diff -urN linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help --- linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help 2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/Documentation/Configure.help 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -2609,6 +2609,20 @@ If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read Documentation/modules.txt. If unsure, say `N'. +stealth networking support +CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH + Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp + ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you + are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT) + you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will + drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your + machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be + destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for + instance. + + If you want to compile it as a module, say M here and read + Documentation/modules.txt. If unsure, say `N'. + MAC address match support CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_MAC MAC matching allows you to match packets based on the source @@ -21729,6 +21743,612 @@ "Area6" will work for most boards. For ADX, select "Area5". +Grsecurity +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features that + will enhance the security of your system. It is highly recommended + that you say Y here and read through the help for each option so + you fully understand the features and can evaluate their usefulness + for your machine. + +Additional security levels +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW + + Low additional security + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will + be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number + of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any + conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot of + unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher security + levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the following features + are enabled: + + linking restrictions + fifo restrictions + random pids + enforcing nproc on execve() + restricted dmesg + random ip ids + enforced chdir("/") on chroot + + Medium additional security + ----------------------------------------------------------------------- + If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included in the + low additional security level will be enabled. These features provide + even more security to your system, though in rare cases they may + be incompatible with very old or poorly written software. If you + enable this option, make sure that your auth service (identd) is + running as gid 10 (usually group wheel). With this option the following + features (in addition to those provided in the low additional security + level) will be enabled: + + random tcp source ports + altered ping ids + failed fork logging + time change logging + signal logging + deny mounts in chroot + deny double chrooting + deny sysctl writes in chroot + deny mknod in chroot + deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot + deny pivot_root in chroot + denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port + /proc restrictions with special gid set to 10 (usually wheel) + address space layout randomization + + High additional security + ---------------------------------------------------------------------- + If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be enabled, + that will protect you against virtually all kinds of attacks against + your system. The much hightened security comes at a cost of an + increased chance of incompatabilities with rare software on your + machine. It is highly recommended that you view + and read about each option. + Also remember that since the /proc restrictions are + enabled, you must run your identd as group wheel (gid 10). + This security level enables the following features in addition to those + listed in the low and medium security levels: + + additional /proc restrictions + chmod restrictions in chroot + no signals, ptrace, or viewing processes outside of chroot + capability restrictions in chroot + deny fchdir out of chroot + priority restrictions in chroot + mprotect restrictions + removal of /proc//[maps|mem] + kernel stack randomization + mount/unmount/remount logging + kernel symbol hiding + +Customized additional security +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM + If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity + option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't + covered in the basic security levels. These additional features include + TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for grsecurity. It is + advised that you read through the help for each option to determine its + usefulness in your situation. + +Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to + be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel. + /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module + support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are + currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel. + Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that + you use the ACL system, as it is still possible for an attacker to + modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl. + If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional + case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing + legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem, + but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this + case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will + not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later. + Enabling this feature could make certain apps like VMWare stop working, + as they need to write to other locations in /dev/mem. + There are a few video cards that require write access to the BIOS, + one of which is the Savage. If you have this video card, you must say + N here, or Xfree86 will not function. + It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the + conditions above. + +Disable privileged I/O +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. + Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. + Unfortunately, some problems need this access to operate properly, + the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be + remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is + enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates + correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option + enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86 + and you still want to protect your kernel against modification, + use the ACL system. + +Hide kernel symbols +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and + displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted + to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective + provided the following conditions are met: + 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution + 2) You are using the ACL system and hiding other files such as your + kernel image and System.map + 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes + /proc/kcore + If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a + useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of + overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities. + +/proc//ipaddr support +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/ + directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task. + The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets. + This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response + to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the + process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via + the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns. + +Proc Restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem + will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. Depending + upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see + only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can + view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose + the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as + a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here. + +Restrict /proc to user only +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own + processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information, + and viewing kernel symbol and module information. + +Restrict /proc to user and group +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be + able to view all processes, network-related information, and + kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want + to run identd as a non-root user. + +Additional proc restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on + /proc that keep normal users from viewing cpu and device information. + +Dmesg(8) Restriction +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) + to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is + created. + +Linking restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users + will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in + world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the + symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be + able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. + +FIFO restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't + own in world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of + the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is + created. + +Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will + have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system + only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created. + +Single group for auditing +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features + will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended + if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large + amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, + a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created. + +GID for auditing +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID + Here you can choose the GID that will be the target of kernel auditing. + Remember to add the users you want to log to the GID specified here. + If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose here won't matter. + You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup script by echoing the GID + to the proper /proc entry. View the help on the sysctl option for more + information. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "audit_gid" is created. + +Chdir logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created. + +(Un)Mount logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is + created. + +IPC logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores, + and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created. + +Exec logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the + other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution + will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track + of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "exec_logging" is created. + WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially + on an active system. + +Resource logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG + If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will + be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current + limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. + +Signal logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as + SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program + occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "signal_logging" is created. + +Fork failure logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. + This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep + their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "forkfail_logging" is created. + +Time change logging +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "timechange_logging" is created. + +Chroot jail restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will + make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you + encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it + is recommended that you enable each one. + +Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix + domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended + that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. + +Deny shmat() out of chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach + to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. + It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, + a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. + +Protect outside processes +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid, + getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is + created. + +Deny mounts in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. + +Deny pivot_root in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use + a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It + works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This + function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out + of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is + created. + +Deny double-chroots +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot + again. This is a widely used method of breaking out of a chroot jail + and should not be allowed. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl + option with name "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. + +Deny fchdir outside of chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing + to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory + outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. + +Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted + applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. + The man page on chroot(2) states: + Note that this call does not change the current working + directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at + `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a + `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. + + It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break + any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. + +Deny (f)chmod +s in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod + or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects + against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is + created. + +Deny mknod in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to + mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it + would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same + as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from + anyhing from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which + they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended + that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. + +Restrict priority changes in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise + the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of + processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply + removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" + is created. + +Log all execs within chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged + to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain + applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and + is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. + +Deny sysctl writes in chroot +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to + write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc + interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. + +Chroot jail capability restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a + chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, + system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable + files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. + This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this + if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of + tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "chroot_caps" is created. + +Trusted path execution +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." + These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in + root-owned directories writeable only by root. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. + +Group for trusted path execution +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID + Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for. + Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID + specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose + here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created. + +Partially restrict non-root users +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the + group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to + execute files in directories they own that are not group or + world-writeable, or in directories owned by root and writeable only by + root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "tpe_restrict_all" is created. + +Randomized PIDs +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be + pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along + with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing + pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part + of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep + those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code + to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created. + +Larger entropy pools +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET + If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux + and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity + features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y + here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying + /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize. + +Truly random TCP ISN selection +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN + If you say Y here, Linux's default selection of TCP Initial Sequence + Numbers (ISNs) will be replaced with that of OpenBSD. Linux uses + an MD4 hash based on the connection plus a time value to create the + ISN, while OpenBSD's selection is random. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_isns" is created. + +Randomized IP IDs +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets + will be randomized. This hinders os fingerprinters and + keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable + portscan. Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging + to the same packet have the same id. By default linux only + increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host. + We use a port of the OpenBSD random ip id code to achieve the + randomness, while keeping the possibility of id duplicates to + near none. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "rand_ip_ids" is created. + +Randomized TCP source ports +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the + fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that + the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing + algorithm. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created. + +Randomized RPC XIDs +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC + If you say Y here, the method of determining XIDs for RPC requests will + be randomized, instead of using linux's default behavior of simply + incrementing the XID. If you want your RPC connections to be more + secure, say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "rand_rpc" is created. + +Socket restrictions +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options. + If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary + groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch + will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose. + +Deny all socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server + applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. + +Group for disabled socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID + Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to + add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID + specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose + here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created. + +Deny all client socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be + able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group + you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers + from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. + +Group for disabled client socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID + Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. + Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to + the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you + choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. + +Deny all server socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created. + +Group for disabled server socket access +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID + Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. + Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to + the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you + choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. + +Sysctl support +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that + grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your + kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity + to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries + are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value. + All features are disabled by default. Please note that this option could + reduce the effectiveness of the added security of this patch if an ACL + system is not put in place. Your init scripts should be read-only, and + root should not have access to adding modules or performing raw i/o + operations. All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock + entry should be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set. + *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT* + +Number of burst messages +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST + This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed + within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The + default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that + many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to + raise this value. + +Seconds in between log messages +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME + This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between + grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most + people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough + to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to + prevent flooding. + +Hide kernel processes +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN + If you say Y here, when the ACL system is enabled via gradm -E, + an additional ACL will be passed to the kernel that hides all kernel + processes. These processes will only be viewable by the authenticated + admin, or processes that have viewing access set. + +Maximum tries before password lockout +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES + This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt + to authorize themselves with the grsecurity ACL system before being + denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time. + The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password. + +Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds +CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT + This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to + authorize to the ACL system with the maximum number of invalid + passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force + a password. + Disable data cache CONFIG_DCACHE_DISABLE This option allows you to run the kernel with data cache disabled. diff -urN linux-2.4.21/Makefile linux-2.4.21/Makefile --- linux-2.4.21/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -123,9 +123,10 @@ CORE_FILES =kernel/kernel.o mm/mm.o fs/fs.o ipc/ipc.o NETWORKS =net/network.o CRYPTO =crypto/crypto.o +GRSECURITY =grsecurity/grsec.o LIBS =$(TOPDIR)/lib/lib.a -SUBDIRS =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto +SUBDIRS =kernel drivers mm fs net ipc lib crypto grsecurity DRIVERS-n := DRIVERS-y := @@ -265,7 +266,7 @@ export CPPFLAGS CFLAGS CFLAGS_KERNEL AFLAGS AFLAGS_KERNEL -export NETWORKS CRYPTO DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS +export NETWORKS CRYPTO DRIVERS LIBS HEAD LDFLAGS LINKFLAGS MAKEBOOT ASFLAGS GRSECURITY .S.s: $(CPP) $(AFLAGS) $(AFLAGS_KERNEL) -traditional -o $*.s $< @@ -284,6 +285,7 @@ $(CORE_FILES) \ $(DRIVERS) \ $(NETWORKS) \ $(CRYPTO) \ + $(GRSECURITY) \ $(LIBS) \ --end-group \ -o vmlinux diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -444,3 +444,12 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu + diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -240,6 +246,13 @@ if (!file) goto out; } + + if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + fput(file); + ret = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flags, off); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -275,6 +276,10 @@ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); if (!child) goto out_notsk; + + if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/arm/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -657,3 +657,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/cris/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -263,3 +263,12 @@ source lib/Config.in endmenu + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu + diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -485,3 +485,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/i387.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -373,13 +373,16 @@ static inline int restore_i387_fxsave( struct _fpstate *buf ) { + int err; struct task_struct *tsk = current; clear_fpu( tsk ); - if ( __copy_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, &buf->_fxsr_env[0], - sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct) ) ) - return 1; + err = __copy_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, &buf->_fxsr_env[0], + sizeof(struct i387_fxsave_struct) ); /* mxcsr bit 6 and 31-16 must be zero for security reasons */ tsk->thread.i387.fxsave.mxcsr &= 0xffbf; + if (err) + return 1; + return convert_fxsr_from_user( &tsk->thread.i387.fxsave, buf ); } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */ static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, short base, short extent, int new_value) @@ -59,8 +60,16 @@ if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_SIZE*32)) return -EINVAL; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + if (turn_on) { + gr_handle_ioperm(); +#else if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) +#endif return -EPERM; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + } +#endif /* * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(), @@ -109,8 +118,13 @@ return -EINVAL; /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ if (level > old) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + gr_handle_iopl(); + return -EPERM; +#else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) return -EPERM; +#endif } regs->eflags = (regs->eflags & 0xffffcfff) | (level << 12); return 0; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -177,6 +178,9 @@ if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ goto out_tsk; + if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; @@ -256,6 +260,17 @@ if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] && ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] && + addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){ + long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2; + long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3; + long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3; + if((type & 1) && (data & align)) + break; + } +#endif + if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[7]) { data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED; for(i=0; i<4; i++) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -55,8 +61,14 @@ goto out; } + if(gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + fput(file); + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); error = do_mmap_pgoff(mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); if (file) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -290,3 +290,12 @@ fi endmenu + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu + diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1179,6 +1180,9 @@ if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -212,6 +213,11 @@ goto out; } + if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + addr = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); addr = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/m68k/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -563,3 +563,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/mips/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -7,3 +7,11 @@ define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 n source arch/mips/config-shared.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/mips64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -7,3 +7,11 @@ define_bool CONFIG_MIPS64 y source arch/mips/config-shared.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -197,3 +197,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -1434,7 +1434,11 @@ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (current->tty == tty || suser()) +#endif return 1; return 0; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include - +#include #include #include #include @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include int sys_pipe(int *fildes) { @@ -104,6 +110,11 @@ goto out; } + if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + fput(file); + return -EACCES; + } + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc32.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -177,6 +178,11 @@ struct file *file; int retval; int i; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct file *old_exec_file; + struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; + struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +#endif file = open_exec(filename); @@ -184,6 +190,20 @@ if (IS_ERR(file)) return retval; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes)); + + if (gr_handle_nproc()) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EACCES; + } + bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0])); @@ -209,11 +238,24 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; + if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; bprm.exec = bprm.p; + + gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -222,11 +264,31 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + old_acl = current->acl; + memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + old_exec_file = current->exec_file; + get_file(file); + current->exec_file = file; +#endif + + gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs); - if (retval >= 0) + if (retval >= 0) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (old_exec_file) + fput(old_exec_file); +#endif /* execve success */ return retval; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + current->acl = old_acl; + memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = old_exec_file; +#endif out: /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ allow_write_access(bprm.file); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -461,3 +461,12 @@ bool 'Support for early boot texts over serial port' CONFIG_SERIAL_TEXT_DEBUG fi endmenu + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu + diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -182,6 +183,9 @@ if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2003-06-23 11:42:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -181,8 +182,14 @@ goto out; } + if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + fput(file); + ret = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); ret = do_mmap_pgoff(current->mm, file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); if (file) fput(file); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/ppc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -1789,7 +1789,11 @@ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (current->tty == tty || suser()) +#endif return 1; return 0; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:33.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/s390/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -76,3 +76,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:34.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/s390x/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -80,3 +80,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sh/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -388,3 +388,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/boot/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ BTOBJS := $(HEAD) init/main.o init/version.o init/do_mounts.o BTLIBS := $(CORE_FILES_NO_BTFIX) $(FILESYSTEMS) \ - $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS) + $(DRIVERS) $(NETWORKS) $(GRSECURITY) # I wanted to make this depend upon BTOBJS so that a parallel # build would work, but this fails because $(HEAD) cannot work diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -276,3 +276,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -310,6 +311,9 @@ goto out; } + if(gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { if (ptrace_attach(child)) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-06-23 11:42:24.