diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/Makefile linux-2.6.11/Makefile --- linux-2.6.11/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ export MODLIB ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),) -core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ +core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/ vmlinux-dirs := $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \ $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -179,6 +179,11 @@ osf_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned lo struct file *file = NULL; unsigned long ret = -EBADF; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + #if 0 if (flags & (_MAP_HASSEMAPHORE | _MAP_INHERIT | _MAP_UNALIGNED)) printk("%s: unimplemented OSF mmap flags %04lx\n", @@ -1288,6 +1293,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps this feature should be incorporated into all ports? */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + if (addr) { addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit); if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM) @@ -1295,8 +1304,16 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp } /* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE. */ - addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE), - len, limit); + + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + addr += current->mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + + addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit); + if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM) return addr; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -289,6 +290,9 @@ do_sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, lo if (!child) goto out_notsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -56,6 +57,142 @@ __load_new_mm_context(struct mm_struct * __reload_thread(pcb); } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected + * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected + * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->pc < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (regs->r26 == regs->pc) + return 1; + + regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 4; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ + unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp; + + err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U && + (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U && + jmp == 0x6BFB0000U) + { + unsigned long r27, addr; + unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16; + unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL; + + addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL); + err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr); + if (err) + break; + + regs->r27 = r27; + regs->pc = r27; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ + unsigned int ldah, lda, br; + + err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4)); + err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U && + (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U && + (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U) + { + unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL; + unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16; + unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL; + + regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL); + regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2); + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */ + unsigned int br; + + err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc); + + if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) { + unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp; + unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver; + + addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2); + err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr); + err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12)); + err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16)); + + if (err) + break; + + if (br2 == 0xC3600000U && + ldq == 0xA77B000CU && + nop == 0x47FF041FU && + jmp == 0x6B7B0000U) + { + regs->r28 = regs->pc+4; + regs->r27 = addr+16; + regs->pc = resolver; + return 3; + } + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif /* * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, @@ -125,7 +262,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns goto good_area; if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so @@ -133,8 +270,34 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns good_area: si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; if (cause < 0) { - if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc) + goto bad_area; + + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + case 2: + case 3: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 4: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp()); + do_exit(SIGKILL); +#else goto bad_area; +#endif + + } } else if (!cause) { /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */ if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE))) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ survive: goto survive; check_stack: - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr)) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr)) goto good_area; out: return fault; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp if (len > TASK_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + if (addr) { if (do_align) addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); @@ -88,8 +92,8 @@ full_search: * Start a new search - just in case we missed * some holes. */ - if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { - start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) { + start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base; goto full_search; } return -ENOMEM; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/arm26/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ survive: goto survive; check_stack: - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(vma, addr)) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN && !expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr)) goto good_area; out: return fault; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/cris/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, str if (address + PAGE_SIZE < rdusp()) goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ config X86_POPAD_OK config X86_ALIGNMENT_16 bool - depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 + depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 default y config X86_GOOD_APIC diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -598,19 +598,39 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call(u32 func, u32 eb int cpu; struct desc_struct save_desc_40; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long cr3; +#endif + cpus = apm_save_cpus(); - cpu = get_cpu(); - save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8]; - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC local_save_flags(flags); APM_DO_CLI; +#endif + APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS; apm_bios_call_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi); APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS; + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC local_irq_restore(flags); - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; +#endif + + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + put_cpu(); apm_restore_cpus(cpus); @@ -640,20 +660,39 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call_simple(u32 func, int cpu; struct desc_struct save_desc_40; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long cr3; +#endif cpus = apm_save_cpus(); - cpu = get_cpu(); - save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8]; - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC local_save_flags(flags); APM_DO_CLI; +#endif + APM_DO_SAVE_SEGS; error = apm_bios_call_simple_asm(func, ebx_in, ecx_in, eax); APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS; + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC local_irq_restore(flags); - __get_cpu_var(cpu_gdt_table)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; +#endif + + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + put_cpu(); apm_restore_cpus(cpus); return error; @@ -2294,35 +2333,35 @@ static int __init apm_init(void) apm_bios_entry.segment = APM_CS; for (i = 0; i < NR_CPUS; i++) { - set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], + set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg << 4)); - set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3], + set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3], __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.cseg_16 << 4)); - set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3], + set_base(cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3], __va((unsigned long)apm_info.bios.dseg << 4)); #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS if (apm_info.bios.version == 0x100) { #endif /* For ASUS motherboard, Award BIOS rev 110 (and others?) */ - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); /* For some unknown machine. */ - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); /* For the DEC Hinote Ultra CT475 (and others?) */ - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3], 64 * 1024 - 1); #ifndef APM_RELAX_SEGMENTS } else { - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], (apm_info.bios.cseg_len - 1) & 0xffff); - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS_16 >> 3], + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS_16 >> 3], (apm_info.bios.cseg_16_len - 1) & 0xffff); - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3], + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3], (apm_info.bios.dseg_len - 1) & 0xffff); /* workaround for broken BIOSes */ if (apm_info.bios.cseg_len <= apm_info.bios.offset) - _set_limit((char *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 -1); + _set_limit((char *)&cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_CS >> 3], 64 * 1024 -1); if (apm_info.bios.dseg_len <= 0x40) { /* 0x40 * 4kB == 64kB */ /* for the BIOS that assumes granularity = 1 */ - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, i)[APM_DS >> 3].b |= 0x800000; + cpu_gdt_table[i][APM_DS >> 3].b |= 0x800000; printk(KERN_NOTICE "apm: we set the granularity of dseg.\n"); } } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -18,8 +17,7 @@ #include "cpu.h" -DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct desc_struct, cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES]); -EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_gdt_table); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_gdt_table); static int cachesize_override __initdata = -1; static int disable_x86_fxsr __initdata = 0; @@ -369,6 +367,10 @@ void __init identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_ if (this_cpu->c_init) this_cpu->c_init(c); +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL) + clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability); +#endif + /* Disable the PN if appropriate */ squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c); @@ -555,7 +557,7 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void) void __init cpu_init (void) { int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu; struct thread_struct *thread = ¤t->thread; if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized)) { @@ -577,17 +579,16 @@ void __init cpu_init (void) * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT, * and set up the GDT descriptor: */ - memcpy(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu), cpu_gdt_table, - GDT_SIZE); - cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE - 1; - cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address = - (unsigned long)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu); + if (cpu) { + memcpy(cpu_gdt_table[cpu], cpu_gdt_table[0], GDT_SIZE); + cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE - 1; + cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address = (unsigned long)cpu_gdt_table[cpu]; + } /* * Set up the per-thread TLS descriptor cache: */ - memcpy(thread->tls_array, &per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu), - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8); + memcpy(thread->tls_array, cpu_gdt_table[cpu], GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8); __asm__ __volatile__("lgdt %0" : : "m" (cpu_gdt_descr[cpu])); __asm__ __volatile__("lidt %0" : : "m" (idt_descr)); @@ -609,7 +610,7 @@ void __init cpu_init (void) load_esp0(t, thread); set_tss_desc(cpu,t); load_TR_desc(); - load_LDT(&init_mm.context); + _load_LDT(&init_mm.context); /* Set up doublefault TSS pointer in the GDT */ __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_DOUBLEFAULT_TSS, &doublefault_tss); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -229,6 +229,15 @@ sysenter_past_esp: movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx jne syscall_exit_work + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK + pushl %eax + call pax_randomize_kstack + popl %eax +#endif + + xorl %ebp,%ebp /* prevent info leak */ + /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */ movl EIP(%esp), %edx movl OLDESP(%esp), %ecx @@ -257,6 +266,11 @@ syscall_exit: movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx # current->work jne syscall_exit_work + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK + call pax_randomize_kstack +#endif + restore_all: RESTORE_ALL @@ -571,7 +585,7 @@ ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug) pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug jmp error_code -.data +.section .rodata,"a",@progbits ENTRY(sys_call_table) .long sys_restart_syscall /* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */ .long sys_exit diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -48,6 +48,12 @@ /* + * Real beginning of normal "text" segment + */ +ENTRY(stext) +ENTRY(_stext) + +/* * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU. On entry, * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer. * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on @@ -78,6 +84,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_32) shrl $2,%ecx rep ; stosl +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + movl $ __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET,%eax + movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 2) + rorl $16,%eax + movb %al,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 4) + movb %ah,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 7) + + movb %al,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 4) + movb %ah,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 7) + rorl $16,%eax + movw %ax,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 2) +#endif + /* * Initialize page tables. This creates a PDE and a set of page * tables, which are located immediately beyond _end. The variable @@ -88,24 +107,42 @@ ENTRY(startup_32) * Warning: don't use %esi or the stack in this code. However, %esp * can be used as a GPR if you really need it... */ -page_pde_offset = (__PAGE_OFFSET >> 20); - +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE +page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 21) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE)); +#else +page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 22) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE)); +#endif movl $(pg0 - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edi +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + movl $(swapper_pm_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx +#else movl $(swapper_pg_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx - movl $0x007, %eax /* 0x007 = PRESENT+RW+USER */ +#endif + movl $0x063, %eax /* 0x063 = DIRTY+ACCESSED+PRESENT+RW */ 10: - leal 0x007(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */ + leal 0x063(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */ movl %ecx,(%edx) /* Store identity PDE entry */ movl %ecx,page_pde_offset(%edx) /* Store kernel PDE entry */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + movl $0,4(%edx) + movl $0,page_pde_offset+4(%edx) + addl $8,%edx + movl $512, %ecx +#else addl $4,%edx movl $1024, %ecx +#endif 11: stosl +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + movl $0,(%edi) + addl $4,%edi +#endif addl $0x1000,%eax loop 11b /* End condition: we must map up to and including INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END */ - /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x007 is the attribute bits */ - leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x007)(%edi),%ebp + /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x063 is the attribute bits */ + leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x063)(%edi),%ebp cmpl %ebp,%eax jb 10b movl %edi,(init_pg_tables_end - __PAGE_OFFSET) @@ -128,6 +165,11 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp) movl %eax,%fs movl %eax,%gs + /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */ + xorl %ebx,%ebx + incl %ebx +#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ + /* * New page tables may be in 4Mbyte page mode and may * be using the global pages. @@ -143,26 +185,27 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp) * not yet offset PAGE_OFFSET.. */ #define cr4_bits mmu_cr4_features-__PAGE_OFFSET +3: movl cr4_bits,%edx andl %edx,%edx - jz 6f + jz 5f movl %cr4,%eax # Turn on paging options (PSE,PAE,..) orl %edx,%eax movl %eax,%cr4 - btl $5, %eax # check if PAE is enabled - jnc 6f +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + movl %ebx,%edi /* Check if extended functions are implemented */ movl $0x80000000, %eax cpuid cmpl $0x80000000, %eax - jbe 6f + jbe 4f mov $0x80000001, %eax cpuid /* Execute Disable bit supported? */ btl $20, %edx - jnc 6f + jnc 4f /* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */ movl $0xc0000080, %ecx @@ -172,13 +215,10 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp) /* Make changes effective */ wrmsr -6: - /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */ - xorl %ebx,%ebx - incl %ebx - -3: -#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ +4: + movl %edi,%ebx +#endif +5: /* * Enable paging @@ -203,9 +243,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp) #ifdef CONFIG_SMP andl %ebx,%ebx - jz 1f /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */ - jmp checkCPUtype -1: + jnz checkCPUtype /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */ #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ /* @@ -402,32 +440,74 @@ ignore_int: popl %eax iret -/* - * Real beginning of normal "text" segment - */ -ENTRY(stext) -ENTRY(_stext) - -/* - * BSS section - */ -.section ".bss.page_aligned","w" +.section .data.swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + .long swapper_pm_dir-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long swapper_pm_dir+512*8-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long swapper_pm_dir+512*16-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long swapper_pm_dir+512*24-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 +#else + .fill 1024,4,0 +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC +ENTRY(kernexec_pg_dir) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + .long kernexec_pm_dir-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*8-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*16-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 + .long kernexec_pm_dir+512*24-__PAGE_OFFSET+1 + .long 0 +#else .fill 1024,4,0 +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE +.section .data.swapper_pm_dir,"a",@progbits +ENTRY(swapper_pm_dir) + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC +ENTRY(kernexec_pm_dir) + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 + .fill 512,8,0 +#endif +#endif + +.section .rodata.empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits ENTRY(empty_zero_page) .fill 4096,1,0 /* - * This starts the data section. - */ -.data + * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium + * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment + * for this. + */ +.section .rodata.idt,"a",@progbits +ENTRY(idt_table) + .fill 256,8,0 + +.section .rodata,"a",@progbits +ready: .byte 0 ENTRY(stack_start) .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE .long __BOOT_DS -ready: .byte 0 - int_msg: .asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n" @@ -469,8 +549,8 @@ cpu_gdt_descr: .align L1_CACHE_BYTES ENTRY(boot_gdt_table) .fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0 - .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ - .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ /* * The Global Descriptor Table contains 28 quadwords, per-CPU. @@ -489,28 +569,27 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table) .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x4b reserved */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x53 reserved */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x5b reserved */ - - .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ - .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ - .quad 0x00cffa000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ - .quad 0x00cff2000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cffb000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */ + .quad 0x00cff3000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x80 TSS descriptor */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x88 LDT descriptor */ /* Segments used for calling PnP BIOS */ - .quad 0x00c09a0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */ - .quad 0x00809a0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */ - .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */ - .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */ - .quad 0x0080920000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */ + .quad 0x00c09b0000000000 /* 0x90 32-bit code */ + .quad 0x00809b0000000000 /* 0x98 16-bit code */ + .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa0 16-bit data */ + .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */ + .quad 0x0080930000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */ /* * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases * and limits are set at run time. */ - .quad 0x00409a0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */ - .quad 0x00009a0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */ - .quad 0x0040920000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */ + .quad 0x00409b0000000000 /* 0xb8 APM CS code */ + .quad 0x00009b0000000000 /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */ + .quad 0x0040930000000000 /* 0xc8 APM DS data */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd0 - unused */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd8 - unused */ @@ -519,3 +598,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table) .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf0 - unused */ .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf8 - GDT entry 31: double-fault TSS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + .fill (NR_CPUS-1)*GDT_ENTRIES,8,0 /* other CPU's GDT */ +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -42,5 +42,4 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task); * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux, * no more per-task TSS's. */ -DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss) ____cacheline_maxaligned_in_smp = INIT_TSS; - +struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_maxaligned_in_smp = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INIT_TSS }; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */ static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base, unsigned int extent, int new_value) @@ -63,9 +64,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS)) return -EINVAL; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + if (turn_on) { + gr_handle_ioperm(); +#else if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) +#endif return -EPERM; - +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + } +#endif /* * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(), @@ -87,7 +95,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long * because the ->io_bitmap_max value must match the bitmap * contents: */ - tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu()); + tss = init_tss + get_cpu(); set_bitmap(t->io_bitmap_ptr, from, num, !turn_on); @@ -137,8 +145,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_iopl(unsigned long u return -EINVAL; /* Trying to gain more privileges? */ if (level > old) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO + gr_handle_iopl(); + return -EPERM; +#else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) return -EPERM; +#endif } regs->eflags = (regs->eflags &~ 0x3000UL) | (level << 12); /* Make sure we return the long way (not sysenter) */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -113,10 +113,10 @@ fastcall unsigned int do_IRQ(struct pt_r * gcc's 3.0 and earlier don't handle that correctly. */ static char softirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE] - __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE))); + __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned"))); static char hardirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE] - __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE))); + __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned"))); /* * allocate per-cpu stacks for hardirq and for softirq processing diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -102,6 +102,19 @@ int init_new_context(struct task_struct retval = copy_ldt(&mm->context, &old_mm->context); up(&old_mm->context.sem); } + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (!mm->context.user_cs_limit) { + mm->context.user_cs_base = 0UL; + mm->context.user_cs_limit = ~0UL; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP) + cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); +#endif + + } +#endif + return retval; } @@ -159,7 +172,7 @@ static int read_default_ldt(void __user { int err; unsigned long size; - void *address; + const void *address; err = 0; address = &default_ldt[0]; @@ -216,6 +229,13 @@ static int write_ldt(void __user * ptr, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & 2)) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } +#endif + entry_1 = LDT_entry_a(&ldt_info); entry_2 = LDT_entry_b(&ldt_info); if (oldmode) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ void exit_thread(void) /* The process may have allocated an io port bitmap... nuke it. */ if (unlikely(NULL != t->io_bitmap_ptr)) { int cpu = get_cpu(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu; kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr); t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL; @@ -345,6 +345,9 @@ void flush_thread(void) { struct task_struct *tsk = current; + __asm__("movl %0,%%fs\n" + "movl %0,%%gs\n" + : : "r" (0) : "memory"); memset(tsk->thread.debugreg, 0, sizeof(unsigned long)*8); memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array)); /* @@ -387,7 +390,7 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl struct task_struct *tsk; int err; - childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info)) - 1; + childregs = ((struct pt_regs *) (THREAD_SIZE + (unsigned long) p->thread_info - sizeof(unsigned long))) - 1; *childregs = *regs; childregs->eax = 0; childregs->esp = esp; @@ -492,9 +495,8 @@ void dump_thread(struct pt_regs * regs, int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *tsk, elf_gregset_t *regs) { struct pt_regs ptregs; - - ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *) - ((unsigned long)tsk->thread_info+THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(ptregs)); + + ptregs = *(struct pt_regs *)(tsk->thread.esp0 - sizeof(ptregs)); ptregs.xcs &= 0xffff; ptregs.xds &= 0xffff; ptregs.xes &= 0xffff; @@ -576,12 +578,20 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread, *next = &next_p->thread; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long flags, cr3; +#endif /* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */ __unlazy_fpu(prev_p); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + /* * Reload esp0, LDT and the page table pointer: */ @@ -592,6 +602,10 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t */ load_TLS(next, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + /* * Save away %fs and %gs. No need to save %es and %ds, as * those are always kernel segments while inside the kernel. @@ -740,6 +754,10 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc struct desc_struct *desc; int cpu, idx; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long flags, cr3; +#endif + if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info))) return -EFAULT; idx = info.entry_number; @@ -773,8 +791,17 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info); desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + load_TLS(t, cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + put_cpu(); return 0; @@ -828,3 +855,29 @@ asmlinkage int sys_get_thread_area(struc return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK +asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void) +{ + struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id(); + unsigned long time; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (!pax_aslr) + return; +#endif + + rdtscl(time); + + /* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */ +#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4 + time &= 0x3EUL; + time <<= 1; +#else + time &= 0x1FUL; + time <<= 2; +#endif + + tss->esp0 ^= time; + current->thread.esp0 = tss->esp0; +} +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -384,6 +385,9 @@ asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; @@ -462,6 +466,17 @@ asmlinkage int sys_ptrace(long request, if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[5]) break; if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] && ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] && + addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){ + long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2; + long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3; + long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3; + if((type & 1) && (data & align)) + break; + } +#endif /* Sanity-check data. Take one half-byte at once with * check = (val >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf. It contains the diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -152,18 +152,18 @@ core_initcall(reboot_init); doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard. It is easy to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */ -static unsigned long long +static const unsigned long long real_mode_gdt_entries [3] = { 0x0000000000000000ULL, /* Null descriptor */ - 0x00009a000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */ - 0x000092000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */ + 0x00009b000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */ + 0x000093000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */ }; static struct { unsigned short size __attribute__ ((packed)); - unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed)); + const unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed)); } real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, real_mode_gdt_entries }, real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, NULL }, diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -73,7 +73,11 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data __initda /* common cpu data for all cpus */ struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data = { 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 1, 0, 0, -1 }; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE +unsigned long mmu_cr4_features = X86_CR4_PAE; +#else unsigned long mmu_cr4_features; +#endif EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmu_cr4_features); #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_INTERPRETER @@ -1411,7 +1415,7 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text); code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext)-1; - data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_etext); + data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_data); data_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_edata)-1; parse_cmdline_early(cmdline_p); @@ -1481,6 +1485,15 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) #endif } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE +static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str) +{ + get_option (&str, &pax_softmode); + return 1; +} +__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode); +#endif + #include "setup_arch_post.h" /* * Local Variables: diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -380,7 +380,17 @@ static void setup_frame(int sig, struct goto give_sigsegv; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL + restorer = frame->retcode; +#else restorer = &__kernel_sigreturn; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif +#endif + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; @@ -475,7 +485,18 @@ static void setup_rt_frame(int sig, stru goto give_sigsegv; /* Set up to return from userspace. */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL + restorer = frame->retcode; +#else restorer = &__kernel_rt_sigreturn; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif +#endif + if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer; err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ static inline long do_mmap2( int error = -EBADF; struct file * file = NULL; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); @@ -106,6 +111,182 @@ out: return err; } +unsigned long +arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long start_addr, start_mmap, task_size = TASK_SIZE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif + + if (len > task_size) + return -ENOMEM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + + if (addr) { + addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr); + vma = find_vma(mm, addr); + if (task_size - len >= addr && + (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start)) + return addr; + } + start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache; + start_mmap = PAGE_ALIGN(task_size/3); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + start_mmap += mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + + if (!(flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr < start_mmap) + start_addr = addr = start_mmap; + else if ((flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr >= start_mmap) + start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base; + +full_search: + for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) { + /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */ + if (task_size - len < addr) { + /* + * Start a new search - just in case we missed + * some holes. + */ + if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) { + start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base; + goto full_search; + } + return -ENOMEM; + } + if (!vma || (addr + len <= vma->vm_start && (addr + len <= mm->start_brk || start_mmap <= addr))) { + /* + * Remember the place where we stopped the search: + */ + mm->free_area_cache = addr + len; + return addr; + } + if (addr < start_mmap && addr + len > mm->start_brk) { + addr = start_mmap; + goto full_search; + } else + addr = vma->vm_end; + } +} + +unsigned long +arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0, + const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff, + const unsigned long flags) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0, task_size = TASK_SIZE; + int first_time = 1; + + if (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) { + mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + + mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base; + addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags); + mm->free_area_cache = base; + mm->mmap_base = base; + return addr; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif + + /* requested length too big for entire address space */ + if (len > task_size) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* dont allow allocations above current base */ + if (mm->free_area_cache > base) + mm->free_area_cache = base; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + + /* requesting a specific address */ + if (addr) { + addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr); + vma = find_vma(mm, addr); + if (task_size - len >= addr && + (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start)) + return addr; + } + +try_again: + /* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */ + if (mm->free_area_cache < len) + goto fail; + + /* either no address requested or cant fit in requested address hole */ + addr = (mm->free_area_cache - len) & PAGE_MASK; + do { + /* + * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address, + * i.e. return with success: + */ + if (!(vma = find_vma(mm, addr))) + return addr; + + /* + * new region fits between prev_vma->vm_end and + * vma->vm_start, use it: + */ + if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start) + /* remember the address as a hint for next time */ + return (mm->free_area_cache = addr); + else + /* pull free_area_cache down to the first hole */ + if (mm->free_area_cache == vma->vm_end) + mm->free_area_cache = vma->vm_start; + + /* try just below the current vma->vm_start */ + addr = vma->vm_start-len; + } while (len <= vma->vm_start); + +fail: + /* + * if hint left us with no space for the requested + * mapping then try again: + */ + if (first_time) { + mm->free_area_cache = base; + first_time = 0; + goto try_again; + } + /* + * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure, + * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario + * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap() + * allocations. + */ + mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags); + /* + * Restore the topdown base: + */ + mm->free_area_cache = base; + + return addr; +} struct sel_arg_struct { unsigned long n; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ extern asmlinkage void sysenter_entry(vo void enable_sep_cpu(void *info) { int cpu = get_cpu(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu; tss->ss1 = __KERNEL_CS; tss->esp1 = sizeof(struct tss_struct) + (unsigned long) tss; @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ void enable_sep_cpu(void *info) extern const char vsyscall_int80_start, vsyscall_int80_end; extern const char vsyscall_sysenter_start, vsyscall_sysenter_end; +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL static int __init sysenter_setup(void) { void *page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -63,3 +64,4 @@ static int __init sysenter_setup(void) } __initcall(sysenter_setup); +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_EISA #include @@ -58,18 +59,13 @@ asmlinkage int system_call(void); -struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, +const struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 } }; /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */ char ignore_fpu_irq = 0; -/* - * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium - * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment - * for this. - */ -struct desc_struct idt_table[256] __attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { {0, 0}, }; +extern struct desc_struct idt_table[256]; asmlinkage void divide_error(void); asmlinkage void debug(void); @@ -115,6 +111,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex unsigned long *stack, unsigned long ebp) { unsigned long addr; + int i = kstack_depth_to_print; #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, (void *)ebp)) { @@ -123,6 +120,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex print_symbol("%s", addr); printk("\n"); ebp = *(unsigned long *)ebp; + --i; } #else while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, stack)) { @@ -131,6 +129,7 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex printk(" [<%08lx>]", addr); print_symbol(" %s", addr); printk("\n"); + --i; } } #endif @@ -240,7 +239,7 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs printk("Code: "); - eip = (u8 *)regs->eip - 43; + eip = (u8 *)regs->eip - 43 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; for (i = 0; i < 64; i++, eip++) { unsigned char c; @@ -268,7 +267,7 @@ static void handle_BUG(struct pt_regs *r if (regs->xcs & 3) goto no_bug; /* Not in kernel */ - eip = regs->eip; + eip = regs->eip + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET) goto no_bug; @@ -456,7 +455,7 @@ DO_ERROR_INFO(17, SIGBUS, "alignment che fastcall void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs * regs, long error_code) { int cpu = get_cpu(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct *tss = &init_tss[cpu]; struct thread_struct *thread = ¤t->thread; /* @@ -491,6 +490,24 @@ fastcall void do_general_protection(stru if (!(regs->xcs & 3)) goto gp_in_kernel; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (current->mm) { + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + unsigned long limit; + + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) { + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit; + if (limit < TASK_SIZE) { + track_exec_limit(mm, limit, TASK_SIZE, PROT_EXEC); + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + return; + } + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + } + } +#endif + current->thread.error_code = error_code; current->thread.trap_no = 13; force_sig(SIGSEGV, current); @@ -506,6 +523,13 @@ gp_in_kernel: if (notify_die(DIE_GPF, "general protection fault", regs, error_code, 13, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP) return; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS) + die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code); + else +#endif + die("general protection fault", regs, error_code); } } @@ -932,6 +956,8 @@ asmlinkage void math_emulate(long arg) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG void __init trap_init_f00f_bug(void) { + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC __set_fixmap(FIX_F00F_IDT, __pa(&idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO); /* @@ -940,6 +966,8 @@ void __init trap_init_f00f_bug(void) */ idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT); __asm__ __volatile__("lidt %0" : : "m" (idt_descr)); +#endif + } #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct pt_regs * fastcall save_v86_state do_exit(SIGSEGV); } - tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu()); + tss = init_tss + get_cpu(); current->thread.esp0 = current->thread.saved_esp0; current->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS; load_esp0(tss, ¤t->thread); @@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm asm volatile("movl %%fs,%0":"=m" (tsk->thread.saved_fs)); asm volatile("movl %%gs,%0":"=m" (tsk->thread.saved_gs)); - tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu()); + tss = init_tss + get_cpu(); tsk->thread.esp0 = (unsigned long) &info->VM86_TSS_ESP0; if (cpu_has_sep) tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = 0; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -2,9 +2,12 @@ * Written by Martin Mares ; */ +#include + #include #include #include +#include OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386") OUTPUT_ARCH(i386) @@ -13,56 +16,15 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64; SECTIONS { . = __PAGE_OFFSET + 0x100000; - /* read-only */ - _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ - .text : { - *(.text) - SCHED_TEXT - LOCK_TEXT - *(.fixup) - *(.gnu.warning) - } = 0x9090 - - _etext = .; /* End of text section */ - - . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */ - __start___ex_table = .; - __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } - __stop___ex_table = .; - - RODATA - - /* writeable */ - .data : { /* Data */ - *(.data) - CONSTRUCTORS + .text.startup : { + BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */ + LONG(startup_32 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - __PAGE_OFFSET) + SHORT(__BOOT_CS) } - . = ALIGN(4096); - __nosave_begin = .; - .data_nosave : { *(.data.nosave) } - . = ALIGN(4096); - __nosave_end = .; - - . = ALIGN(4096); - .data.page_aligned : { *(.data.idt) } - - . = ALIGN(32); - .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) } - - _edata = .; /* End of data section */ - - . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */ - .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) } - /* will be freed after init */ . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */ __init_begin = .; - .init.text : { - _sinittext = .; - *(.init.text) - _einittext = .; - } .init.data : { *(.init.data) } . = ALIGN(16); __setup_start = .; @@ -88,9 +50,13 @@ SECTIONS .altinstructions : { *(.altinstructions) } __alt_instructions_end = .; .altinstr_replacement : { *(.altinstr_replacement) } + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */ .exit.text : { *(.exit.text) } +#endif + .exit.data : { *(.exit.data) } . = ALIGN(4096); __initramfs_start = .; @@ -100,15 +66,107 @@ SECTIONS __per_cpu_start = .; .data.percpu : { *(.data.percpu) } __per_cpu_end = .; + + /* read-only */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + __init_text_start = .; + .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT (__init_text_start) { + _sinittext = .; + *(.init.text) + _einittext = .; + *(.exit.text) + . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024) - 1; + BYTE(0) + } + . = ALIGN(4096); + __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; + /* freed after init ends here */ + +/* + * PaX: this must be kept in synch with the KERNEL_CS base + * in the GDTs in arch/i386/kernel/head.S + */ + _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ + .text : AT (. + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) { +#else + .init.text : { + _sinittext = .; + *(.init.text) + _einittext = .; + } . = ALIGN(4096); __init_end = .; /* freed after init ends here */ - + + _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */ + .text : { +#endif + + *(.text) + SCHED_TEXT + LOCK_TEXT + *(.fixup) + *(.gnu.warning) + } = 0x9090 + + _etext = .; /* End of text section */ + . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; + . = ALIGN(4096); /* Exception table */ + __start___ex_table = .; + __ex_table : { *(__ex_table) } + __stop___ex_table = .; + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .rodata.page_aligned : { + *(.rodata.empty_zero_page) + *(.rodata.idt) + } + + RODATA + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + . = ALIGN(4*1024*1024); +#else + . = ALIGN(32); +#endif + + /* writeable */ + _data = .; + .data : { /* Data */ + *(.data) + CONSTRUCTORS + } + + . = ALIGN(4096); + __nosave_begin = .; + .data_nosave : { *(.data.nosave) } + . = ALIGN(4096); + __nosave_end = .; + + . = ALIGN(32); + .data.cacheline_aligned : { *(.data.cacheline_aligned) } + + . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */ + .data.init_task : { *(.data.init_task) } + + . = ALIGN(4096); + .data.page_aligned : { + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + *(.data.swapper_pm_dir) +#endif + + *(.data.swapper_pg_dir) + } + + _edata = .; /* End of data section */ + __bss_start = .; /* BSS */ .bss : { *(.bss.page_aligned) *(.bss) - } + } . = ALIGN(4); __bss_stop = .; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ #include /* For unblank_screen() */ #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_ /* Unlikely, but must come before segment checks. */ if (unlikely((regs->eflags & VM_MASK) != 0)) - return eip + (seg << 4); + return (eip & 0xFFFF) + (seg << 4); /* By far the most common cases. */ if (likely(seg == __USER_CS || seg == __KERNEL_CS)) @@ -107,7 +110,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_ desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7); } else { /* Must disable preemption while reading the GDT. */ - desc = (u32 *)&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, get_cpu()); + desc = (u32 *)&cpu_gdt_table[get_cpu()]; desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7); } @@ -201,6 +204,31 @@ static inline int is_prefetch(struct pt_ fastcall void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long); +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */ +static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address) +{ + pgd_t *pgd; + pud_t *pud; + pmd_t *pmd; + + pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address); + if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd)) + return 0; + pud = pud_offset(pgd, address); + if (!pud || !pud_present(*pud)) + return 0; + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address); + if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd)) + return 0; + return pte_offset_map(pmd, address); +} +#endif + /* * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate @@ -217,10 +245,14 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re struct mm_struct *mm; struct vm_area_struct * vma; unsigned long address; - unsigned long page; int write; siginfo_t info; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + pte_t *pte; + unsigned char pte_mask1, pte_mask2; +#endif + /* get the address */ __asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address)); @@ -232,6 +264,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re local_irq_enable(); tsk = current; + mm = tsk->mm; info.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR; @@ -258,14 +291,99 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re goto bad_area_nosemaphore; } - mm = tsk->mm; - /* * If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running in an * atomic region then we must not take the fault.. */ if (in_atomic() || !mm) - goto bad_area_nosemaphore; + goto bad_area_nopax; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (unlikely((error_code & 5) != 5 || + (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) || + !(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))) + goto not_pax_fault; + + /* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */ + + /* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */ + if (unlikely(!(error_code & 2) && (regs->eip == address))) { + /* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */ + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 3: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } + + spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); + pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address); + if (unlikely(!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte))) { + pte_unmap(pte); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + goto not_pax_fault; + } + + if (unlikely((error_code & 2) && !pte_write(*pte))) { + /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */ + pte_unmap(pte); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + goto not_pax_fault; + } + + pte_mask1 = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1)); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + if (likely(cpu_isset(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask)) && address >= get_limit(regs->xcs)) + pte_mask2 = 0; + else + pte_mask2 = _PAGE_USER; +#else + pte_mask2 = (address >= get_limit(regs->xcs)) ? 0 : _PAGE_USER; +#endif + + /* + * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry + */ + __asm__ __volatile__ ( + "orb %2,%1\n" +#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC) +/* + * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's + * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any* + * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only + * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will + * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write + * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs + * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all. + + * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the + * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we + * can no longer flush unintended entries. + */ + "invlpg %0\n" +#endif + "testb $0,%0\n" + "xorb %3,%1\n" + : + : "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte), "q" (pte_mask1), "q" (pte_mask2) + : "memory", "cc"); + pte_unmap(pte); + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + return; + +not_pax_fault: +#endif /* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to * addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in the @@ -285,7 +403,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) { if ((error_code & 4) == 0 && !search_exception_tables(regs->eip)) - goto bad_area_nosemaphore; + goto bad_area_nopax; down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); } @@ -306,7 +424,7 @@ fastcall void do_page_fault(struct pt_re if (address + 32 < regs->esp) goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so @@ -374,6 +492,45 @@ bad_area: up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); bad_area_nosemaphore: + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (mm && (error_code & 4) && !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip == address)) { + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) { + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 3: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } +#endif + + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + + } +#endif + +bad_area_nopax: /* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */ if (error_code & 4) { /* @@ -441,28 +598,52 @@ no_context: #endif if (address < PAGE_SIZE) printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + else if (init_mm.start_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET <= address && + address < init_mm.end_code + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) + if (tsk->curr_ip) + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code", + NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid); + else + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code", + tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid); +#endif + else printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request"); printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address); printk(KERN_ALERT " printing eip:\n"); printk("%08lx\n", regs->eip); - asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (page)); - page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> 22]; - printk(KERN_ALERT "*pde = %08lx\n", page); - /* - * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte - * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem. - * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case - * it's allocated already. - */ + { + unsigned long index = pgd_index(address); + unsigned long pgd_paddr; + pgd_t *pgd; + pud_t *pud; + pmd_t *pmd; + pte_t *pte; + + asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (pgd_paddr)); + pgd = index + (pgd_t *)__va(pgd_paddr); + printk(KERN_ALERT "*pgd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pgd), (unsigned long long)pgd_val(*pgd)); + if (pgd_present(*pgd)) { + pud = pud_offset(pgd, address); + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address); + printk(KERN_ALERT "*pmd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pmd), (unsigned long long)pmd_val(*pmd)); + /* + * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte + * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem. + * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case + * it's allocated already. + */ #ifndef CONFIG_HIGHPTE - if (page & 1) { - page &= PAGE_MASK; - address &= 0x003ff000; - page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> PAGE_SHIFT]; - printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %08lx\n", page); - } + if (pmd_present(*pmd) && !pmd_large(*pmd)) { + pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address); + printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pte), (unsigned long long)pte_val(*pte)); + } #endif + } + } die("Oops", regs, error_code); bust_spinlocks(0); do_exit(SIGKILL); @@ -513,7 +694,7 @@ vmalloc_fault: * Do _not_ use "tsk" here. We might be inside * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch.. */ - int index = pgd_index(address); + unsigned long index = pgd_index(address); unsigned long pgd_paddr; pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k; pud_t *pud, *pud_k; @@ -550,3 +731,255 @@ vmalloc_fault: return; } } + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when gcc trampoline was detected + * 3 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4}; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) + int err; +#endif + + if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) + return 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + unsigned long esp_4; + + if (regs->eip >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->eip < current->mm->end_code) + { + err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4UL)); + if (err || esp_4 == regs->eip) + return 1; + + regs->eip += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 3; + } + } +#endif + + if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)) + return 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */ + unsigned char mov1, mov2; + unsigned short jmp; + unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; + unsigned short call; + + err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); + err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); + err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); + err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10)); + err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); + + if (err) + break; + + err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2)); + if (err) + break; + + if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) && + (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF && + (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) && + (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF && + regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]) + { + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1; + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2; + regs->eip = addr2; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */ + unsigned char mov, jmp; + unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; + unsigned short call; + + err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); + err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); + err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); + err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); + + if (err) + break; + + err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2)); + if (err) + break; + + if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + jmp == 0xE9 && + (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF && + regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]) + { + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; + regs->eip += addr2 + 10; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #3 */ + unsigned char mov, jmp; + char offset; + unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; + unsigned short call; + + err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); + err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); + err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); + err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); + + if (err) + break; + + err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-3)); + err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1)); + if (err) + break; + + if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + jmp == 0xE9 && + call == 0x55FF) + { + unsigned long addr; + + err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->ebp + (unsigned long)(long)offset)); + if (err || regs->eip != addr) + break; + + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; + regs->eip += addr2 + 10; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #4 */ + unsigned char mov, jmp, sib; + char offset; + unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret; + unsigned short call; + + err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); + err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); + err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); + err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); + + if (err) + break; + + err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-4)); + err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-2)); + err |= get_user(offset, (char *)(ret-1)); + if (err) + break; + + if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + jmp == 0xE9 && + call == 0x54FF && + sib == 0x24) + { + unsigned long addr; + + err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + (unsigned long)(long)offset)); + if (err || regs->eip != addr) + break; + + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; + regs->eip += addr2 + 10; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #5 */ + unsigned char mov, jmp, sib; + unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret, offset; + unsigned short call; + + err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)regs->eip); + err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1)); + err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5)); + err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6)); + err |= get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)regs->esp); + + if (err) + break; + + err = get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-7)); + err |= get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(ret-5)); + err |= get_user(offset, (unsigned long *)(ret-4)); + if (err) + break; + + if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 && + jmp == 0xE9 && + call == 0x94FF && + sib == 0x24) + { + unsigned long addr; + + err = get_user(addr, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp + 4 + offset)); + if (err || regs->eip != addr) + break; + + ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1; + regs->eip += addr2 + 10; + return 2; + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; /* PaX in action */ +} +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + unsigned char c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%02x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP: "); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + unsigned long c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned long*)sp+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08lx ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include unsigned int __VMALLOC_RESERVE = 128 << 20; @@ -48,30 +49,6 @@ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn static int noinline do_test_wp_bit(void); /* - * Creates a middle page table and puts a pointer to it in the - * given global directory entry. This only returns the gd entry - * in non-PAE compilation mode, since the middle layer is folded. - */ -static pmd_t * __init one_md_table_init(pgd_t *pgd) -{ - pud_t *pud; - pmd_t *pmd_table; - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - pmd_table = (pmd_t *) alloc_bootmem_low_pages(PAGE_SIZE); - set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pmd_table) | _PAGE_PRESENT)); - pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0); - if (pmd_table != pmd_offset(pud, 0)) - BUG(); -#else - pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0); - pmd_table = pmd_offset(pud, 0); -#endif - - return pmd_table; -} - -/* * Create a page table and place a pointer to it in a middle page * directory entry. */ @@ -114,8 +91,6 @@ static void __init page_table_range_init pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx; for ( ; (pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD) && (vaddr != end); pgd++, pgd_idx++) { - if (pgd_none(*pgd)) - one_md_table_init(pgd); pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr); pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr); for (; (pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD) && (vaddr != end); pmd++, pmd_idx++) { @@ -144,6 +119,7 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi { unsigned long pfn; pgd_t *pgd; + pud_t *pud; pmd_t *pmd; pte_t *pte; int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs; @@ -153,7 +129,8 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi pfn = 0; for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD; pgd++, pgd_idx++) { - pmd = one_md_table_init(pgd); + pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0); + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0); if (pfn >= max_low_pfn) continue; for (pmd_idx = 0; pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD && pfn < max_low_pfn; pmd++, pmd_idx++) { @@ -312,13 +289,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void) unsigned long vaddr; pgd_t *pgd_base = swapper_pg_dir; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - int i; - /* Init entries of the first-level page table to the zero page */ - for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) - set_pgd(pgd_base + i, __pgd(__pa(empty_zero_page) | _PAGE_PRESENT)); -#endif - /* Enable PSE if available */ if (cpu_has_pse) { set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PSE); @@ -342,17 +312,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void) page_table_range_init(vaddr, 0, pgd_base); permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base); - -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - /* - * Add low memory identity-mappings - SMP needs it when - * starting up on an AP from real-mode. In the non-PAE - * case we already have these mappings through head.S. - * All user-space mappings are explicitly cleared after - * SMP startup. - */ - pgd_base[0] = pgd_base[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD]; -#endif } #if defined(CONFIG_PM_DISK) || defined(CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND) @@ -386,11 +345,7 @@ void zap_low_mappings (void) * us, because pgd_clear() is a no-op on i386. */ for (i = 0; i < USER_PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - set_pgd(swapper_pg_dir+i, __pgd(1 + __pa(empty_zero_page))); -#else set_pgd(swapper_pg_dir+i, __pgd(0)); -#endif flush_tlb_all(); } @@ -508,15 +463,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void) load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir); + __flush_tlb_all(); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - /* - * We will bail out later - printk doesn't work right now so - * the user would just see a hanging kernel. - */ - if (cpu_has_pae) - set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PAE); + memcpy(kernexec_pm_dir, swapper_pm_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pm_dir)); +#else + memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir)); +#endif + #endif - __flush_tlb_all(); kmap_init(); zone_sizes_init(); @@ -611,7 +568,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void) set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro); codesize = (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text; - datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext; + datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data; initsize = (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin; kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT); @@ -628,10 +585,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void) (unsigned long) (totalhigh_pages << (PAGE_SHIFT-10)) ); -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE - if (!cpu_has_pae) - panic("cannot execute a PAE-enabled kernel on a PAE-less CPU!"); -#endif if (boot_cpu_data.wp_works_ok < 0) test_wp_bit(); @@ -702,6 +655,46 @@ void free_initmem(void) { unsigned long addr; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + /* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */ + { + unsigned long limit; + int cpu; + pgd_t *pgd; + pud_t *pud; + pmd_t *pmd; + + limit = (unsigned long)&_etext >> PAGE_SHIFT; + for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) { + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL); + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b = (cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL); + } + + /* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */ + for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) { + pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); + pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr); + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); + set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)); + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE + memcpy(kernexec_pm_dir, swapper_pm_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pm_dir)); +#else + memcpy(kernexec_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir, sizeof(kernexec_pg_dir)); +#endif + + for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) { + pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr); + pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr); + pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr); + set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW)); + } + flush_tlb_all(); + } +#endif + + memset(__init_begin, 0, (unsigned long)&__init_end - (unsigned long)&__init_begin); addr = (unsigned long)(&__init_begin); for (; addr < (unsigned long)(&__init_end); addr += PAGE_SIZE) { ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr)); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -38,13 +38,19 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_base(struct mm_struct *mm) { unsigned long gap = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur; + unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif if (gap < MIN_GAP) gap = MIN_GAP; else if (gap > MAX_GAP) gap = MAX_GAP; - return TASK_SIZE - (gap & PAGE_MASK); + return task_size - (gap & PAGE_MASK); } /* @@ -61,10 +67,22 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) || current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) { mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area; mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area; } else { mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(mm); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown; mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/pci/pcbios.