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Commit | Line | Data |
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d02222cd | 1 | --- ssl/s3_srvr.c 29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000 1.85.2.14 |
2 | +++ ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000 | |
3 | @@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ | |
4 | if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) | |
5 | { | |
6 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
7 | - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); | |
8 | + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ | |
9 | } | |
10 | ||
11 | if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) | |
12 | @@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@ | |
13 | (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) | |
14 | { | |
15 | al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
16 | - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
17 | - goto f_err; | |
18 | + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ | |
19 | + | |
20 | + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack | |
21 | + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version | |
22 | + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would | |
23 | + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext | |
24 | + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except | |
25 | + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, | |
26 | + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ | |
27 | + p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19"; | |
28 | } | |
29 | } | |
30 | ||
31 | if (al != -1) | |
32 | { | |
33 | -#if 0 | |
34 | - goto f_err; | |
35 | -#else | |
36 | /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure | |
37 | * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding | |
38 | - * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). | |
39 | - * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the | |
40 | - * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher: | |
41 | - * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA | |
42 | - * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12). | |
43 | - */ | |
44 | + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ | |
45 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
46 | i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
47 | p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; | |
48 | p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; | |
49 | RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ | |
50 | -#endif | |
51 | } | |
52 | ||
53 | s->session->master_key_length= |