sec patch stolen form rh ;)

[packages/apache-mod_auth_any.git] / mod_auth_any-1.2.2-fork.patch

--- mod_auth_any-1.2.2/src/mod_auth_any.c.fork	2002-07-02 15:40:25.000000000 -0400
+++ mod_auth_any-1.2.2/src/mod_auth_any.c	2003-03-19 12:47:44.000000000 -0500
@@ -170,127 +170,98 @@
 
 module MODULE_VAR_EXPORT auth_any_module;
 
-/* Escape special characters in the input string so that the bash
-	shell will not interpolate them when the input string is withing
-	single quotes.
-
-   IN: null-terminated character array containing string to be interpolated
-  OUT: newly allocate (using malloc) null-terminated character array
-       containing the input string with the special characters properly
-       escaped */
-char* bash_single_quote_escape_string(const char *s) {
-  /* used to count the length of the string and the number of single quotes */
-  int str_len, sq_count;
-  int s_pos, buf_pos; /* copy chars loop counter */
-  /* used to hold the final result string */
-  char *buf;
-
-  /* Count the single quotes.
-	  LOOP INVARIANT: str_len < (number of chars in string 's')
-      POSTCONDITION: sq_count == (number of single quotes in string 's') */
-  for (str_len = 0, sq_count = 0; s[str_len] != '\0'; str_len++)
-	 if (s[str_len] == '\'')
-		sq_count++;
-
-  /* Allocate the memory for the final string.
-	  Each ' (one char) will become '\'' (4 chars), so multiply by 4
-     and don't forget to add 1 for terminating null. */
-  buf = (char*) malloc(sizeof(char) * (str_len + 1 + sq_count * 4));
-
-  /* Copy the chars of 's' into 'buf', turning each ' into '\'' */
-  for (s_pos = 0, buf_pos = 0; s_pos < str_len; s_pos++) {
-	 /* If we see a single quote, then put '\'' into 'buf' and advance
-		 buf_pos 4 positions, else put the next char from 's' into 'buf'
-		 and advance buf_pos 1 position. */
-	 if(s[s_pos] == '\'') {
-		buf[buf_pos++] = '\'';
-		buf[buf_pos++] = '\\';
-		buf[buf_pos++] = '\'';
-		buf[buf_pos++] = '\'';
-	 } else {
-		buf[buf_pos++] = s[s_pos];
-	 }
-  }
-  /* don't forget the null terminator */
-  buf[buf_pos] = '\0';
-
-  return buf;
-}
-
 /*
-  nb:
-
-  The popen() call to the external validator program is made here.
-*/
+ *  Call the external program auth_pwfile with user and password as its
+ *  arguments.  These should have been passed in over a pipe, but it's too
+ *  late to change that now.  The called program should print the name of the
+ *  valid user to stdout, or print "Authentication Error" on failure.
+ */
 static char *get_pw(request_rec *r, char *user, const char* password, char *auth_pwfile) {
-    configfile_t *f;
-    char* execstr;
-    char* l;
-    const char *rpw, *w;
-    FILE* ext_authprog;
-    FILE* fp;
-	 char *escaped_password;
+    char result[256];
+    int fd[2], i, length = 0;
+    pid_t pid;
 #ifdef __sun
     static char m_envstr[256]; /* sun's putenv() call is a bunch of bull malarkey */
 #endif
-    
-    l = (char*) malloc (MAX_STRING_LEN * sizeof(char));
-    execstr = (char*) malloc (MAX_STRING_LEN * sizeof(char));
 
-#ifdef __sun
-    snprintf (m_envstr, 256, "%s=%s\0", "REMOTE_ADDR", r -> connection -> remote_ip);
-    putenv (m_envstr);
-#else
-    setenv ("REMOTE_ADDR", r -> connection -> remote_ip, 1);
-#endif
-
-    /* escape the password */
-	 escaped_password = bash_single_quote_escape_string(password);
-
-    /* open the program stream */
-    snprintf (execstr, MAX_STRING_LEN, "%s %s \'%s\'", auth_pwfile, user, escaped_password);
-
-	 /* free the escaped password before we forget */
-	 free(escaped_password);
+    memset (result, '\0', sizeof(result));
 
-    if (!(ext_authprog = popen (execstr, "r"))) {
+    /* sanity check the auth_pwfile */
+    if ((auth_pwfile == NULL) || (auth_pwfile[0] != '/')) {
+        ap_log_rerror (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r, "Invalid program: %s",
+		       auth_pwfile);
+        return NULL;
+    }
 
