- secuirty patch

Bug (bugtraq):
Researchers have discovered a timing attack on RSA keys, to which
OpenSSL is generally vulnerable, unless RSA blinding has been turned
on.

Typically, it will not have been, because it is not easily possible to
do so when using OpenSSL to provide SSL or TLS.

The enclosed patch switches blinding on by default. Applications that
wish to can remove the blinding with RSA_blinding_off(), but this is
not generally advised. It is also possible to disable it completely by
defining OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING at compile-time.

The performance impact of blinding appears to be small (a few
percent).

This problem affects many applications using OpenSSL, in particular,
almost all SSL-enabled Apaches. You should rebuild and reinstall
OpenSSL, and all affected applications.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has
assigned the name CAN-2003-0147 to this issue.

We strongly advise upgrading OpenSSL in all cases, as a precaution.

Changed files:
    openssl-sec3.patch -> 1.1

diff --git a/openssl-sec3.patch b/openssl-sec3.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..5cfc4ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-sec3.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+diff -u -r1.28.2.3 rsa_eay.c
+--- crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c       30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000      1.28.2.3
++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c       16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
+@@ -195,6 +195,25 @@
+       return(r);
+       }
+ 
++static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
++      {
++      int ret = 1;
++      CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
++      /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
++      if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
++              ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
++      CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
++      return ret;
++      }
++
++#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
++      do { \
++              if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \
++                              ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
++                              !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
++                      err_instr \
++      } while(0)
++
+ /* signing */
+ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+            unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+@@ -239,8 +258,8 @@
+               goto err;
+               }
+ 
+-      if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+-              RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
++      BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
++
+       if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+               if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ 
+@@ -318,8 +337,8 @@
+               goto err;
+               }
+ 
+-      if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
+-              RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
++      BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
++
+       if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
+               if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
+ 
+diff -u -r1.30.2.2 rsa_lib.c
+--- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c       30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000      1.30.2.2
++++ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c       16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
+@@ -72,7 +72,13 @@
+ 
+ RSA *RSA_new(void)
+       {
+-      return(RSA_new_method(NULL));
++      RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING
++      r->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
++#endif
++
++      return r;
+       }
+ 
+ void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+