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -240,6 +253,12 @@ if (len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE || addr + len > TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) goto out_putf; + if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + fput(file); + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -310,3 +310,11 @@ endmenu source lib/Config.in + +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Grsecurity' +bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then + source grsecurity/Config.in +fi +endmenu diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ioctl32.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -2046,7 +2046,11 @@ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (current->tty == tty || suser()) +#endif return 1; return 0; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -161,6 +162,11 @@ goto out; } + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) { + pt_error_return(regs, EPERM); + goto out; + } + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { if (ptrace_attach(child)) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -280,6 +288,12 @@ if (!file) goto out; } + + if (gr_handle_mmap(file, prot)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out_putf; + } + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); len = PAGE_ALIGN(len); retval = -EINVAL; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2003-06-23 11:42:30.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -3203,6 +3205,11 @@ struct file * file; int retval; int i; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct file *old_exec_file; + struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; + struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +#endif bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES * sizeof(bprm.page[0])); @@ -3213,6 +3229,20 @@ if (IS_ERR(file)) return retval; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes)); + + if (gr_handle_nproc()) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EACCES; + } + bprm.file = file; bprm.filename = filename; bprm.sh_bang = 0; @@ -3233,11 +3263,24 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; + if(!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; bprm.exec = bprm.p; + + gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = copy_strings32(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -3246,11 +3289,32 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + old_acl = current->acl; + memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + old_exec_file = current->exec_file; + get_file(file); + current->exec_file = file; +#endif + + gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs); - if (retval >= 0) + if (retval >= 0) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (old_exec_file) + fput(old_exec_file); +#endif /* execve success */ return retval; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + current->acl = old_acl; + memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = old_exec_file; +#endif out: /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ allow_write_access(bprm.file); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c --- linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c 2003-06-23 11:42:23.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_ioctl.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -1932,7 +1932,11 @@ * To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (current->tty == tty || suser()) +#endif return 1; return 0; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/keyboard.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2003-07-29 17:57:21.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -549,6 +549,16 @@ if ((kbd->kbdmode == VC_RAW || kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) && !(SPECIALS_ALLOWED_IN_RAW_MODE & (1 << value))) return; + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP) + { + void *func = spec_fn_table[value]; + if (func == show_state || func == show_ptregs || + func == show_mem) + return; + } +#endif + spec_fn_table[value](); } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-07-29 17:57:21.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/mem.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -41,6 +42,10 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE) && defined(CONFIG_S390_TAPE_CHAR) extern void tapechar_init(void); #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern struct file_operations grsec_fops; +#endif static ssize_t do_write_mem(struct file * file, void *p, unsigned long realp, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) @@ -114,6 +119,11 @@ unsigned long p = *ppos; unsigned long end_mem; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_mem_write(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + end_mem = __pa(high_memory); if (p >= end_mem) return 0; @@ -186,6 +196,12 @@ { unsigned long offset = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(offset, vma)) + return -EPERM; +#endif + + /* * Accessing memory above the top the kernel knows about or * through a file pointer that was marked O_SYNC will be @@ -285,6 +301,11 @@ ssize_t virtr = 0; char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_kmem_write(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { wrote = count; if (count > (unsigned long) high_memory - p) @@ -517,6 +538,15 @@ static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_open_port(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; +} + +static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +{ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; } @@ -609,7 +639,6 @@ #define full_lseek null_lseek #define write_zero write_null #define read_full read_zero -#define open_mem open_port #define open_kmem open_mem static struct file_operations mem_fops = { @@ -685,6 +714,11 @@ case 9: filp->f_op = &urandom_fops; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + case 10: + filp->f_op = &grsec_fops; + break; +#endif default: return -ENXIO; } @@ -711,7 +745,10 @@ {5, "zero", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &zero_fops}, {7, "full", S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, &full_fops}, {8, "random", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &random_fops}, - {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops} + {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops}, +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + {10,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops} +#endif }; int i; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c 2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/random.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -260,9 +260,15 @@ /* * Configuration information */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET +#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024 +#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256 +#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512 +#else #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512 #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128 #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256 +#endif #define USE_SHA /* @@ -387,6 +393,7 @@ /* * Static global variables */ + static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */ static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c 2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/tty_io.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ #include #include #include - +#include #include #ifdef CONFIG_VT @@ -1397,7 +1397,11 @@ retval = -ENODEV; filp->f_flags = saved_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (!retval && test_bit(TTY_EXCLUSIVE, &tty->flags) && !suser()) +#endif retval = -EBUSY; if (retval) { @@ -1499,7 +1503,11 @@ { char ch, mbz = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if ((current->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if ((current->tty != tty) && !suser()) +#endif return -EPERM; if (get_user(ch, arg)) return -EFAULT; @@ -1537,7 +1545,11 @@ if (inode->i_rdev == SYSCONS_DEV || inode->i_rdev == CONSOLE_DEV) { struct file *f; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (!suser()) +#endif return -EPERM; spin_lock(&redirect_lock); f = redirect; @@ -1589,7 +1601,11 @@ * This tty is already the controlling * tty for another session group! */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if ((arg == 1) && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { +#else if ((arg == 1) && suser()) { +#endif /* * Steal it away */ diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c 2003-06-23 11:42:01.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/char/vt.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_FB_COMPAT_XPMAC #include @@ -443,7 +444,11 @@ * to be the owner of the tty, or super-user. */ perm = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (current->tty == tty || suser()) +#endif perm = 1; kbd = kbd_table + console; @@ -1038,12 +1043,20 @@ return do_unimap_ioctl(cmd, (struct unimapdesc *)arg, perm); case VT_LOCKSWITCH: +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (!suser()) +#endif return -EPERM; vt_dont_switch = 1; return 0; case VT_UNLOCKSWITCH: +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) +#else if (!suser()) +#endif return -EPERM; vt_dont_switch = 0; return 0; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c --- linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c 2003-06-23 11:42:12.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/drivers/pci/proc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:15.000000000 -0400 @@ -562,7 +562,15 @@ pci_for_each_dev(dev) { pci_proc_attach_device(dev); } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL); +#endif if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include @@ -113,10 +114,12 @@ /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */ #ifdef __sparc__ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize); if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_dsize = 0; #else + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE); if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_dsize = 0; @@ -124,10 +127,12 @@ /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */ #ifdef __sparc__ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize); if ((dump.u_ssize) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_ssize = 0; #else + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE); if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_ssize = 0; @@ -276,6 +281,8 @@ rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY) rlim = ~0; + + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss); if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim) return -ENOMEM; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1003,8 +1163,11 @@ #undef DUMP_SEEK #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \ + do { \ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr)); \ if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \ - goto end_coredump; + goto end_coredump; \ + } while (0); #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \ if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \ goto end_coredump; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/buffer.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -1781,6 +1781,9 @@ int err; err = -EFBIG; + + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size); + limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) { send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/exec.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_KMOD #include @@ -687,6 +725,9 @@ cap_set_full(bprm->cap_effective); } + if (gr_handle_ptrace_exec(bprm->file->f_dentry, bprm->file->f_vfsmnt)) + return -EACCES; + memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); } @@ -752,6 +793,8 @@ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); + if(do_unlock) unlock_kernel(); current->keep_capabilities = 0; @@ -885,6 +928,11 @@ struct file *file; int retval; int i; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct file *old_exec_file; + struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; + struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +#endif file = open_exec(filename); @@ -892,7 +940,21 @@ if (IS_ERR(file)) return retval; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes)); + + if (gr_handle_nproc()) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EACCES; + } + bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0])); bprm.file = file; @@ -916,11 +987,26 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; + if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if(gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + retval = copy_strings_kernel(1, &bprm.filename, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; bprm.exec = bprm.p; + + gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + + gr_handle_exec_args(&bprm, argv); + retval = copy_strings(bprm.envc, envp, &bprm); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -929,11 +1015,32 @@ if (retval < 0) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + old_acl = current->acl; + memcpy(old_rlim, current->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + old_exec_file = current->exec_file; + get_file(file); + current->exec_file = file; +#endif + + gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs); - if (retval >= 0) + if (retval >= 0) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (old_exec_file) + fput(old_exec_file); +#endif /* execve success */ return retval; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + current->acl = old_acl; + memcpy(current->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = old_exec_file; +#endif out: /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ allow_write_access(bprm.file); @@ -1090,6 +1234,7 @@ if (!is_dumpable(current)) goto fail; current->mm->dumpable = 0; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump); if (current->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump) goto fail; @@ -1109,7 +1254,7 @@ goto close_fail; if (!file->f_op->write) goto close_fail; - if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0) + if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0) goto close_fail; retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/fcntl.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ int error; int start; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start); + write_lock(&files->file_lock); error = -EINVAL; @@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ } error = -EMFILE; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd); if (newfd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) goto out; @@ -141,6 +145,8 @@ struct file * file, *tofree; struct files_struct * files = current->files; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd); + write_lock(&files->file_lock); if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd))) goto out_unlock; @@ -448,6 +454,10 @@ match = -p->pgrp; if (pid != match) continue; + if (gr_check_protected_task(p)) + continue; + if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) + continue; send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band); } out: diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/locks.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static struct file_lock *locks_alloc_lock(int account) { struct file_lock *fl; + if(account) gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_LOCKS, current->locks); if (account && current->locks >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_LOCKS].rlim_cur) return NULL; fl = kmem_cache_alloc(filelock_cache, SLAB_KERNEL); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/namei.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -343,6 +344,13 @@ current->state = TASK_RUNNING; schedule(); } + + if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, + dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) { + path_release(nd); + return -EACCES; + } + current->link_count++; current->total_link_count++; UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode); @@ -641,6 +649,10 @@ } } return_base: + if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) { + path_release(nd); + return -ENOENT; + } return 0; out_dput: dput(dentry); @@ -1013,7 +1025,21 @@ error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag), nd); if (error) return error; + + if (gr_acl_is_enabled() && nd->dentry->d_inode && + S_ISBLK(nd->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { + error = -EPERM; + goto exit; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto exit; + } + dentry = nd->dentry; + goto ok; } @@ -1046,7 +1072,16 @@ if (!dentry->d_inode) { if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; + if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + goto exit_dput; + } + error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode); + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt); + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); dput(nd->dentry); nd->dentry = dentry; @@ -1056,12 +1091,35 @@ /* Don't check for write permission, don't truncate */ acc_mode = 0; flag &= ~O_TRUNC; + goto ok; } /* * It already exists. */ + + if (gr_acl_is_enabled() && S_ISBLK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { + error = -EPERM; + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + goto exit_dput; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { + error = -EACCES; + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + goto exit_dput; + } + + inode = dentry->d_inode; + + if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) { + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + error = -EACCES; + goto exit_dput; + } + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); error = -EEXIST; @@ -1151,7 +1209,7 @@ if (!error) { DQUOT_INIT(inode); - error = do_truncate(dentry, 0); + error = do_truncate(dentry,0,nd->mnt); } put_write_access(inode); if (error) @@ -1182,6 +1240,13 @@ * stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we * are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND. */ + + if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode, + dentry, nd->mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto exit_dput; + } + UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode); error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd); dput(dentry); @@ -1280,6 +1345,18 @@ mode &= ~current->fs->umask; if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { + if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EPERM; + dput(dentry); + goto out_dput; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + dput(dentry); + goto out_dput; + } + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case 0: case S_IFREG: error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode); @@ -1293,8 +1370,13 @@ default: error = -EINVAL; } + + if(!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(dentry); } +out_dput: up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); path_release(&nd); out: @@ -1346,7 +1428,16 @@ if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; - error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); + error = 0; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + + if(!error) + error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); + if(!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1431,6 +1522,8 @@ char * name; struct dentry *dentry; struct nameidata nd; + ino_t saved_ino = 0; + kdev_t saved_dev = 0; name = getname(pathname); if(IS_ERR(name)) @@ -1455,7 +1548,22 @@ dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { - error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + error = 0; + if (dentry->d_inode) { + if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) { + saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + } + + if (!error) + error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino)) + gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev); + dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1499,6 +1607,8 @@ char * name; struct dentry *dentry; struct nameidata nd; + ino_t saved_ino = 0; + kdev_t saved_dev = 0; name = getname(pathname); if(IS_ERR(name)) @@ -1517,7 +1627,21 @@ /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */ if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len]) goto slashes; - error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + error = 0; + if (dentry->d_inode) { + if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) { + saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_dev; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + } + + if (!error) + error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev)) + gr_handle_delete(saved_ino,saved_dev); exit2: dput(dentry); } @@ -1581,7 +1705,15 @@ dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { - error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); + error = 0; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from)) + error = -EACCES; + + if(!error) + error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from); + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1665,7 +1797,27 @@ new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry); if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) { - error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); + error = 0; + + if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, + old_nd.dentry->d_inode, + old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) { + error = -EPERM; + goto out_error; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, + old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out_error; + } + + error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, + nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt); +out_error: dput(new_dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1896,10 +2048,15 @@ if (IS_ERR(new_dentry)) goto exit4; - lock_kernel(); - error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, + error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt, + old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt, newname); + + if (error == 1) { + lock_kernel(); + error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); - unlock_kernel(); + unlock_kernel(); + } dput(new_dentry); exit4: diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/namespace.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include @@ -325,6 +327,8 @@ lock_kernel(); retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, 0); unlock_kernel(); + + gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); } up_write(&sb->s_umount); return retval; @@ -350,6 +354,9 @@ } spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); up_write(¤t->namespace->sem); + + gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); + return retval; } @@ -729,6 +736,12 @@ if (retval) return retval; + if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) { + retval = -EPERM; + path_release(&nd); + return retval; + } + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags, data_page); @@ -740,6 +753,9 @@ retval = do_add_mount(&nd, type_page, flags, mnt_flags, dev_name, data_page); path_release(&nd); + + gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval); + return retval; } @@ -909,6 +925,9 @@ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot()) + return -EPERM; + lock_kernel(); error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_POSITIVE|LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c 2003-06-23 11:41:28.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/open.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ write_unlock(&files->file_lock); } -int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length) +int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int error; @@ -105,6 +106,9 @@ if (length < 0) return -EINVAL; + if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt)) + return -EACCES; + down(&inode->i_sem); newattrs.ia_size = length; newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME; @@ -163,7 +167,7 @@ error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); if (!error) { DQUOT_INIT(inode); - error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length); + error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt); } put_write_access(inode); @@ -215,7 +219,7 @@ error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); if (!error) - error = do_truncate(dentry, length); + error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt); out_putf: fput(file); out: @@ -284,6 +288,12 @@ (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0) goto dput_and_out; } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); dput_and_out: path_release(&nd); @@ -329,6 +339,12 @@ (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE)) != 0) goto dput_and_out; } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); dput_and_out: path_release(&nd); @@ -371,6 +387,10 @@ if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode) && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) res = -EROFS; + + if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) + res = -EACCES; + path_release(&nd); } @@ -394,6 +414,8 @@ if (error) goto dput_and_out; + gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); dput_and_out: @@ -424,6 +446,13 @@ goto out_putf; error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); + + if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt)) + error = -EPERM; + + if (!error) + gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt); + if (!error) set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); out_putf: @@ -450,8 +479,16 @@ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) goto dput_and_out; + if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) + goto dput_and_out; + set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); set_fs_altroot(); + + gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); + + gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); + error = 0; dput_and_out: path_release(&nd); @@ -480,8 +517,20 @@ err = -EPERM; if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto out_putf; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_putf; + } + if (mode == (mode_t) -1) mode = inode->i_mode; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_putf; + } + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs); @@ -512,8 +561,19 @@ if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto dput_and_out; + if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + if (mode == (mode_t) -1) mode = inode->i_mode; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); @@ -524,7 +584,7 @@ return error; } -static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group) +static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt) { struct inode * inode; int error; @@ -541,6 +601,12 @@ error = -EPERM; if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto out; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + if (user == (uid_t) -1) user = inode->i_uid; if (group == (gid_t) -1) @@ -591,7 +657,7 @@ error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd); if (!error) { - error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); path_release(&nd); } return error; @@ -604,7 +670,7 @@ error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd); if (!error) { - error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); path_release(&nd); } return error; @@ -618,7 +684,8 @@ file = fget(fd); if (file) { - error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, + group, file->f_vfsmnt); fput(file); } return error; @@ -738,6 +805,7 @@ * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test * will limit the total number of files that can be opened. */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd); if (fd >= current->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) goto out; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/array.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -334,6 +340,12 @@ wchan = get_wchan(task); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + wchan = 0; + eip = 0; + esp = 0; +#endif + collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch); /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */ @@ -684,6 +727,16 @@ return retval; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR +int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) +{ + int len; + + len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + return len; +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_SMP int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/base.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs. @@ -41,6 +42,9 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct*,char*); int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct*,char*); int proc_pid_cpu(struct task_struct*,char*); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR +int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*); +#endif static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, struct vfsmount **mnt) { @@ -228,9 +232,22 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { + int ret; + struct task_struct *task; + if (vfs_permission(inode, mask) != 0) return -EACCES; - return proc_check_root(inode); + ret = proc_check_root(inode); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + task = inode->u.proc_i.task; + + if (!task) + return 0; + + return gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task); } static ssize_t pid_maps_read(struct file * file, char * buf, @@ -546,6 +563,9 @@ PROC_PID_STATM, PROC_PID_MAPS, PROC_PID_CPU, +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + PROC_PID_IPADDR, +#endif PROC_PID_MOUNTS, PROC_PID_FD_DIR = 0x8000, /* 0x8000-0xffff */ }; @@ -561,6 +581,9 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP E(PROC_PID_CPU, "cpu", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + E(PROC_PID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR), +#endif E(PROC_PID_MAPS, "maps", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO), E(PROC_PID_MEM, "mem", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR), E(PROC_PID_CWD, "cwd", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO), @@ -717,10 +740,17 @@ get_task_struct(task); inode->u.proc_i.task = task; inode->i_uid = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; +#else inode->i_gid = 0; +#endif + if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) { inode->i_uid = task->euid; +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP inode->i_gid = task->egid; +#endif } out: @@ -928,6 +958,12 @@ inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_cpu; break; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + case PROC_PID_IPADDR: + inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; + inode->u.proc_i.op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr; + break; +#endif case PROC_PID_MEM: inode->i_op = &proc_mem_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_mem_operations; @@ -1026,13 +1062,34 @@ if (!task) goto out; + if(gr_check_hidden_task(task)) { + free_task_struct(task); + goto out; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid) +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) +#endif + ) { + free_task_struct(task); + goto out; + } +#endif inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_PID_INO); free_task_struct(task); if (!inode) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR; +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP; +#else inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; +#endif inode->i_op = &proc_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_base_operations; inode->i_nlink = 3; @@ -1072,6 +1129,18 @@ int pid = p->pid; if (!pid) continue; + if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) + continue; + if(gr_check_hidden_task(p)) + continue; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + if (current->uid && (p->uid != current->uid) +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) +#endif + ) + continue; +#endif if (--index >= 0) continue; pids[nr_pids] = pid; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c 2003-07-29 17:57:01.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/generic.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -503,6 +503,32 @@ return ent; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC +struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent) +{ + struct proc_dir_entry *ent; + mode_t mode = 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR; +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP; +#endif + + ent = proc_create(&parent, name, mode, 2); + if (ent) { + ent->proc_fops = &proc_dir_operations; + ent->proc_iops = &proc_dir_inode_operations; + + if (proc_register(parent, ent) < 0) { + kfree(ent); + ent = NULL; + } + } + return ent; +} +#endif + struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_entry(const char *name, mode_t mode, struct proc_dir_entry *parent) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/inode.