-      ap_log_rerror (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r, "Could not popen() on program: %s: %s",
-		     auth_pwfile, strerror(errno));
-      return NULL;
+    /* set up our communication pipe */
+    if (pipe (fd) == -1) {
+        /* couldn't create pipe for some reason */
+        ap_log_rerror (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r, "Error creating pipe: %s",
+		       strerror(errno));
+        return NULL;
     }
-    /* whew, the popen() has seemingly succeeded, let's write the username passwd stuff*/
-    if (feof(ext_authprog) == 0)
-      fgets (l, MAX_STRING_LEN, ext_authprog);
-    pclose (ext_authprog);
-    
-    if (strncmp(l, "Authentication Error", 19) == 0) /* no authorized */
-      return NULL;
-    /* otherwise, we got a winner :), return user's real name */
-    return l;
 
-    /* ignore the rest */
-    /*    
-    if (!(f = ap_pcfg_openfile(r->pool, auth_pwfile))) {
-	ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r,
-		    "Could not open password file: %s", auth_pwfile);
+    /* start our child */
+    pid = fork ();
+    switch (pid) {
+    case -1:
+        /* fork failed -- clean up and return */
+        close (fd[0]);
+        close (fd[1]);
+        ap_log_rerror (APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r, "Error fork()ing: %s",
+		       strerror (errno));
 	return NULL;
+	break;
+    case 0:
+#ifdef __sun
+        snprintf (m_envstr, sizeof(m_envstr), "%s=%s", "REMOTE_ADDR",
+		  r -> connection -> remote_ip);
+        putenv (m_envstr);
+#else
+        setenv ("REMOTE_ADDR", r -> connection -> remote_ip, 1);
+#endif
+        /* close open fds */
+	i = sysconf (_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+	while (i >= 0) {
+	    if (i != fd[1]) {
+	        fcntl (i, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	    }
+	    i--;
+	}
+	/* make the write end of the pipe our stdout */
+	if (fd[1] != STDOUT_FILENO) {
+	    close (STDOUT_FILENO);
+	    dup2 (fd[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
+	    fcntl (STDOUT_FILENO, F_SETFD, 0);
+	    fcntl (fd[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	}
+        execl (auth_pwfile, auth_pwfile, user, password, NULL);
+	_exit (1);
+	break;
+    default:
+	/* parent: read what the child has to say, if anything */
+	close (fd[1]);
+	do {
+	    i = read (fd[0], result + length, sizeof(result) - length - 1);
+	    if (i != -1) {
+	        length += i;
+	    }
+	} while ((i != -1) && (i != 0) && (length < (sizeof(result) - 1)));
+	close (fd[0]);
+	break;
     }
-    
-    while (!(ap_cfg_getline(l, MAX_STRING_LEN, f))) {
-	if ((l[0] == '#') || (!l[0]))
-	    continue;
-	rpw = l;
-	w = ap_getword(r->pool, &rpw, ':');
 
-	if (!strcmp(user, w)) {
-	    ap_cfg_closefile(f);
-	    return ap_getword(r->pool, &rpw, ':');
-	}
+    while ((length > 0) &&
+           ((result[length - 1] == '\r') || (result[length - 1] == '\n'))) {
+        result[--length] = '\0';
     }
-    ap_cfg_closefile(f);
-    return NULL;
-    */
+
+    if ((strlen(result) == 0) ||
+        (strncmp(result, "Authentication Error", 19) == 0)) /* not authorized */
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* otherwise, we got a winner :), return user's real name */
+    return strdup(result);
 }
 
 static table *groups_for_user(pool *p, char *user, char *grpfile)
@@ -351,9 +322,7 @@
     conn_rec *c = r->connection;
     const char *sent_pw;
     char *real_pw;
-    char *invalid_pw;
     int res;
-    FILE* fp;
     
     if ((res = ap_get_basic_auth_pw(r, &sent_pw)))
 	return res;
@@ -423,8 +392,6 @@
     table *grpstatus;
     const array_header *reqs_arr = ap_requires(r);
     require_line *reqs;
-    FILE* fp;
-
     
     /* BUG FIX: tadc, 11-Nov-1995.  If there is no "requires" directive, 
      * then any user will do.