From: Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2003 19:27:12 +0000 (+0000) Subject: - new X-Git-Tag: auto/ac/sudo-1_6_7p5-5~3 X-Git-Url: http://git.pld-linux.org/?p=packages%2Fsudo.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=5cb05c0321b84e4caffe4a6b9cca8c562d5c307d - new Changed files: sudo-selinux.patch -> 1.1 --- diff --git a/sudo-selinux.patch b/sudo-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca452c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sudo-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +--- sudo-1.6.7p5/Makefile.in.selinux 2003-04-15 20:39:10.000000000 -0400 ++++ sudo-1.6.7p5/Makefile.in 2003-10-27 16:57:47.000000000 -0500 +@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ + # Libraries + LIBS = @LIBS@ + NET_LIBS = @NET_LIBS@ +-SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS) ++SELINUX_LIBS = -lselinux ++SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS) $(SELINUX_LIBS) + + # C preprocessor flags + CPPFLAGS = -I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ +@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ + sudoers_mode = @SUDOERS_MODE@ + + # Pass in paths and uid/gid + OS dependent defined +-DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode) ++DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode) -DWITH_SELINUX + + #### End of system configuration section. #### + +--- sudo-1.6.7p5/sudo.c.selinux 2003-04-15 20:39:14.000000000 -0400 ++++ sudo-1.6.7p5/sudo.c 2003-12-16 22:39:27.611732931 -0500 +@@ -101,6 +101,22 @@ + #include "interfaces.h" + #include "version.h" + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++#include /* for SECCLASS_CHR_FILE */ ++#include /* for is_selinux_enabled() */ ++#include /* for context-mangling functions */ ++#include ++ ++char *role_s = NULL; /* role spec'd by user in argv[] */ ++char *type_s = NULL; /* type spec'd by user in argv[] */ ++security_context_t new_context; /* our target security ID ("sid") */ ++security_context_t old_context; /* our original securiy ID ("old_context") */ ++char *ttyn = NULL; /* tty path */ ++security_context_t tty_context; /* current sid of tty */ ++security_context_t new_tty_context; /* sid to change to while running command*/ ++struct stat statbuf; ++#endif ++ + #ifndef lint + static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: sudo.c,v 1.334 2003/04/01 15:02:49 millert Exp $"; + #endif /* lint */ +@@ -358,6 +374,141 @@ + if (!(validated & FLAG_NOPASS)) + check_user(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ /* ++ * ++ * Step 1: Handle command-line arguments. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++ ++ if( is_selinux_enabled() ) { ++ ++ security_context_t context_s; /* our security context as a string */ ++ int context_length; ++ context_t context; /* manipulatable form of context_s */ ++ ++ ++ /* Fill in a default type if one hasn't been specified */ ++ if( role_s && !type_s ) { ++ if( get_default_type(role_s,&type_s) ) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr,"Couldn't get default type.\n"); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf( "Your type will be %s.\n", type_s ); ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ ++ /* ++ * Get the SID and context of the caller, and extract ++ * the username from the context. Don't rely on the Linux ++ * uid information - it isn't trustworthy. ++ */ ++ ++ /* Put the caller's SID into `old_context'. */ ++ if( 0!=(getprevcon(&old_context)) ) { ++ fprintf(stderr,"failed to get old_context.\n"); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf( "Your old context was %s\n", old_context ); ++#endif ++ /* ++ * Create a context structure so that we extract and modify ++ * components easily. ++ */ ++ context=context_new(old_context); ++ ++ /* ++ * ++ * Step 3: Construct a new SID based on our old SID and the ++ * arguments specified on the command line. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++ /* The first step in constructing a new SID for the new shell we * ++ * plan to exec is to take our old context in `context' as a * ++ * starting point, and modify it according to the options the user * ++ * specified on the command line. */ ++ ++ /* If the user specified a new role on the command line (if `role_s' * ++ * is set), then replace the old role in `context' with this new role. */ ++ if( role_s ) { ++ if( context_role_set(context,role_s)) { ++ fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new role %s\n",role_s); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Your new role is %s\n",context_role_get(context)); ++#endif ++ } /* if user specified new role */ ++ ++ /* If the user specified a new type on the command line (if `type_s' * ++ * is set), then replace the old type in `context' with this new type. */ ++ if( type_s ) { ++ if( context_type_set(context,type_s)) { ++ fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new type %s\n",type_s); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Your new type is %s\n",context_type_get(context)); ++#endif ++ } /* if user specified new type */ ++ ++ /* The second step in creating the new SID is to convert our modified * ++ * `context' structure back to a context string and then to a SID. */ ++ ++ /* Make `context_s' point to a string version of the new `context'. */ ++ if( !