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -152,7 +152,11 @@ if (de->mode) { inode->i_mode = de->mode; inode->i_uid = de->uid; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; +#else inode->i_gid = de->gid; +#endif } if (de->size) inode->i_size = de->size; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -568,6 +568,7 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *entry; + int gr_mode = 0; static struct { char *name; int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*); @@ -582,48 +583,81 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC {"stram", stram_read_proc}, #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES +#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) {"modules", modules_read_proc}, #endif {"stat", kstat_read_proc}, +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD {"devices", devices_read_proc}, -#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) +#endif +#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD) {"interrupts", interrupts_read_proc}, #endif {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc}, +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD {"dma", dma_read_proc}, {"ioports", ioports_read_proc}, {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc}, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SGI_DS1286 {"rtc", ds1286_read_proc}, #endif {"locks", locks_read_proc}, {"swaps", swaps_read_proc}, +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD {"iomem", memory_read_proc}, +#endif {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc}, {NULL,} }; for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++) create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + gr_mode = S_IRUSR; +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) && defined(CONFIG_MODULES) + create_proc_read_entry("modules", gr_mode, NULL, &modules_read_proc, NULL); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL); + create_proc_read_entry("dma", gr_mode, NULL, &dma_read_proc, NULL); + create_proc_read_entry("ioports", gr_mode, NULL, &ioports_read_proc, NULL); + create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL); + create_proc_read_entry("iomem", gr_mode, NULL, &memory_read_proc, NULL); +#if !defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) + create_proc_read_entry("interrupts", gr_mode, NULL, &interrupts_read_proc, NULL); +#endif +#endif + proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts"); /* And now for trickier ones */ entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root); if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", gr_mode, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); + create_seq_entry("slabinfo", gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#else create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations); - create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations); create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#endif + create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - create_seq_entry("ksyms", 0, &proc_ksyms_operations); + create_seq_entry("ksyms", gr_mode, &proc_ksyms_operations); #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL); if (proc_root_kcore) { proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations; proc_root_kcore->size = (size_t)high_memory - PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE; } +#endif if (prof_shift) { entry = create_proc_entry("profile", S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO, NULL); if (entry) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/proc_tty.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -174,7 +174,11 @@ * password lengths and inter-keystroke timings during password * entry. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + proc_tty_driver = proc_priv_mkdir("tty/driver", 0); +#else proc_tty_driver = proc_mkdir_mode("tty/driver", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, 0); +#endif create_proc_read_entry("tty/ldiscs", 0, 0, tty_ldiscs_read_proc,NULL); create_proc_read_entry("tty/drivers", 0, 0, tty_drivers_read_proc,NULL); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/proc/root.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -37,13 +37,21 @@ return; } proc_misc_init(); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + proc_net = proc_priv_mkdir("net", 0); +#else proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", 0); +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC proc_mkdir("sysvipc", 0); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC + proc_sys_root = proc_priv_mkdir("sys", 0); +#else proc_sys_root = proc_mkdir("sys", 0); #endif +#endif #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE) proc_mkdir("sys/fs", 0); proc_mkdir("sys/fs/binfmt_misc", 0); @@ -67,7 +75,12 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_RTAS proc_rtas_init(); #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + proc_bus = proc_priv_mkdir("bus", 0); +#else proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", 0); +#endif } static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c --- linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c 2003-06-23 11:41:29.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/fs/readdir.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ struct readdir_callback { struct old_linux_dirent * dirent; int count; + struct nameidata nd; }; static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, @@ -191,6 +193,10 @@ if (buf->count) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) + return 0; + buf->count++; dirent = buf->dirent; put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino); @@ -215,6 +221,9 @@ buf.count = 0; buf.dirent = dirent; + buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; + buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; + error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf); if (error >= 0) error = buf.count; @@ -242,6 +251,7 @@ struct linux_dirent * previous; int count; int error; + struct nameidata nd; }; static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, @@ -254,6 +264,10 @@ buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ if (reclen > buf->count) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) + return 0; + dirent = buf->previous; if (dirent) put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off); @@ -286,6 +300,9 @@ buf.count = count; buf.error = 0; + buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; + buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; + error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf); if (error < 0) goto out_putf; @@ -320,6 +337,7 @@ struct linux_dirent64 * previous; int count; int error; + struct nameidata nd; }; static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, loff_t offset, @@ -332,6 +350,10 @@ buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ if (reclen > buf->count) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->nd.dentry, buf->nd.mnt, ino)) + return 0; + dirent = buf->previous; if (dirent) { d.d_off = offset; @@ -369,6 +391,9 @@ buf.count = count; buf.error = 0; + buf.nd.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; + buf.nd.dentry = file->f_dentry; + error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf); if (error < 0) goto out_putf; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Config.in 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,260 @@ +choice 'Security level' \ + "Low CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW \ + Medium CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID \ + High CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI \ + Customized CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" Customized +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LOW" = "y" ]; then +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n +fi +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30 + +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y +fi +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MID" = "y" ]; then +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK n +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n +fi +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG n +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30 + +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10 +fi +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HI" = "y" ]; then +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP y +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 10 +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN y + +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT n +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN n +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3 +define_int CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30 + +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD y +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE y +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO n +fi +define_bool CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT y +fi +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM" = "y" ]; then +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Address Space Protection' +bool 'Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM +if [ "$CONFIG_X86" = "y" ]; then + bool 'Disable privileged I/O' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO" = "y" ]; then + define_bool CONFIG_RTC y + fi +fi +bool 'Hide kernel symbols' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM +endmenu +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Role Based Access Control Options' +bool 'Hide kernel processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN +int 'Maximum tries before password lockout' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES 3 +int 'Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT 30 +endmenu +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Filesystem Protections' +bool 'Proc restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC" != "n" ]; then + bool ' Restrict to user only' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "y" ]; then + bool ' Allow special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then + int ' GID for special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 1001 + fi + fi + if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "n" -o "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then + bool ' Additional restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + fi +fi +bool 'Linking restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK +bool 'FIFO restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO +bool 'Chroot jail restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT" != "n" ]; then +bool ' Deny mounts' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT +bool ' Deny double-chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE +bool ' Deny pivot_root in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT +bool ' Enforce chdir("/") on all chroots' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR +bool ' Deny (f)chmod +s' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD +bool ' Deny fchdir out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR +bool ' Deny mknod' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD +bool ' Deny shmat() out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT +bool ' Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX +bool ' Protect outside processes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK +bool ' Restrict priority changes' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE +bool ' Deny sysctl writes in chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL +bool ' Capability restrictions within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS +fi +endmenu +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Kernel Auditing' +bool 'Single group for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP" != "n" ]; then +int ' GID for auditing' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID 1007 +fi +bool 'Exec logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG +bool 'Resource logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG +bool 'Log execs within chroot' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG +bool 'Chdir logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR +bool '(Un)Mount logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT +bool 'IPC logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC +bool 'Signal logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL +bool 'Fork failure logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL +bool 'Time change logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME +bool '/proc//ipaddr support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR +endmenu +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Executable Protections' +bool 'Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE +bool 'Dmesg(8) restriction' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG +bool 'Randomized PIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID +bool 'Trusted path execution' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE" != "n" ]; then +bool ' Partially restrict non-root users' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL +int ' GID for untrusted users:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID 1005 +fi +endmenu +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Network Protections' +bool 'Larger entropy pools' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET +bool 'Truly random TCP ISN selection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN +bool 'Randomized IP IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID +bool 'Randomized TCP source ports' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC +bool 'Randomized RPC XIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC +bool 'Socket restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET" != "n" ]; then +bool ' Deny any sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL" != "n" ]; then +int ' GID to deny all sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID 1004 +fi +bool ' Deny client sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT" != "n" ]; then +int ' GID to deny client sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID 1003 +fi +bool ' Deny server sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER +if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER" != "n" ]; then +int ' GID to deny server sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID 1002 +fi +fi +endmenu +if [ "$CONFIG_SYSCTL" != "n" ]; then +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Sysctl support' +bool 'Sysctl support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL +endmenu +fi +mainmenu_option next_comment +comment 'Logging options' +int 'Seconds in between log messages (minimum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME 10 +int 'Number of messages in a burst (maximum)' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST 4 +endmenu +fi diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton +# during 2001, 2002, and 2003 it has been completely redesigned by +# Brad Spengler +# +# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel +# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL, unless otherwise +# noted (as in obsd_rand.c) + +O_TARGET := grsec.o + +obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \ + grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \ + grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o + +ifeq ($(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC),y) +obj-y += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o obsd_rand.o \ + gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \ + gracl_learn.o +obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o +else +obj-y += grsec_disabled.o +endif + +include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,2653 @@ +/* + * grsecurity/gracl.c + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2001, 2002, 2003 + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set; +static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head; +static struct name_db name_set; +static struct name_db inodev_set; + +static struct acl_role_label *default_role; + +static u16 acl_sp_role_value; + +static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem); +rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +extern char *gr_shared_page[2][NR_CPUS]; + +static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT; + +extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum); +extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG +extern __inline__ void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, + const unsigned long wanted); +#endif + +static unsigned char system_salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; +static unsigned char system_sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; + +static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL; +static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0; + +static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL; + +/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move + entries around. They can be replaced during insert. */ + +static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject; +static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object; +static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev; + +/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since + nested subject parsing is tricky +*/ +static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL; +static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL; + +static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0; +static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL; + +extern int gr_init_uidset(void); +extern void gr_free_uidset(void); +extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid); +extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid); + +__inline__ int +gr_acl_is_enabled(void) +{ + return (gr_status & GR_READY); +} + +static __inline__ int +gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb) +{ + int i; + unsigned long *l1; + unsigned long *l2; + unsigned char *c1; + unsigned char *c2; + int num_longs; + + if (likely(lena != lenb)) + return 0; + + l1 = (unsigned long *)a; + l2 = (unsigned long *)b; + + num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long); + + for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) { + if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2)) + return 0; + } + + c1 = (unsigned char *) l1; + c2 = (unsigned char *) l2; + + i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long)); + + for (; i--; c1++, c2++) { + if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static __inline__ char * +d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, + char *buf, int buflen) +{ + char *res; + struct dentry *our_dentry; + struct vfsmount *our_mount; + struct vfsmount *rootmnt; + struct dentry *root; + + our_dentry = (struct dentry *) dentry; + our_mount = (struct vfsmount *) vfsmnt; + + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + res = __d_path(our_dentry, our_mount, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen); + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + dput(root); + mntput(rootmnt); + return res; +} + +char * +gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()], + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +char * +gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, gr_shared_page[1][smp_processor_id()], + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +__inline__ __u32 +to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode) +{ + __u32 retmode = 0; + + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_READ) ? GR_AUDIT_READ : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_APPEND) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_EXEC) ? GR_AUDIT_EXEC : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_INHERIT) ? GR_AUDIT_INHERIT : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_FIND) ? GR_AUDIT_FIND : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_SETID) ? GR_AUDIT_SETID : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_CREATE) ? GR_AUDIT_CREATE : 0; + retmode |= (reqmode & GR_DELETE) ? GR_AUDIT_DELETE : 0; + + return retmode; +} + +__inline__ struct acl_role_label * +lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, + const gid_t gid) +{ + unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size); + struct acl_role_label *match; + struct role_allowed_ip *ipp; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + + while (match + && (match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (!match || match->uidgid != uid || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)) { + try_group: + index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size); + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = 0; + + while (match + && (match->uidgid != gid + || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (!match || match->uidgid != gid + || !(match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP)) + match = default_role; + else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) { + return match; + } else { + for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { + if (likely + ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) == + (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask))) + return match; + } + match = default_role; + } + } else if (likely(!match->allowed_ips)) { + return match; + } else { + for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { + if (likely + ((task->curr_ip & ipp->netmask) == + (ipp->addr & ipp->netmask))) + return match; + } + goto try_group; + } + + return match; +} + +__inline__ struct acl_subject_label * +lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, + const struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label *match; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = s_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + match = s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_subject) && + (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) && + !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * +lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; + struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + struct acl_object_label *match; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) && + (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) && + !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * +lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; + struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + struct acl_object_label *match; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) && + (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) && + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) + return match; + + i = 0; + index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_object) && + (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev) && + !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static __inline__ struct name_entry * +lookup_name_entry(const char *name) +{ + __u16 len = strlen(name); + unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); + struct name_entry *match; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = name_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; + match = name_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(!match || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len))) + return NULL; + else + return match; +} + +static __inline__ struct name_entry * +lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry *match; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (unlikely(match && (match != deleted_inodev) && + (match->inode == ino) && (match->device == dev))) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static void +insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device, + inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry **curr; + __u8 i = 0; + + curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = nentry; + + return; +} + +static void +insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + unsigned long index = + rhash(role->uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size); + struct acl_role_label **curr; + __u8 i = 0; + + curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + + while (*curr) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = role; + + return; +} + +static int +insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const kdev_t device) +{ + struct name_entry **curr; + __u8 i = 0; + __u16 len = strlen(name); + unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); + + curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; + curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (!(*curr)) { + struct name_entry *nentry = + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); + if (!nentry) + return 0; + nentry->name = name; + nentry->inode = inode; + nentry->device = device; + nentry->len = len; + *curr = nentry; + /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */ + insert_inodev_entry(nentry); + } + + return 1; +} + +static void +insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj, + struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long index = + fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size); + struct acl_object_label **curr; + __u8 i = 0; + + curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; + curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = obj; + + return; +} + +static void +insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label **curr; + __u8 i = 0; + + curr = &s_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + curr = &s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = obj; + + return; +} + +static void ** +create_table(__u32 * len) +{ + unsigned long table_sizes[] = { + 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381, + 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143, + 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689, + 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647 + }; + void *newtable = NULL; + unsigned int pwr = 0; + + while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) && + table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) + pwr++; + + if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) + return newtable; + + if ((table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + newtable = + kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL); + else + newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * sizeof (void *)); + + *len = table_sizes[pwr]; + + return newtable; +} + +static int +init_variables(const unsigned long acl_obj_size, + const unsigned long acl_subj_size, + const unsigned long acl_ip_size, + const unsigned long acl_role_size, + const unsigned long allowed_ip_size, + const unsigned long acl_trans_size, + const __u16 num_sprole_pws) +{ + unsigned long stacksize; + + acl_role_set.r_size = acl_role_size; + name_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size); + inodev_set.n_size = (acl_obj_size + acl_subj_size); + + if (!gr_init_uidset()) + return 1; + + /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */ + + stacksize = (3 * acl_obj_size) + (2 * acl_role_size) + + (4 * acl_subj_size) + acl_ip_size + (2 * acl_trans_size) + + allowed_ip_size + (2 * num_sprole_pws) + 5; + + if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize)) + return 1; + + /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */ + deleted_subject = + (struct acl_subject_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); + deleted_object = + (struct acl_object_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); + deleted_inodev = + (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); + + if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev) + return 1; + + memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); + memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); + memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry)); + + /* We only want 50% full tables for now */ + + acl_role_set.r_hash = + (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size); + name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size); + inodev_set.n_hash = + (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size); + + if (!acl_role_set.r_hash || !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash) + return 1; + memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size); + memset(name_set.n_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size); + memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size); + + return 0; +} + +static void +free_variables(void) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *s; + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct task_struct *task; + + gr_clear_learn_entries(); + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(task) { + task->acl_sp_role = 0; + task->acl_role_id = 0; + task->acl = NULL; + task->role = NULL; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + /* free all object hash tables */ + + if (role_list_head) { + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { + if (!r->subj_hash) + break; + for (s = r->proc_subject; s; s = s->next) { + if (!s->obj_hash) + break; + if ((s->obj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(s->obj_hash); + else + vfree(s->obj_hash); + } + if ((r->subj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(r->subj_hash); + else + vfree(r->subj_hash); + } + } + + acl_free_all(); + + if (acl_role_set.r_hash) { + if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); + else + vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); + } + if (name_set.n_hash) { + if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(name_set.n_hash); + else + vfree(name_set.n_hash); + } + + if (inodev_set.n_hash) { + if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(inodev_set.n_hash); + else + vfree(inodev_set.n_hash); + } + + gr_free_uidset(); + + memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); + memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); + memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db)); + + role_list_head = NULL; + default_role = NULL; + + return; +} + +static __u32 +count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp) +{ + struct acl_object_label o_tmp; + __u32 num = 0; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) + break; + + userp = o_tmp.prev; + num++; + } + + return num; +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role); + +static int +copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_object_label *o_tmp; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + + while (userp) { + if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) + return -EFAULT; + + userp = o_tmp->prev; + + len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + o_tmp->filename = tmp; + + insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj); + if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode, + o_tmp->device)) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (o_tmp->nested) { + o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role); + if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested)) + return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested); + + s_final = o_tmp->nested; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static __u32 +count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp) +{ + struct acl_subject_label s_tmp; + __u32 num = 0; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + break; + + userp = s_tmp.prev; + /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since + they are not included in the hash table, but are + attached to objects. We have already counted + the subjects in userspace for the allocation + stack + */ + if (!s_tmp.parent_subject) + num++; + } + + return num; +} + +static int +copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep) +{ + struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; + + ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips; + + while (ruserip) { + rlast = rtmp; + + if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip, + sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) + return -EFAULT; + + ruserip = rtmp->prev; + + if (!rlast) { + rtmp->prev = NULL; + rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp; + } else { + rlast->next = rtmp; + rtmp->prev = rlast; + } + + if (!ruserip) + rtmp->next = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep) +{ + struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + + rusertp = rolep->transitions; + + while (rusertp) { + rlast = rtmp; + + if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp, + sizeof (struct role_transition))) + return -EFAULT; + + rusertp = rtmp->prev; + + len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); + + if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + rtmp->rolename = tmp; + + if (!rlast) { + rtmp->prev = NULL; + rolep->transitions = rtmp; + } else { + rlast->next = rtmp; + rtmp->prev = rlast; + } + + if (!rusertp) + rtmp->next = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + __u32 num_objs; + struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2; + unsigned long i_num; + int err; + + + if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + if (!s_last) { + s_tmp->prev = NULL; + role->proc_subject = s_tmp; + } else { + s_last->next = s_tmp; + s_tmp->prev = s_last; + } + + s_last = s_tmp; + + len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + s_tmp->filename = tmp; + + if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/")) + role->root_label = s_tmp; + + /* set up object hash table */ + num_objs = count_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object); + + s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs; + s_tmp->obj_hash = + (struct acl_object_label **) + create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size)); + + if (!s_tmp->obj_hash) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0, + s_tmp->obj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)); + + /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested + acl could be found and be the final subject + copied + */ + + s_final = s_tmp; + + /* add in objects */ + err = copy_user_objs(s_tmp->proc_object, s_tmp, role); + + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + /* add in ip acls */ + + if (!s_tmp->ip_num) { + s_tmp->ips = NULL; + goto insert; + } + + i_tmp = + (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num * + sizeof (struct + acl_ip_label *)); + + if (!i_tmp) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) { + *(i_tmp + i_num) = + (struct acl_ip_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)); + if (!