--- coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am.pam 2006-11-24 21:28:10.000000000 +0000
+++ coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am 2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
- # If necessary, add -lm to resolve use of pow in lib/strtod.c.
- uptime_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(POW_LIB) $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
+@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
+ uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
--su_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIB_CRYPT)
-+su_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIB_CRYPT) $(LIB_PAM)
+ # for crypt
+-su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
++su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) $(LIB_PAM)
- dir_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
- ls_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
---- coreutils-6.7/src/su.c.pam 2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ coreutils-6.7/src/su.c 2007-01-09 17:16:43.000000000 +0000
-@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@
+ # for various ACL functions
+ copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
+--- coreutils-6.10/src/su.c.orig 2007-11-25 14:23:31.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/src/su.c 2008-03-02 02:07:13.568059486 +0100
+@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to
be fascist.
Compile-time options:
-DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-@@ -59,6 +69,15 @@
+@@ -58,6 +68,15 @@
prototype (returning `int') in <unistd.h>. */
#define getusershell _getusershell_sys_proto_
+
#include "system.h"
#include "getpass.h"
-
-@@ -128,15 +147,22 @@
+
+@@ -130,10 +130,17 @@
/* The user to become if none is specified. */
#define DEFAULT_USER "root"
+#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt ();
+ char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
+#endif
- char *getusershell ();
- void endusershell ();
- void setusershell ();
-
- extern char **environ;
-static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
-+ const struct passwd *)
++ const struct passwd *)
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ ;
+#else
ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
+#endif
- /* The name this program was run with. */
- char *program_name;
-@@ -225,7 +251,26 @@
+ /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */
+ static bool fast_startup;
+@@ -215,7 +241,26 @@
}
#endif
Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
or if PW has an empty password. */
-@@ -233,6 +278,44 @@
+@@ -223,6 +268,44 @@
static bool
correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
{
char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
#if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
/* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */
-@@ -257,6 +340,7 @@
+@@ -247,6 +330,7 @@
encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
}
/* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -270,12 +354,18 @@
+@@ -260,12 +344,18 @@
/* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
Unset all other environment variables. */
char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
+ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
+ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
if (term)
- term = xstrdup (term);
+ term = xstrdup (term);
environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
environ[0] = NULL;
if (term)
- xsetenv ("TERM", term);
+ xsetenv ("TERM", term);
+ if (display)
-+ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
++ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
+ if (xauthority)
-+ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
++ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
-@@ -308,8 +398,13 @@
+@@ -373,8 +373,13 @@
{
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
errno = 0;
- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
++ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+#endif
- error (EXIT_FAIL, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
+ error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
+ }
endgrent ();
#endif
if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
-@@ -318,6 +413,31 @@
- error (EXIT_FAIL, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
+@@ -308,6 +403,31 @@
+ error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
}
+#ifdef USE_PAM
/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
-@@ -325,17 +445,49 @@
+@@ -315,17 +435,49 @@
static void
run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
-- size_t n_additional_args)
-+ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
+- size_t n_additional_args)
++ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
{
size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
shell_basename = last_component (shell);
arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
arg0[0] = '-';
-@@ -360,6 +512,66 @@
+@@ -350,6 +502,66 @@
error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
exit (exit_status);
}
}
/* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -527,9 +739,9 @@
+@@ -714,9 +714,9 @@
shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
modify_environment (pw, shell);
- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
+#endif
+ /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
+ Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
+@@ -726,5 +726,5 @@
+ if (ferror (stderr))
+ exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
+
- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
+ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
}
@node Delaying
@chapter Delaying
---- coreutils-6.7/configure.ac.pam 2006-12-07 21:30:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ coreutils-6.7/configure.ac 2007-01-09 17:18:04.000000000 +0000
-@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+--- coreutils-6.10/configure.ac.orig 2008-01-13 09:14:23.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/configure.ac 2008-03-02 02:08:10.027276914 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@
gl_INIT
coreutils_MACROS
+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
+)
+
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS(uname,
- OPTIONAL_BIN_PROGS="$OPTIONAL_BIN_PROGS uname\$(EXEEXT)"
- MAN="$MAN uname.1")
-@@ -249,6 +256,13 @@
+ AC_FUNC_FORK
+
+ optional_bin_progs=
+@@ -332,6 +339,13 @@
AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-formatstring-macros])
AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
AC_CONFIG_FILES(
Makefile
doc/Makefile
---- coreutils-6.3/po/pl.po.orig 2006-09-30 11:11:04.000000000 +0200
-+++ coreutils-6.3/po/pl.po 2006-10-10 22:07:14.416124000 +0200
-@@ -8149,6 +8149,49 @@
+--- coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po.orig 2008-01-16 21:22:08.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po 2008-03-02 02:09:23.671473657 +0100
+@@ -8875,6 +8875,49 @@
msgid "Usage: %s [OPTION]... [-] [USER [ARG]...]\n"
- msgstr "Sk³adnia: %s [OPCJA]... [-] [U¯YTKOWNIK [ARGUMENT]...]\n"
+ msgstr "Składnia: %s [OPCJA]... [-] [UŻYTKOWNIK [ARGUMENT]...]\n"
+#: src/su.c:300
+msgid "standard in must be a tty\n\n"
-+msgstr "standartowe wej¶cie musi byæ terminalem\n"
++msgstr "standardowe wejście musi być terminalem\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:425
+msgid "could not open session\n"
-+msgstr "nie mo¿na otworzyæ sesji\n"
++msgstr "nie można otworzyć sesji\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:433
+msgid "error copying PAM environment\n"
-+msgstr "b³±d podczas kopiowania ¶rodowiska PAM\n"
++msgstr "błąd podczas kopiowania środowiska PAM\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:450
+msgid "could not set PAM credentials\n"
-+msgstr "b³±d podczas ustawiania uwierzytelnieñ PAM\n"
++msgstr "błąd podczas ustawiania uwierzytelnienia PAM\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:471
+#, c-format
+msgid "cannot fork user shell: %s"
-+msgstr "nie mo¿na utworzyæ procesu pow³oki u¿ytkownika: %s"
++msgstr "nie można utworzyć procesu powłoki użytkownika: %s"
+
+#: src/su.c:477
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: signal malfunction\n"
-+msgstr "%s: b³êdne dzia³anie sygna³ów\n"
++msgstr "%s: błędne działanie sygnałów\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:490
+#, c-format
+msgid "%s: signal masking malfunction\n"
-+msgstr "%s: b³êdne dzia³anie maskowania sygna³ów\n"
++msgstr "%s: błędne działanie maskowania sygnałów\n"
+
+#: src/su.c:509
+msgid ""
+"Session terminated, killing shell..."
+msgstr ""
+"\n"
-+"Sesja zakoñczona, zabijanie pow³oki..."
++"Sesja zakończona, zabijanie powłoki..."
+
+#: src/su.c:519
+msgid " killed.\n"
+msgstr " zabito.\n"
+
- #: src/su.c:386
- #, fuzzy
+ #: src/su.c:382
msgid ""
+ "Change the effective user id and group id to that of USER.\n"
diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1
--- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1 Mon Apr 12 14:26:19 1999
+++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1 Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004
projects / packages / coreutils.git / blobdiff