X-Git-Url: http://git.pld-linux.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=coreutils-pam.patch;h=6c2b01ee4ed1cce01eac52f9055ec88d8d93f249;hb=e80ed3e54531ed18ae00d741754bc7b242fab09b;hp=c7bf120b50a79bd18b6a012431b3a25d02df6753;hpb=ca7ee99d404b450aba8b0624a7a85300af55a817;p=packages%2Fcoreutils.git

diff --git a/coreutils-pam.patch b/coreutils-pam.patch
index c7bf120..6c2b01e 100644
--- a/coreutils-pam.patch
+++ b/coreutils-pam.patch
@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 --- coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am.pam	2006-11-24 21:28:10.000000000 +0000
 +++ coreutils-6.7/src/Makefile.am	2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
- # If necessary, add -lm to resolve use of pow in lib/strtod.c.
- uptime_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(POW_LIB) $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
+@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@
+ uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
  
--su_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIB_CRYPT)
-+su_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIB_CRYPT) $(LIB_PAM)
+ # for crypt
+-su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
++su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) $(LIB_PAM)
  
- dir_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
- ls_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
---- coreutils-6.7/src/su.c.pam	2007-01-09 17:00:01.000000000 +0000
-+++ coreutils-6.7/src/su.c	2007-01-09 17:16:43.000000000 +0000
-@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@
+ # for various ACL functions
+ copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
+--- coreutils-6.10/src/su.c.orig	2007-11-25 14:23:31.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/src/su.c	2008-03-02 02:07:13.568059486 +0100
+@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
     restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts.  RMS considers that to
     be fascist.
  
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
     Compile-time options:
     -DSYSLOG_SUCCESS	Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
     -DSYSLOG_FAILURE	Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
-@@ -59,6 +69,15 @@
+@@ -58,6 +68,15 @@
     prototype (returning `int') in <unistd.h>.  */
  #define getusershell _getusershell_sys_proto_
  
@@ -43,32 +43,27 @@
 +
  #include "system.h"
  #include "getpass.h"
- 
-@@ -128,15 +147,22 @@
+
+@@ -130,10 +130,17 @@
  /* The user to become if none is specified.  */
  #define DEFAULT_USER "root"
  
 +#ifndef USE_PAM
- char *crypt ();
+ char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
 +#endif
- char *getusershell ();
- void endusershell ();
- void setusershell ();
- 
- extern char **environ;
  
 -static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
 +static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
-+	const struct passwd *)
++		const struct passwd *)
 +#ifdef USE_PAM
 +	;
 +#else
       ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
 +#endif
  
- /* The name this program was run with.  */
- char *program_name;
-@@ -225,7 +251,26 @@
+ /* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell.  */
+ static bool fast_startup;
+@@ -215,7 +241,26 @@
  }
  #endif
  
@@ -95,7 +90,7 @@
     Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
     false if not.  Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
     or if PW has an empty password.  */
-@@ -233,6 +278,44 @@
+@@ -223,6 +268,44 @@
  static bool
  correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
  {
@@ -140,7 +135,7 @@
    char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
  #if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
    /* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems.  */
-@@ -257,6 +340,7 @@
+@@ -247,6 +330,7 @@
    encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
    memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
    return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
@@ -148,42 +143,42 @@
  }
  
  /* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
-@@ -270,12 +354,18 @@
+@@ -260,12 +344,18 @@
        /* Leave TERM unchanged.  Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
           Unset all other environment variables.  */
        char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
 +      char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
 +      char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
        if (term)
- 	term = xstrdup (term);
+         term = xstrdup (term);
        environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
        environ[0] = NULL;
        if (term)
- 	xsetenv ("TERM", term);
+         xsetenv ("TERM", term);
 +      if (display)
-+	xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
++        xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
 +      if (xauthority)
-+	xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
++        xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
        xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
        xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
        xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
-@@ -308,8 +398,13 @@
+@@ -373,8 +373,13 @@
  {
  #ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
    errno = 0;
 -  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
 +  if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
 +#ifdef USE_PAM
-+    pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
-+    pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
++      pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
++      pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
 +#endif
-     error (EXIT_FAIL, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
+     error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
 +  }
    endgrent ();
  #endif
    if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
-@@ -318,6 +413,31 @@
-     error (EXIT_FAIL, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
+@@ -308,6 +403,31 @@
+     error (EXIT_FAILURE, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
  }
  
