-diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/configure.ac sh-utils-2.0.12/configure.ac
---- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/configure.ac Sun Apr 28 11:29:18 2002
-+++ sh-utils-2.0.12/configure.ac Mon May 27 23:10:36 2002
-@@ -8,6 +8,13 @@
+--- coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am.pam 2006-11-24 21:28:10.000000000 +0000
++++ coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am 2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
+@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
+ uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
- AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.6b gnits dist-bzip2])
+ # for crypt
+-su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
++su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) $(LIB_PAM)
-+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
-+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
-+[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries],
-+AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM,,[Use PAM?])
-+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
-+)
-+
- AC_GNU_SOURCE
- jm_PERL
- AC_PROG_CC
-@@ -238,6 +245,13 @@
-
- AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external])
-
-+# just in case we want PAM
-+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)
-+# with PAM su doesn't need libcrypt
-+if test -n "$LIB_PAM" ; then
-+ LIB_CRYPT=
-+fi
-+
- AC_CONFIG_FILES(
- Makefile
- doc/Makefile
-diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/doc/coreutils.texi sh-utils-2.0.12/doc/coreutils.texi
---- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/doc/coreutils.texi Sun Apr 28 23:55:31 2002
-+++ sh-utils-2.0.12/doc/coreutils.texi Mon May 27 23:11:49 2002
-@@ -10898,32 +10898,6 @@
-
- @end table
-
--@cindex wheel group, not supported
--@cindex group wheel, not supported
--@cindex fascism
--@heading Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
--
--(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
--
--@cindex Twenex
--@cindex MIT AI lab
--Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
--rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
--seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
--keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup
--and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
--wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
--
--However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual
--@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
--sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The
--``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
--power of the rulers.
--
--I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are
--used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
--might find this idea strange at first.
--
-
- @node Process control
- @chapter Process control
-diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/Makefile.am sh-utils-2.0.12/src/Makefile.am
---- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/Makefile.am Mon May 27 23:06:24 2002
-+++ sh-utils-2.0.12/src/Makefile.am Mon May 27 23:09:22 2002
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
-
- uptime_LDADD = $(LDADD) @GETLOADAVG_LIBS@
-
--su_LDADD = $(LDADD) @LIB_CRYPT@
-+su_LDADD = $(LDADD) @LIB_CRYPT@ @LIB_PAM@
-
- $(PROGRAMS): ../lib/libfetish.a
-
-diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/su.c sh-utils-2.0.12/src/su.c
---- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/su.c Mon May 27 23:06:24 2002
-+++ sh-utils-2.0.12/src/su.c Mon May 27 23:08:28 2002
-@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@
+ # for various ACL functions
+ copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
+--- coreutils-6.10/src/su.c.orig 2007-11-25 14:23:31.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/src/su.c 2008-03-02 02:07:13.568059486 +0100
+@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to
be fascist.
+
+#endif
+
- Options:
- -, -l, --login Make the subshell a login shell.
- Unset all environment variables except
-@@ -81,6 +91,14 @@
+ Compile-time options:
+ -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
+ -DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
+@@ -58,6 +68,15 @@
prototype (returning `int') in <unistd.h>. */
#define getusershell _getusershell_sys_proto_
+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
-+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
+# include <signal.h>
+# include <sys/wait.h>
+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
++# include <unistd.h>
++# include <security/pam_appl.h>
++# include <security/pam_misc.h>
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
#include "system.h"
- #include "closeout.h"
- #include "dirname.h"
-@@ -151,7 +169,9 @@
+ #include "getpass.h"
+
+@@ -130,10 +130,17 @@
/* The user to become if none is specified. */
#define DEFAULT_USER "root"
+#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt ();
+ char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
+#endif
- char *getpass ();
- char *getusershell ();
- void endusershell ();
-@@ -159,7 +179,7 @@
-
- extern char **environ;
--static void run_shell (const char *, const char *, char **)
-+static void run_shell (const char *, const char *, char **, const struct passwd *)
+-static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
++static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
++ const struct passwd *)
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ ;
++#else
ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
++#endif
- /* The name this program was run with. */
-@@ -272,7 +292,22 @@
+ /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */
+ static bool fast_startup;
+@@ -215,7 +241,26 @@
}
#endif
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
+ return 0; \
+}
++#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
++return; \
++}
+#endif
+
/* Ask the user for a password.
