diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/Documentation/Configure.help linux-2.2.20-hap-2/Documentation/Configure.help
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/Documentation/Configure.help	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/Documentation/Configure.help	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -15291,6 +15291,17 @@
   same as that of the directory or the FIFO is opened without the
   O_CREAT flag.
 
+Allow links/pipes in non-world-writable +t dirs
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH
+  This makes the checks that CONFIG_SECURE_LINK and CONFIG_SECURE_PIPE
+  perform a little less restrictive.  Namely, links/pipes will work
+  again in +t directories if the directory is not world-writable.  Most
+  sticky directories (such as /tmp) *are* world-writable, but you may
+  have other +t directories which are not (to make safe group-writable
+  shared upload directories, for instance).  Say Y only if you have had
+  problems using the CONFIG_SECURE_LINK or CONFIG_SECURE_PIPE options
+  and you think you need this.
+
 Restricted /proc
 CONFIG_SECURE_PROC
   This option restricts the permissions on directories in /proc so
@@ -15302,6 +15313,13 @@
   disables dmesg(8) for the users. You might want to use this on an ISP
   shell server where privacy is an issue.
 
+Unofficial bugfixes
+CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX
+  Currently this fixes the following bug:
+  * stracing an unreadable binary (ie mode 111).  Note that there
+    are still ways to get around this at least on x86.
+  Say Y here unless you know you shouldn't.
+
 Special handling of fd 0, 1, and 2
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2
   File descriptors 0, 1, and 2 have a special meaning for the C library
@@ -15343,6 +15361,102 @@
   Note that this feature will do you no good unless you also configure
   your resource limits (in particular, RLIMIT_AS and RLIMIT_NPROC). Most
   systems don't need this.
+
+Extra logging of unusual events
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+  This turns on some extra kernel logging.  Right now this includes:
+  * some extra verbosity in the network layer (reporting about arp cache
+    changes, and complaining if someone tries to route through us and
+    we're not a router)
+  * also causes some packets that used to be dropped silently to get
+    whined about
+  * logs of who/what/when the system time changes
+  * logs when/why forks fail
+  * logs certain "lethal" signals: SIGSEGV, SIGBUS, SIGABRT, SIGILL
+  This is of limited use, and has some extra overhead, but isn't likely
+  to cause any problems.
+
+Paranoid networking
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+  This turns on some extra paranoia in tcp and udp net code.
+  Currently it does (or tries to):
+  * warns on packets to unserved UDP ports
+  * warns on packets to unserved TCP ports
+    * optionally, denies such packets (CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD)
+  * warns & denies TCP packets with invalid combinations of flags
+  * adds extra info to all IPFW log lines:
+    * length of TCP & data / UDP as well as IP length
+    * print TCP ACK and SEQ numbers in addition to IP ids
+    * prints all TCP flags set (Syn, Ack, Fin, Urg, etc)
+  It also hopefully banishes a longstanding bug with IPFW/IPchains
+  log printing when under heavy IO, where different printk'ed lines
+  step on each other/get truncated, etc.
+  Say Y unless you think it's breaking stuff (or you don't want the
+  log volume, which will be high on a busy server).
+
+Blackhole networking
+CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD
+  When CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK is enabled, this disables the usual
+  behavior of responding to unsolicited/"unserved" TCP packets with
+  a TCP RST, and to unserved UDP packets with an ICMP port-unreach.
+  Note that the UDP behavior is superfluous (can be easily done with
+  ipchains rules) but there's no convenient, desirable way to block
+  the RSTs other than this.  This is recommended for personal systems
+  and low-volume servers.  However, it is rude and breaks RFCs, so
+  it should be left off (the default behavior) for most systems,
+  unless you are *really* paranoid.
+
+Restricted chroot
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+  This causes chroot processes to be a bit more restricted.  Processes
+  which are already in a chroot(2)ed jail now cannot:
+  * chroot(2) again
+  * mknod(2) a character or block device
+  * mount(2) new/remounted filesystems
+  * ptrace(2) processes outside their jail
+  * kill(2) processes outside their jail (except sending SIGCHLD to parent)
+  These are a _few_ of the ways that a root-priv'ed process can break
+  out of a chrooted jail.  They are not all of them.  Basically, if
+  someone has root in a chrooted jail, no can defend -- they've got you.
+  But, this may help you detect the most common things such an intruder
+  would do.  The only way to win is not to play, however -- don't let
+  anything in a chrooted jail get root!  Simple, right?  ;)
+  This may break systems that use initrd, as that implies an original
+  chroot.  Or not -- the "is this process chrooted" test compares the
+  root of the current process to that of init; this may not break under
+  initrd (I have no initrd'd boxes on which to test).
+
+Restricted ptrace
+CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+  When enabled this disables system call tracing (ptrace) entirely for
+  non-root users.  It also prevents tracing syscalls the kernel itself
+  makes, which can confuse some programs such as strace.  When this
+  option is set, CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP can be used to enable
+  ptrace/strace for only certain users.
+  This option will also cause the logging of any *allowed* ptrace calls.
+
+Restricted ptrace usergroup
+CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+  Use this option to allow tracing by a special group (defaults to 0).
+  Users in this group (or processes with this group as egid) can use
+  the ptrace system call--but only against their own processes, unless
+  they are root.  The allowed group can be changed at runtime when
+  CONFIG_SECURE_SYSCTL is enabled, by 
+    echo XX > /proc/sys/kernel/security/trace_gid
+  For a number of boring reasons, the recommended way to use this is to
+  create a dedicated 'ptrace' group, put only trusted users in it, and
+    chgrp ptrace /usr/bin/strace; chmod 2110 /usr/bin/strace
+  (And do the same for other ptrace-using apps they need to run.)
+
+Security Sysctl
+CONFIG_SECURE_SYSCTL
+  If you say Y here, you will be able to change security options that
+  without having to recompile your kernel.  You can echo values to 
+  files in /proc/sys/kernel/security to enable (1) or disable (0) various 
+  features or change runtime configurables like the ptrace-allow group.
+  All features are enabled by default (and default to root-only).
+  Please note that this option could reduce the effectiveness of the
+  added security policy.
 