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ #include #include "pci.h" #include "pci-functions.h" - +#include /* BIOS32 signature: "_32_" */ #define BIOS32_SIGNATURE (('_' << 0) + ('3' << 8) + ('2' << 16) + ('_' << 24)) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -83,10 +83,9 @@ do_fpu_end(void) static void fix_processor_context(void) { int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu); + struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu; set_tss_desc(cpu,t); /* This just modifies memory; should not be necessary. But... This is necessary, because 386 hardware has concept of busy TSS or some similar stupidity. */ - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_TSS].b &= 0xfffffdff; load_TR_desc(); /* This does ltr */ load_LDT(¤t->active_mm->context); /* This does lldt */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ static void elf32_set_personality (void) #define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, have_pt_gnu_stack) (!(have_pt_gnu_stack)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 43 - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT) +#endif + /* Ugly but avoids duplication */ #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c" diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -326,10 +326,17 @@ struct old_linux32_dirent { #define ELF_ARCH EM_386 #define IA32_PAGE_OFFSET 0xc0000000 -#define IA32_STACK_TOP IA32_PAGE_OFFSET #define IA32_GATE_OFFSET IA32_PAGE_OFFSET #define IA32_GATE_END IA32_PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK +#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack) +#else +#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL +#endif + +#define IA32_STACK_TOP (IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK) + /* * The system segments (GDT, TSS, LDT) have to be mapped below 4GB so the IA-32 engine can * access them. diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -939,6 +939,11 @@ sys32_mmap (struct mmap_arg_struct __use flags = a.flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(a.fd); @@ -960,6 +965,11 @@ sys32_mmap2 (unsigned int addr, unsigned struct file *file = NULL; unsigned long retval; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -1424,6 +1425,9 @@ sys_ptrace (long request, pid_t pid, uns if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags) { long map_shared = (flags & MAP_SHARED); - unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1; + unsigned long start_addr, align_mask = PAGE_SIZE - 1, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct *vma; @@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == REGION_HPAGE) addr = 0; #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap; + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp) + addr = mm->free_area_cache; + else +#endif + if (!addr) addr = mm->free_area_cache; @@ -56,9 +65,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) { /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */ if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) { - if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { + if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) { /* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes. */ - addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + addr = task_unmapped_base; goto full_search; } return -ENOMEM; @@ -184,6 +193,11 @@ do_mmap2 (unsigned long addr, unsigned l unsigned long roff; struct file *file = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ expand_backing_store (struct vm_area_str if (address - vma->vm_start > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur || (((vma->vm_mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur)) return -ENOMEM; + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) && + ((vma->vm_mm->locked_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur && + !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) + return -ENOMEM; vma->vm_end += PAGE_SIZE; vma->vm_mm->total_vm += grow; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) @@ -75,6 +80,54 @@ mapped_kernel_page_is_present (unsigned return pte_present(pte); } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->cr_iip = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + int err; + + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->cr_iip >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->cr_iip < current->mm->end_code) + { +#if 0 + /* PaX: this needs fixing */ + if (regs->b0 == regs->cr_iip) + return 1; +#endif + regs->cr_iip += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 2; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + void ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs) { @@ -130,9 +183,31 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT) | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_R_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_READ_BIT)); - if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) + if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) { + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip) + goto bad_area; + + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->cr_iip, (void*)regs->r12); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + goto bad_area; + } + survive: /* * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make @@ -169,7 +244,7 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres if (REGION_NUMBER(address) != REGION_NUMBER(vma->vm_start) || REGION_OFFSET(address) >= RGN_MAP_LIMIT) goto bad_area; - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; } else { vma = prev_vma; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/m32r/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ goto bad_area; } #endif - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/m68k/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, if (address + 256 < rdusp()) goto map_err; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto map_err; /* diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#endif + #include #include #include diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#endif + #include #include #include diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -84,6 +84,11 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str do_color_align = 0; if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) do_color_align = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + if (addr) { if (do_color_align) addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); @@ -94,6 +99,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start)) return addr; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; + else +#endif + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; if (do_color_align) addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -26,6 +26,24 @@ #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +void pax_report_insns(void *pc) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + /* * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate @@ -75,7 +93,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ goto good_area; if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -114,6 +115,9 @@ long sys_ptrace(long request, pid_t pid, if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -104,6 +104,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str { if (len > TASK_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; + else +#endif + if (!addr) addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; @@ -123,6 +130,12 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap2(unsigned l { struct file * file = NULL; unsigned long error = -EBADF; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); if (!file) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -680,9 +680,7 @@ void handle_interruption(int code, struc down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]); - if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start) - && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { - + if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) { fault_address = regs->iaoq[0]; fault_space = regs->iasq[0]; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct exception_data, ex static unsigned long parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst) { - if (code == 6 || code == 16) + if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16) return VM_EXEC; switch (inst & 0xf0000000) { @@ -143,6 +145,139 @@ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsign } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected + * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected + * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP) + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (instruction_pointer(regs) >= current->mm->start_code && + instruction_pointer(regs) < current->mm->end_code) + { +#if 0 + /* PaX: this needs fixing */ + if ((regs->gr[2] & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs)) + return 1; +#endif + regs->iaoq[0] += current->mm->delta_exec; + if ((regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) >= current->mm->start_code && + (regs->iaoq[1] & ~3UL) < current->mm->end_code) + regs->iaoq[1] += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 4; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */ + unsigned int bl, depwi; + + err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs)); + err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4)); + + if (err) + break; + + if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) { + unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12; + + err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if (ldw == 0x0E801096U && + bv == 0xEAC0C000U && + ldw2 == 0x0E881095U) + { + unsigned int resolver, map; + + err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8)); + err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12)); + if (err) + break; + + regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8; + regs->gr[21] = map; + regs->gr[22] = resolver; + regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL; + regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4; + return 3; + } + } + } while (0); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT + if (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)) + return 1; +#endif + + do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */ + unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop; + + err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs)); + err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4)); + err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) && + ldi2 == 0x3414015AU && + bel == 0xE4008200U && + nop == 0x08000240U) + { + regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1; + regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn; + regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16; + regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1]; + regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL; + regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4; + regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2]; + regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2]; + return 2; + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code, unsigned long address) { @@ -168,8 +303,38 @@ good_area: acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir); - if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) + if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) && + (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs)) + { + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 4: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + case 3: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + goto bad_area; + } /* * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make @@ -199,7 +364,7 @@ good_area: check_expansion: vma = prev_vma; - if (vma && (expand_stack(vma, address) == 0)) + if (vma && (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address) == 0)) goto good_area; /* diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -267,6 +268,9 @@ int sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, l if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ do_mmap2(unsigned long addr, size_t len, struct file * file = NULL; int ret = -EBADF; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { if (!(file = fget(fd))) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -51,6 +56,363 @@ unsigned long pte_misses; /* updated by unsigned long pte_errors; /* updated by do_page_fault() */ unsigned int probingmem; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT +void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) +{ + vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL; +} + +static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) +{ + struct page* page; + unsigned int *kaddr; + + page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!page) + return NOPAGE_OOM; + + kaddr = kmap(page); + memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */ + __flush_dcache_icache(kaddr); + kunmap(page); + if (type) + *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; + return page; +} + +static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { + close: pax_syscall_close, + nopage: pax_syscall_nopage, +}; + +static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) +{ + memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma)); + vma->vm_mm = current->mm; + vma->vm_start = addr; + vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; + vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; + vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; + insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); + ++current->mm->total_vm; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected + * 3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected + * 4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected + * 5 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + * 6 when sigreturn trampoline was detected + * 7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->nip < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (regs->link == regs->nip) + return 1; + + regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 5; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */ + unsigned int blrl; + + err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip); + + if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) { + unsigned long temp = regs->nip; + + regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL; + regs->link = temp + 4UL; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ + unsigned int b; + + err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + + if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { + regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); + return 3; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */ + unsigned int li, b; + + err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); + + if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { + unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr; + unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; + + addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); + err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); + err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16)); + err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20)); + err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24)); + err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28)); + + if (err) + break; + + if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU && + add == 0x7D6C5A14U && + (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && + (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && + mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U && + (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && + (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && + bctr == 0x4E800420U) + { + regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; + regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; + regs->nip = regs->ctr; + return 4; + } + } + } while (0); + +#if 0 + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */ + unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr; + + err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); + err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8)); + err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && + (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU && + (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U && + bctr == 0x4E800420U) + { + unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr; + unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; + + addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); + err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); + err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16)); + err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20)); + err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24)); + err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28)); + err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32)); + err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U && + (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U && + rlwinm == 0x556C083CU && + add == 0x7D6C5A14U && + (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && + (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && + mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U && + (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U && + (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U && + bctr == 0x4E800420U) + { + regs->gpr[PT_R11] = + regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; + regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16; + regs->nip = regs->ctr; + return 4; + } + } + } while (0); +#endif + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */ + unsigned int li, b; + + err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); + + if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) { + unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr; + unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL; + + addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL); + err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U && + (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U && + mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U && + bctr == 0x4E800420U) + { + unsigned int r11; + + addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL); + + err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr); + if (err) + break; + + regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11; + regs->ctr = r11; + regs->nip = r11; + return 4; + } + } + } while (0); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT + do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */ + unsigned int li, sc; + + err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); + + if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) { + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long call_syscall; + + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (likely(call_syscall)) + goto emulate; + + vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (current->mm->call_syscall) { + call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + goto emulate; + } + + call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); + if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) { + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return 1; + } + + pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall); + current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + +emulate: + regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn; + regs->nip = call_syscall; + return 6; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */ + unsigned int li, sc; + + err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip); + err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4)); + + if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) { + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned int call_syscall; + + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (likely(call_syscall)) + goto rt_emulate; + + vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (current->mm->call_syscall) { + call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + goto rt_emulate; + } + + call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); + if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) { + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return 1; + } + + pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall); + current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + +rt_emulate: + regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn; + regs->nip = call_syscall; + return 7; + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + /* * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using * an update addressing form which will update r1. @@ -111,7 +473,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1. */ if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) - error_code &= 0x48200000; + error_code &= 0x58200000; else is_write = error_code & 0x02000000; #endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */ @@ -175,7 +537,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, && (!user_mode(regs) || !store_updates_sp(regs))) goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; good_area: @@ -205,15 +567,14 @@ good_area: } else if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) { pte_t *ptep; -#if 0 +#if 1 /* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions right, so we let any page be executed for now. */ if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) goto bad_area; -#endif - +#else /* Since 4xx/Book-E supports per-page execute permission, * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */ ptep = NULL; @@ -233,6 +594,7 @@ good_area: if (ptep != NULL) pte_unmap(ptep); #endif +#endif /* a read */ } else { /* protection fault */ @@ -278,6 +640,38 @@ bad_area: /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */ if (user_mode(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) { + if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) { + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + case 2: + case 3: + case 4: + return 0; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 5: + return 0; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT + case 6: + case 7: + return 0; +#endif + + } + + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } + } +#endif + info.si_signo = SIGSEGV; info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = code; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/kernel/syscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ unsigned long sys_mmap(unsigned long add struct file * file = NULL; unsigned long ret = -EBADF; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { if (!(file = fget(fd))) goto out; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/ppc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -76,6 +77,54 @@ static int store_updates_sp(struct pt_re return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->nip >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->nip < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (regs->link == regs->nip) + return 1; + + regs->nip += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 2; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + /* * The error_code parameter is * - DSISR for a non-SLB data access fault, @@ -193,7 +242,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; good_area: @@ -243,6 +292,25 @@ bad_area: bad_area_nosemaphore: /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */ if (user_mode(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) { + if ((regs->trap == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) { + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } + + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } + } +#endif + info.si_signo = SIGSEGV; info.si_errno = 0; info.si_code = code; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/s390/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ do_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsig goto good_area; if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sh/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ goto good_area; if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sh64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ #endif goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) { + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) { #ifdef DEBUG_FAULT print_task(tsk); printk("%s:%d fault, address is 0x%08x PC %016Lx textaccess %d writeaccess %d\n", diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ libs-y += arch/sparc/prom/ arch/sparc/li # Renaming is done to avoid confusing pattern matching rules in 2.5.45 (multy-) INIT_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(init-y)) CORE_Y := $(core-y) -CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ +CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ grsecurity/ CORE_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(CORE_Y)) DRIVERS_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(drivers-y)) NET_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(net-y)) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -322,6 +323,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs goto out; } + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) { + pt_error_return(regs, EPERM); + goto out_tsk; + } + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { if (ptrace_attach(child)) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str return -ENOMEM; if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000) return -ENOMEM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) + addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + current->mm->delta_mmap; + else +#endif + if (!addr) addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; @@ -227,6 +234,11 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap2(unsigned l struct file * file = NULL; unsigned long retval = -EBADF; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); if (!file) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sunos.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sunos_mmap(unsi struct file * file = NULL; unsigned long retval, ret_type; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { static int cnt; if (cnt++ < 10) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -220,6 +224,269 @@ static unsigned long compute_si_addr(str return safe_compute_effective_address(regs, insn); } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) +{ + vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; +} + +static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) +{ + struct page* page; + unsigned int *kaddr; + + page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!page) + return NOPAGE_OOM; + + kaddr = kmap(page); + memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */ + flush_dcache_page(page); + kunmap(page); + if (type) + *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; + + return page; +} + +static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { + close: pax_emuplt_close, + nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage, +}; + +static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) +{ + memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma)); + vma->vm_mm = current->mm; + vma->vm_start = addr; + vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; + vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; + vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; + insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); + ++current->mm->total_vm; +} + +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected + * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected + * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->pc < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->pc) + return 1; + + regs->pc += current->mm->delta_exec; + if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->npc < current->mm->end_code) + regs->npc += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 4; + } + if (regs->pc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && + regs->pc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) + { + regs->pc -= current->mm->delta_exec; + if (regs->npc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && + regs->npc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) + regs->npc -= current->mm->delta_exec; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ + unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl; + + err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U) + { + unsigned int addr; + + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]; + addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U); + regs->pc = addr; + regs->npc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ + unsigned int ba; + + err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); + + if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) { + unsigned int addr; + + addr = regs->pc + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2); + regs->pc = addr; + regs->npc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */ + unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned int addr; + + addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr; + addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U); + regs->pc = addr; + regs->npc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */ + unsigned int sethi, ba, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned int addr, save, call; + + if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) + addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2); + else + addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2); + + err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + if (err) + break; + + if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && + (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long call_dl_resolve; + + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (likely(call_dl_resolve)) + goto emulate; + + vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) { + call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + goto emulate; + } + + call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); + if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) { + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return 1; + } + + pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve); + current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + +emulate: + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->pc = call_dl_resolve; + regs->npc = addr+4; + return 3; + } + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */ + unsigned int save, call, nop; + + err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4)); + err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4)); + if (err) + break; + + if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && + (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2); + + regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc; + regs->pc = dl_resolve; + regs->npc = dl_resolve+4; + return 3; + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write, unsigned long address) { @@ -271,7 +538,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt goto good_area; if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if(expand_stack(vma, address)) + if(expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so @@ -283,6 +550,29 @@ good_area: if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) goto bad_area; } else { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + case 2: + case 3: + return; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 4: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */ if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC))) goto bad_area; @@ -525,7 +815,7 @@ inline void force_user_fault(unsigned lo goto good_area; if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) goto bad_area; - if(expand_stack(vma, address)) + if(expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; good_area: info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -337,17 +337,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void) /* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */ protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE; - protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY; - protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY; - protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY; + protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC; + protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC; + protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC; protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY; protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY; protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY; protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY; protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE; - protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY; - protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED; - protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED; + protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC; + protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC; + protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC; protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY; protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY; protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -2147,6 +2147,13 @@ void __init ld_mmu_srmmu(void) BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED)); BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY)); BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY)); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC)); + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC)); + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC)); +#endif + BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL)); page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL); pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -173,6 +174,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs goto out; } + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) { + pt_error_return(regs, EPERM); + goto out_tsk; + } + if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH) || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) { if (ptrace_attach(child)) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct * vma; - unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE; + unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE, task_unmapped_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; unsigned long start_addr; int do_color_align; @@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED)) do_color_align = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + task_unmapped_base += mm->delta_mmap; + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + if (addr) { if (do_color_align) addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff); @@ -101,8 +107,8 @@ full_search: vma = find_vma(mm, PAGE_OFFSET); } if (task_size < addr) { - if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) { - start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + if (start_addr != task_unmapped_base) { + start_addr = addr = task_unmapped_base; goto full_search; } return -ENOMEM; @@ -322,6 +328,11 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_mmap(unsign struct file * file = NULL; unsigned long retval = -EBADF; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); if (!file) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sunos32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ asmlinkage u32 sunos_mmap(u32 addr, u32 struct file *file = NULL; unsigned long retval, ret_type; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { static int cnt; if (cnt++ < 10) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -318,6 +322,386 @@ cannot_handle: unhandled_fault (address, current, regs); } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT +static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma) +{ + vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; +} + +static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type) +{ + struct page* page; + unsigned int *kaddr; + + page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!page) + return NOPAGE_OOM; + + kaddr = kmap(page); + memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */ + flush_dcache_page(page); + kunmap(page); + if (type) + *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR; + return page; +} + +static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = { + close: pax_emuplt_close, + nopage: pax_emuplt_nopage, +}; + +static void pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr) +{ + memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma)); + vma->vm_mm = current->mm; + vma->vm_start = addr; + vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE; + vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC; + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; + vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops; + insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma); + ++current->mm->total_vm; +} +#endif + +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected + * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected + * 4 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + int err; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] + 8UL == regs->tpc) + return 1; + + regs->tpc += current->mm->delta_exec; + if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code) + regs->tnpc += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 4; + } + if (regs->tpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && + regs->tpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) + { + regs->tpc -= current->mm->delta_exec; + if (regs->tnpc >= current->mm->start_code + current->mm->delta_exec && + regs->tnpc < current->mm->end_code + current->mm->delta_exec) + regs->tnpc -= current->mm->delta_exec; + } + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */ + unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl; + + err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]; + addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL); + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */ + unsigned int ba; + + err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + + if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) { + unsigned long addr; + + addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2); + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */ + unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr; + addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL); + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */ + unsigned int mov1, call, mov2; + + err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU && + (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && + mov2 == 0x9E100001U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC]; + addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2); + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */ + unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12)); + err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16)); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+24)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U && + (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U && + (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U && + sllx == 0x83287020 && + jmpl == 0x81C04005U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU); + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU); + addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5]; + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */ + unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or, jmpl, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12)); + err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U && + sllx == 0x83287020 && + (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U && + jmpl == 0x81C04005U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU); + addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5]; + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #7 */ + unsigned int sethi, ba, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + (ba & 0xFFF00000U) == 0x30600000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + + addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr; + addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2); + regs->tpc = addr; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 2; + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */ + unsigned int sethi, ba, nop; + + err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8)); + + if (err) + break; + + if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U && + ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long addr; + unsigned int save, call; + + if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) + addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2); + else + addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2); + + err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr); + err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4)); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8)); + if (err) + break; + + if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && + (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + unsigned long call_dl_resolve; + + down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; + up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (likely(call_dl_resolve)) + goto emulate; + + vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) { + call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + goto emulate; + } + + call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE); + if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) { + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma); + return 1; + } + + pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve); + current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve; + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + +emulate: + regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10; + regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve; + regs->tnpc = addr+4; + return 3; + } + } + } while (0); + + do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */ + unsigned int save, call, nop; + + err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4)); + err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc); + err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4)); + if (err) + break; + + if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U && + (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U && + nop == 0x01000000U) + { + unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2); + + regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc; + regs->tpc = dl_resolve; + regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4; + return 3; + } + } while (0); +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; @@ -360,8 +744,10 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct goto intr_or_no_mm; if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) { - if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) + if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) { regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff; + regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff; + } address &= 0xffffffff; } @@ -378,6 +764,34 @@ asmlinkage void do_sparc64_fault(struct if (!vma) goto bad_area; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + /* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */ + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address && + !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB)) + { + if (address != regs->tpc) + goto good_area; + + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT + case 2: + case 3: + goto fault_done; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 4: + goto fault_done; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS)); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + /* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there * was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the @@ -421,7 +835,7 @@ continue_fault: goto bad_area; } } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/sparc64/solaris/misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ static u32 do_solaris_mmap(u32 addr, u32 struct file *file = NULL; unsigned long retval, ret_type; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + /* Do we need it here? */ set_personality(PER_SVR4); if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/um/kernel/trap_kern.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ int handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr goto out; else if(!ARCH_IS_STACKGROW(address)) goto out; - else if(expand_stack(vma, address)) + else if(expand_stack(current, vma, address)) goto out; good_area: diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2005-03-02 02:37:46.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -186,6 +186,17 @@ struct elf_prpsinfo //#include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 24) +#endif + typedef struct user_i387_ia32_struct elf_fpregset_t; typedef struct user32_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/ia32/sys_ia32.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -209,6 +209,11 @@ sys32_mmap(struct mmap_arg_struct __user if (a.offset & ~PAGE_MASK) return -EINVAL; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (a.flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + if (!(a.flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(a.fd); if (!file) @@ -841,6 +846,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_mmap2(unsigned lon unsigned long error; struct file * file = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); if (!(flags & MAP_ANONYMOUS)) { file = fget(fd); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-02 02:37:53.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -214,6 +214,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request, if (pid == 1) /* you may not mess with init */ goto out_tsk; + if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) + goto out_tsk; + if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) { ret = ptrace_attach(child); goto out_tsk; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ long sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsign if (off & ~PAGE_MASK) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) + goto out; +#endif + error = -EBADF; file = NULL; flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE); @@ -102,6 +107,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && (!addr || filp)) { + if (begin == 0x40000000) + begin += mm->delta_mmap & 0x0FFFFFFFU; + else + begin += mm->delta_mmap; + } +#endif + if (len > end) return -ENOMEM; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c --- linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -280,6 +281,63 @@ static int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long a return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +/* + * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->rip = fault address) + * + * returns 1 when task should be killed + * 2 when legitimate ET_EXEC was detected + */ +static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + int err; + + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + if (regs->rip >= current->mm->start_code && + regs->rip < current->mm->end_code) + { + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) { + unsigned int esp_4; + + err = get_user(esp_4, (unsigned int*)(regs->rsp-4UL)); + if (err || esp_4 == regs->rip) + return 1; + } else { + unsigned long esp_8; + + err = get_user(esp_8, (unsigned long*)(regs->rsp-8UL)); + if (err || esp_8 == regs->rip) + return 1; + } + + regs->rip += current->mm->delta_exec; + return 2; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp) +{ + unsigned long i; + + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: "); + for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) { + unsigned int c; + if (get_user(c, (unsigned char*)pc+i)) { + printk("."); + break; + } + printk("%08x ", c); + } + printk("\n"); +} +#endif + int page_fault_trace = 0; int exception_trace = 1; @@ -405,7 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ if (address + 128 < regs->rsp) goto bad_area; } - if (expand_stack(vma, address)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, address)) goto bad_area; /* * Ok, we have a good vm_area for this memory access, so @@ -414,6 +472,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_ good_area: info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR; write = 0; + if ((error_code & 16) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + goto bad_area; switch (error_code & 3) { default: /* 3: write, present */ /* fall through */ @@ -491,7 +551,22 @@ bad_area_nosemaphore: tsk->comm, tsk->pid, address, regs->rip, regs->rsp, error_code); } - + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (mm && (mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (error_code & 16)) { + switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + case 2: + return; +#endif + + } + pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->rip, (void*)regs->rsp); + do_exit(SIGKILL); + } +#endif + tsk->thread.cr2 = address; /* Kernel addresses are always protection faults */ tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >= TASK_SIZE); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -606,6 +606,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) && value != KVAL(K_SAK)) return; /* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP) + { + void *func = fn_handler[value]; + if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs || + func == fn_show_mem) + return; + } +#endif + fn_handler[value](vc, regs); } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/mem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ extern void tapechar_init(void); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern struct file_operations grsec_fops; +#endif + /* * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses * outside of main memory. @@ -187,6 +192,12 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file * f if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, &count)) return -EFAULT; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_mem_write(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + return do_write_mem(__va(p), p, buf, count, ppos); } @@ -201,6 +212,11 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file * file, vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma)) + return -EPERM; +#endif + /* Remap-pfn-range will mark the range VM_IO and VM_RESERVED */ if (remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, @@ -289,6 +305,11 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file * ssize_t written; char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_kmem_write(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) { wrote = count; @@ -415,7 +436,23 @@ static inline size_t read_zero_pagealign count = size; zap_page_range(vma, addr, count, NULL); - zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, PAGE_COPY); + zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + unsigned long addr_m; + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m; + + addr_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(mm, addr_m); + if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == addr_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { + addr_m = addr + vma->vm_mirror; + zap_page_range(vma_m, addr_m, count, NULL); + } else + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: read_zero bug, %08lx, %08lx\n", + addr, vma->vm_start); + } +#endif size -= count; buf += count; @@ -564,6 +601,16 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file * static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM + gr_handle_open_port(); + return -EPERM; +#endif + + return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; +} + +static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp) +{ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM; } @@ -572,7 +619,6 @@ static int open_port(struct inode * inod #define full_lseek null_lseek #define write_zero write_null #define read_full read_zero -#define open_mem open_port #define open_kmem open_mem static struct file_operations mem_fops = { @@ -673,6 +719,11 @@ static int memory_open(struct inode * in case 11: filp->f_op = &kmsg_fops; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + case 12: + filp->f_op = &grsec_fops; + break; +#endif default: return -ENXIO; } @@ -702,6 +753,9 @@ static const struct { {8, "random", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &random_fops}, {9, "urandom", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &urandom_fops}, {11,"kmsg", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, &kmsg_fops}, +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + {12,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops}, +#endif }; static struct class_simple *mem_class; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/random.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -256,9 +256,15 @@ /* * Configuration information */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET +#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 1024 +#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 256 +#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 512 +#else #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512 #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128 #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256 +#endif #define USE_SHA /* @@ -1965,7 +1971,7 @@ static void sysctl_init_random(struct en * ********************************************************************/ -#ifdef CONFIG_INET +#if defined(CONFIG_INET) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) /* * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed @@ -2383,3 +2389,25 @@ __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 cookie, } #endif #endif /* CONFIG_INET */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) +unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void) +{ + static time_t rekey_time; + static __u32 secret[12]; + time_t t; + + /* + * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds. + */ + t = get_seconds(); + if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) { + rekey_time = t; + get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret)); + } + + secret[1] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); + secret[0] = halfMD4Transform(secret+8, secret); + return *(unsigned long *)secret; +} +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ do_kdsk_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbentry __ case KDSKBENT: if (!perm) return -EPERM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) + return -EPERM; +#endif + if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) { /* disallocate map */ key_map = key_maps[s]; @@ -233,6 +239,13 @@ do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbsentry goto reterr; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) { + ret = -EPERM; + goto reterr; + } +#endif + q = func_table[i]; first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft); for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan sdla_t* card = wandev->private; struct net_device* dev; volatile ppp_private_area_t *ppp_priv_area; - ppp_flags_t *flags = card->flags; + ppp_flags_t *flags; unsigned long timeout; /* sanity checks */ @@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan ppp_priv_area->update_comms_stats = 2; ppp_priv_area->timer_int_enabled |= TMR_INT_ENABLED_UPDATE; + flags = card->flags; flags->imask |= PPP_INTR_TIMER; /* wait a maximum of 1 second for the statistics to be updated */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/pci/proc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -565,7 +565,15 @@ static struct file_operations proc_pci_o static void legacy_proc_init(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL); +#endif if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations; } @@ -594,7 +602,15 @@ static int __init pci_proc_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *entry; struct pci_dev *dev = NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus); +#endif +#else proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus); +#endif entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir); if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ __asm__( #define Q_SET_SEL(cpu, selname, address, size) \ do { \ -set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], __va((u32)(address))); \ -set_limit(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], size); \ +set_base(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], __va((u32)(address))); \ +set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \ } while(0) #define Q2_SET_SEL(cpu, selname, address, size) \ do { \ -set_base(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], (u32)(address)); \ -set_limit(per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[(selname) >> 3], size); \ +set_base(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], (u32)(address)); \ +set_limit(cpu_gdt_table[cpu][(selname) >> 3], size); \ } while(0) -static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409200 }; +static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409300 }; /* * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind @@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func struct desc_struct save_desc_40; int cpu; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long cr3; +#endif + /* * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant. * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly. @@ -115,12 +119,17 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func return PNP_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; cpu = get_cpu(); - save_desc_40 = per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8]; - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; /* On some boxes IRQ's during PnP BIOS calls are deadly. */ spin_lock_irqsave(&pnp_bios_lock, flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3); +#endif + + save_desc_40 = cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8]; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc; + /* The lock prevents us bouncing CPU here */ if (ts1_size) Q2_SET_SEL(smp_processor_id(), PNP_TS1, ts1_base, ts1_size); @@ -156,9 +165,14 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func "i" (0) : "memory" ); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags); - per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table,cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3); +#endif + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags); put_cpu(); /* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c --- linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct de size_remap = size_total; vesafb_fix.smem_len = size_remap; -#ifndef __i386__ +#if !defined(__i386__) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0; #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ config PROC_FS config PROC_KCORE bool "/proc/kcore support" if !ARM - depends on PROC_FS && MMU + depends on PROC_FS && MMU && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD config SYSFS bool "sysfs file system support" if EMBEDDED diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -125,10 +126,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */ #ifdef __sparc__ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize, 1); if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_dsize = 0; #else + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1); if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_dsize = 0; @@ -136,10 +139,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */ #ifdef __sparc__ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1); if ((dump.u_ssize) > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_ssize = 0; #else + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1); if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur) dump.u_ssize = 0; @@ -289,6 +294,8 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY) rlim = ~0; + + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1); if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim) return -ENOMEM; @@ -317,10 +324,33 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux (current->mm->start_brk = N_BSSADDR(ex)); current->mm->free_area_cache = current->mm->mmap_base; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + current->mm->free_area_cache += current->mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + current->mm->rss = 0; current->mm->mmap = NULL; compute_creds(bprm); current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) { + current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP) + current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT)) + current->mm->flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT; +#endif + + } +#endif + #ifdef __sparc__ if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) { loff_t pos = fd_offset; @@ -416,7 +446,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data, - PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, + PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE, fd_offset + ex.a_text); up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -37,11 +37,17 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC +#include +#endif + #include static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs); @@ -89,18 +95,32 @@ static struct linux_binfmt elf_format = static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { + unsigned long e = end, retval; + start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start); end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end); + + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); if (end > start) { - unsigned long addr; - down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); - addr = do_brk(start, end - start); - up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); - if (BAD_ADDR(addr)) - return addr; + retval = do_brk(start, end - start); + if (BAD_ADDR(retval)) + goto out; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) { + retval = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGEALIGN(start + current->mm->delta_exec), 0UL, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, start); + if (BAD_ADDR(retval)) + goto out; + } +#endif + } - current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end; - return 0; + current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = e; + retval = 0UL; + +out: + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + return retval; } @@ -321,6 +341,7 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0; unsigned long error = ~0UL; int retval, i, size; + unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE; /* First of all, some simple consistency checks */ if (interp_elf_ex->e_type != ET_EXEC && @@ -358,6 +379,11 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str goto out_close; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; +#endif + eppnt = elf_phdata; for (i=0; ie_phnum; i++, eppnt++) { if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) { @@ -389,8 +415,8 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str * <= p_memsize so it is only necessary to check p_memsz. */ k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr; - if (k > TASK_SIZE || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz || - eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE || TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) { + if (k > task_size || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz || + eppnt->p_memsz > task_size || task_size - eppnt->p_memsz < k) { error = -ENOMEM; goto out_close; } @@ -491,6 +517,227 @@ out: return elf_entry; } +#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE) +static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) +{ + unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC; +#endif + + return pax_flags; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS +static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) +{ + unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC; +#endif + + return pax_flags; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX +static int pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex) +{ + unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC + if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + if ((elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC) && (pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)) + pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDEXEC; +#endif + + return pax_flags; +} +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS) +static int pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata) +{ + unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS + unsigned long i; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX + pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS + for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++) + if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) { + if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) || + ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) || + ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) || + ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) || + ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)) || + ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDEXEC) && ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) || elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || !(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT))) || + (!(elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDEXEC) && (elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN || (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)))) + return -EINVAL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_softmode) + pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]); + else +#endif + + pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]); + break; + } +#endif + + if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags)) + return -EINVAL; + + current->mm->flags |= pax_flags; + return 0; +} +#endif + /* * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared * libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else. @@ -527,6 +774,12 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ struct elfhdr interp_elf_ex; struct exec interp_ex; } *loc; + unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + unsigned long load_addr_random = 0UL; + unsigned long load_bias_random = 0UL; +#endif loc = kmalloc(sizeof(*loc), GFP_KERNEL); if (!loc) { @@ -752,11 +1005,78 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ current->mm->end_code = 0; current->mm->mmap = NULL; current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE + current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) + current->mm->call_syscall = 0UL; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR + current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL; + current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL; + current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL; +#endif + current->mm->def_flags = def_flags; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS) + if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&loc->elf_ex, elf_phdata)) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS + pax_set_initial_flags(bprm); +#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) + if (pax_set_initial_flags_func) + (pax_set_initial_flags_func)(bprm); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = PAGE_SIZE; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + int cpu = get_cpu(); + + current->mm->context.user_cs_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = -SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + set_user_cs(current->mm, cpu); + put_cpu(); + task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) { +#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb)) + + current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current)); + current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current)); + current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current)); + } +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) + executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT; +#endif + /* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages may depend on the personality. */ SET_PERSONALITY(loc->elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter); + + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (!(current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))) +#endif + if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack)) current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC; @@ -828,12 +1148,93 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec. This is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable. */ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + /* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */ + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) { + load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec); + elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED; + } +#endif + } - error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags); - if (BAD_ADDR(error)) { - send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); - goto out_free_dentry; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) && (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC)) { + error = -ENOMEM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot & ~PROT_EXEC, elf_flags); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + unsigned long addr, len; + + addr = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias + vaddr); + len = elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr); + if (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + error = __do_mmap_pgoff(bprm->file, addr, len, elf_prot, elf_flags, (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + } +#endif + + if (BAD_ADDR(error)) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } + + /* PaX: mirror at a randomized base */ + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + + if (!load_addr_set) { + load_addr_random = get_unmapped_area(bprm->file, 0UL, elf_ppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), (elf_ppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr)) >> PAGE_SHIFT, MAP_PRIVATE); + if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) { + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } + load_bias_random = load_addr_random - vaddr; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (elf_prot & PROT_EXEC) { + load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), elf_ppnt->p_memsz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(elf_ppnt->p_vaddr), PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, 0UL); + if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) { + load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); + if (!BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) + load_addr_random -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + } + } else + load_addr_random = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias_random + vaddr), 0UL, elf_prot, elf_flags | MAP_MIRROR, error); + } +#endif + + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + if (BAD_ADDR(load_addr_random)) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } + } else +#endif + + { + error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags); + if (BAD_ADDR(error)) { + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + goto out_free_dentry; + } } if (!load_addr_set) { @@ -845,6 +1246,11 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ load_addr += load_bias; reloc_func_desc = load_bias; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + current->mm->delta_exec = load_addr_random - load_addr; +#endif + } k = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr; if (k < start_code) start_code = k; @@ -855,9 +1261,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be * <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz. */ - if (k > TASK_SIZE || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz || - elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE || - TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) { + if (k > task_size || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz || + elf_ppnt->p_memsz > task_size || + task_size - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) { /* set_brk can never work. Avoid overflows. */ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); goto out_free_dentry; @@ -884,6 +1290,16 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_ start_data += load_bias; end_data += load_bias; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + elf_brk += PAGE_SIZE + pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT); +#undef pax_delta_mask +#endif + /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind @@ -1126,9 +1542,11 @@ static int maydump(struct vm_area_struct if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_SHARED | VM_RESERVED)) return 0; +#if 0 /* If it hasn't been written to, don't write it out */ if (!vma->anon_vma) return 0; +#endif return 1; } @@ -1181,8 +1599,11 @@ static int writenote(struct memelfnote * #undef DUMP_SEEK #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \ + do { \ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \ if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \ - goto end_coredump; + goto end_coredump; \ + } while (0); #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \ if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \ goto end_coredump; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -540,7 +540,9 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b realdatastart = (unsigned long) -ENOMEM; printk("Unable to allocate RAM for process data, errno %d\n", (int)-datapos); + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); return realdatastart; } datapos = realdatastart + MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -561,8 +563,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b } if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) { printk("Unable to read data+bss, errno %d\n", (int)-result); + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len); do_munmap(current->mm, realdatastart, data_len + extra); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); return result; } @@ -624,8 +628,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b } if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) { printk("Unable to read code+data+bss, errno %d\n",(int)-result); + down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len + data_len + extra + MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long)); + up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); return result; } } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux struct files_struct *files = NULL; retval = -ENOEXEC; - if (!enabled) + if (!enabled || bprm->misc) goto _ret; + bprm->misc++; + /* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */ read_lock(&entries_lock); fmt = check_file(bprm); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/buffer.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static int fsync_buffers_list(spinlock_t *lock, struct list_head *list); static void invalidate_bh_lrus(void); @@ -2167,6 +2168,7 @@ int generic_cont_expand(struct inode *in err = -EFBIG; limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1); if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) { send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); goto out; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/compat.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* siocdevprivate_ioctl */ @@ -1427,6 +1428,11 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, struct file *file; int retval; int i; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct file *old_exec_file; + struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; + struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +#endif retval = -ENOMEM; bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1445,6 +1451,15 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, bprm->file = file; bprm->filename = filename; bprm->interp = filename; + + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes), 1); + retval = -EAGAIN; + if (gr_handle_nproc()) + goto out_file; + retval = -EACCES; + if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) + goto out_file; + bprm->mm = mm_alloc(); retval = -ENOMEM; if (!bprm->mm) @@ -1483,16 +1498,52 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, if (retval < 0) goto out; + if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + + gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + old_acl = current->acl; + memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + old_exec_file = current->exec_file; + get_file(file); + current->exec_file = file; +#endif + + gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + retval = search_binary_handler(bprm, regs); if (retval >= 0) { free_arg_pages(bprm); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (old_exec_file) + fput(old_exec_file); +#endif + /* execve success */ security_bprm_free(bprm); kfree(bprm); return retval; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + current->acl = old_acl; + memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = old_exec_file; +#endif + out: /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/dcache.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ already_unhashed: * * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock. */ -static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, +char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, char *buffer, int buflen) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c 2005-03-02 02:38:06.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/exec.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -63,6 +64,20 @@ char core_pattern[65] = "core"; static struct linux_binfmt *formats; static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) +unsigned int pax_aslr=1; +#endif + +unsigned int pax_softmode; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS +void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_initial_flags_func); +#endif + int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt) { struct linux_binfmt ** tmp = &formats; @@ -309,6 +324,10 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma))) goto out_sig; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (page_count(page) == 1) +#endif + flush_dcache_page(page); pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address); @@ -327,6 +346,11 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str goto out; } mm->rss++; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (page_count(page) == 1) +#endif + lru_cache_add_active(page); set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte( page, vma->vm_page_prot)))); @@ -355,6 +379,10 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm int i, ret; long arg_size; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL; +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP /* Move the argument and environment strings to the bottom of the * stack space. @@ -416,8 +444,24 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm if (!mpnt) return -ENOMEM; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_MAYEXEC)) { + mpnt_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL); + if (!mpnt_m) { + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } +#endif + if (security_vm_enough_memory(arg_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)) { kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mpnt_m) + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m); +#endif + return -ENOMEM; } @@ -443,6 +487,13 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm else mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS; mpnt->vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) + mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(mpnt->vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x7]; + else +#endif + mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[mpnt->vm_flags & 0x7]; if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt))) { up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); @@ -450,6 +501,30 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm return ret; } mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = vma_pages(mpnt); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mpnt_m) { + *mpnt_m = *mpnt; + if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { + mpnt_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC); + mpnt_m->vm_page_prot = PAGE_NONE; + } + mpnt_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + mpnt_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE; + mpnt_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; + mpnt->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; + mpnt_m->vm_mirror = mpnt->vm_start - mpnt_m->vm_start; + mpnt->vm_mirror = mpnt_m->vm_start - mpnt->vm_start; + if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt_m))) { + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); + kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m); + return ret; + } + mpnt_m->vm_pgoff = mpnt->vm_pgoff; + mm->total_vm += (mpnt_m->vm_end - mpnt_m->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + } +#endif + } for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { @@ -457,6 +532,14 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm if (page) { bprm->page[i] = NULL; install_arg_page(mpnt, page, stack_base); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mpnt_m) { + page_cache_get(page); + install_arg_page(mpnt_m, page, stack_base + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE); + } +#endif + } stack_base += PAGE_SIZE; } @@ -1128,6 +1211,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, struct file *file; int retval; int i; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct file *old_exec_file; + struct acl_subject_label *old_acl; + struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +#endif retval = -ENOMEM; bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1140,10 +1228,33 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, if (IS_ERR(file)) goto out_kfree; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(¤t->user->processes), 1); + + if (gr_handle_nproc()) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EAGAIN; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) { + allow_write_access(file); + fput(file); + return -EACCES; + } + sched_exec(); bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + if (pax_aslr) +#endif + + bprm->p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK; +#endif + bprm->file = file; bprm->filename = filename; bprm->interp = filename; @@ -1185,8 +1296,38 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, if (retval < 0) goto out; + if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + + gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + old_acl = current->acl; + memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + old_exec_file = current->exec_file; + get_file(file); + current->exec_file = file; +#endif + + retval = gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + if (retval < 0) + goto out_fail; + retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs); if (retval >= 0) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (old_exec_file) + fput(old_exec_file); +#endif free_arg_pages(bprm); /* execve success */ @@ -1197,6 +1338,14 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, return retval; } +out_fail: +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + current->acl = old_acl; + memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim)); + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = old_exec_file; +#endif + out: /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/ for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) { @@ -1357,6 +1506,126 @@ static void format_corename(char *corena *out_ptr = 0; } +int pax_check_flags(unsigned long * flags) +{ + int retval = 0; + +#if !defined(__i386__) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + { + *flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; + retval = -EINVAL; + } +#endif + + if ((*flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + && (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +#endif + + ) + { + *flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; + retval = -EINVAL; + } + + if ((*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) +#endif + + ) + { + *flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT; + retval = -EINVAL; + } + + if ((*flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP + && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) +#endif + + ) + { + *flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; + retval = -EINVAL; + } + + if ((*flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + && !(*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) +#endif + + ) + { + *flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDEXEC; + retval = -EINVAL; + } + + return retval; +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp) +{ + struct task_struct *tsk = current; + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + char* buffer_exec = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC); + char* buffer_fault = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC); + char* path_exec=NULL; + char* path_fault=NULL; + unsigned long start=0UL, end=0UL, offset=0UL; + + if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) { + struct vm_area_struct* vma, * vma_exec=NULL, * vma_fault=NULL; + + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + vma = mm->mmap; + while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) { + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) + vma_exec = vma; + if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end) + vma_fault = vma; + vma = vma->vm_next; + } + if (vma_exec) { + path_exec = d_path(vma_exec->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_exec->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(path_exec)) + path_exec = ""; + } + if (vma_fault) { + start = vma_fault->vm_start; + end = vma_fault->vm_end; + offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT; + if (vma_fault->vm_file) { + path_fault = d_path(vma_fault->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_fault->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE); + if (IS_ERR(path_fault)) + path_fault = ""; + } else + path_fault = ""; + } + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + } + if (tsk->curr_ip) + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset); + else + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset); + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, " + "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, tsk->pid, + tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp); + free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec); + free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault); + pax_report_insns(pc, sp); + do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs); +} +#endif + static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm) { struct task_struct *g, *p; @@ -1455,6 +1724,9 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod current->signal->group_stop_count = 0; clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING); + if (signr == SIGKILL || signr == SIGILL) + gr_handle_brute_attach(current); + if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump) goto fail_unlock; @@ -1480,7 +1752,7 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod goto close_fail; if (!file->f_op->write) goto close_fail; - if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0) + if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0) goto close_fail; retval = binfmt->core_dump(signr, regs, file); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/fcntl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static int locate_fd(struct files_struct int error; error = -EINVAL; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0); if (orig_start >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) goto out; @@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ repeat: } error = -EMFILE; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0); if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) goto out; @@ -123,6 +126,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int ol struct file * file, *tofree; struct files_struct * files = current->files; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0); + spin_lock(&files->file_lock); if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd))) goto out_unlock; @@ -404,7 +409,8 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task return (((fown->euid == 0) || (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) || (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) && - !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig)); + !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig) && + !gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)); } static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p, diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/namei.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -519,6 +520,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct err = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd); if (err) goto loop; + + if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, + dentry->d_inode, dentry, nd->mnt)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto loop; + } + current->link_count++; current->total_link_count++; nd->depth++; @@ -871,11 +879,18 @@ return_reval: break; } return_base: + if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) { + path_release(nd); + return -ENOENT; + } return 0; out_dput: dput(next.dentry); break; } + if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) + err = -ENOENT; + path_release(nd); return_err: return err; @@ -1325,7 +1340,7 @@ int may_open(struct nameidata *nd, int a if (!error) { DQUOT_INIT(inode); - error = do_truncate(dentry, 0); + error = do_truncate(dentry, 0, nd->mnt); } put_write_access(inode); if (error) @@ -1376,6 +1391,17 @@ int open_namei(const char * pathname, in error = path_lookup(pathname, lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_OPEN, nd); if (error) return error; + + if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) { + error = -EPERM; + goto exit; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto exit; + } + goto ok; } @@ -1409,9 +1435,19 @@ do_last: /* Negative dentry, just create the file */ if (!dentry->d_inode) { + if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + goto exit_dput; + } + if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, dentry, mode, nd); + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd->mnt); + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); dput(nd->dentry); nd->dentry = dentry; @@ -1426,6 +1462,25 @@ do_last: /* * It already exists. */ + + if (gr_handle_rawio(dentry->d_inode)) { + error = -EPERM; + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + goto exit_dput; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_open(dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) { + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + error = -EACCES; + goto exit_dput; + } + + if (gr_handle_fifo(dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) { + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); + error = -EACCES; + goto exit_dput; + } + up(&dir->d_inode->i_sem); error = -EEXIST; @@ -1479,6 +1534,13 @@ do_link: error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd); if (error) goto exit_dput; + + if (gr_handle_follow_link(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry->d_inode, + dentry, nd->mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto exit_dput; + } + error = __do_follow_link(dentry, nd); dput(dentry); if (error) @@ -1585,6 +1647,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __u if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { + if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EPERM; + dput(dentry); + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); + path_release(&nd); + goto out; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + dput(dentry); + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); + path_release(&nd); + goto out; + } + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case 0: case S_IFREG: error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd); @@ -1602,6 +1680,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknod(const char __u default: error = -EINVAL; } + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1653,9 +1735,19 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdir(const char __u dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { + error = 0; if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode)) mode &= ~current->fs->umask; - error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + + if (!error) + error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode); + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1739,6 +1831,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __u char * name; struct dentry *dentry; struct nameidata nd; + ino_t saved_ino = 0; + dev_t saved_dev = 0; name = getname(pathname); if(IS_ERR(name)) @@ -1763,7 +1857,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_rmdir(const char __u dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { - error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + error = 0; + if (dentry->d_inode) { + if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) { + saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + } + + if (!error) + error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino)) + gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev); dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1817,6 +1925,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __ struct dentry *dentry; struct nameidata nd; struct inode *inode = NULL; + ino_t saved_ino = 0; + dev_t saved_dev = 0; name = getname(pathname); if(IS_ERR(name)) @@ -1832,13 +1942,26 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unlink(const char __ dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { + error = 0; /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */ if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len]) goto slashes; inode = dentry->d_inode; - if (inode) + if (inode) { + if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) { + saved_ino = inode->i_ino; + saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; + } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt)) + error = -EACCES; + atomic_inc(&inode->i_count); - error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + } + if (!error) + error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry); + if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev)) + gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev); exit2: dput(dentry); } @@ -1901,7 +2024,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlink(const char _ dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); error = PTR_ERR(dentry); if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { - error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO); + error = 0; + if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from)) + error = -EACCES; + + if (!error) + error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO); + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); dput(dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -1985,7 +2116,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_link(const char __us new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0); error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry); if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) { - error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); + error = 0; + if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, + old_nd.dentry->d_inode, + old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to)) + error = -EPERM; + if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, + old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to)) + error = -EACCES; + if (!error) + error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry); + + if (!error) + gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt); + dput(new_dentry); } up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); @@ -2207,8 +2351,16 @@ static inline int do_rename(const char * if (new_dentry == trap) goto exit5; - error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, + error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt, + old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt, + newname); + + if (!error) + error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry, new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry); + if (!error) + gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry, + new_dentry, oldnd.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0); exit5: dput(new_dentry); exit4: diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/namespace.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include #include @@ -426,6 +428,8 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn DQUOT_OFF(sb); retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0); unlock_kernel(); + + gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); } up_write(&sb->s_umount); return retval; @@ -454,6 +458,9 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn if (retval) security_sb_umount_busy(mnt); up_write(¤t->namespace->sem); + + gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval); + return retval; } @@ -1044,6 +1051,11 @@ long do_mount(char * dev_name, char * di if (retval) goto dput_out; + if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) { + retval = -EPERM; + goto dput_out; + } + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags, data_page); @@ -1056,6 +1068,9 @@ long do_mount(char * dev_name, char * di dev_name, data_page); dput_out: path_release(&nd); + + gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval); + return retval; } @@ -1276,6 +1291,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pivot_root(const cha if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot()) + return -EPERM; + lock_kernel(); error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &new_nd); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/open.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -192,7 +193,7 @@ out: return error; } -int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length) +int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt) { int err; struct iattr newattrs; @@ -201,6 +202,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, l if (length < 0) return -EINVAL; + if (!gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, mnt)) + return -EACCES; + newattrs.ia_size = length; newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | ATTR_CTIME; @@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ static inline long do_sys_truncate(const error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); if (!error) { DQUOT_INIT(inode); - error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length); + error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt); } put_write_access(inode); @@ -312,7 +316,7 @@ static inline long do_sys_ftruncate(unsi error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); if (!error) - error = do_truncate(dentry, length); + error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt); out_putf: fput(file); out: @@ -391,6 +395,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_utime(char __user * (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0) goto dput_and_out; } + if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + down(&inode->i_sem); error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); up(&inode->i_sem); @@ -444,6 +453,12 @@ long do_utimes(char __user * filename, s (error = permission(inode,MAY_WRITE,&nd)) != 0) goto dput_and_out; } + + if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + down(&inode->i_sem); error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); up(&inode->i_sem); @@ -505,6 +520,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_access(const char __ if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode) && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) res = -EROFS; + + if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) + res = -EACCES; + path_release(&nd); } @@ -528,6 +547,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __u if (error) goto dput_and_out; + gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); dput_and_out: @@ -558,6 +579,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int goto out_putf; error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL); + + if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt)) + error = -EPERM; + + if (!error) + gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt); + if (!error) set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); out_putf: @@ -583,8 +611,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT)) goto dput_and_out; + if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) + goto dput_and_out; + set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry); set_fs_altroot(); + + gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); + + gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt); + error = 0; dput_and_out: path_release(&nd); @@ -613,9 +649,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int err = -EPERM; if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto out_putf; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_putf; + } + down(&inode->i_sem); if (mode == (mode_t) -1) mode = inode->i_mode; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) { + err = -EPERM; + up(&inode->i_sem); + goto out_putf; + } + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs); @@ -647,9 +696,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto dput_and_out; + if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto dput_and_out; + } + down(&inode->i_sem); if (mode == (mode_t) -1) mode = inode->i_mode; + + if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + error = -EACCES; + up(&inode->i_sem); + goto dput_and_out; + } + newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO); newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME; error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs); @@ -661,7 +722,7 @@ out: return error; } -static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group) +static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt) { struct inode * inode; int error; @@ -678,6 +739,12 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry * error = -EPERM; if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode)) goto out; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME; if (user != (uid_t) -1) { newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID; @@ -703,7 +770,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd); if (!error) { - error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); path_release(&nd); } return error; @@ -716,7 +783,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __ error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd); if (!error) { - error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt); path_release(&nd); } return error; @@ -730,7 +797,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int file = fget(fd); if (file) { - error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group); + error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, + group, file->f_vfsmnt); fput(file); } return error; @@ -852,6 +920,7 @@ repeat: * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test * will limit the total number of files that can be opened. */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0); if (fd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur) goto out; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/array.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -281,6 +281,22 @@ static inline char *task_cap(struct task cap_t(p->cap_effective)); } +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) +static inline char *task_pax(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer) +{ + if (p->mm) + return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c%c\n", + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p', + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e', + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm', + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r', + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC ? 'X' : 'x', + p->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's'); + else + return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t------\n"); +} +#endif + int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) { char * orig = buffer; @@ -298,9 +314,20 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct * #if defined(CONFIG_ARCH_S390) buffer = task_show_regs(task, buffer); #endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) + buffer = task_pax(task, buffer); +#endif + return buffer - orig; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP +#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->mm && (task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \ + task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \ + task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) +#endif + static int do_task_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer, int whole) { unsigned long vsize, eip, esp, wchan = ~0UL; @@ -385,6 +412,19 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru stime = task->stime; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS) { + eip = 0; + esp = 0; + wchan = 0; + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + wchan = 0; + eip =0; + esp =0; +#endif + /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */ /* to make it look like a "normal" Unix priority/nice value */ priority = task_prio(task); @@ -425,9 +465,15 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru vsize, mm ? mm->rss : 0, /* you might want to shift this left 3 */ rsslim, +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0), + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0), + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0), +#else mm ? mm->start_code : 0, mm ? mm->end_code : 0, mm ? mm->start_stack : 0, +#endif esp, eip, /* The signal information here is obsolete. @@ -473,3 +519,14 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *t return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n", size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR +int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer) +{ + int len; + + len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + return len; +} +#endif + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/base.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "internal.h" /* @@ -74,6 +75,9 @@ enum pid_directory_inos { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL PROC_TGID_LOGINUID, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + PROC_TGID_IPADDR, +#endif PROC_TGID_FD_DIR, PROC_TGID_OOM_SCORE, PROC_TGID_OOM_ADJUST, @@ -134,6 +138,9 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[ E(PROC_TGID_ROOT, "root", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO), E(PROC_TGID_EXE, "exe", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO), E(PROC_TGID_MOUNTS, "mounts", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO), +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + E(PROC_TGID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR), +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY E(PROC_TGID_ATTR, "attr", S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO), #endif @@ -269,7 +276,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode * (task->parent == current && \ (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \ (task->state == TASK_STOPPED || task->state == TASK_TRACED) && \ - security_ptrace(current,task) == 0)) + security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task))) static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task) { @@ -284,13 +291,15 @@ static int may_ptrace_attach(struct task (current->uid != task->uid) || (current->gid != task->egid) || (current->gid != task->sgid) || - (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; rmb(); - if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; if (security_ptrace(current, task)) goto out; + if (gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)) + goto out; retval = 1; out: @@ -464,9 +473,25 @@ out: static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) { + int ret = -EACCES; + struct task_struct *task; + if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0) - return -EACCES; - return proc_check_root(inode); + goto out; + + ret = proc_check_root(inode); + if (ret) + goto out; + + task = proc_task(inode); + + if (!task) + goto out; + + ret = gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task); + +out: + return ret; } extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op; @@ -1067,6 +1092,9 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode inode->i_uid = task->euid; inode->i_gid = task->egid; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; +#endif security_task_to_inode(task, inode); out: @@ -1095,7 +1123,9 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry if (pid_alive(task)) { if (proc_type(inode) == PROC_TGID_INO || proc_type(inode) == PROC_TID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) { inode->i_uid = task->euid; +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP inode->i_gid = task->egid; +#endif } else { inode->i_uid = 0; inode->i_gid = 0; @@ -1416,6 +1446,12 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_status; break; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + case PROC_TGID_IPADDR: + inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; + ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr; + break; +#endif case PROC_TID_STAT: inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations; ei->op.proc_read = proc_tid_stat; @@ -1692,6 +1728,22 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in if (!task) goto out; + if (gr_check_hidden_task(task)) { + put_task_struct(task); + goto out; + } + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) + if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid) +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) +#endif + ) { + put_task_struct(task); + goto out; + } +#endif + inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_TGID_INO); @@ -1699,7 +1751,15 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in put_task_struct(task); goto out; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR; +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP; + inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; +#else inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO; +#endif inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations; inode->i_nlink = 3; @@ -1783,6 +1843,9 @@ out: static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsigned long version, unsigned int *tgids) { struct task_struct *p; +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) + struct task_struct *tmp = current; +#endif int nr_tgids = 0; index--; @@ -1803,6 +1866,18 @@ static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsi int tgid = p->pid; if (!pid_alive(p)) continue; + if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p)) + continue; + if (gr_check_hidden_task(p)) + continue; +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP) + if (tmp->uid && (p->uid != tmp->uid) +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID) +#endif + ) + continue; +#endif if (--index >= 0) continue; tgids[nr_tgids] = tgid; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/inode.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -209,7 +209,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe if (de->mode) { inode->i_mode = de->mode; inode->i_uid = de->uid; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID; +#else inode->i_gid = de->gid; +#endif } if (de->size) inode->i_size = de->size; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/internal.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ extern int proc_tid_stat(struct task_str extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct task_struct *, char *); extern int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *, char *); extern int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *, char *); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR +extern int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*); +#endif static inline struct task_struct *proc_task(struct inode *inode) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -547,6 +547,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t void __init proc_misc_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *entry; + int gr_mode = 0; + static struct { char *name; int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*); @@ -561,9 +563,13 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void) #ifdef CONFIG_STRAM_PROC {"stram", stram_read_proc}, #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD {"devices", devices_read_proc}, +#endif {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc}, +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc}, +#endif {"locks", locks_read_proc}, {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc}, {NULL,} @@ -571,6 +577,16 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void) for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++) create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + gr_mode = S_IRUSR; +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_proc_read_entry("devices", gr_mode, NULL, &devices_read_proc, NULL); + create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL); +#endif + proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts"); /* And now for trickier ones */ @@ -581,17 +597,21 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void) create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations); create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations); create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#else create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations); +#endif create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO, &fragmentation_file_operations); create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations); create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations); #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES - create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations); + create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations); #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE +#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD) proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL); if (proc_root_kcore) { proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/root.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -52,7 +52,13 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void) return; } proc_misc_init(); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL); +#else proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", NULL); +#endif proc_net_stat = proc_mkdir("net/stat", NULL); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC @@ -76,7 +82,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void) #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE proc_device_tree_init(); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL); +#endif } static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -21,13 +21,25 @@ char *task_mem(struct mm_struct *mm, cha "VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n" "VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n" "VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n" - "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n", - (mm->total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), + "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n" + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT + "CsBase:\t%8lx\nCsLim:\t%8lx\n" +#endif + + ,(mm->total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), mm->rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), data << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), mm->stack_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), text, lib, - (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10); + (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10 + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT + , mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit +#endif + + ); + return buffer; } @@ -77,8 +89,17 @@ out: return result; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP +#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS (task->mm && (task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \ + task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC || \ + task->mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) +#endif + static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + struct task_struct *task = m->private; +#endif struct vm_area_struct *map = v; struct file *file = map->vm_file; int flags = map->vm_flags; @@ -93,13 +114,23 @@ static int show_map(struct seq_file *m, } seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n", +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_start, + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_end, +#else map->vm_start, map->vm_end, +#endif + flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-', flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-', flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-', flags & VM_MAYSHARE ? 's' : 'p', +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + PAX_RAND_FLAGS ? 0UL : map->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, +#else map->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, +#endif MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), ino, &len); if (map->vm_file) { diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/readdir.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include #include @@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ struct old_linux_dirent { struct readdir_callback { struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent; + struct file * file; int result; }; @@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, cons if (buf->result) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino)) + return 0; + buf->result++; dirent = buf->dirent; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent, @@ -107,6 +114,7 @@ asmlinkage long old_readdir(unsigned int buf.result = 0; buf.dirent = dirent; + buf.file = file; error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf); if (error >= 0) @@ -133,6 +141,7 @@ struct linux_dirent { struct getdents_callback { struct linux_dirent __user * current_dir; struct linux_dirent __user * previous; + struct file * file; int count; int error; }; @@ -147,6 +156,10 @@ static int filldir(void * __buf, const c buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ if (reclen > buf->count) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino)) + return 0; + dirent = buf->previous; if (dirent) { if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off)) @@ -191,6 +204,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents(unsigned in buf.current_dir = dirent; buf.previous = NULL; + buf.file = file; buf.count = count; buf.error = 0; @@ -217,6 +231,7 @@ out: struct getdents_callback64 { struct linux_dirent64 __user * current_dir; struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous; + struct file * file; int count; int error; }; @@ -231,6 +246,10 @@ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */ if (reclen > buf->count) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino)) + return 0; + dirent = buf->previous; if (dirent) { if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off)) @@ -277,6 +296,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents64(unsigned buf.current_dir = dirent; buf.previous = NULL; + buf.file = file; buf.count = count; buf.error = 0; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c --- linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -407,6 +407,11 @@ linvfs_file_mmap( return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; +#endif + vma->vm_ops = &linvfs_file_vm_ops; VOP_SETATTR(vp, &va, XFS_AT_UPDATIME, NULL, error); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,866 @@ +# +# grecurity configuration +# + +menu "Grsecurity" + +config GRKERNSEC + bool "Grsecurity" + select CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_SHA256 + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features + that will enhance the security of your system. It is highly + recommended that you say Y here and read through the help + for each option so that you fully understand the features and + can evaluate their usefulness for your machine. + +choice + prompt "Security Level" + depends GRKERNSEC + default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM + +config GRKERNSEC_LOW + bool "Low" + select GRKERNSEC_LINK + select GRKERNSEC_FIFO + select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET + select GRKERNSEC_DMESG + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + help + If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will + be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number + of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any + conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot + of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher + security levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the + following features are enabled: + + - Linking restrictions + - FIFO restrictions + - Randomized PIDs + - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve + - Restricted dmesg + - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot + +config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM + bool "Medium" + select PAX + select PAX_EI_PAX + select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS + select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS + select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR) + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + select GRKERNSEC_LINK + select GRKERNSEC_FIFO + select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + select GRKERNSEC_DMESG + select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET + select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + select GRKERNSEC_TIME + select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + select GRKERNSEC_PROC + select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + select PAX_RANDUSTACK + select PAX_ASLR + select PAX_RANDMMAP + select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64) + + help + If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included + in the low additional security level will be enabled. These + features provide even more security to your system, though in rare + cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written + software. If you enable this option, make sure that your auth + service (identd) is running as gid 1001. With this option, + the following features (in addition to those provided in the + low additional security level) will be enabled: + + - Randomized TCP source ports + - Failed fork logging + - Time change logging + - Signal logging + - Deny mounts in chroot + - Deny double chrooting + - Deny sysctl writes in chroot + - Deny mknod in chroot + - Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot + - Deny pivot_root in chroot + - Denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port + - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel) + - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) + +config GRKERNSEC_HIGH + bool "High" + select GRKERNSEC_LINK + select GRKERNSEC_FIFO + select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + select GRKERNSEC_DMESG + select GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + select GRKERNSEC_TIME + select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + select GRKERNSEC_PROC + select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR) + select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE + select GRKERNSEC_SHM if (SYSVIPC) + select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + select GRKERNSEC_KMEM + select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG + select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET + select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + select PAX + select PAX_RANDUSTACK + select PAX_ASLR + select PAX_RANDMMAP + select PAX_NOEXEC + select PAX_MPROTECT + select PAX_EI_PAX + select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS + select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS + select PAX_KERNEXEC if (!X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS) + select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && !X86_64) + select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86 && !X86_64) + select PAX_PAGEEXEC if (!X86) + select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64) + select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64) + select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32) + select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC) + select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC) + select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64) + select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC) + help + If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be + enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks + against your system. The heightened security comes at a cost + of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software + on your machine. Since this security level enables PaX, you should + view and read about the PaX + project. While you are there, download chpax and run it on + binaries that cause problems with PaX. Also remember that + since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your + identd as gid 1001. This security level enables the following + features in addition to those listed in the low and medium + security levels: + + - Additional /proc restrictions + - Chmod restrictions in chroot + - No signals, ptrace, or viewing of processes outside of chroot + - Capability restrictions in chroot + - Deny fchdir out of chroot + - Priority restrictions in chroot + - Segmentation-based implementation of PaX + - Mprotect restrictions + - Removal of addresses from /proc//[maps|stat] + - Kernel stack randomization + - Mount/unmount/remount logging + - Kernel symbol hiding + - Destroy unused shared memory +config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM + bool "Custom" + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity + option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't + covered in the basic security levels. These additional features + include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for + grsecurity. It is advised that you read through the help for + each option to determine its usefulness in your situation. + +endchoice + +menu "Address Space Protection" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_KMEM + bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port" + help + If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to + be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel. + /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module + support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are + currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel. + Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that + you use the RBAC system, as it is still possible for an attacker to + modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl. + If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional + case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing + legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem, + but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this + case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will + not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later. + It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the + conditions above. + +config GRKERNSEC_IO + bool "Disable privileged I/O" + depends on X86 + select RTC + help + If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error. + Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel. + Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly, + the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be + remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is + enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates + correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option + enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86 + and you still want to protect your kernel against modification, + use the RBAC system. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP + bool "Remove addresses from /proc//[maps|stat]" + depends on PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR + help + If you say Y here, the /proc//maps and /proc//stat files will + give no information about the addresses of its mappings if + PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task. + If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it + closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid + binaries. + +config GRKERNSEC_BRUTE + bool "Deter exploit bruteforcing" + help + If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking + daemons such as apache or sshd will be deterred. When a child of a + forking daemon is killed by PaX or crashes due to an illegal + instruction, the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every + subsequent fork until the administrator is able to assess the + situation and restart the daemon. It is recommended that you also + enable signal logging in the auditing section so that logs are + generated when a process performs an illegal instruction. + +config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM + bool "Hide kernel symbols" + help + If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and + displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted + to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective + provided the following conditions are met: + 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution + 2) You are using the RBAC system and hiding other files such as your + kernel image and System.map + 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes + /proc/kcore + If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a + useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of + overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities. + +endmenu +menu "Role Based Access Control Options" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN + bool "Hide kernel processes" + help + If you say Y here, all kernel threads will be hidden to all + processes but those whose subject has the "view hidden processes" + flag. + +config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES + int "Maximum tries before password lockout" + default 3 + help + This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt + to authorize themselves with the grsecurity RBAC system before being + denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time. + The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password. + +config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT + int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds" + default 30 + help + This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to + authorize to the RBAC system with the maximum number of invalid + passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force + a password. + +endmenu +menu "Filesystem Protections" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC + bool "Proc restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem + will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. You MUST + choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction. + Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to + see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can + view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose + the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as + a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + bool "Restrict /proc to user only" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC + help + If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own + processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information, + and viewing kernel symbol and module information. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + bool "Allow special group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be + able to view all processes, network-related information, and + kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want + to run identd as a non-root user. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID + int "GID for special group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + default 1001 + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD + bool "Additional restrictions" + depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + help + If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on + /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and + slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits. + +config GRKERNSEC_LINK + bool "Linking restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users + will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in + world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the + symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be + able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_FIFO + bool "FIFO restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't + own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of + the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + bool "Chroot jail restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will + make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you + encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it + is recommended that you enable each one. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + bool "Deny mounts" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + bool "Deny double-chroots" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot + again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking + out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "chroot_deny_chroot" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use + a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It + works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This + function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out + of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted + applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot. + The man page on chroot(2) states: + Note that this call does not change the current working + directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at + `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a + `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'. + + It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break + any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + bool "Deny (f)chmod +s" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod + or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects + against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing + to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory + outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + bool "Deny mknod" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to + mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it + would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same + as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from + anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which + they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended + that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "chroot_deny_mknod" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach + to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail. + It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, + a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix + domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended + that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + bool "Protect outside processes" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to + kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid, + getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + bool "Restrict priority changes" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise + the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of + processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply + removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice" + is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + bool "Deny sysctl writes" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to + write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc + interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + bool "Capability restrictions" + depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT + help + If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a + chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o, + system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable + files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time. + This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this + if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of + tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "chroot_caps" is created. + +endmenu +menu "Kernel Auditing" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + bool "Single group for auditing" + help + If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features + will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended + if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large + amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled, + a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID + int "GID for auditing" + depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + default 1007 + +config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + bool "Exec logging" + help + If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the + other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution + will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track + of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with + name "exec_logging" is created. + WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially + on an active system. + +config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG + bool "Resource logging" + help + If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will + be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current + limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here. + +config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + bool "Log execs within chroot" + help + If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged + to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain + applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and + is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + bool "Chdir logging" + help + If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + bool "(Un)Mount logging" + help + If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the + sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + bool "IPC logging" + help + If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores, + and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + bool "Signal logging" + help + If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as + SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program + occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "signal_logging" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + bool "Fork failure logging" + help + If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged. + This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep + their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option + with name "forkfail_logging" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_TIME + bool "Time change logging" + help + If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "timechange_logging" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR + bool "/proc//ipaddr support" + help + If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/ + directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task. + The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets. + This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response + to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the + process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via + the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns. + +config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL + bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)' + depends on PAX_MPROTECT + help + If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename + of the offending library or binary. The purpose of the feature is + to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and + binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress + of PaX. Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and + never on a production machine, as this option creates an information + leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of + a single memory region. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl + option with name "audit_textrel" is created. + +endmenu + +menu "Executable Protections" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs" + help + If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will + have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system + only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SHM + bool "Destroy unused shared memory" + depends on SYSVIPC + help + If you say Y here, shared memory will be destroyed when no one is + attached to it. Otherwise, resources involved with the shared + memory can be used up and not be associated with any process (as the + shared memory still exists, and the creating process has exited). If + the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "destroy_unused_shm" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_DMESG + bool "Dmesg(8) restriction" + help + If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8) + to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer. + If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is + created. + +config GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + bool "Randomized PIDs" + help + If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be + pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along + with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing + pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part + of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep + those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code + to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_TPE + bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)" + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the + supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted." + These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in + root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option + is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + bool "Partially restrict non-root users" + depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE + help + If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the + group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to + execute files in directories they own that are not group or + world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by + root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "tpe_restrict_all" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID + int "GID for untrusted users" + depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE + default 1005 + help + Here you can choose the GID to enable trusted path protection for. + Remember to add the users you want protection enabled for to the GID + specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose + here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid" is created. + +endmenu +menu "Network Protections" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET + bool "Larger entropy pools" + help + If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux + and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity + features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y + here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying + /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize. + +config GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + bool "Randomized TCP source ports" + default n if GRKERNSEC_LOW || GRKERNSEC_MID + default y if GRKERNSEC_HIGH + help + If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the + fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that + the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing + algorithm. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name + "rand_tcp_src_ports" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET + bool "Socket restrictions" + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options. + If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary + groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch + will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + bool "Deny any sockets to group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server + applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID + int "GID to deny all sockets for" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + default 1004 + help + Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to + add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID + specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you choose + here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_all_gid" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + bool "Deny client sockets to group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be + able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group + you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers + from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a + sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID + int "GID to deny client sockets for" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + default 1003 + help + Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for. + Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to + the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you + choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_client_gid" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + bool "Deny server sockets to group" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will + be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl + option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created. + +config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID + int "GID to deny server sockets for" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + default 1002 + help + Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for. + Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to + the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, whatever you + choose here won't matter. You'll have to specify the GID in your bootup + script by echoing the GID to the proper /proc entry. View the help + on the sysctl option for more information. If the sysctl option is + enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server_gid" is created. + +endmenu +menu "Sysctl support" +depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL + +config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + bool "Sysctl support" + help + If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that + grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your + kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity + to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries + are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value. + All features enabled in the kernel configuration are disabled at boot + if you do not say Y to the "Turn on features by default" option. + All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock entry should + be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set. + *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT* + +config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON + bool "Turn on features by default" + depends on GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + help + If you say Y here, instead of having all features enabled in the + kernel configuration disabled at boot time, the features will be + enabled at boot time. It is recommended you say Y here unless + there is some reason you would want all sysctl-tunable features to + be disabled by default. As mentioned elsewhere, it is important + to enable the grsec_lock entry once you have finished modifying + the sysctl entries. + +endmenu +menu "Logging Options" +depends on GRKERNSEC + +config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME + int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)" + default 10 + help + This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between + grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most + people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough + to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to + prevent flooding. + +config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST + int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)" + default 4 + help + This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed + within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The + default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that + many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to + raise this value. + +endmenu + +endmenu diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton +# during 2001-2005 it has been completely redesigned by Brad Spengler +# into an RBAC system +# +# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel +# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL v2 or higher + +obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \ + grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \ + grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o \ + gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \ + gracl_learn.o grsec_log.o +obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o + +ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +obj-y += grsec_disabled.o +endif + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,3550 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set; +static struct acl_role_label *role_list_head; +static struct name_db name_set; +static struct name_db inodev_set; + +/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we + can share references in the kernel as well +*/ + +static struct dentry *real_root; +static struct vfsmount *real_root_mnt; + +static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set; + +static struct acl_role_label *default_role; + +static u16 acl_sp_role_value; + +extern char *gr_shared_page[4]; +static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem); +rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +struct gr_arg *gr_usermode; + +static unsigned long gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT; + +extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum); +extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG +extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt); +#endif + +extern char * __d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, + struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, + char *buffer, int buflen); + +unsigned char *gr_system_salt; +unsigned char *gr_system_sum; + +static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL; +static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0; + +static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL; + +/* The following are used to keep a place held in the hash table when we move + entries around. They can be replaced during insert. */ + +static struct acl_subject_label *deleted_subject; +static struct acl_object_label *deleted_object; +static struct name_entry *deleted_inodev; + +/* for keeping track of the last and final allocated subjects, since + nested subject parsing is tricky +*/ +static struct acl_subject_label *s_last = NULL; +static struct acl_subject_label *s_final = NULL; + +static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0; +static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL; + +extern int gr_init_uidset(void); +extern void gr_free_uidset(void); +extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid); +extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid); + +__inline__ int +gr_acl_is_enabled(void) +{ + return (gr_status & GR_READY); +} + +char gr_roletype_to_char(void) +{ + switch (current->role->roletype & + (GR_ROLE_DEFAULT | GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP | + GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) { + case GR_ROLE_DEFAULT: + return 'D'; + case GR_ROLE_USER: + return 'U'; + case GR_ROLE_GROUP: + return 'G'; + case GR_ROLE_SPECIAL: + return 'S'; + } + + return 'X'; +} + +__inline__ int +gr_acl_tpe_check(void) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && + grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static int +gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const __u16 lena, const __u16 lenb) +{ + int i; + unsigned long *l1; + unsigned long *l2; + unsigned char *c1; + unsigned char *c2; + int num_longs; + + if (likely(lena != lenb)) + return 0; + + l1 = (unsigned long *)a; + l2 = (unsigned long *)b; + + num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long); + + for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) { + if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2)) + return 0; + } + + c1 = (unsigned char *) l1; + c2 = (unsigned char *) l2; + + i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long)); + + for (; i--; c1++, c2++) { + if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static char * +__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, + char *buf, int buflen) +{ + char *res; + struct dentry *l_dentry = (struct dentry *)dentry; + + /* we can use real_root, real_root_mnt, because this is only called + by the RBAC system */ + res = __d_path(l_dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, real_root, real_root_mnt, buf, buflen); + if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res))) + res = strcpy(buf, ""); + else if (!IS_ROOT(l_dentry) && d_unhashed(l_dentry)) { + unsigned int len; + + /* strip off (deleted) */ + len = strlen(res); + *(res + len - 10) = '\0'; + } + + return res; +} + +static char * +d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt, + char *buf, int buflen) +{ + char *res; + struct dentry *l_dentry = (struct dentry *)dentry; + struct dentry *root; + struct vfsmount *rootmnt; + + /* we can't use real_root, real_root_mnt, because they belong only to the RBAC system */ + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + res = __d_path(l_dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen); + if (unlikely(IS_ERR(res))) + res = strcpy(buf, ""); + else if (!IS_ROOT(l_dentry) && d_unhashed(l_dentry)) { + unsigned int len; + + /* strip off (deleted) */ + len = strlen(res); + *(res + len - 10) = '\0'; + } + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + + dput(root); + mntput(rootmnt); + return res; +} + +char * +gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +char * +gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +char * +gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +char * +gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +char * +gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); +} + +__inline__ __u32 +to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode) +{ + /* masks off auditable permission flags, then shifts them to create + auditing flags, and adds the special case of append auditing if + we're requesting write */ + return (((reqmode & GR_AUDIT_READ) << 10) | ((reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0)); +} + +struct acl_subject_label * +lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp) +{ + unsigned long index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size); + struct subject_map *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; + + while (match && match->user != userp) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size; + match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match != NULL) + return match->kernel; + else + return NULL; +} + +static void +insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap) +{ + unsigned long index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size); + struct subject_map **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + + curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; + + while (*curr) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_map_set.s_size; + curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = subjmap; + + return; +} + +static struct acl_role_label * +lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, + const gid_t gid) +{ + unsigned long index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size); + struct acl_role_label *match; + struct role_allowed_ip *ipp; + int x; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + + while (match) { + if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) { + for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) { + if (match->domain_children[x] == uid) + goto found; + } + } else if (match->uidgid == uid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER) + break; + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } +found: + if (match == NULL) { + try_group: + index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size); + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = 0; + + while (match) { + if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) { + for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) { + if (match->domain_children[x] == gid) + goto found2; + } + } else if (match->uidgid == gid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP) + break; + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } +found2: + if (match == NULL) + match = default_role; + if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) + return match; + else { + for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { + if (likely + ((ntohl(task->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) == + (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask))) + return match; + } + match = default_role; + } + } else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) { + return match; + } else { + for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { + if (likely + ((ntohl(task->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) == + (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask))) + return match; + } + goto try_group; + } + + return match; +} + +struct acl_subject_label * +lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, + const struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = s_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + match = s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match && (match != deleted_subject) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; + struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + struct acl_object_label *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long obj_size = subj->obj_hash_size; + struct acl_object_label **o_hash = subj->obj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + struct acl_object_label *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match && (match != deleted_object) && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) + return match; + + i = 0; + index = fhash(ino, dev, obj_size); + match = o_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev || + (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % obj_size; + match = o_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match && (match != deleted_object) && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static struct name_entry * +lookup_name_entry(const char *name) +{ + __u16 len = strlen(name); + unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); + struct name_entry *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = name_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (match && !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; + match = name_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + return match; +} + +static struct name_entry * +lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry *match; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + match = inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (match && (match != deleted_inodev)) + return match; + else + return NULL; +} + +static void +insert_inodev_entry(struct name_entry *nentry) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(nentry->inode, nentry->device, + inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + + curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_inodev) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + curr = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = nentry; + + return; +} + +static void +__insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role, uid_t uidgid) +{ + unsigned long index = + rhash(uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size); + struct acl_role_label **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + + curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + + while (*curr) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % acl_role_set.r_size; + curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = role; + + return; +} + +static void +insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + int i; + + if (role->roletype & GR_ROLE_DOMAIN) { + for (i = 0; i < role->domain_child_num; i++) + __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->domain_children[i]); + } else + __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->uidgid); +} + +static int +insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device) +{ + struct name_entry **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + __u16 len = strlen(name); + unsigned long index = nhash(name, len, name_set.n_size); + + curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % name_set.n_size; + curr = &name_set.n_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (!(*curr)) { + struct name_entry *nentry = + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); + if (!nentry) + return 0; + nentry->name = name; + nentry->inode = inode; + nentry->device = device; + nentry->len = len; + *curr = nentry; + /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */ + insert_inodev_entry(nentry); + } + + return 1; +} + +static void +insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj, + struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long index = + fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size); + struct acl_object_label **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + + curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_object) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; + curr = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = obj; + + return; +} + +static void +insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label **curr; + unsigned int i = 0; + + curr = &s_hash[index]; + + while (*curr && *curr != deleted_subject) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + curr = &s_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + *curr = obj; + + return; +} + +static void * +create_table(__u32 * len, int elementsize) +{ + unsigned long table_sizes[] = { + 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381, + 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143, + 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689, + 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647 + }; + void *newtable = NULL; + unsigned int pwr = 0; + + while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) && + table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) + pwr++; + + if (table_sizes[pwr] <= (2 * (*len))) + return newtable; + + if ((table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize) <= PAGE_SIZE) + newtable = + kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize, GFP_KERNEL); + else + newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize); + + *len = table_sizes[pwr]; + + return newtable; +} + +static int +init_variables(const struct gr_arg *arg) +{ + unsigned long stacksize; + + subj_map_set.s_size = arg->role_db.num_subjects; + acl_role_set.r_size = arg->role_db.num_roles + arg->role_db.num_domain_children; + name_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects; + inodev_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects; + + if (!gr_init_uidset()) + return 1; + + /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */ + + stacksize = arg->role_db.num_pointers + 5; + + if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize)) + return 1; + + /* create our empty, fake deleted acls */ + deleted_subject = + (struct acl_subject_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); + deleted_object = + (struct acl_object_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); + deleted_inodev = + (struct name_entry *) acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry)); + + if (!deleted_subject || !deleted_object || !deleted_inodev) + return 1; + + memset(deleted_subject, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)); + memset(deleted_object, 0, sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); + memset(deleted_inodev, 0, sizeof (struct name_entry)); + + /* grab reference for the real root dentry and vfsmount */ + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + real_root_mnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + real_root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + + + /* We only want 50% full tables for now */ + + subj_map_set.s_hash = + (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size, sizeof(void *)); + acl_role_set.r_hash = + (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size, sizeof(void *)); + name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size, sizeof(void *)); + inodev_set.n_hash = + (struct name_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.n_size, sizeof(void *)); + + if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash || + !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.n_hash) + return 1; + + memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0, + sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size); + memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size); + memset(name_set.n_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size); + memset(inodev_set.n_hash, 0, + sizeof (struct name_entry *) * inodev_set.n_size); + + return 0; +} + +/* free information not needed after startup + currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects +*/ + +static void +free_init_variables(void) +{ + __u32 i; + + if (subj_map_set.s_hash) { + for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) { + if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) { + kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]); + subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL; + } + } + + if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash); + else + vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash); + } + + return; +} + +static void +free_variables(void) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *s; + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct task_struct *task, *task2; + + gr_clear_learn_entries(); + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + do_each_thread(task2, task) { + task->acl_sp_role = 0; + task->acl_role_id = 0; + task->acl = NULL; + task->role = NULL; + } while_each_thread(task2, task); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + /* release the reference to the real root dentry and vfsmount */ + if (real_root) + dput(real_root); + real_root = NULL; + if (real_root_mnt) + mntput(real_root_mnt); + real_root_mnt = NULL; + + /* free all object hash tables */ + + if (role_list_head) { + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { + if (!r->subj_hash) + break; + for (s = r->hash->first; s; s = s->next) { + if (!s->obj_hash) + break; + if ((s->obj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(s->obj_hash); + else + vfree(s->obj_hash); + } + if ((r->subj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(r->subj_hash); + else + vfree(r->subj_hash); + } + } + + acl_free_all(); + + if (acl_role_set.r_hash) { + if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); + else + vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash); + } + if (name_set.n_hash) { + if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(name_set.n_hash); + else + vfree(name_set.n_hash); + } + + if (inodev_set.n_hash) { + if ((inodev_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <= + PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(inodev_set.n_hash); + else + vfree(inodev_set.n_hash); + } + + gr_free_uidset(); + + memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); + memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db)); + memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db)); + memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db)); + + role_list_head = NULL; + default_role = NULL; + + return; +} + +static __u32 +count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp) +{ + struct acl_object_label o_tmp; + __u32 num = 0; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) + break; + + userp = o_tmp.prev; + num++; + } + + return num; +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role); + +static int +copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj) +{ + struct acl_object_label **guser, *g_tmp, *glast = NULL; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + + if (obj->globbed == NULL) + return 0; + + guser = &obj->globbed; + while (*guser) { + g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label)); + if (g_tmp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser, + sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) + return -EFAULT; + + len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + g_tmp->filename = tmp; + + if (glast) + glast->next = g_tmp; + g_tmp->prev = glast; + *guser = g_tmp; + glast = g_tmp; + guser = &((*guser)->next); + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_object_label *o_tmp; + unsigned int len; + int ret; + char *tmp; + + while (userp) { + if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) + return -EFAULT; + + userp = o_tmp->prev; + + len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + o_tmp->filename = tmp; + + insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj); + if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode, + o_tmp->device)) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (o_tmp->nested) { + o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role); + if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested)) + return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested); + + s_final = o_tmp->nested; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static __u32 +count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp) +{ + struct acl_subject_label s_tmp; + __u32 num = 0; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + break; + + userp = s_tmp.prev; + /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since + they are not included in the hash table, but are + attached to objects. We have already counted + the subjects in userspace for the allocation + stack + */ + if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED)) + num++; + } + + return num; +} + +static int +copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep) +{ + struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; + + ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips; + + while (ruserip) { + rlast = rtmp; + + if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip, + sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) + return -EFAULT; + + ruserip = rtmp->prev; + + if (!rlast) { + rtmp->prev = NULL; + rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp; + } else { + rlast->next = rtmp; + rtmp->prev = rlast; + } + + if (!ruserip) + rtmp->next = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int +copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep) +{ + struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast; + + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + + rusertp = rolep->transitions; + + while (rusertp) { + rlast = rtmp; + + if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp, + sizeof (struct role_transition))) + return -EFAULT; + + rusertp = rtmp->prev; + + len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); + + if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + rtmp->rolename = tmp; + + if (!rlast) { + rtmp->prev = NULL; + rolep->transitions = rtmp; + } else { + rlast->next = rtmp; + rtmp->prev = rlast; + } + + if (!rusertp) + rtmp->next = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + __u32 num_objs; + struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2; + struct gr_hash_struct ghash; + struct subject_map *subjmap; + unsigned long i_num; + int err; + + s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp); + + /* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return + the reference to it, and don't copy it over again + */ + if (s_tmp) + return(s_tmp); + + if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL); + if (subjmap == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + subjmap->user = userp; + subjmap->kernel = s_tmp; + insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap); + + if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + if (!s_last) { + s_tmp->prev = NULL; + role->hash->first = s_tmp; + } else { + s_last->next = s_tmp; + s_tmp->prev = s_last; + } + + s_last = s_tmp; + + len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + s_tmp->filename = tmp; + + if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/")) + role->root_label = s_tmp; + + if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + /* copy user and group transition tables */ + + if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) { + uid_t *uidlist; + + uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)); + if (uidlist == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist; + } + + if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) { + gid_t *gidlist; + + gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)); + if (gidlist == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist; + } + + /* set up object hash table */ + num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first); + + s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs; + s_tmp->obj_hash = + (struct acl_object_label **) + create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size), sizeof(void *)); + + if (!s_tmp->obj_hash) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0, + s_tmp->obj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)); + + /* copy before adding in objects, since a nested + acl could be found and be the final subject + copied + */ + + s_final = s_tmp; + + /* add in objects */ + err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role); + + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + + /* set pointer for parent subject */ + if (s_tmp->parent_subject) { + s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role); + + if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2)) + return s_tmp2; + + s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2; + } + + /* add in ip acls */ + + if (!s_tmp->ip_num) { + s_tmp->ips = NULL; + goto insert; + } + + i_tmp = + (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num * + sizeof (struct + acl_ip_label *)); + + if (!i_tmp) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) { + *(i_tmp + i_num) = + (struct acl_ip_label *) + acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)); + if (!*(i_tmp + i_num)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user + (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num, + sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + + if (copy_from_user + (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2, + sizeof (struct acl_ip_label))) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + s_tmp->ips = i_tmp; + +insert: + if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode, + s_tmp->device)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + return s_tmp; +} + +static int +copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label s_pre; + struct acl_subject_label * ret; + int err; + + while (userp) { + if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp, + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) + return -EFAULT; + + /* do not add nested subjects here, add + while parsing objects + */ + + if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) { + userp = s_pre.prev; + continue; + } + + ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role); + + err = PTR_ERR(ret); + if (IS_ERR(ret)) + return err; + + insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role); + + userp = s_pre.prev; + } + + s_final->next = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int +copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg) +{ + struct acl_role_label **r_utmp, *r_utmp2, *r_tmp = NULL, *r_last; + struct sprole_pw *sptmp; + struct gr_hash_struct *ghash; + uid_t *domainlist; + unsigned long r_num; + unsigned int len; + char *tmp; + int err = 0; + __u16 i; + __u32 num_subjs; + + /* we need a default and kernel role */ + if (arg->role_db.num_roles < 2) + return -EINVAL; + + /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */ + + num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws; + acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *)); + + if (!acl_special_roles) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { + sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw)); + if (!sptmp) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i, + sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + len = + strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); + + if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp); +#endif + sptmp->rolename = tmp; + acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp; + } + + r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table; + + for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.num_roles; r_num++) { + r_last = r_tmp; + + r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label)); + + if (!r_tmp) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2, + sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!r_last) { + r_tmp->prev = NULL; + role_list_head = r_tmp; + } else { + r_last->next = r_tmp; + r_tmp->prev = r_last; + } + + if (r_num == (arg->role_db.num_roles - 1)) + r_tmp->next = NULL; + + len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN); + + if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + r_tmp->rolename = tmp; + + if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default") + && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) { + default_role = r_tmp; + } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) { + kernel_role = r_tmp; + } + + if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + + r_tmp->hash = ghash; + + num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first); + + r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs; + r_tmp->subj_hash = + (struct acl_subject_label **) + create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size), sizeof(void *)); + + if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + + err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp); + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + /* copy domain info */ + if (r_tmp->domain_children != NULL) { + domainlist = acl_alloc(r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t)); + if (domainlist == NULL) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; + } + if (copy_from_user(domainlist, r_tmp->domain_children, r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t))) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto cleanup; + } + r_tmp->domain_children = domainlist; + } + + err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp); + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0, + r_tmp->subj_hash_size * + sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)); + + s_last = NULL; + + err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp); + + if (err) + goto cleanup; + + insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp); + } + + goto return_err; + cleanup: + free_variables(); + return_err: + return err; + +} + +static int +gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args) +{ + int error = 0; + + memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN); + memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN); + + if (init_variables(args)) { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + error = -ENOMEM; + free_variables(); + goto out; + } + + error = copy_user_acl(args); + free_init_variables(); + if (error) { + free_variables(); + goto out; + } + + if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) { + free_variables(); + goto out; + } + + gr_status |= GR_READY; + out: + return error; +} + +/* derived from glibc fnmatch() 0: match, 1: no match*/ + +static int +glob_match(const char *p, const char *n) +{ + char c; + + while ((c = *p++) != '\0') { + switch (c) { + case '?': + if (*n == '\0') + return 1; + else if (*n == '/') + return 1; + break; + case '\\': + if (*n != c) + return 1; + break; + case '*': + for (c = *p++; c == '?' || c == '*'; c = *p++) { + if (*n == '/') + return 1; + else if (c == '?') { + if (*n == '\0') + return 1; + else + ++n; + } + } + if (c == '\0') { + return 0; + } else { + const char *endp; + + if ((endp = strchr(n, '/')) == NULL) + endp = n + strlen(n); + + if (c == '[') { + for (--p; n < endp; ++n) + if (!glob_match(p, n)) + return 0; + } else if (c == '/') { + while (*n != '\0' && *n != '/') + ++n; + if (*n == '/' && !glob_match(p, n + 1)) + return 0; + } else { + for (--p; n < endp; ++n) + if (*n == c && !glob_match(p, n)) + return 0; + } + + return 1; + } + case '[': + { + int not; + char cold; + + if (*n == '\0' || *n == '/') + return 1; + + not = (*p == '!' || *p == '^'); + if (not) + ++p; + + c = *p++; + for (;;) { + unsigned char fn = (unsigned char)*n; + + if (c == '\0') + return 1; + else { + if (c == fn) + goto matched; + cold = c; + c = *p++; + + if (c == '-' && *p != ']') { + unsigned char cend = *p++; + + if (cend == '\0') + return 1; + + if (cold <= fn && fn <= cend) + goto matched; + + c = *p++; + } + } + + if (c == ']') + break; + } + if (!not) + return 1; + break; + matched: + while (c != ']') { + if (c == '\0') + return 1; + + c = *p++; + } + if (not) + return 1; + } + break; + default: + if (c != *n) + return 1; + } + + ++n; + } + + if (*n == '\0') + return 0; + + if (*n == '/') + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed, + struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path) +{ + struct acl_object_label *tmp; + + if (*path == NULL) + *path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt); + + tmp = globbed; + + while (tmp) { + if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path)) + return tmp; + tmp = tmp->next; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +__full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt, + const ino_t curr_ino, const dev_t curr_dev, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj; + struct acl_object_label *retval; + struct acl_object_label *retval2; + + tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj; + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + do { + retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_ino, curr_dev, tmpsubj); + if (retval) { + if (retval->globbed) { + retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry, + (struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path); + if (retval2) + retval = retval2; + } + break; + } + } while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject)); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + return retval; +} + +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * +full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt, + const struct dentry *curr_dentry, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path) +{ + return __full_lookup(orig_dentry, orig_mnt, + curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj, path); +} + +static struct acl_object_label * +__chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; + struct acl_object_label *retval; + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + + for (;;) { + if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt) + break; + + if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + + retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); + if (retval != NULL) + goto out; + + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + + retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); + if (retval != NULL) + goto out; + + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + + retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path); + + if (retval == NULL) + retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, real_root, subj, &path); +out: + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + return retval; +} + +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * +chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + char *path = NULL; + return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path); +} + +static __inline__ struct acl_object_label * +chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path) +{ + return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path); +} + +static struct acl_subject_label * +chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt, + const struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt; + struct acl_subject_label *retval; + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + + for (;;) { + if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt) + break; + if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = + lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (retval != NULL) + goto out; + + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (retval != NULL) + goto out; + + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) { + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(real_root->d_inode->i_ino, + real_root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + } +out: + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + + return retval; +} + +static void +gr_log_learn(const struct task_struct *task, const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode) +{ + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype, + task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry, + task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename, + 1, 1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + + return; +} + +static void +gr_log_learn_id_change(const struct task_struct *task, const char type, const unsigned int real, + const unsigned int effective, const unsigned int fs) +{ + security_learn(GR_ID_LEARN_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype, + task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry, + task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename, + type, real, effective, fs, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + __u32 oldmode, newmode; + __u32 needmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK); + + obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl); + oldmode = obj->mode; + + if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + oldmode |= (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK); + + needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS; + if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) + needmode |= GR_SETID | GR_AUDIT_SETID; + + newmode = + gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + oldmode | needmode); + + needmode = newmode & (GR_FIND | GR_APPEND | GR_WRITE | GR_EXEC | + GR_SETID | GR_READ | GR_FIND | GR_DELETE | + GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT); + + if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID) && !(newmode & GR_SETID)) + goto bad; + + if ((oldmode & needmode) != needmode) + goto bad; + + needmode = oldmode & (GR_NOPTRACE | GR_PTRACERD | GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDITS); + if ((newmode & needmode) != needmode) + goto bad; + + if ((newmode & (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK)) == (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK)) + return newmode; +bad: + needmode = oldmode; + if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) + needmode |= GR_SETID; + + if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) { + gr_log_learn(current, old_dentry, old_mnt, needmode); + return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK); + } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS) + return GR_SUPPRESS; + else + return 0; +} + +__u32 +gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + __u32 retval = mode; + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + struct acl_object_label *currobj; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); + + curracl = current->acl; + + currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl); + retval = currobj->mode & mode; + + if (unlikely + ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE) + && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + retval = new_mode; + + if (new_mode & GR_EXEC && curracl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) + new_mode |= GR_INHERIT; + + if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN)) + gr_log_learn(current, dentry, mnt, new_mode); + } + + return retval; +} + +__u32 +gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent, + const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode) +{ + struct name_entry *match; + struct acl_object_label *matchpo; + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + char *path; + __u32 retval; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS); + + preempt_disable(); + path = gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt); + match = lookup_name_entry(path); + + if (!match) + goto check_parent; + + curracl = current->acl; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (matchpo) { + if ((matchpo->mode & mode) != + (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)) + && curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode); + + preempt_enable(); + return new_mode; + } + preempt_enable(); + return (matchpo->mode & mode); + } + + check_parent: + curracl = current->acl; + + matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path); + retval = matchpo->mode & mode; + + if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))) + && (curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode); + preempt_enable(); + return new_mode; + } + + preempt_enable(); + return retval; +} + +int +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCFIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task)) + return 0; + + if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL) && + task->acl != current->acl) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +void +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + tsk->used_accept = 0; + tsk->acl_sp_role = 0; + tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id; + tsk->acl = current->acl; + tsk->role = current->role; + tsk->curr_ip = current->curr_ip; + if (current->exec_file) + get_file(current->exec_file); + tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file; + tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable; + if (unlikely(current->used_accept)) + current->curr_ip = 0; + + return; +} + +static void +gr_set_proc_res(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *proc; + unsigned short i; + + proc = task->acl; + + if (proc->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < (GR_NLIMITS - 1); i++) { + if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i))) + continue; + + task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur; + task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max; + } + + return; +} + +int +gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs) +{ + unsigned int i; + __u16 num; + uid_t *uidlist; + int curuid; + int realok = 0; + int effectiveok = 0; + int fsok = 0; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'u', real, effective, fs); + + num = current->acl->user_trans_num; + uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions; + + if (uidlist == NULL) + return 0; + + if (real == -1) + realok = 1; + if (effective == -1) + effectiveok = 1; + if (fs == -1) + fsok = 1; + + if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + curuid = (int)uidlist[i]; + if (real == curuid) + realok = 1; + if (effective == curuid) + effectiveok = 1; + if (fs == curuid) + fsok = 1; + } + } else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + curuid = (int)uidlist[i]; + if (real == curuid) + break; + if (effective == curuid) + break; + if (fs == curuid) + break; + } + /* not in deny list */ + if (i == num) { + realok = 1; + effectiveok = 1; + fsok = 1; + } + } + + if (realok && effectiveok && fsok) + return 0; + else { + gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real); + return 1; + } +} + +int +gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs) +{ + unsigned int i; + __u16 num; + gid_t *gidlist; + int curgid; + int realok = 0; + int effectiveok = 0; + int fsok = 0; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'g', real, effective, fs); + + num = current->acl->group_trans_num; + gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions; + + if (gidlist == NULL) + return 0; + + if (real == -1) + realok = 1; + if (effective == -1) + effectiveok = 1; + if (fs == -1) + fsok = 1; + + if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + curgid = (int)gidlist[i]; + if (real == curgid) + realok = 1; + if (effective == curgid) + effectiveok = 1; + if (fs == curgid) + fsok = 1; + } + } else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) { + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { + curgid = (int)gidlist[i]; + if (real == curgid) + break; + if (effective == curgid) + break; + if (fs == curgid) + break; + } + /* not in deny list */ + if (i == num) { + realok = 1; + effectiveok = 1; + fsok = 1; + } + } + + if (realok && effectiveok && fsok) + return 0; + else { + gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real); + return 1; + } +} + +void +gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid) +{ + struct acl_role_label *role = task->role; + struct acl_subject_label *subj = NULL; + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct file *filp; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + filp = task->exec_file; + + /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */ + if (unlikely(!filp)) { + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; + return; + } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) + role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid); + + /* perform subject lookup in possibly new role + we can use this result below in the case where role == task->role + */ + subj = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, role); + + /* if we changed uid/gid, but result in the same role + and are using inheritance, don't lose the inherited subject + if current subject is other than what normal lookup + would result in, we arrived via inheritance, don't + lose subject + */ + if (role != task->role || (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) && + (subj == task->acl))) + task->acl = subj; + + task->role = role; + + task->is_writable = 0; + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); +#endif + + gr_set_proc_res(task); + + return; +} + +int +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + struct acl_subject_label *newacl; + struct acl_object_label *obj; + __u32 retmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role); + + task_lock(task); + if (((task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(task->acl->mode & + GR_POVERRIDE) && (task->acl != newacl) && + !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) && + !gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt) && + !(task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) || + (atomic_read(&task->fs->count) > 1 || + atomic_read(&task->files->count) > 1 || + atomic_read(&task->sighand->count) > 1)) { + task_unlock(task); + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return -EACCES; + } + task_unlock(task); + + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl); + retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT); + + if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) && + ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT))) { + if (obj->nested) + task->acl = obj->nested; + else + task->acl = newacl; + } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT) + gr_log_str_fs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, task->acl->filename, dentry, mnt); + + task->is_writable = 0; + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + + gr_set_proc_res(task); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); +#endif + return 0; +} + +static void +do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) +{ + struct acl_object_label *matchpo; + struct acl_subject_label *matchps; + struct acl_subject_label *i; + struct acl_role_label *role; + + for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { + for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) { + if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) && + (i->inode == ino) && + (i->device == dev))) + i->mode |= GR_DELETED; + if (unlikely((matchpo = + lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, i)) != NULL)) + matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED; + } + + if (unlikely((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL)) + matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED; + } + + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) +{ + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev))) + do_handle_delete(ino, dev); + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + return; +} + +static void +update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice, + struct acl_subject_label *subj) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size); + struct acl_object_label **match; + struct acl_object_label *tmp; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + + while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || + (*match)->device != olddevice || + !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj->obj_hash_size; + match = &subj->obj_hash[index]; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + } + + if (*match && ((*match) != deleted_object) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice) + && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { + tmp = *match; + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; + + *match = deleted_object; + + insert_acl_obj_label(tmp, subj); + } + + return; +} + +static void +update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice, + struct acl_role_label *role) +{ + struct acl_subject_label **s_hash = role->subj_hash; + unsigned long subj_size = role->subj_hash_size; + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj_size); + struct acl_subject_label **match; + struct acl_subject_label *tmp; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = &s_hash[index]; + + while (*match && ((*match)->inode != oldinode || + (*match)->device != olddevice || + !