+ If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
- Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
- 0 if not. Return 1 without asking for a password if run by UID 0
+ Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
+ false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
or if PW has an empty password. */
-@@ -280,6 +315,29 @@
- static int
+@@ -223,6 +268,44 @@
+ static bool
correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
{
+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ /* root always succeeds; this isn't an authentication question (no
-+ * extra privs are being granted) so it shouldn't authenticate with PAM.
-+ * However, we want to create the pam_handle so that proper credentials
-+ * are created later with pam_setcred(). */
++ struct passwd *caller;
++ char *tty_name, *ttyn;
+ retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
+ PAM_BAIL_P;
+
++ if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
++ fprintf(stderr, _("standard in must be a tty\n"));
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ caller = getpwuid(getuid());
++ if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
++ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
++ PAM_BAIL_P;
++ }
++
++ ttyn = ttyname(0);
++ if (ttyn) {
++ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
++ tty_name = ttyn+5;
++ else
++ tty_name = ttyn;
++ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
++ PAM_BAIL_P;
++ }
+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+
+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
-+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
++ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD && getuid()) {
+ /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */
-+ if (getuid()) {
-+ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
-+ } else retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
++ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
++ PAM_BAIL_P;
+ }
+ PAM_BAIL_P;
+ /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
#if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
/* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */
-@@ -304,6 +362,7 @@
+@@ -247,6 +330,7 @@
encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
- return strcmp (encrypted, correct) == 0;
+ return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
+#endif /* !USE_PAM */
}
/* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -313,16 +372,20 @@
- modify_environment (const struct passwd *pw, const char *shell)
- {
- char *term;
-+ char *display;
-
- if (simulate_login)
- {
-- /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
-+ /* Leave TERM, DISPLAY unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
+@@ -260,12 +344,18 @@
+ /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
Unset all other environment variables. */
- term = getenv ("TERM");
-+ display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
- environ = (char **) xmalloc (2 * sizeof (char *));
- environ[0] = 0;
+ char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
++ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
++ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
+ if (term)
+ term = xstrdup (term);
+ environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
+ environ[0] = NULL;
if (term)
- xputenv (concat ("TERM", "=", term));
+ xsetenv ("TERM", term);
+ if (display)
-+ xputenv (concat ("DISPLAY", "=", display));
- xputenv (concat ("HOME", "=", pw->pw_dir));
- xputenv (concat ("SHELL", "=", shell));
- xputenv (concat ("USER", "=", pw->pw_name));
-@@ -359,23 +422,73 @@
- error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
++ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
++ if (xauthority)
++ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
+ xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+ xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
+ xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
+@@ -373,8 +373,13 @@
+ {
+ #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
+ errno = 0;
+- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
++ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
++#endif
+ error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
++ }
endgrent ();
#endif
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ retval = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
-+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
-+ error (1, 0, pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
-+#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
- error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set group id"));
- if (setuid (pw->pw_uid))
+@@ -308,6 +403,31 @@
error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
}
+ env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
+ if(env) {
+ while(*env) {
-+ xputenv(*env);
++ if (putenv (*env))
++ xalloc_die ();
+ env++;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
- If ADDITIONAL_ARGS is nonzero, pass it to the shell as more
- arguments. */
+ Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
+@@ -315,17 +435,49 @@
static void
--run_shell (const char *shell, const char *command, char **additional_args)
-+run_shell (const char *shell, const char *command, char **additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
+ run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
+- size_t n_additional_args)
++ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
{
- const char **args;
- int argno = 1;
+ size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
+ char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
+ size_t argno = 1;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ int child;
+ sigset_t ourset;
+*/
+ if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ fprintf (stderr, _("error copying PAM environment\n"));
-
++
++ /* Credentials should be set in the parent */
++ if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
++ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++ fprintf(stderr, _("could not set PAM credentials\n"));
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == 0) { /* child shell */
+ change_identity (pw);
+ pam_end(pamh, 0);
+#endif
- if (additional_args)
- args = (const char **) xmalloc (sizeof (char *)
- * (10 + elements (additional_args)));
-@@ -408,6 +521,61 @@
- error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
- exit (exit_status);
+
+ if (simulate_login)
+ {
+ char *arg0;
+ char *shell_basename;
+
++ if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