*(i_tmp + i_num)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user + (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num, + sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + if (copy_from_user + (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2, + sizeof (struct acl_ip_label))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + s_tmp->ips = i_tmp; + +insert: + if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode, + s_tmp->device)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + return s_tmp; +} + +static int +copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label s_pre; + struct acl_subject_label * ret; + int err; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* do not add nested subjects here, add + while parsing objects + */ + + if (s_pre.parent_subject) { + userp = s_pre.prev; + continue; + } + + ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role); + + err = PTR_ERR(ret); + if (IS_ERR(ret)) + return err; + + insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role); + + userp = s_pre.prev; + } + + s_final->next = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int +copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg) +{ + struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_last; + struct sprole_pw *sptmp; + unsigned long r_num; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + int err = 0; + __u16 i; + __u32 num_subjs; + + /* we need a default and kernel role */ + if (arg->role_db.r_entries < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */ + + num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws; + acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *)); + + if (!acl_special_roles) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { + sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw)); + if (!sptmp) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i, + sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + len = + strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); + + if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp); +#endif + sptmp->rolename = tmp; + acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp; + } + + r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table; + + for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.r_entries; r_num++) { + r_last = r_tmp; + + r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label)); + + if (!r_tmp) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!r_last) { + r_tmp->prev = NULL; + role_list_head = r_tmp; + } else { + r_last->next = r_tmp; + r_tmp->prev = r_last; + } + + if (r_num == (arg->role_db.r_entries - 1)) + r_tmp->next = NULL; + + len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + r_tmp->rolename = tmp; + + if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default") + && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) { + default_role = r_tmp; + } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) { + kernel_role = r_tmp; + } + + num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject); + + r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs; + r_tmp->subj_hash = + (struct acl_subject_label **) + create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size)); + + if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp); + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp); + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0, + r_tmp->subj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)); + + s_last = NULL; + + err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->proc_subject, r_tmp); + + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp); + } + + goto return_err; + cleanup: + free_variables(); + return_err: + return err; + +} + +static int +gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args) +{ + int error = 0; + + memcpy(&system_salt, args->salt, sizeof (system_salt)); + memcpy(&system_sum, args->sum, sizeof (system_sum)); + + if (init_variables(args->role_db.o_entries, args->role_db.s_entries, + args->role_db.i_entries, args->role_db.r_entries, + args->role_db.a_entries, args->role_db.t_entries, + args->num_sprole_pws)) { + security_alert_good(GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + error = -ENOMEM; + free_variables(); + goto out; + } + + error = copy_user_acl(args); + if (error) + goto out; + + if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) { + free_variables(); + goto out; + } + + gr_status |= GR_READY; + out: + return error; +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; + struct dentry *root; + struct vfsmount *rootmnt; + struct acl_object_label *retval; + + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + + for (;;) { + if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt)) + break; + if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) + goto out; + + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, subj); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) + goto out; + + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_obj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev, + subj); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) { + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_obj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino, + root->d_inode->i_dev, subj); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + } + out: + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + dput(root); + mntput(rootmnt); + + return retval; +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; + struct dentry *root; + struct vfsmount *rootmnt; + struct acl_subject_label *retval; + + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + + for (;;) { + if (unlikely(dentry == root && mnt == rootmnt)) + break; + if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) + goto out; + + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(retval != NULL)) + goto out; + + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) { + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_subj_label(root->d_inode->i_ino, + root->d_inode->i_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + } + out: + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + dput(root); + mntput(rootmnt); + + return retval; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_log_learn(const struct acl_role_label *role, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid, + const struct task_struct *task, const char *pathname, + const __u32 mode) +{ + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, role->rolename, role->roletype, + uid, gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry, + task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename, + 1, 1, pathname, (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + __u32 oldmode, newmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); + + obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl); + oldmode = obj->mode; + + if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) + oldmode |= (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); + newmode = + gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + oldmode | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | + GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if ((newmode & oldmode) == oldmode) + return newmode; + else if (current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) { + gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, + current, gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), oldmode); + return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); + } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS) + return GR_SUPPRESS; + else + return 0; +} + +__u32 +gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + __u32 retval = mode; + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + struct acl_object_label *currobj; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); + + curracl = current->acl; + + currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl); + retval = currobj->mode & mode; + + if (unlikely + ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) && (mode != GR_PTRACERD) + && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + retval = new_mode; + + if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN)) + gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, + current, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), new_mode); + } + + return retval; +} + +__u32 +gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent, + const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode) +{ + struct name_entry *match; + struct acl_object_label *matchpo; + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + __u32 retval; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); + + match = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt)); + + if (!match) + goto check_parent; + + curracl = current->acl; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (matchpo) { + if ((matchpo->mode & mode) != + (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)) + && curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, + current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode); + + return new_mode; + } + return (matchpo->mode & mode); + } + + check_parent: + curracl = current->acl; + + matchpo = chk_obj_label(parent, mnt, curracl); + retval = matchpo->mode & mode; + + if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))) + && (curracl->mode & GR_LEARN)) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, + current, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt), new_mode); + return new_mode; + } + + return retval; +} + +int +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_FIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task)) + return 0; + + if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +__inline__ void +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + tsk->used_accept = 0; + tsk->used_connect = 0; + tsk->acl_sp_role = 0; + tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id; + tsk->acl = current->acl; + tsk->role = current->role; + tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip; + if (current->exec_file) + get_file(current->exec_file); + tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file; + tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable; + if (unlikely(current->used_accept)) + current->curr_ip = 0; + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_set_proc_res(void) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *proc; + unsigned short i; + + proc = current->acl; + + if (proc->mode & GR_LEARN) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { + if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i))) + continue; + + current->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur; + current->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max; + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +do_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid) +{ + task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid); + + return; +} + +void +gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct file *filp; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + filp = task->exec_file; + + /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */ + if (unlikely(!filp)) { + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; + return; + } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) + do_set_role_label(task, uid, gid); + + task->acl = + chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role); + + task->is_writable = 0; + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); +#endif + + gr_set_proc_res(); + + return; +} + +void +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *newacl; + struct acl_object_label *obj; + __u32 retmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role); + + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->acl); + retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT); + + if ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT)) { + if (obj->nested) + current->acl = obj->nested; + else + current->acl = newacl; + } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT) + security_audit(GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, current->acl->filename, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + + current->is_writable = 0; + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + current->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + current->is_writable = 1; + + gr_set_proc_res(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", current->comm, current->pid, current->role->rolename, current->acl->filename); +#endif + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev) +{ + struct acl_object_label *matchpo; + struct acl_subject_label *matchps; + struct acl_subject_label *i; + struct acl_role_label *role; + + for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { + for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) { + if (unlikely(i->parent_subject && + (i->inode == ino) && + (i->device == dev))) + i->mode |= GR_DELETED; + if (unlikely((matchpo = + lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL)) + matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED; + } + + if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL)) + matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED; + } + + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev))) + do_handle_delete(ino, dev); + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice, + struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size); + struct acl_object_label **match; + struct acl_object_label *tmp; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + + while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || + (*match)->device != olddevice || + !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; + match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice) + && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { + tmp = *match; + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; + + *match = deleted_object; + + insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj); + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label **match; + struct acl_subject_label *tmp; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = &s_hash[index]; + + while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || + (*match)->device != olddevice || + !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + match = &s_hash[index]; + } + + if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice) + && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { + tmp = *match; + + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; + + *match = deleted_subject; + + insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role); + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const kdev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const kdev_t newdevice) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry **match; + struct name_entry *tmp; + __u8 i = 0; + + match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*match + && ((*match)->inode != oldinode + || (*match)->device != olddevice)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + } + + if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) { + tmp = *match; + + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + + *match = deleted_inodev; + + insert_inodev_entry(tmp); + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *i; + struct acl_role_label *role; + + for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { + update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, role); + + for (i = role->proc_subject; i; i = i->next) { + if (unlikely(i->parent_subject && + (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) && + (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_dev))) { + i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_dev; + } + update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_dev, i); + } + } + + update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_dev); + + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct name_entry *matchn; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + + if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) { + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt); + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + } + + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) +{ + struct name_entry *matchn; + int error = 0; + + matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt)); + + lock_kernel(); + error = vfs_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); + unlock_kernel(); + + if (unlikely(error)) + return error; + + /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for + NFS silly-renaming + */ + + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) { + if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) && + (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) + do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + new_dentry->d_inode->i_dev); + } + + if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev) && + (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) + do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_dev); + + if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) + do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt); + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + return error; +} + +static int +lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt, + unsigned char **sum) +{ + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct role_transition *trans; + __u16 i; + int found = 0; + + /* check transition table */ + + for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) + return 0; + + /* handle special roles that do not require authentication */ + + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) + && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) { + *salt = NULL; + *sum = NULL; + return 1; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) { + *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt; + *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +assign_special_role(char *rolename) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL; + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct file *filp; + + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) + if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) && + (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) + assigned = r; + + if (!assigned) + return; + + tsk = current->p_pptr; + filp = tsk->exec_file; + + if (tsk && filp) { + tsk->is_writable = 0; + + acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1; + tsk->acl_sp_role = 1; + tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value; + tsk->role = assigned; + tsk->acl = + chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role); + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + tsk->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + tsk->is_writable = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid); +#endif + } + + return; +} + +ssize_t +write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct gr_arg *arg; + struct gr_arg usermode; + unsigned char *sprole_salt; + unsigned char *sprole_sum; + int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg); + int error2 = 0; + + down(&gr_dev_sem); + + arg = (struct gr_arg *) buf; + + if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg)) { + security_alert_good(GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, count, + (int) sizeof (struct gr_arg)); + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if ((gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) + && time_before_eq(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) { + gr_auth_expires = 0; + gr_auth_attempts = 0; + } + + if (copy_from_user(&usermode, arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + if (usermode.mode != SPROLE && time_after(gr_auth_expires, jiffies)) { + error = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + + /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role, + do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication + locking + */ + + if (usermode.mode != SPROLE && current->uid) { + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + + /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */ + + usermode.pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0'; + usermode.sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0'; + + /* Okay. + * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet + * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables + * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */ + + switch (usermode.mode) { + case STATUS: + if (gr_status & GR_READY) + error = 1; + else + error = 2; + goto out; + case SHUTDOWN: + if ((gr_status & GR_READY) + && !(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) { + gr_status &= ~GR_READY; + security_alert_good(GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + free_variables(); + memset(&usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg)); + memset(&system_salt, 0, sizeof (system_salt)); + memset(&system_sum, 0, sizeof (system_sum)); + } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) { + security_alert(GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EPERM; + } else { + security_alert_good(GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EAGAIN; + } + break; + case ENABLE: + if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(&usermode))) + security_alert_good(GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + else { + if (gr_status & GR_READY) + error = -EAGAIN; + else + error = error2; + security_alert(GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + break; + case RELOAD: + if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) { + security_alert_good(GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG); + error = -EAGAIN; + } else if (!(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) { + lock_kernel(); + gr_status &= ~GR_READY; + free_variables(); + if (!(error2 = gracl_init(&usermode))) { + unlock_kernel(); + security_alert_good(GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, + GR_VERSION); + } else { + unlock_kernel(); + error = error2; + security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + } else { + security_alert(GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EPERM; + } + break; + case SEGVMOD: + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { + security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EAGAIN; + break; + } + + if (!(chkpw(&usermode, system_salt, system_sum))) { + security_alert_good(GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + if (usermode.segv_device && usermode.segv_inode) { + struct acl_subject_label *segvacl; + segvacl = + lookup_acl_subj_label(usermode.segv_inode, + usermode.segv_device, + current->role); + if (segvacl) { + segvacl->crashes = 0; + segvacl->expires = 0; + } + } else if (gr_find_uid(usermode.segv_uid) >= 0) { + gr_remove_uid(usermode.segv_uid); + } + } else { + security_alert(GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EPERM; + } + break; + case SPROLE: + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { + security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EAGAIN; + break; + } + + if ((current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) + && time_before_eq(current->role->expires, jiffies)) { + current->role->expires = 0; + current->role->auth_attempts = 0; + } + + if (time_after(current->role->expires, jiffies)) { + error = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + + if (lookup_special_role_auth + (usermode.sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum) + && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum) + || !(chkpw(&usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) { + assign_special_role(usermode.sp_role); + security_alert_good(GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG, + (current->p_pptr) ? current-> + p_pptr->role->rolename : "", + acl_sp_role_value, DEFAULTSECARGS); + } else { + security_alert(GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, usermode.sp_role, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EPERM; + current->role->auth_attempts++; + if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) { + current->role->expires = + jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ; + security_alert(GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG, + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES, + usermode.sp_role, DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + + goto out; + } + break; + default: + security_alert(GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, usermode.mode, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if (error != -EPERM) + goto out; + + gr_auth_attempts++; + + if (gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES) { + security_alert(GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES); + gr_auth_expires = jiffies + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT * HZ; + } + + out: + up(&gr_dev_sem); + return error; +} + +int +gr_set_acls(const int type) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct task_struct *task; + struct file *filp; + unsigned short i; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(task) { + /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler, + if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin + ACL */ + + if (type && (task->role != current->role || + task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id)) + continue; + + task->acl_role_id = 0; + + if ((filp = task->exec_file)) { + do_set_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid); + + task->acl = + chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, + task->role); + if (task->acl) { + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + curr = task->acl; + + task->is_writable = 0; + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); +#endif + if (!(curr->mode & GR_LEARN)) + for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { + if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << i))) + continue; + + task->rlim[i].rlim_cur = + curr->res[i].rlim_cur; + task->rlim[i].rlim_max = + curr->res[i].rlim_max; + } + } else { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + security_alert_good(GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, + task->pid); + return 1; + } + } else { + // it's a kernel process + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN + task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND; +#endif + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return 0; +} + +void +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *acl; + + if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) && + task->acl && (task->acl->mode & GR_LEARN))) + goto skip_reslog; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG + gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted); +#endif + skip_reslog: + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted)) + return; + + acl = task->acl; + + if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & GR_LEARN) || + !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res)))) + return; + + if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) { + unsigned long res_add; + + res_add = wanted; + switch (res) { + case RLIMIT_CPU: + res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_FSIZE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_DATA: + res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_STACK: + res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_CORE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_RSS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_NPROC: + res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_NOFILE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK: + res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_AS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_LOCKS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP; + break; + } + + acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add; + + if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max) + acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add; + + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, acl->filename, + acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max, + "", (unsigned long) res); + } + + return; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root; + +__u32 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval, + const void *newval) +{ + struct proc_dir_entry *tmp; + struct nameidata nd; + const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys"; + char *path = gr_shared_page[0][smp_processor_id()]; + struct acl_object_label *obj; + unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i; + __u32 err = 0; + __u32 mode = 0; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 1; + + if (oldval) + mode |= GR_READ; + if (newval) + mode |= GR_WRITE; + + /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */ + + for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) { + len += strlen(tmp->name); + len++; + depth++; + } + + if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE) + return 0; // deny + + memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + + memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys)); + + pos += strlen(proc_sys); + + for (; depth > 0; depth--) { + path[pos] = '/'; + pos++; + for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; + tmp = tmp->parent) { + if (depth == i) { + memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name, + strlen(tmp->name)); + pos += strlen(tmp->name); + } + i++; + } + } + + if (path_init(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) + err = path_walk(path, &nd); + + if (err) + goto out; + + obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl); + err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & GR_LEARN) && ((err & mode) != mode))) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + err = new_mode; + gr_log_learn(current->role, current->uid, current->gid, + current, path, new_mode); + } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) { + security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", path, + (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", + (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + err = 0; + } else if ((err & mode) != mode) { + err = 0; + } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful", + path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", + (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + + path_release(&nd); + + out: + return err; +} +#endif + +int +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) +{ + struct file *filp; + __u32 retmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + filp = task->exec_file; + + if (unlikely(!filp)) + return 0; + + retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD, filp->f_vfsmnt); + + if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) { + switch (request) { + case PTRACE_POKETEXT: + case PTRACE_POKEDATA: + case PTRACE_POKEUSR: +#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) + case PTRACE_SETREGS: + case PTRACE_SETFPREGS: +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS: +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC + case PTRACE_SETVRREGS: +#endif + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) && + !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) + && (current->acl != task->acl + || (current->acl != current->role->root_label + && current->pid != task->pid))) { + security_alert(GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, + gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt), + task->comm, task->pid, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + __u32 retmode; + struct acl_subject_label *subj; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + if (unlikely + ((current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) + && !(current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE))) + retmode = gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt); + else + return 0; + + subj = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, current->role); + + if (!