(new_context=context_str(context))) { ++ fprintf(stderr,"failed to convert new context to string\n" ); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Your new context is %s\n",new_context); ++#endif ++ ++ /* ++ * ++ * Step 4: Handle relabeling of the tty. ++ * ++ */ ++ ++ /* Fetch TTY information */ ++ ttyn=ttyname(0); ++ if (! ( ttyn==NULL || *ttyn=='\0')) { ++ if (getfilecon(ttyn,&tty_context) <0 ) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not retrieve tty information.\n"); ++ } else { ++ ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Your tty %s was labeled with SID %d\n", ttyn, tty_context); ++#endif ++ ++ new_tty_context = NULL; ++ if (security_compute_relabel(new_context,tty_context,SECCLASS_CHR_FILE,&new_tty_context) < 0) ++ fprintf(stderr, "Warning! Could not get new context for %s, not relabeling.\n", ttyn); ++ else ++ { ++ ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Relabeling tty %s to context %s\n", ttyn, new_tty_context); ++#endif ++ ++ /* Relabel it */ ++ if( setfilecon(ttyn,new_tty_context)!=0 ) { ++ fprintf(stderr,"sudo: error: setfilecon on %s to %s",ttyn,new_tty_context); ++ } ++ freecon(new_tty_context); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ } ++#endif + /* Build up custom environment that avoids any nasty bits. */ + new_environ = rebuild_env(sudo_mode, envp); + +@@ -414,10 +565,59 @@ + (void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL); + + #ifndef PROFILING +- if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) ++ if ((sudo_mode & MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0) { ++ exit(0); ++ } ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if( is_selinux_enabled() ) { ++ /* Fork, allowing parent to clean up after shell has executed */ ++ pid_t childPid=fork(); ++ if( childPid<0 ) { ++ int errsv=errno; ++ ++ fprintf(stderr,"sudo: failure forking: %s",strerror(errsv)); ++ exit(-1); ++ } else if (childPid) { ++ /* PARENT */ ++ wait(NULL); ++ ++#ifdef CANTSPELLGDB ++ printf("Restoring tty %s back to SID %d\n", ttyn, tty_context); ++#endif ++ ++ /* Cleanup TTY Context */ ++ setfilecon(ttyn,tty_context); ++ freecon(tty_context); ++ ++ /* Done! */ + exit(0); +- else +- EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */ ++ } ++ if (setexeccon(new_context) < 0) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not set exec context to %s.\n", new_context); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ freecon(new_context); ++ /* Close and reopen descriptors 0 through 2 */ ++ if( close(0) || close(1) || close(2) ) ++ { ++ fprintf(stderr,"Could not close descriptors.\n"); ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); ++ if (fd != 0) { ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); ++ if (fd != 1) { ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); ++ if (fd != 2) { ++ exit(-1); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ EXEC(safe_cmnd, NewArgv); /* run the command */ + #else + exit(0); + #endif /* PROFILING */ +@@ -693,6 +893,30 @@ + NewArgv++; + break; + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ case 'r': ++ /* Must have an associated SELinux role. */ ++ if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) ++ usage(1); ++ ++ role_s = NewArgv[1]; ++ ++ /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ ++ NewArgc--; ++ NewArgv++; ++ break; ++ case 't': ++ /* Must have an associated SELinux type. */ ++ if (NewArgv[1] == NULL) ++ usage(1); ++ ++ type_s = NewArgv[1]; ++ ++ /* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */ ++ NewArgc--; ++ NewArgv++; ++ break; ++#endif + #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H + case 'c': + /* Must have an associated login class. */ +--- sudo-1.6.7p5/sudo.man.in.selinux 2003-04-15 20:39:14.000000000 -0400 ++++ sudo-1.6.7p5/sudo.man.in 2003-12-11 17:35:52.000000000 -0500 +@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ + .IX Header "SYNOPSIS" + \&\fBsudo\fR \fB\-V\fR | \fB\-h\fR | \fB\-l\fR | \fB\-L\fR | \fB\-v\fR | \fB\-k\fR | \fB\-K\fR | \fB\-s\fR | + [ \fB\-H\fR ] [\fB\-P\fR ] [\fB\-S\fR ] [ \fB\-b\fR ] | [ \fB\-p\fR \fIprompt\fR ] +-[ \fB\-c\fR \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR ] [ \fB\-a\fR \fIauth_type\fR ] ++[ \fB\-c\fR \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR ] [ \fB\-a\fR \fIauth_type\fR ] [\fB\-r\fR \fIrole\fR ] [\fB\-t\fR \fItype\fR ] + [ \fB\-u\fR \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR ] \fIcommand\fR + .SH "DESCRIPTION" + .IX Header "DESCRIPTION" +@@ -327,6 +327,16 @@ + the group vector to the list of groups the target user is in. + The real and effective group IDs, however, are still set to match + the target user. ++.IP "\-r" 4 ++.IX Item "-r" ++The \fB\-r\fR (\fRrole\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the role specified by ++\fIROLE\fR. ++.IP "\-t" 4 ++.IX Item "-t" ++The \fB\-t\fR (\fRtype\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the have the type (domain) ++specified by ++\fITYPE\fR. ++If no type is specified, the default type is derived from the specified role. + .IP "\-S" 4 + .IX Item "-S" + The \fB\-S\fR (\fIstdin\fR) option causes \fBsudo\fR to read the password from +--- sudo-1.6.7p5/sudoers.selinux 2001-12-16 23:45:52.000000000 -0500 ++++ sudo-1.6.7p5/sudoers 2003-10-27 16:57:47.000000000 -0500 +@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ + # Defaults specification + + # User privilege specification +-root ALL=(ALL) ALL ++#You should not use sudo as root in an SELinux environment ++#root ALL=(ALL) ALL + + # Uncomment to allow people in group wheel to run all commands + # %wheel ALL=(ALL) ALL