++ error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
++
+ shell_basename = last_component (shell);
+ arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
+ arg0[0] = '-';
+@@ -350,6 +502,66 @@
+ error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
+ exit (exit_status);
}
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ } else if (child == -1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("can not fork user shell: %s"), strerror(errno));
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
++ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ /* parent only */
+ fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession terminated, killing shell..."));
+ kill (child, SIGTERM);
+ }
++ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
++ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+ PAM_BAIL_P;
++ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
+ if (caught) {
+ sleep(2);
+ kill(child, SIGKILL);
-+ fprintf(stderr, _(" killed.\n"));
++ fprintf(stderr, _(" ...killed.\n"));
+ exit(-1);
+ }
+ exit (WEXITSTATUS(status));
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
}
- /* Return 1 if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -580,9 +748,14 @@
- }
+ /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
+@@ -714,9 +714,9 @@
+ shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
modify_environment (pw, shell);
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ setfsuid(pw->pw_uid);
-+#else
++#ifndef USE_PAM
change_identity (pw);
+- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
+- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
+#endif
- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir))
- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
-- run_shell (shell, command, additional_args);
-+ run_shell (shell, command, additional_args, pw);
+ /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
+ Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
+@@ -726,5 +726,5 @@
+ if (ferror (stderr))
+ exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
+
+- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
++ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
}
+--- coreutils-6.7/doc/coreutils.texi.pam 2006-10-27 15:30:48.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.7/doc/coreutils.texi 2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
+@@ -13395,8 +13395,11 @@
+ @findex syslog
+ @command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
+ failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts. (If the system
+-supports @code{syslog}.) However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
+-user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
++supports @code{syslog}.)
++
++This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
++authentication. You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
++behaviour.
+
+ The program accepts the following options. Also see @ref{Common options}.
+
+@@ -11892,32 +11892,6 @@
+ the exit status of the subshell otherwise
+ @end display
+
+-@cindex wheel group, not supported
+-@cindex group wheel, not supported
+-@cindex fascism
+-@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
+-
+-(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
+-
+-@cindex Twenex
+-@cindex MIT AI lab
+-Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
+-rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
+-seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
+-keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup
+-and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
+-wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
+-
+-However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual
+-@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
+-sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The
+-``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
+-power of the rulers.
+-
+-I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are
+-used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
+-might find this idea strange at first.
+-
+
+ @node Delaying
+ @chapter Delaying
+--- coreutils-6.10/configure.ac.orig 2008-01-13 09:14:23.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/configure.ac 2008-03-02 02:08:10.027276914 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@
+ gl_INIT
+ coreutils_MACROS
+
++dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
++AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
++[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries],
++AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
++LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
++)
++
+ AC_FUNC_FORK
+
+ optional_bin_progs=
+@@ -332,6 +339,13 @@
+ AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-formatstring-macros])
+ AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
+
++# just in case we want PAM
++AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)
++# with PAM su doesn't need libcrypt
++if test -n "$LIB_PAM" ; then
++ LIB_CRYPT=
++fi
++
+ AC_CONFIG_FILES(
+ Makefile
+ doc/Makefile
+--- coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po.orig 2008-01-16 21:22:08.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po 2008-03-02 02:09:23.671473657 +0100
+@@ -8875,6 +8875,49 @@
+ msgid "Usage: %s [OPTION]... [-] [USER [ARG]...]\n"
+ msgstr "Składnia: %s [OPCJA]... [-] [UŻYTKOWNIK [ARGUMENT]...]\n"
+
++#: src/su.c:300
++msgid "standard in must be a tty\n\n"
++msgstr "standardowe wejście musi być terminalem\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:425
++msgid "could not open session\n"
++msgstr "nie można otworzyć sesji\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:433
++msgid "error copying PAM environment\n"
++msgstr "błąd podczas kopiowania środowiska PAM\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:450
++msgid "could not set PAM credentials\n"
++msgstr "błąd podczas ustawiania uwierzytelnienia PAM\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:471
++#, c-format
++msgid "cannot fork user shell: %s"
++msgstr "nie można utworzyć procesu powłoki użytkownika: %s"
++
++#: src/su.c:477
++#, c-format
++msgid "%s: signal malfunction\n"
++msgstr "%s: błędne działanie sygnałów\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:490
++#, c-format
++msgid "%s: signal masking malfunction\n"
++msgstr "%s: błędne działanie maskowania sygnałów\n"
++
++#: src/su.c:509
++msgid ""
++"\n"
++"Session terminated, killing shell..."
++msgstr ""
++"\n"
++"Sesja zakończona, zabijanie powłoki..."
++
++#: src/su.c:519
++msgid " killed.\n"
++msgstr " zabito.\n"
++
+ #: src/su.c:382
+ msgid ""
+ "Change the effective user id and group id to that of USER.\n"
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1 Mon Apr 12 14:26:19 1999
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -47,13 +47,6 @@
+ puede ser compilado para reportar fallo, y opcionalmente éxito en syslog.
+ .B su
+ intentará utilizar syslog.
+-.PP
+-Este programa no soporta el grupo "wheel", el cual restringe quien podrá
+-ejecutar
+-.B su
+-hacia la cuenta de root (el superusuario) ya que esta política podría
+-ayudar a los administradores de máquinas a facilitar un uso inadecuado a otros
+-usuarios.
+ .SS OPCIONES
+ .TP
+ .I "\-c COMANDO, \-\-command=COMANDO"
+@@ -118,22 +111,3 @@
+ .I "\-\-version"
+ Escribe información sobre la versión en la salida estándar y acaba sin
+ provocar error.
+-
+-.SH Por que GNU no soporta el grupo "wheel" (por Richard Stallman)
+-A veces, algunos listillos intentan hacerse con el poder total
+-sobre el resto de usuarios. Por ejemplo, en 1984, un grupo de usuarios del
+-laboratorio de Inteligencia Artificial del MIT decidieron tomar el poder
+-cambiando el password de operador del sistema Twenex y manteniendolo secreto
+-para el resto de usuarios. (De todas maneras, hubiera sido posible desbaratar
+-la situación y devolver el control a los usuarios legítimos parcheando el
+-kernel, pero no sabría como realizar esta operación en un sistema Unix.)
+-.PP
+-Sin embargo, casualmente alguien contó el secreto. Mediante el uso habitual de
+-.B su
+-una vez que alguien conoce el password de root puede contarselo al resto de
+-usuarios. El grupo "wheel" hará que esto sea imposible, protegiendo así el poder
+-de los superusuarios.
+-.PP
+-Yo estoy del lado de las masas, no de los superusuarios. Si eres de los que
+-estan de acuerdo con los jefes y los administradores de sistemas en cualquier
+-cosa que hagan, al principio encontrarás esta idea algo extraña.
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/fr/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/fr/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/fr/su.1 Sun Aug 10 12:00:00 2003
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/fr/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -54,13 +54,6 @@
+ peut être compilé afin de fournir des rapports d'échec, et éventuellement
+ de réussite des tentatives d'utilisation de
+ .BR su .
+-.PP
+-Ce programme ne gère pas le "groupe wheel" utilisé pour restreindre
+-l'accès par
+-.B su
+-au compte Super-Utilisateur, car il pourrait aider des administrateurs
+-système fascistes à disposer d'un pouvoir incontrôlé
+-sur les autres utilisateurs.
+ .SS OPTIONS
+ .TP
+ .I "\-c COMMANDE, \-\-command=COMMANDE"
+@@ -119,25 +112,5 @@
+ .I "\-\-version"
+ Afficher un numéro de version sur la sortie standard et se terminer normalement.
+
+-.SH Pourquoi GNU SU ne gère-t-il pas le groupe `wheel' (par Richard Stallman)
+-Il peut arriver qu'un petit groupe d'utilisateurs essayent de s'approprier
+-l'ensemble du système. Par exemple, en 1984, quelques utilisateurs du
+-laboratoire d'I.A du MIT ont tentés de prendre le pouvoir en modifiant
+-le mot de passe de l'opérateur sur le système Twenex, et en
+-gardant ce mot de passe secret. (J'ai pu les en empêcher en modifiant le noyau, et
+-restaurer ainsi les autres accès, mais je ne saurais pas en faire autant
+-sous Unix).
+-.PP
+-Néanmoins, il arrive parfois que les chefs fournissent le mot
+-de passe de root à un utilisateur ordinaire.
+-Avec le mécanisme habituel de \fBsu\fP,
+-une fois que quelqu'un connaît ce mot de passe, il peut le transmettre
+-à ses amis. Le principe du "groupe wheel" rend ce partage impossible,
+-ce qui renforce la puissance des chefs.
+-.PP
+-Je me situe du cote du peuple, pas du côté des chefs. Si vous avez l'habitude
+-de soutenir les patrons et les administrateurs systèmes quoi qu'ils fassent,
+-cette idée peut vous paraître étrange au premier abord.
+-
+ .SH TRADUCTION
+ Christophe Blaess, 1997-2003.
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/hu/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/hu/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/hu/su.1 Sun Jul 9 14:19:12 2000
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/hu/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -151,33 +151,6 @@
+ .B "\-\-version"
+ A program verziójáról ír ki információt a standard kimenetre, majd
+ sikeres visszatérési értékkel kilép.
+-.SH Miért nem támogatja a GNU su a wheel csoportot? (Richard Stallman)
+-
+-Néha a rendszer fölötti teljes ellenõrzést egy néhány emberbõl
+-álló csoport akarja kézbe venni. Például 1984-ben pár user a MIT AI
+-laborban úgy döntött, hogy átveszik az irányítást a Twenex rendszer
+-operátori jelszavának megváltoztatásával, és annak titokban tartásával.
+-(A puccsot sikerült leverni, és a felhasználókat jogaikba visszahelyezni
+-egy kernel patch segítségével, de Unix alatt ezt nem tudtam volna megcsinálni.)
+-(A fordító megj.: a wheel csoportot ezzel a módszerrel könnyen
+-önkényesen is leszûkíthetik a csoporttagok , így tulajdonképpen nincs sok értelme.)
+-.PP
+-Néha az uralmon levõk elárulják a root jelszót. A szokásos su
+-mechanizmus szerint, ha valaki megtudja a root jelszót, és
+-szimpatizál a többi közönséges felhasználóval, elárulhatja nekik
+-is. A wheel csoport ezt lehetetlenné tenné, és így bebetonozná az
+-uralmon levõ hatalmát.
+-.PP
+-Én a tömegek oldalán állok, nem az uralkodókén. Ha te mindig a
+-fõnökök és a rendszergazdák oldalán állsz, bármit is tesznek, akkor
+-valószínûleg furcsálni fogod ezt a hozzáállást.
+-.PP
+-A fordító megjegyzése:
+-Valami jó azért mégis lenne a wheel csoportban: az, hogy ha a root
+-jelszó kitudódna azzal nem tudna bármelyik felhasználó közvetlenül
+-visszaélni. A wheel csoporthoz hasonló dolgot lehet elérni a
+-.B sudo
+-csomaggal.
+ .SH MEGJEGYZÉS
+ A hibákat a bug-sh-utils@gnu.org címen lehet jelenteni.
+ Az oldalt Ragnar Hojland Espinosa <ragnar@macula.net> frissítette.
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/it/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/it/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/it/su.1 Mon Jul 1 23:09:38 2002
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/it/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -52,11 +52,6 @@
+ .B su
+ può essere compilato per riportare tramite syslog gli errori, ed
+ eventualmente anche i successi che ottiene.
+-.PP
+-Questo programma non supporta un "gruppo wheel" che limita chi può fare
+-.B su
+-agli account del superuser, poiché ciò può aiutare amministratori di
+-sistema "fascisti" a tenere un potere inautorizzato sugli altri utenti.
+ .SS OPZIONI
+ .TP
+ .I "\-c COMANDO, \-\-command=COMANDO"
+@@ -117,21 +112,3 @@
+ .I "\-\-version"
+ Stampa in standard output informazioni sulla versione e esce (con
+ successo).
+-.SH Perché GNU su non supporta il gruppo wheel (di Richard Stallman)
+-Qualche volta pochi utenti provano a tenere il potere assoluto sul
+-resto degli utenti. Per esempio, nel 1984, alcuni utenti nel
+-laboratorio di AI del MIT decisero impossessarsi del potere cambiando
+-la password dell'operatore su un sistema Twenex e tenendola segreta a
+-tutti gli altri (fui in grado di contrastare questo colpaccio e
+-restituire il potere agli utenti ``patch-ando'' il kernel, ma non
+-saprei come fare ciò in Unix).
+-.PP
+-Comunque, occasionalmente i sovrani lo fanno. Tramite l'usuale
+-meccanismo su, una volta che qualcuno che simpatizzi con gli
+-utenti normali, abbia imparato la password di root può dirla anche
+-agli altri. La caratteristica del "gruppo wheel" renderebbe ciò
+-impossibile, consolidando quindi il potere dei sovrani.
+-.PP
+-Io sono dalla parte delle masse, non da quella dei sovrani. Se tu sei
+-abituato a sostenere i capi e gli amministratori di sistema in tutto
+-quello che fanno, potresti trovare questa idea strana all'inizio.
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/ja/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/ja/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/ja/su.1 Sun Dec 14 16:06:54 2003
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/ja/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -83,12 +83,6 @@
+ .B su
+ ¤¬¼ºÇÔ¤·¤¿¤È¤ syslog ¤Ë¥ì¥Ý¡¼¥È¤¹¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¥³¥ó¥Ñ¥¤¥ë¤¹¤ë¤³¤È
+ ¤¬¤Ç¤¤ë¡ÊÀ®¸ù¤ò¥ì¥Ý¡¼¥È¤¹¤ë¤è¤¦¤Ë¤â¤Ç¤¤ë¡Ë¡£
+-.PP
+-¤³¤Î¥×¥í¥°¥é¥à¤Ï "wheel group" ¤Îµ¡Ç½¡Ê
+-.B su
+-¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¥¹¡¼¥Ñ¡¼¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¥¢¥«¥¦¥ó¥È¤Ë¤Ê¤ì¤ë¥æ¡¼¥¶¤òÀ©¸Â¤¹¤ëµ¡Ç½¡Ë¤ò¥µ¥Ý¡¼
+-¥È¤·¤Ê¤¤¡£¤³¤ì¤ÏÀìÀ©Åª¤Ê¥·¥¹¥Æ¥à´ÉÍý¼Ô¤¬Â¾¤Î¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¤ËÉÔÅö¤Ê¸¢ÎϤò¿¶¤ë
+-¤¨¤Ê¤¤¤è¤¦¤Ë¤¹¤ë¤¿¤á¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£
+ .SS OPTIONS
+ .TP
+ .I "\-c COMMAND, \-\-command=COMMAND"
+@@ -151,19 +145,3 @@
+ .TP
+ .I "\-\-version"
+ ¥Ð¡¼¥¸¥ç¥ó¾ðÊó¤òɸ½à½ÐÎϤËɽ¼¨¤·¡¢¼Â¹ÔÀ®¸ù¤òÊÖ¤·¤Æ½ªÎ»¤¹¤ë¡£
+-.SH GNU su ¤Ç wheel ¥°¥ë¡¼¥×¤ò¥µ¥Ý¡¼¥È¤·¤Ê¤¤¤ï¤±¡ÊRichard Stallman¡Ë
+-¤È¤¤ª¤ê¡¢¾¯¿ô¤Î¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¤Ë¤è¤Ã¤Æ¡¢Â¾¤Î¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¤ËÂФ¹¤ëÁ´¸¢¤ò¾¸°®¤·¤è¤¦
+-¤È¤¹¤ë»î¤ß¤¬¤Ê¤µ¤ì¤ë¤³¤È¤¬¤¢¤ë¡£Î㤨¤Ð 1984 ǯ¡¢ MIT AI ¥é¥Ü¤Î¾¯¿ô¤Î¥æ¡¼
+-¥¶¡¼¤Ï Twenex ¥·¥¹¥Æ¥à¤Î¥ª¥Ú¥ì¡¼¥¿¡¼¥Ñ¥¹¥ï¡¼¥É¤ÎÊѹ¹¸¢¸Â¤ò¶¯Ã¥¤·¡¢¤³¤ì
+-¤ò¾¤Î¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¤«¤éÈëÆ¿¤¹¤ë¤³¤È¤Ë·èÄꤷ¤¿¡Ê¤³¤ÎºÝ¤Ë¤Ï»ä¤Ï¤³¤Î¥¯¡¼¥Ç¥¿¡¼
+-¤Î΢¤ò¤«¤¡¢¥«¡¼¥Í¥ë¤Ë¥Ñ¥Ã¥Á¤òÅö¤Æ¤Æ¸¢¸Â¤ò¼è¤êÊÖ¤¹¤³¤È¤ËÀ®¸ù¤·¤¿¡£¤·¤«
+-¤·¤³¤ì¤¬ Unix ¤Ç¤¢¤Ã¤¿¤é¡¢»ä¤Ë¤Ï¤É¤¦¤¹¤ì¤Ð¤è¤¤¤«¤ï¤«¤é¤Ê¤«¤Ã¤¿¤À¤í¤¦¡Ë¡£
+-.PP
+-¤·¤«¤·¤Ê¤¬¤é¡¢»þ¤Ë¤ÏÀìÀ©¼Ô¤âÈëÌ©¤òϳ¤é¤¹¤â¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£Ä̾ï¤Î su ¤Î¥á¥«¥Ë
+-¥º¥à¤Ç¤Ï¡¢°ìÈ̥桼¥¶¡¼¤Î¦¤ËΩ¤Ä¼Ô¤¬ root ¤Î¥Ñ¥¹¥ï¡¼¥É¤òÃΤì¤Ð¡¢¤³¤ì¤ò
+-¾¤Î¥æ¡¼¥¶¡¼¤Ë¤âÃΤ餻¤ë¤³¤È¤¬¤Ç¤¤ë¡£¤·¤«¤· "wheel group" µ¡Ç½¤Ï¤³¤ì
+-¤òÉÔ²Äǽ¤Ë¤·¡¢·ë²Ì¤È¤·¤ÆÀìÀ©¼Ôã¤Î¸¢¸Â¤ò¶¯¸Ç¤¿¤ë¤â¤Î¤Ë¤·¤Æ¤·¤Þ¤¦¡£
+-.PP
+-»ä¤ÏÂç½°¤Î¦¤ËΩ¤Ä¤â¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢ÀìÀ©Åª¤ÊΩ¾ì¤Ë¤ÏÈ¿ÂФ¹¤ë¡£¤¢¤Ê¤¿¤Ï¥Ü¥¹¤ä
+-¥·¥¹¥Æ¥à´ÉÍý¼Ô¤Î¤ä¤ê¸ý¤Ë½¾¤¦¤³¤È¤Ë´·¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¤«¤âÃΤì¤Ê¤¤¤¬¡¢¤½¤Î¾ì¹ç¤Ï
+-¤Þ¤º¤½¤Î¤³¤È¼«¿È¤òÉԻ׵Ĥ˻פ¦¤Ù¤¤Ç¤Ï¤Ê¤¤¤À¤í¤¦¤«¡£
+diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/pl/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/pl/su.1
+--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/pl/su.1 Tue Jun 20 16:07:31 2000
++++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/pl/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
+@@ -78,8 +78,6 @@
+ mo¿e zostaæ tak skompilowane, by raportowa³o nieudane, lub opcjonalnie
+ równie¿ udane próby zmiany id przy u¿yciu
+ .BR su .
+-Jednak \fBsu\fP w wersji GNU nie sprawdza czy u¿ytkownik jest cz³onkiem grupy
+-`wheel' -- patrz poni¿ej.
+ .SH OPCJE
+ .TP
+ .BR \-c " \fIpolecenie\fP, " \-\-command= \fIpolecenie
+@@ -139,25 +137,6 @@
+ .TP
+ .B \-\-version
+ Wy¶wietla numer wersji programu i koñczy pracê.
+-.SH Dlaczego GNU `su' nie obs³uguje grupy `wheel'
+-
+-(Sekcjê tê napisa³ Richard Stallman)
+-
+-Czasami kilku u¿ytkowników usi³uje sprawowaæ nieograniczon± w³adzê nad
+-pozosta³ymi. Na przyk³ad, w 1984, kilku u¿ytkowników w laboratorium AI MIT
+-zdecydowa³o siê `przej±æ w³adzê' zmieniaj±c has³o operatora systemu Twenex
+-i trzymaj±c je w tajemnicy przed wszystkimi innymi. (Uda³o mi siê
+-udaremniæ ten zamach i przywróciæ w³adzê u¿ytkownikom ³ataj±c j±dro, lecz
+-nie wiedzia³bym jak zrobiæ to w Uniksie.)
+-
+-Jednak, od czasu do czasu panuj±cy wyjawiaj± komu¶. Przy zwyk³ym
+-mechanizmie `su', kto¶, kto pozna³ has³o root'a i sympatyzuje ze zwyk³ymi
+-u¿ytkownikami, mo¿e przekazaæ je pozosta³ym. Funkcja "grupy wheel"
+-uniemo¿liwia³aby to, i w ten sposób umacnia³a w³adzê rz±dz±cych.
+-
+-Jestem po stronie mas, nie po stronie rz±dz±cych. Je¿eli zwyk³e¶ popieraæ
+-szefów i administratorów systemów we wszystkim, co robi±, podej¶cie to mo¿e
+-pocz±tkowo wydaæ Ci siê dziwne.
+ .SH "ZG£ASZANIE B£ÊDÓW"
+ B³êdy proszê zg³aszaæ, w jêz.ang., do <bug-sh-utils@gnu.org>.
+ .SH COPYRIGHT
projects / packages / coreutils.git / blobdiff