- fix vserver patch

[packages/kernel.git] / kernel-small_fixes.patch

diff --git a/kernel-small_fixes.patch b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
index f785fa9c0e01c07988053933fb97cefb10e82954..575bbe1fe7f5437efc4c79a0556853aed7f955b6 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel-small_fixes.patch
+++ b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
@@ -26,6 +26,18 @@
                                exit
                        fi
                done
+--- a/Makefile 2016-11-10 20:41:43.646224629 +0100
++++ b/Makefile 2016-11-10 20:40:35.640323501 +0100
+@@ -784,6 +774,9 @@
+ # Prohibit date/time macros, which would make the build non-deterministic
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS   += $(call cc-option,-Werror=date-time)
+ 
++# enforce correct pointer usage
++KBUILD_CFLAGS   += $(call cc-option,-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types)
++
+ # use the deterministic mode of AR if available
+ KBUILD_ARFLAGS := $(call ar-option,D)
+ 
 
 From 7a29ac474a47eb8cf212b45917683ae89d6fa13b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
@@ -112,86 +124,4 @@ index 29531ec..65fbfb7 100644
 +                      WQ_MEM_RECLAIM|WQ_FREEZABLE, 0, mp->m_fsname);
        if (!mp->m_eofblocks_workqueue)
                goto out_destroy_log;
- 
-
-From 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
-Subject: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
-
-Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
-(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
-to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
-paper.
-
-This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
-some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
-sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
-
-Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
-
-Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
-to remove the host limit in the future.
-
-v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
-
-Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
-Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
-Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-index d6c8f4cd0..91868bb 100644
---- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
- 
- /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
--int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
-+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
- 
- int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
- int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
-@@ -3458,7 +3458,7 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
-       static u32 challenge_timestamp;
-       static unsigned int challenge_count;
-       struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
--      u32 now;
-+      u32 count, now;
- 
-       /* First check our per-socket dupack rate limit. */
-       if (tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
-@@ -3466,13 +3466,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
-                                &tp->last_oow_ack_time))
-               return;
- 
--      /* Then check the check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
-+      /* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */
-       now = jiffies / HZ;
-       if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
-+              u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
-+
-               challenge_timestamp = now;
--              challenge_count = 0;
-+              WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, half +
-+                         prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit));
-       }
--      if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
-+      count = READ_ONCE(challenge_count);
-+      if (count > 0) {
-+              WRITE_ONCE(challenge_count, count - 1);
-               NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
-               tcp_send_ack(sk);
-       }
--- 
-cgit v1.0-17-g0c1e3