- up to 3.18.41

diff --git a/kernel-small_fixes.patch b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
index 75bcd274ae950ce457cf1f3e4b4deaf7bede102a..d4b603499b05f64e51b96e527678c26a94700ef8 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel-small_fixes.patch
+++ b/kernel-small_fixes.patch
@@ -26,122 +26,3 @@
                                exit
                        fi
                done
-From a0d876bf464ea9abeb3f74aaf6737b6bcfd650c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Date: Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:04:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/8] tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
-Status: RO
-Content-Length: 2797
-Lines: 78
-
-[ Upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 ]
-
-Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
-(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
-to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
-paper.
-
-This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
-some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
-sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
-
-Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
-
-Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
-to remove the host limit in the future.
-
-v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
-
-Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
-Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
-Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
----
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c |   12 +++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_most
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);
- 
- /* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */
--int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100;
-+int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 1000;
- 
- int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly;
- int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly;
-@@ -3293,12 +3293,18 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
-       static u32 challenge_timestamp;
-       static unsigned int challenge_count;
-       u32 now = jiffies / HZ;
-+      u32 count;
- 
-       if (now != challenge_timestamp) {
-+              u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
-+
-               challenge_timestamp = now;
--              challenge_count = 0;
-+              challenge_count = half +
-+                                prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
-       }
--      if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) {
-+      count = challenge_count;
-+      if (count > 0) {
-+              challenge_count = count - 1;
-               NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
-               tcp_send_ack(sk);
-       }
-From foo@baz Wed Aug 17 10:00:14 CEST 2016
-Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2016 10:00:14 +0200
-To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-Subject: tcp: make challenge acks faster
-
-From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
-When backporting upstream commit 75ff39ccc1bd ("tcp: make challenge acks
-less predictable") I negelected to use the correct ACCESS* type macros.
-This fixes that up to hopefully speed things up a bit more.
-
-Thanks to Chas Wiliams for the 3.10 backport which reminded me of this.
-
-Cc: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
-Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
-Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
-Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
-Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-Cc: Chas Williams <ciwillia@brocade.com>
-Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
----
- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c |    6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
-@@ -3299,12 +3299,12 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc
-               u32 half = (sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit + 1) >> 1;
- 
-               challenge_timestamp = now;
--              challenge_count = half +
-+              ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = half +
-                                 prandom_u32_max(sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);
-       }
--      count = challenge_count;
-+      count = ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count);
-       if (count > 0) {
--              challenge_count = count - 1;
-+              ACCESS_ONCE(challenge_count) = count - 1;
-               NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK);
-               tcp_send_ack(sk);
-       }

diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index f70d05b69b934f961c40b6cdbb2d760891804e50..7f2238eeb05734df11383477078c29f493368808 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
 
 %define                rel             1
 %define                basever         3.18
-%define                postver         .39
+%define                postver         .41
 
 # define this to '-%{basever}' for longterm branch
 %define                versuffix       -%{basever}
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ Source0:    http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/linux-%{basever}.tar.xz
 # Source0-md5: 9e854df51ca3fef8bfe566dbd7b89241
 %if "%{postver}" != ".0"
 Patch0:                http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/patch-%{version}.xz
-# Patch0-md5:  bac79805cf2ba55c8b10dbc48fc5d32f
+# Patch0-md5:  3beddc275c1e52bb43cf0eb813f5145d
 %endif
 Source1:       kernel.sysconfig