((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED))) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % subj_size; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + match = &s_hash[index]; + } + + if (*match && (*match != deleted_subject) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice) + && ((*match)->mode & GR_DELETED)) { + tmp = *match; + + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + tmp->mode &= ~GR_DELETED; + + *match = deleted_subject; + + insert_acl_subj_label(tmp, role); + } + + return; +} + +static void +update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice, + const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice) +{ + unsigned long index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.n_size); + struct name_entry **match; + struct name_entry *tmp; + unsigned int i = 0; + + match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + + while (*match + && ((*match)->inode != oldinode + || (*match)->device != olddevice)) { + index = (index + (1 << i)) % inodev_set.n_size; + i = (i + 1) % 32; + match = &inodev_set.n_hash[index]; + } + + if (*match && (*match != deleted_inodev) + && ((*match)->inode == oldinode) + && ((*match)->device == olddevice)) { + tmp = *match; + + tmp->inode = newinode; + tmp->device = newdevice; + + *match = deleted_inodev; + + insert_inodev_entry(tmp); + } + + return; +} + +static void +do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *i; + struct acl_role_label *role; + + for (role = role_list_head; role; role = role->next) { + update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role); + + for (i = role->hash->first; i; i = i->next) { + if (unlikely((i->mode & GR_NESTED) && + (i->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) && + (i->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev))) { + i->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino; + i->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev; + } + update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, i); + } + } + + update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device, + dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); + + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + struct name_entry *matchn; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + preempt_enable(); + + if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) { + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt); + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + } + + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) +{ + struct name_entry *matchn; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename(new_dentry, mnt)); + preempt_enable(); + + /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for + NFS silly-renaming + */ + + write_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) { + if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && + (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) + do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); + } + + if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && + (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1))) + do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev); + + if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) + do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt); + + write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + return; +} + +static int +lookup_special_role_auth(const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt, + unsigned char **sum) +{ + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct role_allowed_ip *ipp; + struct role_transition *trans; + __u16 i; + int found = 0; + + /* check transition table */ + + for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!found) + return 0; + + /* handle special roles that do not require authentication + and check ip */ + + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) && + (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) { + found = 0; + if (r->allowed_ips != NULL) { + for (ipp = r->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) { + if ((ntohl(current->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) == + (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)) + found = 1; + } + } else + found = 2; + if (!found) + return 0; + + if (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW) { + *salt = NULL; + *sum = NULL; + return 1; + } + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) { + if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) { + *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt; + *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void +assign_special_role(char *rolename) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct acl_role_label *r; + struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL; + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct file *filp; + + for (r = role_list_head; r; r = r->next) + if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) && + (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) + assigned = r; + + if (!assigned) + return; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + + tsk = current->parent; + if (tsk == NULL) { + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return; + } + + filp = tsk->exec_file; + if (filp == NULL) { + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return; + } + + tsk->is_writable = 0; + + acl_sp_role_value = (acl_sp_role_value % 65535) + 1; + tsk->acl_sp_role = 1; + tsk->acl_role_id = acl_sp_role_value; + tsk->role = assigned; + tsk->acl = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role); + + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + tsk->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + tsk->is_writable = 1; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid); +#endif + + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return; +} + +int gr_check_secure_terminal(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct task_struct *p, *p2, *p3; + struct files_struct *files; + struct file *our_file = NULL, *file; + int i; + + if (task->signal->tty == NULL) + return 1; + + task_lock(task); + files = task->files; + if (files != NULL) { + spin_lock(&files->file_lock); + for (i=0; i < files->max_fds; i++) { + file = fcheck_files(files, i); + if (file && (our_file == NULL) && (file->private_data == task->signal->tty)) { + get_file(file); + our_file = file; + } + } + spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + } + task_unlock(task); + + if (our_file == NULL) + return 1; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + do_each_thread(p2, p) { + task_lock(p); + files = p->files; + if (files == NULL || + (p->signal && p->signal->tty == task->signal->tty)) { + task_unlock(p); + continue; + } + spin_lock(&files->file_lock); + for (i=0; i < files->max_fds; i++) { + file = fcheck_files(files, i); + if (file && S_ISCHR(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev == our_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev) { + p3 = task; + while (p3->pid > 0) { + if (p3 == p) + break; + p3 = p3->parent; + } + if (p3 == p) + break; + gr_log_ttysniff(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG, p); + gr_handle_alertkill(p); + spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + task_unlock(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + fput(our_file); + return 0; + } + } + spin_unlock(&files->file_lock); + task_unlock(p); + } while_each_thread(p2, p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + fput(our_file); + return 1; +} + +ssize_t +write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct gr_arg_wrapper uwrap; + unsigned char *sprole_salt; + unsigned char *sprole_sum; + int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper); + int error2 = 0; + + down(&gr_dev_sem); + + if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper)) { + gr_log_int_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, (int)count, (int)sizeof(struct gr_arg_wrapper)); + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + + if (gr_auth_expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), gr_auth_expires)) { + gr_auth_expires = 0; + gr_auth_attempts = 0; + } + + if (copy_from_user(&uwrap, buf, sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper))) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + if ((uwrap.version != (GRSECURITY_VERSION | (6 << 16))) || (uwrap.size != sizeof(struct gr_arg))) { + error = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + + if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, uwrap.arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) { + error = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES && + time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) { + error = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + + /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role, + do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication + locking + */ + + if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != STATUS && + gr_usermode->mode != UNSPROLE && current->uid) { + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + + /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */ + + gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0'; + gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0'; + + /* Okay. + * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet + * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables + * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */ + + switch (gr_usermode->mode) { + case STATUS: + if (gr_status & GR_READY) { + error = 1; + if (!gr_check_secure_terminal(current)) + error = 3; + } else + error = 2; + goto out; + case SHUTDOWN: + if ((gr_status & GR_READY) + && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { + gr_status &= ~GR_READY; + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG); + free_variables(); + memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg)); + memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN); + memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN); + } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG); + error = -EPERM; + } else { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG); + error = -EAGAIN; + } + break; + case ENABLE: + if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + else { + if (gr_status & GR_READY) + error = -EAGAIN; + else + error = error2; + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + } + break; + case RELOAD: + if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + error = -EAGAIN; + } else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { + lock_kernel(); + gr_status &= ~GR_READY; + free_variables(); + if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) { + unlock_kernel(); + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + } else { + unlock_kernel(); + error = error2; + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + } + } else { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION); + error = -EPERM; + } + break; + case SEGVMOD: + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG); + error = -EAGAIN; + break; + } + + if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG); + if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) { + struct acl_subject_label *segvacl; + segvacl = + lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode, + gr_usermode->segv_device, + current->role); + if (segvacl) { + segvacl->crashes = 0; + segvacl->expires = 0; + } + } else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) { + gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid); + } + } else { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG); + error = -EPERM; + } + break; + case SPROLE: + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG); + error = -EAGAIN; + break; + } + + if (current->role->expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), current->role->expires)) { + current->role->expires = 0; + current->role->auth_attempts = 0; + } + + if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES && + time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) { + error = -EBUSY; + goto out; + } + + if (lookup_special_role_auth + (gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum) + && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum) + || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) { + char *p = ""; + assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + if (current->parent) + p = current->parent->role->rolename; + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG, + p, acl_sp_role_value); + } else { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role); + error = -EPERM; + if(!(current->role->auth_attempts++)) + current->role->expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT; + + goto out; + } + break; + case UNSPROLE: + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG); + error = -EAGAIN; + break; + } + + if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) { + char *p = ""; + int i = 0; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + if (current->parent) { + p = current->parent->role->rolename; + i = current->parent->acl_role_id; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG, p, i); + gr_set_acls(1); + } else { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename); + error = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + break; + default: + gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode); + error = -EINVAL; + break; + } + + if (error != -EPERM) + goto out; + + if(!(gr_auth_attempts++)) + gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT; + + out: + up(&gr_dev_sem); + return error; +} + +int +gr_set_acls(const int type) +{ + struct acl_object_label *obj; + struct task_struct *task, *task2; + struct file *filp; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + do_each_thread(task2, task) { + /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler, + if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin + ACL */ + + if (type && (task->role != current->role || + task->acl_role_id != current->acl_role_id)) + continue; + + task->acl_role_id = 0; + task->acl_sp_role = 0; + + if ((filp = task->exec_file)) { + task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid); + + task->acl = + chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, + task->role); + if (task->acl) { + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + curr = task->acl; + + task->is_writable = 0; + /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable + by the default ACL */ + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE)) + task->is_writable = 1; + + gr_set_proc_res(task); + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG + printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename); +#endif + } else { + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, task->pid); + return 1; + } + } else { + // it's a kernel process + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN + task->acl->mode &= ~GR_FIND; +#endif + } + } while_each_thread(task2, task); + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return 0; +} + +void +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *acl; + + if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) && + task->acl && (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)))) + goto skip_reslog; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG + gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt); +#endif + skip_reslog: + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted)) + return; + + acl = task->acl; + + if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) || + !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res)))) + return; + + if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) { + unsigned long res_add; + + res_add = wanted; + switch (res) { + case RLIMIT_CPU: + res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_FSIZE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_DATA: + res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_STACK: + res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_CORE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_RSS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_NPROC: + res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_NOFILE: + res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK: + res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_AS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP; + break; + case RLIMIT_LOCKS: + res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP; + break; + } + + acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add; + + if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max) + acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add; + + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, + task->role->roletype, acl->filename, + acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max, + "", (unsigned long) res); + } + + return; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS +void +pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + struct acl_subject_label *proc; + unsigned long flags; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return; + + flags = pax_get_flags(task); + + proc = task->acl; + + if (proc->mode & GR_PAXPAGE) + flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC; + if (proc->mode & GR_PAXSEGM) + flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC; + if (proc->mode & GR_PAXGCC) + flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP; + if (proc->mode & GR_PAXMPROTECT) + flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT; + if (proc->mode & GR_PAXRANDMMAP) + flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDMMAP; + + pax_set_flags(task, flags); + + return; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root; + +/* the following function is called under the BKL */ + +__u32 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval, + const void *newval) +{ + struct proc_dir_entry *tmp; + struct nameidata nd; + const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys"; + char *path; + struct acl_object_label *obj; + unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i; + __u32 err = 0; + __u32 mode = 0; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 1; + + path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()); + + if (oldval) + mode |= GR_READ; + if (newval) + mode |= GR_WRITE; + + /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */ + + for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) { + len += strlen(tmp->name); + len++; + depth++; + } + + if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE) + return 0; /* deny */ + + memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + + memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys)); + + pos += strlen(proc_sys); + + for (; depth > 0; depth--) { + path[pos] = '/'; + pos++; + for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; + tmp = tmp->parent) { + if (depth == i) { + memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name, + strlen(tmp->name)); + pos += strlen(tmp->name); + } + i++; + } + } + + err = path_lookup(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd); + + if (err) + goto out; + + obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl); + err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) && + ((err & mode) != mode))) { + __u32 new_mode = mode; + + new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS); + + err = new_mode; + gr_log_learn(current, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, new_mode); + } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) { + gr_log_str4(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied", + path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", + (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : ""); + err = 0; + } else if ((err & mode) != mode) { + err = 0; + } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_str4(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful", + path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "", + (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : ""); + } + + path_release(&nd); + + out: + return err; +} +#endif + +int +gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct file *filp; + struct task_struct *tmp = task; + struct task_struct *curtemp = current; + __u32 retmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + filp = task->exec_file; + + while (tmp->pid > 0) { + if (tmp == curtemp) + break; + tmp = tmp->parent; + } + + if (!filp || (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE))) { + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + return 1; + } + + retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt); + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) + return 1; + + if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) + && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label + && current->pid != task->pid))) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) +{ + struct task_struct *tmp = task; + struct task_struct *curtemp = current; + __u32 retmode; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 0; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + while (tmp->pid > 0) { + if (tmp == curtemp) + break; + tmp = tmp->parent; + } + + if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) { + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task); + return 1; + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + if (unlikely(!task->exec_file)) { + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + return 0; + } + + retmode = gr_search_file(task->exec_file->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt); + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + + if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) { + gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task); + return 1; + } + + if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) { + switch (request) { + case PTRACE_POKETEXT: + case PTRACE_POKEDATA: + case PTRACE_POKEUSR: +#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) && !defined(CONFIG_IA64) + case PTRACE_SETREGS: + case PTRACE_SETFPREGS: +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS: +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC + case PTRACE_SETVRREGS: +#endif + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } + } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) && + !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) && + (current->acl != task->acl)) { + gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int is_writable_mmap(const struct file *filp) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2; + + if (gr_status & GR_READY && !(task->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) && + !task->is_writable) { + obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label); + obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, + task->role->root_label); + if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) + return 1; + + if (is_writable_mmap(file)) + return 0; + + mode = + gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, + GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, + file->f_vfsmnt); + + if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC))) + return 1; + + if (is_writable_mmap(file)) + return 0; + + mode = + gr_search_file(file->f_dentry, + GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS, + file->f_vfsmnt); + + if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || (!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!gr_tpe_allow(file) || !(mode & GR_EXEC))) { + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) +{ + unsigned long runtime; + unsigned long cputime; + unsigned int wday, cday; + __u8 whr, chr; + __u8 wmin, cmin; + __u8 wsec, csec; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl || + !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT))) + return; + + runtime = xtime.tv_sec - task->start_time.tv_sec; + wday = runtime / (3600 * 24); + runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24); + whr = runtime / 3600; + runtime -= whr * 3600; + wmin = runtime / 60; + runtime -= wmin * 60; + wsec = runtime; + + cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ; + cday = cputime / (3600 * 24); + cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24); + chr = cputime / 3600; + cputime -= chr * 3600; + cmin = cputime / 60; + cputime -= cmin * 60; + csec = cputime; + + gr_log_procacct(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, code); + + return; +} + +void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (gr_status & GR_READY) { + task->role = kernel_role; + task->acl = kernel_role->root_label; + } + return; +} + +int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino) +{ + struct task_struct *task = current; + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt; + struct acl_object_label *obj, *tmp; + struct acl_subject_label *subj; + unsigned int cnt; + char *path; + + if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) + return 1; + + if (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + return 1; + + subj = task->acl; + do { + obj = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj); + if (obj != NULL) + return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0; + } while ((subj = subj->parent_subject)); + + obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl); + if (obj->globbed == NULL) + return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0; + + preempt_disable(); + path = d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()), + PAGE_SIZE); + cnt = strlen(path); + if ((cnt + namelen + 2) <= PAGE_SIZE) { + *(path + cnt) = '/'; + + memcpy(path + cnt + 1, name, namelen); + *(path + cnt + namelen + 1) = '\0'; + + tmp = obj->globbed; + while (tmp) { + if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, path)) { + preempt_enable(); + return (tmp->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0; + } + tmp = tmp->next; + } + preempt_enable(); + return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0; + } + preempt_enable(); + + return 1; +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change); +#endif + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1; +static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1; +static void **alloc_stack; + +static __inline__ int +alloc_pop(void) +{ + if (alloc_stack_next == 1) + return 0; + + kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]); + + alloc_stack_next--; + + return 1; +} + +static __inline__ void +alloc_push(void *buf) +{ + if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size) + BUG(); + + alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf; + + alloc_stack_next++; + + return; +} + +void * +acl_alloc(unsigned long len) +{ + void *ret; + + if (len > PAGE_SIZE) + BUG(); + + ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (ret) + alloc_push(ret); + + return ret; +} + +void +acl_free_all(void) +{ + if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack) + return; + + while (alloc_pop()) ; + + if (alloc_stack) { + if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + kfree(alloc_stack); + else + vfree(alloc_stack); + } + + alloc_stack = NULL; + alloc_stack_size = 1; + alloc_stack_next = 1; + + return; +} + +int +acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size) +{ + if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE) + alloc_stack = + (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL); + else + alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *)); + + alloc_stack_size = size; + + if (!alloc_stack) + return 0; + else + return 1; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const char *captab_log[29] = { + "CAP_CHOWN", + "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE", + "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH", + "CAP_FOWNER", + "CAP_FSETID", + "CAP_KILL", + "CAP_SETGID", + "CAP_SETUID", + "CAP_SETPCAP", + "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE", + "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE", + "CAP_NET_BROADCAST", + "CAP_NET_ADMIN", + "CAP_NET_RAW", + "CAP_IPC_LOCK", + "CAP_IPC_OWNER", + "CAP_SYS_MODULE", + "CAP_SYS_RAWIO", + "CAP_SYS_CHROOT", + "CAP_SYS_PTRACE", + "CAP_SYS_PACCT", + "CAP_SYS_ADMIN", + "CAP_SYS_BOOT", + "CAP_SYS_NICE", + "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE", + "CAP_SYS_TIME", + "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG", + "CAP_MKNOD", + "CAP_LEASE" +}; + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable); + +int +gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0; + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return 1; + + curracl = task->acl; + + cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower; + cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask; + + while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) { + if (!(cap_mask & (1 << cap)) && (curracl->cap_mask & (1 << cap))) + cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (1 << cap); + cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask; + } + + if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap)) + return 1; + + curracl = task->acl; + + if ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) + && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) { + security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, + task->role->roletype, task->uid, + task->gid, task->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, + task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename, + curracl->filename, 0UL, + 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip)); + return 1; + } + + if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < 29) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) + gr_log_cap(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, task, captab_log[cap]); + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0; + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return 1; + + curracl = current->acl; + + cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower; + cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask; + + while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) { + cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask); + cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask; + } + + if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap)) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,423 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) + return GR_FIND; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); + + if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND))) + return 0; + + return GR_FIND; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND; + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode)) + return reqmode; + + if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) + reqmode |= GR_APPEND; + else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE)) + reqmode |= GR_WRITE; + if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, + mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : ""); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : ""); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct dentry * p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + __u32 mode; + + if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND)) + reqmode |= GR_APPEND; + if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY))) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) + reqmode |= GR_SETID; + + mode = + gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt, + reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : ""); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode & + GR_APPEND ? " appending" : ""); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND; + + if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + reqmode |= GR_EXEC; + if (fmode & S_IWOTH) + reqmode |= GR_WRITE; + if (fmode & S_IROTH) + reqmode |= GR_READ; + + mode = + gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, + mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", + reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : ""); + return reqmode; + } else + if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) + { + gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt, + reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "", + reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "", + reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : ""); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode)) + return 0; + + return reqmode; +} + +static __u32 generic_fs_handler(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt) +{ + __u32 mode; + + mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) + return 0; + + return (reqmode); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely(dentry->d_inode && S_ISSOCK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))) + return 1; + + if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, + GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } else { + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) { + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID, + GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } else { + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG); + } +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE, + GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG); +} + +/* hardlinks require at minimum create permission, + any additional privilege required is based on the + privilege of the file being linked to +*/ +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) +{ + __u32 mode; + __u32 needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_LINK; + __u32 needaudit = GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_LINK; + + mode = + gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry, + old_mnt); + + if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && (mode & needaudit))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) +{ + __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + __u32 mode; + + mode = + gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | + GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode)) + return 0; + + return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE); +} + +static __u32 generic_fs_create_handler(const struct dentry *new_dentry, const struct dentry *parent_dentry, const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt) +{ + __u32 mode; + + mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS); + + if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt); + return mode; + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt); + return 0; + } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode))) + return 0; + + return (reqmode); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const int mode) +{ + __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE; + if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))) + reqmode |= GR_SETID; + + return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG); +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt) +{ + return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG); +} + +#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \ + (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \ + ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ))) + +int +gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *old_parent_inode, + struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) +{ + __u32 comp1, comp2; + int error = 0; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + if (!new_dentry->d_inode) { + comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, + GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ | + GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS); + comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | + GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | + GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); + } else { + comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE | + GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | + GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt); + comp2 = + gr_search_file(old_dentry, + GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ | + GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | + GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt); + } + + if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && + ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS))) + gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname); + else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS) + && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) { + gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname); + error = -EACCES; + } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2))) + error = -EACCES; + + return error; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_exit(void) +{ + u16 id; + char *rolename; + struct file *exec_file; + + if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) { + id = current->acl_role_id; + rolename = current->role->rolename; + gr_set_acls(1); + gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, rolename, id); + } + + write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + exec_file = current->exec_file; + current->exec_file = NULL; + write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + + if (exec_file) + fput(exec_file); +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define GR_BIND 0x01 +#define GR_CONNECT 0x02 + +static const char * gr_protocols[256] = { + "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt", + "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet", + "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1", + "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp", + "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++", + "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre", + "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile", + "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63", + "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv", + "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak", + "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf", + "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp", + "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim", + "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip", + "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp", + "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup", + "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135", + "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143", + "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151", + "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159", + "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167", + "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175", + "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183", + "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191", + "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199", + "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207", + "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215", + "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223", + "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231", + "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239", + "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247", + "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255", + }; + +static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = { + "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6", + "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet" + }; + +const char * +gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto) +{ + return gr_protocols[proto]; +} + +const char * +gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type) +{ + return gr_socktypes[type]; +} + +int +gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + goto exit; + + if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET) + || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255)) + goto exit; // let the kernel handle it + + curr = current->acl; + + if (!curr->ips) + goto exit; + + if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) && + (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32)))) + goto exit; + + if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) { + /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes + dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not + bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */ + if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) { + __u32 fakeip = 0; + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, + protocol, GR_CONNECT, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) { + __u32 fakeip = 0; + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type, + protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + } + /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */ + goto exit; + } + + gr_log_str3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet", + gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol)); + + return 0; + exit: + return 1; +} + +static __inline__ int +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + struct acl_ip_label *ip; + unsigned long i; + __u32 ip_addr = 0; + __u16 ip_port = 0; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET)) + return 1; + + curr = current->acl; + + if (!curr->ips) + return 1; + + ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr; + ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port); + + for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) { + ip = *(curr->ips + i); + if ((ip->mode & mode) && + (ip_port >= ip->low) && + (ip_port <= ip->high) && + ((ntohl(ip_addr) & ip->netmask) == + (ntohl(ip->addr) & ip->netmask)) + && (ip-> + proto[sk->sk_protocol / 32] & (1 << (sk->sk_protocol % 32))) + && (ip->type & (1 << type))) + return 1; + } + + if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) { + security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename, + current->role->roletype, current->uid, + current->gid, current->exec_file ? + gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry, + current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : + curr->filename, curr->filename, + NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type, + sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + return 1; + } + + if (mode == GR_BIND) + gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol)); + else if (mode == GR_CONNECT) + gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol)); + + return 0; +} + +int +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); +} + +int +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type); +} + +int gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr; + addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type); +} + +int gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock) +{ + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + struct sockaddr_in addr; + + addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr; + addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type); +} + +int +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + if (addr) + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM); + else { + struct sockaddr_in sin; + const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); + + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr; + sin.sin_port = inet->dport; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); + } +} + +int +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sockaddr_in sin; + + if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr))) + return 1; // skip this packet + + sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr; + sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source; + + return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM); +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos); +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); + +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait); +static int gr_learn_attached; + +/* use a 512k buffer */ +#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024) + +static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem); + +/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn + uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts + use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep +*/ +static char *learn_buffer; +static char *learn_buffer_user; +static int learn_buffer_len; +static int learn_buffer_user_len; + +static ssize_t +read_learn(struct file *file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos) +{ + DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current); + ssize_t retval = 0; + + add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + do { + down(&gr_learn_user_sem); + spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); + if (learn_buffer_len) + break; + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + up(&gr_learn_user_sem); + if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) { + retval = -EAGAIN; + goto out; + } + if (signal_pending(current)) { + retval = -ERESTARTSYS; + goto out; + } + + schedule(); + } while (1); + + memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len); + learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len; + retval = learn_buffer_len; + learn_buffer_len = 0; + + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + + if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len)) + retval = -EFAULT; + + up(&gr_learn_user_sem); +out: + set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait); + return retval; +} + +static unsigned int +poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait) +{ + poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait); + + if (learn_buffer_len) + return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM); + + return 0; +} + +void +gr_clear_learn_entries(void) +{ + char *tmp; + + down(&gr_learn_user_sem); + if (learn_buffer != NULL) { + spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); + tmp = learn_buffer; + learn_buffer = NULL; + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + vfree(learn_buffer); + } + if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) { + vfree(learn_buffer_user); + learn_buffer_user = NULL; + } + learn_buffer_len = 0; + up(&gr_learn_user_sem); + + return; +} + +void +gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + unsigned int len; + + if (!gr_learn_attached) + return; + + spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); + + /* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to + compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append + */ + if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) { + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait); + return; + } + if (learn_buffer == NULL) { + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + return; + } + + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + learn_buffer_len += len + 1; + + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait); + + return; +} + +static int +open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached) + return -EBUSY; + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { + down(&gr_learn_user_sem); + if (learn_buffer == NULL) + learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE); + if (learn_buffer_user == NULL) + learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE); + if (learn_buffer == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + if (learn_buffer_user == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + learn_buffer_len = 0; + learn_buffer_user_len = 0; + gr_learn_attached = 1; + up(&gr_learn_user_sem); + } + return 0; +} + +static int +close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + char *tmp; + + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { + down(&gr_learn_user_sem); + if (learn_buffer != NULL) { + spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock); + tmp = learn_buffer; + learn_buffer = NULL; + spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock); + vfree(tmp); + } + if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) { + vfree(learn_buffer_user); + learn_buffer_user = NULL; + } + learn_buffer_len = 0; + learn_buffer_user_len = 0; + gr_learn_attached = 0; + up(&gr_learn_user_sem); + } + + return 0; +} + +struct file_operations grsec_fops = { + .read = read_learn, + .write = write_grsec_handler, + .open = open_learn, + .release = close_learn, + .poll = poll_learn, +}; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static const char *restab_log[11] = { + "RLIMIT_CPU", + "RLIMIT_FSIZE", + "RLIMIT_DATA", + "RLIMIT_STACK", + "RLIMIT_CORE", + "RLIMIT_RSS", + "RLIMIT_NPROC", + "RLIMIT_NOFILE", + "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK", + "RLIMIT_AS", + "RLIMIT_LOCKS" +}; + +void +gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) +{ + if (res == RLIMIT_NPROC && + (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || + cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))) + return; + else if (res == RLIMIT_MEMLOCK && + cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + + if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur) || + (!gt && wanted >= task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) && + task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY)) + gr_log_res_ulong2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RESOURCE_MSG, task, wanted, restab_log[res], task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur); + + preempt_enable_no_resched(); + + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,297 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static struct crash_uid *uid_set; +static unsigned short uid_used; +static rwlock_t gr_uid_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock; +extern struct acl_subject_label * + lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev, + struct acl_role_label *role); +extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t); + +int +gr_init_uidset(void) +{ + uid_set = + kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL); + uid_used = 0; + + return uid_set ? 1 : 0; +} + +void +gr_free_uidset(void) +{ + if (uid_set) + kfree(uid_set); + + return; +} + +int +gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set; + uid_t buid; + int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid; + + while (high >= low) { + mid = (low + high) >> 1; + buid = tmp[mid].uid; + if (buid == uid) + return mid; + if (buid > uid) + high = mid - 1; + if (buid < uid) + low = mid + 1; + } + + return -1; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_insertsort(void) +{ + unsigned short i, j; + struct crash_uid index; + + for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) { + index = uid_set[i]; + j = i; + while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) { + uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1]; + j--; + } + uid_set[j] = index; + } + + return; +} + +static __inline__ void +gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires) +{ + int loc; + + if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX) + return; + + loc = gr_find_uid(uid); + + if (loc >= 0) { + uid_set[loc].expires = expires; + return; + } + + uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid; + uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires; + uid_used++; + + gr_insertsort(); + + return; +} + +void +gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc) +{ + unsigned short i; + + for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++) + uid_set[i - i] = uid_set[i]; + + uid_used--; + + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + int loc; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + read_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + loc = gr_find_uid(uid); + read_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + + if (loc < 0) + return 0; + + write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds())) + gr_remove_uid(loc); + else { + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + return 1; + } + + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + return 0; +} + +static __inline__ int +proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid || + task->uid != task->fsuid) + return 1; + if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid || + task->gid != task->fsgid) + return 1; + + return 0; +} +static __inline__ int +gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t) +{ + unsigned long int flags; + int ret; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); + if (sigismember(&t->blocked, sig) || t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) { + t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL; + sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig); + recalc_sigpending_tsk(t); + } + ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); + + return ret; +} + +void +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + struct acl_subject_label *curr2; + struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2; + + if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL) + return; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return; + + curr = task->acl; + + if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES))) + return; + + if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { + curr->expires = 0; + curr->crashes = 0; + } + + curr->crashes++; + + if (!curr->expires) + curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max; + + if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && + time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { + if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) { + gr_log_crash1(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max); + write_lock(&gr_uid_lock); + gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires); + write_unlock(&gr_uid_lock); + curr->expires = 0; + curr->crashes = 0; + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) { + if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk); + } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } else { + gr_log_crash2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) { + if (likely(tsk != task)) { + curr2 = tsk->acl; + + if (curr2->device == curr->device && + curr2->inode == curr->inode) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk); + } + } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } + } + + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curr; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return 0; + + read_lock(&gr_inode_lock); + curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, + current->role); + read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock); + + if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) || + (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires)) + return 0; + + if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) && + time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) + return 1; + else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) { + curr->crashes = 0; + curr->expires = 0; + } + + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct acl_subject_label *curracl; + __u32 curr_ip; + struct task_struct *p, *p2; + + if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled())) + return; + + curracl = task->acl; + curr_ip = task->curr_ip; + + if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip) { + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + do_each_thread(p2, p) { + if (p->curr_ip == curr_ip) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, p); + } while_each_thread(p2, p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC) + gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task); + + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return 1; + + task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid); + + if (unlikely(!task)) + task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid); + + if (unlikely(task && (time_before((unsigned long)task->start_time.tv_sec, (unsigned long)shm_createtime) || + (task->pid == shm_lapid)) && + (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) && + (task->acl != current->acl))) { + gr_log_int3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group && + in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir && + !grsec_enable_group)) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, dentry, mnt); + } +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + struct pid *spid = NULL; + + if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix)) + return 1; + + if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) + return 1; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + + spid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, pid); + if (spid) { + struct task_struct *p; + p = pid_task(&spid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID); + task_lock(p); + if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) { + task_unlock(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG); + return 0; + } + task_unlock(p); + } + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + return 1; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_nice(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (niceval < task_nice(p)) + && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) && + inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + return 1; +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || !current->fs || + !proc_is_chrooted(current) || !p) + return 0; + + task_lock(p); + if ((p->exit_state & (EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD)) || + (p->fs && !have_same_root(current, p))) { + task_unlock(p); + return 1; + } + task_unlock(p); +#endif + return 0; +} + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted); + +#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR) +int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt; + struct dentry *realroot; + struct vfsmount *realrootmnt; + struct dentry *currentroot; + struct vfsmount *currentmnt; + + read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt); + realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root); + read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock); + + read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); + currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt); + currentroot = dget(current->fs->root); + read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + for (;;) { + if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) + || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt))) + break; + if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) { + if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt) + break; + dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; + mnt = mnt->mnt_parent; + continue; + } + dentry = dentry->d_parent; + } + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + + dput(currentroot); + mntput(currentmnt); + + if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt) { + /* access is outside of chroot */ + dput(realroot); + mntput(realrootmnt); + return 0; + } + + dput(realroot); + mntput(realrootmnt); + return 1; +} +#endif + +int +gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir) + return 1; + + if (!proc_is_chrooted(current)) + return 1; + else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, u_dentry, u_mnt); + return 0; + } +#endif + return 1; +} + +int +gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + struct pid *pid = NULL; + time_t starttime; + + if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat)) + return 1; + + if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current))) + return 1; + + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + + pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_cprid); + if (pid) { + struct task_struct *p; + p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID); + task_lock(p); + starttime = p->start_time.tv_sec; + if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) && + time_before((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) { + task_unlock(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG); + return 0; + } + task_unlock(p); + } else { + pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_lapid); + if (pid) { + struct task_struct *p; + p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID); + task_lock(p); + if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) { + task_unlock(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG); + return 0; + } + task_unlock(p); + } + } + + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + return 1; +} + +void +gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current)) + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt); +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) && + proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_str_fs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, dentry, mnt); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) && + !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) { + task->cap_permitted = + cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + task->cap_inheritable = + cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + task->cap_effective = + cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS); + } +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current) + && (op & 002)) + return -EACCES; +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir) + set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry); +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod && + ((mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))) && + proc_is_chrooted(current)) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_caps); +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,418 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS +void +pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +__u32 +gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode) +{ + return mode; +} +#endif + +int +gr_acl_is_enabled(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, + const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_set_acls(const int type) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid) +{ + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + const int fmode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot, + unsigned int *vm_flags) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +grsecurity_init(void) +{ + return; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const int mode) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry, + const struct dentry * parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, + const struct dentry * old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct inode *old_parent_inode, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, + const int namelen, const ino_t ino) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt) +{ + return 1; +} + +__u32 +gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry, + const struct dentry * p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_acl_handle_exit(void) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return 1; +} + +int +gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr) +{ + return 1; +} + +void +gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return; +} + +int +gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs) +{ + return 0; +} + +int +gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs) +{ + return 0; +} + + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change); +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG +static char gr_exec_arg_buf[132]; +static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_exec_arg_sem); +#endif + +int +gr_handle_nproc(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user && + (atomic_read(¤t->user->processes) > + current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NPROC_MSG); + return -EAGAIN; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +void +gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char __user *__user *argv) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + char *grarg = gr_exec_arg_buf; + unsigned int i, x, execlen = 0; + char c; + + if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group && + in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) + || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group))) + return; + + down(&gr_exec_arg_sem); + memset(grarg, 0, sizeof(gr_exec_arg_buf)); + + if (unlikely(argv == NULL)) + goto log; + + for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 128; i++) { + const char __user *p; + unsigned int len; + + if (copy_from_user(&p, argv + i, sizeof(p))) + goto log; + if (!p) + goto log; + len = strnlen_user(p, 128 - execlen); + if (len > 128 - execlen) + len = 128 - execlen; + else if (len > 0) + len--; + if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len)) + goto log; + + /* rewrite unprintable characters */ + for (x = 0; x < len; x++) { + c = *(grarg + execlen + x); + if (c < 32 || c > 126) + *(grarg + execlen + x) = ' '; + } + + execlen += len; + *(grarg + execlen) = ' '; + *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0'; + execlen++; + } + + log: + gr_log_fs_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, bprm->file->f_dentry, + bprm->file->f_vfsmnt, grarg); + up(&gr_exec_arg_sem); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) && + !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && + (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) && + (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) { + if (!generic_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode, NULL)) + gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FIFO_MSG, dentry, mnt, dentry->d_inode->i_uid, dentry->d_inode->i_gid); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_forkfail(const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + if (grsec_enable_forkfail) + gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int grsec_enable_shm; +int grsec_enable_link; +int grsec_enable_dmesg; +int grsec_enable_fifo; +int grsec_enable_execve; +int grsec_enable_execlog; +int grsec_enable_signal; +int grsec_enable_forkfail; +int grsec_enable_time; +int grsec_enable_audit_textrel; +int grsec_enable_group; +int grsec_audit_gid; +int grsec_enable_chdir; +int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; +int grsec_enable_mount; +int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; +int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; +int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; +int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; +int grsec_enable_chroot_double; +int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; +int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; +int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; +int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; +int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; +int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; +int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; +int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; +int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; +int grsec_enable_tpe; +int grsec_tpe_gid; +int grsec_enable_tpe_all; +int grsec_enable_randpid; +int grsec_enable_randsrc; +int grsec_enable_socket_all; +int grsec_socket_all_gid; +int grsec_enable_socket_client; +int grsec_socket_client_gid; +int grsec_enable_socket_server; +int grsec_socket_server_gid; +int grsec_lock; + +spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; +unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0; +unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0; + +spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +char *gr_shared_page[4]; + +char *gr_alert_log_fmt; +char *gr_audit_log_fmt; +char *gr_alert_log_buf; +char *gr_audit_log_buf; + +extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode; +extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt; +extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum; + +void +grsecurity_init(void) +{ + int j; + /* create the per-cpu shared pages */ + + preempt_disable(); + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE, __alignof__(char *)); + if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page"); + return; + } + } + preempt_enable(); + + /* allocate log buffers */ + gr_alert_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gr_alert_log_fmt) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log format buffer"); + return; + } + gr_audit_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gr_audit_log_fmt) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log format buffer"); + return; + } + gr_alert_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gr_alert_log_buf) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log buffer"); + return; + } + gr_audit_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!gr_audit_log_buf) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log buffer"); + return; + } + + /* allocate memory for authentication structure */ + gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL); + gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) { + panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure"); + return; + } + +#if !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON) +#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + grsec_lock = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM + grsec_enable_shm = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL + grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + grsec_enable_group = 1; + grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + grsec_enable_chdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + grsec_enable_mount = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + grsec_enable_link = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + grsec_enable_dmesg = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + grsec_enable_fifo = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + grsec_enable_execve = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + grsec_enable_execlog = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + grsec_enable_signal = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + grsec_enable_forkfail = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + grsec_enable_time = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + grsec_enable_tpe = 1; + grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1; +#endif +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + grsec_enable_randpid = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + grsec_enable_randsrc = 1; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + grsec_enable_socket_all = 1; + grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + grsec_enable_socket_client = 1; + grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + grsec_enable_socket_server = 1; + grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID; +#endif +#endif + + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0) + && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT)) + gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) + && (semflg & IPC_CREAT)) + gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && + !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0) + && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT)) + gr_log_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) && + grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || + (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group)) + gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, + const struct inode *inode, + const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && + (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) && + (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) { + gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && + (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) || + ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) || + (generic_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, NULL))) && + !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) { + gr_log_fs_int2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HARDLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to); + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define BEGIN_LOCKS(x) \ + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \ + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \ + if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \ + spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ + else \ + spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock) + +#define END_LOCKS(x) \ + if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \ + spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \ + else \ + spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \ + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \ + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \ + if (x == GR_DONT_AUDIT) \ + gr_handle_alertkill(current) + +enum { + FLOODING, + NO_FLOODING +}; + +extern char *gr_alert_log_fmt; +extern char *gr_audit_log_fmt; +extern char *gr_alert_log_buf; +extern char *gr_audit_log_buf; + +static int gr_log_start(int audit) +{ + char *loglevel = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? KERN_INFO : KERN_ALERT; + char *fmt = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_fmt : gr_alert_log_fmt; + char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf; + + if (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) + goto set_fmt; + + if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) { + grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; + grsec_alert_fyet = 0; + } else if ((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) { + grsec_alert_fyet++; + } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) { + grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies; + grsec_alert_fyet++; + printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for %d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME); + return FLOODING; + } else return FLOODING; + +set_fmt: + memset(buf, 0, PAGE_SIZE); + if (current->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) { + sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) "); + snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename); + } else if (current->curr_ip) { + sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: "); + snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->curr_ip)); + } else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) { + sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) "); + snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename); + } else { + sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: "); + strcpy(buf, fmt); + } + + return NO_FLOODING; +} + +static void gr_log_middle(int audit, const char *msg, va_list ap) +{ + char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf; + unsigned int len = strlen(buf); + + vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap); + + return; +} + +static void gr_log_middle_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, ...) +{ + char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf; + unsigned int len = strlen(buf); + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, msg); + vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap); + va_end(ap); + + return; +} + +static void gr_log_end(int audit) +{ + char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf; + unsigned int len = strlen(buf); + + snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, DEFAULTSECMSG, DEFAULTSECARGS(current)); + printk("%s\n", buf); + + return; +} + +void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...) +{ + int logtype; + char *result = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? "successful" : "denied"; + char *str1, *str2, *str3; + int num1, num2; + unsigned long ulong1, ulong2; + struct dentry *dentry; + struct vfsmount *mnt; + struct file *file; + struct task_struct *task; + va_list ap; + + BEGIN_LOCKS(audit); + logtype = gr_log_start(audit); + if (logtype == FLOODING) { + END_LOCKS(audit); + return; + } + va_start(ap, argtypes); + switch (argtypes) { + case GR_TTYSNIFF: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid); + break; + case GR_RBAC: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + break; + case GR_RBAC_STR: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1); + break; + case GR_STR_RBAC: + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + break; + case GR_RBAC_MODE2: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + str2 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2); + break; + case GR_RBAC_MODE3: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + str2 = va_arg(ap, char *); + str3 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2, str3); + break; + case GR_FILENAME: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + break; + case GR_STR_FILENAME: + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt)); + break; + case GR_FILENAME_STR: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1); + break; + case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + num1 = va_arg(ap, int); + num2 = va_arg(ap, int); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2); + break; + case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR: + dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *); + mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *); + num1 = va_arg(ap, int); + num2 = va_arg(ap, int); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2, str1); + break; + case GR_TEXTREL: + file = va_arg(ap, struct file *); + ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, file ? gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt) : "", ulong1, ulong2); + break; + case GR_PTRACE: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid); + break; + case GR_RESOURCE: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, ulong1, str1, ulong2, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid); + break; + case GR_CAP: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + str1 = va_arg(ap, char *); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid); + break; + case GR_SIG: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + num1 = va_arg(ap, int); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, num1, gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid); + break; + case GR_CRASH1: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, task->uid, ulong1); + break; + case GR_CRASH2: + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ulong1); + break; + case GR_PSACCT: + { + unsigned int wday, cday; + __u8 whr, chr; + __u8 wmin, cmin; + __u8 wsec, csec; + char cur_tty[64] = { 0 }; + char parent_tty[64] = { 0 }; + + task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *); + wday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int); + cday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int); + whr = va_arg(ap, int); + chr = va_arg(ap, int); + wmin = va_arg(ap, int); + cmin = va_arg(ap, int); + wsec = va_arg(ap, int); + csec = va_arg(ap, int); + ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long); + + gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->curr_ip), tty_name(task->signal->tty, cur_tty), task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", ulong1, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, NIPQUAD(task->parent->curr_ip), tty_name(task->parent->signal->tty, parent_tty), task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid); + } + break; + default: + gr_log_middle(audit, msg, ap); + } + va_end(ap); + gr_log_end(audit); + END_LOCKS(audit); +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_handle_ioperm(void) +{ + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPERM_MSG); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_iopl(void) +{ + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPL_MSG); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_mem_write(void) +{ + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_kmem_write(void) +{ + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_KMEM_MSG); + return; +} + +void +gr_handle_open_port(void) +{ + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG); + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (offset + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start <= offset) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG); + return -EPERM; + } + + if (offset < __pa(high_memory) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 + && !(offset == 0xf0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x10000)) + && !(offset == 0xa0000 && ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) <= 0x20000)) +#endif + ) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG); + return -EPERM; + } else if (offset < __pa(high_memory)) + vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; + + return 0; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none"); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none"); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0)) + gr_log_str_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern int pid_max; + +int +gr_random_pid(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + int pid; + + if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) { + /* return a pid in the range 1 ... pid_max - 1 + optimize this so we don't have to do a real division + */ + pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % pid_max); + if (pid == pid_max) + pid = pid_max - 1; + return pid; + } +#endif + return 0; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) || + (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) { + if (t->pid == current->pid) { + gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig); + } else { + gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, t, sig); + } + } +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) { + gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, p, sig); + return -EPERM; + } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted((struct task_struct *)p)) { + return -EPERM; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + if (p->parent && p->parent->exec_file == p->exec_file) + p->parent->brute = 1; + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); +#endif + return; +} + +void gr_handle_brute_check(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE + if (current->brute) { + set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + schedule_timeout(30 * HZ); + } +#endif + return; +} + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE) +extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC +EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_get_random_long); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(grsec_enable_randsrc); +#endif + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink); + +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb); +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr); + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg); + +#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +#define gr_conn_table_size 65521 +struct task_struct *gr_conn_table[gr_conn_table_size]; +struct task_struct *deleted_conn = (struct task_struct *)~0; +spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; + +extern const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type); +extern const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto); + +static __inline__ int +conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size) +{ + return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size); +} + +static __inline__ int +conn_match(const struct task_struct *task, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, + __u16 sport, __u16 dport) +{ + if (unlikely(task != deleted_conn && task->gr_saddr == saddr && + task->gr_daddr == daddr && task->gr_sport == sport && + task->gr_dport == dport)) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *task) +{ + unsigned int index; + + if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) + return; + + if (!thread_group_leader(task)) + task = task->group_leader; + + index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, + task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, + gr_conn_table_size); + + spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + + while (gr_conn_table[index] && gr_conn_table[index] != deleted_conn) { + index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; + } + + gr_conn_table[index] = task; + + spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + + return; +} + +void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct task_struct *task) +{ + unsigned int index; + + if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) + return; + + if (!thread_group_leader(task)) + task = task->group_leader; + + index = conn_hash(task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, + task->gr_sport, task->gr_dport, + gr_conn_table_size); + + while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], + task->gr_saddr, task->gr_daddr, task->gr_sport, + task->gr_dport)) { + index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; + } + + if (gr_conn_table[index]) { + if (gr_conn_table[(index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size]) + gr_conn_table[index] = deleted_conn; + else + gr_conn_table[index] = NULL; + } + + return; +} + +struct task_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, + __u16 sport, __u16 dport) +{ + unsigned int index; + + if (unlikely(gr_conn_table == NULL)) + return NULL; + + index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size); + + while (gr_conn_table[index] && !conn_match(gr_conn_table[index], + saddr, daddr, sport, dport)) { + index = (index + 1) % gr_conn_table_size; + } + + return gr_conn_table[index]; +} + +#endif + +void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + if (!thread_group_leader(task)) + gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->group_leader); + else + gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task); + spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); +#endif + return; +} + +void +gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct task_struct *p; + struct task_struct *set; + const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk); + + if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)) + return; + + set = current; + if (!thread_group_leader(set)) + set = set->group_leader; + + spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr, + inet->dport, inet->sport); + if (unlikely(p != NULL)) { + set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip; + set->used_accept = 1; + gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p); + spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + return; + } + spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock); + + set->curr_ip = inet->daddr; + set->used_accept = 1; +#endif + return; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) && + (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) { + gr_log_int_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol)); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + if (grsec_enable_socket_server && + in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) && + sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && + (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct sock *sck) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + if (grsec_enable_socket_server && + in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) && + sck && (sck->sk_family != AF_UNIX) && + (sck->sk_family != AF_LOCAL)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +int +gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) && + sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && + (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) { + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_MSG); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +__u32 +gr_cap_rtnetlink(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!gr_acl_is_enabled()) + return current->cap_effective; + else if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_NET_ADMIN) && + gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return current->cap_effective; + else + return 0; +#else + return current->cap_effective; +#endif +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,432 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +int +gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) { + gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL +enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL, +GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT, +GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM, +GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS, +GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS, +GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDSRC, GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, +GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, +GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG, +GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_SHM, GS_LOCK}; + + +ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK + { + .ctl_name = GS_LINK, + .procname = "linking_restrictions", + .data = &grsec_enable_link, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO + { + .ctl_name = GS_FIFO, + .procname = "fifo_restrictions", + .data = &grsec_enable_fifo, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE + { + .ctl_name = GS_EXECVE, + .procname = "execve_limiting", + .data = &grsec_enable_execve, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG + { + .ctl_name = GS_EXECLOG, + .procname = "exec_logging", + .data = &grsec_enable_execlog, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL + { + .ctl_name = GS_SIGNAL, + .procname = "signal_logging", + .data = &grsec_enable_signal, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL + { + .ctl_name = GS_FORKFAIL, + .procname = "forkfail_logging", + .data = &grsec_enable_forkfail, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + { + .ctl_name = GS_TIME, + .procname = "timechange_logging", + .data = &grsec_enable_time, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, + .procname = "chroot_deny_shmat", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_UNIX, + .procname = "chroot_deny_unix", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_unix, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MNT, + .procname = "chroot_deny_mount", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mount, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, + .procname = "chroot_deny_fchdir", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_DBL, + .procname = "chroot_deny_chroot", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_double, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_PVT, + .procname = "chroot_deny_pivot", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CD, + .procname = "chroot_enforce_chdir", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CM, + .procname = "chroot_deny_chmod", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MK, + .procname = "chroot_deny_mknod", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_NI, + .procname = "chroot_restrict_nice", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_nice, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, + .procname = "chroot_execlog", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CAPS, + .procname = "chroot_caps", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL + { + .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, + .procname = "chroot_deny_sysctl", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE + { + .ctl_name = GS_TPE, + .procname = "tpe", + .data = &grsec_enable_tpe, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .ctl_name = GS_TPE_GID, + .procname = "tpe_gid", + .data = &grsec_tpe_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + { + .ctl_name = GS_TPE_ALL, + .procname = "tpe_restrict_all", + .data = &grsec_enable_tpe_all, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID + { + .ctl_name = GS_RANDPID, + .procname = "rand_pids", + .data = &grsec_enable_randpid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + { + .ctl_name = GS_RANDSRC, + .procname = "rand_tcp_src_ports", + .data = &grsec_enable_randsrc, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL, + .procname = "socket_all", + .data = &grsec_enable_socket_all, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, + .procname = "socket_all_gid", + .data = &grsec_socket_all_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, + .procname = "socket_client", + .data = &grsec_enable_socket_client, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, + .procname = "socket_client_gid", + .data = &grsec_socket_client_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER, + .procname = "socket_server", + .data = &grsec_enable_socket_server, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, + .procname = "socket_server_gid", + .data = &grsec_socket_server_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP + { + .ctl_name = GS_GROUP, + .procname = "audit_group", + .data = &grsec_enable_group, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { + .ctl_name = GS_GID, + .procname = "audit_gid", + .data = &grsec_audit_gid, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR + { + .ctl_name = GS_ACHDIR, + .procname = "audit_chdir", + .data = &grsec_enable_chdir, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT + { + .ctl_name = GS_AMOUNT, + .procname = "audit_mount", + .data = &grsec_enable_mount, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC + { + .ctl_name = GS_AIPC, + .procname = "audit_ipc", + .data = &grsec_enable_audit_ipc, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL + { + .ctl_name = GS_TEXTREL, + .procname = "audit_textrel", + .data = &grsec_enable_audit_textrel, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + { + .ctl_name = GS_DMSG, + .procname = "dmesg", + .data = &grsec_enable_dmesg, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK + { + .ctl_name = GS_FINDTASK, + .procname = "chroot_findtask", + .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM + { + .ctl_name = GS_SHM, + .procname = "destroy_unused_shm", + .data = &grsec_enable_shm, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif + { + .ctl_name = GS_LOCK, + .procname = "grsec_lock", + .data = &grsec_lock, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, + { .ctl_name = 0 } +}; +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL + if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel) + gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +#include +#include +#include + +void +gr_log_timechange(void) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME + if (grsec_enable_time) + gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TIME_MSG); +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void); + +int +gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode; + + if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe && in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) && + (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || + (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 0; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL + if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all && + ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) || + (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) { + gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt); + return 0; + } +#endif +#endif + return 1; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c --- linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/grsecurity/grsum.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + + +#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE) +#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel" +#endif + +int +chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum) +{ + char *p; + struct crypto_tfm *tfm; + unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; + struct scatterlist sg[2]; + volatile int retval = 0; + volatile int dummy = 0; + unsigned int i; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0); + if (tfm == NULL) { + /* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */ + return 1; + } + + crypto_digest_init(tfm); + + p = salt; + sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p); + sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK); + sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN; + + crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1); + + p = entry->pw; + sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p); + sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK); + sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw); + + crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1); + + crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum); + + memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN); + + for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++) + if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i]) + retval = 1; + else + dummy = 1; // waste a cycle + + crypto_free_tfm(tfm); + + return retval; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct exec set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000L \ ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4)) -#define STACK_TOP \ +#define __STACK_TOP \ (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL) #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19) +#endif + /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be registered using atexit. This provides a mean for the dynamic linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x20000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x40000 /* do not block on IO */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_SYNC 2 /* synchronous memory sync */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -110,6 +110,15 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _ALPHA_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:37:52.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -98,6 +98,17 @@ #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS) #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE) #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x)) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:46.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct exec #define M_ARM 103 #ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \ +#define __STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \ TASK_SIZE : TASK_SIZE_26) #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ typedef struct user_fp elf_fpregset_t; #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x00008000UL + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10) +#endif + /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI. A value of 0 means we have no such handler. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ typedef struct { pgd_t pgd; } pud_t; */ static inline int pgd_none(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; } -static inline int pgd_present(pgd_t pgd) { return 1; } +#define pgd_present(x) (pgd_val(x) & _PAGE_PRESENT) static inline void pgd_clear(pgd_t *pgd) { } #define pud_ERROR(pud) (pgd_ERROR((pud).pgd)) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ struct exec #ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC +#define __STACK_TOP ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE) +#else +#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE +#endif #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -8,12 +8,70 @@ #include #include -#include +#include #include +#include +#include -extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES]; -DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct desc_struct, cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES]); +extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][GDT_ENTRIES]; + +#define pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3) \ +do { \ + typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \ + typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ + local_irq_save(flags); \ + asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3)); \ + load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir); \ +} while(0) + +#define pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3) \ +do { \ + typecheck(unsigned long,flags); \ + typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ + asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3)); \ + local_irq_restore(flags); \ +} while(0) + +#define pax_open_kernel_noirq(cr3) \ +do { \ + typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ + asm("movl %%cr3,%0":"=r" (cr3)); \ + load_cr3(kernexec_pg_dir); \ +} while(0) + +#define pax_close_kernel_noirq(cr3) \ +do { \ + typecheck(unsigned long,cr3); \ + asm("movl %0,%%cr3": :"r" (cr3)); \ +} while(0) + +static inline void set_user_cs(struct mm_struct *mm, int cpu) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + unsigned long base = mm->context.user_cs_base; + unsigned long limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long flags, cr3; + + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + + if (limit) { + limit -= 1UL; + limit >>= 12; + } + + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].a = (limit & 0xFFFFUL) | (base << 16); + cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].b = (limit & 0xF0000UL) | 0xC0FB00UL | (base & 0xFF000000UL) | ((base >> 16) & 0xFFUL); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + +#endif +} struct Xgt_desc_struct { unsigned short size; @@ -30,7 +88,7 @@ extern struct Xgt_desc_struct idt_descr, * This is the ldt that every process will get unless we need * something other than this. */ -extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[]; +extern const struct desc_struct default_ldt[]; extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr); #define _set_tssldt_desc(n,addr,limit,type) \ @@ -44,17 +102,34 @@ __asm__ __volatile__ ("movw %w3,0(%2)\n\ "rorl $16,%%eax" \ : "=m"(*(n)) : "a" (addr), "r"(n), "ir"(limit), "i"(type)) -static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, void *addr) +static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, const void *addr) { - _set_tssldt_desc(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[entry], (int)addr, + _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][entry], (int)addr, offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1, 0x89); } #define set_tss_desc(cpu,addr) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, addr) -static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, void *addr, unsigned int size) +static inline void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size) { - _set_tssldt_desc(&per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82); + _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82); +} + +static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size) +{ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + unsigned long flags, cr3; + + pax_open_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + + _set_tssldt_desc(&cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC + pax_close_kernel(flags, cr3); +#endif + } #define LDT_entry_a(info) \ @@ -70,7 +145,7 @@ static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned ((info)->seg_32bit << 22) | \ ((info)->limit_in_pages << 23) | \ ((info)->useable << 20) | \ - 0x7000) + 0x7100) #define LDT_empty(info) (\ (info)->base_addr == 0 && \ @@ -88,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned static inline void load_TLS(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu) { -#define C(i) per_cpu(cpu_gdt_table, cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i] +#define C(i) cpu_gdt_table[cpu][GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + i] = t->tls_array[i] C(0); C(1); C(2); #undef C } @@ -107,7 +182,7 @@ static inline void clear_LDT(void) */ static inline void load_LDT_nolock(mm_context_t *pc, int cpu) { - void *segments = pc->ldt; + const void *segments = pc->ldt; int count = pc->size; if (likely(!count)) { @@ -135,6 +210,22 @@ static inline unsigned long get_desc_bas return base; } +static inline void _load_LDT(mm_context_t *pc) +{ + int cpu = get_cpu(); + const void *segments = pc->ldt; + int count = pc->size; + + if (likely(!count)) { + segments = &default_ldt[0]; + count = 5; + } + + __set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count); + load_LDT_desc(); + put_cpu(); +} + #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -72,6 +72,17 @@ typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxr #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15 +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15 +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16) +#endif + /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is now struct_user_regs, they are different) */ @@ -113,8 +124,11 @@ typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxr * Architecture-neutral AT_ values in 0-17, leave some room * for more of them, start the x86-specific ones at 32. */ + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL #define AT_SYSINFO 32 #define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 33 +#endif #ifdef __KERNEL__ #define SET_PERSONALITY(ex, ibcs2) do { } while (0) @@ -135,7 +149,14 @@ extern int dump_task_extended_fpu (struc #define VSYSCALL_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL)) #define VSYSCALL_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VSYSCALL_BASE) + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC +#define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE : (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall) +#else #define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall) +#endif + extern void __kernel_vsyscall; #define ARCH_DLINFO \ @@ -191,3 +212,5 @@ do { \ #endif #endif + +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" - "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" "setc %%al\n\t" "popl %%ebp\n\t" "popl %%edi\n\t" @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_as __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" - "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t" + "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t" "setc %%bl\n\t" "popl %%ebp\n\t" "popl %%edi\n\t" diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -12,6 +12,17 @@ typedef struct { int size; struct semaphore sem; void *ldt; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + unsigned long user_cs_base; + unsigned long user_cs_limit; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP) + cpumask_t cpu_user_cs_mask; +#endif + +#endif + } mm_context_t; #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -46,6 +46,13 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s */ if (unlikely(prev->context.ldt != next->context.ldt)) load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP) + cpu_clear(cpu, prev->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); + cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); +#endif + + set_user_cs(next, cpu); } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP else { @@ -58,6 +65,12 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s */ load_cr3(next->pgd); load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); +#endif + + set_user_cs(next, cpu); } } #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/module.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ struct mod_arch_specific #define MODULE_STACKSIZE "" #endif -#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +#define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY " +#else +#define MODULE_GRSEC "" +#endif + +#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE MODULE_GRSEC #endif /* _ASM_I386_MODULE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -9,11 +9,11 @@ #define LARGE_PAGE_MASK (~(LARGE_PAGE_SIZE-1)) #define LARGE_PAGE_SIZE (1UL << PMD_SHIFT) +#include + #ifdef __KERNEL__ #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ -#include - #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USE_3DNOW #include @@ -127,6 +127,23 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #define __PAGE_OFFSET (0xC0000000UL) #endif +#endif /* __KERNEL__ */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000) +#else +#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0xC0400000UL) +#endif +#else +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0) +#else +#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0x0UL) +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef __KERNEL__ #define PAGE_OFFSET ((unsigned long)__PAGE_OFFSET) #define VMALLOC_RESERVE ((unsigned long)__VMALLOC_RESERVE) @@ -148,6 +165,19 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; ((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#define CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT 1 +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _I386_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include /* for struct page */ #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \ - set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + __pa(pte))) + set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE + __pa(pte))) #define pmd_populate(mm, pmd, pte) \ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + \ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ */ #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page)) extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024]; -extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024]; extern kmem_cache_t *pgd_cache; extern kmem_cache_t *pmd_cache; extern spinlock_t pgd_lock; @@ -42,6 +41,7 @@ void pgd_ctor(void *, kmem_cache_t *, un void pgd_dtor(void *, kmem_cache_t *, unsigned long); void pgtable_cache_init(void); void paging_init(void); +#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ /* * The Linux x86 paging architecture is 'compile-time dual-mode', it @@ -56,6 +56,23 @@ void paging_init(void); # include #endif +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE +extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD]; +extern pmd_t swapper_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC +extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD]; +extern pmd_t kernexec_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD]; +#endif +#else +extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC +extern pgd_t kernexec_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD]; +#endif +#endif + #define PGDIR_SIZE (1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT) #define PGDIR_MASK (~(PGDIR_SIZE-1)) @@ -138,17 +155,26 @@ void paging_init(void); #define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC \ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) -#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \ - __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC \ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) -#define PAGE_COPY \ - PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC #define PAGE_READONLY \ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC \ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \ + __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif + +#define PAGE_COPY \ + PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC #define _PAGE_KERNEL \ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) #define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \ @@ -173,18 +199,18 @@ extern unsigned long long __PAGE_KERNEL, * This is the closest we can get.. */ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE -#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY -#define __P010 PAGE_COPY -#define __P011 PAGE_COPY +#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC +#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC #define __S000 PAGE_NONE -#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY -#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED -#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED +#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC +#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC @@ -396,6 +422,9 @@ extern void noexec_setup(const char *str #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */ +#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA +#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN + #ifndef CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM #define kern_addr_valid(addr) (1) #endif /* !CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include /* flag for disabling the tsc */ extern int tsc_disable; @@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ struct desc_struct { }; #define desc_empty(desc) \ - (!((desc)->a + (desc)->b)) + (!((desc)->a | (desc)->b)) #define desc_equal(desc1, desc2) \ (((desc1)->a == (desc2)->a) && ((desc1)->b == (desc2)->b)) @@ -87,7 +86,10 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 { extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data; extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data; extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss; +#if 0 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss); +#endif +extern struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS]; #ifdef CONFIG_SMP extern struct cpuinfo_x86 cpu_data[]; @@ -301,10 +303,23 @@ extern int bootloader_type; */ #define TASK_SIZE (PAGE_OFFSET) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC +#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE ((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2) +#endif + /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm * space during mmap's. */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3)) +#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) +#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)? 0x00110000UL : TASK_SIZE/3)) +#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3)) +#else #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3)) +#endif #define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT @@ -509,16 +524,12 @@ void show_trace(struct task_struct *task unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p); #define THREAD_SIZE_LONGS (THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long)) -#define KSTK_TOP(info) \ -({ \ - unsigned long *__ptr = (unsigned long *)(info); \ - (unsigned long)(&__ptr[THREAD_SIZE_LONGS]); \ -}) +#define KSTK_TOP(info) ((info)->task.thread.esp0) #define task_pt_regs(task) \ ({ \ struct pt_regs *__regs__; \ - __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)KSTK_TOP((task)->thread_info); \ + __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)((task)->thread.esp0); \ __regs__ - 1; \ }) @@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ static inline void rep_nop(void) extern inline void prefetch(const void *x) { alternative_input(ASM_NOP4, - "prefetchnta (%1)", + "prefetchnta (%2)", X86_FEATURE_XMM, "r" (x)); } @@ -656,7 +667,7 @@ extern inline void prefetch(const void * extern inline void prefetchw(const void *x) { alternative_input(ASM_NOP4, - "prefetchw (%1)", + "prefetchw (%2)", X86_FEATURE_3DNOW, "r" (x)); } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-i386/system.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* for LOCK_PREFIX */ #ifdef __KERNEL__ @@ -301,7 +302,7 @@ struct alt_instr { asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \ ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ " .align 4\n" \ - " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \ + " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \ " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \ " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \ " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \ @@ -309,7 +310,7 @@ struct alt_instr { ".previous\n" \ ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \ "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \ - ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory") + ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : "memory") /* * Alternative inline assembly with input. @@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ struct alt_instr { asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \ ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \ " .align 4\n" \ - " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \ + " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \ " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \ " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \ " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \ @@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ struct alt_instr { ".previous\n" \ ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \ "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \ - ".previous" :: "i" (feature), ##input) + ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET), ##input) /* * Force strict CPU ordering. diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -162,6 +162,16 @@ typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t[ELF_NGR typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t; typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG]; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13) +#endif struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration... */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x08000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x40000 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -204,4 +204,13 @@ get_order (unsigned long size) (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) != 0) \ ? VM_EXEC : 0)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_IA64_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:37:53.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -121,6 +121,17 @@ #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +#endif + #define PAGE_GATE __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX) #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX) #define PAGE_KERNELRX __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2005-03-02 02:37:58.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ struct thread_struct { .on_ustack = 0, \ .ksp = 0, \ .map_base = DEFAULT_MAP_BASE, \ - .rbs_bot = STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \ + .rbs_bot = __STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \ .task_size = DEFAULT_TASK_SIZE, \ .last_fph_cpu = -1, \ INIT_THREAD_IA32 \ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -11,6 +11,6 @@ #define MAX_USER_STACK_SIZE (RGN_MAP_LIMIT/2) /* Make a default stack size of 2GB */ #define DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE (1UL << 31) -#define STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT) +#define __STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT) #endif /* _ASM_IA64_USTACK_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ struct exec #ifdef __KERNEL__ #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS32 -#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE +#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE #endif #ifdef CONFIG_MIPS64 -#define STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE) +#define __STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE) #endif #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -279,4 +279,15 @@ extern int dump_task_fpu(struct task_str #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2) #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT) +#endif + #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:01.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-mips/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -139,6 +139,15 @@ static __inline__ int get_order(unsigned #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE) #define CAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - UNCAC_BASE + PAGE_OFFSET) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct exec /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc. * prumpf */ -#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE +#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -337,6 +337,17 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration.. #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16 +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16 +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16 +#endif + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space, but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x10000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x20000 /* do not block on IO */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 +#endif + #define MS_SYNC 1 /* synchronous memory sync */ #define MS_ASYNC 2 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 4 /* invalidate the caches */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -157,6 +157,15 @@ extern int npmem_ranges; #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _PARISC_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -210,6 +210,17 @@ extern void *vmalloc_start; #define PAGE_EXECREAD __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED) #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_EXECREAD #define PAGE_RWX __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL) #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED) #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ #define __PPC_A_OUT_H__ /* grabbed from the intel stuff */ -#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE +#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE struct exec diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -90,6 +90,17 @@ struct task_struct; #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15 +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15 +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 15 +#endif + #define USE_ELF_CORE_DUMP #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE 4096 diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:34.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -163,5 +163,14 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _PPC_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -389,11 +389,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema #define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER) -#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) +#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW) -#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC) +#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER) -#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) +#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC) + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x) +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_RAM) #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(_PAGE_IO) @@ -405,21 +415,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema * This is the closest we can get.. */ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE -#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __P010 PAGE_COPY -#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X -#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY +#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC +#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC +#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __P110 PAGE_COPY +#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X #define __S000 PAGE_NONE -#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED -#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X -#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY +#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC +#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC +#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED +#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:31.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ struct exec /* Give 32-bit user space a full 4G address space to live in. */ #define STACK_TOP_USER32 (TASK_SIZE_USER32) -#define STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \ +#define __STACK_TOP ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || \ (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? \ STACK_TOP_USER32 : STACK_TOP_USER64) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -154,6 +154,17 @@ typedef elf_vrreg_t elf_vrregset_t32[ELF #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (0x10000000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) || (ppcdebugset(PPCDBG_BINFMT_32ADDR))) ? 16 : 24) +#endif + #ifdef __KERNEL__ /* Common routine for both 32-bit and 64-bit processes */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0200 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -235,5 +235,14 @@ extern u64 ppc64_pft_size; /* Log 2 of #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _PPC64_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-ppc64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -115,6 +115,17 @@ #define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER) #define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif + #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRENABLE) #define PAGE_KERNEL_CI __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED | \ _PAGE_WRENABLE | _PAGE_NO_CACHE | _PAGE_GUARDED) @@ -126,21 +137,21 @@ * This is the closest we can get.. */ #define __P000 PAGE_NONE -#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __P010 PAGE_COPY -#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X -#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY +#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC +#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC +#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __P110 PAGE_COPY +#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X #define __S000 PAGE_NONE -#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED -#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X -#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY +#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC +#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC +#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC +#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X -#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED +#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head #include -#define STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE) +#define __STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE) #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:18.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -145,6 +145,17 @@ typedef struct { #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16 +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16 +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16 +#endif + /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what instruction set this cpu supports. This can NOT be done in userspace on Sparc. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:26.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:51.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -176,6 +176,15 @@ extern unsigned long pfn_base; #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _SPARC_PAGE_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_none) BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared) BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy) BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec) +BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec) +BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec) +#endif + BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel) #define PMD_SHIFT SUN4C_PMD_SHIFT @@ -71,6 +78,16 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel) #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy)) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly)) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec)) +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec)) +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec)) +#else +# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED +# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY +# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#endif + extern unsigned long page_kernel; #ifdef MODULE diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -115,6 +115,16 @@ SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF) #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ + SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF) +#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ + SRMMU_REF) +#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \ + SRMMU_REF) +#endif + #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \ SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions. */ -#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < STACK_TOP) +#define __user_ok(addr,size) ((addr) < __STACK_TOP) #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)) #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size))) #define access_ok(type,addr,size) __access_ok((unsigned long)(addr),(size)) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head #ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L) +#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L) #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -140,6 +140,16 @@ typedef struct { #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x0000010000000000UL #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1) +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 ) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 ) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 ) +#endif /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what instruction set this cpu supports. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ #define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800 /* ETXTBSY */ #define MAP_EXECUTABLE 0x1000 /* mark it as an executable */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x0400 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -156,6 +156,15 @@ static __inline__ int get_order(unsigned #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #endif /* !(__KERNEL__) */ #endif /* !(_SPARC64_PAGE_H) */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct exec #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include -#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE) +#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? IA32_PAGE_OFFSET : TASK_SIZE) #endif #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ typedef struct user_i387_struct elf_fpre #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR +#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL) + +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32) +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32) +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT +#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32) +#endif + /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is now struct_user_regs, they are different). Assumes current is the process getting dumped. */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */ #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC +#define MAP_MIRROR 0x8000 +#endif + #define MS_ASYNC 1 /* sync memory asynchronously */ #define MS_INVALIDATE 2 /* invalidate the caches */ #define MS_SYNC 4 /* synchronous memory sync */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -136,6 +136,15 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \ VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \ + ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#else +#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC)) +#endif +#endif + #define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \ - set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte))) + set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte))) #define pud_populate(mm, pud, pmd) \ set_pud(pud, __pud(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd))) #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pud) \ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -161,6 +161,10 @@ extern inline void pgd_clear (pgd_t * pg #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + +#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY +#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED + #define __PAGE_KERNEL \ (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX) #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/a.out.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -7,6 +7,16 @@ #include +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK +#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack) +#else +#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL +#endif + +#ifndef STACK_TOP +#define STACK_TOP (__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK) +#endif + #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */ /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */ @@ -37,6 +47,14 @@ enum machine_type { M_MIPS2 = 152 /* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */ }; +/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */ +#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ +#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */ +#define F_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */ +#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */ +#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ +#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ + #if !defined (N_MAGIC) #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff) #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/binfmts.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{ unsigned interp_flags; unsigned interp_data; unsigned long loader, exec; + int misc; }; #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0 @@ -83,5 +84,8 @@ extern void compute_creds(struct linux_b extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs); extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new); +void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp); +void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp); + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/elf.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ #include #include +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) +#undef elf_read_implies_exec +#endif + #ifndef elf_read_implies_exec /* Executables for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically. @@ -45,6 +49,16 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword; #define PT_GNU_STACK (PT_LOOS + 0x474e551) +#define PT_PAX_FLAGS (PT_LOOS + 0x5041580) + +/* Constants for the e_flags field */ +#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ +#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */ +#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */ +#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */ +#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC 16 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ +#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ + /* These constants define the different elf file types */ #define ET_NONE 0 #define ET_REL 1 @@ -137,6 +151,8 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword; #define DT_DEBUG 21 #define DT_TEXTREL 22 #define DT_JMPREL 23 +#define DT_FLAGS 30 + #define DF_TEXTREL 0x00000004 #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000 #define DT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff @@ -287,6 +303,19 @@ typedef struct elf64_hdr { #define PF_W 0x2 #define PF_X 0x1 +#define PF_PAGEEXEC (1 << 4) /* Enable PAGEEXEC */ +#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC (1 << 5) /* Disable PAGEEXEC */ +#define PF_SEGMEXEC (1 << 6) /* Enable SEGMEXEC */ +#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC (1 << 7) /* Disable SEGMEXEC */ +#define PF_MPROTECT (1 << 8) /* Enable MPROTECT */ +#define PF_NOMPROTECT (1 << 9) /* Disable MPROTECT */ +#define PF_RANDEXEC (1 << 10) /* Enable RANDEXEC */ +#define PF_NORANDEXEC (1 << 11) /* Disable RANDEXEC */ +#define PF_EMUTRAMP (1 << 12) /* Enable EMUTRAMP */ +#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP (1 << 13) /* Disable EMUTRAMP */ +#define PF_RANDMMAP (1 << 14) /* Enable RANDMMAP */ +#define PF_NORANDMMAP (1 << 15) /* Disable RANDMMAP */ + typedef struct elf32_phdr{ Elf32_Word p_type; Elf32_Off p_offset; @@ -379,6 +408,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr { #define EI_OSABI 7 #define EI_PAD 8 +#define EI_PAX 14 + #define ELFMAG0 0x7f /* EI_MAG */ #define ELFMAG1 'E' #define ELFMAG2 'L' @@ -435,6 +466,7 @@ extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC []; #define elfhdr elf32_hdr #define elf_phdr elf32_phdr #define elf_note elf32_note +#define elf_dyn Elf32_Dyn #else @@ -442,6 +474,7 @@ extern Elf64_Dyn _DYNAMIC []; #define elfhdr elf64_hdr #define elf_phdr elf64_phdr #define elf_note elf64_note +#define elf_dyn Elf64_Dyn #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/fs.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ static inline int break_lease(struct ino /* fs/open.c */ -extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start); +extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *); extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int); extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int); extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gracl.