 #
 # A couple of things I keep forgetting:
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/alpha/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/alpha/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/alpha/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/alpha/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -333,10 +333,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -517,6 +517,9 @@
 sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data,
 	   int a4, int a5, struct pt_regs regs)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	unsigned long tmp;
 	long ret;
@@ -555,6 +558,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 		if (child->p_pptr != current) {
 			REMOVE_LINKS(child);
@@ -684,11 +735,18 @@
 }
 
 asmlinkage void
-syscall_trace(void)
+syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 	    != (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/arm/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/arm/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/arm/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/arm/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -488,10 +488,16 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -792,6 +792,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -828,6 +831,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 
 		if (child->p_pptr != current) {
@@ -855,12 +906,19 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
 	schedule();
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -427,11 +427,17 @@
 CONFIG_SECURE_STACK_SMART=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
-
+CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE=y
 #
 # Kernel hacking
 #
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -385,6 +385,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	struct user * dummy = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -425,6 +428,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
@@ -708,11 +759,18 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -401,11 +401,13 @@
  */
 		if ((addr & 0xFF800000) == 0xBF800000 ||
 		    (addr >= PAGE_OFFSET - _STK_LIM && addr < PAGE_OFFSET))
-			security_alert("return onto stack running as "
-				"UID %d, EUID %d, process %s:%d",
+			security_alert("return onto stack by %s[%d], UID %d, "
+				"EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
 				"returns onto stack",
-				current->uid, current->euid,
-				current->comm, current->pid);
+				current->comm, current->pid, current->uid,
+				current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+				current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+				current->p_pptr->euid);
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_STACK_SMART
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/m68k/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/m68k/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/m68k/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/m68k/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -243,10 +243,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
@@ -351,6 +354,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
@@ -604,13 +655,20 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	lock_kernel();
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		goto out;
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
 	schedule();
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/mips/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/mips/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/mips/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/mips/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -369,10 +369,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -258,6 +258,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	unsigned int flags;
 	int res;
@@ -308,6 +311,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
@@ -520,11 +571,18 @@
 	return res;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/ppc/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/ppc/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/ppc/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/ppc/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -499,10 +499,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:05 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -334,6 +334,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	int ret = -EPERM;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -372,6 +375,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
@@ -539,11 +590,18 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/s390/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/s390/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/s390/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/s390/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -194,10 +194,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:06 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, long addr, long data)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	struct task_struct *child;
 	int ret = -EPERM;
 	unsigned long tmp;
@@ -461,6 +464,54 @@
 		/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 		if (child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 		if (child->p_pptr != current) 
 		{
@@ -590,12 +641,19 @@
 	return ret;
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 	lock_kernel();
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 	    != (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	notify_parent(current, SIGCHLD);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -340,10 +340,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Kernel hacking
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:06 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -508,6 +508,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	unsigned long request = regs->u_regs[UREG_I0];
 	unsigned long pid = regs->u_regs[UREG_I1];
 	unsigned long addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_I2];
@@ -582,6 +585,55 @@
 			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
 			goto out;
 		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
 		if(child->p_pptr != current) {
@@ -922,14 +974,21 @@
 	unlock_kernel();
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 #ifdef DEBUG_PTRACE
 	printk("%s [%d]: syscall_trace\n", current->comm, current->pid);
 #endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	current->tss.flags ^= MAGIC_CONSTANT;
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc64/defconfig linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc64/defconfig
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc64/defconfig	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc64/defconfig	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -391,10 +391,15 @@
 #
 CONFIG_SECURE_LINK=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO=y
-# CONFIG_SECURE_PROC is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_PROC=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2=y
 CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC=y
 # CONFIG_SECURE_SHM is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING=y
+CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK=y
+# CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD is not set
+CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT=y
 
 #
 # Watchdog
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:06 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -537,6 +537,9 @@
 
 asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	int request = regs->u_regs[UREG_I0];
 	pid_t pid = regs->u_regs[UREG_I1];
 	unsigned long addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_I2];
@@ -620,6 +623,55 @@
 			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
 			goto out;
 		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) &&
+		    !(hap_same_root(current, child)) ) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it ptrace
+		 * any process not in the same jail with it
+		 */
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] within chrooted "
+	"jail [%s]:%lu by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+	"ptraces from a chrooted process",
+	child->comm, child->pid, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+	current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid,
+			    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+			    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+			    current->p_pptr->egid );
+			goto out;
+		}
+		security_alert("ptrace of %s[%d] by %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+		    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+		    "ptraces",
+		    child->comm, child->pid, current->comm,
+		    current->pid, current->uid,
+		    current->euid, current->gid,
+		    current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid, current->p_pptr->gid,
+		    current->p_pptr->egid );
+#endif
 		child->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 		write_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
 		if(child->p_pptr != current) {
@@ -1134,14 +1186,21 @@
 	unlock_kernel();
 }
 
