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
1255 + * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
1256 + *
1257 + * Returns: 0 on success else error
1258 + */
1259 +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
1260 +                    const char *devname, const char *type,
1261 +                    unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
1262 +                    struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
1263 +{
1264 +       int pos;
1265 +
1266 +       if (!profile->policy.dfa)
1267 +               return -EACCES;
1268 +
1269 +       pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
1270 +                          profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
1271 +                          mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
1272 +       if (pos) {
1273 +               *info = mnt_info_table[pos];
1274 +               return -EACCES;
1275 +       }
1276 +
1277 +       return 0;
1278 +}
1279 +
1280 +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path)
1281 +{
1282 +       return profile->path_flags |
1283 +               S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
1284 +}
1285 +
1286 +int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
1287 +              unsigned long flags, void *data)
1288 +{
1289 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1290 +       const char *name, *info = NULL;
1291 +       char *buffer = NULL;
1292 +       int binary, error;
1293 +
1294 +       binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
1295 +
1296 +       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
1297 +                            &info);
1298 +       if (error)
1299 +               goto audit;
1300 +
1301 +       error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
1302 +                         &perms, &info);
1303 +
1304 +audit:
1305 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
1306 +                           NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
1307 +                           error);
1308 +       kfree(buffer);
1309 +
1310 +       return error;
1311 +}
1312 +
1313 +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
1314 +                 const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
1315 +{
1316 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1317 +       char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
1318 +       const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
1319 +       struct path old_path;
1320 +       int error;
1321 +
1322 +       if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
1323 +               return -EINVAL;
1324 +
1325 +       flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
1326 +
1327 +       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
1328 +                            &info);
1329 +       if (error)
1330 +               goto audit;
1331 +
1332 +       error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
1333 +       if (error)
1334 +               goto audit;
1335 +
1336 +       error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
1337 +                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
1338 +       path_put(&old_path);
1339 +       if (error)
1340 +               goto audit;
1341 +
1342 +       error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
1343 +                         &perms, &info);
1344 +
1345 +audit:
1346 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
1347 +                           NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
1348 +                           info, error);
1349 +       kfree(buffer);
1350 +       kfree(old_buffer);
1351 +
1352 +       return error;
1353 +}
1354 +
1355 +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
1356 +                        unsigned long flags)
1357 +{
1358 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1359 +       char *buffer = NULL;
1360 +       const char *name, *info = NULL;
1361 +       int error;
1362 +
1363 +       /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
1364 +       flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
1365 +                 MS_UNBINDABLE);
1366 +
1367 +       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
1368 +                            &info);
1369 +       if (error)
1370 +               goto audit;
1371 +
1372 +       error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
1373 +                         &info);
1374 +
1375 +audit:
1376 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
1377 +                           NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
1378 +                           error);
1379 +       kfree(buffer);
1380 +
1381 +       return error;
1382 +}
1383 +
1384 +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path,
1385 +                 const char *orig_name)
1386 +{
1387 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1388 +       char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
1389 +       const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
1390 +       struct path old_path;
1391 +       int error;
1392 +
1393 +       if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
1394 +               return -EINVAL;
1395 +
1396 +       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
1397 +                            &info);
1398 +       if (error)
1399 +               goto audit;
1400 +
1401 +       error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
1402 +       if (error)
1403 +               goto audit;
1404 +
1405 +       error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
1406 +                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
1407 +       path_put(&old_path);
1408 +       if (error)
1409 +               goto audit;
1410 +
1411 +       error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
1412 +                         &perms, &info);
1413 +
1414 +audit:
1415 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
1416 +                           NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
1417 +                           info, error);
1418 +       kfree(buffer);
1419 +       kfree(old_buffer);
1420 +
1421 +       return error;
1422 +}
1423 +
1424 +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
1425 +                const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
1426 +                void *data)
1427 +{
1428 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1429 +       char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
1430 +       const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
1431 +       int binary = 1;
1432 +       int error;
1433 +
1434 +       dev_name = orig_dev_name;
1435 +       if (type) {
1436 +               int requires_dev;
1437 +               struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
1438 +               if (!fstype)
1439 +                       return -ENODEV;
1440 +
1441 +               binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
1442 +               requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
1443 +               put_filesystem(fstype);
1444 +
1445 +               if (requires_dev) {
1446 +                       struct path dev_path;
1447 +
1448 +                       if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
1449 +                               error = -ENOENT;
1450 +                               goto out;
1451 +                       }
1452 +
1453 +                       error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
1454 +                       if (error)
1455 +                               goto audit;
1456 +
1457 +                       error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
1458 +                                            path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
1459 +                                            &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
1460 +                       path_put(&dev_path);
1461 +                       if (error)
1462 +                               goto audit;
1463 +               }
1464 +       }
1465 +
1466 +       error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
1467 +                            &info);
1468 +       if (error)
1469 +               goto audit;
1470 +
1471 +       error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
1472 +                         &perms, &info);
1473 +
1474 +audit:
1475 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name,  dev_name,
1476 +                           type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
1477 +                           error);
1478 +       kfree(buffer);
1479 +       kfree(dev_buffer);
1480 +
1481 +out:
1482 +       return error;
1483 +
1484 +}
1485 +
1486 +int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1487 +{
1488 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1489 +       char *buffer = NULL;
1490 +       const char *name, *info = NULL;
1491 +       int error;
1492 +
1493 +       struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
1494 +       error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
1495 +                            &info);
1496 +       if (error)
1497 +               goto audit;
1498 +
1499 +       if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
1500 +               unsigned int state;
1501 +               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
1502 +                                    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
1503 +                                    name);
1504 +               perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
1505 +       }
1506 +
1507 +       if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
1508 +               error = -EACCES;
1509 +
1510 +audit:
1511 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
1512 +                           NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
1513 +       kfree(buffer);
1514 +
1515 +       return error;
1516 +}
1517 +
1518 +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *old_path,
1519 +                const struct path *new_path)
1520 +{
1521 +       struct file_perms perms = { };
1522 +       struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
1523 +       char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
1524 +       const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
1525 +       int error;
1526 +
1527 +       error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
1528 +                            &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
1529 +       if (error)
1530 +               goto audit;
1531 +
1532 +       error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
1533 +                            &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
1534 +       if (error)
1535 +               goto audit;
1536 +
1537 +       if (profile->policy.dfa) {
1538 +               unsigned int state;
1539 +               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
1540 +                                    profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
1541 +                                    new_name);
1542 +               state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
1543 +               state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
1544 +               perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
1545 +       }
1546 +
1547 +       if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
1548 +               if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
1549 +                       target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
1550 +                       if (!target)
1551 +                               error = -ENOENT;
1552 +                       else
1553 +                               error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
1554 +               }
1555 +       } else
1556 +               error = -EACCES;
1557 +
1558 +audit:
1559 +       error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
1560 +                           old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
1561 +                           0, NULL,  AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
1562 +       aa_put_profile(target);
1563 +       kfree(old_buffer);
1564 +       kfree(new_buffer);
1565 +
1566 +       return error;
1567 +}
1568
1569