(retmode & GR_PTRACERD) && + !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) && + (current->acl != subj)) { + security_alert(GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || + (current->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) || !filp || + !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) + return 0; + + if (unlikely(current->is_writable)) + return 0; + + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, + current->role->root_label); + if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) { + security_alert(GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, + gr_to_filename(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) + return 1; + + mode = + gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, + GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, + file->f_vfsmnt); + + if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { + security_alert(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { + security_audit(GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) + return 1; + + mode = + gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, + GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, + file->f_vfsmnt); + + if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { + security_alert(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { + security_audit(GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) +{ + unsigned long runtime; + unsigned long cputime; + unsigned int wday, cday; + __u8 whr, chr; + __u8 wmin, cmin; + __u8 wsec, csec; + char cur_tty[64] = { 0 }; + char parent_tty[64] = { 0 }; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl || + !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT))) + return; + + runtime = (jiffies - task->start_time) / HZ; + wday = runtime / (3600 * 24); + runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24); + whr = runtime / 3600; + runtime -= whr * 3600; + wmin = runtime / 60; + runtime -= wmin * 60; + wsec = runtime; + + cputime = (task->times.tms_utime + task->times.tms_stime) / HZ; + cday = cputime / (3600 * 24); + cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24); + chr = cputime / 3600; + cputime -= chr * 3600; + cmin = cputime / 60; + cputime -= cmin * 60; + csec = cputime; + + security_audit(GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task->comm, + task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->tty, + cur_tty), + task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, + wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, + (task-> + flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", + code, task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid, + NIPQUAD(task->p_pptr->curr_ip), + tty_name(task->p_pptr->tty, parent_tty), + task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid, + task->p_pptr->egid); + + return; +} + +void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (gr_status & GR_READY) { + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; + } + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/* stack-based acl allocation tracking (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1; +static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1; +static void **alloc_stack; + +static __inline__ int +alloc_pop(void) +{ + if ((alloc_stack_next - 1) == 0) + return 0; + + if (*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2)) + kfree(*(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 2)); + + alloc_stack_next--; + + return 1; +} + +static __inline__ void +alloc_push(void *buf) +{ + if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size) + BUG(); + + *(alloc_stack + alloc_stack_next - 1) = buf; + + alloc_stack_next++; + + return; +} + +void * +acl_alloc(unsigned long len) +{ + void *ret; + + if (len > PAGE_SIZE) + BUG(); + + ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (ret) + alloc_push(ret); + + return ret; +} + +void +acl_free_all(void) +{ + if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack) + return; + + while (alloc_pop()) ; + + if (alloc_stack) { + if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(alloc_stack); + else + vfree(alloc_stack); + } + + alloc_stack = NULL; + alloc_stack_size = 1; + alloc_stack_next = 1; + + return; +} + +int +acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size) +{ + if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + alloc_stack = + (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL); + else + alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *)); + + alloc_stack_size = size; + + if (!alloc_stack) + return 0; + else + return 1; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +/* capability handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002,2003 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const char *captab_log[29] = { + "CAP_CHOWN", + "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE", + "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH", + "CAP_FOWNER", + "CAP_FSETID", + "CAP_KILL", + "CAP_SETGID", + "CAP_SETUID", + "CAP_SETPCAP", + "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE", + "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE", + "CAP_NET_BROADCAST", + "CAP_NET_ADMIN", + "CAP_NET_RAW", + "CAP_IPC_LOCK", + "CAP_IPC_OWNER", + "CAP_SYS_MODULE", + "CAP_SYS_RAWIO", + "CAP_SYS_CHROOT", + "CAP_SYS_PTRACE", + "CAP_SYS_PACCT", + "CAP_SYS_ADMIN", + "CAP_SYS_BOOT", + "CAP_SYS_NICE", + "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE", + "CAP_SYS_TIME", + "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG", + "CAP_MKNOD", + "CAP_LEASE" +}; + +int +gr_is_capable(const int cap) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return 1; + + curracl = current->acl; + + if (!cap_raised(curracl->cap_lower, cap)) + return 1; + + if ((curracl->mode & GR_LEARN) + && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) { + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename, + curracl->filename, 0UL, + 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + return 1; + } + + if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) + security_alert(GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, captab_log[cap], DEFAULTSECARGS); + + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,469 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) + return GR_FIND; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); + + if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) { + security_audit(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + security_alert(GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND))) + return 0; + + return GR_FIND; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND; + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) + return reqmode; + + if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) + reqmode |= GR_APPEND; + else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE)) + reqmode |= GR_WRITE; + if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, + mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : + reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + security_alert(GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct dentry * p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) + reqmode |= GR_APPEND; + if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) + reqmode |= GR_SETID; + + mode = + gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt, + reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : + reqmode & GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + security_alert(GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(dentry, p_mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "", DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND; + + if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + reqmode |= GR_EXEC; + if (fmode & S_IWOTH) + reqmode |= GR_WRITE; + if (fmode & S_IROTH) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, + mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", + reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + security_alert(GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", + reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "", + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +#define generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, reqmode, fmt) \ +{ \ + __u32 mode; \ + \ + mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); \ + \ + if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \ + security_audit(fmt, "successful", \ + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); \ + return mode; \ + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \ + security_alert(fmt, "denied", gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), \ + DEFAULTSECARGS); \ + return 0; \ + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \ + return 0; \ + \ + return (reqmode); \ +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, + GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } else { + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, + GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } else { + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE, + GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const ino_t ino) +{ + if (likely((unsigned long)(dentry->d_inode))) { + struct dentry d = *dentry; + struct inode inode = *(dentry->d_inode); + + inode.i_ino = ino; + d.d_inode = &inode; + + if (unlikely(!gr_search_file(&d, GR_FIND | GR_NOLEARN, mnt))) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) +{ + __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + __u32 mode; + + mode = + gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry, + old_mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + security_alert(GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), to, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) + return 0; + + return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) +{ + __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + __u32 mode; + + mode = + gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | + GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + security_audit(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "successful", + from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, "denied", + from, gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) + return 0; + + return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); +} + +#define generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode, fmt) \ +{ \ + __u32 mode; \ + \ + mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); \ + \ + if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { \ + security_audit(fmt, "successful", \ + gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \ + DEFAULTSECARGS); \ + return mode; \ + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { \ + security_alert(fmt, "denied", \ + gr_to_filename(new_dentry, parent_mnt), \ + DEFAULTSECARGS); \ + return 0; \ + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) \ + return 0; \ + \ + return (reqmode); \ +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const int mode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))) + reqmode |= GR_SETID; + + generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt) +{ + generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG); +} + +#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \ + (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \ + ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ))) + +int +gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *old_parent_inode, + struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) +{ + __u8 gr_replace = 1; + __u32 comp1, comp2; + int error = 0; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 1; + + if (!new_dentry->d_inode) { + gr_replace = 0; + + comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ | + GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS); + comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | + GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | + GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); + } else { + comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | + GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | + GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt); + comp2 = + gr_search_file(old_dentry, + GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ | + GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); + } + + if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && + ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS))) + security_audit(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "successful", + gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), + newname, DEFAULTSECARGS); + else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS) + && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) { + security_alert(GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, "denied", + gr_to_filename(old_dentry, old_mnt), newname, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + error = -EACCES; + } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2))) + error = -EACCES; + + if (error) + return error; + + error = gr_handle_rename(old_parent_inode, parent_dentry->d_inode, + old_dentry, new_dentry, old_mnt, gr_replace); + + return error; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_exit(void) +{ + u16 id; + char *rolename; + + if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) { + id = current->acl_role_id; + rolename = current->role->rolename; + gr_set_acls(1); + security_alert_good(GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, + rolename, id, DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + + if (current->exec_file) { + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = NULL; + } +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * grsecurity/gracl_ip.c + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define GR_BIND 0x01 +#define GR_CONNECT 0x02 + +static const char * gr_protocols[256] = { + "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt", + "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet", + "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1", + "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp", + "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++", + "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre", + "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile", + "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63", + "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv", + "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak", + "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf", + "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp", + "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim", + "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip", + "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp", + "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup", + "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135", + "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143", + "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151", + "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159", + "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167", + "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175", + "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183", + "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191", + "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199", + "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207", + "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215", + "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223", + "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231", + "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239", + "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247", + "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255", + }; + +static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = { + "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6", + "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet" + }; + +static __inline__ const char * +gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto) +{ + return gr_protocols[proto]; +} + +static __inline__ const char * +gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type) +{ + return gr_socktypes[type]; +} + +int +gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + goto exit; + + if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET) + || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255)) + goto exit; // let the kernel handle it + + curr = current->acl; + + if (!curr->ips) + goto exit; + + if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) && + (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32)))) + goto exit; + + if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) { + /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes + dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not + bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */ + if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) { + __u32 fakeip = 0; + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, + protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) { + __u32 fakeip = 0; + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, + protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + } + /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */ + goto exit; + } + + security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", gr_socktype_to_name(type), + gr_proto_to_name(protocol), DEFAULTSECARGS); + + return 0; + exit: + return 1; +} + +static __inline__ int +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + struct acl_ip_label *ip; + unsigned long i; + __u32 ip_addr = 0; + __u16 ip_port = 0; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->family != PF_INET)) + return 1; + + curr = current->acl; + + if (!curr->ips) + return 1; + + ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port); + + for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) { + ip = *(curr->ips + i); + if ((ip->mode & mode) && + (ip_port >= ip->low) && + (ip_port <= ip->high) && + ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) == + (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask)) + && (ip-> + proto[sk->protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->protocol % 32))) + && (ip->type & (1 << type))) + return 1; + } + + if (curr->mode & GR_LEARN) { + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type, + sk->protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + return 1; + } + + if (mode == GR_BIND) + security_alert(GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, + gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->protocol), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + else if (mode == GR_CONNECT) + security_alert(GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, + gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->protocol), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); +} + +int +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); +} + +int +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + if (addr) + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM); + else { + struct sockaddr_in sin; + + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = sk->daddr; + sin.sin_port = sk->dport; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); + } +} + +int +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sockaddr_in sin; + + if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr))) + return 1; // skip this packet + + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr; + sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char * buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos); +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); + +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait); +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(input_wait); +static atomic_t learn_buffer_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0); +static int gr_learn_attached; + +#define LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS 256 +#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE 16384 + +static spinlock_t learn_buffer_lock[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS] = { [0 ... (LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS - 1)] = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED }; +static char *learn_buffer[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS]; +static int learn_buffer_len[LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS]; + +static ssize_t +read_learn(struct file *file, char * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) +{ + DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); + ssize_t retval = 0; + char *tmp; + unsigned int len; + int i; + + add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + do { + if (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > 1) + break; + + if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { + retval = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + if (signal_pending(current)) { + retval = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto out; + } + + schedule(); + } while (1); + + + for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) { + spin_lock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + len = learn_buffer_len[i]; + tmp = learn_buffer[i]; + if (!len || !tmp) { + spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + continue; + } + learn_buffer[i] = NULL; + learn_buffer_len[i] = 0; + spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + + if (count < ((i * LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE) + len)) { + retval = -EINVAL; + vfree(tmp); + goto out; + } + if (copy_to_user(buf + (i * LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE), tmp, len)) { + retval = -EFAULT; + vfree(tmp); + goto out; + } + + retval += len; + vfree(tmp); + atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count); + atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count); + } + + wake_up(&input_wait); +out: + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); + return retval; +} + +static unsigned int +poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait) +{ + poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait); + + if (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > 1) + return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); + + return 0; +} + +void +gr_clear_learn_entries(void) +{ + int i; + + atomic_set(&learn_buffer_count, 0); + wake_up(&input_wait); + + for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) { + if (learn_buffer_len[i]) { + vfree(learn_buffer[i]); + learn_buffer[i] = NULL; + learn_buffer_len[i] = 0; + } + } + + return; +} + +void +gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); + va_list args; + char *tmpbuf; + char *buf; + int i; + unsigned int len; + + if (!gr_learn_attached) + return; + + tmpbuf = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE); + + if (tmpbuf == NULL) + return; + + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(tmpbuf, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + if (len < 0) + len = LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 1; + + buf = vmalloc(len + 1); + + if (buf == NULL) { + vfree(tmpbuf); + return; + } + + memcpy(buf, tmpbuf, len); + buf[len] = '\0'; + vfree(tmpbuf); + + add_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait); + + atomic_inc(&learn_buffer_count); + while (atomic_read(&learn_buffer_count) > ((2 * (LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS - 1)) + 1)) { + /* don't sleep under the BKL */ + if (unlikely(current->lock_depth >= 0)) { + remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait); + atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count); + vfree(buf); + return; + } + sleep_on(&input_wait); + } + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) { + remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait); + atomic_dec(&learn_buffer_count); + vfree(buf); + return; + } + + for (i = 0; i < LEARN_BUFFER_SLOTS; i++) { + spin_lock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + + if (learn_buffer_len[i]) { + spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + continue; + } + + learn_buffer[i] = buf; + + learn_buffer_len[i] = len + 1; + + atomic_inc(&learn_buffer_count); + spin_unlock(&learn_buffer_lock[i]); + break; + } + + remove_wait_queue(&input_wait, &wait); + wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait); + + return; +} + +static int +open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached) + return -EBUSY; + else if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) + gr_learn_attached = 1; + + return 0; +} + +static int +close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) + gr_learn_attached = 0; + + return 0; +} + +struct file_operations grsec_fops = { + read: read_learn, + write: write_grsec_handler, + open: open_learn, + release: close_learn, + poll: poll_learn, +}; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +/* resource handling routines (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const char *restab_log[11] = { + "RLIMIT_CPU", + "RLIMIT_FSIZE", + "RLIMIT_DATA", + "RLIMIT_STACK", + "RLIMIT_CORE", + "RLIMIT_RSS", + "RLIMIT_NPROC", + "RLIMIT_NOFILE", + "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK", + "RLIMIT_AS", + "RLIMIT_LOCKS" +}; + +__inline__ void +gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted) +{ + if (unlikely(res == RLIMIT_NPROC && + (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)))) + return; + + if (unlikely(wanted >= task->rlim[res].rlim_cur && + task->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)) + security_alert(GR_RESOURCE_MSG, wanted, restab_log[res], + task->rlim[res].rlim_cur, task->comm, + task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, + task->gid, task->egid, task->p_pptr->comm, + task->p_pptr->pid, task->p_pptr->uid, + task->p_pptr->euid, task->p_pptr->gid, + task->p_pptr->egid); + + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,323 @@ +/* + * grsecurity/gracl_segv.c + * Copyright Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static struct crash_uid *uid_set; +static unsigned short uid_used; +static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock; +extern __inline__ struct acl_subject_label *lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t + inode, + const kdev_t + dev, + struct + acl_role_label + *role); + +int +gr_init_uidset(void) +{ + uid_set = + kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL); + uid_used = 0; + + return uid_set ? 1 : 0; +} + +void +gr_free_uidset(void) +{ + if (uid_set) + kfree(uid_set); + + return; +} + +int +gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set; + uid_t buid; + int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid; + + while (high >= low) { + mid = (low + high) >> 1; + buid = tmp[mid].uid; + if (buid == uid) + return mid; + if (buid > uid) + high = mid - 1; + if (buid < uid) + low = mid + 1; + } + + return -1; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_insertsort(void) +{ + unsigned short i, j; + struct crash_uid index; + + for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) { + index = uid_set[i]; + j = i; + while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) { + uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1]; + j--; + } + uid_set[j] = index; + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires) +{ + int loc; + + if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX) + return; + + loc = gr_find_uid(uid); + + if (loc >= 0) { + uid_set[loc].expires = expires; + return; + } + + uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid; + uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires; + uid_used++; + + gr_insertsort(); + + return; +} + +void +gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc) +{ + unsigned short i; + + for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++) + uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i]; + + uid_used--; + + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + int loc; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + read_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + loc = gr_find_uid(uid); + read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + + if (loc < 0) + return 0; + + write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, jiffies)) + gr_remove_uid(loc); + else { + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + return 1; + } + + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + return 0; +} + +static __inline__ int +proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid || + task->uid != task->fsuid) + return 1; + if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid || + task->gid != task->fsgid) + return 1; + + return 0; +} +static __inline__ int +gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t) +{ + unsigned long int flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags); + if (t->sig == NULL) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags); + return -ESRCH; + } + + if (t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) + t->sig->action[sig - 1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; + sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig); + recalc_sigpending(t); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags); + + return send_sig_info(sig, (void *) 1L, t); +} + +void +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + struct acl_subject_label *curr2; + struct task_struct *tsk; + + if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL) + return; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return; + + curr = task->acl; + + if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES))) + return; + + if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) { + curr->expires = 0; + curr->crashes = 0; + } + + curr->crashes++; + + if (!curr->expires) + curr->expires = jiffies + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max; + + if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && + time_after(curr->expires, jiffies)) { + if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) { + security_alert(GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task->comm, + task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, + task->gid, task->egid, + task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid, + task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid, + task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid, + task->uid, + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ); + write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires); + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + curr->expires = 0; + curr->crashes = 0; + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(tsk) { + if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk); + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } else { + security_alert(GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task->comm, + task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, + task->gid, task->egid, + task->p_pptr->comm, task->p_pptr->pid, + task->p_pptr->uid, task->p_pptr->euid, + task->p_pptr->gid, task->p_pptr->egid, + kdevname(curr->device), curr->inode, + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max / HZ); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(tsk) { + if (likely(tsk != task)) { + curr2 = tsk->acl; + + if (curr2->device == curr->device && + curr2->inode == curr->inode) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk); + } + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } + } + + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev, + current->role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) || + (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires)) + return 0; + + if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && + time_after(curr->expires, jiffies)) + return 1; + else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, jiffies)) { + curr->crashes = 0; + curr->expires = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_alertkill(void) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + __u32 curr_ip; + struct task_struct *task; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return; + + curracl = current->acl; + curr_ip = current->curr_ip; + + if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip && + (curr_ip != 0xffffffff)) { + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(task) { + if (task->curr_ip == curr_ip) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task); + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, current); + + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* shared memory handling routines, (c) Brad Spengler 2002, 2003 */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return 1; + + task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid); + + if (unlikely(!task)) + task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid); + + if (unlikely(task && ((task->start_time < shm_createtime) || + (task->pid == shm_lapid)) && + (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) && + (task->acl != current->acl))) { + security_alert(GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group && + in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir && + !grsec_enable_group)) { + security_audit(GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + } +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + struct task_struct *p, **htable; + + if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix)) + return 1; + + if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) + return 1; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + + htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)]; + + for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next) ; + + if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + security_alert(GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + return 1; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_nice(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(task_t *p, const int niceval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (!have_same_root(p, current) + || (have_same_root(p, current) + && (niceval < task_nice(p)) + && proc_is_chrooted(current)))) { + security_alert(GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -ESRCH; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && + !have_same_root(current, target)) { + security_alert(GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG, target->comm, target->pid, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 1; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || (current->pid <= 1)) + return 0; + + if (p && p->fs && p->fs->root && p->fs->root->d_inode && + child_reaper && child_reaper->fs && child_reaper->fs->root && + child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode && current && current->fs && + current->fs->root && current->fs->root->d_inode) { + if (proc_is_chrooted(current) && !have_same_root(current, p)) + return 1; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir) + return 1; + + if (!proc_is_chrooted(current)) + return 1; + else { + struct dentry *dentry = u_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = u_mnt; + struct dentry *realroot; + struct vfsmount *realrootmnt; + struct dentry *currentroot; + struct vfsmount *currentmnt; + + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + + read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); + currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt); + currentroot = dget(current->fs->root); + read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + for (;;) { + if (unlikely + ((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) + || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt))) + break; + if (unlikely + (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + + dput(currentroot); + mntput(currentmnt); + + if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) { + /* ok, they're definitely trying to fchdir outside of the + chroot. */ + dput(realroot); + mntput(realrootmnt); + security_alert(GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, + gr_to_filename(u_dentry, u_mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } else { + dput(realroot); + mntput(realrootmnt); + return 1; + } + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +int +gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + struct task_struct *p, **htable; + + if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat)) + return 1; + + if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) + return 1; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + + htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_cprid)]; + + for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_cprid; p = p->pidhash_next) ; + + if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p) && + (p->start_time < shm_createtime))) { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } + + if (unlikely(!p)) { + htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(shm_lapid)]; + for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != shm_lapid; + p = p->pidhash_next) ; + + if (unlikely(p && !have_same_root(current, p))) { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + security_alert(GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } + } + + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + return 1; +} + +void +gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current)) + security_audit(GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && + proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) { + task->cap_permitted = + cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + task->cap_inheritable = + cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + task->cap_effective = + cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + } +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current) + && (op & 002)) + return -EACCES; +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir) + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod && + ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID)) && + proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + security_alert(GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, + gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,368 @@ +/* + * when grsecurity is disabled, compile all external functions into nothing + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +__u32 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode) +{ + return mode; +} +#endif + +int +gr_acl_is_enabled(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_set_acls(const int type) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} + +__inline__ void +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_is_capable(const int cap) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_handle_alertkill(void) +{ + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot, + unsigned int *vm_flags) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +grsecurity_init(void) +{ + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const int mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct inode *old_parent_inode, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt, const ino_t ino) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct dentry * p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_exit(void) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +int +gr_handle_nproc(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user && + (atomic_read(¤t->user->processes) > + current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) { + security_alert(GR_NPROC_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EAGAIN; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + char grarg[64] = { 0 }; + __u8 execlen = 0; + unsigned int i; + + if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group && + in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) + || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group))) + return; + + if (unlikely(!argv)) + goto log; + + for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 62; i++) { + char *p; + __u8 len; + + if (get_user(p, argv + i)) + goto log; + if (!p) + goto log; + len = strnlen_user(p, 62 - execlen); + if (len > 62 - execlen) + len = 62 - execlen; + else if (len > 0) + len--; + if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len)) + goto log; + execlen += len; + *(grarg + execlen) = ' '; + *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0'; + execlen++; + } + + log: + security_audit(GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, gr_to_filename(bprm->file->f_dentry, + bprm->file->f_vfsmnt), + grarg, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && + (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) && + (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) { + if (!permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode)) + security_alert(GR_FIFO_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + dentry->d_inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_forkfail(const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + if (grsec_enable_forkfail) + security_alert(GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int grsec_enable_link; +int grsec_enable_dmesg; +int grsec_enable_fifo; +int grsec_enable_execve; +int grsec_enable_execlog; +int grsec_enable_signal; +int grsec_enable_forkfail; +int grsec_enable_time; +int grsec_enable_group; +int grsec_audit_gid; +int grsec_enable_chdir; +int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; +int grsec_enable_mount; +int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; +int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; +int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; +int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; +int grsec_enable_chroot_double; +int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; +int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; +int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; +int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; +int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; +int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; +int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; +int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; +int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; +int grsec_enable_tpe; +int grsec_tpe_gid; +int grsec_enable_tpe_all; +int grsec_enable_randpid; +int grsec_enable_randid; +int grsec_enable_randisn; +int grsec_enable_randsrc; +int grsec_enable_randrpc; +int grsec_enable_socket_all; +int grsec_socket_all_gid; +int grsec_enable_socket_client; +int grsec_socket_client_gid; +int grsec_enable_socket_server; +int grsec_socket_server_gid; +int grsec_lock; + +spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0; +unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0; + +spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime = 0; +unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; + +spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +char *gr_shared_page[2][NR_CPUS]; + +extern void arc4_init(void); + +void +grsecurity_init(void) +{ + int i, j; + /* create the per-cpu shared pages */ + + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) { + gr_shared_page[j][i] = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gr_shared_page[j][i]) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page"); + return; + } + } + } + + arc4_init(); + +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + grsec_lock = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + grsec_enable_group = 1; + grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + grsec_enable_chdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + grsec_enable_mount = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + grsec_enable_link = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + grsec_enable_dmesg = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + grsec_enable_fifo = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + grsec_enable_execve = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + grsec_enable_execlog = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + grsec_enable_signal = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + grsec_enable_forkfail = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + grsec_enable_time = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + grsec_enable_tpe = 1; + grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1; +#endif +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + grsec_enable_randpid = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + grsec_enable_randid = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN + grsec_enable_randisn = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + grsec_enable_randsrc = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC + grsec_enable_randrpc = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + grsec_enable_socket_all = 1; + grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + grsec_enable_socket_client = 1; + grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + grsec_enable_socket_server = 1; + grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID; +#endif +#endif + + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0) + && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT)) + security_audit(GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + security_audit(GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) + && (semflg & IPC_CREAT)) + security_audit(GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + security_audit(GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) + && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT)) + security_audit(GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + security_audit(GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, + const struct inode *inode, + const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && + (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) && + (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) { + security_alert(GR_SYMLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && + (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) || + ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) || + (permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) && + !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) { + security_alert(GR_HARDLINK_MSG, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), + inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_handle_ioperm(void) +{ + security_alert(GR_IOPERM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_iopl(void) +{ + security_alert(GR_IOPL_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_mem_write(void) +{ + security_alert(GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_kmem_write(void) +{ + security_alert(GR_KMEM_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_open_port(void) +{ + security_alert(GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (offset < __pa(high_memory) && + (pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) & PROT_WRITE) && + (offset != 0xa0000 || ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) > 0x20000))) { + security_alert(GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory)) + vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; + + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + security_audit(GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + security_audit(GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + security_audit(GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern int last_pid; + +int +gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + struct task_struct *p; + int pid; + + if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) { + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_lock(pid_lock); + + repeater: + + pid = 1 + (arc4random() % PID_MAX); + + for_each_task(p) { + if (p->pid == pid || p->pgrp == pid || + p->tgid == pid || p->session == pid) + goto repeater; + } + last_pid = pid; + spin_unlock(pid_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return pid; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) || + (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) { + if (t->pid == current->pid) { + security_alert_good(GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + } else { + security_alert_good(GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, sig, t->comm, + t->pid, t->uid, t->euid, t->gid, + t->egid, t->p_pptr->comm, + t->p_pptr->pid, t->p_pptr->uid, + t->p_pptr->euid, t->p_pptr->gid, + t->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS); + } + } +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) { + security_alert(GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, sig, p->comm, p->pid, p->uid, + p->euid, p->gid, p->egid, p->p_pptr->comm, + p->p_pptr->pid, p->p_pptr->uid, + p->p_pptr->euid, p->p_pptr->gid, + p->p_pptr->egid, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EPERM; + } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) { + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct task_struct *p; + unsigned int i; + struct inode *inode; + struct file *filp; + struct socket *connect_sock; + + if (unlikely(sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)) + return; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + for_each_task(p) { + if (!p->used_connect) + continue; + task_lock(p); + if (unlikely(!p->files)) { + task_unlock(p); + continue; + } + read_lock(&p->files->file_lock); + for (i = 0; i < p->files->max_fds; i++) { + filp = fcheck_files(p->files, i); + if (likely(!filp)) + continue; + inode = filp->f_dentry->d_inode; + if (likely(!inode || !inode->i_sock)) + continue; + connect_sock = &inode->u.socket_i; + if (unlikely(!connect_sock || + connect_sock->sk->protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)) + continue; + if (unlikely(sk->rcv_saddr == connect_sock->sk->daddr && + sk->daddr == connect_sock->sk->rcv_saddr && + ntohs(sk->sport) == + ntohs(connect_sock->sk->dport) + && ntohs(sk->dport) == + ntohs(connect_sock->sk->sport))) { + current->curr_ip = p->curr_ip; + current->used_accept = 1; + read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock); + task_unlock(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return; + } + } + read_unlock(&p->files->file_lock); + task_unlock(p); + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + current->curr_ip = sk->daddr; + current->used_accept = 1; +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) && + (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) { + security_alert(GR_SOCK_MSG, family, type, protocol, + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + if (grsec_enable_socket_server && + in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) && + sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && + (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { + security_alert(GR_BIND_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) && + sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && + (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { + security_alert(GR_CONNECT_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +__u32 +gr_cap_rtnetlink(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return current->cap_effective; + else + return (current->cap_effective & ~(current->acl->cap_lower)); +#else + return current->cap_effective; +#endif +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) { + security_alert(GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name, DEFAULTSECARGS); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_timechange(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + if (grsec_enable_time) + security_alert_good(GR_TIME_MSG, DEFAULTSECARGS); +#endif + return; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode; + + if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid) && + (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || + (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) { + security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all && + ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) || + (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) { + security_alert(GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, + gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt), + DEFAULTSECARGS); + return 0; + } +#endif +#endif + return 1; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/grsum.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +/* digest-sha256.c,v 1.13 2002/10/02 22:02:08 hvr Exp $ + * + * SHA-256 code by Jean-Luc Cooke . + * + * Glue code originally by Andrew McDonald and Alan Smithee, mailed + * to maintainer on pulped trees. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the + * Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any + * later version. + * + */ + +typedef struct { + __u32 state[8]; + __u32 count[2]; + __u8 buf[128]; +} sha256_ctx_t; + +static __inline__ __u32 +generic_rotr32(const __u32 x, const unsigned bits) +{ + const unsigned n = bits % 32; + return (x >> n) | (x << (32 - n)); +} + +#define Ch(x,y,z) ((x & y) ^ (~x & z)) +#define Maj(x,y,z) ((x & y) ^ ( x & z) ^ (y & z)) +#define RORu32(x,y) generic_rotr32(x, y) +#define e0(x) (RORu32(x, 2) ^ RORu32(x,13) ^ RORu32(x,22)) +#define e1(x) (RORu32(x, 6) ^ RORu32(x,11) ^ RORu32(x,25)) +#define s0(x) (RORu32(x, 7) ^ RORu32(x,18) ^ (x >> 3)) +#define s1(x) (RORu32(x,17) ^ RORu32(x,19) ^ (x >> 10)) + +#define H0 0x6a09e667 +#define H1 0xbb67ae85 +#define H2 0x3c6ef372 +#define H3 0xa54ff53a +#define H4 0x510e527f +#define H5 0x9b05688c +#define H6 0x1f83d9ab +#define H7 0x5be0cd19 + +const static __u32 sha256_K[64] = { + 0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5, + 0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5, + 0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3, + 0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174, + 0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc, + 0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da, + 0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7, + 0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967, + 0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13, + 0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85, + 0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3, + 0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070, + 0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5, + 0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3, + 0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208, + 0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2 +}; + +#define LOAD_OP(I)\ + {\ + t1 = input[(4*I) ] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\ + t1 |= input[(4*I)+1] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\ + t1 |= input[(4*I)+2] & 0xff; t1<<=8;\ + t1 |= input[(4*I)+3] & 0xff;\ + W[I] = t1;\ + } + +#define BLEND_OP(I) W[I] = s1(W[I-2]) + W[I-7] + s0(W[I-15]) + W[I-16]; + +static void +SHA256Transform(__u32 * state, const __u8 * input) +{ + __u32 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2; + __u32 W[64]; + + int i; + + /* load the input */ + LOAD_OP(0); + LOAD_OP(1); + LOAD_OP(2); + LOAD_OP(3); + LOAD_OP(4); + LOAD_OP(5); + LOAD_OP(6); + LOAD_OP(7); + LOAD_OP(8); + LOAD_OP(9); + LOAD_OP(10); + LOAD_OP(11); + LOAD_OP(12); + LOAD_OP(13); + LOAD_OP(14); + LOAD_OP(15); + + /* now blend */ + for (i = 16; i < 64; i += 8) { + BLEND_OP(i); + BLEND_OP(i + 1); + BLEND_OP(i + 2); + BLEND_OP(i + 3); + BLEND_OP(i + 4); + BLEND_OP(i + 5); + BLEND_OP(i + 6); + BLEND_OP(i + 7); + } + + /* load the state into our registers */ + a = state[0]; + b = state[1]; + c = state[2]; + d = state[3]; + e = state[4]; + f = state[5]; + g = state[6]; + h = state[7]; + + /* now iterate */ + for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 8) { + t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + sha256_K[i] + W[i]; + t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a, b, c); + d += t1; + h = t1 + t2; + t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d, e, f) + sha256_K[i + 1] + W[i + 1]; + t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h, a, b); + c += t1; + g = t1 + t2; + t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c, d, e) + sha256_K[i + 2] + W[i + 2]; + t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g, h, a); + b += t1; + f = t1 + t2; + t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b, c, d) + sha256_K[i + 3] + W[i + 3]; + t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f, g, h); + a += t1; + e = t1 + t2; + t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a, b, c) + sha256_K[i + 4] + W[i + 4]; + t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e, f, g); + h += t1; + d = t1 + t2; + t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h, a, b) + sha256_K[i + 5] + W[i + 5]; + t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d, e, f); + g += t1; + c = t1 + t2; + t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g, h, a) + sha256_K[i + 6] + W[i + 6]; + t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c, d, e); + f += t1; + b = t1 + t2; + t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f, g, h) + sha256_K[i + 7] + W[i + 7]; + t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b, c, d); + e += t1; + a = t1 + t2; + } + + state[0] += a; + state[1] += b; + state[2] += c; + state[3] += d; + state[4] += e; + state[5] += f; + state[6] += g; + state[7] += h; + + /* clear any sensitive info... */ + a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = t1 = t2 = 0; + memset(W, 0, 64 * sizeof (__u32)); +} + +static void +SHA256Init(sha256_ctx_t * C) +{ + C->state[0] = H0; + C->state[1] = H1; + C->state[2] = H2; + C->state[3] = H3; + C->state[4] = H4; + C->state[5] = H5; + C->state[6] = H6; + C->state[7] = H7; + C->count[0] = C->count[1] = 0; + memset(C->buf, 0, 128); +} + +static void +SHA256Update(sha256_ctx_t * C, const __u8 * input, __u32 inputLen) +{ + __u32 i, index, partLen; + + /* Compute number of bytes mod 128 */ + index = (__u32) ((C->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f); + + /* Update number of bits */ + if ((C->count[0] += (inputLen << 3)) < (inputLen << 3)) { + C->count[1]++; + C->count[1] += (inputLen >> 29); + } + + partLen = 64 - index; + + /* Transform as many times as possible. */ + if (inputLen >= partLen) { + memcpy(&C->buf[index], input, partLen); + SHA256Transform(C->state, C->buf); + + for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64) + SHA256Transform(C->state, &input[i]); + index = 0; + } else { + i = 0; + } + + /* Buffer remaining input */ + memcpy(&C->buf[index], &input[i], inputLen - i); +} + +static void +SHA256Final(sha256_ctx_t * C, __u8 * digest) +{ + const static __u8 padding[64] = { 0x80, }; + __u8 bits[8]; + __u32 t, index, padLen; + int i, j; + + /* Save number of bits */ + t = C->count[0]; + bits[7] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[6] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[5] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[4] = t; + t = C->count[1]; + bits[3] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[2] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[1] = t; + t >>= 8; + bits[0] = t; + + /* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */ + index = (C->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f; + padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : ((64 + 56) - index); + SHA256Update(C, padding, padLen); + + /* Append length (before padding) */ + SHA256Update(C, bits, sizeof (bits)); + + /* Store state in digest */ + for (i = j = 0; i < 8; i++, j += 4) { + t = C->state[i]; + digest[j + 3] = t; + t >>= 8; + digest[j + 2] = t; + t >>= 8; + digest[j + 1] = t; + t >>= 8; + digest[j] = t; + } + + /* Zeroize sensitive information. */ + memset(C, 0, sizeof (sha256_ctx_t)); +} + +int +chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum) +{ + sha256_ctx_t context; + unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; + volatile int retval = 0; + volatile int dummy = 0; + unsigned int i; + + SHA256Init(&context); + SHA256Update(&context, salt, GR_SALT_LEN); + SHA256Update(&context, entry->pw, strlen(entry->pw)); + SHA256Final(&context, temp_sum); + + memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN); + + for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++) + if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i]) + retval = 1; + else + dummy = 1; // waste a cycle + + return retval; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c --- linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/grsecurity/obsd_rand.c 2003-06-23 11:49:16.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1996, 1997, 2000-2002 Michael Shalayeff. + * + * Version 1.89, last modified 19-Sep-99 + * + * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Copyright 1998 Niels Provos + * All rights reserved. + * Theo de Raadt came up with the idea of using + * such a mathematical system to generate more random (yet non-repeating) + * ids to solve the resolver/named problem. But Niels designed the + * actual system based on the constraints. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer, + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * This product includes software developed by Niels Provos. + * 4. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products + * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define RU_OUT 180 +#define RU_MAX 30000 +#define RU_GEN 2 +#define RU_N 32749 +#define RU_AGEN 7 +#define RU_M 31104 +#define PFAC_N 3 +const static __u16 pfacts[PFAC_N] = { 2, 3, 2729 }; + +static __u16 ru_x; +static __u16 ru_seed, ru_seed2; +static __u16 ru_a, ru_b; +static __u16 ru_g; +static __u16 ru_counter = 0; +static __u16 ru_msb = 0; +static unsigned long ru_reseed = 0; +static __u32 tmp; + +static struct arc4_stream { + __u8 s[256]; + unsigned int cnt; + __u8 i; + __u8 j; +} arc4random_state[NR_CPUS]; + +#define TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS 15 +#define TCP_RNDISS_OUT 7200 +#define TCP_RNDISS_MAX 30000 + +static __u8 tcp_rndiss_sbox[NR_CPUS][128]; +static __u16 tcp_rndiss_msb[NR_CPUS]; +static __u16 tcp_rndiss_cnt[NR_CPUS]; +static unsigned long tcp_rndiss_reseed[NR_CPUS]; + +static unsigned long arc4random_reseed[NR_CPUS]; + +static int arc4random_initialized[NR_CPUS]; + +static __u16 pmod(__u16, __u16, __u16); +static void ip_initid(void); +__u16 ip_randomid(void); + +static __inline__ __u8 arc4_getbyte(void); +static __inline__ void arc4_stir(void); +static void arc4maybeinit(void); +__u32 arc4random(void); + +static __inline__ __u8 +arc4_getbyte(void) +{ + register __u8 si, sj; + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + arc4random_state[cpu].cnt++; + arc4random_state[cpu].i++; + si = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i]; + arc4random_state[cpu].j += si; + sj = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j]; + arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i] = sj; + arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j] = si; + return arc4random_state[cpu].s[(si + sj) & 0xff]; +} + +static __inline__ void +arc4_stir(void) +{ + __u8 buf[256]; + register __u8 si; + register int n; + int len = sizeof (buf); + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + unsigned long flags; + + do_gettimeofday((struct timeval *) buf); + get_random_bytes(buf + sizeof (struct timeval), + len - sizeof (struct timeval)); + + save_flags(flags); + cli(); + + arc4random_state[cpu].i--; + for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) { + arc4random_state[cpu].i++; + si = arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i]; + arc4random_state[cpu].j += si + buf[n % len]; + arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].i] = + arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j]; + arc4random_state[cpu].s[arc4random_state[cpu].j] = si; + } + arc4random_state[cpu].j = arc4random_state[cpu].i; + arc4random_state[cpu].cnt = 0; + + restore_flags(flags); + + for (n = 0; n < 256 * 4; n++) + arc4_getbyte(); + + return; +} + +void +arc4_init(void) +{ + int i, n; + + for (n = 0; n < NR_CPUS; n++) { + for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) + arc4random_state[n].s[i] = i; + arc4random_initialized[n] = 0; + } +} + +static void +arc4maybeinit(void) +{ + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + if (arc4random_initialized[cpu] && + time_after(xtime.tv_sec, arc4random_reseed[cpu])) + arc4random_initialized[cpu] = 0; + + if (!arc4random_initialized[cpu]) { + arc4random_initialized[cpu]++; + arc4_stir(); + arc4random_reseed[cpu] = xtime.tv_sec + (10 * 60); + } +} + +__u32 +arc4random(void) +{ + arc4maybeinit(); + return ((arc4_getbyte() << 24) | (arc4_getbyte() << 16) + | (arc4_getbyte() << 8) | arc4_getbyte()); +} + +static __u16 +pmod(__u16 gen, __u16 exp, __u16 mod) +{ + __u16 s, t, u; + + s = 1; + t = gen; + u = exp; + + while (u) { + if (u & 1) + s = (s * t) % mod; + u >>= 1; + t = (t * t) % mod; + } + return (s); +} + +static void +ip_initid(void) +{ + __u16 j, i; + int noprime = 1; + + ru_x = ((tmp = arc4random()) & 0xFFFF) % RU_M; + + ru_seed = (tmp >> 16) & 0x7FFF; + ru_seed2 = arc4random() & 0x7FFF; + + ru_b = ((tmp = arc4random()) & 0xfffe) | 1; + ru_a = pmod(RU_AGEN, (tmp >> 16) & 0xfffe, RU_M); + while (ru_b % 3 == 0) + ru_b += 2; + + j = (tmp = arc4random()) % RU_N; + tmp = tmp >> 16; + + while (noprime) { + for (i = 0; i < PFAC_N; i++) + if (j % pfacts[i] == 0) + break; + + if (i >= PFAC_N) + noprime = 0; + else + j = (j + 1) % RU_N; + } + + ru_g = pmod(RU_GEN, j, RU_N); + ru_counter = 0; + + ru_reseed = xtime.tv_sec + RU_OUT; + ru_msb = ru_msb == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000; +} + +__u16 +ip_randomid(void) +{ + int i, n; + + if (ru_counter >= RU_MAX || time_after(xtime.tv_sec, ru_reseed)) + ip_initid(); + + if (!tmp) + tmp = arc4random(); + + n = tmp & 0x3; + tmp = tmp >> 2; + if (ru_counter + n >= RU_MAX) + ip_initid(); + for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) + ru_x = (ru_a * ru_x + ru_b) % RU_M; + ru_counter += i; + + return ((ru_seed ^ pmod(ru_g, ru_seed2 ^ ru_x, RU_N)) | ru_msb); +} + +__u16 +tcp_rndiss_encrypt(__u16 val) +{ + __u16 sum = 0, i; + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + for (i = 0; i < TCP_RNDISS_ROUNDS; i++) { + sum += 0x79b9; + val ^= ((__u16) tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu][(val ^ sum) ^ 0x7f]) << 7; + val = ((val & 0xff) << 7) | (val >> 8); + } + + return val; +} + +static void +tcp_rndiss_init(void) +{ + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + get_random_bytes(tcp_rndiss_sbox[cpu], sizeof (tcp_rndiss_sbox)); + tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu] = xtime.tv_sec + TCP_RNDISS_OUT; + tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] = tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu] == 0x8000 ? 