 +#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -214,12 +209,12 @@
  /* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
     If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
     Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
-@@ -325,17 +445,49 @@
+@@ -315,17 +435,49 @@
  
  static void
  run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
--	   size_t n_additional_args)
-+	   size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
+-           size_t n_additional_args)
++           size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
  {
    size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
    char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
@@ -265,7 +260,7 @@
        shell_basename = last_component (shell);
        arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
        arg0[0] = '-';
-@@ -360,6 +512,66 @@
+@@ -350,6 +502,66 @@
      error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
      exit (exit_status);
    }
@@ -332,7 +327,7 @@
  }
  
  /* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
-@@ -527,9 +739,9 @@
+@@ -714,9 +714,9 @@
    shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
    modify_environment (pw, shell);
  
@@ -342,6 +337,12 @@
 -    error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
 +#endif
  
+   /* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
+      Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
+@@ -726,5 +726,5 @@
+   if (ferror (stderr))
+     exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
+ 
 -  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
 +  run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
  }
@@ -394,23 +395,23 @@
  
  @node Delaying
  @chapter Delaying
---- coreutils-6.7/configure.ac.pam	2006-12-07 21:30:24.000000000 +0000
-+++ coreutils-6.7/configure.ac	2007-01-09 17:18:04.000000000 +0000
-@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
+--- coreutils-6.10/configure.ac.orig	2008-01-13 09:14:23.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/configure.ac	2008-03-02 02:08:10.027276914 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,13 @@
  gl_INIT
  coreutils_MACROS
  
 +dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
 +AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
 +[  --enable-pam              Enable use of the PAM libraries],
-+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
++AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
 +LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
 +)
 +
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS(uname,
- 	OPTIONAL_BIN_PROGS="$OPTIONAL_BIN_PROGS uname\$(EXEEXT)"
- 	MAN="$MAN uname.1")
-@@ -249,6 +256,13 @@
+ AC_FUNC_FORK
+ 
+ optional_bin_progs=
+@@ -332,6 +339,13 @@
  AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-formatstring-macros])
  AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.15])
  
@@ -424,15 +425,15 @@
  AC_CONFIG_FILES(
    Makefile
    doc/Makefile
---- coreutils-6.3/po/pl.po.orig	2006-09-30 11:11:04.000000000 +0200
-+++ coreutils-6.3/po/pl.po	2006-10-10 22:07:14.416124000 +0200
-@@ -8149,6 +8149,49 @@
+--- coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po.orig	2008-01-16 21:22:08.000000000 +0100
++++ coreutils-6.10/po/pl.po	2008-03-02 02:09:23.671473657 +0100
+@@ -8875,6 +8875,49 @@
  msgid "Usage: %s [OPTION]... [-] [USER [ARG]...]\n"
  msgstr "Składnia: %s [OPCJA]... [-] [UŻYTKOWNIK [ARGUMENT]...]\n"
  
 +#: src/su.c:300
 +msgid "standard in must be a tty\n\n"
-+msgstr "standartowe wejście musi być terminalem\n"
++msgstr "standardowe wejście musi być terminalem\n"
 +
 +#: src/su.c:425
 +msgid "could not open session\n"
@@ -444,7 +445,7 @@
 +
 +#: src/su.c:450
 +msgid "could not set PAM credentials\n"
-+msgstr "błąd podczas ustawiania uwierzytelnień PAM\n"
++msgstr "błąd podczas ustawiania uwierzytelnienia PAM\n"
 +
 +#: src/su.c:471
 +#, c-format
@@ -473,9 +474,9 @@
 +msgid " killed.\n"
 +msgstr " zabito.\n"
 +
- #: src/su.c:386
- #, fuzzy
+ #: src/su.c:382
  msgid ""
+ "Change the effective user id and group id to that of USER.\n"
 diff -Nur coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1 coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1
 --- coreutils-5.2.1.orig/man/es/su.1	Mon Apr 12 14:26:19 1999
 +++ coreutils-5.2.1/man/es/su.1	Thu Mar 18 17:05:55 2004