- cosmetics
[packages/openssl.git] / openssl-security2.patch
1 --- ssl/s3_srvr.c       29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000      1.85.2.14
2 +++ ssl/s3_srvr.c       19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
3 @@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
4                 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
5                         {
6                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
7 -                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
8 +                       /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
9                         }
10  
11                 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
12 @@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
13                                 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
14                                 {
15                                 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
16 -                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
17 -                               goto f_err;
18 +                               /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
19 +
20 +                               /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
21 +                                * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
22 +                                * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
23 +                                * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
24 +                                * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
25 +                                * that the version number is wrong.  To avoid such attacks,
26 +                                * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
27 +                               p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
28                                 }
29                         }
30  
31                 if (al != -1)
32                         {
33 -#if 0
34 -                       goto f_err;
35 -#else
36                         /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
37                          * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
38 -                        * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
39 -                        * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
40 -                        * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
41 -                        * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
42 -                        * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
43 -                        */
44 +                        * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
45                         ERR_clear_error();
46                         i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
47                         p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
48                         p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
49                         RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
50 -#endif
51                         }
52         
53                 s->session->master_key_length=
This page took 0.031129 seconds and 3 git commands to generate.