diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/configure.ac sh-utils-2.0.12/configure.ac --- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/configure.ac Sun Apr 28 11:29:18 2002 +++ sh-utils-2.0.12/configure.ac Mon May 27 23:10:36 2002 @@ -8,6 +8,13 @@ AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.6b gnits dist-bzip2]) +dnl Give the chance to enable PAM +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl +[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries], +AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM,,[Use PAM?]) +LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc" +) + AC_GNU_SOURCE jm_PERL AC_PROG_CC @@ -238,6 +245,13 @@ AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external]) +# just in case we want PAM +AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM) +# with PAM su doesn't need libcrypt +if test -n "$LIB_PAM" ; then + LIB_CRYPT= +fi + AC_CONFIG_FILES( Makefile doc/Makefile diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/doc/coreutils.texi sh-utils-2.0.12/doc/coreutils.texi --- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/doc/coreutils.texi Sun Apr 28 23:55:31 2002 +++ sh-utils-2.0.12/doc/coreutils.texi Mon May 27 23:11:49 2002 @@ -10898,32 +10898,6 @@ @end table -@cindex wheel group, not supported -@cindex group wheel, not supported -@cindex fascism -@heading Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group - -(This section is by Richard Stallman.) - -@cindex Twenex -@cindex MIT AI lab -Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the -rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to -seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and -keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup -and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I -wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.) - -However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual -@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who -sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The -``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the -power of the rulers. - -I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are -used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you -might find this idea strange at first. - @node Process control @chapter Process control diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/Makefile.am sh-utils-2.0.12/src/Makefile.am --- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/Makefile.am Mon May 27 23:06:24 2002 +++ sh-utils-2.0.12/src/Makefile.am Mon May 27 23:09:22 2002 @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ uptime_LDADD = $(LDADD) @GETLOADAVG_LIBS@ -su_LDADD = $(LDADD) @LIB_CRYPT@ +su_LDADD = $(LDADD) @LIB_CRYPT@ @LIB_PAM@ $(PROGRAMS): ../lib/libfetish.a diff -Nur sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/su.c sh-utils-2.0.12/src/su.c --- sh-utils-2.0.12.orig/src/su.c Mon May 27 23:06:24 2002 +++ sh-utils-2.0.12/src/su.c Mon May 27 23:08:28 2002 @@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to be fascist. +#ifdef USE_PAM + + Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a + wheel group is enforced by su. RMS tries to restrict your access + to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that + to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to + enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf + +#endif + Options: -, -l, --login Make the subshell a login shell. Unset all environment variables except @@ -81,6 +91,14 @@ prototype (returning `int') in . */ #define getusershell _getusershell_sys_proto_ +#ifdef USE_PAM +# include +# include +# include +# include +# include +#endif /* USE_PAM */ + #include "system.h" #include "closeout.h" #include "dirname.h" @@ -151,7 +169,9 @@ /* The user to become if none is specified. */ #define DEFAULT_USER "root" +#ifndef USE_PAM char *crypt (); +#endif char *getpass (); char *getusershell (); void endusershell (); @@ -159,7 +179,7 @@ extern char **environ; -static void run_shell (const char *, const char *, char **) +static void run_shell (const char *, const char *, char **, const struct passwd *) ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN; /* The name this program was run with. */ @@ -272,7 +292,22 @@ } #endif +#ifdef USE_PAM +static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; +static int retval; +static struct pam_conv conv = { + misc_conv, + NULL +}; + +#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \ + pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \ + return 0; \ +} +#endif + /* Ask the user for a password. + If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary. Return 1 if the user gives the correct password for entry PW, 0 if not. Return 1 without asking for a password if run by UID 0 or if PW has an empty password. */ @@ -280,6 +315,29 @@ static int correct_password (const struct passwd *pw) { +#ifdef USE_PAM + /* root always succeeds; this isn't an authentication question (no + * extra privs are being granted) so it shouldn't authenticate with PAM. + * However, we want to create the pam_handle so that proper credentials + * are created later with pam_setcred(). */ + retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh); + PAM_BAIL_P; + + retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); + PAM_BAIL_P; + + retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); + if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { + /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */ + if (getuid()) { + retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); + PAM_BAIL_P; + } else retval = PAM_SUCCESS; + } + PAM_BAIL_P; + /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */ + return 1; +#else /* !USE_PAM */ char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct; #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */ @@ -304,6 +362,7 @@ encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct); memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted)); return strcmp (encrypted, correct) == 0; +#endif /* !USE_PAM */ } /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being @@ -313,16 +372,20 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd *pw, const char *shell) { char *term; + char *display; if (simulate_login) { - /* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH. + /* Leave TERM, DISPLAY unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH. Unset all other environment variables. */ term = getenv ("TERM"); + display = getenv ("DISPLAY"); environ = (char **) xmalloc (2 * sizeof (char *)); environ[0] = 0; if (term) xputenv (concat ("TERM", "=", term)); + if (display) + xputenv (concat ("DISPLAY", "=", display)); xputenv (concat ("HOME", "=", pw->pw_dir)); xputenv (concat ("SHELL", "=", shell)); xputenv (concat ("USER", "=", pw->pw_name)); @@ -359,23 +422,73 @@ error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set groups")); endgrent (); #endif +#ifdef USE_PAM + retval = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); + if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) + error (1, 0, pam_strerror(pamh, retval)); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ if (setgid (pw->pw_gid)) error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set group id")); if (setuid (pw->pw_uid)) error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set user id")); } +#ifdef USE_PAM +static int caught=0; +/* Signal handler for parent process later */ +static void su_catch_sig(int sig) +{ + ++caught; +} + +int +pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh) +{ + char **env; + + env = pam_getenvlist(pamh); + if(env) { + while(*env) { + xputenv(*env); + env++; + } + } + return(0); +} +#endif + /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty. If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option. If ADDITIONAL_ARGS is nonzero, pass it to the shell as more arguments. */ static void -run_shell (const char *shell, const char *command, char **additional_args) +run_shell (const char *shell, const char *command, char **additional_args, const struct passwd *pw) { const char **args; int argno = 1; +#ifdef USE_PAM + int child; + sigset_t ourset; + int status; + + retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0); + if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) { + fprintf (stderr, _("could not open session\n")); + exit (1); + } + +/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may + be passed even in the session phase +*/ + if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS) + fprintf (stderr, _("error copying PAM environment\n")); + child = fork(); + if (child == 0) { /* child shell */ + change_identity (pw); + pam_end(pamh, 0); +#endif if (additional_args) args = (const char **) xmalloc (sizeof (char *) * (10 + elements (additional_args))); @@ -408,6 +521,61 @@ error (0, errno, "%s", shell); exit (exit_status); } +#ifdef USE_PAM + } else if (child == -1) { + fprintf(stderr, _("cannot fork user shell: %s"), strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + /* parent only */ + sigfillset(&ourset); + if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s: signal malfunction\n"), PROGRAM_NAME); + caught = 1; + } + if (!caught) { + struct sigaction action; + action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig; + sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask); + action.sa_flags = 0; + sigemptyset(&ourset); + if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM) + || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM) + || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL) + || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"), PROGRAM_NAME); + caught = 1; + } + } + if (!caught) { + do { + int pid; + + pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED); + + if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) { + kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); + /* once we get here, we must have resumed */ + kill(pid, SIGCONT); + } + } while (WIFSTOPPED(status)); + } + + if (caught) { + fprintf(stderr, _("\nSession terminated, killing shell...")); + kill (child, SIGTERM); + } + retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0); + PAM_BAIL_P; + retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); + PAM_BAIL_P; + if (caught) { + sleep(2); + kill(child, SIGKILL); + fprintf(stderr, _(" killed.\n")); + exit(-1); + } + exit (WEXITSTATUS(status)); +#endif /* USE_PAM */ } /* Return 1 if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by @@ -580,9 +748,14 @@ } modify_environment (pw, shell); + +#ifdef USE_PAM + setfsuid(pw->pw_uid); +#else change_identity (pw); +#endif if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir)) error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir); - run_shell (shell, command, additional_args); + run_shell (shell, command, additional_args, pw); } --- coreutils-4.5.3.orig/po/pl.po Fri Nov 1 01:55:42 2002 +++ coreutils-4.5.3/po/pl.po Fri Nov 1 02:11:20 2002 @@ -6491,6 +6491,41 @@ msgid "cannot set user id" msgstr "nie można ustawić identyfikatora użytkownika" +#: src/su.c:468 +msgid "could not open session\n" +msgstr "nie można otworzyć sesji\n" + +#: src/su.c:476 +msgid "error copying PAM environment\n" +msgstr "błąd podczas kopiowania środowiska PAM\n" + +#: src/su.c:521 +#, c-format +msgid "cannot fork user shell: %s" +msgstr "nie można utworzyć procesu powłoki użytkownika: %s" + +#: src/su.c:527 +#, c-format +msgid "%s: signal malfunction\n" +msgstr "%s: błędne działanie sygnałów\n" + +#: src/su.c:540 +#, c-format +msgid "%s: signal masking malfunction\n" +msgstr "%s: błędne działanie maskowania sygnałów\n" + +#: src/su.c:559 +msgid "" +"\n" +"Session terminated, killing shell..." +msgstr "" +"\n" +"Sesja zakończona, zabijanie powłoki..." + +#: src/su.c:569 +msgid " killed.\n" +msgstr " zabito.\n" + #: src/su.c:437 #, c-format msgid "Usage: %s [OPTION]... [-] [USER [ARG]...]\n"