This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'RA-branch'.

[packages/openssl.git] / openssl-security2.patch

diff --git a/openssl-security2.patch b/openssl-security2.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..5277735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-security2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c      29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000      1.85.2.14
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c      19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
+@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
+               if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+                       {
+                       al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-                      SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++                      /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+                       }
+ 
+               if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
+                               (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+                               {
+                               al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-                              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+-                              goto f_err;
++                              /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++                              /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
++                               * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
++                               * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
++                               * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
++                               * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
++                               * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
++                               * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
++                              p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
+                               }
+                       }
+ 
+               if (al != -1)
+                       {
+-#if 0
+-                      goto f_err;
+-#else
+                       /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+                        * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+-                       * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+-                       * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+-                       * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+-                       * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+-                       * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+-                       */
++                       * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+                       ERR_clear_error();
+                       i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+                       p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+                       p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+                       RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+                       }
+       
+               s->session->master_key_length=