- openssl-1.1 buildfix (cherry-picked commit f16f247 from https://github.com/Lekenste...

- release 3

diff --git a/dmg2img-openssl-1.1.patch b/dmg2img-openssl-1.1.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..0e30fba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dmg2img-openssl-1.1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+commit f16f247d30f868e84f31e24792b4464488f1c009
+Author: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
+Date:   Tue May 2 15:53:38 2017 +0200
+
+    vfdecrypt: OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility
+    
+    Allocate contexts from the heap on all OpenSSL versions, this is needed
+    since OpenSSL 1.1.0. No attempt is done at addressing issues like global
+    variables and fixing potential memleaks on error paths.
+    
+    Compile-tested only with OpenSSL 1.1.0e (Arch Linux) and OpenSSL 1.0.2g
+    (Ubuntu 16.04), I have no test file.
+    
+    Fixes https://github.com/Lekensteyn/dmg2img/issues/4
+
+diff --git a/vfdecrypt.c b/vfdecrypt.c
+index 56d3530..b1a36d3 100644
+--- a/vfdecrypt.c
++++ b/vfdecrypt.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void adjust_v2_header_byteorder(cencrypted_v2_pwheader *pwhdr) {
+   pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size = htonl(pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+ }
+ 
+-HMAC_CTX hmacsha1_ctx;
++HMAC_CTX *hmacsha1_ctx;
+ AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
+ int CHUNK_SIZE=4096;  // default
+ 
+@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ void compute_iv(uint32_t chunk_no, uint8_t *iv) {
+   unsigned int mdLen;
+   
+   chunk_no = OSSwapHostToBigInt32(chunk_no);
+-  HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+-  HMAC_Update(&hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
+-  HMAC_Final(&hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
++  HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
++  HMAC_Update(hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
++  HMAC_Final(hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+   memcpy(iv, mdResult, CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -212,52 +212,75 @@ void decrypt_chunk(uint8_t *ctext, uint8_t *ptext, uint32_t chunk_no) {
+ /* DES3-EDE unwrap operation loosely based on to RFC 2630, section 12.6 
+  *    wrapped_key has to be 40 bytes in length.  */
+ int apple_des3_ede_unwrap_key(uint8_t *wrapped_key, int wrapped_key_len, uint8_t *decryptKey, uint8_t *unwrapped_key) {
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+   uint8_t *TEMP1, *TEMP2, *CEKICV;
+   uint8_t IV[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
+   int outlen, tmplen, i;
+ 
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++  ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++  if (!ctx) {
++    fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++    return(-1);
++  }
++
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+   /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+   TEMP1 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+   TEMP2 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+   CEKICV = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+   /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+-  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
++  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
+ 
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
++  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+   outlen += tmplen;
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+ 
+   /* reverse order of TEMP3 */
+   for(i = 0; i < outlen; i++) TEMP2[i] = TEMP1[outlen - i - 1];
+ 
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+   /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+-  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
++  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
++  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (3) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (4) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+ 
+   outlen += tmplen;
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+ 
+   memcpy(unwrapped_key, CEKICV+4, outlen-4);
+   free(TEMP1);
+   free(TEMP2);
+   free(CEKICV);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++  free(ctx);
++#endif
+   return(0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -279,31 +302,46 @@ int unwrap_v1_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v1_header *header, uint8_t *ae
+ int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v2_pwheader *header, uint8_t *aes_key, uint8_t *hmacsha1_key) {
+   /* derived key is a 3DES-EDE key */
+   uint8_t derived_key[192/8];
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+   uint8_t *TEMP1;
+   int outlen, tmplen;
+ 
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++  ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++  if (!ctx) {
++    fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++    return(-1);
++  }
++
+   PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char*)header->kdf_salt, 20,
+                        PBKDF2_ITERATION_COUNT, sizeof(derived_key), derived_key);
+ 
+   print_hex(derived_key, 192/8);
+ 
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+   /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+   TEMP1 = malloc(header->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+   /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+-  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
++  EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
+ 
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
++  if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+-  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++  if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+     fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+     return(-1);
+   }
+   outlen += tmplen;
+-  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++  free(ctx);
++#endif
+   memcpy(aes_key, TEMP1, 16);
+   memcpy(hmacsha1_key, TEMP1, 20);
+ 
+@@ -446,8 +484,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+     CHUNK_SIZE = v2header.blocksize;
+   }
+   
+-  HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacsha1_ctx);
+-  HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  hmacsha1_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
++#else
++  hmacsha1_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*hmacsha1_ctx));
++#endif
++  if (!hmacsha1_ctx) {
++    fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: HMAC CTX!\n");
++    exit(1);
++  }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  HMAC_CTX_reset(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++  HMAC_CTX_init(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
++  HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+   AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH * 8, &aes_decrypt_key);
+   
+   if (verbose >= 1) {
+@@ -472,5 +523,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+   }
+   
+   if (verbose)  fprintf(stderr, "%"PRIX32" chunks written\n", chunk_no);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++  HMAC_CTX_free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++  HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmacsha1_ctx);
++  free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
+   return(0);
+ }

diff --git a/dmg2img.spec b/dmg2img.spec
index 84698437fb37e9cf3101e1b04b731920a59658f6..7baf79f1183e54e07e916e4776a9a91fd229e1f0 100644 (file)
--- a/dmg2img.spec
+++ b/dmg2img.spec
@@ -2,11 +2,12 @@ Summary:      Tool to convert Apple's compressed DMG to standard (hfsplus) disk image
 Summary(pl.UTF-8):     Narzędzie konwertujące skompresowane pliki Apple DMG na obrazy dysków (hfsplus)
 Name:          dmg2img
 Version:       1.6.7
-Release:       2
+Release:       3
 License:       GPL v2
 Group:         Applications/File
 Source0:       http://vu1tur.eu.org/tools/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 # Source0-md5: 1f0e66285ee4a46b480f3130bc112512
+Patch0:                %{name}-openssl-1.1.patch
 URL:           http://vu1tur.eu.org/tools/
 BuildRequires: bzip2-devel
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ pliki obrazów dysków (hfsplus).
 
 %prep
 %setup -q
+%patch0 -p1
 
 %{__sed} -i -e '/CC/s/-s /$(LDFLAGS)/' Makefile