0 : 0x8000; + tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] = 0; +} + +__u32 +ip_randomisn(void) +{ + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + if (tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu] >= TCP_RNDISS_MAX || + time_after(xtime.tv_sec, tcp_rndiss_reseed[cpu])) + tcp_rndiss_init(); + + return (((tcp_rndiss_encrypt(tcp_rndiss_cnt[cpu]++) | + tcp_rndiss_msb[cpu]) << 16) | (arc4random() & 0x7fff)); +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/fs.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_open(const char *, int, int); asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int); /* yes, it's really unsigned */ -extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start); +extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *); extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int); extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gracl.h 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +#ifndef GR_ACL_H +#define GR_ACL_H +#endif +#include +#include + +#include + +/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * + * grsecurity ACL System + * Main header file + * Purpose: define most gracl data structures + * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ + +/* Major status information */ + +#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.0" + +enum { + + SHUTDOWN = 0, + ENABLE = 1, + SPROLE = 2, + RELOAD = 3, + SEGVMOD = 4, + STATUS = 5 +}; + +/* Password setup definitions + * kernel/grhash.c */ +enum { + GR_PW_LEN = 128, + GR_SALT_LEN = 16, + GR_SHA_LEN = 32, +}; + +enum { + GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64, +}; + +/* Begin Data Structures */ + +struct sprole_pw { + unsigned char *rolename; + unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; + unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */ +}; + +struct name_entry { + ino_t inode; + kdev_t device; + char *name; + __u16 len; +}; + +struct acl_role_db { + struct acl_role_label **r_hash; + __u32 r_size; +}; + +struct name_db { + struct name_entry **n_hash; + __u32 n_size; +}; + +struct crash_uid { + uid_t uid; + unsigned long expires; +}; + +/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */ +struct acl_subject_label { + char *filename; + ino_t inode; + kdev_t device; + __u32 mode; + __u32 cap_raise; + __u32 cap_lower; + + struct rlimit res[RLIM_NLIMITS + 1]; + __u16 resmask; + + __u32 ip_proto[8]; + __u32 ip_type; + struct acl_ip_label **ips; + __u32 ip_num; + + __u32 crashes; + unsigned long expires; + + struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject; + struct acl_object_label *proc_object; + struct acl_ip_label *ip_object; + struct acl_subject_label *prev; + struct acl_subject_label *next; + + struct acl_object_label **obj_hash; + __u32 obj_hash_size; +}; + +struct role_allowed_ip { + __u32 addr; + __u32 netmask; + + struct role_allowed_ip *prev; + struct role_allowed_ip *next; +}; + +struct role_transition { + char *rolename; + + struct role_transition *prev; + struct role_transition *next; +}; + +struct acl_role_label { + char *rolename; + uid_t uidgid; + __u16 roletype; + + __u16 auth_attempts; + unsigned long expires; + + struct acl_subject_label *root_label; + struct acl_subject_label *proc_subject; + + struct acl_role_label *prev; + struct acl_role_label *next; + + struct role_transition *transitions; + struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips; + struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash; + __u32 subj_hash_size; +}; + +struct user_acl_role_db { + struct acl_role_label **r_table; + __u32 r_entries; /* number of entries in table */ + __u32 s_entries; /* total number of subject acls */ + __u32 i_entries; /* total number of ip acls */ + __u32 o_entries; /* Total number of object acls */ + __u32 a_entries; /* total number of allowed ips */ + __u32 t_entries; /* total number of transitions */ +}; + +struct acl_object_label { + char *filename; + ino_t inode; + kdev_t device; + __u32 mode; + + struct acl_subject_label *nested; + + /* next two structures not used */ + + struct acl_object_label *prev; + struct acl_object_label *next; +}; + +struct acl_ip_label { + __u32 addr; + __u32 netmask; + __u16 low, high; + __u8 mode; + __u32 type; + __u32 proto[8]; + + /* next two structures not used */ + + struct acl_ip_label *prev; + struct acl_ip_label *next; +}; + +struct gr_arg { + struct user_acl_role_db role_db; + unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN]; + unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; + unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; + unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN]; + struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws; + __u16 num_sprole_pws; + kdev_t segv_device; + ino_t segv_inode; + uid_t segv_uid; + __u16 mode; +}; + +/* End Data Structures Section */ + +/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler + Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times + in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match. + Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/ + +static __inline__ unsigned long +rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz); +} + +static __inline__ unsigned long +fhash(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz); +} + +static __inline__ unsigned long +nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz; +} diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/gralloc.h 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#ifndef __GRALLOC_H +#define __GRALLOC_H + +void acl_free_all(void); +int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size); +void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len); + +#endif diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grdefs.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +#ifndef GRDEFS_H +#define GRDEFS_H + +/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */ + +enum { + GR_READY = 0x01, + GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state +}; + +/* Begin ACL declarations */ + +/* Role flags */ + +enum { + GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001, + GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002, + GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004, + GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008, + GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010, + GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020, + GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040 +}; + +/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */ +enum { + GR_DELETED = 0x00000080 +}; + +/* ACL Object-only mode flags */ +enum { + GR_READ = 0x00000001, + GR_APPEND = 0x00000002, + GR_WRITE = 0x00000004, + GR_EXEC = 0x00000008, + GR_FIND = 0x00000010, + GR_INHERIT = 0x00000040, + GR_PTRACERD = 0x00000100, + GR_SETID = 0x00000200, + GR_CREATE = 0x00000400, + GR_DELETE = 0x00000800, + GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00001000, + GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00002000, + GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x0004000, + GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00008000, + GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00010000, + GR_AUDIT_INHERIT = 0x00020000, + GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00400000, + GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00800000, + GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x01000000, + GR_SUPPRESS = 0x02000000, + GR_NOLEARN = 0x04000000 +}; + +#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \ + GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \ + GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE) + +/* ACL subject-only mode flags */ +enum { + GR_KILL = 0x00000001, + GR_VIEW = 0x00000002, + GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000100, + GR_LEARN = 0x00000200, + GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000400, + /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ + GR_DUMMY = 0x00000800, + + GR_PROTSHM = 0x00040000, + GR_KILLPROC = 0x00080000, + GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00100000, + /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ + GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00200000, + GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00400000, + GR_PROCACCT = 0x00800000 +}; + +#define GR_CRASH_RES 11 +#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500 + +/* begin resource learning section */ +enum { + GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60, + GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000, + GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000, + GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000, + GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000, + GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000, + GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1, + GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5, + GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000, + GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000, + GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2 +}; + +#endif diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grinternal.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H +#define __GRINTERNAL_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + +#include +#include + +extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...); +extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode); +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); +extern __inline__ __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode); +extern int gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace); +extern int gr_set_acls(const int type); + +extern void gr_handle_alertkill(void); +extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); + +extern int grsec_enable_link; +extern int grsec_enable_fifo; +extern int grsec_enable_execve; +extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb; +extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid; +extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec; +extern int grsec_forkbomb_max; +extern int grsec_enable_execlog; +extern int grsec_enable_signal; +extern int grsec_enable_forkfail; +extern int grsec_enable_time; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; +extern int grsec_enable_tpe; +extern int grsec_tpe_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all; +extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps; +extern int grsec_enable_randpid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_all; +extern int grsec_socket_all_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_client; +extern int grsec_socket_client_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_server; +extern int grsec_socket_server_gid; +extern int grsec_audit_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_group; +extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; +extern int grsec_enable_mount; +extern int grsec_enable_chdir; +extern int grsec_lock; + +extern struct task_struct *child_reaper; + +extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock; +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime; +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet; + +extern spinlock_t grsec_alertgood_lock; +extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_wtime; +extern unsigned long grsec_alertgood_fyet; + +extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock; + +#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \ + ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev != \ + child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) || \ + (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \ + child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))) + +#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev == \ + tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) && \ + (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \ + tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)) + +#define DEFAULTSECARGS current->comm, current->pid, current->uid, \ + current->euid, current->gid, current->egid, \ + current->p_pptr->comm, current->p_pptr->pid, \ + current->p_pptr->uid, current->p_pptr->euid, \ + current->p_pptr->gid, current->p_pptr->egid + +#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER)) + +#define security_alert_good(normal_msg,args...) \ +({ \ + spin_lock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \ + \ + if (!grsec_alertgood_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \ + grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet = 0; \ + if (current->curr_ip) \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ + else \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ + } else if((jiffies - grsec_alertgood_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alertgood_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \ + grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \ + if (current->curr_ip) \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ + else \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ + } else if (grsec_alertgood_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \ + grsec_alertgood_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alertgood_fyet++; \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \ + "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \ + } \ + \ + spin_unlock(&grsec_alertgood_lock); \ +}) + +#define security_alert(normal_msg,args...) \ +({ \ + spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ + \ + if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { \ + grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet = 0; \ + if (current->curr_ip) \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ + else \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ + } else if((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { \ + grsec_alert_fyet++; \ + if (current->curr_ip) \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ + else \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: " normal_msg "\n" , ## args); \ + } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { \ + grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; grsec_alert_fyet++; \ + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for " \ + "%d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); \ + } \ + \ + gr_handle_alertkill(); \ + spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ +}) + +#define security_audit(normal_msg,args...) \ +({ \ + spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock); \ + if (current->curr_ip) \ + printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: " normal_msg "\n", \ + NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip) , ## args); \ + else \ + printk(KERN_INFO "grsec: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \ + spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \ +}) + +#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \ +({ \ + gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \ +}) + +#endif + +#endif diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grmsg.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +#define DEFAULTSECMSG "(%.16s:%d) uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent (%.16s:%d) uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" +#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "(%.16s:%d) IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent (%.16s:%d) IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" +#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_KMEM_MSG "attempted write to /dev/kmem by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "attempted open of /dev/port by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "attempted write of /dev/mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "attempted mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u" +#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "refused attempt to mknod %.950s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect to the unix domain socket %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_NPROC_MSG "attempt to overstep process limit by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds" +#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " Banning execution of [%.16s:%lu] for %lu seconds" +#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to mount %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to pivot_root from chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to double chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied attempt to chmod +s %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "attempted fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s" +#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use gracl=off from your boot loader" +#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: being fed garbage %d bytes sent %d required" +#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "Loaded %s" +#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "Unable to load %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG " RBAC system may already be enabled." +#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system" +#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "Reloaded %s" +#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "Failed reload of %s for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "Ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "Invalid mode %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MAXPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d), locking password authentication" +#define GR_MAXROLEPW_ACL_MSG "Maximum pw attempts reached (%d) trying to auth to special role %s, locking auth for role of " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CAPSET_CHROOT_MSG "denied capset of (%.16s:%d) within chroot by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "attempted priority change by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "Attempted send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "attempt to modify grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "Fatal: Unable to find ACL for (%.16s:%d)" +#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SOCK_MSG "attempted socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_BIND_MSG "attempted bind() by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "attempted connect by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "attempted bind to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "attempted connect to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u" +#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount %.30s to %.64s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.63s) by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " DEFAULTSECMSG +#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "attempted resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu by " DEFAULTSECMSG diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2003-07-29 17:58:19.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H +#define GR_SECURITY_H + +extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_capset(const struct task_struct *target); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(const struct task_struct *p, + const int niceval); +extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task); +extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const char *dev_name); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid); + +extern int gr_handle_nproc(void); + +extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void); +extern void gr_handle_iopl(void); + +extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file); + +extern int gr_random_pid(spinlock_t * pid_lock); + +extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval); +extern void gr_log_timechange(void); +extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t); +extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv); +extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg); +extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); +extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg); +extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); +extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size); +extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); + +extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, + const struct inode *inode, + const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, + const int acc_mode); +extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + struct inode *inode, + const int mode, const char *to); + +extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap); +extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit, + const unsigned long wanted); +extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig); +extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig); +extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid); +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); +extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, + const unsigned long prot); +extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, + const unsigned long prot); +extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_ptrace_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request); +extern int gr_handle_mmap(const struct file *filp, const unsigned long prot); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp); +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); +extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task); +extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, + const gid_t gid); +extern void gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct dentry *p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode); +extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const int mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const kdev_t dev); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const char *from); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to); +extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *old_parent_inode, + struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname); +extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const ino_t ino); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void); +extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code); +extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task); +extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void); +extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void); +extern void gr_handle_open_port(void); +extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, + struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void); +extern __u32 ip_randomisn(void); +extern __u32 arc4random(void); + +extern int grsec_enable_dmesg; +extern int grsec_enable_randid; +extern int grsec_enable_randisn; +extern int grsec_enable_randsrc; +extern int grsec_enable_randrpc; +#endif + +#endif diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/mm.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ extern struct list_head active_list; extern struct list_head inactive_list; +extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct * task, const int limit, + const unsigned long wanted); + #include #include #include @@ -639,6 +704,8 @@ address &= PAGE_MASK; spin_lock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, vma->vm_end - address); + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT); if (vma->vm_end - address > current->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur || ((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) { spin_unlock(&vma->vm_mm->page_table_lock); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/proc_fs.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mknod(const char *,mode_t, struct proc_dir_entry *,kdev_t); extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir(const char *,struct proc_dir_entry *); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC +extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_priv_mkdir(const char *, struct proc_dir_entry *); +#endif static inline struct proc_dir_entry *create_proc_read_entry(const char *name, mode_t mode, struct proc_dir_entry *base, diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sched.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ #include #include +extern int gr_is_capable(const int cap); +extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(const struct task_struct *p); + struct exec_domain; /* @@ -415,6 +432,19 @@ /* journalling filesystem info */ void *journal_info; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +/* added by grsecurity's ACL system */ + struct acl_subject_label *acl; + struct acl_role_label *role; + struct file *exec_file; + u32 curr_ip; + u16 acl_role_id; + u8 acl_sp_role:1; + u8 used_accept:1; + u8 used_connect:1; + u8 is_writable:1; +#endif }; /* @@ -549,6 +586,8 @@ *p->pidhash_pprev = p->pidhash_next; } +#include + static inline task_t *find_task_by_pid(int pid) { task_t *p, **htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(pid)]; @@ -556,6 +595,8 @@ for(p = *htable; p && p->pid != pid; p = p->pidhash_next) ; + if(gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) p = NULL; + return p; } @@ -576,8 +617,6 @@ extern struct user_struct * alloc_uid(uid_t); extern void free_uid(struct user_struct *); -#include - extern unsigned long volatile jiffies; extern unsigned long itimer_ticks; extern unsigned long itimer_next; @@ -741,7 +780,7 @@ static inline int capable(int cap) { #if 1 /* ok now */ - if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) + if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable(cap)) #else if (cap_is_fs_cap(cap) ? current->fsuid == 0 : current->euid == 0) #endif diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-06-23 11:41:32.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/linux/sysctl.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ KERN_CADPID=54, /* int: PID of the process to notify on CAD */ KERN_KDB=55, /* int: kdb on/off */ KERN_CORE_PATTERN=56, /* string: pattern for core-files */ + KERN_GRSECURITY=68, /* grsecurity */ }; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h 2003-06-23 11:41:37.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/net/inetpeer.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include #include + #include struct inet_peer @@ -34,6 +35,11 @@ /* can be called with or without local BH being disabled */ struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(__u32 daddr, int create); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID +extern int grsec_enable_randid; +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void); +#endif + extern spinlock_t inet_peer_unused_lock; extern struct inet_peer *inet_peer_unused_head; extern struct inet_peer **inet_peer_unused_tailp; @@ -58,7 +64,14 @@ __u16 id; spin_lock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock); - id = p->ip_id_count++; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + id = p->ip_id_count++; + spin_unlock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock); return id; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h --- linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h 2003-06-23 11:41:37.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/include/net/ip.h 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ void (*destructor)(struct sock *); }; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID +extern int grsec_enable_randid; +extern __u16 ip_randomid(void); +#endif + extern struct ip_ra_chain *ip_ra_chain; extern rwlock_t ip_ra_lock; @@ -196,7 +201,13 @@ * does not change, they drop every other packet in * a TCP stream using header compression. */ - iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + iph->id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0); } else __ip_select_ident(iph, dst); } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/init/main.c linux-2.4.21/init/main.c --- linux-2.4.21/init/main.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/init/main.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ extern void ipc_init(void); #endif +extern void grsecurity_init(void); + /* * Boot command-line arguments */ @@ -546,6 +549,7 @@ do_basic_setup(); prepare_namespace(); + grsecurity_init(); /* * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c 2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/msg.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "util.h" @@ -326,6 +327,9 @@ msg_unlock(id); } up(&msg_ids.sem); + + gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg); + return ret; } @@ -560,6 +564,8 @@ break; } case IPC_RMID: + gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); + freeque (msqid); break; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c 2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/sem.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "util.h" @@ -181,6 +182,9 @@ } up(&sem_ids.sem); + + gr_log_semget(err, semflg); + return err; } @@ -728,6 +732,8 @@ switch(cmd){ case IPC_RMID: + gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); + freeary(semid); err = 0; break; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c --- linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c 2003-06-23 11:41:59.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/ipc/shm.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "util.h" @@ -38,8 +39,21 @@ time_t shm_ctim; pid_t shm_cprid; pid_t shm_lprid; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + time_t shm_createtime; + pid_t shm_lapid; +#endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, + const int shmid); +extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime); +#endif + #define shm_flags shm_perm.mode static struct file_operations shm_file_operations; @@ -209,6 +223,9 @@ shp->shm_lprid = 0; shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0; shp->shm_ctim = CURRENT_TIME; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + shp->shm_createtime = CURRENT_TIME; +#endif shp->shm_segsz = size; shp->shm_nattch = 0; shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq); @@ -254,6 +271,9 @@ shm_unlock(id); } up(&shm_ids.sem); + + gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size); + return err; } @@ -509,6 +529,9 @@ err=-EPERM; goto out_unlock_up; } + + gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid); + if (shp->shm_nattch){ shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST; /* Do not find it any more */ @@ -622,9 +645,28 @@ shm_unlock(shmid); return -EACCES; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime, + shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) { + shm_unlock(shmid); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) { + shm_unlock(shmid); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + file = shp->shm_file; size = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_size; shp->shm_nattch++; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + shp->shm_lapid = current->pid; +#endif + shm_unlock(shmid); down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/capability.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include +#include kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; @@ -168,6 +169,10 @@ target = current; } + if (gr_handle_chroot_capset(target)) { + error = -ESRCH; + goto out; + } /* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */ if (!cap_issubset(inheritable, diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/exit.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT #include #endif +#include #include #include @@ -165,12 +165,21 @@ { write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->exec_file) { + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = NULL; + } +#endif + /* Reparent to init */ REMOVE_LINKS(current); current->p_pptr = child_reaper; current->p_opptr = child_reaper; SET_LINKS(current); + gr_set_kernel_label(current); + /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */ current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; @@ -439,6 +440,10 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT acct_process(code); #endif + + gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code); + gr_acl_handle_exit(); + __exit_mm(tsk); lock_kernel(); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/fork.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -93,6 +94,10 @@ if (flags & CLONE_PID) return current->pid; + pid = gr_random_pid(&lastpid_lock); + if (pid) + return pid; + spin_lock(&lastpid_lock); beginpid = last_pid; if((++last_pid) & 0xffff8000) { @@ -635,6 +640,9 @@ * friends to set the per-user process limit to something lower * than the amount of processes root is running. -- Rik */ + + gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes)); + if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) goto bad_fork_free; @@ -719,6 +727,7 @@ retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs); if (retval) goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace; + gr_copy_label(p); p->semundo = NULL; /* Our parent execution domain becomes current domain @@ -804,6 +813,9 @@ free_uid(p->user); bad_fork_free: free_task_struct(p); + + gr_log_forkfail(retval); + goto fork_out; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/ksyms.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #if defined(CONFIG_PROC_FS) @@ -585,3 +586,9 @@ /* debug */ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_stack); + +/* grsecurity */ +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_is_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/module.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -887,6 +887,11 @@ struct module *mod; int err; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) + return -EPERM; +#endif + lock_kernel(); if (name_user == NULL) mod = &kernel_module; @@ -956,6 +961,11 @@ int i; struct kernel_sym ksym; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) + return 0; +#endif + lock_kernel(); for (mod = module_list, i = 0; mod; mod = mod->next) { /* include the count for the module name! */ diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/printk.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include /* For in_interrupt() */ #include #include +#include #include @@ -294,6 +295,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_syslog(int type, char * buf, int len) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && grsec_enable_dmesg) + return -EPERM; + else +#endif if ((type != 3) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return do_syslog(type, buf, len); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sched.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -29,11 +30,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include +#include /* * Convert user-nice values [ -20 ... 0 ... 19 ] @@ -910,6 +912,9 @@ return -EPERM; if (increment < -40) increment = -40; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_nice()) + return -EPERM; } if (increment > 40) increment = 40; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/signal.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include @@ -554,6 +556,8 @@ if (!sig || !t->sig) goto out_nolock; + gr_log_signal(sig, t); + spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags); handle_stop_signal(sig, t); @@ -603,6 +607,8 @@ recalc_sigpending(t); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sigmask_lock, flags); + gr_handle_crash(t, sig); + return send_sig_info(sig, info, t); } @@ -622,9 +628,13 @@ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); for_each_task(p) { if (p->pgrp == pgrp && thread_group_leader(p)) { - int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); - if (retval) - retval = err; + if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) + retval = -EPERM; + else { + int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); + if (retval) + retval = err; + } } } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); @@ -675,7 +685,10 @@ if (tg) p = tg; } - error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); + if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) + error = -EPERM; + else + error = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); return error; @@ -700,10 +713,14 @@ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); for_each_task(p) { if (p->pid > 1 && p != current && thread_group_leader(p)) { - int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); - ++count; - if (err != -EPERM) - retval = err; + if (gr_handle_signal(p, sig)) + retval = -EPERM; + else { + int err = send_sig_info(sig, info, p); + ++count; + if (err != -EPERM) + retval = err; + } } } read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sys.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -239,6 +241,12 @@ } if (error == -ESRCH) error = 0; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return -ESRCH; + } + if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) error = -EACCES; else @@ -425,6 +433,9 @@ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid)) current->sgid = new_egid; + + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid); + current->fsgid = new_egid; current->egid = new_egid; current->gid = new_rgid; @@ -447,6 +458,9 @@ current->mm->dumpable=0; wmb(); } + + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid); + current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid; } else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) @@ -530,6 +544,9 @@ current->mm->dumpable = 0; wmb(); } + + gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid); + current->uid = new_ruid; current->user = new_user; free_uid(old_user); @@ -626,6 +643,9 @@ } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) return -EPERM; + if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid)) + return -EPERM; + if (old_euid != uid) { current->mm->dumpable = 0; @@ -722,8 +742,10 @@ current->egid = egid; } current->fsgid = current->egid; - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid); current->gid = rgid; + } if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) current->sgid = sgid; return 0; @@ -1140,6 +1162,10 @@ if(copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) return -EFAULT; old_rlim = current->rlim + resource; + + if (old_rlim->rlim_max < old_rlim->rlim_cur) + return -EINVAL; + if (((new_rlim.rlim_cur > old_rlim->rlim_max) || (new_rlim.rlim_max > old_rlim->rlim_max)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/sysctl.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ #endif #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) +#include +#include + +extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table * table, const void *oldval, + const void *newval); +extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); /* External variables not in a header file. */ extern int panic_timeout; @@ -119,6 +126,8 @@ static ctl_table dev_table[]; extern ctl_table random_table[]; +static ctl_table grsecurity_table[]; + /* /proc declarations: */ #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS @@ -259,8 +268,191 @@ {KERN_S390_USER_DEBUG_LOGGING,"userprocess_debug", &sysctl_userprocess_debug,sizeof(int),0644,NULL,&proc_dointvec}, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + {KERN_GRSECURITY, "grsecurity", NULL, 0, 0555, grsecurity_table}, +#endif + {0} +}; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL +enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL, +GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT, +GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM, +GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS, +GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS, +GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_RANDISN, +GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, +GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_TTY, GS_TTYS, +GS_PTY, GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, GS_RANDRPC, +GS_FINDTASK, GS_LOCK}; + +static ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + {GS_LINK, "linking_restrictions", &grsec_enable_link, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + {GS_FIFO, "fifo_restrictions", &grsec_enable_fifo, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + {GS_EXECVE, "execve_limiting", &grsec_enable_execve, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + {GS_EXECLOG, "exec_logging", &grsec_enable_execlog, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + {GS_SIGNAL, "signal_logging", &grsec_enable_signal, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + {GS_FORKFAIL, "forkfail_logging", &grsec_enable_forkfail, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + {GS_TIME, "timechange_logging", &grsec_enable_time, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + {GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, "chroot_deny_shmat", &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + {GS_CHROOT_UNIX, "chroot_deny_unix", &grsec_enable_chroot_unix, sizeof(int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + {GS_CHROOT_MNT, "chroot_deny_mount", &grsec_enable_chroot_mount, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + {GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, "chroot_deny_fchdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + {GS_CHROOT_DBL, "chroot_deny_chroot", &grsec_enable_chroot_double, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + {GS_CHROOT_PVT, "chroot_deny_pivot", &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + {GS_CHROOT_CD, "chroot_enforce_chdir", &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + {GS_CHROOT_CM, "chroot_deny_chmod", &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + {GS_CHROOT_MK, "chroot_deny_mknod", &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + {GS_CHROOT_NI, "chroot_restrict_nice", &grsec_enable_chroot_nice, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + {GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, "chroot_execlog", + &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + {GS_CHROOT_CAPS, "chroot_caps", &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + {GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, "chroot_deny_sysctl", &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + {GS_TPE, "tpe", &grsec_enable_tpe, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, + {GS_TPE_GID, "tpe_gid", &grsec_tpe_gid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + {GS_TPE_ALL, "tpe_restrict_all", &grsec_enable_tpe_all, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + {GS_RANDPID, "rand_pids", &grsec_enable_randpid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + {GS_RANDID, "rand_ip_ids", &grsec_enable_randid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + {GS_RANDSRC, "rand_tcp_src_ports", &grsec_enable_randsrc, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN + {GS_RANDISN, "rand_isns", &grsec_enable_randisn, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + {GS_SOCKET_ALL, "socket_all", &grsec_enable_socket_all, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, + {GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, "socket_all_gid", + &grsec_socket_all_gid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, "socket_client", + &grsec_enable_socket_client, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, + {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, "socket_client_gid", + &grsec_socket_client_gid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + {GS_SOCKET_SERVER, "socket_server", + &grsec_enable_socket_server, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, + {GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, "socket_server_gid", + &grsec_socket_server_gid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + {GS_GROUP, "audit_group", &grsec_enable_group, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, + {GS_GID, "audit_gid", + &grsec_audit_gid, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + {GS_ACHDIR, "audit_chdir", &grsec_enable_chdir, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + {GS_AMOUNT, "audit_mount", &grsec_enable_mount, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + {GS_AIPC, "audit_ipc", &grsec_enable_audit_ipc, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + {GS_AIPC, "dmesg", &grsec_enable_dmesg, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC + {GS_RANDRPC, "rand_rpc", &grsec_enable_randrpc, sizeof (int), + 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + {GS_FINDTASK, "chroot_findtask", &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask, + sizeof (int), 0600, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, +#endif + {GS_LOCK, "grsec_lock", &grsec_lock, sizeof (int), 0600, NULL, + &proc_dointvec}, {0} }; +#endif static ctl_table vm_table[] = { {VM_BDFLUSH, "bdflush", &bdf_prm, 9*sizeof(int), 0644, NULL, @@ -395,6 +587,11 @@ static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op) { + if (gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op)) + return -EACCES; + if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op)) + return -EACCES; + return test_perm(table->mode, op); } @@ -428,6 +625,10 @@ table = table->child; goto repeat; } + + if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval)) + return -EACCES; + error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen, oldval, oldlenp, newval, newlen, context); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/time.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -89,6 +90,9 @@ time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT; time_esterror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT; write_unlock_irq(&xtime_lock); + + gr_log_timechange(); + return 0; } @@ -167,6 +171,8 @@ * globally block out interrupts when it runs. */ do_settimeofday(tv); + + gr_log_timechange(); } return 0; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c --- linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/kernel/timer.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -541,6 +541,9 @@ psecs = (p->times.tms_utime += user); psecs += (p->times.tms_stime += system); + + gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs / HZ); + if (psecs / HZ > p->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) { /* Send SIGXCPU every second.. */ if (!(psecs % HZ)) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/filemap.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -2501,6 +2507,7 @@ error = -EIO; rlim_rss = current->rlim ? current->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur : LONG_MAX; /* default: see resource.h */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_RSS, vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start)); if ((vma->vm_mm->rss + (end - start)) > rlim_rss) return error; @@ -3004,6 +3011,7 @@ err = -EFBIG; if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && limit != RLIM_INFINITY) { + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, pos); if (pos >= limit) { send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); goto out; @@ -3039,6 +3047,7 @@ */ if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) { + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, count + (u32)pos); if (pos >= inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) { if (count || pos > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/memory.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -1065,6 +1129,7 @@ do_expand: limit = current->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset); if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit) goto out_sig; if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mlock.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -209,6 +235,7 @@ lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; /* check against resource limits */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked); if (locked > lock_limit) goto out; @@ -276,6 +303,7 @@ lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; ret = -ENOMEM; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm); if (current->mm->total_vm > lock_limit) goto out; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mmap.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -168,6 +170,7 @@ /* Check against rlimit.. */ rlim = current->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data); if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim) goto out; @@ -432,6 +462,7 @@ if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) { unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; locked += len; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked); if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur) return -EAGAIN; } @@ -480,6 +532,9 @@ } } + if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot)) + return -EACCES; + /* Clear old maps */ munmap_back: vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent); @@ -490,6 +545,7 @@ } /* Check against address space limit. */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len); if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1047,6 +1255,7 @@ if (mm->def_flags & VM_LOCKED) { unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; locked += len; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked); if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur) return -EAGAIN; } @@ -1063,6 +1272,7 @@ } /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len); if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) return -ENOMEM; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mprotect.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -288,6 +392,11 @@ if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start) goto out; + if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + for (nstart = start ; ; ) { unsigned int newflags; int last = 0; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/mremap.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -278,10 +301,13 @@ unsigned long locked = current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; locked += new_len - old_len; ret = -EAGAIN; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked); if (locked > current->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur) goto out; } ret = -ENOMEM; + + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len)); if ((current->mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + (new_len - old_len) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) goto out; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c --- linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c 2003-06-23 11:41:31.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/mm/shmem.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -822,6 +822,8 @@ */ err = -EFBIG; if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) { + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, pos); + if (pos >= limit) { send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); goto out; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/af_inet.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -374,7 +375,12 @@ else sk->protinfo.af_inet.pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT; - sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0; sock_init_data(sock,sk); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/icmp.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include + #include #include #include @@ -712,6 +714,7 @@ icmp_param.data.icmph=*skb->h.icmph; icmp_param.data.icmph.type=ICMP_ECHOREPLY; + icmp_param.skb=skb; icmp_param.offset=0; icmp_param.data_len=skb->len; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2003-07-29 17:57:12.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/ip_output.c 2003-07-29 17:58:20.000000000 -0400 @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * Shall we try to damage output packets if routing dev changes? @@ -511,7 +512,13 @@ * Begin outputting the bytes. */ - id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) { + id = htons(ip_randomid()); + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid()); + } else +#endif + id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++; do { char *data; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Config.in 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ dep_tristate ' address type match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES dep_tristate ' tcpmss match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES dep_tristate ' realm match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES + dep_tristate ' stealth match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES if [ "$CONFIG_IP_NF_CONNTRACK" != "n" ]; then dep_tristate ' Helper match support' CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER $CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES fi diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_UNCLEAN) += ipt_unclean.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STRING) += ipt_string.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS) += ipt_tcpmss.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM) += ipt_realm.o diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +/* Kernel module to add stealth support. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif); + +static int +match(const struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + const void *matchinfo, + int offset, + const void *hdr, + u_int16_t datalen, + int *hotdrop) +{ + struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph; + struct tcphdr *th = (struct tcphdr *) hdr; + struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *) hdr; + struct sock *sk = NULL; + + if (!ip || !hdr || offset) return 0; + + switch(ip->protocol) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + if (datalen < sizeof(struct tcphdr)) { + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } + if (!(th->syn && !th->ack)) return 0; + sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th->dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif); + break; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + if (datalen < sizeof(struct udphdr)) { + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } + sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh->source, ip->daddr, uh->dest, skb->dev->ifindex); + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this + return 1; + else { + sock_put(sk); + return 0; + } +} + +/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */ +static int +checkentry(const char *tablename, + const struct ipt_ip *ip, + void *matchinfo, + unsigned int matchsize, + unsigned int hook_mask) +{ + if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0)) + return 0; + + if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) || + ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO))) + && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN))) + return 1; + + printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n"); + + return 0; +} + + +static struct ipt_match stealth_match += { { NULL, NULL }, "stealth", &match, &checkentry, NULL, THIS_MODULE }; + +static int __init init(void) +{ + return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match); +} + +static void __exit fini(void) +{ + ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match); +} + +module_init(init); +module_exit(fini); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr; extern int sysctl_ip_default_ttl; @@ -221,9 +222,18 @@ spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock); rover = tcp_port_rover; - do { rover++; - if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) - rover = low; + do { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) { + rover = low + (arc4random() % (high - low)); + } else +#endif + { + rover++; + if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) + rover = low; + } + head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)]; spin_lock(&head->lock); for (tb = head->chain; tb; tb = tb->next) @@ -546,6 +556,11 @@ static inline __u32 tcp_v4_init_sequence(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN + if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn)) + return ip_randomisn(); + else +#endif return secure_tcp_sequence_number(skb->nh.iph->daddr, skb->nh.iph->saddr, skb->h.th->dest, @@ -681,9 +696,16 @@ rover = tcp_port_rover; do { - rover++; - if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) - rover = low; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + if(grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) { + rover = low + (arc4random() % (high - low)); + } else +#endif + { + rover++; + if ((rover < low) || (rover > high)) + rover = low; + } head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)]; spin_lock(&head->lock); @@ -844,11 +866,22 @@ if (err) goto failure; - if (!tp->write_seq) + if (!tp->write_seq) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN + if (likely(grsec_enable_randisn)) + tp->write_seq = ip_randomisn(); + else +#endif tp->write_seq = secure_tcp_sequence_number(sk->saddr, sk->daddr, sk->sport, usin->sin_port); + } - sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies; err = tcp_connect(sk); if (err) @@ -1570,7 +1603,13 @@ newtp->ext_header_len = 0; if (newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt) newtp->ext_header_len = newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt->optlen; - newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies; tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst->pmtu); newtp->advmss = dst->advmss; diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-06-23 11:41:55.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/ipv4/udp.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -98,6 +99,11 @@ #include #include +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sk_buff *skb); +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr); + /* * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer */ @@ -474,9 +480,16 @@ ufh.uh.dest = usin->sin_port; if (ufh.uh.dest == 0) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin)) + return -EPERM; } else { if (sk->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) return -ENOTCONN; + + if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL)) + return -EPERM; + ufh.daddr = sk->daddr; ufh.uh.dest = sk->dport; /* Open fast path for connected socket. @@ -484,6 +497,7 @@ */ connected = 1; } + ipc.addr = sk->saddr; ufh.uh.source = sk->sport; @@ -655,6 +669,11 @@ if (!skb) goto out; + if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_free; + } + copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); if (copied > len) { copied = len; @@ -759,7 +778,13 @@ sk->daddr = rt->rt_dst; sk->dport = usin->sin_port; sk->state = TCP_ESTABLISHED; - sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID + if(grsec_enable_randid) + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = htons(ip_randomid()); + else +#endif + sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies; sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst); return(0); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2003-06-23 11:41:58.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -620,7 +621,8 @@ check them, when this message will be delivered to corresponding kernel module. --ANK (980802) */ - NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective; + + NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = gr_cap_rtnetlink(); err = -EFAULT; if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb,len), msg->msg_iov, len)) { diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c 2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/netsyms.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_HIPPI #include #endif @@ -598,6 +599,47 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(softnet_data); +#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE) +#if !defined (CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD) && !defined (CONFIG_KHTTPD_MODULE) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_v4_lookup_listener); +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomid); +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(arc4random); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDISN +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_randomisn); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randisn); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randid); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randrpc); +#endif + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink); + +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb); +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr); + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg); + +#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create); +#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_NET_RADIO) || defined(CONFIG_NET_PCMCIA_RADIO) #include EXPORT_SYMBOL(wireless_send_event); diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c 2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/socket.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -85,6 +85,18 @@ #include #include +extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk); +extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, + const int protocol); +extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck); +extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck); +extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock, + const struct sockaddr_in * addr); +extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock, + const struct sockaddr_in * addr); +extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, + const int protocol); + static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare); static ssize_t sock_read(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos); @@ -699,6 +711,7 @@ int sock_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + struct socket *sock; /* * It was possible the inode is NULL we were * closing an unfinished socket. @@ -709,8 +722,21 @@ printk(KERN_DEBUG "sock_close: NULL inode\n"); return 0; } + sock = socki_lookup(inode); + sock_fasync(-1, filp, 0); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (unlikely(current->used_accept && sock->sk && + (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) && + (sock->sk->daddr == current->curr_ip))) { + current->used_accept = 0; + current->curr_ip = 0; + } +#endif + sock_release(socki_lookup(inode)); + return 0; } @@ -903,6 +929,16 @@ int retval; struct socket *sock; + if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -998,12 +1034,26 @@ { struct socket *sock; char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; + struct sockaddr * sck; int err; if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL) { - if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) + if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) { + sck = (struct sockaddr *) address; + + if(!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EACCES; + } + err = sock->ops->bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen); + } sockfd_put(sock); } return err; @@ -1079,6 +1129,8 @@ if ((err = sock_map_fd(newsock)) < 0) goto out_release; + gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk); + out_put: sockfd_put(sock); out: @@ -1106,6 +1158,7 @@ { struct socket *sock; char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; + struct sockaddr * sck; int err; sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err); @@ -1114,6 +1167,24 @@ err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, address); if (err < 0) goto out_put; + + sck = (struct sockaddr *) address; + + if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *) sck)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_put; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_put; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (sock->sk->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) + current->used_connect = 1; +#endif + err = sock->ops->connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) address, addrlen, sock->file->f_flags); out_put: @@ -1333,6 +1404,14 @@ err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how); sockfd_put(sock); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (likely(!err && current->used_accept)) { + current->used_accept = 0; + current->curr_ip = 0; + } +#endif + return err; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2003-06-23 11:41:57.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2003-06-23 11:49:17.000000000 -0400 @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1267,6 +1268,12 @@ } ret = xid++; spin_unlock(&xid_lock); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDRPC + if (grsec_enable_randrpc) + ret = arc4random(); +#endif + return ret; } diff -urN linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c --- linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c 2003-06-23 11:41:53.000000000 -0400 +++ linux-2.4.21/net/unix/af_unix.c 2003-06-23 11:49:18.000000000 -0400 @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -599,6 +600,11 @@ if (err) goto put_fail; + if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto put_fail; + } + err = -ECONNREFUSED; if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) goto put_fail; @@ -622,6 +628,13 @@ if (u) { struct dentry *dentry; dentry = u->protinfo.af_unix.dentry; + + if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->peercred.pid)) { + err = -EPERM; + sock_put(u); + goto fail; + } + if (dentry) UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode); } else @@ -720,9 +733,19 @@ * All right, let's create it. */ mode = S_IFSOCK | (sock->inode->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask); + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_mknod_dput; + } + err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0); + if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); dput(nd.dentry); nd.dentry = dentry; @@ -740,6 +763,10 @@ goto out_unlock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + sk->peercred.pid = current->pid; +#endif + list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash]; } else { list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)]; @@ -866,6 +893,9 @@ int st; int err; long timeo; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct task_struct *p, **htable; +#endif err = unix_mkname(sunaddr, addr_len, &hash); if (err < 0) @@ -989,6 +1019,17 @@ /* Set credentials */ sk->peercred = other->peercred; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + htable = &pidhash[pid_hashfn(other->peercred.pid)]; + for (p = *htable; p && p->pid != other->peercred.pid; p = p->pidhash_next); + if (p) { + p->curr_ip = current->curr_ip; + p->used_accept = 1; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + sock_hold(newsk); unix_peer(sk)=newsk; sock->state=SS_CONNECTED;