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +#ifndef GR_ACL_H +#define GR_ACL_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/* Major status information */ + +#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.1.3" +#define GRSECURITY_VERSION 0x213 + +enum { + + SHUTDOWN = 0, + ENABLE = 1, + SPROLE = 2, + RELOAD = 3, + SEGVMOD = 4, + STATUS = 5, + UNSPROLE = 6 +}; + +/* Password setup definitions + * kernel/grhash.c */ +enum { + GR_PW_LEN = 128, + GR_SALT_LEN = 16, + GR_SHA_LEN = 32, +}; + +enum { + GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64, +}; + +#define GR_NLIMITS (RLIMIT_LOCKS + 2) + +/* Begin Data Structures */ + +struct sprole_pw { + unsigned char *rolename; + unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; + unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */ +}; + +struct name_entry { + ino_t inode; + dev_t device; + char *name; + __u16 len; +}; + +struct acl_role_db { + struct acl_role_label **r_hash; + __u32 r_size; +}; + +struct name_db { + struct name_entry **n_hash; + __u32 n_size; +}; + +struct crash_uid { + uid_t uid; + unsigned long expires; +}; + +struct gr_hash_struct { + void **table; + void **nametable; + void *first; + __u32 table_size; + __u32 used_size; + int type; +}; + +/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */ + +struct acl_subject_label { + char *filename; + ino_t inode; + dev_t device; + __u32 mode; + __u32 cap_mask; + __u32 cap_lower; + + struct rlimit res[GR_NLIMITS]; + __u16 resmask; + + __u8 user_trans_type; + __u8 group_trans_type; + uid_t *user_transitions; + gid_t *group_transitions; + __u16 user_trans_num; + __u16 group_trans_num; + + __u32 ip_proto[8]; + __u32 ip_type; + struct acl_ip_label **ips; + __u32 ip_num; + + __u32 crashes; + unsigned long expires; + + struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject; + struct gr_hash_struct *hash; + struct acl_subject_label *prev; + struct acl_subject_label *next; + + struct acl_object_label **obj_hash; + __u32 obj_hash_size; +}; + +struct role_allowed_ip { + __u32 addr; + __u32 netmask; + + struct role_allowed_ip *prev; + struct role_allowed_ip *next; +}; + +struct role_transition { + char *rolename; + + struct role_transition *prev; + struct role_transition *next; +}; + +struct acl_role_label { + char *rolename; + uid_t uidgid; + __u16 roletype; + + __u16 auth_attempts; + unsigned long expires; + + struct acl_subject_label *root_label; + struct gr_hash_struct *hash; + + struct acl_role_label *prev; + struct acl_role_label *next; + + struct role_transition *transitions; + struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips; + uid_t *domain_children; + __u16 domain_child_num; + + struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash; + __u32 subj_hash_size; +}; + +struct user_acl_role_db { + struct acl_role_label **r_table; + __u32 num_pointers; /* Number of allocations to track */ + __u32 num_roles; /* Number of roles */ + __u32 num_domain_children; /* Number of domain children */ + __u32 num_subjects; /* Number of subjects */ + __u32 num_objects; /* Number of objects */ +}; + +struct acl_object_label { + char *filename; + ino_t inode; + dev_t device; + __u32 mode; + + struct acl_subject_label *nested; + struct acl_object_label *globbed; + + /* next two structures not used */ + + struct acl_object_label *prev; + struct acl_object_label *next; +}; + +struct acl_ip_label { + __u32 addr; + __u32 netmask; + __u16 low, high; + __u8 mode; + __u32 type; + __u32 proto[8]; + + /* next two structures not used */ + + struct acl_ip_label *prev; + struct acl_ip_label *next; +}; + +struct gr_arg { + struct user_acl_role_db role_db; + unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN]; + unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN]; + unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; + unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN]; + struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws; + dev_t segv_device; + ino_t segv_inode; + uid_t segv_uid; + __u16 num_sprole_pws; + __u16 mode; +}; + +struct gr_arg_wrapper { + struct gr_arg *arg; + __u32 version; + __u32 size; +}; + +struct subject_map { + struct acl_subject_label *user; + struct acl_subject_label *kernel; +}; + +struct acl_subj_map_db { + struct subject_map **s_hash; + __u32 s_size; +}; + +/* End Data Structures Section */ + +/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler + Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times + in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match. + Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/ + +static __inline__ unsigned long +chash(const void *dentry, const void *mnt, const struct acl_subject_label *subj, + const unsigned long sz) +{ + return (((const unsigned long)subj + (const unsigned long)mnt + + (const unsigned long)dentry) % sz); +} + +static __inline__ unsigned long +rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz); +} + + static __inline__ unsigned long +shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz); +} + +static __inline__ unsigned long +fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz); +} + +static __inline__ unsigned long +nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned long sz) +{ + return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz; +} + +#endif + diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/gralloc.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +#ifndef __GRALLOC_H +#define __GRALLOC_H + +void acl_free_all(void); +int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size); +void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len); + +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grdefs.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +#ifndef GRDEFS_H +#define GRDEFS_H + +/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */ + +enum { + GR_READY = 0x01, + GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state +}; + +/* Begin ACL declarations */ + +/* Role flags */ + +enum { + GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001, + GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002, + GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004, + GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008, + GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010, + GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020, + GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040, + GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080, + GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100, + GR_ROLE_DOMAIN = 0x0200 +}; + +/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */ +enum { + GR_DELETED = 0x80000000 +}; + +/* ACL Object-only mode flags */ +enum { + GR_READ = 0x00000001, + GR_APPEND = 0x00000002, + GR_WRITE = 0x00000004, + GR_EXEC = 0x00000008, + GR_FIND = 0x00000010, + GR_INHERIT = 0x00000020, + GR_SETID = 0x00000040, + GR_CREATE = 0x00000080, + GR_DELETE = 0x00000100, + GR_LINK = 0x00000200, + GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00000400, + GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00000800, + GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x00001000, + GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00002000, + GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00004000, + GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00008000, + GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00010000, + GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00020000, + GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00040000, + GR_AUDIT_LINK = 0x00080000, + GR_PTRACERD = 0x00100000, + GR_NOPTRACE = 0x00200000, + GR_SUPPRESS = 0x00400000, + GR_NOLEARN = 0x00800000 +}; + +#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \ + GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \ + GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_LINK) + +/* ACL subject-only mode flags */ +enum { + GR_KILL = 0x00000001, + GR_VIEW = 0x00000002, + GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000004, + GR_LEARN = 0x00000008, + GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000010, + /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ + GR_DUMMY = 0x00000020, + GR_PAXPAGE = 0x00000040, + GR_PAXSEGM = 0x00000080, + GR_PAXGCC = 0x00000100, + GR_PAXRANDMMAP = 0x00000200, + GR_PAXMPROTECT = 0x00000400, + GR_PROTSHM = 0x00000800, + GR_KILLPROC = 0x00001000, + GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00002000, + /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */ + GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00004000, + GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00008000, + GR_PROCACCT = 0x00010000, + GR_RELAXPTRACE = 0x00020000, + GR_NESTED = 0x00040000, + GR_INHERITLEARN = 0x00080000, + GR_PROCFIND = 0x00100000, + GR_POVERRIDE = 0x00200000 +}; + +enum { + GR_ID_USER = 0x01, + GR_ID_GROUP = 0x02, +}; + +enum { + GR_ID_ALLOW = 0x01, + GR_ID_DENY = 0x02, +}; + +#define GR_CRASH_RES 11 +#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500 + +/* begin resource learning section */ +enum { + GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60, + GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000, + GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000, + GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000, + GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000, + GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000, + GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1, + GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5, + GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000, + GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000, + GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2 +}; + +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grinternal.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H +#define __GRINTERNAL_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...); +extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode); +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); +extern __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode); +extern int gr_set_acls(const int type); + +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); +extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void); + +extern void gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task); +extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); + +extern int grsec_enable_link; +extern int grsec_enable_fifo; +extern int grsec_enable_execve; +extern int grsec_enable_shm; +extern int grsec_enable_execlog; +extern int grsec_enable_signal; +extern int grsec_enable_forkfail; +extern int grsec_enable_time; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl; +extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix; +extern int grsec_enable_tpe; +extern int grsec_tpe_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all; +extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps; +extern int grsec_enable_randpid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_all; +extern int grsec_socket_all_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_client; +extern int grsec_socket_client_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_socket_server; +extern int grsec_socket_server_gid; +extern int grsec_audit_gid; +extern int grsec_enable_group; +extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc; +extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel; +extern int grsec_enable_mount; +extern int grsec_enable_chdir; +extern int grsec_lock; + +extern struct task_struct *child_reaper; + +extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock; +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime; +extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet; + +extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock; + +extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock; + +#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \ + gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \ + tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") + +#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \ + gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \ + tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") + +#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \ + gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \ + tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") + +#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \ + gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \ + tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/") + +#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && \ + ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \ + child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \ + (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \ + child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))) + +#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \ + tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \ + (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \ + tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)) + +#define DEFAULTSECARGS(task) gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, \ + task->pid, task->uid, \ + task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, \ + gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), \ + task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, \ + task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, \ + task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid + +#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \ + CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER)) + +#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \ +({ \ + read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \ + gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \ + read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \ +}) + +enum { + GR_DO_AUDIT, + GR_DONT_AUDIT, + GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD +}; + +enum { + GR_TTYSNIFF, + GR_RBAC, + GR_RBAC_STR, + GR_STR_RBAC, + GR_RBAC_MODE2, + GR_RBAC_MODE3, + GR_FILENAME, + GR_NOARGS, + GR_ONE_INT, + GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR, + GR_ONE_STR, + GR_STR_INT, + GR_TWO_INT, + GR_THREE_INT, + GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR, + GR_TWO_STR, + GR_THREE_STR, + GR_FOUR_STR, + GR_STR_FILENAME, + GR_FILENAME_STR, + GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT, + GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR, + GR_TEXTREL, + GR_PTRACE, + GR_RESOURCE, + GR_CAP, + GR_SIG, + GR_CRASH1, + GR_CRASH2, + GR_PSACCT +}; + +#define gr_log_ttysniff(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TTYSNIFF, task) +#define gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC, dentry, mnt) +#define gr_log_fs_rbac_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_STR, dentry, mnt, str) +#define gr_log_fs_str_rbac(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_RBAC, str, dentry, mnt) +#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE2, dentry, mnt, str1, str2) +#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE3, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3) +#define gr_log_fs_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME, dentry, mnt) +#define gr_log_noargs(audit, msg) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_NOARGS) +#define gr_log_int(audit, msg, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT, num) +#define gr_log_int_str2(audit, msg, num, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR, num, str1, str2) +#define gr_log_str(audit, msg, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_STR, str) +#define gr_log_str_int(audit, msg, str, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_INT, str, num) +#define gr_log_int_int(audit, msg, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_INT, num1, num2) +#define gr_log_int3(audit, msg, num1, num2, num3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_INT, num1, num2, num3) +#define gr_log_int5_str2(audit, msg, num1, num2, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR, num1, num2, str1, str2) +#define gr_log_str_str(audit, msg, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_STR, str1, str2) +#define gr_log_str3(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_STR, str1, str2, str3) +#define gr_log_str4(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3, str4) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FOUR_STR, str1, str2, str3, str4) +#define gr_log_str_fs(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_FILENAME, str, dentry, mnt) +#define gr_log_fs_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_STR, dentry, mnt, str) +#define gr_log_fs_int2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT, dentry, mnt, num1, num2) +#define gr_log_fs_int2_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str) +#define gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(audit, msg, file, ulong1, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TEXTREL, file, ulong1, ulong2) +#define gr_log_ptrace(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PTRACE, task) +#define gr_log_res_ulong2_str(audit, msg, task, ulong1, str, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RESOURCE, task, ulong1, str, ulong2) +#define gr_log_cap(audit, msg, task, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CAP, task, str) +#define gr_log_sig(audit, msg, task, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_SIG, task, num) +#define gr_log_crash1(audit, msg, task, ulong) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH1, task, ulong) +#define gr_log_crash2(audit, msg, task, ulong1) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH2, task, ulong1) +#define gr_log_procacct(audit, msg, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PSACCT, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9) + +extern void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...); + +#endif + +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grmsg.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" +#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%d/%d gid/egid:%d/%d" +#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by " +#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by " +#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by " +#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by " +#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect() to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by " +#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by " +#define GR_KMEM_MSG "denied write of /dev/kmem by " +#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "denied open of /dev/port by " +#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "denied write of /dev/mem by " +#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "denied mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by " +#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by " +#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u" +#define GR_ID_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%c\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%u.%u.%u.%u" +#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by " +#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by " +#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by " +#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by " +#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied mknod of %.950s from chroot by " +#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by " +#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect() to the unix domain socket %.950s by " +#define GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG "terminal being sniffed by IP:%u.%u.%u.%u %.480s[%.16s:%d], parent %.480s[%.16s:%d] against " +#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by " +#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by " +#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by " +#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by " +#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for " +#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by " +#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by " +#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by " +#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by " +#define GR_NPROC_MSG "denied overstep of process limit by " +#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by " +#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by " +#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds" +#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning execution for %lu seconds" +#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied mount of %.30s as %.930s from chroot by " +#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied pivot_root from chroot by " +#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by " +#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by " +#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by " +#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied double chroot to %.950s by " +#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by " +#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by " +#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by " +#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by " +#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by " +#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by " +#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s by " +#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use gracl=off from your boot loader" +#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: %d bytes sent %d required, being fed garbaged by " +#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for " +#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for " +#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for " +#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for " +#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for " +#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for " +#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system loaded by " +#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "unable to load %s for " +#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system" +#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system reloaded by " +#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "failed reload of %s for " +#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for " +#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by " +#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by " +#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for " +#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for " +#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by " +#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for " +#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "invalid mode %d by " +#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by " +#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by " +#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change by " +#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " +#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " +#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "denied send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by " +#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "denied modification of grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by " +#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by " +#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by " +#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "fatal: unable to find subject for (%.16s:%d), loaded by " +#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by " +#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by " +#define GR_SOCK_MSG "denied socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by " +#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "denied socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by " +#define GR_BIND_MSG "denied bind() by " +#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "denied connect() by " +#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "denied bind() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " +#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "denied connect() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by " +#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u" +#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process " +#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for " +#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %d denied for " +#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %d denied for " +#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by " +#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by " +#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount of %.30s to %.64s by " +#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by " +#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.128s) by " +#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by " +#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " +#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by " +#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " +#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by " +#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%d euid:%d removed by " +#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "denied resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu for " +#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by " diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H +#define GR_SECURITY_H +#include +#include +#include + +extern void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p); +extern void gr_handle_brute_check(void); + +extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void); + +extern int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs); +extern int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs); + +extern void gr_add_to_task_ip_table(struct task_struct *p); +extern void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p); + +extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, + const int niceval); +extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task); +extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const char *dev_name); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid); + +extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode); +extern int gr_handle_nproc(void); + +extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void); +extern void gr_handle_iopl(void); + +extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file); + +extern int gr_random_pid(void); + +extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval); +extern void gr_log_timechange(void); +extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t); +extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv); +extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval); +extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg); +extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); +extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg); +extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); +extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size); +extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid); +extern void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent, + const struct inode *inode, + const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, + const int acc_mode); +extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, + struct inode *inode, + const int mode, const char *to); + +extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap); +extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap); +extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit, + const unsigned long wanted, const int gt); +extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig); +extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig); +extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid); +extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task); +extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, + const unsigned long prot); +extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, + const unsigned long prot); +extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request); +extern int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp); +extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void); +extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task); +extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, + const gid_t gid); +extern int gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct dentry *p_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode, + const int imode); +extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const int mode); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const char *from); +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to); +extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *old_parent_inode, + struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname); +extern void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir, + struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct dentry *new_dentry, + struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace); +extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry, + const struct dentry *parent_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, + const struct dentry *old_dentry, + const struct vfsmount *old_mnt); +extern int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, + const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino); + +extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, + const struct vfsmount *mnt); +extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void); +extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code); +extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task); +extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC +extern void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task); +#else +static inline void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void); +extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void); +extern void gr_handle_open_port(void); +extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, + struct vm_area_struct *vma); + +extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void); +#define get_random_long() pax_get_random_long() + +extern int grsec_enable_dmesg; +extern int grsec_enable_randsrc; +extern int grsec_enable_shm; +#endif + +#endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #include #include #include +#include #ifndef MM_VM_SIZE #define MM_VM_SIZE(mm) ((TASK_SIZE + PGDIR_SIZE - 1) & PGDIR_MASK) @@ -113,8 +114,49 @@ struct vm_area_struct { #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA struct mempolicy *vm_policy; /* NUMA policy for the VMA */ #endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + unsigned long vm_mirror; /* PaX: mirror distance */ +#endif + }; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) +extern unsigned int pax_aslr; +#endif + +extern unsigned int pax_softmode; +#endif + +extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *); + +/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */ +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) +static inline unsigned long pax_get_flags(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (likely(tsk->mm)) + return tsk->mm->flags; + else + return 0UL; +} + +/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */ +static inline long pax_set_flags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (likely(tsk->mm)) { + tsk->mm->flags = flags; + return 0; + } + return -EINVAL; +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS +extern void pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm); +#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) +extern void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm); +#endif + /* * This struct defines the per-mm list of VMAs for uClinux. If CONFIG_MMU is * disabled, then there's a single shared list of VMAs maintained by the @@ -165,6 +207,18 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void #define VM_HUGETLB 0x00400000 /* Huge TLB Page VM */ #define VM_NONLINEAR 0x00800000 /* Is non-linear (remap_file_pages) */ +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +#define VM_MIRROR 0x01000000 /* vma is mirroring another */ +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE 0x02000000 /* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */ +#endif + +#ifdef __VM_STACK_FLAGS +#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS (0x00000033 | __VM_STACK_FLAGS) +#endif + #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */ #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS #endif @@ -734,6 +788,10 @@ extern unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struc unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff); +extern unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flag, unsigned long pgoff); + static inline unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flag, unsigned long offset) @@ -783,7 +841,7 @@ void handle_ra_miss(struct address_space unsigned long max_sane_readahead(unsigned long nr); /* Do stack extension */ -extern int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address); +extern int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address); /* Look up the first VMA which satisfies addr < vm_end, NULL if none. */ extern struct vm_area_struct * find_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr); @@ -806,7 +864,7 @@ static inline unsigned long vma_pages(st return (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; } -extern struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr); +extern struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr); extern struct page * vmalloc_to_page(void *addr); extern unsigned long vmalloc_to_pfn(void *addr); @@ -856,5 +914,11 @@ int in_gate_area_no_task(unsigned long a #define in_gate_area(task, addr) ({(void)task; in_gate_area_no_task(addr);}) #endif /* __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT +extern void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot); +#else +static inline void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) {} +#endif + #endif /* __KERNEL__ */ #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/mman.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ static inline unsigned long calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags) { return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN ) | + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) | +#endif + _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE ) | _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE) | _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED, VM_LOCKED ); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/random.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ extern __u32 check_tcp_syn_cookie(__u32 extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport); +extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void); + #ifndef MODULE extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops; #endif diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sched.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include struct exec_domain; +struct linux_binprm; /* * cloning flags: @@ -256,8 +257,34 @@ struct mm_struct { unsigned long hiwater_rss; /* High-water RSS usage */ unsigned long hiwater_vm; /* High-water virtual memory usage */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) + unsigned long flags; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE + unsigned long call_dl_resolve; +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT) + unsigned long call_syscall; +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR + unsigned long delta_mmap; /* randomized offset */ + unsigned long delta_exec; /* randomized offset */ + unsigned long delta_stack; /* randomized offset */ +#endif + }; +#define MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 0x01000000 /* Paging based non-executable pages */ +#define MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 0x02000000 /* Emulate trampolines */ +#define MF_PAX_MPROTECT 0x04000000 /* Restrict mprotect() */ +#define MF_PAX_RANDMMAP 0x08000000 /* Randomize mmap() base */ +#define MF_PAX_RANDEXEC 0x10000000 /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */ +#define MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 0x20000000 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */ + struct sighand_struct { atomic_t count; struct k_sigaction action[_NSIG]; @@ -685,6 +712,23 @@ struct task_struct { struct mempolicy *mempolicy; short il_next; #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + /* grsecurity */ + struct acl_subject_label *acl; + struct acl_role_label *role; + struct file *exec_file; + u32 curr_ip; + u32 gr_saddr; + u32 gr_daddr; + u16 gr_sport; + u16 gr_dport; + u16 acl_role_id; + u8 acl_sp_role:1; + u8 used_accept:1; + u8 is_writable:1; + u8 brute:1; +#endif }; static inline pid_t process_group(struct task_struct *tsk) @@ -918,14 +962,29 @@ static inline int sas_ss_flags(unsigned : on_sig_stack(sp) ? SS_ONSTACK : 0); } +extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap); +extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY /* code is in security.c */ extern int capable(int cap); +static inline int capable_nolog(int cap) +{ + return capable(cap); +} #else static inline int capable(int cap) { - if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) { + if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(current, cap)) { + current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static inline int capable_nolog(int cap) +{ + if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) { current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; return 1; } @@ -1172,6 +1231,12 @@ extern void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm) { mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) + mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap; +#endif + mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area; mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h 2005-03-02 02:38:17.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/shm.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ struct shmid_kernel /* private to the ke pid_t shm_cprid; pid_t shm_lprid; struct user_struct *mlock_user; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + time_t shm_createtime; + pid_t shm_lapid; +#endif }; /* shm_mode upper byte flags */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h --- linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/include/linux/sysctl.h 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -135,8 +135,20 @@ enum KERN_UNKNOWN_NMI_PANIC=66, /* int: unknown nmi panic flag */ KERN_BOOTLOADER_TYPE=67, /* int: boot loader type */ KERN_FBSPLASH=68, /* string: path to fbsplash helper */ + KERN_GRSECURITY=69, /* grsecurity */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + KERN_PAX=70, /* PaX control */ +#endif + }; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE +enum { + PAX_ASLR=1, /* PaX: disable/enable all randomization features */ + PAX_SOFTMODE=2 /* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */ +}; +#endif /* CTL_VM names: */ enum diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/init/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ menuconfig EMBEDDED config KALLSYMS bool "Load all symbols for debugging/kksymoops" if EMBEDDED default y + depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM help Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/init/main.c linux-2.6.11/init/main.c --- linux-2.6.11/init/main.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/init/main.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ extern void acpi_early_init(void); #else static inline void acpi_early_init(void) { } #endif +extern void grsecurity_init(void); #ifdef CONFIG_TC extern void tc_init(void); @@ -660,6 +661,7 @@ static int init(void * unused) execute_command = "/init"; else prepare_namespace(); + grsecurity_init(); /* * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c --- linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/msg.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include "util.h" @@ -229,6 +230,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgget (key_t key, i msg_unlock(msq); } up(&msg_ids.sem); + + gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg); + return ret; } @@ -478,6 +482,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, i break; } case IPC_RMID: + gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); + freeque (msq, msqid); break; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c --- linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c 2005-03-02 02:38:03.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/sem.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "util.h" @@ -239,6 +240,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_semget (key_t key, i } up(&sem_ids.sem); + + gr_log_semget(err, semflg); + return err; } @@ -826,6 +830,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int se switch(cmd){ case IPC_RMID: + gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid); + freeary(sma, semid); err = 0; break; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c --- linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c 2005-03-02 02:38:09.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/ipc/shm.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include "util.h" @@ -51,6 +52,14 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st static int sysvipc_shm_read_proc(char *buffer, char **start, off_t offset, int length, int *eof, void *data); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, + const int shmid); +extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid, + const time_t shm_createtime); +#endif + size_t shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX; size_t shm_ctlall = SHMALL; int shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI; @@ -143,6 +152,17 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st shp->shm_lprid = current->tgid; shp->shm_dtim = get_seconds(); shp->shm_nattch--; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM + if (grsec_enable_shm) { + if (shp->shm_nattch == 0) { + shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST; + shm_destroy(shp); + } else + shm_unlock(shp); + up(&shm_ids.sem); + return; + } +#endif if(shp->shm_nattch == 0 && shp->shm_flags & SHM_DEST) shm_destroy (shp); @@ -224,6 +244,9 @@ static int newseg (key_t key, int shmflg shp->shm_lprid = 0; shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0; shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds(); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + shp->shm_createtime = get_seconds(); +#endif shp->shm_segsz = size; shp->shm_nattch = 0; shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq); @@ -278,6 +301,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, s } up(&shm_ids.sem); + gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size); + return err; } @@ -583,6 +608,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, i if (err) goto out_unlock_up; + gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid); + if (shp->shm_nattch){ shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST; /* Do not find it any more */ @@ -725,9 +752,27 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh return err; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime, + shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) { + shm_unlock(shp); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) { + shm_unlock(shp); + return -EACCES; + } +#endif + file = shp->shm_file; size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode); shp->shm_nattch++; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + shp->shm_lapid = current->pid; +#endif + shm_unlock(shp); down_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); @@ -912,3 +957,24 @@ done: return len; } #endif + +void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM + int i; + struct shmid_kernel *shp; + + if (!grsec_enable_shm) + return; + + for (i = 0; i <= shm_ids.max_id; i++) { + shp = shm_get(i); + if (shp && (shp->shm_cprid == task->pid) && + (shp->shm_nattch <= 0)) { + shp->shm_flags |= SHM_DEST; + shm_destroy(shp); + } + } +#endif + return; +} diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/capability.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c 2005-03-02 02:37:55.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/configs.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -89,8 +89,16 @@ static int __init ikconfig_init(void) struct proc_dir_entry *entry; /* create the current config file */ +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root); +#endif +#else entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO, &proc_root); +#endif if (!entry) return -ENOMEM; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/exit.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -26,6 +26,11 @@ #include #include #include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC +extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock; +#endif #include #include @@ -223,6 +228,15 @@ void reparent_to_init(void) { write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + if (current->exec_file) { + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = NULL; + } + write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); +#endif + ptrace_unlink(current); /* Reparent to init */ REMOVE_LINKS(current); @@ -230,6 +244,8 @@ void reparent_to_init(void) current->real_parent = child_reaper; SET_LINKS(current); + gr_set_kernel_label(current); + /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */ current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD; @@ -324,6 +340,17 @@ void daemonize(const char *name, ...) vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args); va_end(args); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); + if (current->exec_file) { + fput(current->exec_file); + current->exec_file = NULL; + } + write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); +#endif + + gr_set_kernel_label(current); + /* * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the * user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them @@ -811,9 +838,15 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long co group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live); if (group_dead) acct_process(code); + + gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code); + gr_acl_handle_exit(); + gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk); + exit_mm(tsk); exit_sem(tsk); + gr_shm_exit(tsk); __exit_files(tsk); __exit_fs(tsk); exit_namespace(tsk); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/fork.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ static inline int dup_mmap(struct mm_str mm->locked_vm = 0; mm->mmap = NULL; mm->mmap_cache = NULL; - mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->mmap_base; + mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache; mm->map_count = 0; mm->rss = 0; mm->anon_rss = 0; @@ -300,7 +301,6 @@ static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct rwlock_init(&mm->ioctx_list_lock); mm->ioctx_list = NULL; mm->default_kioctx = (struct kioctx)INIT_KIOCTX(mm->default_kioctx, *mm); - mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE; if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) { mm->def_flags = 0; @@ -822,6 +822,9 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon goto fork_out; retval = -EAGAIN; + + gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0); + if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && @@ -927,6 +930,8 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon if (retval) goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace; + gr_copy_label(p); + p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL; /* * Clear TID on mm_release()? @@ -1077,6 +1082,9 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count: free_uid(p->user); bad_fork_free: free_task(p); + + gr_log_forkfail(retval); + goto fork_out; } @@ -1134,6 +1142,9 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, if (pid < 0) return -EAGAIN; + + gr_handle_brute_check(); + if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) { trace = fork_traceflag (clone_flags); if (trace) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/futex.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ static int get_futex_key(unsigned long u struct page *page; int err; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (uaddr >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)) + return -EFAULT; +#endif + /* * The futex address must be "naturally" aligned. */ @@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ static int get_futex_key(unsigned long u * The futex is hashed differently depending on whether * it's in a shared or private mapping. So check vma first. */ - vma = find_extend_vma(mm, uaddr); + vma = find_extend_vma(current, mm, uaddr); if (unlikely(!vma)) return -EFAULT; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c 2005-03-02 02:38:32.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/kallsyms.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -388,7 +388,15 @@ int __init kallsyms_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL); +#endif if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations; return 0; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/pid.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #define pid_hashfn(nr) hash_long((unsigned long)nr, pidhash_shift) static struct hlist_head *pid_hash[PIDTYPE_MAX]; @@ -76,7 +77,9 @@ int alloc_pidmap(void) int i, offset, max_scan, pid, last = last_pid; pidmap_t *map; - pid = last + 1; + pid = gr_random_pid(); + if (!pid) + pid = last_pid + 1; if (pid >= pid_max) pid = RESERVED_PIDS; offset = pid & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK; @@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ void fastcall detach_pid(task_t *task, e task_t *find_task_by_pid_type(int type, int nr) { struct pid *pid; + task_t *task = NULL; pid = find_pid(type, nr); if (!pid) return NULL; - return pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type); + task = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type); + + if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task)) + return NULL; + + return task; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid_type); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/printk.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -253,6 +254,11 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user * bu char c; int error = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG + if (grsec_enable_dmesg && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; +#endif + error = security_syslog(type); if (error) return error; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/resource.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -136,10 +136,27 @@ static int __init ioresources_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL); +#endif if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations; + +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER + entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL); +#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP + entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL); +#endif +#else entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL); +#endif if (entry) entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations; return 0; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c 2005-03-02 02:38:19.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sched.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -2309,6 +2310,7 @@ static void check_rlimit(struct task_str total = cputime_add(p->utime, p->stime); secs = cputime_to_secs(total); + gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_CPU, secs, 1); if (unlikely(secs >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur)) { /* Send SIGXCPU every second. */ tmp = cputime_sub(total, cputime); @@ -3297,6 +3299,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment) return -EPERM; if (increment < -40) increment = -40; + if (gr_handle_chroot_nice()) + return -EPERM; } if (increment > 40) increment = 40; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/signal.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -642,7 +643,12 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) && !capable(CAP_KILL)) return error; - return security_task_kill(t, info, sig); + if (gr_handle_signal(t, sig)) + return error; + error = security_task_kill(t, info, sig); + if (!error) + gr_log_signal(sig, t); + return error; } /* forward decl */ @@ -840,7 +846,7 @@ out_set: (((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&(sigptr)->signal, (sig))) -static int +int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t) { int ret = 0; @@ -892,6 +898,9 @@ force_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo * ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags); + gr_log_signal(sig, t); + gr_handle_crash(t, sig); + return ret; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sys.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -229,6 +230,12 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_stru error = -EACCES; goto out; } + + if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); if (no_nice) { error = no_nice; @@ -528,6 +535,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid)) current->sgid = new_egid; + + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid); + current->fsgid = new_egid; current->egid = new_egid; current->gid = new_rgid; @@ -556,6 +566,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid) current->mm->dumpable=0; wmb(); } + + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid); + current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid; } else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid)) @@ -596,6 +609,9 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int current->mm->dumpable = 0; wmb(); } + + gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid); + current->uid = new_ruid; return 0; } @@ -698,6 +714,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid) } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid)) return -EPERM; + if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid)) + return -EPERM; + if (old_euid != uid) { current->mm->dumpable = 0; @@ -801,8 +820,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid current->egid = egid; } current->fsgid = current->egid; - if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) + if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { + gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid); current->gid = rgid; + } if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) current->sgid = sgid; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c 2005-03-02 02:37:48.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/sysctl.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -50,6 +50,14 @@ #endif #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) +#include +#include + +extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const void *oldval, + const void *newval); +extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, + const int op); +extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op); /* External variables not in a header file. */ extern int C_A_D; @@ -147,6 +155,32 @@ extern ctl_table pty_table[]; #ifdef HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #endif +extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[]; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE +static ctl_table pax_table[] = { + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK) + { + .ctl_name = PAX_ASLR, + .procname = "aslr", + .data = &pax_aslr, + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, +#endif + + { + .ctl_name = PAX_SOFTMODE, + .procname = "softmode", + .data = &pax_softmode, + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + } +}; +#endif /* /proc declarations: */ @@ -632,6 +666,24 @@ static ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL + { + .ctl_name = KERN_GRSECURITY, + .procname = "grsecurity", + .mode = 0500, + .child = grsecurity_table, + }, +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE + { + .ctl_name = KERN_PAX, + .procname = "pax", + .mode = 0500, + .child = pax_table, + }, +#endif + { .ctl_name = 0 } }; @@ -1023,6 +1075,10 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op) static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op) { int error; + if (table->de && gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op)) + return -EACCES; + if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op)) + return -EACCES; error = security_sysctl(table, op); if (error) return error; @@ -1059,6 +1115,10 @@ repeat: table = table->child; goto repeat; } + + if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval)) + return -EACCES; + error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen, oldval, oldlenp, newval, newlen, context); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c --- linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/kernel/time.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_stime(time_t __user return err; do_settimeofday(&tv); + + gr_log_timechange(); + return 0; } @@ -194,6 +198,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_settimeofday(struct return -EFAULT; } + gr_log_timechange(); + return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL); } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/filemap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include + /* * This is needed for the following functions: * - try_to_release_page @@ -1516,6 +1518,12 @@ int generic_file_mmap(struct file * file if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage) return -ENOEXEC; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f]; +#endif + file_accessed(file); vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops; return 0; @@ -1815,6 +1823,7 @@ inline int generic_write_checks(struct f *pos = i_size_read(inode); if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) { + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0); if (*pos >= limit) { send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0); return -EFBIG; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/madvise.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -14,8 +14,42 @@ * We can potentially split a vm area into separate * areas, each area with its own behavior. */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, int behavior); + +static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, int behavior) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m; + unsigned long start_m, end_m; + int error; + + start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m); + if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { + start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror; + end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror; + error = __madvise_behavior(vma_m, start_m, end_m, behavior); + if (error) + return error; + } else { + printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: madvise bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + return __madvise_behavior(vma, start, end, behavior); +} + +static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, + unsigned long end, int behavior) +#else static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior) +#endif { struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; int error = 0; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c 2005-03-02 02:38:08.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/memory.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -873,7 +874,7 @@ int get_user_pages(struct task_struct *t do { struct vm_area_struct * vma; - vma = find_extend_vma(mm, start); + vma = find_extend_vma(tsk, mm, start); if (!vma && in_gate_area(tsk, start)) { unsigned long pg = start & PAGE_MASK; struct vm_area_struct *gate_vma = get_gate_vma(tsk); @@ -1254,6 +1255,85 @@ static inline void break_cow(struct vm_a update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); } +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE + * + * mm->page_table_lock is held on entry and is not released on exit or inside + * to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc) + */ +static void pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long address, pte_t *pte) +{ + unsigned long address_m; + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; + pte_t * pte_m, entry_m; + struct page * page_m; + + address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m); + BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m); + + address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror; + + { + pgd_t *pgd_m; + pud_t *pud_m; + pmd_t *pmd_m; + + pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m); + pud_m = pud_offset(pgd_m, address_m); + pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_m, address_m); + pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m); + } + + if (pte_present(*pte_m)) { + flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m); + flush_icache_page(vma_m, pte_page(*pte_m)); + } + entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(pte_m); + if (pte_present(entry_m)) + flush_tlb_page(vma_m, address_m); + + if (pte_none(entry_m)) { + ++mm->rss; + } else if (pte_present(entry_m)) { + page_m = pte_page(entry_m); + if (PageAnon(page_m)) + --mm->anon_rss; + if (PageReserved(page_m)) + ++mm->rss; + else + page_remove_rmap(page_m); + page_cache_release(page_m); + } else if (!pte_file(entry_m)) { + free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m)); + ++mm->rss; + } else { + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: bug in mirror_fault: %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", + address, vma->vm_start, address_m, vma_m->vm_start); + } + + page_m = pte_page(*pte); + entry_m = mk_pte(page_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot); + if (pte_write(*pte)) + entry_m = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry_m), vma_m); + if (!PageReserved(page_m)) { + page_cache_get(page_m); + /* + * we can test PG_anon without holding page_map_lock because + * we hold the page table lock and have a reference to page_m + */ + if (PageAnon(page_m)) + page_add_anon_rmap(page_m, vma_m, address_m); + else + page_add_file_rmap(page_m); + } + ptep_establish(vma_m, address_m, pte_m, entry_m); + update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m); + pte_unmap_nested(pte_m); +} +#endif + /* * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address @@ -1350,6 +1430,12 @@ static int do_wp_page(struct mm_struct * /* Free the old page.. */ new_page = old_page; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) + pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table); +#endif + } pte_unmap(page_table); page_cache_release(new_page); @@ -1605,6 +1691,7 @@ int vmtruncate(struct inode * inode, lof do_expand: limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1); if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit) goto out_sig; if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes) @@ -1770,6 +1857,12 @@ static int do_swap_page(struct mm_struct /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */ update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) + pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table); +#endif + pte_unmap(page_table); spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); out: @@ -1825,10 +1918,16 @@ do_anonymous_page(struct mm_struct *mm, } set_pte(page_table, entry); - pte_unmap(page_table); /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */ update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, entry); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) + pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, addr, page_table); +#endif + + pte_unmap(page_table); spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); out: return VM_FAULT_MINOR; @@ -1945,6 +2044,15 @@ retry: page_add_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address); } else page_add_file_rmap(new_page); + + /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */ + update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) + pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table); +#endif + pte_unmap(page_table); } else { /* One of our sibling threads was faster, back out. */ @@ -1954,8 +2062,6 @@ retry: goto out; } - /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */ - update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry); spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); out: return ret; @@ -2066,6 +2172,11 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm pmd_t *pmd; pte_t *pte; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + unsigned long address_m = 0UL; + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; +#endif + __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); inc_page_state(pgfault); @@ -2080,6 +2191,45 @@ int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address); spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + pgd_t *pgd_m; + pud_t *pud_m; + pmd_t *pmd_m = NULL; + pte_t *pte_m = NULL; + + address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m); + + /* PaX: sanity checks */ + if (!vma_m) { + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n", + address, vma, address_m, vma_m); + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || + vma_m->vm_start != address_m || + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start) + { + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", + address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end); + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; + } + + address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror; + pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m); + pud_m = pud_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m); + if (pud_m) + pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pud_m, address_m); + if (pmd_m) + pte_m = pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd_m, address_m); + if (!pud_m || !pmd_m || !pte_m) + goto oom; + pte_unmap(pte_m); + } +#endif + pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, address); if (!pud) goto oom; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c 2005-03-02 02:38:33.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mempolicy.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -293,6 +293,12 @@ check_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsign return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); if (prev && prev->vm_end < vma->vm_start) return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma-vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); +#endif + if ((flags & MPOL_MF_STRICT) && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) { err = verify_pages(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, nodes); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c 2005-03-02 02:37:47.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mlock.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -8,13 +8,62 @@ #include #include #include +#include +static int __mlock_fixup1(struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags); + +static int __mlock_fixup2(struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags); static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) { + int error; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; + unsigned long start_m = 0UL, end_m = 0UL, newflags_m = 0UL; + + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, start_m); + if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != start_m || !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { + printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror; + end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror; + if (newflags & VM_LOCKED) + newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED; + else + newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags & ~VM_LOCKED; + error = __mlock_fixup1(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags_m); + if (error) + return error; + } +#endif + + error = __mlock_fixup1(vma, start, end, newflags); + if (error) + return error; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + error = __mlock_fixup2(vma_m, start_m, end_m, newflags_m); + if (error) + return error; + } +#endif + + return __mlock_fixup2(vma, start, end, newflags); +} + +static int __mlock_fixup1(struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) +{ struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; - int pages; int ret = 0; if (newflags == vma->vm_flags) @@ -26,11 +75,20 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st goto out; } - if (end != vma->vm_end) { + if (end != vma->vm_end) ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0); - if (ret) - goto out; - } + +out: + if (ret == -ENOMEM) + ret = -EAGAIN; + return ret; +} + +static int __mlock_fixup2(struct vm_area_struct * vma, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) +{ + int pages; + int ret = 0; /* * vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode. @@ -48,9 +106,8 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st if (!