-asmlinkage void syscall_trace(void)
+asmlinkage void syscall_trace(int unused)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	struct pt_regs *regs = (struct pt_regs *) &unused;
+#endif
 #ifdef DEBUG_PTRACE
 	printk("%s [%d]: syscall_trace\n", current->comm, current->pid);
 #endif
 	if ((current->ptrace & (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 			!= (PT_PTRACED|PT_TRACESYS))
 		return;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	if (!user_mode(regs))
+		return; /* Don't trace the kernel's syscalls */
+#endif
 	current->exit_code = SIGTRAP;
 	current->state = TASK_STOPPED;
 	current->tss.flags ^= MAGIC_CONSTANT;
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/exec.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/exec.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/exec.c	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/exec.c	Sat Nov 10 02:37:07 2001
@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@
  */
 int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	extern int sysctl_security_trace, sysctl_security_trace_gid;
+#endif
 	int mode;
 	int retval,id_change,cap_raised;
 	struct inode * inode = bprm->dentry->d_inode;
@@ -778,7 +781,55 @@
 			return retval;
 #endif
 	}
-
+/* Total mess of ifdef's follow. */
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX) || defined(CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE)
+	/* ptraced executables must be readable */
+	if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+		if (sysctl_security_trace && current->uid
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+			&& current->egid != sysctl_security_trace_gid
+#endif
+		) {
+			security_alert("denied ptrace of %s by %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "ptrace attempts",
+			    bprm->filename, current->comm, current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid,
+			    current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid);
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX
+		if ((retval = permission(bprm->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ)) != 0) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+			security_alert("refused ptrace of unreadable executable %s by "
+			    "%s[%d], UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+			    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+			    "unreadable executables ptraced",
+			    bprm->filename, current->comm, current->pid, current->uid,
+			    current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid,
+			    current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING */
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+	/* log all permitted ptrace's */
+	security_alert("ptrace of %s by %s[%d], "
+	    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d, parent %s[%d], "
+	    "UID/EUID %d/%d, GID/EGID %d/%d",
+	    "ptraces",
+	    bprm->filename, current->comm, current->pid, current->uid,
+	    current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+	    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid,
+	    current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE */
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX || CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE */
 	memset(bprm->buf,0,sizeof(bprm->buf));
 	return read_exec(bprm->dentry,0,bprm->buf,128,1);
 }
@@ -946,6 +997,22 @@
 	int retval;
 	int i;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+	/*
+	 * This process is in a chrooted jail; log everything it exec's
+	 */
+		security_alert("exec of %s within chrooted jail [%s]:%lu by "
+			"%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			"execs from a chrooted process",
+			filename, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,current->comm,
+			current->pid,current->uid, current->euid,
+			current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid );
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT */
+	
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC
 /*
  * This check is similar to that done in kernel/fork.c, except that we
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/namei.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/namei.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/namei.c	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/namei.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -306,18 +306,28 @@
 			if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
 			    (base->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
 			    inode->i_uid != base->d_inode->i_uid &&
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH
+			/*
+			 * Let this happen as long as the +t dir is
+			 * not world-writable.
+			 */
+			    (base->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH) &&
+#endif
 			    current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) {
-				security_alert("not followed symlink of %d.%d "
-					"by UID %d, EUID %d, process %s:%d",
+				security_alert("not followed symlink of [%s]:%lu "
+					"owned by %d.%d by %s[%d], UID %d, "
+					"EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
 					"symlinks not followed",
-					inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid,
-					current->uid, current->euid,
-					current->comm, current->pid);
+					kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino,
+					inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+					current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+					current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+					current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
 				dput(dentry);
 				dput(base);
 				return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
 			}
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_LINK */
 
 			if (current->need_resched) {
 				current->state = TASK_RUNNING;	
@@ -756,19 +766,28 @@
 		if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) && !(flag & O_EXCL) &&
 		    (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
 		    inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid &&
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH
+		/*
+		 * Let this happen as long as the +t dir isn't world-writable
+		 */
+		    (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH) &&
+#endif
 		    current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) {
 			if (!permission(inode, acc_mode))
-			security_alert("denied writing FIFO of %d.%d "
-				"by UID %d, EUID %d, process %s:%d",
+			security_alert("denied writing FIFO [%s]:%lu owned "
+				"by %d.%d by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent "
+				"%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
 				"writes into a FIFO denied",
-				inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid,
-				current->uid, current->euid,
-				current->comm, current->pid);
+				kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino,
+				inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+				current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+				current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+				current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
 			error = -EACCES;
 			unlock_dir(dir);
 			goto exit;
 		}
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO */
 
 		/*
 		 * Somebody might have created the file while we
@@ -909,6 +928,10 @@
 {
 	int error;
 	char * tmp;
+	struct dentry * dentry;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	char hap_dev_mode;
+#endif
 
 	lock_kernel();
 	error = -EPERM;
@@ -927,7 +950,41 @@
 	tmp = getname(filename);
 	error = PTR_ERR(tmp);
 	if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
-		struct dentry * dentry = do_mknod(tmp,mode,dev);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+		if (!S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
+		    if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+		    /*
+		     * This process is in a chrooted jail; don't let it
+		     * make a raw device through which to break out (by
+		     * double-mounting an fs, reading kmem, kybd, etc)
+		     */
+			switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+			    case S_IFREG:	hap_dev_mode = 'r';	break;
+			    case S_IFCHR:	hap_dev_mode = 'c';	break;
+			    case S_IFBLK:	hap_dev_mode = 'b';	break;
+			    case S_IFSOCK:	hap_dev_mode = 's';	break;
+			    default:		hap_dev_mode = 'u';
+			}
+			security_alert("refused attempt to mknod %c:[%s] (%s) "
+			    "from chrooted jail [%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d by "
+			    "%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID "
+			    "%d, EUID %d",
+			    "chrooted mknods denied",
+			    hap_dev_mode, kdevname(dev), tmp,
+			    kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			    current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			    current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+			putname(tmp);
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		    }
+		}
+#endif
+		dentry = do_mknod(tmp,mode,dev);
 		putname(tmp);
 		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
@@ -1258,13 +1315,21 @@
 	    ((inode->i_mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
 	    (error = permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) &&
 	    !capable(CAP_FOWNER) &&
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH
+	/*
+	 * Let users hard link to files in their group.
+	 */
+	    current->fsgid != inode->i_gid &&
+#endif
 	    current->uid) {
-		security_alert("denied hard link to %d.%d "
-			"for UID %d, EUID %d, process %s:%d",
+		security_alert("denied hard link to [%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d "
+			"by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
 			"hard links denied",
+			kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino,
 			inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid,
-			current->uid, current->euid,
-			current->comm, current->pid);
+			current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
 		goto exit_lock;
 	}
 #endif
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/open.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/open.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/open.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:08 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/open.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -402,6 +402,9 @@
 	int error;
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct dentry *dentry, *tmp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	char * hap_new_chroot_path;
+#endif
 
 	lock_kernel();
 	
@@ -423,11 +426,55 @@
 	error = -EPERM;
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
 		goto dput_and_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+	/*
+	 * This process is already in a chrooted jail; don't let it chroot out.
+	 */
+		if (IS_ERR(hap_new_chroot_path = getname(filename)))
+			hap_new_chroot_path = "[err]";
+		security_alert("refused attempt to chroot from [%s]:%lu to "
+		    "[%s]:%lu (%s) owned by %d.%d, process %s[%d], UID %d, "
+		    "EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+		    "double chroots denied",
+		    kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+      		    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+		    kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino, hap_new_chroot_path,
+		    inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid,
+		    current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+		    current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+		    current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+		putname(hap_new_chroot_path);
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto dput_and_out;
+	}
+#endif
 
 	/* exchange dentries */
 	tmp = current->fs->root;
 	current->fs->root = dentry;
 	dentry = tmp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	/* drop various dangerous capabilities when chrooting
+	 * note init is exempt for initrd-type games */
+	if (current->pid && current->pid > 1) {
+		cap_lower(current->cap_permitted,
+			CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+			CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO &
+			CAP_SYS_PACCT & CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT &
+			CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME & CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+		cap_lower(current->cap_inheritable,
+			CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+			CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO &
+			CAP_SYS_PACCT & CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT &
+			CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME & CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+		cap_lower(current->cap_effective,
+			CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+			CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO &
+			CAP_SYS_PACCT & CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT &
+			CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME & CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+	}
+#endif
 	error = 0;
 
 dput_and_out:
@@ -464,6 +511,31 @@
 		goto out_putf;
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	if ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) {
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it turn on the set[ug]id bits.
+		 */
+			security_alert("refused attempt to fchmod +s [%s]:%lu "
+			    "owned by %d.%d to mode 0%07o from chrooted jail "
+			    "[%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID "
+			    "%d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			    "chrooted fchmod +s's denied",
+			    kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino,
+			    inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, mode,
+			    kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			    current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			    current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+			err = -EPERM;
+			goto out_putf;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
@@ -481,6 +553,9 @@
 	struct inode * inode;
 	int error;
 	struct iattr newattrs;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	char * hap_chmod_filename;
+#endif
 
 	lock_kernel();
 	dentry = namei(filename);
@@ -500,6 +575,34 @@
 
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	if ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) {
+		if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+		/*
+		 * This process is chrooted; don't let it turn on the set[gu]id bits.
+		 */
+			if (IS_ERR(hap_chmod_filename = getname(filename)))
+				hap_chmod_filename = "[err]";
+			security_alert("refused attempt to chmod +s [%s]:%lu "
+			    "(%s) owned by %d.%d to mode 0%07o from chrooted "
+			    "jail [%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d by %s[%d], UID %d, "
+			    "EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			    "chrooted chmod +s's denied",
+			    kdevname(inode->i_dev), inode->i_ino, hap_chmod_filename,
+			    inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, mode,
+			    kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+			    current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			    current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			    current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+			putname(hap_chmod_filename);
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto dput_and_out;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	error = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/super.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/super.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/fs/super.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:08 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/fs/super.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
 #include <linux/kmod.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * We use a semaphore to synchronize all mount/umount
  * activity - imagine the mess if we have a race between
@@ -1045,10 +1049,42 @@
 	unsigned long flags = 0;
 	unsigned long page = 0;
 	struct file dummy;	/* allows read-write or read-only flag */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	char * hap_mount_dev;
+	char * hap_mount_path;
+#endif
 
 	lock_kernel();
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	if (!(hap_same_root_as_init(current))) {
+	/*
+	 * This process is in a chrooted jail; don't let it (re)mount any filesystems.
+	 */
+		if(IS_ERR(hap_mount_dev = getname(dev_name)))
+			hap_mount_dev = "nodev";
+		if(IS_ERR(hap_mount_path = getname(dir_name)))
+			hap_mount_path = "[err]";
+		security_alert("refused attempt to mount [%s] as %s "
+		    "from chrooted jail [%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d by "
+		    "%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID "
+		    "%d, EUID %d",
+		    "chrooted mounts denied",
+		    hap_mount_dev, hap_mount_path,
+		    kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+		    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+		    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+		    current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, current->comm, current->pid,
+		    current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+		    current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid,
+		    current->p_pptr->euid);
+		putname(hap_mount_dev);         
+		putname(hap_mount_path);
+		retval = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#endif
 	if ((new_flags &
 	     (MS_MGC_MSK | MS_REMOUNT)) == (MS_MGC_VAL | MS_REMOUNT)) {
 		retval = copy_mount_options (data, &page);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/kernel.h linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/kernel.h
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/kernel.h	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/kernel.h	Sat Nov 10 02:20:12 2001
@@ -89,18 +89,33 @@
 \
 	spin_lock(&security_alert_lock); \
 \
-/* Make sure at least one minute passed since the last warning logged */ \
-	if (!warning_time || jiffies - warning_time > 60 * HZ) { \
+/* Make sure at least one second passed since the last warning logged */ \
+	if (!warning_time || jiffies - warning_time > HZ) { \
 		warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 1; \
-		printk(KERN_ALERT "Security: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "Security: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
 	} else if (no_flood_yet) { \
 		warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 0; \
-		printk(KERN_ALERT "Security: more " flood_msg \
-			", logging disabled for a minute\n"); \
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "Security: more " flood_msg \
+			", logging disabled for one second\n"); \
 	} \
 \
 	spin_unlock(&security_alert_lock); \
 })
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+#define hap_same_root(haptask1, haptask2)				\
+	/* if root devices and inodes match, processes share a		\
+	 * common root (neither, or both together, are chrooted) */	\
+	((haptask1->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==				\
+	  haptask2->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&			\
+	 (haptask1->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==				\
+	  haptask2->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) )
+
+#define hap_same_root_as_init(haptask)				\
+	/* compare the given process to init */			\
+	hap_same_root(haptask,					\
+		(task[smp_num_cpus] ? : task[0])) /* voodoo */
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT */
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/sysctl.h
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/sysctl.h	Sun Mar 25 11:37:40 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/sysctl.h	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@
 	KERN_SHMALL=41,		/* int: maximum size of shared memory */
 	KERN_SPARC_STOP_A=44,	/* int: Sparc Stop-A enable */
 	KERN_HOTPLUG=49,	/* string: path to hotplug policy agent */
-	KERN_IEEE_EMULATION_WARNINGS=50 /* int: unimplemented ieee instructions */
+	KERN_IEEE_EMULATION_WARNINGS=50, /* int: unimplemented ieee instructions */
+	KERN_SECURITY=51	/* Security */ 
 };
 
 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/tasks.h linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/tasks.h
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/linux/tasks.h	Sun Mar 25 11:31:03 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/linux/tasks.h	Sat Nov 10 02:20:12 2001
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 #define NR_CPUS 1
 #endif
 
-#define NR_TASKS	4080	/* On x86 Max about 4000 */
+#define NR_TASKS	2048	/* On x86 Max about 4000 */
 
 #define MAX_TASKS_PER_USER 256
 #define MIN_TASKS_LEFT_FOR_ROOT 64
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/net/dst.h linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/net/dst.h
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/include/net/dst.h	Sun Mar 25 11:31:07 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/include/net/dst.h	Sat Nov 10 02:21:36 2001
@@ -16,7 +16,11 @@
  * 1 - rare events and bugs (default)
  * 2 - trace mode.
  */
-#define RT_CACHE_DEBUG		0
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+#define RT_CACHE_DEBUG         1
+#else
+#define RT_CACHE_DEBUG         0
+#endif
 
 #define DST_GC_MIN	(1*HZ)
 #define DST_GC_INC	(5*HZ)
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/fork.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/fork.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/fork.c	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/fork.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -746,6 +746,15 @@
 		free_uid(p);
 bad_fork_free:
 	free_task_struct(p);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+	security_alert("fork failure errno %d by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, "
+		"parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+		"fork failures",
+		retval, current->comm, current->pid,
+		current->uid, current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+		current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	goto bad_fork;
 }
 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/signal.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/signal.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/signal.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:16 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/signal.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	struct task_struct * hap_init_task;
+#endif
 
 #if DEBUG_SIG
 printk("SIG queue (%s:%d): %d ", t->comm, t->pid, sig);
@@ -270,13 +273,67 @@
 	    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
 	    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
 		goto out_nolock;
-
-	/* The null signal is a permissions and process existance probe.
-	   No signal is actually delivered.  Same goes for zombies.
-	   We have to grab the spinlock now so that we do not race
+	/* We have to grab the spinlock now so that we do not race
 	   with flush_signals. */
-	ret = 0;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+	/*
+	 * chrooted processes can only send signals to other processes in
+	 * the same jail, with the exception that they can send SIGALRM and
+	 * SIGIO to any process, and SIGCHLD to their parent, regardless.
+	 */
+	/*
+	 * this is still needed with the hap_same_root macros because we
+	 * have to check init's task struct to be careful not to deref a
+	 * null pointer later
+	 */
+	hap_init_task = task[smp_num_cpus] ? : task[0]; /* find task for init */
+	if ( 	/* noop for 'signal zero' */
+		sig &&
+
+		/* be careful not to deref a null pointer later */
+		t->pid && t->fs && t->fs->root && t->fs->root->d_inode && t->p_pptr &&
+		current->pid && current->fs && current->fs->root &&
+		current->fs->root->d_inode && current->p_pptr &&
+		hap_init_task && hap_init_task->pid && hap_init_task->fs &&
+		hap_init_task->fs->root && hap_init_task->fs->root->d_inode &&
+
+		/* real work starting: check if signal is "mostly harmless" */
+	     !( sig == SIGALRM || sig == SIGIO ||
+
+ 		/* check if current is not chrooted */
+		(hap_same_root_as_init(current)) ||
+
+		/* else check if current && target are under same chroot */
+		(hap_same_root(t, current)) ||
+
+		/* else check if child is sending parent SIGCHILD */
+		(t->pid == current->p_pptr->pid && sig == SIGCHLD) ) ) {
+
+		/* Note: if target is init, its parent is task 0 */
+		security_alert("refused signal %d out of chrooted jail [%s]:%lu "
+			"owned by %d.%d by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent "
+			"%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d to %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d with "
+			"root [%s]:%lu owned by %d.%d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			"refused signals",
+			sig, kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, current->comm,
+			current->pid, current->uid, current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm,
+			current->p_pptr->pid, current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid,
+			t->comm, t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, kdevname(t->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			t->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, t->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			t->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid, t->p_pptr->comm, t->p_pptr->pid,
+			t->p_pptr->uid, t->p_pptr->euid);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
+		goto out_nolock;
+	}
+
+#endif
+	ret = 0;
+	/* The null signal is a permissions and process existance probe.
+	   No signal is actually delivered.  Same goes for zombies. */
 	if (!sig || !t->sig) {
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
 		goto out_nolock;
@@ -301,6 +358,34 @@
 		/* Inflict this corner case with recalculations, not mainline */
 		recalc_sigpending(t);
 		break;
+#if CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+	case SIGSEGV: case SIGILL: case SIGABRT: case SIGBUS:
+#ifdef __i386__
+		security_alert("signal %d (%s addr 0x%08lx) sent to "
+			"%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, "
+			"by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			"signal warnings",
+			sig, (t->tss.error_code & 2) ? "write" : "read or execute",
+			t->tss.cr2,
+			t->comm, t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->p_pptr->comm,
+			t->p_pptr->pid, t->p_pptr->uid, t->p_pptr->euid,
+			current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+#else
+		security_alert("signal %d sent to "
+			"%s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, "
+			"by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d",
+			"signal warnings",
+			sig,
+			t->comm, t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->p_pptr->comm,
+			t->p_pptr->pid, t->p_pptr->uid, t->p_pptr->euid,
+			current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+			current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+			current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
+		break;
+#endif
 	}
 
 	/* Optimize away the signal, if it's a signal that can be
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/sysctl.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/sysctl.c	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/sysctl.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -96,12 +96,20 @@
 static ctl_table fs_table[];
 static ctl_table debug_table[];
 static ctl_table dev_table[];
-
+static ctl_table security_table[];
 
 /* /proc declarations: */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 
+/* Keep these here reguardless if CONFIG_SECURE_SYSCTL is defined or not */
+int sysctl_security = 1;
+int sysctl_security_trace = 1;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+int sysctl_security_trace_gid = 0;
+#endif
+
 static ssize_t proc_readsys(struct file *, char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 static ssize_t proc_writesys(struct file *, const char *, size_t, loff_t *);
 static int proc_sys_permission(struct inode *, int);
@@ -251,6 +259,18 @@
 	 &sysctl_ieee_emulation_warnings,sizeof(int),0644,NULL,&proc_dointvec},
 #endif
 #endif 
+	{KERN_SECURITY, "security", NULL, 0, 0550, security_table},
+	{0}
+};
+
+enum {SEC_TRACE=1, SEC_TRACE_GID , SEC_SYSCTL};
+static ctl_table security_table[] = {
+	{SEC_TRACE, "trace", &sysctl_security_trace, sizeof (int),
+	0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+	{SEC_TRACE_GID, "trace_gid", &sysctl_security_trace_gid, sizeof (int),
+	0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
 	{0}
 };
 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/time.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/time.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/kernel/time.c	Sun Mar 25 11:31:02 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/kernel/time.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -108,6 +108,14 @@
 	time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
 	time_esterror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
 	write_unlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+	security_alert("time set by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], "
+		"UID %d, EUID %d",
+		"time sets",
+		current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+		current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -184,6 +192,14 @@
 		 * globally block out interrupts when it runs.
 		 */
 		do_settimeofday(tv);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+	security_alert("time set by %s[%d], UID %d, EUID %d, parent %s[%d], "
+		"UID %d, EUID %d",
+		"time sets",
+		current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid,
+		current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/core/utils.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/core/utils.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/core/utils.c	Sun Mar 25 11:31:12 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/core/utils.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -35,12 +35,21 @@
 	net_random();
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+int net_msg_cost = HZ;
+#else
 int net_msg_cost = 5*HZ;
+#endif
 int net_msg_burst = 10*5*HZ;
 
 /* 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+ * This enforces a rate limit: not more than one kernel message
+ * every 1secs to make a denial-of-service attack harder.
+#else
  * This enforces a rate limit: not more than one kernel message
  * every 5secs to make a denial-of-service attack impossible.
+#endif
  *
  * All warning printk()s should be guarded by this function. 
  */ 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/ip_fw.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/ip_fw.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/ip_fw.c	Sun Mar 25 11:31:12 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/ip_fw.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -416,34 +416,83 @@
 	__u32 *opt = (__u32 *) (ip + 1);
 	int opti;
 	
-	if (f)
-	{
+	if (f) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+		/* log any accepted packet at kern.debug instead of kern.info */
+		if (f->simplebranch==FW_ACCEPT ||
+			f->simplebranch==FW_REDIRECT ||
+			f->simplebranch==FW_MASQUERADE)
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "Packet log: %s ",chainlabel);
+		else
+#endif
 		printk(KERN_INFO "Packet log: %s ",chainlabel);
-		
 		printk("%s ",branchname(f->branch,f->simplebranch));
 		if (f->simplebranch==FW_REDIRECT)
 			printk("%d ",f->ipfw.fw_redirpt);
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+	if (ip->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP
+	    && !(ip->frag_off & __constant_htons(IP_OFFSET))) {
+		struct tcphdr *tcp = (struct tcphdr *)((__u32 *)ip + ip->ihl);
+		printk("%s PROTO=TCP %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu "
+			"L=%hu:%hu:%hu S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu:%u:%u F=0x%4.4hX "
+			"T=%hu %c%c%c%c%c%c",
+			ifname,
+			NIPQUAD(ip->saddr), src_port,
+			NIPQUAD(ip->daddr), dst_port,
+			ntohs(ip->tot_len), ntohs(ip->tot_len) - ip->ihl*4,
+			ntohs(ip->tot_len) - ip->ihl*4 - tcp->doff*4,
+			ip->tos, ntohs(ip->id), ntohl(tcp->seq),
+			ntohl(tcp->ack_seq), ip->frag_off, ip->ttl,
+			tcp->ack ? 'A' : '.',
+			tcp->syn ? 'S' : '.',
+			tcp->fin ? 'F' : '.',
+			tcp->rst ? 'R' : '.',
+			tcp->psh ? 'P' : '.',
+			tcp->urg ? 'U' : '.' );
+	} else if (ip->protocol == IPPROTO_UDP
+	    && !(ip->frag_off & __constant_htons(IP_OFFSET))) {
+		struct udphdr *udp = (struct udphdr *)((__u32 *)ip + ip->ihl);
+		printk("%s PROTO=UDP %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu "
+			"L=%hu:%u S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu F=0x%4.4hX T=%hu",
+			ifname,
+			NIPQUAD(ip->saddr), src_port,
+			NIPQUAD(ip->daddr), dst_port,
+			ntohs(ip->tot_len), ntohs(udp->len),
+			ip->tos, ntohs(ip->id), ip->frag_off, ip->ttl);
+	} else if (ip->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP
+	    && !(ip->frag_off & __constant_htons(IP_OFFSET))) {
+		struct icmphdr *icmp = (struct icmphdr *)((__u32 *)ip + ip->ihl);
+		printk("%s PROTO=ICMP/%d:%d %d.%d.%d.%d %d.%d.%d.%d L=%hu "
+			"S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu:%hu:%hu F=0x%4.4hX T=%hu",
+			ifname, icmp->type, icmp->code,
+			NIPQUAD(ip->saddr),
+			NIPQUAD(ip->daddr),
+			ntohs(ip->tot_len), ip->tos,
+			ntohs(ip->id), ntohs(icmp->un.echo.id),
+			ntohs(icmp->un.echo.sequence),
+			ip->frag_off, ip->ttl);
+	} else {
+#endif
 	printk("%s PROTO=%d %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu %d.%d.%d.%d:%hu"
 	       " L=%hu S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu F=0x%4.4hX T=%hu",
 	       ifname, ip->protocol,
-	       (ntohl(ip->saddr)>>24)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->saddr)>>16)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->saddr)>>8)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->saddr))&0xFF,
-	       src_port,
-	       (ntohl(ip->daddr)>>24)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->daddr)>>16)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->daddr)>>8)&0xFF,
-	       (ntohl(ip->daddr))&0xFF,
-	       dst_port,
+	       NIPQUAD(ip->saddr), src_port,
+	       NIPQUAD(ip->daddr), dst_port,
 	       ntohs(ip->tot_len), ip->tos, ntohs(ip->id),
 	       ntohs(ip->frag_off), ip->ttl);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+	    }
+#endif
 
 	for (opti = 0; opti < (ip->ihl - sizeof(struct iphdr) / 4); opti++)
 		printk(" O=0x%8.8X", *opt++);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+	printk(" (#%d)\n", count);
+#else
 	printk(" %s(#%d)\n", syn ? "SYN " : /* "PENANCE" */ "", count);
+#endif
 }
 
 /* function for checking chain labels for user space. */
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/route.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/route.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/route.c	Fri Nov  2 11:39:16 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/route.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -715,12 +715,20 @@
 	return;
 
 reject_redirect:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+	security_alert("redirect from %d.%d.%d.%d/%s to %d.%d.%d.%d ignored; "
+			"path = %d.%d.%d.%d -> %d.%d.%d.%d, tos %02x\n",
+			"redirects ignored",
+			NIPQUAD(old_gw), dev->name, NIPQUAD(new_gw),
+			NIPQUAD(saddr), NIPQUAD(daddr), tos);
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
 	if (IN_DEV_LOG_MARTIANS(in_dev) && net_ratelimit())
 		printk(KERN_INFO "Redirect from %X/%s to %X ignored."
 		       "Path = %X -> %X, tos %02x\n",
 		       ntohl(old_gw), dev->name, ntohl(new_gw),
 		       ntohl(saddr), ntohl(daddr), tos);
+#endif
 #endif
 }
 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	Sun Mar 25 11:37:41 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -1747,6 +1747,14 @@
 	   len < (th->doff * 4))
 		goto bad_packet;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+	/* Throw out packets with clearly bogus flags. */
+	if ( !	(th->ack || th->syn || th->rst) ||
+		(th->fin && (th->syn || th->rst) ) ||
+		(th->rst && (th->syn || th->urg) ) ||
+		(th->syn && th->urg) )
+	goto tcp_bad_flags;
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_IP_TRANSPARENT_PROXY
 	if (IPCB(skb)->redirport)
 		sk = tcp_v4_proxy_lookup(th->dest, skb->nh.iph->saddr, th->source,
@@ -1762,7 +1770,11 @@
 	}
 #endif
 	if (!sk)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+		goto tcp_unserved;
+#else
 		goto no_tcp_socket;
+#endif
 	if(!ipsec_sk_policy(sk,skb))
 		goto discard_it;
 
@@ -1780,6 +1792,52 @@
 
 	__skb_queue_tail(&sk->back_log, skb);
 	return 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+
+tcp_bad_flags:
+	if(net_ratelimit())
+	    printk(KERN_INFO
+		"Packet log: badflag DENY %s PROTO=TCP %d.%d.%d.%d:%d "
+		"%d.%d.%d.%d:%d L=%hu:%u:%u S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu:%u:%u "
+		"T=%hu %c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
+		skb->dev->name, NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->saddr), ntohs(th->source),
+		NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->daddr), ntohs(th->dest),
+		ntohs(skb->nh.iph->tot_len), skb->len, skb->len - th->doff*4,
+		skb->nh.iph->tos, ntohs(skb->nh.iph->id), ntohl(th->seq),
+		ntohl(th->ack_seq), skb->nh.iph->ttl,
+		th->ack ? 'A' : '.',
+		th->syn ? 'S' : '.',
+		th->fin ? 'F' : '.',
+		th->rst ? 'R' : '.',
+		th->psh ? 'P' : '.',
+		th->urg ? 'U' : '.' );
+	/*
+	 * This will cause tcp_send_reset to *not* send.
+	 */
+	th->rst=1;
+	goto no_tcp_socket;
+
+tcp_unserved:
+	if(net_ratelimit())
+	    printk(KERN_INFO
+		"Packet log: unserved DENY %s PROTO=TCP %d.%d.%d.%d:%d "
+		"%d.%d.%d.%d:%d L=%hu:%u:%u S=0x%2.2hX "
+		"I=%hu:%u:%u T=%hu %c%c%c%c%c%c\n",
+		skb->dev->name, NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->saddr), ntohs(th->source),
+		NIPQUAD(skb->nh.iph->daddr), ntohs(th->dest),
+		ntohs(skb->nh.iph->tot_len), skb->len, skb->len - th->doff*4,
+		skb->nh.iph->tos, ntohs(skb->nh.iph->id), ntohl(th->seq),
+		ntohl(th->ack_seq), skb->nh.iph->ttl,
+		th->ack ? 'A' : '.',
+		th->syn ? 'S' : '.',
+		th->fin ? 'F' : '.',
+		th->rst ? 'R' : '.',
+		th->psh ? 'P' : '.',
+		th->urg ? 'U' : '.' );
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD
+	th->rst=1;
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK */
 
 no_tcp_socket:
 	tcp_v4_send_reset(skb);
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/udp.c
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/net/ipv4/udp.c	Sun Mar 25 11:37:41 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/net/ipv4/udp.c	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -1137,6 +1137,14 @@
 			goto csum_error;
 #endif
   		udp_statistics.UdpNoPorts++;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+		/*
+		 * This will cause a message for _every_ UDP packet we didn't
+		 * ask for, _including_ broadcasts.  If you don't care about
+		 * broadcasts, move the following line inside the if { .. } below.
+		 */
+		goto udp_unserved_port;
+#else
 		icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
 
 		/*
@@ -1145,9 +1153,29 @@
 		 */
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return(0);
+#endif
   	}
 	udp_deliver(sk, skb);
 	return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+
+udp_unserved_port:
+	if(net_ratelimit())
+	    printk( KERN_INFO
+		"Packet log: unserved DENY %s PROTO=UDP %d.%d.%d.%d:%d %d.%d.%d.%d:%d "
+		"L=%hu:%u S=0x%2.2hX I=%hu T=%hu\n",
+		skb->dev->name, NIPQUAD(saddr), ntohs(uh->source),
+		NIPQUAD(daddr), ntohs(uh->dest), ntohs(skb->nh.iph->tot_len),
+		ntohs(uh->len), skb->nh.iph->tos, ntohs(skb->nh.iph->id),
+		skb->nh.iph->ttl);
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD
+	icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
+#endif
+	skb->sk = NULL;
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return(0);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK */
 
 csum_error:
 	/* 
diff -urP linux-2.2.20-ow1/security/Common.in linux-2.2.20-hap-2/security/Common.in
--- linux-2.2.20-ow1/security/Common.in	Sat Nov  3 13:14:57 2001
+++ linux-2.2.20-hap-2/security/Common.in	Fri Nov  9 19:16:17 2001
@@ -4,9 +4,26 @@
 
 bool 'Restricted links in /tmp' CONFIG_SECURE_LINK
 bool 'Restricted FIFOs in /tmp' CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO
+if [ "$CONFIG_SECURE_LINK" = "y" -o "CONFIG_SECURE_FIFO" = "y" ]; then
+	bool 'Allow links/fifos in non-world-writable +t dirs' CONFIG_SECURE_NOTSOMUCH
+fi
 bool 'Restricted /proc' CONFIG_SECURE_PROC
 bool 'Special handling of fd 0, 1, and 2' CONFIG_SECURE_FD_0_1_2
 bool 'Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execve(2)' CONFIG_SECURE_RLIMIT_NPROC
 if [ "$CONFIG_SYSVIPC" = "y" ]; then
 	bool 'Destroy shared memory segments not in use' CONFIG_SECURE_SHM
+fi
+bool 'Unofficial bugfixes' CONFIG_SECURE_BUGFIX
+bool 'Extra logging of unusual events' CONFIG_SECURE_LOGGING
+bool 'Paranoid networking' CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK
+if [ "$CONFIG_SECURE_NETWORK" = "y" ]; then
+	bool 'Blackhole networking' CONFIG_SECURE_NET_SBD
+fi
+bool 'Restricted chroot' CONFIG_SECURE_CHROOT
+bool 'Restricted ptrace' CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE
+if [ "$CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE" == "y" ]; then
+	bool '   Allow special group' CONFIG_SECURE_TRACE_USERGROUP
+fi
+if [ "$CONFIG_SYSCTL" == "y" ]; then
+	bool 'Security Sysctl Support' CONFIG_SECURE_SYSCTL
 fi