(newflags & VM_IO)) ret = make_pages_present(start, end); } - vma->vm_mm->locked_vm -= pages; -out: + if (ret == -ENOMEM) ret = -EAGAIN; return ret; @@ -68,6 +125,17 @@ static int do_mlock(unsigned long start, return -EINVAL; if (end == start) return 0; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + } else +#endif + + if (end > TASK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + vma = find_vma(current->mm, start); if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start) return -ENOMEM; @@ -121,6 +189,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlock(unsigned long lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; /* check against resource limits */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1); if ((locked <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) error = do_mlock(start, len, 1); up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); @@ -153,6 +222,16 @@ static int do_mlockall(int flags) for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = vma->vm_next) { unsigned int newflags; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) + break; + } else +#endif + + if (vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE) + break; + newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED; if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT)) newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED; @@ -182,6 +261,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlockall(int flags) lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; ret = -ENOMEM; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1); if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT) || (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) ret = do_mlockall(flags); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_overcommit_ratio); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_max_map_count); EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_committed_space); EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vm_enough_memory); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(protection_map); /* * Requires inode->i_mapping->i_mmap_lock @@ -227,6 +229,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigne /* Check against rlimit.. */ rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data, 1); if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim) goto out; @@ -605,7 +608,11 @@ again: remove_next = 1 + (end > next-> * If the vma has a ->close operation then the driver probably needs to release * per-vma resources, so we don't attempt to merge those. */ +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +#define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED | VM_MIRROR) +#else #define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED) +#endif static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags) @@ -865,6 +872,42 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff) { + unsigned long ret = -EINVAL; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && + (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr && addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))) + return ret; +#endif + + ret = __do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ret < TASK_SIZE && ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + && (!(current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) || ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE))) +#endif + + ) + { + unsigned long ret_m; + prot = prot & PROT_EXEC ? prot : PROT_NONE; + ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flags | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret); + if (ret_m >= TASK_SIZE) { + do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len); + ret = ret_m; + } + } +#endif + + return ret; +} + +unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr, + unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff) +{ struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev; struct inode *inode; @@ -875,6 +918,28 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file int accountable = 1; unsigned long charged = 0; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL; + + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) { + /* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */ + if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE)) + return -EINVAL; + + vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff); + + if (!vma_m || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma_m) || + vma_m->vm_start != pgoff || + (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || + (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))) + return -EINVAL; + + file = vma_m->vm_file; + pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff; + len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start; + } +#endif + if (file) { if (is_file_hugepages(file)) accountable = 0; @@ -915,7 +980,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure * that it represents a valid section of the address space. */ - addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags); + addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags | ((prot & PROT_EXEC) ? MAP_EXECUTABLE : 0)); if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) return addr; @@ -926,6 +991,30 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) | mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC; + if (file && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) + vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) { + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) { + if ((prot & (PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_EXEC) + vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC); + else + vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC + if (file && (flags & MAP_MIRROR) && (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; +#endif + + } +#endif + + } +#endif + if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) { if (!can_do_mlock()) return -EPERM; @@ -937,6 +1026,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur; locked += len; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1); if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) return -EAGAIN; } @@ -984,6 +1074,11 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file /* * Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma. */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (!(flags & MAP_MIRROR)) +#endif + pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT; break; default: @@ -995,17 +1090,21 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file if (error) return error; + if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot)) + return -EACCES; + /* Clear old maps */ error = -ENOMEM; -munmap_back: vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent); if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) { if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len)) return -ENOMEM; - goto munmap_back; + vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent); + BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len); } /* Check against address space limit. */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1); if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1052,6 +1151,13 @@ munmap_back: vma->vm_start = addr; vma->vm_end = addr + len; vma->vm_flags = vm_flags; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if ((file || !(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f]; + else +#endif + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f]; vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff; @@ -1076,6 +1182,14 @@ munmap_back: goto free_vma; } +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) { + vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR; + vma_m->vm_mirror = vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start; + vma->vm_mirror = vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start; + } +#endif + /* We set VM_ACCOUNT in a shared mapping's vm_flags, to inform * shmem_zero_setup (perhaps called through /dev/zero's ->mmap) * that memory reservation must be checked; but that reservation @@ -1111,6 +1225,7 @@ munmap_back: out: mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT; __vm_stat_account(mm, vm_flags, file, len >> PAGE_SHIFT); + track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, vm_flags); if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) { mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT; make_pages_present(addr, addr + len); @@ -1142,6 +1257,7 @@ unacct_error: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(do_mmap_pgoff); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__do_mmap_pgoff); /* Get an address range which is currently unmapped. * For shmat() with addr=0. @@ -1166,6 +1282,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp if (len > TASK_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + if (addr) { addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr); vma = find_vma(mm, addr); @@ -1221,7 +1341,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff, const unsigned long flags) { - struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0; int first_time = 1; @@ -1234,6 +1354,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi if (mm->free_area_cache > base) mm->free_area_cache = base; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp) +#endif + /* requesting a specific address */ if (addr) { addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr); @@ -1255,15 +1379,14 @@ try_again: * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address, * i.e. return with success: */ - if (!(vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev_vma))) + if (!(vma = find_vma(mm, addr))) return addr; /* * new region fits between prev_vma->vm_end and * vma->vm_start, use it: */ - if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start && - (!prev_vma || (addr >= prev_vma->vm_end))) + if (addr+len <= vma->vm_start) /* remember the address as a hint for next time */ return (mm->free_area_cache = addr); else @@ -1428,12 +1551,16 @@ out: * update accounting. This is shared with both the * grow-up and grow-down cases. */ -static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long size, unsigned long grow) +static int acct_stack_growth(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long size, unsigned long grow) { struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm; - struct rlimit *rlim = current->signal->rlim; + struct rlimit *rlim = tsk->signal->rlim; + + BUG_ON(mm != tsk->mm); /* address space limit tests */ + gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm + grow) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); + gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_STACK, size, 1); if (mm->total_vm + grow > rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1447,6 +1574,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a unsigned long limit; locked = mm->locked_vm + grow; limit = rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT; + gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1); if (locked > limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) return -ENOMEM; } @@ -1472,7 +1600,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a /* * vma is the first one with address > vma->vm_end. Have to extend vma. */ -int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address) +int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long address) { int error; @@ -1503,7 +1631,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * size = address - vma->vm_start; grow = (address - vma->vm_end) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow); + error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, grow); if (!error) vma->vm_end = address; } @@ -1512,7 +1640,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * } struct vm_area_struct * -find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) +find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr) { struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev; @@ -1520,7 +1648,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un vma = find_vma_prev(mm, addr, &prev); if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr)) return vma; - if (!prev || expand_stack(prev, addr)) + if (!prev || expand_stack(tsk, prev, addr)) return NULL; if (prev->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) { make_pages_present(addr, prev->vm_end); @@ -1531,7 +1659,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, un /* * vma is the first one with address < vma->vm_start. Have to extend vma. */ -int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address) +int expand_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address) { int error; @@ -1555,13 +1683,50 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * if (address < vma->vm_start) { unsigned long size, grow; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL; + unsigned long address_m = 0UL; + + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m); + if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m || + !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != + vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start || + vma->anon_vma != vma_m->anon_vma) { + printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n", + address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end); + anon_vma_unlock(vma); + return -EFAULT; + } + address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror; + } +#endif + size = vma->vm_end - address; grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT; - error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow); +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma_m) + error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, 2*grow); + else +#endif + + error = acct_stack_growth(tsk, vma, size, grow); if (!error) { vma->vm_start = address; vma->vm_pgoff -= grow; + track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma_m) { + vma_m->vm_start = address_m; + vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow; + track_exec_limit(vma_m->vm_mm, vma_m->vm_start, vma_m->vm_end, vma_m->vm_flags); + } +#endif + } } anon_vma_unlock(vma); @@ -1569,7 +1734,7 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct * } struct vm_area_struct * -find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr) +find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr) { struct vm_area_struct * vma; unsigned long start; @@ -1583,7 +1748,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, u if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)) return NULL; start = vma->vm_start; - if (expand_stack(vma, addr)) + if (expand_stack(tsk, vma, addr)) return NULL; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) { make_pages_present(addr, start); @@ -1606,7 +1771,7 @@ find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, u * we just free'd - but there's no telling how much before. */ static void free_pgtables(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *prev, - unsigned long start, unsigned long end) + struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { unsigned long first = start & PGDIR_MASK; unsigned long last = end + PGDIR_SIZE - 1; @@ -1641,6 +1806,14 @@ static void free_pgtables(struct mmu_gat break; } no_mmaps: + while (mpnt && first < last) { + if ((mpnt->vm_end > first) &&(last > mpnt->vm_start)) { + first = mpnt->vm_end + PGDIR_SIZE - 1; + last = mpnt->vm_start; + } + mpnt = mpnt->vm_next; + } + if (last < first) /* for arches with discontiguous pgd indices */ return; if (first < FIRST_USER_PGD_NR * PGDIR_SIZE) @@ -1663,11 +1836,11 @@ static void unmap_vma(struct mm_struct * { size_t len = area->vm_end - area->vm_start; - area->vm_mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; + mm->total_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; if (area->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) - area->vm_mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; + mm->locked_vm -= len >> PAGE_SHIFT; vm_stat_unaccount(area); - area->vm_mm->unmap_area(area); + mm->unmap_area(area); remove_vm_struct(area); } @@ -1696,6 +1869,7 @@ static void unmap_vma_list(struct mm_str static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct *prev, + struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { @@ -1710,31 +1884,93 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struc if (is_hugepage_only_range(start, end - start)) hugetlb_free_pgtables(tlb, prev, start, end); else - free_pgtables(tlb, prev, start, end); + free_pgtables(tlb, prev, mpnt, start, end); tlb_finish_mmu(tlb, start, end); } +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +static void unmap_mirror_region(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *mpnt) +{ + + while (mpnt) { + struct vm_area_struct *next; + + next = mpnt->vm_next; + mpnt->vm_next = NULL; + unmap_region(mm, mpnt, NULL, next, mpnt->vm_start, mpnt->vm_end); + mpnt->vm_next = next; + mpnt = next; + } +} +#endif + /* * Create a list of vma's touched by the unmap, removing them from the mm's * vma list as we go.. */ static void detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma, - struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long end) + struct vm_area_struct *prev, struct vm_area_struct **mpnt_m, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { struct vm_area_struct **insertion_point; struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma = NULL; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + unsigned long start_m; + struct vm_area_struct *vma_m, *head_vma = vma, *mirrors = NULL; +#endif + insertion_point = (prev ? &prev->vm_next : &mm->mmap); do { rb_erase(&vma->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb); mm->map_count--; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && + vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror >= start && + vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror < end) + { + mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ + start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma(mm, start_m); + if (vma_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) && vma_m->vm_start == start_m) { + vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR; + vma_m->vm_flags &= ~VM_MIRROR; + } else + printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: munmap bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); + } +#endif + tail_vma = vma; vma = vma->vm_next; } while (vma && vma->vm_start < end); *insertion_point = vma; tail_vma->vm_next = NULL; mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + for (; head_vma; head_vma = head_vma->vm_next) { + struct vm_area_struct *prev_m; + + if (!(head_vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) + continue; + + start_m = head_vma->vm_start + head_vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma_prev(mm, start_m, &prev_m); + rb_erase(&vma_m->vm_rb, &mm->mm_rb); + mm->map_count--; + insertion_point = prev_m ? &prev_m->vm_next : &mm->mmap; + *insertion_point = vma_m->vm_next; + if (*mpnt_m) { + mirrors->vm_next = vma_m; + mirrors = vma_m; + } else + *mpnt_m = mirrors = vma_m; + mirrors->vm_next = NULL; + mm->mmap_cache = NULL; /* Kill the cache. */ + } +#endif + } /* @@ -1797,7 +2033,11 @@ int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, str int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len) { unsigned long end; - struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last; + struct vm_area_struct *mpnt, *prev, *last, *mpnt_m = NULL; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + struct vm_area_struct *last_m; +#endif if ((start & ~PAGE_MASK) || start > TASK_SIZE || len > TASK_SIZE-start) return -EINVAL; @@ -1824,7 +2064,23 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi * places tmp vma above, and higher split_vma places tmp vma below. */ if (start > mpnt->vm_start) { - int error = split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0); + int error; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (mpnt->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + unsigned long start_m = mpnt->vm_start + mpnt->vm_mirror; + + mpnt_m = find_vma(mm, start_m); + if (!mpnt_m || (!mpnt_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || mpnt_m->vm_start != start_m) + return -EINVAL; + start_m = start + mpnt->vm_mirror; + error = split_vma(mm, mpnt_m, start_m, 0); + if (error) + return error; + } +#endif + + error = split_vma(mm, mpnt, start, 0); if (error) return error; prev = mpnt; @@ -1833,7 +2089,22 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi /* Does it split the last one? */ last = find_vma(mm, end); if (last && end > last->vm_start) { - int error = split_vma(mm, last, end, 1); + int error; + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (last->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + unsigned long end_m = last->vm_start + last->vm_mirror; + + last_m = find_vma(mm, end_m); + if (!last_m || (!last_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) || last_m->vm_start != end_m) + return -EINVAL; + end_m = end + last->vm_mirror; + if (split_vma(mm, last_m, end_m, 1)) + return -ENOMEM; + } +#endif + + error = split_vma(mm, last, end, 1); if (error) return error; } @@ -1842,14 +2113,28 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi /* * Remove the vma's, and unmap the actual pages */ - detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, end); + + mpnt_m = NULL; + detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped(mm, mpnt, prev, &mpnt_m, start, end); spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); - unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, start, end); + unmap_region(mm, mpnt, prev, NULL, start, end); + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + unmap_mirror_region(mm, mpnt_m); +#endif + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); /* Fix up all other VM information */ unmap_vma_list(mm, mpnt); +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (mpnt_m) + unmap_vma_list(mm, mpnt_m); +#endif + + track_exec_limit(mm, start, end, 0UL); + return 0; } @@ -1862,6 +2147,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long profile_munmap(addr); +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && + (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len); up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); @@ -1883,8 +2174,32 @@ static inline void verify_mm_writelocked * anonymous maps. eventually we may be able to do some * brk-specific accounting here. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC +unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len); + unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) { + unsigned long ret; + + ret = __do_brk(addr, len); + if (ret == addr && (current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | MF_PAX_MPROTECT)) == MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + unsigned long ret_m; + + ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, addr); + if (ret_m > TASK_SIZE) { + do_munmap(current->mm, addr, len); + ret = ret_m; + } + } + + return ret; +} + +unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) +#else +unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) +#endif +{ struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm; struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev; unsigned long flags; @@ -1895,6 +2210,13 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, if (!len) return addr; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if ((addr + len) > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr) + return -EINVAL; + } else +#endif + if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr) return -EINVAL; @@ -1906,6 +2228,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT; lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur; locked += len; + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked, 1); if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) return -EAGAIN; } @@ -1919,15 +2242,16 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, /* * Clear old maps. this also does some error checking for us */ - munmap_back: vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent); if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) { if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len)) return -ENOMEM; - goto munmap_back; + vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent); + BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len); } /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */ + gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1); if ((mm->total_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len > current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1940,6 +2264,18 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags; +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) + if (mm->flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) { + flags &= ~VM_EXEC; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if (mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) + flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC; +#endif + + } +#endif + /* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */ if (vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags, NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL)) @@ -1960,6 +2296,13 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, vma->vm_end = addr + len; vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff; vma->vm_flags = flags; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f]; + else +#endif + vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f]; vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent); out: @@ -1968,6 +2311,7 @@ out: mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT; make_pages_present(addr, addr + len); } + track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, flags); acct_update_integrals(); update_mem_hiwater(); return addr; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c 2005-03-02 02:38:37.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mprotect.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -19,11 +19,18 @@ #include #include #include +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +#include +#include +#endif #include #include #include #include +#include static inline void change_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address, @@ -138,6 +145,97 @@ change_protection(struct vm_area_struct spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); } +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT +/* called while holding the mmap semaphor for writing */ +static inline void establish_user_cs_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +{ + struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, start); + + for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next) + change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot); + +} + +void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) +{ + unsigned long oldlimit, newlimit = 0UL; + + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) + return; + + spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock); + oldlimit = mm->context.user_cs_limit; + if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && oldlimit < end) + /* USER_CS limit moved up */ + newlimit = end; + else if (!(prot & VM_EXEC) && start < oldlimit && oldlimit <= end) + /* USER_CS limit moved down */ + newlimit = start; + + if (newlimit) { + mm->context.user_cs_limit = newlimit; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP + wmb(); + cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); + cpu_set(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask); +#endif + + set_user_cs(mm, smp_processor_id()); + } + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); + if (newlimit == end) + establish_user_cs_limit(mm, oldlimit, end); +} +#endif + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) +static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags); + +static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m; + unsigned long start_m, end_m; + int error; + + start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror; + vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m); + if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) { + start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror; + end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (vma_m->vm_start >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) && !(newflags & VM_EXEC)) + error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)); + else +#endif + + error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags); + if (error) + return error; + } else { + printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags); +} + +static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, + unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags) +{ + struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm; + unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags; + long nrpages = (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + unsigned long charged = 0; + pgprot_t newprot; + pgoff_t pgoff; + int error; +#else static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags) @@ -154,6 +252,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm *pprev = vma; return 0; } +#endif /* * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit; @@ -172,6 +271,12 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm } } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC + if (!(mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE))) + newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf]; + else +#endif + newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf]; /* @@ -219,6 +324,69 @@ fail: return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT +/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments + * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life. + * + * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment + * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones. + */ +static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start) +{ + struct elfhdr elf_h; + struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn; + elf_dyn dyn; + unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr); + +#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS + if ((vma->vm_start != start) || + !vma->vm_file || + !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) || + (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE)) +#endif + + return; + + if (sizeof(elf_h) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) || + memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) || + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS + (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) || +#else + elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN || +#endif + + !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) || + elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) || + elf_h.e_phnum > j) + return; + + for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) { + if (sizeof(elf_p) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p))) + return; + if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) { + p_dyn = elf_p; + j = i; + } + } + if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j) + return; + + i = 0UL; + do { + if (sizeof(dyn) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn))) + return; + if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) { + vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE; + gr_log_textrel(vma); + return; + } + i++; + } while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL); + return; +} +#endif + asmlinkage long sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot) { @@ -236,6 +404,17 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t end = start + len; if (end < start) return -ENOMEM; + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + } else +#endif + + if (end > TASK_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM)) return -EINVAL; if (end == start) @@ -276,6 +455,16 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t if (start > vma->vm_start) prev = vma; + if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) + pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start); +#endif + for (nstart = start ; ; ) { unsigned long newflags; @@ -293,6 +482,12 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT + /* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */ + if ((vma->vm_mm->flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE)) + newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE; +#endif + error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot); if (error) goto out; @@ -316,6 +511,9 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t goto out; } } + + track_exec_limit(current->mm, start, end, vm_flags); + out: up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); return error; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:10.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/mremap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -150,6 +150,12 @@ move_one_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma if (dst) { pte_t pte; pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, old_addr, src); + +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT + if ((mm->flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + pte_exprotect(pte); +#endif + set_pte(dst, pte); } else error = -ENOMEM; @@ -293,6 +299,18 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad if (!new_len) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len || + old_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-old_len) + goto out; + } else +#endif + + if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-new_len || + old_len > TASK_SIZE || addr > TASK_SIZE-old_len) + goto out; + /* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */ if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) { if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) @@ -300,6 +318,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE)) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + if (current->mm->flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) { + if (new_len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || new_addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-new_len) + goto out; + } else +#endif + if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len) goto out; @@ -343,6 +368,16 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if ((current->mm->flags & (MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | MF_PAX_RANDEXEC)) && + (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) + { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } +#endif + /* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */ if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr) goto out; @@ -397,6 +432,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad acct_update_integrals(); update_mem_hiwater(); ret = addr; + track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len, vma->vm_flags); goto out; } } @@ -407,8 +443,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad */ ret = -ENOMEM; if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) { + unsigned long map_flags = 0; if (!(flags & MREMAP_FIXED)) { - unsigned long map_flags = 0; if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) map_flags |= MAP_SHARED; @@ -418,7 +454,12 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) goto out; } + map_flags = vma->vm_flags; ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr); + if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK)) { + track_exec_limit(current->mm, addr, addr + old_len, 0UL); + track_exec_limit(current->mm, new_addr, new_addr + new_len, map_flags); + } } out: if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c 2005-03-02 02:38:25.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/nommu.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ struct page * follow_page(struct mm_stru return NULL; } -struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) +struct vm_area_struct *find_extend_vma(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct * mm, unsigned long addr) { return NULL; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c --- linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:38.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/mm/rmap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -109,6 +109,19 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_stru list_add(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head); allocated = NULL; } + +#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDEXEC) + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) { + struct vm_area_struct *vma_m; + + vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror); + BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror); + BUG_ON(vma_m->anon_vma || vma->vm_pgoff != vma_m->vm_pgoff); + vma_m->anon_vma = anon_vma; + __anon_vma_link(vma_m); + } +#endif + spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock); if (locked) diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:20.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -256,6 +256,21 @@ config IP_NF_MATCH_TCPMSS To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N. +config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH + tristate "stealth match support" + depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES + help + Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp + ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you + are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT) + you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will + drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your + machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be + destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for + instance. + + To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N. + config IP_NF_MATCH_HELPER tristate "Helper match support" depends on IP_NF_CONNTRACK && IP_NF_IPTABLES diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile --- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_REALM) += ipt_r obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_PHYSDEV) += ipt_physdev.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_COMMENT) += ipt_comment.o +obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o # targets obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT) += ipt_REJECT.o diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* Kernel module to add stealth support. + * + * Copyright (C) 2002 Brad Spengler + * + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +extern struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr, unsigned short hnum, int dif); +extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif); + +static int +match(const struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + const void *matchinfo, + int offset, + int *hotdrop) +{ + struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph; + struct tcphdr th; + struct udphdr uh; + struct sock *sk = NULL; + + if (!ip || offset) return 0; + + switch(ip->protocol) { + case IPPROTO_TCP: + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) { + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } + if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return 0; + sk = tcp_v4_lookup_listener(ip->daddr, ntohs(th.dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif); + break; + case IPPROTO_UDP: + if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) { + *hotdrop = 1; + return 0; + } + sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex); + break; + default: + return 0; + } + + if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this + return 1; + else { + sock_put(sk); + return 0; + } +} + +/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */ +static int +checkentry(const char *tablename, + const struct ipt_ip *ip, + void *matchinfo, + unsigned int matchsize, + unsigned int hook_mask) +{ + if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0)) + return 0; + + if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) || + ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO))) + && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN))) + return 1; + + printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n"); + + return 0; +} + + +static struct ipt_match stealth_match = { + .name = "stealth", + .match = &match, + .checkentry = &checkentry, + .destroy = NULL, + .me = THIS_MODULE +}; + +static int __init init(void) +{ + return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match); +} + +static void __exit fini(void) +{ + ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match); +} + +module_init(init); +module_exit(fini); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2005-03-02 02:37:54.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -223,6 +224,10 @@ static int tcp_v4_get_port(struct sock * spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock); rover = tcp_port_rover; +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + if (grsec_enable_randsrc && (high > low)) + rover = low + (get_random_long() % remaining); +#endif do { rover++; if (rover < low || rover > high) @@ -448,7 +453,7 @@ static struct sock *__tcp_v4_lookup_list } /* Optimize the common listener case. */ -static inline struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr, +struct sock *tcp_v4_lookup_listener(u32 daddr, unsigned short hnum, int dif) { struct sock *sk = NULL; @@ -474,6 +479,8 @@ sherry_cache: return sk; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_v4_lookup_listener); + /* Sockets in TCP_CLOSE state are _always_ taken out of the hash, so * we need not check it for TCP lookups anymore, thanks Alexey. -DaveM * @@ -665,7 +672,12 @@ static inline int tcp_v4_hash_connect(st struct hlist_node *node; struct tcp_tw_bucket *tw = NULL; - local_bh_disable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC + if (grsec_enable_randsrc) + offset = get_random_long(); +#endif + + local_bh_disable(); for (i = 1; i <= range; i++) { port = low + (i + offset) % range; head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(port)]; @@ -714,6 +726,15 @@ ok: } spin_unlock(&head->lock); +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC + gr_del_task_from_ip_table(current); + current->gr_saddr = inet_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr; + current->gr_daddr = inet_sk(sk)->daddr; + current->gr_sport = inet_sk(sk)->sport; + current->gr_dport = inet_sk(sk)->dport; + gr_add_to_task_ip_table(current); +#endif + if (tw) { tcp_tw_deschedule(tw); tcp_tw_put(tw); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c 2005-03-02 02:37:49.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/ipv4/udp.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -108,6 +109,12 @@ #include #include +extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sk_buff *skb); +extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, + const struct sockaddr_in *addr); + + /* * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer */ @@ -264,8 +271,7 @@ static struct sock *udp_v4_lookup_longwa return result; } -static __inline__ struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, - u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif) +struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif) { struct sock *sk; @@ -540,9 +546,16 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, stru dport = usin->sin_port; if (dport == 0) return -EINVAL; + + if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin)) + return -EPERM; } else { if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) return -EDESTADDRREQ; + + if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL)) + return -EPERM; + daddr = inet->daddr; dport = inet->dport; /* Open fast path for connected socket. @@ -795,6 +808,11 @@ try_again: if (!skb) goto out; + if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_free; + } + copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr); if (copied > len) { copied = len; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c 2005-03-02 02:37:58.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/socket.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO #include /* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */ @@ -94,6 +95,21 @@ #include #include +extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk); +extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, + const int protocol); +extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck); +extern int gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct socket *sck); +extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck); +extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock, + const struct sockaddr_in * addr); +extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock, + const struct sockaddr_in * addr); +extern int gr_search_listen(const struct socket * sock); +extern int gr_search_accept(const struct socket * sock); +extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, + const int protocol); + static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare); static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t pos); @@ -1184,6 +1200,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socket(int family, i int retval; struct socket *sock; + if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) { + retval = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock); if (retval < 0) goto out; @@ -1279,11 +1305,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_bind(int fd, struct { struct socket *sock; char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; + struct sockaddr *sck; int err; if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL) { if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) { + sck = (struct sockaddr *)address; + if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EACCES; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EACCES; + } + err = security_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen); if (err) { sockfd_put(sock); @@ -1320,6 +1358,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_listen(int fd, int b return err; } + if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EPERM; + } + + if(!gr_search_listen(sock)) { + sockfd_put(sock); + return -EPERM; + } + err=sock->ops->listen(sock, backlog); sockfd_put(sock); } @@ -1360,6 +1408,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc if (err) goto out_release; + if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_release; + } + + if(!gr_search_accept(sock)) { + err = -EPERM; + goto out_release; + } + /* * We don't need try_module_get here, as the listening socket (sock) * has the protocol module (sock->ops->owner) held. @@ -1386,6 +1444,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc goto out_release; security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock); + gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk); out_put: sockfd_put(sock); @@ -1413,6 +1472,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru { struct socket *sock; char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR]; + struct sockaddr *sck; int err; sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err); @@ -1422,6 +1482,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru if (err < 0) goto out_put; + sck = (struct sockaddr *)address; + + if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_put; + } + + if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_put; + } + err = security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen); if (err) goto out_put; @@ -1675,6 +1747,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shutdown(int fd, int err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how); sockfd_put(sock); } + return err; } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/sunrpc/xprt.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c --- linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c 2005-03-02 02:38:12.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/net/unix/af_unix.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include int sysctl_unix_max_dgram_qlen = 10; @@ -672,6 +673,11 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru if (err) goto put_fail; + if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto put_fail; + } + err = -ECONNREFUSED; if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) goto put_fail; @@ -695,6 +701,13 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru if (u) { struct dentry *dentry; dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry; + + if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) { + err = -EPERM; + sock_put(u); + goto fail; + } + if (dentry) touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry); } else @@ -794,9 +807,18 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock */ mode = S_IFSOCK | (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask); + + if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) { + err = -EACCES; + goto out_mknod_dput; + } + err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0); if (err) goto out_mknod_dput; + + gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt); + up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem); dput(nd.dentry); nd.dentry = dentry; @@ -814,6 +836,10 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock goto out_unlock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX + sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid; +#endif + list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash]; } else { list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)]; diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig --- linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig 2005-03-02 02:38:13.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/security/Kconfig 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -4,6 +4,407 @@ menu "Security options" +source grsecurity/Kconfig + +menu "PaX" + +config PAX + bool "Enable various PaX features" + depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64) + help + This allows you to enable various PaX features. PaX adds + intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce + the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs. + +menu "PaX Control" + depends on PAX + +config PAX_SOFTMODE + bool 'Support soft mode' + help + Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that + is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables + marked explicitly. You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it + is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use. + + Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command + line option on boot. Furthermore you can control various PaX features + at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax. + +config PAX_EI_PAX + bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking' + help + Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on + a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at + http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from + an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header. This marking has + numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not + know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it + has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support. + + If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF + program header then you MUST enable this option otherwise they + will not get any protection. + + Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well, + the PT_PAX_FLAG marks will override the legacy EI_PAX marks. + +config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS + bool 'Use ELF program header marking' + help + Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on + a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at + http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from + a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS). This marking + has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully + integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available + from http://pax.grsecurity.net). + + If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF + program header then you MUST enable the EI_PAX marking support + otherwise they will not get any protection. + + Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well, + the EI_PAX marks will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marks. + +choice + prompt 'MAC system integration' + default PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS + help + Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling + PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported + by your particular system. + + - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX, + - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_flags() itself, + - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_flags_func callback. + + NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only. + +config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS + bool 'none' + +config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS + bool 'direct' + +config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS + bool 'hook' +endchoice + +endmenu + +menu "Non-executable pages" + depends on PAX + +config PAX_NOEXEC + bool "Enforce non-executable pages" + depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64) + help + By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory + pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make + use of this feature. In practice this means that if a page is + readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable. + + There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this + fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can + introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's + memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it. + + If the attacked program was running with different (typically + higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate + his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for + which he does not have write access to, etc). + + Enabling this option will let you choose from various features + that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in + a program. + + This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and + expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family + of functions is executable (which it is not). Notable examples + are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine. + +config PAX_PAGEEXEC + bool "Paging based non-executable pages" + depends on PAX_NOEXEC && (!X86 || X86_64 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMM || MPENTIUM4 || MK7 || MK8) + select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if X86 && !X86_64 + help + This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU. + On i386 and ppc there is a variable but usually low performance + impact on applications. On alpha, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64 + and x86_64 there is no performance impact. + +config PAX_SEGMEXEC + bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages" + depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 + help + This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the + CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will + be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB. + +choice + prompt "Default non-executable page method" + depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PAX_SEGMEXEC + default PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC + help + Select the default non-executable page method applied to applications + that do not select one themselves. + +config PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC + bool "PAGEEXEC" + +config PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC + bool "SEGMEXEC" +endchoice + +config PAX_EMUTRAMP + bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC32 || X86) && !X86_64 + default y if PARISC || PPC32 + help + There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or + another attempt to execute special small code snippets from + non-executable memory pages. Most notable examples are the + signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and + the GCC trampolines. + + If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then + such programs will no longer work under your kernel. + + As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' + utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs + yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages. + + On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as + well, otherwise your system will not even boot. + + Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' + utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC + for the affected files. + + NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the + protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker + could abuse. Therefore the best solution is to not have any + files on your system that would require this option. This can + be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel + signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs + that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC. + Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements + nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX. + +config PAX_EMUSIGRT + bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines" + depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC32) + default y + help + Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect + and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack + that would otherwise lead to task termination. + + This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with + legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17, + Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically + everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in + normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does. + + On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your + system will not even boot. + + NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis + and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided + by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any + files on your system that would require this option. + +config PAX_MPROTECT + bool "Restrict mprotect()" + depends on (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !PPC64 + help + Enabling this option will prevent programs from + - changing the executable status of memory pages that were + not originally created as executable, + - making read-only executable pages writable again, + - creating executable pages from anonymous memory. + + You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by + the enforcement of non-executable pages. + + NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control + this feature on a per file basis. + +config PAX_NOELFRELOCS + bool "Disallow ELF text relocations" + depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64) + help + Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective + in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an + attacked task's address space. There remain only two venues + for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already + existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it + create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap() + an already existing ELF library that does not have position + independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it + writable and copy his code there. While protecting against + the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented + by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not + need to relocate their code). If you are sure this is your case, + then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even + be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM + modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default). + + NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested + when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked + your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package + referenced there has already been updated to support this). + +config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS + bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations" + depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC) + default y + help + On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications + that require text relocations and would not work without enabling + this option. If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should + enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that + none of your applications need it. + +config PAX_EMUPLT + bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT" + depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64) + default y + help + Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect + and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files. + On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and + become non-executable leading to task termination. Therefore + it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc, + sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot. + + NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection + provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper + solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does + not need to be writable. + +config PAX_DLRESOLVE + bool + depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64) + default y + +config PAX_SYSCALL + bool + depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC32 + default y + +config PAX_KERNEXEC + bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages" + depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86 && !X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS + help + This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT, + that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject + and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself. + +endmenu + +menu "Address Space Layout Randomization" + depends on PAX + +config PAX_ASLR + bool "Address Space Layout Randomization" + depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS + help + Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of + certain addresses in the attacked program. The following options + will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization + to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to + guess them in most cases. Any failed guess will most likely crash + the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts + and react on them. PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms, + instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's + segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's + (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or + develop one yourself. + + By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas: + - top of the task's kernel stack + - top of the task's userland stack + - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one + (this includes all libraries) + - base address of the main executable + + It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout + randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides + a very effective protection. + + NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control + this feature on a per file basis. + +config PAX_RANDKSTACK + bool "Randomize kernel stack base" + depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && !X86_64 + help + By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel + stack on every system call. This will not only force an attacker + to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible + leaked information about it. + + Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization + may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very + carefully test your system. Note that once enabled in the kernel + configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis. + +config PAX_RANDUSTACK + bool "Randomize user stack base" + depends on PAX_ASLR + help + By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland + stack. The randomization is done in two steps where the second + one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and + cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more + than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is). + For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or + 'paxctl' on a per file basis. + +config PAX_RANDMMAP + bool "Randomize mmap() base" + depends on PAX_ASLR + help + By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for + mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves. As a result + all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses + and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker + attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a + shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated + privilege level). + + Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its + base address will be randomized as well, completing the full + randomization of the address space layout. Attacking such programs + becomes a guess game. You can find an example of doing this at + http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at + http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz . + + NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this + feature on a per file basis. + +config PAX_NOVSYSCALL + bool "Disable the vsyscall page" + depends on PAX_ASLR && X86 && !X86_64 + help + The Linux 2.6 kernel introduced a new feature that speeds up or + simplifies certain operations, such as system calls or returns + from signal handlers. + + Unfortunately the implementation also gives a powerful instrument + into the hands of exploit writers: the so-called vsyscall page exists + in every task at the same fixed address and it contains machine code + that is very useful in performing the return-to-libc style attack. + + Since this exploit technique cannot in general be protected against + via kernel solutions, this option will allow you to disable the use + of the vsyscall page and revert back to the old behaviour. + +endmenu + +endmenu + config KEYS bool "Enable access key retention support" help diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c --- linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c 2005-03-02 02:38:07.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/security/commoncap.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -44,7 +45,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv); int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) { /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ - if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap)) + if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(tsk, cap)) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +int cap_capable_nolog (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +{ + /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */ + if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap)) return 0; return -EPERM; } @@ -60,7 +69,7 @@ int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *pare { /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) return -EPERM; return 0; } @@ -163,8 +172,11 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_ } } - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid)) + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + + if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid)) + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual @@ -175,6 +187,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_ cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective); } + gr_handle_chroot_caps(current); + /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */ current->keep_capabilities = 0; @@ -320,12 +334,13 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) + if (cap_capable_nolog(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable_nolog); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_settime); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_ptrace); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capget); diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c --- linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c 2005-03-02 02:37:50.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/security/dummy.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) { @@ -138,8 +139,11 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru } } - current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; - current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid)) + current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; + + if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid)) + current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; dummy_capget(current, ¤t->cap_effective, ¤t->cap_inheritable, ¤t->cap_permitted); } diff -urNp linux-2.6.11/security/security.c linux-2.6.11/security/security.c --- linux-2.6.11/security/security.c 2005-03-02 02:37:30.000000000 -0500 +++ linux-2.6.11/security/security.c 2005-03-09 11:56:44.000000000 -0500 @@ -200,4 +200,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_security); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security); EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog); EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops);