run depmod before geninitrd and rc-boot

[packages/kernel.git] / linux-grsecurity-1.8-2.4.7.patch

diff -urN linux/Documentation/Configure.help linux.grsec/Documentation/Configure.help
--- linux/Documentation/Configure.help	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/Documentation/Configure.help	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -18157,6 +18157,361 @@
    boards supported by this driver, and for further information 
    on the use of this driver. 
 
+Non-executable Stack
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+  If you say Y here, your system will not allow execution of
+  code on the stack, making buffer overflow exploitation more difficult.
+  Exploits will have to dabble in more obscure methods of
+  exploitation(bss,got,heap..)
+
+Gcc trampoline support
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK_GCC
+  If you say Y here, the system will support trampoline code along
+  with the stack protection.  If you do not have any programs on
+  your system that require this (glibc 2.0 users must say YES to
+  this option) you may say no here.
+
+PaX protection
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX 
+  By design the IA-32 architecture does not allow for protecting
+  memory pages against execution, i.e. if a page is readable (such
+  as the stack or heap) it is also executable.  There is a well
+  known exploit technique that makes use of this fact and a common
+  programming mistake where an attacker can introduce executable
+  code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's memory
+  (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.  If the
+  attacked program was running with different (typically higher)
+  privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate his
+  own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
+  which he does not have write access to, etc).
+
+  Since the implementation is software based, it comes with a
+  performance impact, you should evaluate your system carefully
+  before deciding to use this feature on production systems.
+
+  Enabling this feature will enforce the non-executable flag on
+  memory pages thereby making it harder to execute 'foreign' code
+  in a program.  This will also break programs that rely on the
+  old behaviour and expect that dynamically allocated memory via
+  the malloc() family of functions is executable (which it is not).
+  Notable examples are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime
+  and wine.
+
+  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to enable/disable this
+  feature on a per file basis.
+
+Emulate trampolines
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+  There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
+  another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
+  non-executable memory pages.  Most notable examples are the
+  signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
+  the GCC trampolines.
+
+  If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC then such programs will no
+  longer work under your kernel.  As a remedy you can say Y here
+  and use the 'chpax' utility to enable trampoline emulation for
+  the affected programs yet still have the protection provided by
+  CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC.  Alternatively you can say N here and use
+  the 'chpax' utility to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC for the
+  affected files.
+
+  NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
+  protection provided by CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC that an attacker
+  could abuse.  Therefore the best solution is to not have any
+  files on your system that would require this option.  This can
+  be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
+  signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
+  that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
+  Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
+  nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
+
+Restrict mprotect()
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+  Enabling this option will prevent programs from changing the
+  executable status of memory pages that were not originally
+  created as executable.  The kernel will also prevent programs
+  from making read-only executable pages writable again.
+
+  You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
+  the enforcement of the PAGE_EXEC flag (CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC).
+
+  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to enable/disable this
+  feature on a per file basis.
+
+Randomize mmap() base
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+  By saying Y here the kernel will somewhat randomize the address
+  space of programs at each execution (the top of the stack, the
+  base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves
+  and the base address of dynamic ELF executables).
+
+  As a result all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random
+  addresses and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where
+  an attacker attempts to execute library code for his purposes
+  (e.g. spawn a shell from an exploited program that is running at
+  an elevated privilege level).
+
+  Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
+  base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
+  randomization of the address space.  Attacking such programs becomes
+  a guess game.
+
+  It is strongly recommended to say Y here even if CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
+  is not enabled as address space randomization has negligible impact
+  on performance yet it provides a very effective protection.
+
+  NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' utility to enable/disable this
+  feature on a per file basis.
+           
+
+Proc Restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
+  If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
+  will be altered to enhance system security and privacy.  Depending
+  upon the options you choose, you can either restrict users to see
+  only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
+  not see all processes, but can view other proc entries that would
+  normally be restricted to the user.  If you're running identd as
+  a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
+  
+Linking restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+  If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
+  will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in 
+  world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the 
+  symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
+  able to hardlink to files they do not own.
+
+FIFO restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
+  If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
+  own in world-writeable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
+  the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in.
+
+Secure file descriptors
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+  If you say Y here, set*id binaries will be protected from data spoofing
+  attacks (eg. making a program read /etc/shadow).  The patches do this
+  by opening up /dev/null to any of the stdin, stdout, stderr file descriptors
+  for set*id binaries that are open and run by a user that is not the owner
+  of the file.
+
+Exec process limiting
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
+  If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
+  have the value checked during execve() calls.  The current system
+  only checks the system limit during fork() calls.
+
+Fork-bombing protection
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+  If you say Y here, you will be able to configure a group to add to users
+  on your system that you want to be unable to fork-bomb the system.
+  You will be able to specify a maximum process limit for the user and
+  set a rate limit for all forks under their uid. (Fork-bombing is a
+  tactic used by attackers that can be enacted in two ways, (1) loading
+  up thousands of processes until the system can't take any more (this
+  method can be stopped outside of the kernel with PAM, however we place
+  protection for it in the kernel to be more complete and reduce overhead),
+  and (2), by forking processes at a rapid rate, and then killing them
+  off, which cannot be protected against in the same way at tactic 1)
+  The rate limit is specified in forks allowed per second.  Set this
+  limit low enough to stop tactic 2, but high enough to allow for
+  normal operation.
+
+Exec logging
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+  If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
+  other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
+  will be logged).  Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
+  of their users.
+  WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
+  on an active system.
+ 
+Set*id logging
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+  If you say Y here, all set*id() calls will be logged.  Such information
+  could be useful when detecting a possible intrusion attempt.
+
+Signal logging
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
+  If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
+  SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
+  occured, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
+
+BSD-style coredumps
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP
+  If you say Y here, linux will use a style similar to BSD for
+  coredumps, core.processname.  Not a security feature, just
+  a useful one.
+
+Fork failure logging
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
+  If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
+  This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
+  their process limit.
+
+Time change logging
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+  If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
+
+Secure keymap loading
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+  If you say Y here, KDSKBENT and KDSKBSENT ioctl calls being
+  called by unprivileged users will be denied. If you answer N,
+  everyone will be able to modify keyboard bindings.
+
+  Saying N makes hacking root account easier for anyone who
+  has access to the console.                     
+
+Enhanced network randomness
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+  If you say Y here, the functions controlling the randomness
+  of the Linux IP stack will be enhanced to decrease the chances
+  of being able to predict certain packets that require some
+  amount of randomness.
+
+Chroot jail restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+  If you say Y here, processes in a chrooted jail will be much more
+  difficult to break out of.  It stops most generic ways of breaking
+  a chroot jail. Adding in chroot jail restrictions adds these
+  protective measures to the kernel:
+  No mknod()
+  No ptracing
+  No fchmod +s or chmod +s (usually used to create a rootshell)
+  No double chroots
+  Restricted signal sending to other processes
+  No mounting or remounting of devices
+  Enforced chdir("/") on all chroots
+
+Log all execs within a jail
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
+  If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged to
+  syslog.
+
+Chroot jail capability restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
+  If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
+  chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
+  system and net admin tasks, transferring capabilities, and
+  tty configuration tasks.  This is left an option because it breaks
+  some apps (glftpd)  Disable this if your chrooted apps are having
+  problems.
+
+Trusted path execution
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
+  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
+  supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
+  These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
+  root-owned directories writeable only by root. 
+
+Partially restrict non-root users
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+  If you say Y here, All other non-root users will only be allowed to
+  execute files in directories they own that are not group or
+  world-writeable, or in directories owned by root and writeable only by
+  root.
+
+Trusted path execution glibc protection
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GLIBC
+  If you say Y here, all non-root users will not be able to execute
+  any files while glibc specific environment variables such as
+  LD_PRELOAD are set, which could be used to evade the trusted
+  path execution protection.  It also protects against evasion
+  through /lib/ld-2.*  It is recommended you say Y here also.
+
+Randomized PIDs
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+  If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
+  pseudo-randomly generated.  This is extremely effective along
+  with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
+  pids of daemons, etc.  PIDs are also used in some cases as part
+  of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
+  those filenames from being predicted as well.  We also use code
+  to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon.
+
+Randomized IP IDs
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+  If you say Y here, all the id field on all outgoing packets
+  will be randomized.  This hinders os fingerprinters and
+  keeps your machine from being used as a bounce for an untraceable
+  portscan.  Ids are used for fragmented packets, fragments belonging
+  to the same packet have the same id.  By default linux only
+  increments the id value on each packet sent to an individual host.
+  I've replaced the usage of all the other ip generation routines with
+  my own for speed.  I generate random data for 64 packets at once and
+  distribute them as needed.  I also keep track of the last 32 packets
+  so that we don't create two packets with the same ids too soon,
+  which would cause problems if the packets were fragmented and had
+  to be reassembled.
+  This option will make your system more OpenBSD-ish ;)
+
+Randomized TCP source ports
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
+  If you say Y here, situations where a source port is generated on the
+  fly for the TCP protocol (ie. with connect() ) will be altered so that
+  the source port is generated at random, instead of a simple incrementing
+  algorithm.
+
+Altered Ping IDs
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+  If you say Y here, the way Linux handles echo replies will be changed
+  so that the reply uses an ID equal to the ID of the echo request.
+  This will help in confusing OS detection.
+
+Randomized TTL
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+  If you say Y here, your TTL (time to live) for packets will be set at
+  random, with a base level you specify, to further confuse OS detection.
+  The default base level for this option is set to the Linux default.
+
+Socket restrictions
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
+  If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
+  If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
+  groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
+  will do one of three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
+  Deny all socket access: keeps users from connecting to other hosts
+  from the machine or running servers from the machine
+  Deny all client sockets: keeps users from connecting to other machines
+  only
+  Deny all server sockets: keeps users from running servers on the machine
+  You should change the GID's from the default to what you have set up on
+  your system.
+
+Stealth network enhancements
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH
+  If you say Y here, you will enable several enhancements that will
+  improve your system's protection against portscans.
+  Enabling these options and filtering all open ports should make
+  your machine very hard to detect, while not interfering with (most)
+  normal operation.  Enabling the UDP stealth options is known to slow
+  down SSH connection times, and may also interfere with other protocols
+  as well.  All the stealth options break RFC, so there's always the
+  possibility that it might affect how certain network applications react
+  to your system.
+
+Sysctl support
+CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+  If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
+  grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
+  kernel.  You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
+  to enable (1) or disable (0) various features.  They can only be set
+  once per boot for security reasons.  All features are enabled by default.
+  Please note that this option could reduce the effectiveness
+  of the added security of this patch if an ACL system is not put in
+  place.  Your init scripts should be read-only, and root should not have
+  access to adding modules or performing raw i/o operations.  All options
+  should be set at startup, so that they cannot be set again.  *THIS IS
+  EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
+
+Oblivion ACL System
+CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+  If you say Y here, you enable the Access Control List system for 
+  grsecurity called Oblivion. You will need to run obvadm setup 
+  to set your password and create your config files.
+  
 #
 # ARM options
 #
diff -urN linux/arch/alpha/config.in linux.grsec/arch/alpha/config.in
--- linux/arch/alpha/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/alpha/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -368,3 +368,12 @@
 bool 'Legacy kernel start address' CONFIG_ALPHA_LEGACY_START_ADDRESS
 
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/arm/config.in linux.grsec/arch/arm/config.in
--- linux/arch/arm/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/arm/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -504,3 +504,12 @@
 dep_bool '  Kernel low-level debugging messages via footbridge serial port' CONFIG_DEBUG_DC21285_PORT $CONFIG_DEBUG_LL $CONFIG_FOOTBRIDGE
 dep_bool '  kernel low-level debugging messages via UART2' CONFIG_DEBUG_CLPS711X_UART2 $CONFIG_DEBUG_LL $CONFIG_ARCH_CLPS711X
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/cris/config.in linux.grsec/arch/cris/config.in
--- linux/arch/cris/config.in	Wed Jul  4 20:50:38 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/cris/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -240,3 +240,12 @@
   int ' Profile shift count' CONFIG_PROFILE_SHIFT 2
 fi
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/config.in linux.grsec/arch/i386/config.in
--- linux/arch/i386/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:59 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -405,3 +405,12 @@
 fi
 bool 'Compile the kernel with frame pointers' CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	Sun Sep 30 01:30:54 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 #define ASSEMBLY
 #include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
 
 EBX		= 0x00
 ECX		= 0x04
@@ -410,8 +411,51 @@
 #endif
 
 ENTRY(page_fault)
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	pushl $ SYMBOL_NAME(pax_do_page_fault)
+	pushl %ds
+	pushl %eax
+	xorl %eax,%eax
+	pushl %ebp
+	pushl %edi
+	pushl %esi
+	pushl %edx
+	decl %eax			# eax = -1
+	pushl %ecx
+	pushl %ebx
+	cld
+	movl %es,%ecx
+	movl ORIG_EAX(%esp), %esi	# get the error code
+	movl ES(%esp), %edi		# get the function address
+	movl %eax, ORIG_EAX(%esp)
+	movl %ecx, ES(%esp)
+	movl %esp,%edx
+	pushl %esi			# push the error code
+	pushl %edx			# push the pt_regs pointer
+	movl $(__KERNEL_DS),%edx
+	movl %edx,%ds
+	movl %edx,%es
+	GET_CURRENT(%ebx)
+	call *%edi
+	addl $8,%esp
+	decl %eax
+	jnz ret_from_exception
+
+	popl %ebx
+	popl %ecx
+	popl %edx
+	popl %esi
+	popl %edi
+	popl %ebp
+	popl %eax
+	popl %ds
+	popl %es
+	addl $4,%esp
+	jmp system_call
+#else
 	pushl $ SYMBOL_NAME(do_page_fault)
 	jmp error_code
+#endif
 
 ENTRY(machine_check)
 	pushl $0
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/head.S
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/head.S	Wed Jun 20 20:00:53 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/head.S	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -433,7 +433,11 @@
 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* not used */
 	.quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff	/* 0x10 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
 	.quad 0x00cf92000000ffff	/* 0x18 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+        .quad 0x00cbfa000000f7ff        /* 0x23 user   3GB-8MB code at 0 */
+#else
 	.quad 0x00cffa000000ffff	/* 0x23 user   4GB code at 0x00000000 */
+#endif
 	.quad 0x00cff2000000ffff	/* 0x2b user   4GB data at 0x00000000 */
 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* not used */
 	.quad 0x0000000000000000	/* not used */
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/process.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:54 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/process.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/irq.h>
 
+
 asmlinkage void ret_from_fork(void) __asm__("ret_from_fork");
 
 int hlt_counter;
@@ -736,7 +737,7 @@
 {
 	int error;
 	char * filename;
-
+	
 	filename = getname((char *) regs.ebx);
 	error = PTR_ERR(filename);
 	if (IS_ERR(filename))
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Fri Jul 20 21:39:55 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -20,7 +20,10 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/i387.h>
 #include <asm/debugreg.h>
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
 /*
  * does not yet catch signals sent when the child dies.
  * in exit.c or in signal.c.
@@ -177,6 +180,29 @@
 	}
 	if (child->p_pptr != current)
 		goto out_tsk;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+               if(grsec_enable_chroot &&
+		!(   (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+                       child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+                       (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+                       child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) &&
+                  !(   (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+                       child->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+                       (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+                       child->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+                   security_alert("denied ptrace of process(%.16s:%d) within chroot() jail "
+                                  "(%.32s:%lu) by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+                                  "UID (%d), EUID(%d)","ptrace from chroot()",
+                                  child->comm,child->pid,kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+                                  current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino, current->comm, current->pid,
+                                  current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+				  current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+                                  goto out_tsk;
+                   }
+#endif
+
+
 	switch (request) {
 	/* when I and D space are separate, these will need to be fixed. */
 	case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT: /* read word at location addr. */ 
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c	Wed Jul  4 23:41:33 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
  *  2000-06-20  Pentium III FXSR, SSE support by Gareth Hughes
  */
 
+#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
@@ -23,6 +24,10 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/i387.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 #define DEBUG_SIG 0
 
 #define _BLOCKABLE (~(sigmask(SIGKILL) | sigmask(SIGSTOP)))
@@ -420,11 +425,15 @@
 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
 		err |= __put_user(ka->sa.sa_restorer, &frame->pretcode);
 	} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+		err |= __put_user(MAGIC_SIGRETURN, &frame->pretcode);
+#else
 		err |= __put_user(frame->retcode, &frame->pretcode);
 		/* This is popl %eax ; movl $,%eax ; int $0x80 */
 		err |= __put_user(0xb858, (short *)(frame->retcode+0));
 		err |= __put_user(__NR_sigreturn, (int *)(frame->retcode+2));
 		err |= __put_user(0x80cd, (short *)(frame->retcode+6));
+#endif
 	}
 
 	if (err)
@@ -495,11 +504,15 @@
 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER) {
 		err |= __put_user(ka->sa.sa_restorer, &frame->pretcode);
 	} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+		err |= __put_user(MAGIC_RT_SIGRETURN, &frame->pretcode);
+#else
 		err |= __put_user(frame->retcode, &frame->pretcode);
 		/* This is movl $,%eax ; int $0x80 */
 		err |= __put_user(0xb8, (char *)(frame->retcode+0));
 		err |= __put_user(__NR_rt_sigreturn, (int *)(frame->retcode+1));
 		err |= __put_user(0x80cd, (short *)(frame->retcode+5));
+#endif
 	}
 
 	if (err)
@@ -556,6 +569,18 @@
 				regs->eip -= 2;
 		}
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	/* PaX: clean up as our trace attempt became obsolete */
+	if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (current->ptrace & PT_PAX_TRACE)) {
+		if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PAX_OLDTF)) {
+			regs->eflags &= ~TF_MASK;
+		}
+		current->ptrace &= ~(PT_PAX_TRACE | PT_PAX_KEEPTF | PT_PAX_OLDTF);
+		current->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+		current->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+	}
+#endif
 
 	/* Set up the stack frame */
 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO)
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
--- linux/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:54 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/irq.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 asmlinkage int system_call(void);
 #if defined(CONFIG_KDB)
 asmlinkage int kdb_call(void);
@@ -489,15 +493,185 @@
 DO_ERROR(11, SIGBUS,  "segment not present", segment_not_present)
 DO_ERROR(12, SIGBUS,  "stack segment", stack_segment)
 DO_ERROR_INFO(17, SIGBUS, "alignment check", alignment_check, BUS_ADRALN, get_cr2())
-
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK) && defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK_GCC)
+static unsigned long *get_reg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned char regnum)
+{
+    switch (regnum) {
+	case 0: return &regs->eax;
+	case 1: return &regs->ecx;
+	case 2: return &regs->edx;
+	case 3: return &regs->ebx;
+	case 4: return &regs->esp;
+	case 5: return &regs->ebp;
+	case 6: return &regs->esi;
+	case 7: return &regs->edi;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+static unsigned long get_modrm(struct pt_regs *regs, int *err)
+{
+       unsigned char modrm, sib;
+       signed char rel8;
+       unsigned long rel32;
+       int size, regnum, scale;
+       unsigned long index, base, addr, value;
+
+       *err |= __get_user(modrm, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 1));
+       size = 2;
+       regnum = modrm & 7;
+       addr = *get_reg(regs, regnum);
+       if (regnum == 4 && (modrm & 0xC0) != 0xC0) {
+               *err |= __get_user(sib, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 2));
+               size = 3;
+               scale = sib >> 6;
+               index = *get_reg(regs, (sib >> 3) & 7);
+               base = *get_reg(regs, sib & 7);
+               addr = base + (index << scale);
+       }
+
+       switch (modrm & 0xC0) {
+       case 0x00:
+               if (regnum == 5) {
+                       *err |= __get_user(addr,
+                               (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 2));
+                       size = 6;
+               }
+               *err |= __get_user(value, (unsigned long *)addr);
+               break;
+
+       case 0x40:
+               *err |= __get_user(rel8, (signed char *)(regs->eip + size));
+               size++;
+               addr += rel8;
+               *err |= __get_user(value, (unsigned long *)addr);
+               break;
+
+       case 0x80:
+               *err |= __get_user(rel32, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + size));
+               size += 4;
+               addr += rel32;
+               *err |= __get_user(value, (unsigned long *)addr);
+               break;
+
+       case 0xC0:
+       default:
+               value = addr;
+       }
+
+       if (*err) return 0;
+       regs->eip += size;
+       return value;
+}
+#endif
 asmlinkage void do_general_protection(struct pt_regs * regs, long error_code)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+    unsigned long addr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK_GCC
+    unsigned char insn;
+    int err, count;
+#endif
+#endif
 	if (regs->eflags & VM_MASK)
 		goto gp_in_vm86;
 
 	if (!(regs->xcs & 3))
 		goto gp_in_kernel;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+/* Check if it was return from a signal handler */
+        if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __USER_CS)
+        if (*(unsigned char *)regs->eip == 0xC3)
+        if (!__get_user(addr, (unsigned long *)regs->esp)) {
+                if ((addr & 0xFFFFFFFE) == MAGIC_SIGRETURN) {
+/* Call sys_sigreturn() or sys_rt_sigreturn() to restore the context */
+                        regs->esp += 8;
+                        __asm__("movl %3,%%esi\n\t"
+                                "subl %1,%%esp\n\t"
+                                "movl %2,%%ecx\n\t"
+                                "movl %%esp,%%edi\n\t"
+                                "rep; movsl\n\t"
+                                "testl $1,%4\n\t"
+                                "jnz 1f\n\t"
+                                "call sys_sigreturn\n\t"
+                                "leal %3,%%edi\n\t"
+                                "jmp 2f\n\t"
+                                "1:\n\t"
+                                "call sys_rt_sigreturn\n\t"
+                                "leal %3,%%edi\n\t"
+                                "2:\n\t"
+                                "addl %1,%%edi\n\t"
+                                "movl %%esp,%%esi\n\t"
+                                "movl %2,%%ecx\n\t"
+                                "movl (%%edi),%%edi\n\t"
+                                "rep; movsl\n\t"
+                                "movl %%esi,%%esp"
+                        :
+/* %eax is returned separately */
+                        "=a" (regs->eax)
+                        :
+                        "i" (sizeof(*regs)),
+                        "i" (sizeof(*regs) >> 2),
+                        "m" (regs),
+                        "r" (addr)
+                        :
+                        "cx", "dx", "si", "di", "cc", "memory");
+                        return;
+                }
+/*
+ *  * Check if we're returning to the stack area, which is only likely to happen
+ *   * when attempting to exploit a buffer overflow.
+ *    */
+                if ((addr & 0xFF800000) == 0xBF800000 ||
+                    (addr >= PAGE_OFFSET - _STK_LIM && addr < PAGE_OFFSET))
+                        security_alert("return onto stack by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID (%d)",
+                                "returns onto stack",
+                                current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+				 current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+                                current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+        }
+ 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK_GCC
+/* Check if it could have been a trampoline call */
+        if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __USER_CS)
+        if (*(unsigned char *)regs->eip == 0xFF)
+        if (!__get_user(insn, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 1)))
+        if ((insn & 0x38) == 0x10 && insn != 0xD4) {    /* call mod r/m */
+/* First, emulate the call */
+                err = 0;
+                addr = get_modrm(regs, &err);
+                if (!err) {
+                        regs->esp -= 4;
+                        err = __put_user(regs->eip, (unsigned long *)regs->esp);
+                        regs->eip = addr;
+                }  
+/* Then, start emulating the trampoline itself */
+               count = 0;
+               while (!err && !__get_user(insn, (unsigned char *)regs->eip++))
+               if ((insn & 0xF8) == 0xB8) {            /* movl imm32,%reg */
+/* We only have 8 GP registers, no reason to initialize one twice */
+                        if (count++ >= 8) break;
+                        err |= __get_user(addr, (unsigned long *)regs->eip);
+                        regs->eip += 4;
+                        *get_reg(regs, insn & 7) = addr;
+                } else
+                if (insn == 0xFF) {
+                        err |= __get_user(insn, (unsigned char *)regs->eip);
+                        if ((insn & 0xF8) == 0xE0) {    /* jmp *%reg */
+                                regs->eip = *get_reg(regs, insn & 7);
+                                if (err) break; else return;
+                        }
+                        break;
+                } else
+               if (insn == 0xE9) {                     /* jmp rel32 */
+                       err |= __get_user(addr, (unsigned long *)regs->eip);
+                       if (err) break;
+                       regs->eip += 4 + addr;
+                       return;
+               } else
+                       break;
+       }                        
+#endif
+#endif
 	current->thread.error_code = error_code;
 	current->thread.trap_no = 13;
 	force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
@@ -720,6 +894,10 @@
 	inb(0x71);		/* dummy */
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+void pax_handle_ptes(struct task_struct *tsk);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Our handling of the processor debug registers is non-trivial.
  * We do not clear them on entry and exit from the kernel. Therefore
@@ -759,6 +937,23 @@
 		return;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	/* PaX: clean up */
+	/* PaX: clean up */
+	if ((tsk->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (condition & DR_STEP) && (tsk->ptrace & PT_PAX_TRACE)) {
+		tsk->ptrace &= ~PT_PAX_TRACE;
+		pax_handle_ptes(tsk);
+		if (!(tsk->ptrace & PT_PAX_KEEPTF) && !(tsk->ptrace & PT_PAX_OLDTF))
+			regs->eflags &= ~TF_MASK;
+		tsk->ptrace &= ~PT_PAX_KEEPTF;
+		if (!(tsk->ptrace & PT_PAX_OLDTF)) {
+			condition &= ~DR_STEP;
+			if (!(condition & (DR_TRAP0|DR_TRAP1|DR_TRAP2|DR_TRAP3)))
+				return;
+		}
+		tsk->ptrace &= ~PT_PAX_OLDTF;
+	}
+#endif
 	/* Mask out spurious debug traps due to lazy DR7 setting */
 	if (condition & (DR_TRAP0|DR_TRAP1|DR_TRAP2|DR_TRAP3)) {
 		if (!tsk->thread.debugreg[7])
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/mm/fault.c
--- linux/arch/i386/mm/fault.c	Tue May 15 09:16:51 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/mm/fault.c	Sun Sep 30 01:55:48 2001
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *  Copyright (C) 1995  Linus Torvalds
  */
 
+#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/signal.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#endif
 
 #include <asm/system.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -103,23 +107,31 @@
  *	bit 1 == 0 means read, 1 means write
  *	bit 2 == 0 means kernel, 1 means user-mode
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address)
+#else
 asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+#endif
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	struct mm_struct *mm;
 	struct vm_area_struct * vma;
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
 	unsigned long address;
+#endif
 	unsigned long page;
 	unsigned long fixup;
 	int write;
 	siginfo_t info;
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
 	/* get the address */
 	__asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
 
 	/* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */
 	if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
 		local_irq_enable();
+#endif
 
 	tsk = current;
 
@@ -177,21 +189,37 @@
 good_area:
 	info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
 	write = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	switch (error_code & 7) {
+#else
 	switch (error_code & 3) {
+#endif
 		default:	/* 3: write, present */
 #ifdef TEST_VERIFY_AREA
 			if (regs->cs == KERNEL_CS)
 				printk("WP fault at %08lx\n", regs->eip);
 #endif
 			/* fall through */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		case 7:		/* PaX: write, present, some protection violation */
+#endif
 		case 2:		/* write, not present */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		case 6:
+#endif
 			if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
 				goto bad_area;
 			write++;
 			break;
 		case 1:		/* read, present */
 			goto bad_area;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		case 5:		/* PaX: read, present, protection violation */
+#endif
 		case 0:		/* read, not present */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		case 4:
+#endif
 			if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
 				goto bad_area;
 	}
@@ -358,3 +386,440 @@
 		return;
 	}
 }
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+/* PaX: called with the page_table_lock spinlock held */
+static inline pte_t * pax_get_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
+{
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+
+	pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
+	if (!pgd || !pgd_present(*pgd))
+		return 0;
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, address);
+	if (!pmd || !pmd_present(*pmd))
+		return 0;
+	return pte_offset(pmd, address);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders
+ *
+ * returns 0 when access should be allowed
+ *         1 when task should be killed
+ *         2 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
+ *         3 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
+ *         4 when gcc trampoline was detected
+ */
+static int pax_handle_read_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
+{
+	static unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4};
+	int err;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+	if (!(current->flags & PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
+		return 1;
+	{ /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
+		unsigned char pop, mov;
+		unsigned short sys;
+		unsigned long nr;
+
+		err = __get_user(pop, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
+		err |= __get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 1));
+		err |= __get_user(nr, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 2));
+		err |= __get_user(sys, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 6));
+
+		if (!err) {
+			if (pop == 0x58 &&
+			    mov == 0xb8 &&
+			    nr == __NR_sigreturn &&
+			    sys == 0x80cd)
+			{
+				regs->esp += 4;
+				regs->eax = nr;
+				regs->eip += 8;
+				return 2;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	{ /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
+		unsigned char mov;
+		unsigned short sys;
+		unsigned long nr;
+
+		err = __get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
+		err |= __get_user(nr, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
+		err |= __get_user(sys, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 5));
+
+		if (!err) {
+			if (mov == 0xb8 &&
+			    nr == __NR_rt_sigreturn &&
+			    sys == 0x80cd)
+			{
+				regs->eax = nr;
+				regs->eip += 7;
+				return 3;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	{ /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
+		unsigned char mov1, mov2;
+		unsigned short jmp;
+		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
+
+		err = __get_user(mov1, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
+		err |= __get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
+		err |= __get_user(mov2, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
+		err |= __get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
+		err |= __get_user(jmp, (unsigned short *)(regs->eip + 10));
+		err |= __get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)(regs->esp));
+
+		if (!err) {
+			unsigned short call;
+
+			err = __get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
+			if (!err) {
+				if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
+				    (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
+				    (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) &&
+				    (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF &&
+				    (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07) &&
+				    (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
+				    (regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]))
+				{
+					((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1;
+					((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2;
+					regs->eip = addr2;
+					return 4;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	{ /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
+		unsigned char mov, jmp;
+		unsigned long addr1, addr2, ret;
+
+		err = __get_user(mov, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip));
+		err |= __get_user(addr1, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 1));
+		err |= __get_user(jmp, (unsigned char *)(regs->eip + 5));
+		err |= __get_user(addr2, (unsigned long *)(regs->eip + 6));
+		err |= __get_user(ret, (unsigned long *)(regs->esp));
+
+		if (!err) {
+			unsigned short call;
+
+			err = __get_user(call, (unsigned short *)(ret-2));
+			if (!err) {
+				if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
+				    jmp == 0xE9 &&
+				    (call & 0xF8FF) == 0xD0FF &&
+				    (regs->eip == ((unsigned long*)regs)[trans[(call>>8) & 0x07]]))
+				{
+					((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
+					regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
+					return 4;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return 1; /* PaX in action */
+}
+
+static int pax_handle_opcode(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	unsigned long opsize = 1;
+	unsigned long opsize_override = 0;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	if (regs->eflags & TF_MASK)
+		tsk->ptrace |= PT_PAX_OLDTF;
+	else
+		tsk->ptrace &= ~PT_PAX_OLDTF;
+	tsk->ptrace &= ~PT_PAX_KEEPTF;
+
+	for (i=0; i<15; i++) {
+		unsigned char opcode;
+		if (__get_user(opcode, (unsigned char*)(regs->eip+i)))
+			break;
+		switch (opcode) {
+		case 0x26:
+		case 0x2E:
+		case 0x36:
+		case 0x3E:
+		case 0x64:
+		case 0x65:
+		case 0x67:
+		case 0xF0:
+		case 0xF2:
+		case 0xF3:
+			break;
+
+		case 0x66:
+			opsize_override = 1;
+			break;
+
+		case 0x9C: /* PUSHF */
+			if (opsize ^ opsize_override) {
+				__put_user(regs->eflags & 0x00FCFFFFul, (unsigned long*)(regs->esp-4));
+				regs->esp -= 4;
+			} else {
+				__put_user(regs->eflags, (unsigned short*)(regs->esp-2));
+				regs->esp -= 2;
+			}
+			regs->eip += i + 1;
+			return 1;
+
+		case 0x9D: /* POPF */
+		case 0xCF: /* IRET */
+		tsk->ptrace |= PT_PAX_KEEPTF;
+			return 0;
+
+		default:
+			return 0;
+		}
+ 	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void pax_handle_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
+{
+	pte_t *pte;
+	pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
+	if (pte) {
+		set_pte(pte, pte_exprotect(*pte));
+		__flush_tlb_one(address);
+	}
+}
+
+#define PAX_SPIN_COUNT 256
+
+void pax_handle_ptes(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+
+	mm = tsk->mm;
+	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+	switch (tsk->thread.pax_faults.count) {
+	default:
+		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: wtf: %s:%d, %ld\n", tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->thread.pax_faults.count);
+		break;
+
+	case PAX_SPIN_COUNT+4:
+		pax_handle_pte(mm, tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[3]);
+
+	case PAX_SPIN_COUNT+3:
+		pax_handle_pte(mm, tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[2]);
+
+	case PAX_SPIN_COUNT+2:
+		pax_handle_pte(mm, tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[1]);
+
+	case PAX_SPIN_COUNT+1:
+		pax_handle_pte(mm, tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[0]);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+	tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+	tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PaX: handle the extra page faults or pass it down to the original handler
+ *
+ * returns 0 when nothing special was detected
+ *         1 when sigreturn trampoline (syscall) has to be emulated
+ */
+asmlinkage int pax_do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long address;
+	pte_t *pte;
+	unsigned char pte_mask = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER;
+	int ret;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	__asm__("movl %%cr2,%0":"=r" (address));
+
+	/* It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved */
+	if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
+		local_irq_enable();
+
+	if ((error_code & 5) != 5 || address >= TASK_SIZE || regs->xcs != __USER_CS || (VM_MASK & regs->eflags))
+		goto chain;
+
+	/* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
+
+	if (error_code == 7) {
+		pte_mask |= _PAGE_DIRTY;
+	/* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
+	} else if (regs->eip == address) { /* read/instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
+		ret = pax_handle_read_fault(regs, address);
+		switch (ret) {
+		case 4:
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+			return 0;
+
+		case 3:
+		case 2:
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+			return 1;
+
+		default:
+		case 1: {
+			char* buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+			char* path=NULL;
+
+			if (buffer) {
+				struct vm_area_struct* vma;
+
+				down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+				vma = mm->mmap;
+				while (vma) {
+					if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+						break;
+					}
+					vma = vma->vm_next;
+				}
+				if (vma)
+					path = d_path(vma->vm_file->f_dentry, vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
+				up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+			}
+			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, EIP: %08lX, ESP: %08lX\n", path, tsk->comm, tsk->pid, regs->eip, regs->esp);
+			if (buffer) free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+			printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at EIP: ");
+			for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+				unsigned char c;
+				if (__get_user(c, (unsigned char*)(regs->eip+i))) {
+					printk("<invalid address>.");
+					break;
+				}
+				printk("%02x ", c);
+			}
+			printk("\n");
+
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+			tsk->ptrace &= ~(PT_PAX_TRACE | PT_PAX_KEEPTF | PT_PAX_OLDTF);
+			regs->eflags &= ~TF_MASK;
+			tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+			tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+			tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
+			force_sig(SIGKILL,tsk);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		case 0:
+		}
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+	pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
+	if (!pte || !(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_exec(*pte)) {
+		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+		goto chain;
+	}
+
+	if ((error_code == 7) && !pte_write(*pte)) { /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
+		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+		goto chain;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
+	 */
+	if (regs->eip != tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip) { /* detect DTLB trashing */
+		tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = regs->eip;
+		tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+
+pax_emu:
+		__asm__ __volatile__ (
+			"orb %2,%1\n"
+			"invlpg %0\n"
+			"testb $0,%0\n"
+			"xorb %3,%1\n"
+			:
+			: "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte) , "r" (pte_mask) , "i" (_PAGE_USER)
+			: "memory", "cc");
+		spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (tsk->thread.pax_faults.count < PAX_SPIN_COUNT) {
+		++tsk->thread.pax_faults.count;
+		goto pax_emu;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+
+	if (tsk->thread.pax_faults.count == PAX_SPIN_COUNT) {
+		if (pax_handle_opcode(tsk, regs)) {
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+			tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+			tsk->ptrace &= ~(PT_PAX_TRACE | PT_PAX_KEEPTF | PT_PAX_OLDTF);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			++tsk->thread.pax_faults.count;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (tsk->thread.pax_faults.count > PAX_SPIN_COUNT+1+3) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: preventing DoS: %s:%d, EIP: %08lX, ESP: %08lX\n", tsk->comm, tsk->pid, regs->eip, regs->esp);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at EIP: ");
+		for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+			unsigned char c;
+			if (__get_user(c, (unsigned char*)(regs->eip+i))) {
+				printk("<invalid address>.");
+				break;
+			}
+			printk("%02x ", c);
+		}
+		printk("\n");
+
+		tsk->thread.pax_faults.eip = 0;
+		tsk->thread.pax_faults.count = 0;
+		tsk->ptrace &= ~(PT_PAX_TRACE | PT_PAX_KEEPTF | PT_PAX_OLDTF);
+		regs->eflags &= ~TF_MASK;
+		tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
+		tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+		tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
+		force_sig(SIGKILL,tsk);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+	pte = pax_get_pte(mm, address);
+	if (pte) {
+		set_pte(pte, pte_mkexec(*pte));
+		__flush_tlb_one(address);
+		tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[tsk->thread.pax_faults.count-PAX_SPIN_COUNT-1] = address;
+		++tsk->thread.pax_faults.count;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
+	tsk->ptrace |= PT_PAX_TRACE;
+	regs->eflags |= TF_MASK;
+
+#if 0
+	if (tsk->thread.pax_faults.count > PAX_SPIN_COUNT+1+1) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: DTLB trashing, level %ld: %s:%d,"
+				"EIP: %08lX, ESP: %08lX, cr2: %08lX\n",
+				tsk->thread.pax_faults.count - (PAX_SPIN_COUNT+1),
+				tsk->comm, tsk->pid, regs->eip, regs->esp, address);
+		printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: DTLB trashing, %08lX, %08lX, %08lX\n",
+				tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[0],
+				tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[1],
+				tsk->thread.pax_faults.addresses[2]);
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+
+chain:
+	do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
diff -urN linux/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux.grsec/arch/i386/mm/init.c
--- linux/arch/i386/mm/init.c	Sat Apr 21 01:15:20 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/i386/mm/init.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -397,7 +397,11 @@
 	pmd = pmd_offset(pgd, vaddr);
 	pte = pte_offset(pmd, vaddr);
 	old_pte = *pte;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	*pte = mk_pte_phys(0, PAGE_READONLY_EXEC);
+#else
 	*pte = mk_pte_phys(0, PAGE_READONLY);
+#endif
 	local_flush_tlb();
 
 	boot_cpu_data.wp_works_ok = do_test_wp_bit(vaddr);
diff -urN linux/arch/ia64/config.in linux.grsec/arch/ia64/config.in
--- linux/arch/ia64/config.in	Wed Apr 18 02:19:24 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/ia64/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -281,3 +281,12 @@
 bool 'Disable VHPT' CONFIG_DISABLE_VHPT
 
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/m68k/config.in linux.grsec/arch/m68k/config.in
--- linux/arch/m68k/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/m68k/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -548,3 +548,12 @@
 #bool 'Debug kmalloc/kfree' CONFIG_DEBUG_MALLOC
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/mips/config.in linux.grsec/arch/mips/config.in
--- linux/arch/mips/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/mips/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -509,3 +509,12 @@
    bool 'Run uncached' CONFIG_MIPS_UNCACHED
 fi
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/mips64/config.in linux.grsec/arch/mips64/config.in
--- linux/arch/mips64/config.in	Wed Jul  4 20:50:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/mips64/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -274,3 +274,12 @@
    bool 'Run uncached' CONFIG_MIPS_UNCACHED
 fi
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/parisc/config.in linux.grsec/arch/parisc/config.in
--- linux/arch/parisc/config.in	Wed Apr 18 02:19:25 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/parisc/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -208,3 +208,11 @@
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 endmenu
 
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/ppc/config.in linux.grsec/arch/ppc/config.in
--- linux/arch/ppc/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/ppc/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:18 2001
@@ -379,3 +379,12 @@
 bool 'Include kgdb kernel debugger' CONFIG_KGDB
 bool 'Include xmon kernel debugger' CONFIG_XMON
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/s390/config.in linux.grsec/arch/s390/config.in
--- linux/arch/s390/config.in	Wed Apr 18 02:19:25 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/s390/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -70,3 +70,11 @@
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 endmenu
 
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/s390x/config.in linux.grsec/arch/s390x/config.in
--- linux/arch/s390x/config.in	Wed Apr 18 02:19:25 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/s390x/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -74,3 +74,11 @@
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 endmenu
 
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/sh/config.in linux.grsec/arch/sh/config.in
--- linux/arch/sh/config.in	Wed Jun 27 22:55:29 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/sh/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -326,3 +326,12 @@
    bool 'Early printk support' CONFIG_SH_EARLY_PRINTK
 fi
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/sparc/config.in linux.grsec/arch/sparc/config.in
--- linux/arch/sparc/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:52 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/sparc/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -274,3 +274,12 @@
 
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/arch/sparc64/config.in linux.grsec/arch/sparc64/config.in
--- linux/arch/sparc64/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:30:50 2001
+++ linux.grsec/arch/sparc64/config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -289,3 +289,12 @@
 bool 'Magic SysRq key' CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ
 #bool 'ECache flush trap support at ta 0x72' CONFIG_EC_FLUSH_TRAP
 endmenu
+
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Grsecurity'
+bool 'Grsecurity' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC" = "y" ]; then
+    source grsecurity/Config.in
+fi
+endmenu
+
diff -urN linux/drivers/char/mem.c linux.grsec/drivers/char/mem.c
--- linux/drivers/char/mem.c	Wed Jul 11 01:07:46 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/char/mem.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -205,9 +205,20 @@
 	/*
 	 * Don't dump addresses that are not real memory to a core file.
 	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	if (offset >= __pa(high_memory) || (file->f_flags & O_SYNC)) {
+#else 
 	if (offset >= __pa(high_memory) || (file->f_flags & O_SYNC))
+#endif
 		vma->vm_flags |= VM_IO;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		/* it turned out to be device memory (eg. video RAM), don't apply PaX */
+		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+			vma->vm_flags |= VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC;
+			vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
+		}                                                                                                          
+	}
+#endif
 	if (remap_page_range(vma->vm_start, offset, vma->vm_end-vma->vm_start,
 			     vma->vm_page_prot))
 		return -EAGAIN;
@@ -368,8 +379,11 @@
 			count = size;
 
 		zap_page_range(mm, addr, count);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	        zeromap_page_range(addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot); 
+#else
         	zeromap_page_range(addr, count, PAGE_COPY);
-
+#endif
 		size -= count;
 		buf += count;
 		addr += count;
diff -urN linux/drivers/char/random.c linux.grsec/drivers/char/random.c
--- linux/drivers/char/random.c	Mon Jul  2 22:56:41 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/char/random.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@
 /*
  * Configuration information
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE_RANDNET 4096
+#define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE_RANDNET 1024
+#define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE_RANDNET 2048
+#endif
 #define DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE 512
 #define SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE 128
 #define BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE 256
@@ -380,8 +386,13 @@
 /*
  * Static global variables
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
+struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
+#else
 static struct entropy_store *random_state; /* The default global store */
 static struct entropy_store *sec_random_state; /* secondary store */
+#endif
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
 
@@ -1383,11 +1394,23 @@
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (create_entropy_store(DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE, &random_state))
+	if (create_entropy_store(
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+	grsec_enable_randnet?DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE_RANDNET:
+#endif
+	DEFAULT_POOL_SIZE, &random_state))
 		return;		/* Error, return */
-	if (batch_entropy_init(BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE, random_state))
+	if (batch_entropy_init(
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+	grsec_enable_randnet?BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE_RANDNET:
+#endif
+	BATCH_ENTROPY_SIZE, random_state))
 		return;		/* Error, return */
-	if (create_entropy_store(SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE, &sec_random_state))
+	if (create_entropy_store(
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+	grsec_enable_randnet?SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE_RANDNET:
+#endif
+	SECONDARY_POOL_SIZE, &sec_random_state))
 		return;		/* Error, return */
 	clear_entropy_store(random_state);
 	clear_entropy_store(sec_random_state);
diff -urN linux/drivers/char/vt.c linux.grsec/drivers/char/vt.c
--- linux/drivers/char/vt.c	Fri Feb  9 20:30:22 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/char/vt.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
 #include <asm/vc_ioctl.h>
 #endif /* CONFIG_FB_COMPAT_XPMAC */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 char vt_dont_switch;
 extern struct tty_driver console_driver;
 
@@ -174,7 +178,11 @@
 		    val = (i ? K_HOLE : K_NOSUCHMAP);
 		return put_user(val, &user_kbe->kb_value);
 	case KDSKBENT:
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+		if (!perm || (grsec_enable_kbmap && !suser()))
+#else 
 		if (!perm)
+#endif
 			return -EPERM;
 		if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) {
 			/* disallocate map */
@@ -293,7 +301,11 @@
 		put_user('\0', q);
 		return ((p && *p) ? -EOVERFLOW : 0);
 	case KDSKBSENT:
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+		if (!perm || (grsec_enable_kbmap && !suser()))
+#else 
 		if (!perm)
+#endif
 			return -EPERM;
 
 		q = func_table[i];
diff -urN linux/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c linux.grsec/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c
--- linux/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c	Fri Jul 20 02:48:16 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/ieee1394/video1394.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -794,7 +794,11 @@
         pos=(unsigned long) d->buf;
         while (size > 0) {
                 page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
                 if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
                         return -EAGAIN;
                 start+=PAGE_SIZE;
                 pos+=PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/bttv-driver.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/bttv-driver.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/bttv-driver.c	Tue Jul 17 00:13:32 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/bttv-driver.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -2037,7 +2037,11 @@
         pos=(unsigned long) btv->fbuffer;
         while (size > 0) {
                 page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+                if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
                 if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
                         return -EAGAIN;
                 start+=PAGE_SIZE;
                 pos+=PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/cpia.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/cpia.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/cpia.c	Sun May 20 02:43:06 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/cpia.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -3004,7 +3004,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)(cam->frame_buf);
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC)) {
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED)) {
+#endif
 			up(&cam->busy_lock);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		}
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/meye.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/meye.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/meye.c	Wed Jul  4 23:41:33 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/meye.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -1267,7 +1267,11 @@
 
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC)) {
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED)) {
+#endif
 			up(&meye.lock);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		}
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/planb.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/planb.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/planb.c	Thu Jun 28 02:10:55 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/planb.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -2001,7 +2001,11 @@
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < pb->rawbuf_size; i++) {
 		if (remap_page_range(start, virt_to_phys((void *)pb->rawbuf[i]),
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+						PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
 						PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		start += PAGE_SIZE;
 		if (size <= PAGE_SIZE)
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/zr36067.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/zr36067.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/zr36067.c	Wed Jul  4 23:41:33 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/zr36067.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -4312,7 +4312,11 @@
 				    frag_tab[2 * j];
 				page = virt_to_phys(bus_to_virt(pos));	/* should just be pos on i386 */
 				if (remap_page_range
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+				    (start, page, todo, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC)) {
+#else
 				    (start, page, todo, PAGE_SHARED)) {
+#endif
 					printk(KERN_ERR
 					       "%s: zoran_mmap(V4L): remap_page_range failed\n",
 					       zr->name);
@@ -4353,7 +4357,11 @@
 			       ("V4L remap page range %d 0x%lx %ld to 0x%lx\n",
 				i, page, todo, start));
 			if (remap_page_range
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+			    (start, page, todo, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC)) {
+#else
 			    (start, page, todo, PAGE_SHARED)) {
+#endif
 				printk(KERN_ERR
 				       "%s: zoran_mmap(V4L): remap_page_range failed\n",
 				       zr->name);
diff -urN linux/drivers/media/video/zr36120.c linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/zr36120.c
--- linux/drivers/media/video/zr36120.c	Tue Jul 17 00:13:32 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/media/video/zr36120.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -1475,7 +1475,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)ztv->fbuffer;
 	while (size>0) {
 		unsigned long page = virt_to_phys((void*)pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		start += PAGE_SIZE;
 		pos += PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/usb/ibmcam.c linux.grsec/drivers/usb/ibmcam.c
--- linux/drivers/usb/ibmcam.c	Wed Jun 13 00:53:37 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/usb/ibmcam.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -2841,7 +2841,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)ibmcam->fbuf;
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
 			return -EAGAIN;
 
 		start += PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/usb/ov511.c linux.grsec/drivers/usb/ov511.c
--- linux/drivers/usb/ov511.c	Tue Jul 17 00:13:32 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/usb/ov511.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -2756,7 +2756,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)ov511->fbuf;
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		start += PAGE_SIZE;
 		pos += PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/usb/pwc-if.c linux.grsec/drivers/usb/pwc-if.c
--- linux/drivers/usb/pwc-if.c	Thu Jun 21 02:42:09 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/usb/pwc-if.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -1511,7 +1511,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)pdev->image_data;
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC))
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED))
+#endif
 			return -EAGAIN;
 
 		start += PAGE_SIZE;
diff -urN linux/drivers/usb/se401.c linux.grsec/drivers/usb/se401.c
--- linux/drivers/usb/se401.c	Mon Jul  2 22:56:41 2001
+++ linux.grsec/drivers/usb/se401.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:19 2001
@@ -1388,7 +1388,11 @@
 	pos = (unsigned long)se401->fbuf;
 	while (size > 0) {
 		page = kvirt_to_pa(pos);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED_EXEC)) {
+#else
 		if (remap_page_range(start, page, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHARED)) {
+#endif
 			up(&se401->lock);
 			return -EAGAIN;
 		}
diff -urN linux/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux.grsec/fs/binfmt_aout.c
--- linux/fs/binfmt_aout.c	Fri Jul 20 05:33:38 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/binfmt_aout.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/config.h>
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -29,6 +30,10 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *, struct pt_regs * regs);
 static int load_aout_library(struct file*);
 static int aout_core_dump(long signr, struct pt_regs * regs, struct file *file);
@@ -305,6 +310,25 @@
 	current->mm->mmap = NULL;
 	compute_creds(bprm);
  	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+       if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_STACKEXEC) current->flags |= PF_STACKEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+      if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
+              current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+      if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
+              current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+      if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))        
+              current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
+#endif
+
 #ifdef __sparc__
 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
 		loff_t pos = fd_offset;
@@ -391,7 +415,11 @@
 
 		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
  		error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+#else
 				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+#endif
 				MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
 				fd_offset + ex.a_text);
 		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
diff -urN linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux.grsec/fs/binfmt_elf.c
--- linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:59 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/binfmt_elf.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
-
+#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/stat.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/highuid.h>
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/param.h>
@@ -40,6 +43,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs);
 static int load_elf_library(struct file*);
 static unsigned long elf_map (struct file *, unsigned long, struct elf_phdr *, int, int);
@@ -71,7 +78,10 @@
 #define ELF_PAGEOFFSET(_v) ((_v) & (ELF_MIN_ALIGN-1))
 #define ELF_PAGEALIGN(_v) (((_v) + ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1) & ~(ELF_MIN_ALIGN - 1))
 
-static struct linux_binfmt elf_format = {
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+static
+#endif
+struct linux_binfmt elf_format = {
 	NULL, THIS_MODULE, load_elf_binary, load_elf_library, elf_core_dump, ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE
 };
 
@@ -133,6 +143,11 @@
 	} else
 		u_platform = p;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
+		u_platform -= (current->mm->delta_stack & ~PAGE_MASK);
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * Force 16 byte _final_ alignment here for generality.
 	 */
@@ -559,7 +574,48 @@
 	current->mm->end_data = 0;
 	current->mm->end_code = 0;
 	current->mm->mmap = NULL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	current->mm->delta_mmap = 0;
+	current->mm->delta_exec = 0;
+	current->mm->delta_stack = 0;
+#endif
 	current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+       if (elf_ex.e_flags & EF_STACKEXEC)
+	current->flags |= PF_STACKEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	if (!(elf_ex.e_flags & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
+		current->flags |= PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+	if (elf_ex.e_flags & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
+		current->flags |= PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+	if (!(elf_ex.e_flags & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
+		current->flags |= PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+	if (!(elf_ex.e_flags & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP)) {
+		unsigned short delta;
+		current->flags |= PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
+
+		get_random_bytes(&delta, sizeof(delta));
+		current->mm->delta_mmap = (unsigned long)delta << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		get_random_bytes(&delta, sizeof(delta));
+		current->mm->delta_exec = (unsigned long)delta << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		get_random_bytes(&delta, sizeof(delta));
+		current->mm->delta_stack = (unsigned long)delta << 4;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	elf_entry = (unsigned long) elf_ex.e_entry;
 
 	/* Do this so that we can load the interpreter, if need be.  We will
@@ -596,6 +652,13 @@
 			   base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec.  This
 		           is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
 			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+			/* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
+			if (current->flags | PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
+				load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(0x08048000 - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec);
+			}
+#endif
+
 		}
 
 		error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
diff -urN linux/fs/exec.c linux.grsec/fs/exec.c
--- linux/fs/exec.c	Fri Jul 20 05:32:54 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/exec.c	Sun Sep 30 01:55:22 2001
@@ -45,6 +45,25 @@
 #include <linux/kmod.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE) ||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP)||defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE) ||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
+
 static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
 static rwlock_t binfmt_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
 
@@ -276,7 +295,12 @@
 		goto out;
 	flush_dcache_page(page);
 	flush_page_to_ram(page);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(page,
+		(tsk->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC:PAGE_COPY_EXEC))));
+#else
 	set_pte(pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(page, PAGE_COPY))));
+#endif
 	tsk->mm->rss++;
 	spin_unlock(&tsk->mm->page_table_lock);
 
@@ -297,6 +321,12 @@
 
 	stack_base = STACK_TOP - MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
+		stack_base = PAGE_MASK & (stack_base - current->mm->delta_stack);
+
+#endif
+ 
 	bprm->p += stack_base;
 	if (bprm->loader)
 		bprm->loader += stack_base;
@@ -310,9 +340,15 @@
 	{
 		mpnt->vm_mm = current->mm;
 		mpnt->vm_start = PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long) bprm->p;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+		mpnt->vm_end = stack_base + MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE;
+		mpnt->vm_page_prot = (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC:PAGE_COPY_EXEC;
+		mpnt->vm_flags = (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?VM_STACK_FLAGS:(VM_STACK_FLAGS|VM_EXEC|VM_MAYEXEC);
+#else
 		mpnt->vm_end = STACK_TOP;
 		mpnt->vm_page_prot = PAGE_COPY;
 		mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
+#endif
 		mpnt->vm_ops = NULL;
 		mpnt->vm_pgoff = 0;
 		mpnt->vm_file = NULL;
@@ -468,6 +504,65 @@
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&oldsig->count))
 		kmem_cache_free(sigact_cachep, oldsig);
 }
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+static inline int tweak_fd_open_null(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+    struct inode *i;
+    struct dentry *d;
+    struct file *f;
+
+    if(!(i = get_empty_inode()))
+        return -ENOMEM;
+    if(!(d = dget(d_alloc_root(i)))){
+        iput(i);
+        return -ENOMEM;
+    }
+    if(!(f = get_empty_filp())){
+        dput(d);
+        iput(i);
+        return -ENFILE;
+    }
+    i->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
+    i->i_uid = current->fsuid;
+    i->i_gid = current->fsgid;
+    i->i_rdev = MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR,3);
+    i->i_blksize = PAGE_SIZE;
+    i->i_blocks = 0;
+    i->i_atime = i->i_mtime = i->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
+    i->i_op = &page_symlink_inode_operations;
+    i->i_state = I_DIRTY;
+    f->f_flags = O_RDWR;
+    f->f_mode = FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE;
+    f->f_dentry = d;
+    f->f_pos = 0;
+    f->f_reada = 0;
+    chrdev_open(i,f);
+    bprm->tweak_fd_null = f;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int tweak_fd_0_1_2(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+    int fd,new,retval;
+    struct file *f;
+    f = bprm->tweak_fd_null;
+    for(fd=0;fd<=2;fd++){
+        if(current->files->fd[fd]) continue;
+        if((new = get_unused_fd()) != fd) {
+            if(new >= 0) put_unused_fd(new);
+            return -EMFILE;
+        }
+        if(f)
+            atomic_inc(&f->f_count);
+        else
+            if((retval = tweak_fd_open_null(bprm)))
+                return retval;
+        fd_install(fd,bprm->tweak_fd_null);
+               bprm->tweak_fd_mask |= 1 << fd;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif
 
 /*
  * These functions flushes out all traces of the currently running executable
@@ -558,6 +653,25 @@
 				current->comm[i++] = ch;
 	}
 	current->comm[i] = '\0';
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+        current->flags &= ~PF_STACKEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_MPROTECT;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+	current->flags &= ~PF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
+#endif
 
 	flush_thread();
 
@@ -574,7 +688,10 @@
 			
 	flush_signal_handlers(current);
 	flush_old_files(current->files);
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+        if(grsec_enable_fd && bprm->priv_change)
+            return tweak_fd_0_1_2(bprm);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 
 mmap_failed:
@@ -604,6 +721,9 @@
 {
 	int mode;
 	struct inode * inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+	if (grsec_enable_fd)	bprm->priv_change = 0;
+#endif
 
 	mode = inode->i_mode;
 	/* Huh? We had already checked for MAY_EXEC, WTF do we check this? */
@@ -617,8 +737,16 @@
 
 	if(!IS_NOSUID(inode)) {
 		/* Set-uid? */
-		if (mode & S_ISUID)
-			bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+                if (mode & S_ISUID){
+                        bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
+                        if(grsec_enable_fd && (bprm->e_uid != current->euid))
+                            bprm->priv_change = 1;
+                }
+#else
+                if (mode & S_ISUID)
+                        bprm->e_uid = inode->i_uid;
+#endif
 
 		/* Set-gid? */
 		/*
@@ -626,9 +754,17 @@
 		 * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
 		 * executable.
 		 */
-		if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
-			bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
-	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+                if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)){
+                        bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
+                        if(grsec_enable_fd && !in_group_p(bprm->e_gid))
+                            bprm->priv_change = 1;
+                }
+#else
+                if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))
+                        bprm->e_gid = inode->i_gid;
+#endif	
+}
 
 	/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
 	cap_clear(bprm->cap_inheritable);
@@ -648,10 +784,10 @@
 			cap_set_full(bprm->cap_inheritable);
 			cap_set_full(bprm->cap_permitted);
 		}
-		if (bprm->e_uid == 0) 
+
+		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
 			cap_set_full(bprm->cap_effective);
 	}
-
 	memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
 	return kernel_read(bprm->file,0,bprm->buf,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
 }
@@ -699,6 +835,9 @@
 							current->cap_permitted);
 			}
 		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+            if (grsec_enable_fd) tweak_fd_0_1_2(bprm);
+#endif
 		do_unlock = 1;
 	}
 
@@ -847,6 +986,39 @@
 	struct file *file;
 	int retval;
 	int i;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+	int x;
+	char *grargs;
+	char grarg[68];
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
+	if(grsec_enable_chroot_execlog &&
+	 !(	(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+		(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+		security_alert("exec of %.64s within chroot() jail (%.32s:%lu) by process (%.16s:%d), "
+			       "UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)",
+			       "execs from chroot()",filename,kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			       current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,current->comm,current->pid,
+			       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+			       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+		}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
+    if(grsec_enable_execve && current->user)
+    if(atomic_read(&current->user->processes) > current->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur)
+    {
+	security_alert("Attempt to overstep process limit by (%.16s:%d), "
+	"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)",
+		       "proc limit overstep",
+			current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+			current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+			current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+			current->p_pptr->euid);
+	return -EAGAIN;
+    }
+#endif
 
 	file = open_exec(filename);
 
@@ -854,6 +1026,94 @@
 	if (IS_ERR(file))
 		return retval;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
+if (grsec_enable_tpe) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GLIBC
+if (grsec_enable_tpe_glibc) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+if(grsec_enable_tpe_all?current->uid:in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)){
+#else
+if(in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)){
+#endif
+		char **envpp=envp,*envpt;
+                while(*envpp){
+		envpt=*envpp;
+		if((*envpt == 'L') && (*(envpt + 1) == 'D') &&
+ 		(*(envpt + 2) == '_') && strchr(envpt,'=')){
+	security_alert("denied exec of %.32s by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) reason: "
+	"malicious environment","denied execs",
+	filename,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+	current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+	current->p_pptr->euid);
+	dput(file->f_dentry);
+	return -EACCES;
+		}
+		*envpp=*++envpp;
+        }
+    if(!strncmp(file->f_dentry->d_name.name,"ld-2.",5) &&
+    !strncmp(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_name.name,"lib",3)){
+	security_alert("denied exec of %.32s by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) reason: "
+	"tried to bypass via ld","denied execs",
+	filename,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+	current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+	current->p_pptr->euid);
+	dput(file->f_dentry);
+	return -EACCES;
+    }
+}
+}
+#endif
+if((current->uid) &&
+   ((file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid) ||
+   (!(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid) &&
+   ((file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
+    (file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH)))) &&
+   (in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid))){
+security_alert("denied exec of %.32s by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) reason: "
+	"untrusted","denied execs",
+	filename,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+	current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+	current->p_pptr->euid);
+	dput(file->f_dentry);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+else if(grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
+	(current->uid) && !(((!(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid) &&
+    !(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) &&
+    !(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH)) ||
+    ((file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid == current->uid) &&
+    !(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) &&
+    !(file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))){
+security_alert("denied exec of %.32s by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) reason:"
+	" untrusted","denied execs",
+	filename,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+	current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+	current->p_pptr->euid);
+	dput(file->f_dentry);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+if( ( (obv_search(file->f_dentry,OBV_EXEC,file->f_vfsmnt)) == OBV_DENY) ) {
+	obv_seclog("denying execution of %.1024s by (%.16s:%d), "
+        "UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+                        filename,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+	fput(file);
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+#endif
+
 	bprm.p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
 	memset(bprm.page, 0, MAX_ARG_PAGES*sizeof(bprm.page[0])); 
 
@@ -867,13 +1127,37 @@
 		fput(file);
 		return bprm.argc;
 	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+	if (grsec_enable_execlog) {
+	    for(x=0;x<sizeof(grarg);x++)
+		grarg[x]='\0';
+	    for(x=0;x<bprm.argc;x++) {
+		if((strlen(argv[x]) + strlen(grarg) + 2) < sizeof(grarg)) {
+		    grargs=strcat(grarg,argv[x]);
+		    if(x<bprm.argc-1)
+			grargs=strcat(grarg," ");
+		}
+	    }
+	    printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: exec of (%.68s) by (%.16s:%d), "
+        	"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+                        grarg,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+	}
+#endif
 
 	if ((bprm.envc = count(envp, bprm.p / sizeof(void *))) < 0) {
 		allow_write_access(file);
 		fput(file);
 		return bprm.envc;
 	}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+        if (grsec_enable_fd) {
+	bprm.tweak_fd_mask = 0;
+        bprm.tweak_fd_null = NULL;
+	}
+#endif
 	retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
 	if (retval < 0) 
 		goto out; 
@@ -892,9 +1176,19 @@
 		goto out; 
 
 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
-	if (retval >= 0)
+	if (retval >= 0) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		if(obv_set_proc_acl(file->f_dentry,current,filename,file->f_vfsmnt)) {
+			obv_seclog("could not set acl for %ld %d\n",
+			file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+			file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
+			goto out; 
+		}
+#endif
+
 		/* execve success */
 		return retval;
+	}
 
 out:
 	/* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
@@ -907,7 +1201,13 @@
 		if (page)
 			__free_page(page);
 	}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+	if(grsec_enable_fd && bprm.tweak_fd_mask) {                                            
+	for(i=0;i<=2;i++)
+            if(bprm.tweak_fd_mask & (1 << i))
+                (void)sys_close(i);
+	}
+#endif
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -940,8 +1240,11 @@
 		goto fail;
 
 	memcpy(corename,"core.", 5);
-#if 0
-	memcpy(corename+5,current->comm,sizeof(current->comm));
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP
+	if(grsec_enable_coredump)
+		memcpy(corename+5,current->comm,sizeof(current->comm));
+	else
+		corename[4] = '\0';
 #else
 	corename[4] = '\0';
 #endif
@@ -960,7 +1263,11 @@
 		goto close_fail;
 	if (!file->f_op->write)
 		goto close_fail;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0, file->f_vfsmnt) != 0)
+#else
 	if (do_truncate(file->f_dentry, 0) != 0)
+#endif
 		goto close_fail;
 
 	down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
diff -urN linux/fs/namei.c linux.grsec/fs/namei.c
--- linux/fs/namei.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:55 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/namei.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -25,8 +25,21 @@
 #include <asm/namei.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO) ||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
 #define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
+
 /* [Feb-1997 T. Schoebel-Theuer]
  * Fundamental changes in the pathname lookup mechanisms (namei)
  * were necessary because of omirr.  The reason is that omirr needs
@@ -309,6 +322,27 @@
 	if (current->link_count >= 8)
 		goto loop;
 	current->link_count++;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+	if(grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
+	  (dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
+	  dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid &&
+	  (dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH) &&
+	  current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid) {
+	  security_alert("not following symlink (%.30s/%.30s) of [%.32s]:%lu owned by %d.%d "
+			 "by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+			 "UID (%d), EUID (%d)","symlinks not followed",
+			 dentry->d_parent->d_name.name,
+			 dentry->d_name.name,
+			 kdevname(dentry->d_inode->i_dev),
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_gid,current->comm,
+			 current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+			 current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+			 current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	return -EACCES;
+	}
+#endif
 	UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
 	err = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
 	current->link_count--;
@@ -589,6 +623,24 @@
 		else if (this.len == 2 && this.name[1] == '.')
 			nd->last_type = LAST_DOTDOT;
 return_base:
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		if(nd->dentry)
+			if( ( (obv_check_hidden(nd->dentry,nd->mnt)) == OBV_DENY) ) {
+				obv_seclog("attempt to access hidden file "
+				"with inode %ld dev %d by (%.16s:%d), "
+        			"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+				"UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+				nd->dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+				nd->dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        	current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        	current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        	current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        	current->p_pptr->euid);
+				err = -ENOENT; /*Fake that its not there*/
+				goto out_dput;
+			}
+#endif
+
 		return 0;
 out_dput:
 		dput(dentry);
@@ -930,6 +982,62 @@
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	struct dentry *dir;
 	int count = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	int tmp;
+	if(nd->flags) {
+		nd->flags = 0;
+		if(path_init(pathname,lookup_flags(flag)|LOOKUP_PARENT,nd))
+			error = path_walk(pathname,nd);
+		if(error) return error;
+	} else {
+		if(path_init(pathname,lookup_flags(flag),nd))
+			error = path_walk(pathname,nd);
+		if(error) return error;
+	}
+	if( (tmp = (flag&O_ACCMODE)) > 0) {
+		if(tmp & FMODE_READ ) {
+			if( (obv_search(nd->dentry,OBV_READ,nd->mnt)) == OBV_DENY) {
+				obv_seclog("attempt to open %.1024s read-only "
+				"by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+				"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",pathname,
+			current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto exit;
+			}
+		}
+		else if(flag & O_APPEND) {
+			if( (obv_search(nd->dentry,OBV_APPEND,nd->mnt)) == OBV_DENY) {
+				obv_seclog("attempt to open %.1024s "
+				"append-only by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+			"EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+	                pathname,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto exit;
+			}
+		}
+		if(tmp & FMODE_WRITE && (!(flag & O_APPEND))) { /* its write*/
+			if( ( (obv_search(nd->dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd->mnt)) == OBV_DENY) ) {
+				obv_seclog("attempt to open %.1024s "
+				"for writing by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+			"EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+	                pathname,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				error = -EPERM;
+				goto exit;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	path_release(nd);
+#endif
+
 
 	acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
 
@@ -1032,12 +1140,32 @@
 	error = permission(inode,acc_mode);
 	if (error)
 		goto exit;
-
 	/*
 	 * FIFO's, sockets and device files are special: they don't
 	 * actually live on the filesystem itself, and as such you
 	 * can write to them even if the filesystem is read-only.
 	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
+               if (grsec_enable_fifo &&
+		   S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) && !(flag & O_EXCL) &&
+                   (dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
+                   inode->i_uid != dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid &&
+                   current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) {
+                       if (!permission(inode, acc_mode))
+                       security_alert("denied writing FIFO (%.32s/%.32s) of %d.%d "
+                               "by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+			       "(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)",
+                               "writes into a FIFO denied",dentry->d_parent->d_name.name,dentry->d_name.name,
+                               inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid,
+			       current->comm,current->pid,
+                               current->uid, current->euid,
+                               current->p_pptr->comm,
+			       current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+			       current->p_pptr->euid);
+                       error = -EACCES;
+                       goto exit;
+               }
+#endif
 	if (S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
 	    	flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
 	} else if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) || S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) {
@@ -1081,7 +1209,11 @@
 		if (!error) {
 			DQUOT_INIT(inode);
 			
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			error = do_truncate(dentry,0,nd->mnt);
+#else
 			error = do_truncate(dentry, 0);
+#endif
 		}
 		put_write_access(inode);
 		if (error)
@@ -1112,6 +1244,29 @@
 	 * stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
 	 * are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
 	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+	if(grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
+	  (dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
+	  dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_uid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid &&
+	  (dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH) &&
+	  current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid) {
+	  security_alert("not following symlink (%.30s/%.30s) [%.32s]:%lu of %d.%d "
+			 "by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+			 "UID (%d), EUID (%d)","symlinks not followed",
+			 dentry->d_parent->d_name.name,
+			 dentry->d_name.name,
+			 kdevname(dentry->d_inode->i_dev),
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+			 dentry->d_inode->i_gid,current->comm,
+			 current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+			 current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+			 current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	error = -EACCES;
+	goto exit;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
 	error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
 	dput(dentry);
@@ -1195,7 +1350,9 @@
 	char * tmp;
 	struct dentry * dentry;
 	struct nameidata nd;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	char grdevmode;
+#endif
 	if (S_ISDIR(mode))
 		return -EPERM;
 	tmp = getname(filename);
@@ -1212,6 +1369,50 @@
 	if (!IS_POSIX_ACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
 		mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if (grsec_enable_chroot && !S_ISFIFO(mode)) {
+	    if(!(   (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+		    child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+		    (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+		    child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+		switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+		    case S_IFREG:	grdevmode = 'r';	break;
+		    case S_IFCHR:	grdevmode = 'c';	break;
+		    case S_IFBLK:	grdevmode = 'b';	break;
+		    case S_IFSOCK:	grdevmode = 's';	break;
+		    default:		grdevmode = 'u';
+		}
+		security_alert("refused attempt to mknod(%c:%.32s) (%.30s) from chroot() jail (%s:%lu) "
+			       "owned by %d %d by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID "
+			       "(%d), EUID (%d)","chroot() mknods denied",grdevmode,kdevname(dev),tmp,
+			       kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+			       current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid,
+			       current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+			       current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+			dput(dentry);
+			error = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+#endif	
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY) ) {
+		obv_seclog("attempt to mknod %.1024s (dev %d) by (%.16s:%d), "
+        	"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+		filename,dev,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+		dput(dentry);
+		path_release(&nd);
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+
+	
 		switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 		case 0: case S_IFREG:
 			error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode);
@@ -1279,9 +1480,26 @@
 		dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1);
 		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			error = 0;
+			if( ( ((obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY))){
+			obv_seclog("attempt to mkdir %.1024s by (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+                pathname,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				error = -EPERM;
+			}
+			if(!error) {
+#endif
+
 			if (!IS_POSIX_ACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
 				mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
 			error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			}
+#endif
 			dput(dentry);
 		}
 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
@@ -1388,7 +1606,20 @@
 	dentry = lookup_hash(&nd.last, nd.dentry);
 	error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 	if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-		error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		error = 0;
+		if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+			obv_seclog("attempt to rmdir %.1024s by (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+                pathname,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+			error = -EPERM;
+		}
+		if(!error)
+#endif
+			error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
 		dput(dentry);
 	}
 	up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
@@ -1451,7 +1682,21 @@
 		/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
 		if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
 			goto slashes;
-		error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		error = 0;
+		if( ( (obv_search(dentry,OBV_WRITE, nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+		obv_seclog("attempt to unlink %.1024s by (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+                name,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+			error = -EPERM;
+		}
+		if(!error)
+#endif
+
+			error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
 	exit2:
 		dput(dentry);
 	}
@@ -1508,6 +1753,19 @@
 	if (!IS_ERR(to)) {
 		struct dentry *dentry;
 		struct nameidata nd;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		struct nameidata old_nd;
+		if(path_init(from,LOOKUP_POSITIVE|LOOKUP_FOLLOW,&old_nd))
+			if(path_walk(from,&old_nd)) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				printk("Error looking up %s\n",from);
+#endif
+
+				path_release(&old_nd);
+				return -EROFS;
+			}
+#endif
+
 
 		if (path_init(to, LOOKUP_PARENT, &nd))
 			error = path_walk(to, &nd);
@@ -1516,7 +1774,24 @@
 		dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
 		error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-			error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			error = 0;
+			if( obv_search(old_nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,old_nd.mnt) == OBV_DENY || obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt) == OBV_DENY) {
+				obv_seclog("attempt to symlink %.1024s "
+				"to %.1024s  by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+				"EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d) "
+				"EUID(%d)\n",oldname,newname,
+                	current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				error = -EPERM;
+			}
+			path_release(&old_nd);
+			if(!error)
+#endif
+
+				error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from);
 			dput(dentry);
 		}
 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
@@ -1607,7 +1882,44 @@
 		new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
 		error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
 		if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
-			error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+	if(grsec_enable_link) {
+	error = -EPERM;
+	if(current->fsuid != old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_uid &&
+	(!S_ISREG(old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ||
+	(old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISUID) ||
+	((old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == 
+	(S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) || (error = permission(old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
+	MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
+	security_alert("denied hardlink of %.30s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for (%.16s:%d),"
+	" UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)",
+	"denied hardlinks",oldname,old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+	old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_gid,newname,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+	current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	} else {
+#endif	
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	error = 0;
+	if( obv_search(old_nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,old_nd.mnt) == OBV_DENY || obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt) == OBV_DENY) {
+		obv_seclog("attempt to link %.1024s to %.1024s "
+				"by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "  
+                                "EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d) "
+                                "EUID(%d)\n",oldname,newname,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+		error = -EPERM;
+	}
+	if(!error)
+#endif
+
+		error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+	}
+	}
+#endif
 			dput(new_dentry);
 		}
 		up(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
@@ -1844,11 +2156,30 @@
 	error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
 	if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
 		goto exit4;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	error = 0;
+	if( obv_search(old_dir,OBV_WRITE,oldnd.mnt) == OBV_DENY || obv_search(new_dir,OBV_WRITE,newnd.mnt) == OBV_DENY) {
+		obv_seclog("attempt to rename %.1024s to %.1024s "
+				"by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "  
+                                "EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d) "
+                                "EUID(%d)\n",oldname,newname,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+		error = -EPERM;
+	}
+	if(!error) {
+#endif
 
-	lock_kernel();
-	error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
-				   new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
-	unlock_kernel();
+
+		lock_kernel();
+		error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
+				new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
+		unlock_kernel();
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	}
+#endif
 
 	dput(new_dentry);
 exit4:
diff -urN linux/fs/open.c linux.grsec/fs/open.c
--- linux/fs/open.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:53 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/open.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -17,8 +17,35 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
 #define special_file(m) (S_ISCHR(m)||S_ISBLK(m)||S_ISFIFO(m)||S_ISSOCK(m))
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+static int conv_flags(int p) {
+	int retval = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+	if(p & O_NOFOLLOW)
+		retval &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+	if( (p & (O_CREAT|O_EXCL)) == (O_CREAT | O_EXCL))
+		retval &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+	if(p & O_DIRECTORY)
+		retval |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
+	return retval;
+}
+#endif
+
+
 int vfs_statfs(struct super_block *sb, struct statfs *buf)
 {
 	int retval = -ENODEV;
@@ -70,7 +97,11 @@
 	return error;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+#else
 int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, loff_t length)
+#endif
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error;
@@ -80,6 +111,22 @@
 	if (length < 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if( ( (obv_search(dentry,OBV_WRITE,mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+		obv_seclog("attempted to truncate file with inode %ld dev "
+		"%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+			dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+		dput(dentry);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+#endif
+
+
 	down(&inode->i_sem);
 	down_write(&inode->i_truncate_sem);
 	newattrs.ia_size = length;
@@ -135,7 +182,11 @@
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length);
 	if (!error) {
 		DQUOT_INIT(inode);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length, nd.mnt);
+#else
 		error = do_truncate(nd.dentry, length);
+#endif
 	}
 	put_write_access(inode);
 
@@ -175,7 +226,11 @@
 
 	error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length);
 	if (!error)
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		error = do_truncate(dentry, length, file->f_vfsmnt);
+#else
 		error = do_truncate(dentry, length);
+#endif
 out_putf:
 	fput(file);
 out:
@@ -229,6 +284,23 @@
 	if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+       if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+               obv_seclog("attempted to change access time for file"  
+               "with inode %ld dev "
+               "%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",nd.dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                       nd.dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+               path_release(&nd);
+               return -EPERM;
+       }
+#endif
+
+
 	/* Don't worry, the checks are done in inode_change_ok() */
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_ATIME;
 	if (times) {
@@ -274,6 +346,23 @@
 	if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+       if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+               obv_seclog("attempted to change access time for file with"
+                "inode %ld dev "
+               "%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",nd.dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                       nd.dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+               path_release(&nd);
+               return -EPERM;
+       }
+#endif
+
+
 	/* Don't worry, the checks are done in inode_change_ok() */
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME | ATTR_MTIME | ATTR_ATIME;
 	if (utimes) {
@@ -325,6 +414,21 @@
 
 	res = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
 	if (!res) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+       if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+               obv_seclog("attempted to access file with inode %ld dev "
+               "%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",nd.dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                       nd.dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid, 
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+               path_release(&nd);
+               res = -EPERM;
+       }
+#endif
+
 		res = permission(nd.dentry->d_inode, mode);
 		/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
 		if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
@@ -362,6 +466,21 @@
 	if (error)
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+       if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_READ,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+               obv_seclog("Attempted to chdir to directory with inode %ld dev "
+               "%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",nd.dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                        nd.dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+               error = -EPERM;
+               goto dput_and_out;
+       }
+#endif
+
 	set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
 
 dput_and_out:
@@ -392,6 +511,21 @@
 		goto out_putf;
 
 	error = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+       if( ( (obv_search(file->f_dentry,OBV_WRITE,file->f_vfsmnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+               obv_seclog("attempted to truncate file with inode %ld dev "
+               "%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                       file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+               error = -EPERM;
+       }
+#endif
+
 	if (!error)
 		set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
 out_putf:
@@ -423,11 +557,46 @@
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
 	error = -EPERM;
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
-		goto dput_and_out;
+ 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+  		goto dput_and_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if(grsec_enable_chroot &&
+	 !(	(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+		(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+		security_alert("denied attempt to chroot() from (%.32s:%lu) to (%.30s)"
+			       ", process (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent "
+			       "(%16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)", "double chroot() denied",
+			       kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,name,
+			       current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+			       current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+			       current->p_pptr->euid);
+			goto dput_and_out;
+	}
+#endif	
 
 	set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
 	set_fs_altroot();
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
+	if(grsec_enable_chroot_caps && current->pid && current->pid > 1) {
+	    cap_lower(current->cap_permitted,CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+		      CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO & CAP_SYS_PACCT &
+		      CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT & CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME &
+		      CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+	    cap_lower(current->cap_inheritable,CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+		      CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO & CAP_SYS_PACCT &
+		      CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT & CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME &
+		      CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+	    cap_lower(current->cap_effective,CAP_FOWNER & CAP_SETPCAP & CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE &
+		      CAP_NET_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_MODULE & CAP_SYS_RAWIO & CAP_SYS_PACCT &
+		      CAP_SYS_ADMIN & CAP_SYS_BOOT & CAP_SYS_RESOURCE & CAP_SYS_TIME &
+		      CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if (grsec_enable_chroot) sys_chdir("/");
+#endif
 	error = 0;
 dput_and_out:
 	path_release(&nd);
@@ -456,8 +625,46 @@
 	err = -EPERM;
 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
 		goto out_putf;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if( ( (obv_search(dentry,OBV_WRITE,file->f_vfsmnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+		obv_seclog("Attempt to fchmod program with inode %ld dev %d "
+		"by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
+                        dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out_putf;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if(grsec_enable_chroot && ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID))) {
+	if(!( 	(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+		(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+	    
+	    security_alert("denied attempt to fchmod() +s (%.32s:%lu) owned by %d.%d to mode 0%07o "
+			   "from chroot() jail (%.32s:%lu) of %d.%d by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+			   "EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","denied fchmod() +s in chroot()",
+			   kdevname(inode->i_dev),inode->i_ino,inode->i_uid,inode->i_gid,mode,
+			   kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,
+			   current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid,
+			   current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+			   current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+			   current->p_pptr->euid);
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out_putf;
+	    }
+	}	    
+#endif
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
@@ -488,8 +695,43 @@
 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
 		goto dput_and_out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if( ( (obv_search(nd.dentry,OBV_WRITE,nd.mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+		obv_seclog("Attempt to chmod file %1024s by (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d),EUID(%d)\n",filename,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid, 
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+		error = -EPERM;
+		goto dput_and_out;
+	}
+#endif
+
+
 	if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
 		mode = inode->i_mode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if (grsec_enable_chroot && ((mode & S_ISUID) || (mode & S_ISGID))) {
+	if(!( 	(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+		(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+		child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+	    security_alert("denied attempt to chmod() +s (%.32s:%lu) (%.30s) owned by %d.%d to mode 0%07o "
+			   "from chroot() jail (%.32s:%lu) of %d.%d by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), "
+			   "EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","denied fchmod() +s in chroot()",
+			   kdevname(inode->i_dev),inode->i_ino,filename,inode->i_uid,inode->i_gid,
+			   mode,kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			   current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			   current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid,current->comm,current->pid,
+			   current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+			   current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+		    error = -EPERM;
+		    goto dput_and_out;
+	    }
+	}
+#endif
 	newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
 	newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
 	error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
@@ -500,7 +742,7 @@
 	return error;
 }
 
-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
+static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
 {
 	struct inode * inode;
 	int error;
@@ -514,9 +756,36 @@
 	error = -EROFS;
 	if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_NOEXEC
+	if(in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_NOEXEC_GID) &&
+	(group == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_NOEXEC_GID)){
+	security_alert("denied chown of %.32s by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+	"EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d) reason: tried to "
+	"bypass noexec","denied noexec chowns",dentry->d_name.name,current->comm,
+	current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+	current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	return -EPERM;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	error = -EPERM;
 	if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if( ( (obv_search(dentry,OBV_WRITE,mnt)) == OBV_DENY)) {
+		obv_seclog("Attempt to chown file with inode %ld dev %d "
+		"to %d.%d by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+		"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+		dentry->d_inode->i_ino,dentry->d_inode->i_dev,user,group,
+                current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                current->p_pptr->euid);
+		dput(dentry);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (user == (uid_t) -1)
 		user = inode->i_uid;
 	if (group == (gid_t) -1)
@@ -567,7 +836,7 @@
 
 	error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
+		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
 		path_release(&nd);
 	}
 	return error;
@@ -580,7 +849,7 @@
 
 	error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
 	if (!error) {
-		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
+		error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
 		path_release(&nd);
 	}
 	return error;
@@ -594,7 +863,7 @@
 
 	file = fget(fd);
 	if (file) {
-		error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
+		error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group, file->f_vfsmnt);
 		fput(file);
 	}
 	return error;
@@ -618,12 +887,30 @@
 {
 	int namei_flags, error;
 	struct nameidata nd;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct nameidata obv;
+#endif
 
 	namei_flags = flags;
 	if ((namei_flags+1) & O_ACCMODE)
 		namei_flags++;
 	if (namei_flags & O_TRUNC)
 		namei_flags |= 2;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	error = 0;
+	if(path_init(filename,conv_flags(namei_flags),&obv))
+		error = path_walk(filename,&obv);
+	if(error) goto out;
+	if(!obv.dentry->d_inode)
+		nd.flags = 1;
+	else
+		nd.flags = 0;
+	path_release(&obv);
+out:
+
+#endif
+
 
 	error = open_namei(filename, namei_flags, mode, &nd);
 	if (!error)
diff -urN linux/fs/proc/base.c linux.grsec/fs/proc/base.c
--- linux/fs/proc/base.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:59 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/proc/base.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
  * Feel free to change the macro below - just keep the range distinct from
@@ -566,6 +570,25 @@
 static struct pid_entry base_stuff[] = {
   E(PROC_PID_FD,	"fd",		S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR),
   E(PROC_PID_ENVIRON,	"environ",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+  E(PROC_PID_STATUS,	"status",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_CMDLINE,	"cmdline",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_STAT,	"stat",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+  E(PROC_PID_STATM,	"statm",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+  E(PROC_PID_CPU,	"cpu",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+#endif
+  E(PROC_PID_MAPS,	"maps",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+  E(PROC_PID_STATUS,	"status",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+  E(PROC_PID_CMDLINE,	"cmdline",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+  E(PROC_PID_STAT,	"stat",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+  E(PROC_PID_STATM,	"statm",	S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+  E(PROC_PID_CPU,	"cpu",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+#endif
+  E(PROC_PID_MAPS,	"maps",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP),
+#else
   E(PROC_PID_STATUS,	"status",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_CMDLINE,	"cmdline",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_STAT,	"stat",		S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
@@ -575,6 +598,7 @@
   E(PROC_PID_CPUS_ALLOWED,	"cpus_allowed",	S_IFREG|S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR),
 #endif
   E(PROC_PID_MAPS,	"maps",		S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
+#endif
   E(PROC_PID_MEM,	"mem",		S_IFREG|S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR),
   E(PROC_PID_CWD,	"cwd",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
   E(PROC_PID_ROOT,	"root",		S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
@@ -726,7 +750,11 @@
 	inode->i_gid = 0;
 	if (ino == PROC_PID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
 		inode->i_uid = task->euid;
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
 		inode->i_gid = task->egid;
+#else
+               inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
+#endif
 	}
 
 out:
@@ -1034,13 +1062,26 @@
 	if (!task)
 		goto out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if(task->obvacl)
+		if(obv_check_hidden_proc(task))
+			goto out;
+#endif
+
+
 	inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_PID_INO);
 
 	free_task_struct(task);
 
 	if (!inode)
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
+#else
 	inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
+#endif
 	inode->i_op = &proc_base_inode_operations;
 	inode->i_fop = &proc_base_operations;
 	inode->i_nlink = 3;
@@ -1082,6 +1123,12 @@
 			continue;
 		if (--index >= 0)
 			continue;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		if(p->obvacl)
+			if(obv_check_hidden_proc(p))
+				continue;
+#endif
+
 		pids[nr_pids] = pid;
 		nr_pids++;
 		if (nr_pids >= PROC_MAXPIDS)
diff -urN linux/fs/proc/inode.c linux.grsec/fs/proc/inode.c
--- linux/fs/proc/inode.c	Wed Apr 18 08:16:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/proc/inode.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -152,7 +152,11 @@
 		if (de->mode) {
 			inode->i_mode = de->mode;
 			inode->i_uid = de->uid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+			inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
+#else
 			inode->i_gid = de->gid;
+#endif
 		}
 		if (de->size)
 			inode->i_size = de->size;
diff -urN linux/fs/read_write.c linux.grsec/fs/read_write.c
--- linux/fs/read_write.c	Tue Apr 17 23:36:44 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/read_write.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
+
 struct file_operations generic_ro_fops = {
 	read:		generic_file_read,
 	mmap:		generic_file_mmap,
@@ -124,6 +129,21 @@
 	file = fget(fd);
 	if (file) {
 		if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			if(  (file->f_dentry->d_inode) && (S_ISBLK(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))) {
+				obv_seclog("Attempt to read from block file "
+				"with inode %ld dev %d by (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+		file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_dev,
+                       current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				fput(file);
+				return -EPERM;
+			}
+#endif
+
 			ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_READ, file->f_dentry->d_inode,
 						file, file->f_pos, count);
 			if (!ret) {
@@ -151,6 +171,21 @@
 	if (file) {
 		if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
 			struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+			if( (inode !=  NULL) && (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))) {
+				obv_seclog("Attempt to write to block file "
+                                "with inode %ld dev %d by (%.16s:%d), "
+                "UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+			inode->i_ino,inode->i_dev,
+                        current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+                        current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+				fput(file);
+				return -EPERM;
+			}
+#endif
+
 			ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_WRITE, inode, file,
 				file->f_pos, count);
 			if (!ret) {
diff -urN linux/fs/readdir.c linux.grsec/fs/readdir.c
--- linux/fs/readdir.c	Mon Dec 11 22:45:42 2000
+++ linux.grsec/fs/readdir.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
 int vfs_readdir(struct file *file, filldir_t filler, void *buf)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -120,6 +124,10 @@
 struct readdir_callback {
 	struct old_linux_dirent * dirent;
 	int count;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+#endif
 };
 
 static int fillonedir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, off_t offset,
@@ -127,9 +135,30 @@
 {
 	struct readdir_callback * buf = (struct readdir_callback *) __buf;
 	struct old_linux_dirent * dirent;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	ino_t old_ino;
+#endif
 
 	if (buf->count)
 		return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if(buf->dentry && buf->dentry->d_inode) {
+		old_ino = buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+		//down(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = ino;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+		printk("Guess what: %ld %d is about to get a readdir check\n",buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino,buf->dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
+#endif
+	if( obv_check_hidden(buf->dentry,buf->mnt) == OBV_DENY) {
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = old_ino;
+		//up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	//up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+	buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = ino;
+	}
+#endif
+	    
 	buf->count++;
 	dirent = buf->dirent;
 	put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino);
@@ -153,6 +182,10 @@
 
 	buf.count = 0;
 	buf.dirent = dirent;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	buf.dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	buf.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
+#endif
 
 	error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
 	if (error >= 0)
@@ -181,6 +214,10 @@
 	struct linux_dirent * previous;
 	int count;
 	int error;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+#endif
 };
 
 static int filldir(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, off_t offset,
@@ -189,10 +226,30 @@
 	struct linux_dirent * dirent;
 	struct getdents_callback * buf = (struct getdents_callback *) __buf;
 	int reclen = ROUND_UP(NAME_OFFSET(dirent) + namlen + 1);
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	ino_t old_ino;
+#endif
 
 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
 	if (reclen > buf->count)
 		return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if(buf->dentry && buf->dentry->d_inode) {
+		old_ino = buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+		//down(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = ino;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+		printk("Guess what: %ld %d is about to get a readdir check\n",buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino,buf->dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
+#endif
+	if( obv_check_hidden(buf->dentry,buf->mnt) == OBV_DENY) {
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = old_ino;
+		//up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = old_ino;
+	//up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+	}
+#endif
 	dirent = buf->previous;
 	if (dirent)
 		put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off);
@@ -224,6 +281,10 @@
 	buf.previous = NULL;
 	buf.count = count;
 	buf.error = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	buf.dentry = file->f_dentry;
+	buf.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
+#endif
 
 	error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir, &buf);
 	if (error < 0)
@@ -259,6 +320,10 @@
 	struct linux_dirent64 * previous;
 	int count;
 	int error;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+#endif
 };
 
 static int filldir64(void * __buf, const char * name, int namlen, off_t offset,
@@ -267,10 +332,30 @@
 	struct linux_dirent64 * dirent, d;
 	struct getdents_callback64 * buf = (struct getdents_callback64 *) __buf;
 	int reclen = ROUND_UP64(NAME_OFFSET(dirent) + namlen + 1);
-
+        
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	ino_t old_ino;
+#endif
 	buf->error = -EINVAL;	/* only used if we fail.. */
 	if (reclen > buf->count)
 		return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if(buf->dentry && buf->dentry->d_inode) {
+		old_ino = buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+		//down(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = ino;
+		if((obv_check_hidden(buf->dentry,buf->mnt)) == OBV_DENY) {
+			buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = old_ino;
+		//	up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		buf->dentry->d_inode->i_ino = old_ino;
+		//up(&buf->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
+	}
+#endif
+
+
+	
 	dirent = buf->previous;
 	if (dirent) {
 		d.d_off = offset;
@@ -307,6 +392,11 @@
 	buf.previous = NULL;
 	buf.count = count;
 	buf.error = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	buf.mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
+	buf.dentry = file->f_dentry;
+#endif
+
 
 	error = vfs_readdir(file, filldir64, &buf);
 	if (error < 0)
diff -urN linux/fs/super.c linux.grsec/fs/super.c
--- linux/fs/super.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:55 2001
+++ linux.grsec/fs/super.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
 #define __NO_VERSION__
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * We use a semaphore to synchronize all mount/umount
  * activity - imagine the mess if we have a race between
@@ -1422,6 +1428,27 @@
 		retval = path_walk(dir_name, &nd);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+      if (grsec_enable_chroot &&
+	!(  (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+              child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+              (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+              child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino) ) ) {
+               security_alert("denied attempt to mount (%.30s) as %.64s from chroot() jail (%.32s:%lu) "
+               "of %d.%d by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+               "UID (%d), EUID (%d)","denied mounts in chroot()",dev_name,dir_name,
+	       kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+	       current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+	       current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid,current->comm,current->pid,
+	       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+	       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+                      retval = -EPERM;
+                      path_release(&nd);
+		      return retval;
+      }
+#endif
+
 
 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
 		retval = do_remount(&nd, flags&~MS_REMOUNT,
diff -urN linux/grsecurity/Config.in linux.grsec/grsecurity/Config.in
--- linux/grsecurity/Config.in	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/grsecurity/Config.in	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Buffer Overflow Protection'
+if [ "$CONFIG_X86" != "n" ]; then
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX" != "y" ]; then
+bool 'Openwall non-executable stack' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK" != "n" ]; then
+bool '   Gcc trampoline support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK_GCC
+fi
+fi
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK" != "y" ]; then
+bool 'PaX protection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX" = "y" ]; then
+  bool '   Emulate trampolines' CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
+  bool '   Restrict mprotect()' CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
+  bool '   Randomize mmap() base' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+fi
+fi
+fi
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Access Control Lists'
+bool 'Enable Oblivion Process Management' CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+if [ "$CONFIG_OBV_PROC" = "y" ]; then
+   int 'Maximum Number of Oblivion Rulesets for Files, Processes' CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET 256
+   int 'Seconds in between Oblivion log messages(minimum)' CONFIG_OBV_FLOODTIME 3
+   choice 'Default ruleset for programs without acls' \
+   "Deny CONFIG_OBV_DEF_DENY \
+    Allow CONFIG_OBV_DEF_ALLOW \
+    Deny_if_running_as_root CONFIG_OBV_DEF_DENY_ROOT " Allow
+   bool 'Enable Oblivion Debugging Messages' CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+   string 'Path to obvadm' CONFIG_OBVADM_PATH "/sbin/obvadm"
+   int 'Maximum tries before password lockout' CONFIG_OBV_MAXTRIES 3
+   int 'Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds' CONFIG_OBV_TIMEOUT 30
+fi
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Filesystem Protections'
+bool 'Proc restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC" != "n" ]; then
+bool '   Restrict to user only' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER" != "y" ]; then
+bool '   Allow special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP" != "n" ]; then
+int  '   GID for special group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID 1001
+fi
+fi
+fi
+bool 'Linking restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+bool 'FIFO restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
+bool 'Secure file descriptors' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+bool 'Chroot jail restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT" != "n" ]; then
+bool '   Log execs within jail' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
+bool '   Capability restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
+fi
+bool 'Secure keymap loading' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Security Logging'
+bool 'Exec logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+bool 'Set*id logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+bool 'Signal logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
+bool 'Fork failure logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
+bool 'Time change logging' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Executable Protections'
+bool 'Exec process limiting' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
+bool 'Fork-bomb protection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB" != "n" ]; then
+int '   GID for restricted users' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_GID 1006
+int '   Forks allowed per second' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_SEC 40
+int '   Maximum processes allowed' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_MAX 20
+fi
+bool 'Trusted path execution' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE" != "n" ]; then
+bool '   Glibc protection' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GLIBC
+bool '   Partially restrict non-root users' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+int  '   GID for untrusted users:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID 1005
+fi
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Network Protections'
+bool 'Randomized PIDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+bool 'Randomized IP IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+bool 'Randomized TCP source ports' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
+bool 'Altered Ping IDs' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+bool 'Randomized TTL' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL" != "n" ]; then
+int  '   TTL starting point:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL_THRESH 64
+fi
+bool 'Enhanced network randomness' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+bool 'Socket restrictions' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET" != "n" ]; then
+bool '  Deny any sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL" != "n" ]; then
+int  '   GID to deny all sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ALL_GID 1004
+fi
+bool '  Deny client sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT" != "n" ]; then
+int  '   GID to deny client sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CLIENT_GID 1003
+fi
+bool '  Deny server sockets to group' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER" != "n" ]; then
+int  '   GID to deny server sockets for:' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SERVER_GID 1002
+fi
+fi
+bool 'Stealth networking' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH
+if [ "$CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH" != "n" ]; then
+bool '   Do not send Connection Resets' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_RST
+bool '   Do not reply to UDP with ICMP unreachables' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_UDP
+bool '   Do not reply to ICMP requests' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP
+bool '   Do not reply to IGMP requests' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_IGMP
+bool '   Drop packets with illegitimate flags' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_FLAGS
+fi
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Sysctl support'
+bool 'Sysctl support' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+endmenu
+mainmenu_option next_comment
+comment 'Miscellaneous Enhancements'
+bool 'BSD-style coredumps' CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP
+endmenu
diff -urN linux/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/a.out.h
--- linux/include/asm-i386/a.out.h	Fri Jun 16 20:33:06 1995
+++ linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/a.out.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -18,9 +18,11 @@
 #define N_SYMSIZE(a)	((a).a_syms)
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#define STACK_TOP 	((current->flags & PF_STACKEXEC) ? TASK_SIZE - _STK_LIM : TASK_SIZE)
+#else
 #define STACK_TOP	TASK_SIZE
-
+#endif
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */
diff -urN linux/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h
--- linux/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h	Fri Jul 20 21:52:18 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -180,9 +180,19 @@
 #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_MASK | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY)
 
 #define PAGE_NONE	__pgprot(_PAGE_PROTNONE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW |_PAGE_USER |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#define PAGE_COPY_EXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+
+#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC  __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) 
+#else
 #define PAGE_SHARED	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #define PAGE_COPY	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
 #define PAGE_READONLY	__pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
+#endif
 
 #define __PAGE_KERNEL \
 	(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
@@ -216,6 +226,15 @@
  * This is the closest we can get..
  */
 #define __P000	PAGE_NONE
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#define __P001  PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
+#define __P010  PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+#define __P011  PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
+#define __P100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __P101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __P110  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
+#define __P111  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
+#else
 #define __P001	PAGE_READONLY
 #define __P010	PAGE_COPY
 #define __P011	PAGE_COPY
@@ -223,8 +242,18 @@
 #define __P101	PAGE_READONLY
 #define __P110	PAGE_COPY
 #define __P111	PAGE_COPY
+#endif
 
 #define __S000	PAGE_NONE
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#define __S001  PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
+#define __S010  PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+#define __S011  PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
+#define __S100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __S101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
+#define __S110  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
+#define __S111  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
+#else
 #define __S001	PAGE_READONLY
 #define __S010	PAGE_SHARED
 #define __S011	PAGE_SHARED
@@ -232,6 +261,7 @@
 #define __S101	PAGE_READONLY
 #define __S110	PAGE_SHARED
 #define __S111	PAGE_SHARED
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Define this if things work differently on an i386 and an i486:
diff -urN linux/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/processor.h
--- linux/include/asm-i386/processor.h	Fri Jul 20 21:52:18 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/asm-i386/processor.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -264,12 +264,24 @@
  * User space process size: 3GB (default).
  */
 #define TASK_SIZE	(PAGE_OFFSET)
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#define MAGIC_SIGRETURN		(PAGE_OFFSET + 0xDE0000)
+#define MAGIC_RT_SIGRETURN	(PAGE_OFFSET + 0xDE0001)
+#endif
 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
  * space during mmap's.
  */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+extern struct linux_binfmt elf_format;
+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(size) ( \
+       current->binfmt == &elf_format && \
+       !(current->flags & PF_STACKEXEC) && \
+       (size) < 0x00ef0000UL \
+       ? 0x00110000UL \
+       : TASK_SIZE / 3 )     
+#else
 #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE	(TASK_SIZE / 3)
-
+#endif
 /*
  * Size of io_bitmap in longwords: 32 is ports 0-0x3ff.
  */
@@ -360,6 +372,14 @@
 	unsigned long __cacheline_filler[5];
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+struct pax_fault_info {
+	unsigned long eip;
+	unsigned long addresses[4];
+	unsigned long count;
+};
+#endif
+
 struct thread_struct {
 	unsigned long	esp0;
 	unsigned long	eip;
@@ -370,6 +390,11 @@
 	unsigned long	debugreg[8];  /* %%db0-7 debug registers */
 /* fault info */
 	unsigned long	cr2, trap_no, error_code;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+/* PaX fault info */
+	struct pax_fault_info pax_faults;
+#endif
+
 /* floating point info */
 	union i387_union	i387;
 /* virtual 86 mode info */
diff -urN linux/include/linux/a.out.h linux.grsec/include/linux/a.out.h
--- linux/include/linux/a.out.h	Fri Jul 20 21:52:18 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/a.out.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@
   M_MIPS2 = 152		/* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
+#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC        1       /* Enforce PAGE_EXEC */
+#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP        2       /* Emulate trampolines */
+#define F_PAX_MPROTECT        4       /* Restrict mprotect() */
+#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP        8       /* Randomize mmap() base */   
+#endif
+
 #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
 #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
 #endif
@@ -56,7 +64,9 @@
 #define N_SET_FLAGS(exec, flags) \
 	((exec).a_info = \
 	 ((exec).a_info&0x00ffffff) | (((flags) & 0xff) << 24))
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#define F_STACKEXEC	1
+#endif
 /* Code indicating object file or impure executable.  */
 #define OMAGIC 0407
 /* Code indicating pure executable.  */
diff -urN linux/include/linux/binfmts.h linux.grsec/include/linux/binfmts.h
--- linux/include/linux/binfmts.h	Fri Jul 20 21:52:18 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/binfmts.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_BINFMTS_H
 #define _LINUX_BINFMTS_H
 
+#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 
@@ -30,6 +31,11 @@
 	int argc, envc;
 	char * filename;	/* Name of binary */
 	unsigned long loader, exec;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+        int priv_change;
+        int tweak_fd_mask;
+        struct file *tweak_fd_null;
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
diff -urN linux/include/linux/elf.h linux.grsec/include/linux/elf.h
--- linux/include/linux/elf.h	Sun Sep 30 01:30:57 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/elf.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -85,7 +85,9 @@
  * up with a final number.
  */
 #define EM_ALPHA	0x9026
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#define EF_STACKEXEC	1
+#endif
 /*
  * This is the old interim value for S/390 architecture
  */
@@ -254,6 +256,13 @@
 #define R_MIPS_LOVENDOR		100
 #define R_MIPS_HIVENDOR		127
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+/* Constants for the e_flags field */
+#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC               1       /* 0: Enforce PAGE_EXEC */
+#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP               2       /* 0: Emulate trampolines */
+#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT               4       /* 0: Restrict mprotect() */
+#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP               8       /* 0: Randomize mmap() base */ 
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Sparc ELF relocation types
diff -urN linux/include/linux/fs.h linux.grsec/include/linux/fs.h
--- linux/include/linux/fs.h	Sun Sep 30 01:30:57 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/fs.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -1048,7 +1048,11 @@
 
 asmlinkage long sys_open(const char *, int, int);
 asmlinkage long sys_close(unsigned int);	/* yes, it's really unsigned */
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start, struct vfsmount *);
+#else
 extern int do_truncate(struct dentry *, loff_t start);
+#endif
 
 extern struct file *filp_open(const char *, int, int);
 extern struct file * dentry_open(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *, int);
diff -urN linux/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux.grsec/include/linux/grsecurity.h
--- linux/include/linux/grsecurity.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/grsecurity.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+extern int grsec_enable_link;
+extern int grsec_enable_fifo;    
+extern int grsec_enable_fd;
+extern int grsec_enable_execve;
+extern int grsec_enable_forkbomb;
+extern int grsec_forkbomb_gid;
+extern int grsec_forkbomb_sec;
+extern int grsec_forkbomb_max;
+extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
+extern int grsec_enable_suid;
+extern int grsec_enable_signal;
+extern int grsec_enable_coredump;
+extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
+extern int grsec_enable_time;
+extern int grsec_enable_kbmap;
+extern int grsec_enable_randnet;
+extern int grsec_enable_chroot;
+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
+extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
+extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
+extern int grsec_enable_tpe_glibc;
+extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all; 
+extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
+extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
+extern int grsec_enable_randid; 
+extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
+extern int grsec_enable_randping;
+extern int grsec_enable_randttl; 
+extern int grsec_randttl_thresh; 
+extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
+extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
+extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
+extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
+extern int grsec_enable_socket_server; 
+extern int grsec_socket_server_gid; 
+extern int grsec_enable_stealth_rst;
+extern int grsec_enable_stealth_udp;
+extern int grsec_enable_stealth_icmp;
+extern int grsec_enable_stealth_igmp;
+extern int grsec_enable_stealth_flags;
diff -urN linux/include/linux/kernel.h linux.grsec/include/linux/kernel.h
--- linux/include/linux/kernel.h	Tue Jun 12 20:51:43 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/kernel.h	Sun Sep 30 01:57:33 2001
@@ -59,8 +59,12 @@
 extern long simple_strtol(const char *,char **,unsigned int);
 extern unsigned long long simple_strtoull(const char *,char **,unsigned int);
 extern long long simple_strtoll(const char *,char **,unsigned int);
-extern int sprintf(char * buf, const char * fmt, ...);
-extern int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *, va_list);
+extern int sprintf(char * buf, const char * fmt, ...)
+      __attribute__ ((format (printf,2,3)));
+extern int vsprintf(char *buf, const char *, va_list)
+      __attribute__ ((format (printf,2,0)));
+extern int _vsnprintf(char *buf, int n, const char *, va_list)
+      __attribute__ ((format (printf,3,0)));
 extern int get_option(char **str, int *pint);
 extern char *get_options(char *str, int nints, int *ints);
 extern unsigned long long memparse(char *ptr, char **retptr);
@@ -105,6 +109,47 @@
 	((unsigned char *)&addr)[1], \
 	((unsigned char *)&addr)[2], \
 	((unsigned char *)&addr)[3]
+#ifndef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+#define obv_seclog(default_msg, args...) \
+({ \
+	static unsigned long msg_time = 0, getting_messages = 0; \
+	static spinlock_t oblivion_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; \
+	\
+	spin_lock(&oblivion_lock); \
+	\
+	if((!msg_time) || (jiffies - msg_time > CONFIG_OBV_FLOODTIME * HZ)) { \
+		getting_messages = 1; \
+		msg_time = jiffies; \
+		printk(KERN_INFO "oblivion: " default_msg "\n", ##args ); \
+	} else if(getting_messages) { \
+		msg_time = jiffies; \
+		getting_messages = 0; \
+		printk(KERN_ALERT "Flooded with msgs. Logging disabled for %i seconds \n", CONFIG_OBV_FLOODTIME); \
+	\
+	} \
+	spin_unlock(&oblivion_lock); \
+})
+#else
+#define obv_seclog(msg,args...) printk(KERN_INFO "oblivion " msg "\n", ##args);
+#endif
+
+#define security_alert(normal_msg,flood_msg,args...) \
+({ \
+	static unsigned long warning_time = 0, no_flood_yet = 0; \
+	static spinlock_t security_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED; \
+	\
+	spin_lock(&security_alert_lock); \
+	if(!warning_time || jiffies - warning_time > 30 * HZ) { \
+	    warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 1; \
+	    printk(KERN_ALERT "grsecurity: " normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
+	} else if (no_flood_yet) { \
+	    warning_time = jiffies; no_flood_yet = 0; \
+	    printk(KERN_ALERT "grsecurity: more " flood_msg \
+		    ", logging disabled for 30 seconds\n"); \
+	} \
+	\
+	spin_unlock(&security_alert_lock); \
+})
 
 #define HIPQUAD(addr) \
 	((unsigned char *)&addr)[3], \
diff -urN linux/include/linux/mm.h linux.grsec/include/linux/mm.h
--- linux/include/linux/mm.h	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/mm.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -104,7 +104,11 @@
 #define VM_DONTEXPAND	0x00040000	/* Cannot expand with mremap() */
 #define VM_RESERVED	0x00080000	/* Don't unmap it from swap_out */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+#define VM_STACK_FLAGS  0x00000133 
+#else
 #define VM_STACK_FLAGS	0x00000177
+#endif
 
 #define VM_READHINTMASK			(VM_SEQ_READ | VM_RAND_READ)
 #define VM_ClearReadHint(v)		(v)->vm_flags &= ~VM_READHINTMASK
diff -urN linux/include/linux/oblivion.h linux.grsec/include/linux/oblivion.h
--- linux/include/linux/oblivion.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/oblivion.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+
+#include <linux/obvdefs.h>
+
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Oblivion kernel Modification
+ * Main header file
+ * Purpose: define most Oblivion data structures 
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+#define OBV_VERSION "oblivion v1.0"
+
+#define OBV_SHUTDOWN_MODE 0
+#define OBV_ENABLE_MODE 1
+#define OBV_CHCAPS_MODE 2
+#define OBV_AUTH_MODE 3
+#define OBV_GOD_MODE 4
+
+/* required headers: <linux/kdev_t.h>, <linux/types.h> */
+
+/* I need to include linux/fs.h in oblivion.c and it would be
+ * overkill to include kdev_t.h twice(once here and once in fs.h)
+ * so I just did the other necessary header inclusion before including oblivion.h*/
+
+
+
+#define OBV_MAX_PW_LEN 129
+#define OBV_SHASUM_SIZE 20
+#define OBV_MAX_EXTRA_LEN 1025
+
+/* Begin Data Structures */
+struct obv_pw {
+	char pw[OBV_MAX_PW_LEN];
+	char extra[OBV_MAX_EXTRA_LEN];
+	__u8 sum[OBV_SHASUM_SIZE];  /* 160-bit SHA hash of the password*/
+	__u8 mode; /* On/Off/Restart(Restart is not ready yet..*/
+};
+
+struct obv_sum {
+       __u8 sum[OBV_SHASUM_SIZE];
+       ino_t file_inode;
+       kdev_t file_dev;
+};
+
+struct obv_sum_db {
+       struct obv_sum *db;
+       int max_ref;
+};
+
+
+struct obv_file_acl {
+	ino_t file_inode;
+	kdev_t file_dev;
+	__u32 mode; 
+};
+
+/* When sorting/searching, we can effectively search obv_file_acl and obv_acl structures since their identifying information(inodes/devs) are the same name and their size, due to the above padding, is also the same*/
+
+struct obv_file_db {
+	struct obv_file_acl *db;
+	int max_ref;
+};
+
+
+/* information about r/w/x info for a file by a process */
+/* Uses a (balanced )binary tree for its implementation...ideas are welcome for 
+ * a more efficient way however=)*/
+
+struct obv_proc_acl {
+	ino_t file_inode;
+	kdev_t file_dev; 
+	/* to do rules like /tmp * set the dir /tmp rw .. best solution I can find*/
+	__u16 mode;
+	/* you may consider the file inode, file_dev, and mode to(combined) be the key */
+	struct obv_proc_acl *left;
+	struct obv_proc_acl *right;
+	__u16 height; /* used for avl rebalancing*/
+};
+
+
+
+/* information about a process */
+struct obv_acl {
+	ino_t file_inode;
+	kdev_t file_dev;
+	__u8 mode;
+	kernel_cap_t file_caps; /* capability set*/
+	struct obv_proc_acl *tree;
+};
+
+/* database - contains process ACLs */
+struct obv_proc_db {
+	struct obv_acl *db;
+	int max_ref;
+};
+
+/* Temporary storage--see kernel/oblivion.c */
+struct obv_temp {
+	ino_t file_inode;
+	kdev_t file_dev;
+	__u16 mode;
+};
+/* Begin Capabilities subsection */
+
+#define CONFIG_OBV_MAX_CAP 30
+
+struct obv_cap {
+	char * capname;
+	kernel_cap_t capval;
+};
+
+struct obv_cap_list {
+	struct obv_cap table[CONFIG_OBV_MAX_CAP];
+};
+/* End Capabilities subsection */
+/* End Data Structures */
+
+/* Begin SHA hash section */
+#define SHA1HANDSOFF /* Copies data before messing with it. */
+
+struct SHA1_CTX {
+	unsigned long state[5];
+	unsigned long count[2];
+	unsigned char buffer[64];
+};
+
+#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
+
+/* blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. */
+/* I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay */
+#ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
+		|(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
+#else
+#define blk0(i) block->l[i]
+#endif /* __LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
+			^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
+
+	/* (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations used in SHA1 */
+#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+/* End SHA hash section */
diff -urN linux/include/linux/obvcipher.h linux.grsec/include/linux/obvcipher.h
--- linux/include/linux/obvcipher.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/obvcipher.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+extern void SHA1Init(struct SHA1_CTX *context);
+extern void SHA1Update(struct SHA1_CTX *context, unsigned char *data,unsigned  int len);
+extern void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20],struct SHA1_CTX *context);
+extern int obv_chkpw(struct obv_pw *entry);
diff -urN linux/include/linux/obvdefs.h linux.grsec/include/linux/obvdefs.h
--- linux/include/linux/obvdefs.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/obvdefs.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+
+/* Begin Status/Return value declarations */
+
+#define OBV_ALLOW 1
+#define OBV_NOTFOUND -1
+#define OBV_DENY 0
+
+#define OBV_LOADING 0x01
+#define OBV_DISABLED 0x02
+#define OBV_READY 0x04
+#define OBV_1ST 0x08
+/* Debugging mode*/ 
+#define OBV_TESTING 0x080
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEF_DENY
+#define OBV_DEFAULT OBV_DENY
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEF_DENY_ROOT
+#define OBV_DEFAULT !(current->euid) ? OBV_DENY : OBV_ALLOW;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEF_ALLOW
+#define OBV_DEFAULT OBV_ALLOW
+#endif
+
+/* End Status declarations */
+
+
+
+
+/* Begin  ACL declarations */
+#define OBV_READ 0x01
+#define OBV_APPEND 0x02
+#define OBV_WRITE 0x04
+#define OBV_EXEC 0x08
+#define OBV_HIDDEN 0x10
+#define OBV_OVERRIDE 0x20 /* Override File ACL, useful for proc only*/
+#define OBV_PROTECTED 0x40
+
+/* Standard stuff done, on to File ACL stuff */
+
+#define OBV_FILE_READ OBV_READ
+#define OBV_FILE_APPEND OBV_APPEND
+#define OBV_FILE_WRITE (OBV_WRITE | OBV_APPEND)
+#define OBV_FILE_EXEC OBV_EXEC
+#define OBV_FILE_HIDDEN OBV_HIDDEN
+
+
+#define OBV_PROC_READ OBV_READ
+#define OBV_PROC_APPEND OBV_APPEND
+#define OBV_PROC_WRITE (OBV_WRITE|OBV_APPEND); /* write access implies append access*/
+#define OBV_PROC_EXEC OBV_EXEC
+#define OBV_PROC_ACCESS OBV_HIDDEN
+#define OBV_PROC_OVERRIDE OBV_OVERRIDE
+#define OBV_PROC_IGN_DEFAULT OBV_IGN_DEFAULT
+#define OBV_PROC_HIDDEN OBV_HIDDEN /* Hidden, unkillable(except by init) process. Good for hiding your IDSes / logging daemons:)*/
+#define OBV_PROC_PROTECTED OBV_PROTECTED
+ 
+/* Begin TODO */
+#define OBV_REQSUM 0x200 /* Require program to have SHAsum in database*/
+#define OBV_INHERIT 0x400 /* Children inherit parent's process acls*/
+#define OBV_AUTH 0x100    /* Require secondary authentication before execution*/
+#define OBV_FILE_REQSUM OBV_REQSUM
+#define OBV_FILE_AUTH OBV_AUTH
+#define OBV_PROC_REQSUM OBV_REQSUM
+#define OBV_PROC_INHERIT OBV_INHERIT
+#define OBV_PROC_AUTH OBV_AUTH
+/* End TODO */
+
+#define OBV_PROC_EXTRA (OBV_PROC_OVERRIDE|OBV_PROC_REQSUM|OBV_PROC_INHERIT|OBV_PROC_AUTH)
+/* Extra things that must be checked after a search*/
+
+#define OBV_FILE_EXTRA (OBV_FILE_REQSUM|OBV_FILE_AUTH)
+#define OBV_RW (OBV_READ|OBV_WRITE)
+#define OBV_RX (OBV_READ|OBV_EXEC)
+#define OBV_RWX (OBV_READ|OBV_WRITE|OBV_EXEC)
+
+/* End ACL Declarations */
+
diff -urN linux/include/linux/obvext.h linux.grsec/include/linux/obvext.h
--- linux/include/linux/obvext.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/obvext.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Oblivion external header
+ * Used for sections of the kernel that must access oblivion
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/obvdefs.h>
+
+extern int obv_status;
+extern int obv_disable;
+extern int obv_check_hidden(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern int obv_search(struct dentry *dentry, __u16 mode, struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern int obv_set_proc_acl(struct dentry *dentry,struct task_struct *tsk,char *filename, struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern int obv_check_hidden_proc(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int obv_check_protected(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern int obv_proc_handler(ctl_table *table,int write, struct file *filp, void *buffer, size_t *lenp);
diff -urN linux/include/linux/sched.h linux.grsec/include/linux/sched.h
--- linux/include/linux/sched.h	Sun Sep 30 01:30:53 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/sched.h	Sun Sep 30 01:56:59 2001
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+struct obv_acl;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * cloning flags:
  */
@@ -225,7 +229,12 @@
 	unsigned long def_flags;
 	unsigned long cpu_vm_mask;
 	unsigned long swap_address;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	unsigned long delta_mmap;		/* PaX: randomized offset */
+	unsigned long delta_exec;		/* PaX: randomized offset */
+	unsigned long delta_stack;		/* PaX: randomized offset */
+#endif
+ 
 	unsigned dumpable:1;
 
 	/* Architecture-specific MM context */
@@ -404,6 +413,10 @@
 
 /* journalling filesystem info */
 	void *journal_info;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct obv_acl *obvacl;
+#endif
+
 };
 
 /*
@@ -421,6 +434,11 @@
 
 #define PF_USEDFPU	0x00100000	/* task used FPU this quantum (SMP) */
 
+#define PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC       0x01000000      /* PaX: Enforce PAGE_EXEC */
+#define PF_PAX_EMUTRAMP       0x02000000      /* PaX: Emulate trampolines */
+#define PF_PAX_MPROTECT       0x04000000      /* PaX: Restrict mprotect() */
+#define PF_PAX_RANDMMAP       0x08000000      /* PaX: Randomize mmap() base */
+
 /*
  * Ptrace flags
  */
@@ -428,7 +446,17 @@
 #define PT_PTRACED	0x00000001
 #define PT_TRACESYS	0x00000002
 #define PT_DTRACE	0x00000004	/* delayed trace (used on m68k, i386) */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#define PF_STACKEXEC    0x01000000
+#endif
 #define PT_TRACESYSGOOD	0x00000008
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+/* PaX: for handling DTLB trashing */
+#define PT_PAX_TRACE    0x00000020
+#define PT_PAX_KEEPTF   0x00000040
+#define PT_PAX_OLDTF    0x00000080
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Limit the stack by to some sane default: root can always
diff -urN linux/include/linux/sysctl.h linux.grsec/include/linux/sysctl.h
--- linux/include/linux/sysctl.h	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/linux/sysctl.h	Sun Sep 30 01:59:05 2001
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@
 	KERN_S390_USER_DEBUG_LOGGING=51, /* int: dumps of user faults */
 	KERN_NMI_WATCHDOG=52,	/* int: nmi_watchdog on/off */
 	KERN_KDB=53,		/* int: kdb on/off */
+	KERN_GRSECURITY=68,	/* grsecurity */
+	KERN_OBV = 69,		/* struct obv_pw, controls oblivion*/
 };
 
 
diff -urN linux/include/net/inetpeer.h linux.grsec/include/net/inetpeer.h
--- linux/include/net/inetpeer.h	Fri Jul 20 21:52:19 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/net/inetpeer.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <asm/atomic.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
 
 struct inet_peer
 {
@@ -58,7 +61,9 @@
 	__u16 id;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
-	id = p->ip_id_count++;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+	get_random_bytes(&id,(sizeof(id) / 2));
+#endif
 	spin_unlock_bh(&inet_peer_idlock);
 	return id;
 }
diff -urN linux/include/net/ip.h linux.grsec/include/net/ip.h
--- linux/include/net/ip.h	Fri Jul 20 21:53:07 2001
+++ linux.grsec/include/net/ip.h	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 #include <linux/in_route.h>
 #include <net/route.h>
 #include <net/arp.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
 
 #ifndef _SNMP_H
 #include <net/snmp.h>
@@ -196,7 +199,11 @@
 		 * does not change, they drop every other packet in
 		 * a TCP stream using header compression.
 		 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+	 	get_random_bytes(&iph->id,(sizeof(iph->id) / 2));
+#else
 		iph->id = ((sk && sk->daddr) ? htons(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++) : 0);
+#endif
 	} else
 		__ip_select_ident(iph, dst);
 }
diff -urN linux/init/main.c linux.grsec/init/main.c
--- linux/init/main.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/init/main.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -74,6 +74,12 @@
 #include <linux/kdb.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
+
+
 /*
  * Versions of gcc older than that listed below may actually compile
  * and link okay, but the end product can have subtle run time bugs.
@@ -113,6 +119,12 @@
 extern void ipc_init(void);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+static __init int obv_setup(char *line);
+#endif
+
+
+
 /*
  * Boot command-line arguments
  */
@@ -307,6 +319,19 @@
 }
 
 __setup("root=", root_dev_setup);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+static int __init obv_setup(char *str) 
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+	obv_seclog("Obv got %.3s at startup\n",str);
+#endif
+	if(*str == '0') obv_disable = 1;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("oblivion=",obv_setup);
+#endif
+
 
 static int __init checksetup(char *line)
 {
diff -urN linux/kernel/Makefile linux.grsec/kernel/Makefile
--- linux/kernel/Makefile	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/Makefile	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += ksyms.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM) += pm.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OBV_PROC) += oblivion.o obvqsort.o obvhash.o
 
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_IA64),y)
 # According to Alan Modra <alan@linuxcare.com.au>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
diff -urN linux/kernel/exit.c linux.grsec/kernel/exit.c
--- linux/kernel/exit.c	Fri May  4 23:44:06 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/exit.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+extern void obv_exit(struct task_struct *tsk);
+#endif
+
+
 extern void sem_exit (void);
 extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
 
@@ -419,7 +428,10 @@
 	}
 	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 }
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+pid_t last_pids[64];
+int cur_n_pids;
+#endif
 NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
@@ -437,9 +449,18 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT
 	acct_process(code);
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	obv_exit(tsk);
+#endif
 	__exit_mm(tsk);
 
 	lock_kernel();
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+	if(grsec_enable_randpid){
+	last_pids[cur_n_pids++] = tsk -> pid;
+	cur_n_pids &= 63;
+	}
+#endif
 	sem_exit();
 	__exit_files(tsk);
 	__exit_fs(tsk);
diff -urN linux/kernel/fork.c linux.grsec/kernel/fork.c
--- linux/kernel/fork.c	Wed Jul 18 03:23:28 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/fork.c	Sun Sep 30 02:01:52 2001
@@ -19,12 +19,29 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/completion.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL)||defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID) \
+   || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/oblivion.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+extern struct entropy_store *random_state;
+extern struct entropy_store *sec_random_state;
+#endif
+
 /* The idle threads do not count.. */
 int nr_threads;
 int nr_running;
@@ -35,6 +52,13 @@
 
 struct task_struct *pidhash[PIDHASH_SZ];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+static __inline__ int obv_copy_acl(struct task_struct *tsk) {
+	tsk->obvacl = current->obvacl;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 void add_wait_queue(wait_queue_head_t *q, wait_queue_t * wait)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -80,9 +104,18 @@
 /* Protects next_safe and last_pid. */
 spinlock_t lastpid_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+extern pid_t last_pids[64];
+extern int cur_n_pids;
+#endif
+
 static int get_pid(unsigned long flags)
 {
 	static int next_safe = PID_MAX;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+	int loops;	
+#endif
+
 	struct task_struct *p;
 
 	if (flags & CLONE_PID)
@@ -90,31 +123,69 @@
 
 	spin_lock(&lastpid_lock);
 	if((++last_pid) & 0xffff8000) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+	if(!grsec_enable_randpid)
+#endif
 		last_pid = 300;		/* Skip daemons etc. */
 		goto inside;
 	}
-	if(last_pid >= next_safe) {
+	if(last_pid >= 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+	grsec_enable_randpid?2:
+#endif
+	next_safe) {
 inside:
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+	if(!grsec_enable_randpid)
+#endif
 		next_safe = PID_MAX;
 		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 	repeat:
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+       if (grsec_enable_randpid) {
+                if((random_state) || (sec_random_state)){
+               do {
+                        get_random_bytes(&last_pid, sizeof(last_pid));
+                        last_pid %= PID_MAX;
+                       if(last_pid < 0)
+                               last_pid-=(2 * last_pid);
+                } while (last_pid < 1);
+               } else
+               last_pid = 1+((xtime.tv_usec * total_forks) % PID_MAX);
+               for(loops=0;loops<64;loops++){
+                       if(last_pids[loops] == last_pid)
+                               goto repeat;
+               }
+       }
+#endif
+
 		for_each_task(p) {
 			if(p->pid == last_pid	||
 			   p->pgrp == last_pid	||
 			   p->session == last_pid) {
-				if(++last_pid >= next_safe) {
+				if(
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+				!grsec_enable_randpid &&
+#endif
+				++last_pid >= next_safe) {
 					if(last_pid & 0xffff8000)
 						last_pid = 300;
 					next_safe = PID_MAX;
 				}
 				goto repeat;
 			}
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+                       if(!grsec_enable_randpid){
+#endif
 			if(p->pid > last_pid && next_safe > p->pid)
 				next_safe = p->pid;
 			if(p->pgrp > last_pid && next_safe > p->pgrp)
 				next_safe = p->pgrp;
 			if(p->session > last_pid && next_safe > p->session)
 				next_safe = p->session;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+		}
+#endif
 		}
 		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
 	}
@@ -534,6 +605,7 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
+
 static inline void copy_flags(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *p)
 {
 	unsigned long new_flags = p->flags;
@@ -560,7 +632,11 @@
 	int retval;
 	struct task_struct *p;
 	struct completion vfork;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+	int sec_forks = 0;
+	int user_tasks = 0;
+	unsigned long curr_time = jiffies;
+#endif
 	retval = -EPERM;
 
 	/* 
@@ -583,6 +659,42 @@
 	if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >= p->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur)
 		goto bad_fork_free;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+if(grsec_enable_forkbomb) {
+if(in_group_p(grsec_forkbomb_gid)){
+        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+        for_each_task(p)
+        {
+                if ((p->uid) == current->uid)
+                {
+                user_tasks++;
+                if ( (curr_time - (p->start_time)) <= 100)
+                        sec_forks++;
+                }
+        }
+        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+       if (user_tasks >= grsec_forkbomb_max){
+	security_alert("max process limit reached with (%s:%d) by UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","max proc limits "
+	"reached",
+	current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+	current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	goto bad_fork_free;
+       } else if (sec_forks >= grsec_forkbomb_sec){
+	security_alert("fork rate-limit reached with (%s:%d) by UID (%d), "
+	"EUID (%d), parent (%s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","fork rate-limits "
+	"reached",
+	current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+	current->euid, current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+	current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	goto bad_fork_free;
+       }
+}
+}
+#endif
+
 	atomic_inc(&p->user->__count);
 	atomic_inc(&p->user->processes);
 
@@ -654,6 +766,11 @@
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
 	if (copy_mm(clone_flags, p))
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	if (obv_copy_acl(p))
+	    goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
+#endif
+
 	retval = copy_thread(0, clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
 	if (retval)
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
@@ -740,6 +857,13 @@
 	free_uid(p->user);
 bad_fork_free:
 	free_task_struct(p);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
+	if(grsec_enable_forkfail)
+    security_alert("failed fork with errno %d by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+                  "UID (%d), EUID (%d)","failed forks",retval,current->comm,current->pid,
+		  current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+                  current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	goto fork_out;
 }
 
diff -urN linux/kernel/oblivion.c linux.grsec/kernel/oblivion.c
--- linux/kernel/oblivion.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/oblivion.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Oblivion: A Security-Enhancing Linux Kernel Modification
+ * Author: Michael Dalton
+ * E-Mail: shadowrye@linux.com
+ * Information: This modification is designed to give 
+ * fine-tuned control over processes, to prevent
+ * the damage of buffer overflows by disallowing them to run or
+ * write to anything that is abnormal.  It also protects files from
+ * access by unauthorized programs(read only/append only/hidden modes)
+ * and has capability management features.
+ *
+ * Modifications
+ * 4-20-2001 - Began development of OPM .3 
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+/* Access Layers */
+
+
+/* Files -
+ * file database -> file info
+ */
+
+/* Process
+ * process database -> process entry (and capabilities) -> process file access rights 
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/errno.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/oblivion.h>
+#include <linux/obvcipher.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+#define OBV_SET_AUTH 1
+#define OBV_SET_INHERIT 2
+#define OBV_SET_PROC 3
+
+#define CONFIG_OBV_PROCACL_CONF "/etc/obv/proc.acl"
+#define CONFIG_OBV_FILEACL_CONF "/etc/obv/file.acl"
+#define CONFIG_OBV_SUM_CONF 	"/etc/obv/sum.db"
+#define CONFIG_OBV_PW_CONF      "/etc/obv/pw"
+#define CONFIG_OBVADM_ACL CONFIG_OBVADM_PATH ## " fx"
+#define CONFIG_GODMODE_ACL "/ frwxoi"
+/* i.e. this would become "/sbin/obvadm x" for executable access only to
+ * /sbin/obvadm (and find it if its hidden) */
+
+#define obv_empty_tree (struct obv_proc_acl *) NULL
+
+#define obv_heightof(tree) ( (tree == obv_empty_tree) ? 0 : (tree->height) )
+
+#define INIT_CAP_TABLE(table) \
+table[0].capname = "CAP_CHOWN";\
+table[0].capval = CAP_CHOWN; \
+table[1].capname = "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE"; \
+table[1].capval = CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE; \
+table[2].capname = "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH"; \
+table[2].capval = CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH; \
+table[3].capname = "CAP_FOWNER"; \
+table[3].capval = CAP_FOWNER; \
+table[4].capname = "CAP_FSETID"; \
+table[4].capval = CAP_FSETID; \
+table[5].capname = "CAP_FS_MASK"; \
+table[5].capval = CAP_FS_MASK; \
+table[6].capname = "CAP_KILL"; \
+table[6].capval = CAP_KILL; \
+table[7].capname = "CAP_SETGID"; \
+table[7].capval = CAP_SETGID; \
+table[8].capname = "CAP_SETUID"; \
+table[8].capval = CAP_SETUID; \
+table[9].capname = "CAP_SETPCAP"; \
+table[9].capval = CAP_SETPCAP; \
+table[10].capname = "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE"; \
+table[10].capval = CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE; \
+table[11].capname = "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE"; \
+table[11].capval = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE; \
+table[12].capname = "CAP_NET_BROADCAST"; \
+table[12].capval = CAP_NET_BROADCAST;\
+table[13].capname = "CAP_NET_ADMIN"; \
+table[13].capval = CAP_NET_ADMIN; \
+table[14].capname = "CAP_NET_RAW"; \
+table[14].capval = CAP_NET_RAW; \
+table[15].capname = "CAP_IPC_LOCK"; \
+table[15].capval = CAP_IPC_LOCK; \
+table[16].capname = "CAP_IPC_OWNER"; \
+table[16].capval = CAP_IPC_OWNER; \
+table[17].capname = "CAP_SYS_MODULE"; \
+table[17].capval = CAP_SYS_MODULE; \
+table[18].capname = "CAP_SYS_RAWIO"; \
+table[18].capval = CAP_SYS_RAWIO; \
+table[19].capname = "CAP_SYS_CHROOT"; \
+table[19].capval = CAP_SYS_CHROOT; \
+table[20].capname = "CAP_SYS_PTRACE"; \
+table[20].capval = CAP_SYS_PTRACE; \
+table[21].capname = "CAP_SYS_PACCT"; \
+table[21].capval = CAP_SYS_PACCT; \
+table[22].capname = "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"; \
+table[22].capval = CAP_SYS_ADMIN; \
+table[23].capname = "CAP_SYS_BOOT"; \
+table[23].capval = CAP_SYS_BOOT; \
+table[24].capname = "CAP_SYS_NICE"; \
+table[24].capval = CAP_SYS_NICE; \
+table[25].capname = "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE"; \
+table[25].capval = CAP_SYS_RESOURCE; \
+table[26].capname = "CAP_SYS_TIME"; \
+table[26].capval = CAP_SYS_TIME; \
+table[27].capname = "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG"; \
+table[27].capval = CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG; \
+table[28].capname = "CAP_MKNOD"; \
+table[28].capval = CAP_MKNOD; \
+table[29].capname = "CAP_LEASE"; \
+table[29].capval = CAP_LEASE;
+
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Global variables
+ * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+int _enable_oblivion_load = 0;
+int obv_disable = 0; /* handles boot time disabling of oblivion*/
+static struct obv_proc_db procdb;
+static struct obv_file_db filedb;
+/* Main variables for holding the rulesets*/
+static spinlock_t obv_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
+__u8 obv_status = (OBV_1ST | OBV_DISABLED);
+struct obv_pw obv_pwent;
+struct obv_cap_list *caplist;    
+struct obv_acl obv_god_mode = { 0,0,0,~0,obv_empty_tree};
+/* iddqd style god mode;) Full caps/access rights*/
+extern kdev_t ROOT_DEV;
+struct obv_acl obv_auth = { 0,0,(__u8)OBV_PROC_AUTH,CAP_INIT_EFF_SET,obv_empty_tree };
+/* acl for authentication mode */
+
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Sorting Routines
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+
+
+static __inline__ int obv_procacl_less(const struct obv_temp *a, const struct obv_proc_acl *b) 
+{
+	return ( (a->file_inode < b->file_inode) || ( (a->file_inode == b->file_inode) && (a->file_dev < b->file_dev) ) ) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+#define obv_proc_acl_less(a,b) obv_procacl_less(a,b)
+
+static __inline__ int obv_procacl_eq(const struct obv_temp *a, const struct obv_proc_acl *b)
+{
+	return ( (a->file_inode == b->file_inode) && (a->file_dev == b->file_dev) ) ? 1:0;
+}
+
+
+static __inline__ int obv_acl_eq(const struct obv_acl *a, const struct obv_acl *b) 
+{
+	return ( (a->file_inode == b->file_inode) && (a->file_dev == b->file_dev)) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+extern void obv_qsort(void *const pbase,size_t total_elems,size_t size,int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
+
+/* see obvqsort.c for above. Slightly adapted from gnu libc's qsort*/
+
+static __inline__ int obv_file_acl_cmp(const void *va, const void *vb) 
+{
+	struct obv_file_acl *a = (struct obv_file_acl *) va;
+	struct obv_file_acl *b = (struct obv_file_acl *) vb;
+	if (a->file_inode < b->file_inode) 
+		return -1;
+	else if(a->file_inode == b->file_inode)  {
+		if(a->file_dev < b->file_dev) 
+			return -1;
+		else if(a->file_dev == b->file_dev)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static __inline__ int obv_fileacl_less(const struct obv_file_acl *f1, const struct obv_temp *f2) {
+	return ( ((f1->file_inode < f2->file_inode)) || (f1->file_inode == f2->file_inode && f1->file_dev < f2->file_dev) ) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static __inline__ int obv_fileacl_eq(const struct obv_file_acl *f1, const struct obv_temp *f2) {
+	return ( (f1->file_inode == f2->file_inode) && (f1->file_dev == f2->file_dev)) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+static __inline__ int obv_acl_cmp(const void *va, const void *vb) 
+{
+	struct obv_acl *a = (struct obv_acl *) va;
+	struct obv_acl *b = (struct obv_acl *) vb;
+	if (a->file_inode < b->file_inode)  
+		return -1;
+
+	else if(a->file_inode == b->file_inode)  {
+		if(a->file_dev < b->file_dev) 
+			return -1;
+		else if(a->file_dev == b->file_dev) 
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+#define obv_acl_less(a,b) (((obv_acl_cmp((const void *)a,(const void *)b)) < 0))
+
+static struct obv_proc_acl * obv_rotl(struct obv_proc_acl *tree) 
+{
+	struct obv_proc_acl *tmp = tree->right;
+	tree->right = tmp->left;
+	tmp->left = tree;
+	if(obv_heightof(tree->left) >= obv_heightof(tree->right))
+		tree->height = obv_heightof(tree->left) +1;
+	else
+		tree->height = obv_heightof(tree->right) + 1;
+	if(obv_heightof(tmp->left) >= obv_heightof(tmp->right))
+		tmp->height = obv_heightof(tmp->left) + 1;
+	else
+		tmp->height = obv_heightof(tmp->right) + 1;
+	return tmp;
+}
+
+static struct obv_proc_acl * obv_rotr(struct obv_proc_acl *tree)
+{
+	struct obv_proc_acl *tmp = tree->left;
+	tree->left = tmp->right;
+	tmp->right = tree;
+	if(obv_heightof(tree->left) >= obv_heightof(tree->right))
+		tree->height=obv_heightof(tree->left) + 1;
+	else
+		tree->height = obv_heightof(tree->right) + 1;
+	if(obv_heightof(tmp->left) >= obv_heightof(tmp->right))
+		tmp->height = obv_heightof(tmp->left) + 1;
+	else
+		tmp->height = obv_heightof(tmp->right) + 1;  
+	return tmp;
+}
+
+static struct obv_proc_acl * obv_drlr(struct obv_proc_acl *tree) {
+	tree->right = obv_rotr(tree->right);
+	return obv_rotl(tree);
+}
+
+static struct obv_proc_acl * obv_dlrr(struct obv_proc_acl *tree) {
+	tree->left = obv_rotl(tree->left);
+	return obv_rotr(tree);
+}
+
+
+static void obv_sort(void) 
+{
+	obv_qsort((void *)procdb.db,procdb.max_ref,sizeof(struct obv_acl),obv_acl_cmp);
+	obv_qsort((void *)filedb.db,filedb.max_ref,sizeof(struct obv_file_acl),obv_file_acl_cmp);
+}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_OLD_DEBUG
+static  void obv_list_file_acls(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	for(i=0;i<filedb.max_ref;i++) {
+		obv_seclog("File ACL pos %d has inode %ld dev %d mode %x\n",i,filedb.db[i].file_inode,filedb.db[i].file_dev,filedb.db[i].mode);
+	}
+}
+
+static void obv_traverse(struct obv_proc_acl *head) 
+{
+	if(!head) {
+		obv_seclog("null tree\n");
+		return;
+	}
+	obv_seclog("Tree: %ld %d %x\n",head->file_inode,head->file_dev,head->mode);
+	if(head->left != obv_empty_tree) {
+		obv_seclog("Doing left proc acl\n");
+		obv_traverse(head->left);
+	}
+	if(head->right != obv_empty_tree) {
+		obv_seclog("Doing right proc acl\n");
+		obv_traverse(head->right);
+	}
+}
+
+static void obv_list_proc_acls(void) 
+{
+	int i;
+	for(i=0;i<procdb.max_ref;i++) {
+		obv_seclog("ACL pos %d has inode %ld dev %d\n",i,procdb.db[i].file_inode,procdb.db[i].file_dev);
+		obv_seclog("ACL tree is..\n");
+		obv_traverse(procdb.db[i].tree);
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Config file management
+ * Yikes! If anyone has cleanup ideas I'd love to hear em
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+
+
+
+static int obv_add_pw_conf(void)
+{
+	struct file *filp;
+	int retval;
+	mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
+	filp = filp_open(CONFIG_OBV_PW_CONF, O_RDONLY, O_RDONLY);
+	if( ( IS_ERR(filp) ) || (filp == NULL) || (!(filp->f_op->read)) ) {
+		obv_seclog("Could not open config file %.1024s\n",CONFIG_OBV_PW_CONF);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	filp->f_pos = 0;
+	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
+	retval = filp->f_op->read(filp,obv_pwent.sum,sizeof(obv_pwent.sum)/sizeof(obv_pwent.sum[0]),&filp->f_pos);
+	set_fs(old_fs);
+	if(retval != sizeof(obv_pwent.sum)/sizeof(obv_pwent.sum[0])) {
+		obv_seclog("Invalid pw entry detected, got %d wanted %d\n",retval,sizeof(obv_pwent.sum));
+		retval = 1;
+	} else retval = 0;
+	filp_close(filp,NULL);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+
+
+static int obv_add_file_acl(char *line) 
+{
+	char *p, *q;
+	struct nameidata filedata;
+	int working = 1;
+	struct obv_file_acl *curr;
+
+	if( (p = memscan(line,'/',strlen(line))) == line + strlen(line) ) {
+		// obv_seclog("Line %.1024s seems wrong\n",line);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else curr = &(filedb.db[filedb.max_ref]);
+
+	if( (q = memscan(p,' ',strlen(p))) == p + strlen(p))
+		return 0;
+	*q++ = '\0';
+	if(path_init(p,LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_POSITIVE,&filedata)) 
+		if(path_walk(p,&filedata)) {
+			obv_seclog("Unable to locate file %.1024s\n",p);
+			//goto out;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	if( !(filedata.dentry) || IS_ERR(filedata.dentry) ) {
+		obv_seclog("Error adding file acl for file %.1024s\n",p);
+		// goto out;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	curr->file_inode = filedata.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	curr->file_dev = filedata.dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
+	curr->mode = 0;
+
+	while(*q == ' ') q++;
+	while(working) {	
+		switch(*q) {
+			case 'r' :
+				curr->mode |= OBV_FILE_READ;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			case 'h' :
+				curr->mode |= OBV_FILE_HIDDEN;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			case 'a' :
+				curr->mode |= OBV_FILE_APPEND;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			case 'w' :
+				curr->mode |= OBV_FILE_WRITE;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			case 'x':
+				curr->mode |= OBV_FILE_EXEC;
+				q++;
+				break;
+				/* Note: 's' and 'a' only come into play when something is executed*/
+			case 's' :
+				filedb.db[filedb.max_ref].mode |= OBV_FILE_REQSUM;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			case 'u' :
+				filedb.db[filedb.max_ref].mode |= OBV_FILE_AUTH;
+				q++;
+				break;
+			default:  /* if anything else, the '\0' at the end of the line will hit here and cause us to terminate, so it won't go on indefinately and start accessing memory it shouldn't*/
+				working = 0;
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+	obv_seclog("Added File ACL for inode %ld dev %d with mode %x and max_ref %d\n",curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev,curr->mode,filedb.max_ref);
+#endif
+	filedb.max_ref++;
+	path_release(&filedata); 
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static __inline__ struct obv_proc_acl * obv_set(struct obv_temp *data, struct obv_proc_acl *left, struct obv_proc_acl *right,__u16 height) 
+{
+	struct obv_proc_acl *dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct obv_proc_acl),GFP_KERNEL);
+	if(dest == NULL) {
+		obv_seclog("Memory allocation failure, Oblivion panicing\n");
+		return procdb.db[procdb.max_ref].tree;
+	}
+	dest->file_inode = data->file_inode;
+	dest->file_dev = data->file_dev;
+	dest->mode = data->mode;
+	dest->left = left; dest->right = right;
+	dest->height = height;
+	return dest;
+}
+
+
+static struct obv_proc_acl * obv_tree_ins(struct obv_proc_acl *tree, struct obv_temp *entry) 
+{
+	if(tree == obv_empty_tree) {
+		tree = obv_set(entry,obv_empty_tree,obv_empty_tree,0);
+		return tree;
+	}
+	else if(obv_procacl_less(entry,tree)) {
+		tree->left = obv_tree_ins(tree->left,entry);
+		if(obv_heightof(tree->left) > obv_heightof(tree->right) + 1) {
+			if(obv_procacl_less(entry,tree->left)) 
+				tree = obv_rotr(tree);
+			else
+				tree = obv_dlrr(tree);
+		}
+	}
+	else /* assuming no duplicate entries*/ {
+		tree->right = obv_tree_ins(tree->right,entry);
+		if(obv_heightof(tree->right) > obv_heightof(tree->left) + 1) {
+			if(obv_procacl_less(entry,tree->right)) 
+				tree = obv_drlr(tree);
+			else
+				tree = obv_rotl(tree);
+		}
+	}
+	if(obv_heightof(tree->left) >= obv_heightof(tree->right))
+		tree->height = obv_heightof(tree->left) + 1;
+	else
+		tree->height = obv_heightof(tree->right) + 1;
+	return tree;
+}
+
+static kernel_cap_t obv_cap_conv(char *p)
+{
+	kernel_cap_t cap;
+	int i;
+	char *q;
+	cap_t(cap) = 0;
+	if(!p) return cap;
+	if( (q = memscan(p,'\n',strlen(p))) != p + strlen(p))
+		*q = '\0';
+
+	while(*p == ' ') p++;
+	if( (strncmp(p,"CAP",3)) != 0) 
+		goto out;
+	for(i=0;i<CONFIG_OBV_MAX_CAP;i++) {
+		if(!(strcmp(p,caplist->table[i].capname))) {
+			cap_t(cap) = CAP_TO_MASK(caplist->table[i].capval);
+			return cap;
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	return cap;
+}
+
+
+static int obv_add_proc_acl(char *line,struct obv_acl *obv) 
+{
+	char *p, *q;
+	struct nameidata nd;
+	int working = 1;
+	struct obv_temp curr;
+	if( (p = memscan(line,'+',strlen(line)) ) != line + strlen(line) ) {
+		cap_t(obv->file_caps) |= cap_t(obv_cap_conv(++p));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else if ( (p = memscan(line,'-',strlen(line)) ) != line + strlen(line) ) {
+		cap_t(obv->file_caps) &= ~cap_t(obv_cap_conv(++p));
+		return 0;
+	} 
+
+	else {
+		if( (p = memscan(line,'/',strlen(line))) == line + strlen(line)) {
+			obv_seclog("Line %.1024s missing a /\n",line);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if ( (q = memscan(p,' ',strlen(p))) == p + strlen(p)) {
+			obv_seclog("Missing a space in obv proc acl entry, line %.1024s\n",line);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		*q++ = '\0';
+		if(path_init(p,LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_POSITIVE,&nd))
+			if(path_walk(p,&nd)) {
+				obv_seclog("path walk failure for %.1024s\n",line);
+				return 1;
+			}
+		if( (!nd.dentry) || (IS_ERR(nd.dentry)) || (!(nd.dentry->d_inode)) ) {
+			if(nd.dentry)
+				path_release(&nd);
+			obv_seclog("lookup failure for %.1024s\n",line);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		curr.file_inode = nd.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+		curr.file_dev = nd.dentry->d_inode->i_dev;
+		curr.mode = 0;
+
+		while(*q == ' ') q++;
+		while(working) {
+			switch(*q) {
+				case 'r' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_READ;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'w' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_WRITE;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'x' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_EXEC;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'a' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_APPEND;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'f':
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_ACCESS;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'o':
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_OVERRIDE;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'u' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_AUTH;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'i' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_INHERIT;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 's' :
+					curr.mode |= OBV_PROC_REQSUM;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				default: 
+					working = 0;
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+		obv_seclog("About to insert %ld %d %.1024s\n",curr.file_inode,curr.file_dev,line);
+#endif
+		obv->tree = obv_tree_ins(obv->tree,&curr);
+		path_release(&nd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1; /* we should never make it here*/
+}
+
+static int obv_add_pw(char *pw)
+{
+	struct SHA1_CTX context;
+	SHA1Init(&context);
+	SHA1Update(&context,pw,strlen(pw));
+	SHA1Final(obv_pwent.sum,&context);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int obv_add_line(char *line, int type) 
+{
+	static int mode = 0;
+	char *p,*q;
+	struct dentry *file;
+	struct nameidata filed;
+	static struct obv_acl *curr;
+	int working;
+	/* mode = 0 : we are ready for a new program acl
+	 * mode = 1 : we are in the middle of reading a program acl*/
+	switch(type) {
+		case 2 : return obv_add_pw(line);
+		case 1 : return obv_add_file_acl(line);
+		case 0 : break; /* handled below*/
+		default: obv_seclog("Unknown type %d passed\n",type);
+			 return 1;
+			 break;
+	}
+
+	if(!mode) {
+		if(procdb.max_ref >= CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET) return 1;
+		if( (p = memscan (line,'/',strlen(line))) == (line+strlen(line)) ) {
+			return 0;
+		}
+		else curr = &(procdb.db[procdb.max_ref]);
+
+
+		q = memscan(p,' ',strlen(p));
+		*q++= '\0';
+
+		if(path_init(p,LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_POSITIVE,&filed) ) 
+			if(path_walk(p,&filed)) {
+				obv_seclog("Add file error for file %.1024s\n",p);
+				return 1;
+			}
+		file = filed.dentry;
+		if (IS_ERR(file) || !file || !(file->d_inode)) {
+			if(file)
+				path_release(&filed);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		curr->file_inode = file->d_inode->i_ino;
+		curr->file_dev = file->d_inode->i_dev;
+		while(*q == ' ') q++;
+		curr->mode = 0;
+		working = 1;
+		while(working) {
+			switch(*q) {
+				case 'p':
+					curr->mode |= OBV_PROC_PROTECTED;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				case 'h':
+					curr->mode |= OBV_PROC_HIDDEN;
+					q++;
+					break;
+				default:
+					working = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		curr->file_caps = cap_bset;
+		mode = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+		obv_seclog("Added program (full entry) with inode %ld dev %d mode %x line %.1024s\n",curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev,curr->mode,line); 
+#endif
+		path_release(&filed);
+		curr->tree = obv_empty_tree;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else if( (p=memscan(line,'}',strlen(line))) != (line + strlen(line)) ) {
+		procdb.max_ref++;
+		mode = 0;
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		return obv_add_proc_acl(line,curr);
+	}
+}
+
+static int obv_init_variables(void) 
+{
+	caplist = kmalloc(sizeof(struct obv_cap_list),GFP_KERNEL);
+	if(caplist) {
+		INIT_CAP_TABLE(caplist->table)
+	}
+
+	procdb.db = kmalloc(sizeof(struct obv_acl) * CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET,GFP_KERNEL);
+	filedb.db = kmalloc(sizeof(struct obv_file_acl) * CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET,GFP_KERNEL);
+	procdb.max_ref = filedb.max_ref = 0;
+
+	if( (obv_add_proc_acl(CONFIG_OBVADM_ACL,&obv_auth)) )
+		return 1;
+	else if( (obv_add_proc_acl(CONFIG_GODMODE_ACL,&obv_god_mode)) )
+		return 1;
+	else if( (obv_add_proc_acl("/etc r",&obv_auth)) )
+		return 1;
+	else if( (obv_add_proc_acl("/lib r",&obv_auth)) )
+		return 1;
+
+	return procdb.db && filedb.db && caplist ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+
+static int obv_conf_parse(const char *conffile,const int type)
+{
+	/* Purpose: open and read from oblivion config file */
+	struct file *filp;
+	int bytes_read = 0, start = 0, end = 0, obv_fatal = 0;
+	char buffer[1024];
+	char *filepos = NULL,*memscanp = NULL;
+	mm_segment_t old_fs;
+	filepos = buffer;
+	filp = filp_open(conffile, O_RDONLY, O_RDONLY);
+	if( ( IS_ERR(filp) ) || (filp == NULL) ) {
+		obv_seclog("Could not open config file %.1024s\n",conffile);
+
+		obv_fatal = 1;
+		return obv_fatal;
+	} else if ( filp->f_op->read == NULL ) {
+		fput(filp);
+		obv_fatal = 2;
+		return obv_fatal;
+	}
+	/* end error checking, now for the real work */
+	while ( ! end ) {
+		filp->f_pos = start; /* offset of our read :) */
+		old_fs = get_fs();
+		filepos = buffer;
+		/* if current task isn't from the kernel, we'll
+		   have a current->addr_limit.seg that isn't 0xFFFFFFFF
+
+		   and we can't have that */
+		set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
+		bytes_read = filp->f_op->read (filp,buffer,1024,&filp->f_pos);
+		set_fs(old_fs);
+		if(bytes_read < 1024 ) {
+			end = 1;
+			filepos[bytes_read++] = '\n'; /* last line
+							 must make sure we have a newline */
+		} while ( ( memscanp = memscan(filepos,'\n',sizeof(buffer)) )  != filepos + bytes_read && (bytes_read > 0) ) {
+			*memscanp++ = '\0' ;
+			/* necessary for later strlen()'s...*/
+			bytes_read -= memscanp-filepos;
+			filp->f_pos += memscanp-filepos;
+			if( (*filepos != '#') ) 
+				if(obv_add_line(filepos,type))
+					return 1;
+			filepos = memscanp; /* next area to search .. */
+		}
+		if (bytes_read == 1024 ) {
+			/* hmmm we got a return for no \n in the buffer
+			   must be too long of a line */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	filp_close(filp,NULL);
+	return obv_fatal;
+}
+
+static void obv_free_unused_memory(void) {
+	int i;
+	if(procdb.max_ref < CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET)
+		for(i = procdb.max_ref;i < CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET;i++) {
+			kfree(&procdb.db[i]);
+		}
+	if(filedb.max_ref < CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET)
+		for(i = filedb.max_ref;i < CONFIG_OBV_MAX_RULESET;i++) {
+			kfree(&filedb.db[i]);
+		}
+}
+
+static int oblivion_init(void) 
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	spin_lock(&obv_lock);
+	obv_status &= ~OBV_DISABLED;
+	obv_status |= OBV_LOADING;
+	/* okay we're the only oblivion_init that can run due to the spinlock*/
+	if(obv_init_variables() )
+		error = -1;
+	else if(obv_add_pw_conf())
+		error = -2;
+	else if (obv_conf_parse(CONFIG_OBV_PROCACL_CONF,0))
+		error = -3;
+	else if(obv_conf_parse(CONFIG_OBV_FILEACL_CONF,1))
+		error = -4;
+	obv_sort();
+	if(!error) {
+		obv_free_unused_memory();
+		obv_status |= OBV_READY; /* locked, cocked, and ready to rock*/ 
+	}else {
+		obv_status |= OBV_DISABLED;
+		obv_seclog("Error loading , trying to run kernel with oblivion disabled. To disable oblivion at startup use <kernel image name> oblivion=off from your boot loader\n");
+	}
+	obv_status &= ~OBV_LOADING;
+	spin_unlock(&obv_lock);
+	return error;
+}
+
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * Begin Misc Section 
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+
+/* Searching stuff, program exit cleanup, and sysctl parsing */
+
+/* Nonrecursive binary sort, idea from libc, implementation is slightly different but the inspirationw as found there=) */
+
+static __inline__ int do_obv_file_acl_search(struct obv_temp *curr) 
+{
+	int high, low; 
+	struct obv_file_acl *pos;
+	high = filedb.max_ref;
+	low = 0;
+	while(low < high) {
+		pos = &filedb.db[((low+high)/2)];
+		if(obv_fileacl_less(pos,curr))
+			low = (( (low + high) / 2) + 1 );
+		else if(obv_fileacl_eq(pos,curr)) {
+			if(pos->mode & curr->mode) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				obv_seclog("File ACL allow, req %x allowed %x\n source: %ld %d dest %ld %d\n",curr->mode,pos->mode,pos->file_inode,pos->file_dev,curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev);
+#endif
+				return OBV_ALLOW;
+			}
+			else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				if(!(curr->mode & OBV_FILE_HIDDEN))
+				obv_seclog("File ACL deny, req %x allowed %x\n source %ld %d dest %ld %d\n",curr->mode,pos->mode,pos->file_inode,pos->file_dev,curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev);
+#endif
+				return OBV_DENY;
+			}
+		}
+		else high = ( (low + high) / 2);
+	}
+	return OBV_NOTFOUND;
+}
+
+static __inline__ int do_obv_proc_acl_search(struct obv_acl *proc,struct obv_proc_acl *root,struct obv_temp *curr) 
+{
+	/* Nonrecursively search down the Red-Black tree to see if we have an acl for this file*/
+	struct obv_proc_acl *pos = root;
+	if(proc == NULL || pos == NULL) /* no entry*/ {
+		return OBV_DEFAULT;
+	}
+	// obv_seclog("Got called...and there's an entry (curr is %ld %d\n",curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev);
+	while(pos != obv_empty_tree) {
+		if(obv_procacl_eq(curr,pos))  {
+			if(curr->mode & pos->mode) {
+				__u16 tmp;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				obv_seclog("Process %ld %d allowed for file %ld %d tried for mode %x allowed mode %x\n",proc->file_inode,proc->file_dev,curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev,curr->mode,pos->mode);
+#endif
+				tmp = pos->mode & OBV_PROC_EXTRA;
+				curr->mode |= tmp; /* Store any "extra" access rights like 
+						      inherit or override*/
+				return OBV_ALLOW;
+			} else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				obv_seclog("Process %ld %d denied for file %ld %d tried for mode %x allowed mode %x\n",proc->file_inode,proc->file_dev,curr->file_inode,curr->file_dev,curr->mode,pos->mode);
+#endif
+				return OBV_DENY;
+			}
+		}
+		else if(obv_procacl_less(curr,pos)) 
+			pos = pos->left;
+		else 
+			pos=pos->right;
+	}
+
+	return OBV_NOTFOUND; 
+}
+
+static __inline__ int obv_chk_proc_acls(struct dentry * dentry, struct obv_temp *searchval, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+	struct dentry *curr = dentry;
+	int retval = OBV_NOTFOUND;
+	struct nameidata tmp = {NULL, NULL};
+	struct vfsmount *parent;
+
+loop :         
+	do {
+		if(!curr || !curr->d_inode) break;
+		searchval->file_inode = curr->d_inode->i_ino;
+		searchval->file_dev = curr->d_inode->i_dev;
+		retval = do_obv_proc_acl_search(current->obvacl,current->obvacl->tree,searchval); 
+		if(curr->d_inode == curr->d_parent->d_inode) break;
+		curr = curr->d_parent;
+	} while( (curr) && (retval == OBV_NOTFOUND) );
+	if(retval == OBV_NOTFOUND && curr->d_inode && curr->d_inode->i_dev != ROOT_DEV ) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+		obv_seclog("In mount loop(proc acl) for %ld %d\n",dentry->d_inode->i_ino,dentry->d_inode->i_dev);
+#endif
+		if(tmp.mnt) {
+			if(tmp.mnt == tmp.mnt->mnt_parent) goto exit;
+		}
+		else if(mnt == mnt->mnt_parent) goto exit;
+
+
+		if(!tmp.mnt) {
+			tmp.mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
+			tmp.dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+
+		}
+
+		else {
+			parent = tmp.mnt->mnt_parent;
+			dput(tmp.dentry);
+			tmp.dentry = dget(tmp.mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+			mntput(tmp.mnt);
+			tmp.mnt = parent;
+		}
+		mntget(tmp.mnt);
+		curr = tmp.dentry;
+		goto loop;
+	}
+exit:		
+	if(tmp.mnt) mntput(tmp.mnt);
+	if(tmp.dentry) dput(tmp.dentry);
+
+
+	return retval == OBV_NOTFOUND ? OBV_DENY : retval;
+	/* if its not in a program's ACL list it should be denied */
+
+}
+
+static __inline__ int obv_chk_file_acls(struct dentry * dentry, struct obv_temp *searchval, struct vfsmount *mnt) 
+{
+	struct dentry *curr = dentry;
+	int retval = OBV_NOTFOUND;
+	struct vfsmount *parent;
+	struct nameidata tmp = {NULL,NULL};
+loop:	
+	do {
+		if(!curr || !curr->d_inode) break;
+		searchval->file_inode = curr->d_inode->i_ino;
+		searchval->file_dev = curr->d_inode->i_dev;
+		retval = do_obv_file_acl_search(searchval); 
+		if(curr->d_inode == curr->d_parent->d_inode) break;
+		curr = curr->d_parent;
+	} while( (curr) && (retval == OBV_NOTFOUND) );
+
+	if(retval == OBV_NOTFOUND && curr->d_inode && curr->d_inode->i_dev != ROOT_DEV ) {
+		if(tmp.mnt) {
+			if(tmp.mnt == tmp.mnt->mnt_parent) goto exit;
+		}
+		else if(mnt == mnt->mnt_parent) goto exit;
+		if(!tmp.mnt) {
+			tmp.mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
+			tmp.dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+
+		}
+
+		else {
+			parent = tmp.mnt->mnt_parent;
+			dput(tmp.dentry);
+			tmp.dentry = dget(tmp.mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+			mntput(tmp.mnt);
+			tmp.mnt = parent;
+		}
+		mntget(tmp.mnt);
+		curr = tmp.dentry;
+		goto loop;
+	}
+exit:		
+	if(tmp.mnt) mntput(tmp.mnt);
+	if(tmp.dentry) dput(tmp.dentry);
+
+
+
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+
+
+int obv_check_hidden(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) {
+	/* This has to be done a little differently than a normal search.
+	 * If a file "allows" hidden access it is hidden, and thus requires 
+	 * a process that has hidden file access capabilities to access it.
+	 * If the file acl denies hidden access/has no acl then no proc acl 
+	 * check is needed*/
+	struct obv_temp searchval;
+	searchval.mode = OBV_HIDDEN;
+	if(!dentry) return OBV_ALLOW;
+	if(obv_status & OBV_READY) {
+		if( (obv_chk_file_acls(dentry,&searchval,mnt)) == OBV_ALLOW) {
+			if(current->obvacl && current->obvacl->tree)
+				return obv_chk_proc_acls(dentry,&searchval,mnt);
+			else return OBV_DENY;
+		}
+	}
+	return OBV_ALLOW;
+}
+
+int obv_check_hidden_proc(struct task_struct *tsk) 
+{
+	if(obv_status & OBV_READY)
+		if(tsk->obvacl->mode & OBV_PROC_HIDDEN)
+			return 1; /* next release adds processes allowed to view hidden ones*/
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int obv_check_protected(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	if(obv_status & OBV_READY)
+		if(tsk->obvacl->mode & OBV_PROC_PROTECTED)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+int obv_search(struct dentry *dentry, __u16 mode, struct vfsmount *mnt) 
+{
+	int proc_retval = OBV_NOTFOUND, file_retval = OBV_NOTFOUND;
+	int retval = OBV_DEFAULT;
+	if(dentry && dentry->d_inode && mnt) {
+		if(obv_status & OBV_READY) {
+			struct obv_temp searchval;
+			searchval.mode = mode;
+			if(current->obvacl && current->obvacl->tree)  {
+				if( ( proc_retval = obv_chk_proc_acls(dentry,&searchval,mnt) ) == OBV_DENY) {
+					if( (current->obvacl->mode & OBV_AUTH) && (S_ISCHR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
+						retval = OBV_NOTFOUND;
+					/* Okay. This process is under
+					 * authentication mode. Let it
+					 * read/write to the tty (and pass it on
+					 * to the file acls just in case
+					 * Does anyone know how to gain the ino$
+					 * from current->tty? It seems only the
+					 * device num(major/minor) is stored*/
+
+					else {
+						retval = OBV_DENY;
+						goto out;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+
+
+			if( (proc_retval == OBV_ALLOW) && (searchval.mode & OBV_PROC_OVERRIDE)){
+				retval = OBV_ALLOW;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if( (file_retval = obv_chk_file_acls(dentry,&searchval,mnt)) == OBV_DENY) {
+				retval = OBV_DENY;
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if( (proc_retval != file_retval) || (proc_retval == OBV_ALLOW)) {
+				/* The choice to check for proc_retval being OBV_ALLOW was
+				 * random. If proc_retval and file_retval are equal and
+				 * either one is the value OBV_ALLOW then both are OBV_ALLOW
+				 * */
+				retval = OBV_ALLOW;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else retval = OBV_ALLOW; /* we aren't loaded, must be early in bootup*/
+	}
+out: 
+	return retval; /* Else both returned OBV_NOTFOUND..must be the default*/
+}
+
+
+static __inline__ struct obv_acl * do_obv_find_proc(struct obv_acl *curr)  
+{
+	int high,low;
+	struct obv_acl *pos;
+	low = 0;
+	high = procdb.max_ref;
+	while(low < high) {
+		pos = &procdb.db[((low+high)/2)];
+		if(obv_acl_less(pos,curr))
+			low = ( ( (low + high) / 2) +1 );
+		else if(obv_acl_eq(pos,curr))
+			return pos;
+		else
+			high = ( (high + low) / 2);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int __inline__ obv_chk_inherit(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+	struct obv_temp temp;
+	temp.mode = OBV_PROC_INHERIT;
+	if( (obv_chk_proc_acls(dentry,&temp,mnt)) == OBV_ALLOW) 
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __inline__ obv_chk_auth(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+	struct obv_temp temp;
+	temp.mode = OBV_PROC_AUTH;
+	if( (obv_chk_proc_acls(dentry,&temp,mnt)) == OBV_ALLOW)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;   
+}
+
+static int obv_do_auth(void)
+{
+#define OBV_AUTH_MSG "Authorize yourself to Oblivion please\n"
+
+	char *p = OBV_AUTH_MSG;   
+	if(!(current->tty) || (!current->tty->driver.write)) return 1;
+	current->tty->driver.write(current->tty,0,p,strlen(p));
+	current->obvacl = &obv_auth;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_set_proc_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int mode) 
+{
+	struct vfsmount *parent;
+	struct nameidata tmp = {NULL, NULL};
+	struct obv_acl curracl, *retval = NULL;
+	struct dentry *curr = dentry;
+
+
+	switch(mode) {
+		case OBV_SET_AUTH:
+			return obv_chk_auth(dentry,mnt);
+			break;
+		case OBV_SET_INHERIT:
+			return obv_chk_inherit(dentry,mnt);
+			break;
+		case OBV_SET_PROC: 
+			break;
+		default :
+			obv_seclog("BUG! Received unknown mode %d for set_proc_acl\n",mode);
+			return (unsigned long)NULL;
+			break;
+	}
+	/* Okay now we handle OBV_SET_PROC */
+loop:	
+	do {
+
+		if(!curr || !curr->d_inode) break;
+		curracl.file_inode = curr->d_inode->i_ino;
+		curracl.file_dev = curr->d_inode->i_dev;
+		retval = do_obv_find_proc(&curracl); 
+		if(curr->d_inode == curr->d_parent->d_inode) break;
+		curr = curr->d_parent;
+	} while( (curr) && (!retval) );
+	if(!retval && curr->d_inode && curr->d_inode->i_dev != ROOT_DEV) {
+		if(tmp.mnt) {
+			if(tmp.mnt == tmp.mnt->mnt_parent) 
+				goto exit;
+		}
+		else if(mnt == mnt->mnt_parent) 
+			goto exit;
+
+		if(!tmp.mnt) {
+			tmp.mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
+			tmp.dentry = dget(mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+
+		}
+
+		else {
+			parent = tmp.mnt->mnt_parent;
+			dput(tmp.dentry);
+			tmp.dentry = dget(tmp.mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+			mntput(tmp.mnt);
+			tmp.mnt = parent;
+		}
+		mntget(tmp.mnt);
+		curr = tmp.dentry;
+		goto loop;
+	}
+exit:
+	if(tmp.mnt) mntput(tmp.mnt);
+	if(tmp.dentry) dput(tmp.dentry);
+
+	return (unsigned long)retval;
+
+}
+
+static int do_obv_inherit(void) 
+{
+	return 0; 
+	/* Note: for copying due to fork() we use the code the oblivin code in
+	 * kernel/fork.c. If we're inheriting then our current ACL
+	 * (that of the program calling execve) is the ACL we inherit, 
+	 * so no work needs to be done. Just return success 
+	 */
+}
+
+
+int obv_set_proc_acl(struct dentry *dentry,struct task_struct *tsk,char *filename, struct vfsmount *mnt) 
+{
+	struct obv_acl *temp = NULL;
+	if(obv_status & OBV_READY) {
+		if(current->obvacl) {
+		if(do_set_proc_acl(dentry,mnt,OBV_SET_INHERIT))
+			return do_obv_inherit();
+		
+		else if(do_set_proc_acl(dentry,mnt,OBV_SET_AUTH))
+			return obv_do_auth();
+		}
+		temp = (struct obv_acl *)do_set_proc_acl(dentry,mnt,OBV_SET_PROC);
+	}  
+        tsk->obvacl = temp;
+	if(tsk->obvacl)
+		tsk->cap_permitted = tsk->cap_effective =  tsk->obvacl->file_caps;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+void obv_exit(struct task_struct *tsk) 
+{
+	tsk->obvacl = NULL;
+}
+
+static int obv_chcaps(struct obv_pw *entry)
+{
+	char *p = entry->extra;
+	char *q;
+	char *mode;
+	p[OBV_MAX_EXTRA_LEN-1] = '\0'; /* take no chances*/
+	while( (q = memscan(p,'\n',strlen(p))) != p + strlen(p)) {
+		mode = p++;
+		*q++ = '\0';
+		switch(*mode) {
+			case '+' :
+				cap_bset |= cap_t(obv_cap_conv(p));
+				break;
+			case '-' :
+				cap_bset &= ~cap_t(obv_cap_conv(p));
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+		}
+		p = q;
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+	obv_seclog("cap bset is now %x\n",cap_bset);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* The following variables are needed for timer manipulation */
+static struct timer_list obv_badpw;
+static int failures = 0;
+static int during_wait = 0;
+
+static void obv_timer(unsigned long ignored)
+{
+	failures = 0;
+	during_wait = 0;
+	del_timer(&obv_badpw);          
+}
+
+int obv_proc_handler(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, void *buffer, size_t *lenp) 
+{
+	/* This is the main todo. simply I allow disabling oblivion only
+	 * at bootup(after its turned on). I don't have time today to 
+	 * impelement a good pw scheme. The first thing I do when I get back is to do that.
+	 */
+	struct obv_pw *usermode = (struct obv_pw *) buffer;
+	int error = sizeof(struct obv_pw);
+	if(*lenp != sizeof(struct obv_pw)){
+		obv_seclog("Proc handler: being fed garbage %d byte send %d required\n",*lenp,sizeof(struct obv_pw)); 
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if(during_wait) return -EPERM;
+	switch (usermode->mode){
+		case OBV_SHUTDOWN_MODE:
+			if(!(obv_chkpw(usermode))) {
+				obv_seclog("shutdown auth success for "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+						current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+						current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+						current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+						current->p_pptr->euid);
+				spin_lock(&obv_lock);
+				obv_status &= ~OBV_READY;
+				obv_status |= OBV_DISABLED;
+				spin_unlock(&obv_lock);
+				break;
+			} else 
+				error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		case OBV_ENABLE_MODE:
+			if(obv_disable) {
+				obv_seclog("Disabled at boot time, ignoring load request\n");
+				break;
+			}
+			else if(obv_status & OBV_1ST) {
+				obv_seclog("Loading %.32s\n",OBV_VERSION);
+				oblivion_init();
+				spin_lock(&obv_lock);
+				obv_status &= ~OBV_1ST; 
+				spin_unlock(&obv_lock);
+				break;
+			}
+			else {
+				obv_seclog("%.32s already loaded, re-enabling\n",OBV_VERSION);
+				spin_lock(&obv_lock);
+				obv_status &= ~OBV_DISABLED;
+				obv_status |= OBV_READY;
+				spin_unlock(&obv_lock);
+				break;
+			}
+
+		case OBV_CHCAPS_MODE : 
+			if(obv_status & OBV_1ST) {
+				oblivion_init();
+			}
+			if(obv_status & OBV_1ST || !(obv_chkpw(usermode))) {
+				if(!(obv_chcaps(usermode))) {
+					obv_seclog("successful capability change by "
+							"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+							"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",
+							current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+							current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+							current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+							current->p_pptr->euid);
+
+				}
+				obv_status &= ~OBV_1ST;
+			}
+			else
+				error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		case OBV_GOD_MODE:
+			if(!(obv_chkpw(usermode))) {
+				obv_seclog("successful change to admin mode by "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)\n",
+						current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+						current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+						current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+						current->p_pptr->euid);
+				if(current->p_pptr)
+					current->p_pptr->obvacl = &obv_god_mode;
+			}
+			else
+				error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		case OBV_AUTH_MODE:
+			if(!(obv_chkpw(usermode)) ) {
+				obv_seclog("successful authentication by "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent "
+						"(%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)\n",
+						current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+						current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+						current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+						current->p_pptr->euid);
+				if(current->p_pptr)
+					current->p_pptr->obvacl = NULL;
+				/* The parent invoked obvadm, it is the
+				 * task that we must deal with */
+			}
+			else
+				error = -EPERM;
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			obv_seclog("Invalid value %d by "
+					"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent "
+					"(%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",usermode->mode,
+					current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+					current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+					current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+					current->p_pptr->euid);
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if(error < 0) {
+		failures++;
+		if(failures > CONFIG_OBV_MAXTRIES) {
+			obv_seclog("Maximum pw attempts reached, locking "
+					"password authentication\n");
+			init_timer(&obv_badpw);
+			obv_badpw.data = 0;
+			obv_badpw.function = obv_timer;
+			obv_badpw.expires = jiffies + CONFIG_OBV_TIMEOUT*HZ;
+			add_timer(&obv_badpw);
+			during_wait = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
diff -urN linux/kernel/obvhash.c linux.grsec/kernel/obvhash.c
--- linux/kernel/obvhash.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/obvhash.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/oblivion.h>
+
+/*
+Modified for use in OPM by Michael Dalton <michael@linux.com> 
+Modified for kerneli by Andrew McDonald <andrew@mcdonald.org.uk>
+from:
+
+SHA-1 in C
+By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+100% Public Domain
+Available from:
+ftp://ftp.zedz.net/pub/crypto/crypto/HASH/sha/sha1.c
+
+Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
+"abc"
+  A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
+"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+  84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
+A million repetitions of "a"
+  34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
+*/
+
+
+extern struct obv_pw obv_pwent;
+
+void SHA1Transform(unsigned long state[5], unsigned char buffer[64])
+{
+	unsigned long a, b, c, d, e;
+	typedef union {
+		unsigned char c[64];
+		unsigned long l[16];
+	} CHAR64LONG16;
+	CHAR64LONG16* block;
+#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF
+	static unsigned char workspace[64];
+	block = (CHAR64LONG16*)workspace;
+	memcpy(block, buffer, 64);
+#else
+	block = (CHAR64LONG16*)buffer;
+#endif
+	/* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	/* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
+	R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
+	R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
+	R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
+	R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
+	R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
+	R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
+	R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
+	R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
+	R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
+	R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
+	R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
+	R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
+	R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
+	R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
+	R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
+	R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
+	R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
+	R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
+	R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
+	R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
+	/* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	/* Wipe variables */
+	a = b = c = d = e = 0;
+}
+
+
+/* SHA1Init - Initialize new context */
+
+void SHA1Init(struct SHA1_CTX* context)
+{
+	/* SHA1 initialization constants */
+	context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+	context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+	context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+	context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+	context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+	context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Run your data through this. */
+
+void SHA1Update(struct SHA1_CTX* context, unsigned char* data, unsigned int len)
+{
+	unsigned int i, j;
+
+	j = (context->count[0] >> 3) & 63;
+	if ((context->count[0] += len << 3) < (len << 3)) context->count[1]++;
+	context->count[1] += (len >> 29);
+	if ((j + len) > 63) {
+		memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
+		SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64) {
+			SHA1Transform(context->state, &data[i]);
+		}
+		j = 0;
+	}
+	else i = 0;
+	memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
+}
+
+
+/* Add padding and return the message digest. */
+
+void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20], struct SHA1_CTX* context)
+{
+	unsigned long i, j;
+	unsigned char finalcount[8];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		finalcount[i] = (unsigned char)((context->count[(i >= 4 ? 0 : 1)]
+				 >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255); 
+                                 /* Endian independent */
+	}
+	SHA1Update(context, (unsigned char *)"\200", 1);
+	while ((context->count[0] & 504) != 448) {
+		SHA1Update(context, (unsigned char *)"\0", 1);
+	}
+	SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8);  /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
+	for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+		digest[i] = (unsigned char)
+			((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
+	}
+	/* Wipe variables */
+	i = j = 0;
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, 64);
+	memset(context->state, 0, 20);
+	memset(context->count, 0, 8);
+	memset(&finalcount, 0, 8);
+#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF  /* make SHA1Transform overwrite it's own static vars */
+	SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+#endif
+}
+
+int obv_chkpw(struct obv_pw *entry) 
+{
+	struct SHA1_CTX context;
+	char *pos = memscan(entry->pw,'\n',strlen(entry->pw));
+	if(pos != entry->pw + strlen(entry->pw)) *pos = '\0';
+	SHA1Init(&context);
+	SHA1Update(&context,entry->pw,strlen(entry->pw));
+	SHA1Final(entry->sum,&context);
+	return memcmp(obv_pwent.sum,entry->sum,OBV_SHASUM_SIZE);
+}
diff -urN linux/kernel/obvqsort.c linux.grsec/kernel/obvqsort.c
--- linux/kernel/obvqsort.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/obvqsort.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
+/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
+ * The following code is a slightly modified qsort found in glibc
+ * The best implementation for a non-recursive qsort around
+ * that I could find, and probably
+ * better than what I would have come up with=)
+ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/malloc.h>
+
+
+
+/* Byte-wise swap two items of size SIZE. */
+#define SWAP(a, b, size)						      \
+  do									      \
+    {									      \
+      register size_t __size = (size);					      \
+      register char *__a = (a), *__b = (b);				      \
+      do								      \
+	{								      \
+	  char __tmp = *__a;						      \
+	  *__a++ = *__b;						      \
+	  *__b++ = __tmp;						      \
+	} while (--__size > 0);						      \
+    } while (0)
+
+/* Discontinue quicksort algorithm when partition gets below this size.
+   This particular magic number was chosen to work best on a Sun 4/260. */
+#define MAX_THRESH 4
+
+/* Stack node declarations used to store unfulfilled partition obligations. */
+typedef struct
+  {
+    char *lo;
+    char *hi;
+  } stack_node;
+
+/* The next 4 #defines implement a very fast in-line stack abstraction. */
+#define STACK_SIZE	(8 * sizeof(unsigned long int))
+#define PUSH(low, high)	((void) ((top->lo = (low)), (top->hi = (high)), ++top))
+#define	POP(low, high)	((void) (--top, (low = top->lo), (high = top->hi)))
+#define	STACK_NOT_EMPTY	(stack < top)
+
+
+/* Order size using quicksort.  This implementation incorporates
+   four optimizations discussed in Sedgewick:
+
+   1. Non-recursive, using an explicit stack of pointer that store the
+      next array partition to sort.  To save time, this maximum amount
+      of space required to store an array of MAX_INT is allocated on the
+      stack.  Assuming a 32-bit integer, this needs only 32 *
+      sizeof(stack_node) == 136 bits.  Pretty cheap, actually.
+
+   2. Chose the pivot element using a median-of-three decision tree.
+      This reduces the probability of selecting a bad pivot value and
+      eliminates certain extraneous comparisons.
+
+   3. Only quicksorts TOTAL_ELEMS / MAX_THRESH partitions, leaving
+      insertion sort to order the MAX_THRESH items within each partition.
+      This is a big win, since insertion sort is faster for small, mostly
+      sorted array segments.
+
+   4. The larger of the two sub-partitions is always pushed onto the
+      stack first, with the algorithm then concentrating on the
+      smaller partition.  This *guarantees* no more than log (n)
+      stack size is needed (actually O(1) in this case)!  */
+
+
+void obv_qsort (void *pbase, size_t total_elems, size_t size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void*))
+{
+  register char *base_ptr = (char *) pbase;
+
+  /* Allocating SIZE bytes for a pivot buffer facilitates a better
+     algorithm below since we can do comparisons directly on the pivot. */
+  char *pivot_buffer = (char *) kmalloc(size,GFP_KERNEL);
+  const size_t max_thresh = MAX_THRESH * size;
+
+  if (total_elems == 0)
+    /* Avoid lossage with unsigned arithmetic below.  */
+    return;
+
+  if (total_elems > MAX_THRESH)
+    {
+      char *lo = base_ptr;
+      char *hi = &lo[size * (total_elems - 1)];
+      /* Largest size needed for 32-bit int!!! */
+      stack_node stack[STACK_SIZE];
+      stack_node *top = stack + 1;
+
+      while (STACK_NOT_EMPTY)
+        {
+          char *left_ptr;
+          char *right_ptr;
+
+	  char *pivot = pivot_buffer;
+
+	  /* Select median value from among LO, MID, and HI. Rearrange
+	     LO and HI so the three values are sorted. This lowers the
+	     probability of picking a pathological pivot value and
+	     skips a comparison for both the LEFT_PTR and RIGHT_PTR. */
+
+	  char *mid = lo + size * ((hi - lo) / size >> 1);
+
+	  if ((*cmp) ((void *) mid, (void *) lo) < 0)
+	    SWAP (mid, lo, size);
+	  if ((*cmp) ((void *) hi, (void *) mid) < 0)
+	    SWAP (mid, hi, size);
+	  else
+	    goto jump_over;
+	  if ((*cmp) ((void *) mid, (void *) lo) < 0)
+	    SWAP (mid, lo, size);
+	jump_over:;
+	  memcpy (pivot, mid, size);
+	  pivot = pivot_buffer;
+
+	  left_ptr  = lo + size;
+	  right_ptr = hi - size;
+
+	  /* Here's the famous ``collapse the walls'' section of quicksort.
+	     Gotta like those tight inner loops!  They are the main reason
+	     that this algorithm runs much faster than others. */
+	  do
+	    {
+	      while ((*cmp) ((void *) left_ptr, (void *) pivot) < 0)
+		left_ptr += size;
+
+	      while ((*cmp) ((void *) pivot, (void *) right_ptr) < 0)
+		right_ptr -= size;
+
+	      if (left_ptr < right_ptr)
+		{
+		  SWAP (left_ptr, right_ptr, size);
+		  left_ptr += size;
+		  right_ptr -= size;
+		}
+	      else if (left_ptr == right_ptr)
+		{
+		  left_ptr += size;
+		  right_ptr -= size;
+		  break;
+		}
+	    }
+	  while (left_ptr <= right_ptr);
+
+          /* Set up pointers for next iteration.  First determine whether
+             left and right partitions are below the threshold size.  If so,
+             ignore one or both.  Otherwise, push the larger partition's
+             bounds on the stack and continue sorting the smaller one. */
+
+          if ((size_t) (right_ptr - lo) <= max_thresh)
+            {
+              if ((size_t) (hi - left_ptr) <= max_thresh)
+		/* Ignore both small partitions. */
+                POP (lo, hi);
+              else
+		/* Ignore small left partition. */
+                lo = left_ptr;
+            }
+          else if ((size_t) (hi - left_ptr) <= max_thresh)
+	    /* Ignore small right partition. */
+            hi = right_ptr;
+          else if ((right_ptr - lo) > (hi - left_ptr))
+            {
+	      /* Push larger left partition indices. */
+              PUSH (lo, right_ptr);
+              lo = left_ptr;
+            }
+          else
+            {
+	      /* Push larger right partition indices. */
+              PUSH (left_ptr, hi);
+              hi = right_ptr;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    kfree(pivot_buffer);
+
+  /* Once the BASE_PTR array is partially sorted by quicksort the rest
+     is completely sorted using insertion sort, since this is efficient
+     for partitions below MAX_THRESH size. BASE_PTR points to the beginning
+     of the array to sort, and END_PTR points at the very last element in
+     the array (*not* one beyond it!). */
+
+
+  {
+    char *const end_ptr = &base_ptr[size * (total_elems - 1)];
+    char *tmp_ptr = base_ptr;
+    char *thresh = min(end_ptr, base_ptr + max_thresh);
+    register char *run_ptr;
+
+    /* Find smallest element in first threshold and place it at the
+       array's beginning.  This is the smallest array element,
+       and the operation speeds up insertion sort's inner loop. */
+
+    for (run_ptr = tmp_ptr + size; run_ptr <= thresh; run_ptr += size)
+      if ((*cmp) ((void *) run_ptr, (void *) tmp_ptr) < 0)
+        tmp_ptr = run_ptr;
+
+    if (tmp_ptr != base_ptr)
+      SWAP (tmp_ptr, base_ptr, size);
+
+    /* Insertion sort, running from left-hand-side up to right-hand-side.  */
+
+    run_ptr = base_ptr + size;
+    while ((run_ptr += size) <= end_ptr)
+      {
+	tmp_ptr = run_ptr - size;
+	while ((*cmp) ((void *) run_ptr, (void *) tmp_ptr) < 0)
+	  tmp_ptr -= size;
+
+	tmp_ptr += size;
+        if (tmp_ptr != run_ptr)
+          {
+            char *trav;
+
+	    trav = run_ptr + size;
+	    while (--trav >= run_ptr)
+              {
+                char c = *trav;
+                char *hi, *lo;
+
+                for (hi = lo = trav; (lo -= size) >= tmp_ptr; hi = lo)
+                  *hi = *lo;
+                *hi = c;
+              }
+          }
+      }
+  }
+}
diff -urN linux/kernel/signal.c linux.grsec/kernel/signal.c
--- linux/kernel/signal.c	Thu Jan  4 05:45:26 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/signal.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -16,6 +16,21 @@
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL)||defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * SLAB caches for signal bits.
  */
@@ -518,7 +533,31 @@
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	if (bad_signal(sig, info, t))
 		goto out_nolock;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+	if(	t->pid && current->pid && child_reaper && child_reaper->pid && current->fs && current->pid > 1
+		&& sig && grsec_enable_chroot && 
+	    !( sig == SIGALRM || sig == SIGIO ||
+	      ((current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+	      child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+	      (current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+	      child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)) ||
+	      ((t->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev ==
+	      current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev) &&
+	      (t->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino ==
+	      current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)) ||
+	      (t->pid == current->p_pptr->pid && sig == SIGCHLD) ) ) {
+	      security_alert("denied signal %d out of chroot() jail (%.32s:%lu) of %d.%d "
+	    		     "by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) "
+			     "to (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)",
+			     "denied signals in chroot()",sig,kdevname(current->fs->root->d_inode->i_dev),
+			     current->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino,current->fs->root->d_inode->i_uid,
+			     current->fs->root->d_inode->i_gid,current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,
+			     current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+			     current->p_pptr->euid,t->comm,t->pid,t->uid,t->euid,t->p_pptr->comm,
+			     t->p_pptr->pid,t->p_pptr->uid,t->p_pptr->euid);
+			goto out_nolock;
+	      }
+#endif
 	/* The null signal is a permissions and process existance probe.
 	   No signal is actually delivered.  Same goes for zombies. */
 	ret = 0;
@@ -528,6 +567,25 @@
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sigmask_lock, flags);
 	handle_stop_signal(sig, t);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
+    if(grsec_enable_signal && (
+	(sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) || (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
+	if(t->pid == current->pid) {
+	    security_alert("signal %d  sent to (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), "
+			   "parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","signal warnings",sig,
+			   t->comm,t->pid,t->uid,t->euid,t->p_pptr->comm,t->p_pptr->pid,
+			   t->p_pptr->uid,t->p_pptr->euid);
+	} else {
+	    security_alert("signal %d sent to (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), "
+			   "parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), "
+			   "parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)","signal warnings",
+			   sig,t->comm,t->pid,t->uid,t->euid,t->p_pptr->comm,t->p_pptr->pid,
+			   t->p_pptr->uid,t->p_pptr->euid,current->comm,current->pid,
+			   current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+			   current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+	}
+    } 
+#endif
 	/* Optimize away the signal, if it's a signal that can be
 	   handled immediately (ie non-blocked and untraced) and
 	   that is ignored (either explicitly or by default).  */
@@ -980,6 +1038,22 @@
 sys_kill(int pid, int sig)
 {
 	struct siginfo info;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	struct task_struct *tsk = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+	if(tsk && tsk->obvacl) {
+		if( (obv_check_protected(tsk)) ) {
+			if(current->pid > 1) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_DEBUG
+				obv_seclog("protected proc: returning EPERM, not init\n");
+				/* Allow init to kill for shutdown purposes*/
+#endif
+				return -EPERM;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 
 	info.si_signo = sig;
 	info.si_errno = 0;
diff -urN linux/kernel/sys.c linux.grsec/kernel/sys.c
--- linux/kernel/sys.c	Fri Jul 20 05:34:31 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/sys.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
  *  Copyright (C) 1991, 1992  Linus Torvalds
  */
 
+#include <linux/config.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
@@ -18,6 +19,10 @@
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 /*
  * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
  * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
@@ -378,6 +383,13 @@
 	int old_egid = current->egid;
 	int new_rgid = old_rgid;
 	int new_egid = old_egid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setregid(rgid=%d/egid=%d) by (%.16s:%d),UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",rgid,egid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
 		if ((old_rgid == rgid) ||
@@ -419,6 +431,13 @@
 asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
 {
 	int old_egid = current->egid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setgid(%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",gid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
 	{
@@ -538,6 +557,13 @@
 	new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
 	new_euid = old_euid = current->euid;
 	old_suid = current->suid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setreuid(ruid=%d/euid=%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",ruid,euid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
 		new_ruid = ruid;
@@ -598,7 +624,13 @@
 	old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
 	old_suid = current->suid;
 	new_suid = old_suid;
-	
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setuid(%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",uid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 	if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		if (uid != old_ruid && set_user(uid, old_euid != uid) < 0)
 			return -EAGAIN;
@@ -631,6 +663,13 @@
 	int old_ruid = current->uid;
 	int old_euid = current->euid;
 	int old_suid = current->suid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setresuid(ruid=%d/suid=%d/euid=%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",ruid,suid,euid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && (ruid != current->uid) &&
@@ -682,6 +721,14 @@
  */
 asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setresgid(rgid=%d/sgid=%d/egid=%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",rgid,sgid,egid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
+
 	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
 		if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && (rgid != current->gid) &&
 		    (rgid != current->egid) && (rgid != current->sgid))
@@ -730,6 +777,13 @@
 asmlinkage long sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
 {
 	int old_fsuid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setfsuid(%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",uid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
 	if (uid == current->uid || uid == current->euid ||
@@ -772,6 +826,13 @@
 asmlinkage long sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
 {
 	int old_fsgid;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+	if(grsec_enable_suid)
+	printk(KERN_INFO "grsecurity: setfsgid(%d) by (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), "
+		       "UID(%d), EUID(%d)\n",gid,current->comm,current->pid,
+		       current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,
+		       current->p_pptr->uid,current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif		
 
 	old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
 	if (gid == current->gid || gid == current->egid ||
diff -urN linux/kernel/sysctl.c linux.grsec/kernel/sysctl.c
--- linux/kernel/sysctl.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:58 2001
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/sysctl.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -34,12 +34,20 @@
 #include <linux/highuid.h>
 #include <linux/kdb.h>
 
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ROOT_NFS
 #include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+#include <linux/obvext.h>
+#endif
+
+
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
 
 /* External variables not in a header file. */
@@ -117,6 +125,9 @@
 static ctl_table debug_table[];
 static ctl_table dev_table[];
 extern ctl_table random_table[];
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+static ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
+#endif
 
 /* /proc declarations: */
 
@@ -265,9 +276,317 @@
 	{KERN_KDB, "kdb", &kdb_on, sizeof(int),
 	 0644, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
 #endif	/* CONFIG_KDB */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+	{KERN_GRSECURITY, "grsecurity", NULL, 0, 0550, grsecurity_table},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_OBV_PROC
+	 {KERN_OBV,"oblivion",NULL,sizeof(int),0600,NULL,&obv_proc_handler},
+#endif
+
 	{0}
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+int grsec_enable_link= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
+int grsec_enable_fifo= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+int grsec_enable_fd= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
+int grsec_enable_execve= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+int grsec_enable_forkbomb= -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_forkbomb_gid = -1;
+int grsec_forkbomb_sec = -1;
+int grsec_forkbomb_max = -1;
+#else
+int grsec_forkbomb_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_GID;
+int grsec_forkbomb_sec = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_SEC;
+int grsec_forkbomb_max = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB_MAX;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+int grsec_enable_execlog= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+int grsec_enable_suid= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
+int grsec_enable_signal= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP
+int grsec_enable_coredump= -1;   
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
+int grsec_enable_forkfail= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+int grsec_enable_time= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+int grsec_enable_kbmap= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+int grsec_enable_randnet= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+int grsec_enable_chroot= -1;  
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
+int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
+int grsec_enable_chroot_caps= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
+int grsec_enable_tpe= -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_tpe_gid= -1;
+#else
+int grsec_tpe_gid= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GLIBC
+int grsec_enable_tpe_glibc= -1;  
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+int grsec_enable_tpe_all= -1;   
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+int grsec_enable_randpid= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+int grsec_enable_randid= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC   
+int grsec_enable_randsrc= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+int grsec_enable_randping= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+int grsec_enable_randttl= -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_randttl_thresh= -1;
+#else
+int grsec_randttl_thresh= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL_THRESH;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
+int grsec_enable_socket_all= -1; 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_socket_all_gid= -1;
+#else
+int grsec_socket_all_gid= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ALL_GID;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
+int grsec_enable_socket_client= -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_socket_client_gid= -1;
+#else
+int grsec_socket_client_gid= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CLIENT_GID;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
+int grsec_enable_socket_server= -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+int grsec_socket_server_gid= -1;
+#else
+int grsec_socket_server_gid= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SERVER_GID;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_RST
+int grsec_enable_stealth_rst= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_UDP
+int grsec_enable_stealth_udp= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP
+int grsec_enable_stealth_icmp= -1;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_IGMP 
+int grsec_enable_stealth_igmp= -1; 
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_FLAGS
+int grsec_enable_stealth_flags= -1;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+enum {GS_LINK=1,GS_FIFO, GS_FD, GS_EXECVE, GS_FORK,
+GS_FORK_GID, GS_FORK_SEC, GS_FORK_MAX, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SUID,
+GS_SIGNAL, GS_COREDUMP, GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_KBMAP, GS_RANDNET,
+GS_CHROOT, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID,
+GS_TPE_GLIBC, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS, GS_RANDPID, GS_RANDID, GS_RANDSRC,
+GS_RANDPING, GS_RANDTTL, GS_RANDTTL_THRESH, GS_SOCKET_ALL,
+GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID,
+GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, GS_STEALTH_RST,
+GS_STEALTH_UDP, GS_STEALTH_ICMP, GS_STEALTH_IGMP, GS_STEALTH_FLAGS};
+
+static ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
+       {GS_LINK, "linking_restrictions", &grsec_enable_link, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec}, 
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
+       {GS_FIFO, "fifo_restrictions", &grsec_enable_fifo, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FD
+       {GS_FD, "secure_fds", &grsec_enable_fd, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
+       {GS_EXECVE, "execve_limiting", &grsec_enable_execve, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKBOMB
+       {GS_FORK, "fork_bomb_prot", &grsec_enable_forkbomb, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_FORK_GID, "fork_bomb_gid", &grsec_forkbomb_gid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_FORK_SEC, "fork_bomb_sec", &grsec_forkbomb_sec, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_FORK_MAX, "fork_bomb_max", &grsec_forkbomb_max, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
+       {GS_EXECLOG, "exec_logging", &grsec_enable_execlog, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SUID
+       {GS_SUID, "suid_logging", &grsec_enable_suid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
+       {GS_SIGNAL, "signal_logging", &grsec_enable_signal, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_COREDUMP
+       {GS_COREDUMP, "coredump", &grsec_enable_coredump, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
+       {GS_FORKFAIL, "forkfail_logging", &grsec_enable_forkfail, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+       {GS_TIME, "timechange_logging", &grsec_enable_time, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KBMAP
+       {GS_KBMAP, "secure_kbmap", &grsec_enable_kbmap, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+       {GS_RANDNET, "rand_net", &grsec_enable_randnet, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
+       {GS_CHROOT, "chroot_restrictions", &grsec_enable_chroot, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
+       {GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, "chroot_execlog",
+	&grsec_enable_chroot_execlog, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
+       {GS_CHROOT_CAPS, "chroot_caps", &grsec_enable_chroot_caps, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
+       {GS_TPE, "tpe", &grsec_enable_tpe, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_TPE_GID, "tpe_gid", &grsec_tpe_gid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GLIBC
+       {GS_TPE_GLIBC, "tpe_glibc", &grsec_enable_tpe_glibc, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
+       {GS_TPE_ALL, "tpe_restrict_all", &grsec_enable_tpe_all, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
+       {GS_RANDPID, "rand_pids", &grsec_enable_randpid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+       {GS_RANDID, "rand_ip_ids", &grsec_enable_randid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
+       {GS_RANDSRC, "rand_tcp_src_ports", &grsec_enable_randsrc, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+       {GS_RANDPING, "altered_pings", &grsec_enable_randping, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+       {GS_RANDTTL, "rand_ttl", &grsec_enable_randttl, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_RANDTTL_THRESH, "rand_ttl_thresh", 
+	&grsec_randttl_thresh, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
+       {GS_SOCKET_ALL, "socket_all", &grsec_enable_socket_all, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, "socket_all_gid", 
+	&grsec_socket_all_gid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
+       {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT, "socket_client", 
+	&grsec_enable_socket_client, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, "socket_client_gid", 
+	&grsec_socket_client_gid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
+       {GS_SOCKET_SERVER, "socket_server", 
+	&grsec_enable_socket_server, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+       {GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID, "socket_server_gid",
+	&grsec_socket_server_gid, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_RST
+       {GS_STEALTH_RST, "stealth_rst", &grsec_enable_stealth_rst, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_UDP
+       {GS_STEALTH_UDP, "stealth_udp", &grsec_enable_stealth_udp, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP
+       {GS_STEALTH_ICMP, "stealth_icmp", 
+	&grsec_enable_stealth_icmp, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_IGMP
+       {GS_STEALTH_IGMP, "stealth_igmp", 
+	&grsec_enable_stealth_igmp, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_FLAGS
+       {GS_STEALTH_FLAGS, "stealth_flags", 
+	&grsec_enable_stealth_flags, sizeof (int),
+        0640, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
+#endif
+       {0}
+};
+#endif
+
 static ctl_table vm_table[] = {
 	{VM_FREEPG, "freepages", 
 	 &freepages, sizeof(freepages_t), 0444, NULL, &proc_dointvec},
@@ -363,6 +682,7 @@
 		if (!oldlenp || get_user(old_len, oldlenp))
 			return -EFAULT;
 	}
+
 	tmp = &root_table_header.ctl_entry;
 	do {
 		struct ctl_table_header *head =
@@ -373,6 +693,7 @@
 					&context);
 		if (context)
 			kfree(context);
+
 		if (error != -ENOTDIR)
 			return error;
 		tmp = tmp->next;
@@ -843,7 +1164,7 @@
 	
 	#define TMPBUFLEN 20
 	char buf[TMPBUFLEN], *p;
-	
+
 	if (!table->data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp ||
 	    (filp->f_pos && !write)) {
 		*lenp = 0;
@@ -851,6 +1172,22 @@
 	}
 	
 	i = (int *) table->data;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
+		if(table->de->parent->name &&
+		(strlen(table->de->parent->name) == 10)) { 
+		if((!strcmp(table->de->parent->name,"grsecurity")) &&
+                        (write) && (*i != -1)){
+                        security_alert("attempt to modify grsecurity "
+                        "sysctl values by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), "
+                        "parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)",
+                        "attempted sysctl changes",current->comm,current->pid,
+                        current->uid,current->euid,current->p_pptr->comm,
+                        current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+                        current->p_pptr->euid);
+                        return -EACCES;
+                }
+		}
+#endif
 	vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(int);
 	left = *lenp;
 	
diff -urN linux/kernel/time.c linux.grsec/kernel/time.c
--- linux/kernel/time.c	Mon Oct 16 21:58:51 2000
+++ linux.grsec/kernel/time.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 /* 
  * The timezone where the local system is located.  Used as a default by some
@@ -105,6 +108,13 @@
 	time_maxerror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
 	time_esterror = NTP_PHASE_LIMIT;
 	write_unlock_irq(&xtime_lock);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+   if(grsec_enable_time)
+   security_alert("time set by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)",
+		   "time sets", current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+		   current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+		   current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -181,6 +191,13 @@
 		 * globally block out interrupts when it runs.
 		 */
 		do_settimeofday(tv);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
+    if(grsec_enable_time)
+    security_alert("time set by (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID (%d), EUID (%d)",
+		   "time sets", current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+		   current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+		   current->p_pptr->euid);
+#endif
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff -urN linux/mm/mmap.c linux.grsec/mm/mmap.c
--- linux/mm/mmap.c	Tue Jul  3 21:14:15 2001
+++ linux.grsec/mm/mmap.c	Sun Sep 30 02:05:24 2001
@@ -13,10 +13,15 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 /* description of effects of mapping type and prot in current implementation.
  * this is due to the limited x86 page protection hardware.  The expected
  * behavior is in parens:
@@ -243,6 +248,24 @@
 	 */
 	vm_flags = calc_vm_flags(prot,flags) | mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
+		if (flags & MAP_GROWSDOWN)
+			vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && !(prot & PROT_EXEC))
+			vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
+		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (flags & MAP_GROWSDOWN))
+			vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
+#endif
+
+	} else {
+		if (prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE)) /* they imply PROT_EXEC on IA-32 */
+			vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* mlock MCL_FUTURE? */
 	if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
 		unsigned long locked = mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -406,9 +429,20 @@
 	if (len > TASK_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (!addr)
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STACK
+		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE(len);
+#else
 		addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
+#endif
 	addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
 
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_RANDMMAP
+	/* PaX: randomize base address if requested */
+	if (current->flags & PF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
+		addr += current->mm->delta_mmap;
+	}
+#endif
 	for (vma = find_vma(current->mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
 		/* At this point:  (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
 		if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr)
@@ -859,6 +893,17 @@
 
 	flags |= VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
 	
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX
+       if (current->flags & PF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
+               flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+              if (current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT)
+                      flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
+#endif
+	}
+#endif
+
 	/* Can we just expand an old anonymous mapping? */
 	if (addr) {
 		struct vm_area_struct * vma = find_vma(mm, addr-1);
diff -urN linux/mm/mprotect.c linux.grsec/mm/mprotect.c
--- linux/mm/mprotect.c	Mon Mar 19 21:35:08 2001
+++ linux.grsec/mm/mprotect.c	Sun Sep 30 02:06:18 2001
@@ -261,6 +261,12 @@
 			break;
 		}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PAX_MPROTECT
+		/* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
+		if ((current->flags & PF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
+			newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
+		}
+#endif
 		if (vma->vm_end >= end) {
 			error = mprotect_fixup(vma, nstart, end, newflags);
 			break;
diff -urN linux/net/core/dev.c linux.grsec/net/core/dev.c
--- linux/net/core/dev.c	Mon Jul 16 01:29:40 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/core/dev.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -2751,7 +2751,23 @@
 			dp = &dev->next;
 		}
 	}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create("dev", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, dev_get_info);
+	create_proc_read_entry("net/softnet_stat", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, 0, dev_proc_stats, NULL);
+#ifdef WIRELESS_EXT
+	proc_net_create("wireless", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, dev_get_wireless_info);
+#endif	/* WIRELESS_EXT */
+#endif	/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create("dev", S_IRUSR, dev_get_info);
+	create_proc_read_entry("net/softnet_stat", S_IRUSR, 0, dev_proc_stats, NULL);
+#ifdef WIRELESS_EXT
+	proc_net_create("wireless", S_IRUSR, dev_get_wireless_info);
+#endif	/* WIRELESS_EXT */
+#endif	/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 	proc_net_create("dev", 0, dev_get_info);
 	create_proc_read_entry("net/softnet_stat", 0, 0, dev_proc_stats, NULL);
@@ -2759,7 +2775,7 @@
 	proc_net_create("wireless", 0, dev_get_wireless_info);
 #endif	/* WIRELESS_EXT */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
-
+#endif
 	dev_boot_phase = 0;
 
 	open_softirq(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ, net_tx_action, NULL);
diff -urN linux/net/core/utils.c linux.grsec/net/core/utils.c
--- linux/net/core/utils.c	Mon Aug 23 19:01:02 1999
+++ linux.grsec/net/core/utils.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -23,16 +23,50 @@
 
 static unsigned long net_rand_seed = 152L;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+
+#define RNG_N_STORED_WORDS 256
+unsigned long rng_storage[RNG_N_STORED_WORDS];
+int nleft=0;
+#endif
+
 unsigned long net_random(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+	if (grsec_enable_randnet) {
+	if (!nleft)
+	{
+		get_random_bytes(rng_storage,sizeof(rng_storage));
+		nleft=RNG_N_STORED_WORDS;
+	}
+	
+	nleft--;
+	return rng_storage[nleft];
+	} else {
+	net_rand_seed=net_rand_seed*69069L+1;
+        return net_rand_seed^jiffies;
+	}
+#else
 	net_rand_seed=net_rand_seed*69069L+1;
         return net_rand_seed^jiffies;
+#endif
 }
 
 void net_srandom(unsigned long entropy)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
+	if(grsec_enable_randnet)
+	add_mouse_randomness((__u32)entropy);
+	else {
 	net_rand_seed ^= entropy;
 	net_random();
+	}
+#else
+	net_rand_seed ^= entropy;
+	net_random();
+#endif
 }
 
 int net_msg_cost = 5*HZ;
@@ -71,3 +105,4 @@
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ratelimit_lock, flags);
 	return 0;
 }
+
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c	Sun Sep 30 01:30:52 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/af_inet.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID)
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -320,6 +324,10 @@
         struct list_head *p;
         struct inet_protosw *answer;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+      unsigned long randttl;
+#endif
+
 	sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 	sk = sk_alloc(PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
 	if (sk == NULL) 
@@ -372,7 +380,14 @@
 	else
 		sk->protinfo.af_inet.pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+if(grsec_enable_randid)
+get_random_bytes(&sk->protinfo.af_inet.id,(sizeof(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id) / 2)); 
+else
 	sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
+#else
+	sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = 0;
+#endif
 
 	sock_init_data(sock,sk);
 
@@ -384,7 +399,16 @@
 
 	sk->backlog_rcv = sk->prot->backlog_rcv;
 
-	sk->protinfo.af_inet.ttl	= sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+if(grsec_enable_randttl){
+        get_random_bytes(&randttl,sizeof(randttl));
+        sk->protinfo.af_inet.ttl = grsec_randttl_thresh +
+        (randttl % (256 - grsec_randttl_thresh));
+} else
+	sk->protinfo.af_inet.ttl = sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
+#else                  
+	sk->protinfo.af_inet.ttl = sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
+#endif
 
 	sk->protinfo.af_inet.mc_loop	= 1;
 	sk->protinfo.af_inet.mc_ttl	= 1;
@@ -1185,6 +1209,25 @@
 	/*
 	 *	Create all the /proc entries.
 	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create ("raw", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, raw_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("netstat", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, netstat_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("snmp", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, snmp_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("sockstat", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, afinet_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("tcp", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, tcp_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("udp", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, udp_get_info);
+#endif
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create ("raw", S_IRUSR, raw_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("netstat", S_IRUSR, netstat_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("snmp", S_IRUSR, snmp_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("sockstat", S_IRUSR, afinet_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("tcp", S_IRUSR, tcp_get_info);
+	proc_net_create ("udp", S_IRUSR, udp_get_info);
+#endif
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 	proc_net_create ("raw", 0, raw_get_info);
 	proc_net_create ("netstat", 0, netstat_get_info);
@@ -1192,6 +1235,7 @@
 	proc_net_create ("sockstat", 0, afinet_get_info);
 	proc_net_create ("tcp", 0, tcp_get_info);
 	proc_net_create ("udp", 0, udp_get_info);
+#endif
 #endif		/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
 	return 0;
 }
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/arp.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/arp.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/arp.c	Wed May 16 19:21:45 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/arp.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -1196,8 +1196,13 @@
 	neigh_table_init(&arp_tbl);
 
 	dev_add_pack(&arp_packet_type);
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+	proc_net_create ("arp", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, arp_get_info);
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+	proc_net_create ("arp", S_IRUSR, arp_get_info);
+#else
 	proc_net_create ("arp", 0, arp_get_info);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 	neigh_sysctl_register(NULL, &arp_tbl.parms, NET_IPV4, NET_IPV4_NEIGH, "ipv4");
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c	Tue Jun 12 04:15:27 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -642,9 +642,19 @@
 
 void __init ip_fib_init(void)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create("route",S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP,fib_get_procinfo);
+#endif		/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+	proc_net_create("route",S_IRUSR,fib_get_procinfo);
+#endif		/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 	proc_net_create("route",0,fib_get_procinfo);
 #endif		/* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+#endif
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES
 	local_table = fib_hash_init(RT_TABLE_LOCAL);
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/icmp.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/icmp.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/icmp.c	Thu Jun 21 06:00:55 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/icmp.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -87,6 +87,14 @@
 #include <asm/system.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <net/checksum.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 #define min(a,b)	((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
 
@@ -364,7 +372,6 @@
 	icmp_xmit_unlock_bh();
 }
 
-
 /*
  *	Send an ICMP message in response to a situation
  *
@@ -728,10 +735,18 @@
 
 		icmp_param.data.icmph=*skb->h.icmph;
 		icmp_param.data.icmph.type=ICMP_ECHOREPLY;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPING
+	if(grsec_enable_randping)
+		icmp_param.data.icmph.un.echo.id =
+		skb->h.icmph->un.echo.id;
+#endif
 		icmp_param.skb=skb;
 		icmp_param.offset=0;
 		icmp_param.data_len=skb->len;
 		icmp_param.head_len=sizeof(struct icmphdr);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP
+	if (!grsec_enable_stealth_icmp)
+#endif		
 		icmp_reply(&icmp_param, skb);
 	}
 }
@@ -773,6 +788,9 @@
 	icmp_param.offset=0;
 	icmp_param.data_len=0;
 	icmp_param.head_len=sizeof(struct icmphdr)+12;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_ICMP
+	if(!grsec_enable_stealth_icmp)
+#endif
 	icmp_reply(&icmp_param, skb);
 }
 
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/igmp.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/igmp.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/igmp.c	Thu Apr 12 21:11:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/igmp.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@
 #include <linux/mroute.h>
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_IGMP
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
 
 #define IP_MAX_MEMBERSHIPS 20
 
@@ -199,7 +203,10 @@
 	struct igmphdr *ih;
 	struct rtable *rt;
 	u32	dst;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_IGMP
+	if(grsec_enable_stealth_igmp)
+		return(-1);
+#endif
 	/* According to IGMPv2 specs, LEAVE messages are
 	 * sent to all-routers group.
 	 */
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c	Tue May 15 10:29:35 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@
 #include <linux/inetdevice.h>
 #include <linux/igmp.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -846,6 +850,9 @@
 	iph->saddr		=	rt->rt_src;
 
 	if ((iph->ttl = tiph->ttl) == 0) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+	unsigned long randttl;
+#endif
 		if (skb->protocol == __constant_htons(ETH_P_IP))
 			iph->ttl = old_iph->ttl;
 #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6
@@ -853,6 +860,13 @@
 			iph->ttl = ((struct ipv6hdr*)old_iph)->hop_limit;
 #endif
 		else
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+			if(grsec_enable_randttl){
+			get_random_bytes(&randttl,sizeof(randttl));
+			iph->ttl = grsec_randttl_thresh +
+			(randttl % (256 - grsec_randttl_thresh)); 
+			} else
+#endif
 			iph->ttl = sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
 	}
 
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/ip_output.c	Wed Jul 11 01:11:43 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_output.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/mroute.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 /*
  *      Shall we try to damage output packets if routing dev changes?
@@ -328,7 +332,9 @@
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return -EMSGSIZE;
 	}
+
 	ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->u.dst, sk);
+
 	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_HW &&
 	    (skb = skb_checksum_help(skb)) == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -499,7 +505,13 @@
 	 *	Begin outputting the bytes.
 	 */
 
-	id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+	if(grsec_enable_randid){ 
+       get_random_bytes(&id,(sizeof(id) / 2));
+       sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = id;
+	} else
+#endif
+       id = sk->protinfo.af_inet.id++;
 
 	do {
 		char *data;
@@ -554,7 +566,7 @@
 					 */
 					__ip_select_ident(iph, &rt->u.dst);
 					id = iph->id;
-				}
+				} 
 
 				/*
 				 *	Any further fragments will have MF set.
@@ -994,7 +1006,17 @@
 	ip_rt_init();
 	inet_initpeers();
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
+	proc_net_create("igmp", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, ip_mc_procinfo);
+#endif
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
+	proc_net_create("igmp", S_IRUSR, ip_mc_procinfo);
+#endif
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
 	proc_net_create("igmp", 0, ip_mc_procinfo);
+#endif
 #endif
 }
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c	Thu Apr 12 21:11:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@
 
 #include <linux/errqueue.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 
 #define MAX(a,b) ((a)>(b)?(a):(b))
 
@@ -383,7 +387,9 @@
 int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, char *optval, int optlen)
 {
 	int val=0,err;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+	unsigned long randttl;
+#endif
 	if (level != SOL_IP)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 
@@ -500,8 +506,16 @@
 		case IP_TTL:
 			if (optlen<1)
 				goto e_inval;
-			if(val==-1)
+			if(val==-1){
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDTTL
+                        if(grsec_enable_randttl){
+                        get_random_bytes(&randttl,sizeof(randttl));
+                        val = grsec_randttl_thresh +
+                        (randttl % (256 - grsec_randttl_thresh));
+                        } else
+#endif
 				val = sysctl_ip_default_ttl;
+			}
 			if(val<1||val>255)
 				goto e_inval;
 			sk->protinfo.af_inet.ttl=val;
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/ipmr.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ipmr.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/ipmr.c	Sat Jun 30 04:38:26 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/ipmr.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -1761,8 +1761,20 @@
 	init_timer(&ipmr_expire_timer);
 	ipmr_expire_timer.function=ipmr_expire_process;
 	register_netdevice_notifier(&ip_mr_notifier);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS	
+	proc_net_create("ip_mr_vif",S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP,ipmr_vif_info);
+	proc_net_create("ip_mr_cache",S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP,ipmr_mfc_info);
+#endif	
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS	
+	proc_net_create("ip_mr_vif",S_IRUSR,ipmr_vif_info);
+	proc_net_create("ip_mr_cache",S_IRUSR,ipmr_mfc_info);
+#endif	
+#else
 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS	
 	proc_net_create("ip_mr_vif",0,ipmr_vif_info);
 	proc_net_create("ip_mr_cache",0,ipmr_mfc_info);
 #endif	
+#endif
 }
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/route.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/route.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/route.c	Fri Jul 20 03:11:13 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/route.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:20 2001
@@ -2525,9 +2525,31 @@
 					ip_rt_gc_interval;
 	add_timer(&rt_periodic_timer);
 
-	proc_net_create ("rt_cache", 0, rt_cache_get_info);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+       proc_net_create ("rt_cache", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, rt_cache_get_info);
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+       proc_net_create ("rt_cache", S_IRUSR, rt_cache_get_info);
+#else 
+        proc_net_create ("rt_cache", 0, rt_cache_get_info);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
+	proc_net_create ("rt_cache_stat", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, rt_cache_stat_get_info);
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+	proc_net_create ("rt_cache_stat", S_IRUSR, rt_cache_stat_get_info);
+#else 
 	proc_net_create ("rt_cache_stat", 0, rt_cache_stat_get_info);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE
-	create_proc_read_entry("net/rt_acct", 0, 0, ip_rt_acct_read, NULL);
+      create_proc_read_entry("net/rt_acct", S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP, 0, ip_rt_acct_read, NULL);
+#endif
+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE
+      create_proc_read_entry("net/rt_acct", S_IRUSR, 0, ip_rt_acct_read, NULL);
+#endif
+#else
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE
+       create_proc_read_entry("net/rt_acct", 0, 0, ip_rt_acct_read, NULL);
+#endif
 #endif
 }
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	Wed Apr 25 23:57:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:21 2001
@@ -63,6 +63,13 @@
 #include <linux/stddef.h>
 #include <linux/ipsec.h>
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID)||defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_RST)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_FLAGS)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+
 extern int sysctl_ip_dynaddr;
 
 /* Check TCP sequence numbers in ICMP packets. */
@@ -177,12 +184,37 @@
 		int high = sysctl_local_port_range[1];
 		int remaining = (high - low) + 1;
 		int rover;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
+                unsigned long longrover;
+		int count = 0;
+#endif
 
 		spin_lock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
 		rover = tcp_port_rover;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDSRC
+                do {
+	if(grsec_enable_randsrc){
+		    if(count < 64){
+                    	get_random_bytes(&longrover,sizeof(longrover));
+		    	rover=low+(longrover % (high - low));
+		    } else if(count == 64)
+		    	rover = tcp_port_rover;
+		    else if(count > 64){
+			rover++;
+			if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
+			   rover = low;
+		    }
+		    count++;
+	} else {
+			rover++;
+			if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
+				rover = low;
+	}
+#else
 		do {	rover++;
 			if ((rover < low) || (rover > high))
 				rover = low;
+#endif
 			head = &tcp_bhash[tcp_bhashfn(rover)];
 			spin_lock(&head->lock);
 			for (tb = head->chain; tb; tb = tb->next)
@@ -192,7 +224,9 @@
 		next:
 			spin_unlock(&head->lock);
 		} while (--remaining > 0);
+
 		tcp_port_rover = rover;
+
 		spin_unlock(&tcp_portalloc_lock);
 
 		/* Exhausted local port range during search? */
@@ -718,6 +752,11 @@
 	tp->ext_header_len = 0;
 	if (sk->protinfo.af_inet.opt)
 		tp->ext_header_len = sk->protinfo.af_inet.opt->optlen;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+if(grsec_enable_randid)
+	get_random_bytes(&sk->protinfo.af_inet.id,(sizeof(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id) / 2));
+else
+#endif
 	sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = tp->write_seq^jiffies;
 
 	tp->mss_clamp = 536;
@@ -1031,7 +1070,10 @@
 	struct tcphdr *th = skb->h.th;
 	struct tcphdr rth;
 	struct ip_reply_arg arg;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_RST
+	if(grsec_enable_stealth_rst)
+		return;
+#endif
 	/* Never send a reset in response to a reset. */
 	if (th->rst)
 		return;
@@ -1444,6 +1486,11 @@
 	newtp->ext_header_len = 0;
 	if (newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt)
 		newtp->ext_header_len = newsk->protinfo.af_inet.opt->optlen;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+	if(grsec_enable_randid)
+	get_random_bytes(&newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id,(sizeof(newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id) / 2)); 
+	else
+#endif
 	newsk->protinfo.af_inet.id = newtp->write_seq^jiffies;
 
 	tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst->pmtu);
@@ -1608,6 +1655,18 @@
 
 	if (th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr)/4)
 		goto bad_packet;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_FLAGS
+if(grsec_enable_stealth_flags){
+          if(th->fin && th->syn)
+               goto discard_it;
+
+          if(!(th->ack || th->syn || th->rst) || th->res1)
+               goto discard_it;
+
+          if(th->fin && th->psh && th->urg)
+               goto discard_it;
+}
+#endif
 	if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff*4))
 		goto discard_it;
 
diff -urN linux/net/ipv4/udp.c linux.grsec/net/ipv4/udp.c
--- linux/net/ipv4/udp.c	Thu Apr 12 21:11:39 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/ipv4/udp.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:21 2001
@@ -93,7 +93,12 @@
 #include <net/route.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
 #include <net/checksum.h>
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_UDP)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
 /*
  *	Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
  */
@@ -738,6 +743,12 @@
 	sk->daddr = rt->rt_dst;
 	sk->dport = usin->sin_port;
 	sk->state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDID
+if(grsec_enable_randid)
+	get_random_bytes(&sk->protinfo.af_inet.id,(sizeof(sk->protinfo.af_inet.id) / 2));
+else
+#endif
 	sk->protinfo.af_inet.id = jiffies;
 
 	sk_dst_set(sk, &rt->u.dst);
@@ -909,12 +920,14 @@
 		sock_put(sk);
 		return 0;
 	}
-
 	/* No socket. Drop packet silently, if checksum is wrong */
 	if (udp_checksum_complete(skb))
 		goto csum_error;
 
 	UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UdpNoPorts);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_STEALTH_UDP
+	if(!grsec_enable_stealth_udp)
+#endif	
 	icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
 
 	/*
diff -urN linux/net/socket.c linux.grsec/net/socket.c
--- linux/net/socket.c	Fri Jul 20 03:11:13 2001
+++ linux.grsec/net/socket.c	Sun Sep 30 01:54:21 2001
@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@
 #include <net/scm.h>
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT)||\
+    defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER)
+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
+#endif
+
+
 static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
 static loff_t sock_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence);
 static ssize_t sock_read(struct file *file, char *buf,
@@ -914,7 +921,18 @@
 {
 	int retval;
 	struct socket *sock;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
+	if(grsec_enable_socket_all &&
+	(in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid)) && (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)){
+		security_alert("attempted socket(%d,%d,%d) by (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+		"EUID(%d)","attempted sockets",family,type,protocol,
+		current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+		current->p_pptr->euid);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+#endif
 	retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
 	if (retval < 0)
 		goto out;
@@ -1011,7 +1029,18 @@
 	struct socket *sock;
 	char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
 	int err;
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
+	if(grsec_enable_socket_server &&
+	(in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid)) && (umyaddr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && (umyaddr->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)){
+		security_alert("attempted bind() by (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+		"EUID(%d)","attempted binds",
+		current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+		current->p_pptr->euid);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+#endif
 	if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
 	{
 		if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0)
@@ -1119,10 +1148,21 @@
 	struct socket *sock;
 	char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
 	int err;
-
 	sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
 	if (!sock)
 		goto out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
+	if(grsec_enable_socket_client &&
+	(in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid)) && (uservaddr->sa_family != AF_UNIX) && (uservaddr->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)){
+		security_alert("attempted connect() to fd %d by (%.16s:%d), "
+		"UID(%d), EUID(%d), parent (%.16s:%d), UID(%d), "
+		"EUID(%d)","attempted connects",fd,
+		current->comm,current->pid,current->uid,current->euid,
+		current->p_pptr->comm,current->p_pptr->pid,current->p_pptr->uid,
+		current->p_pptr->euid);
+		return -ENETUNREACH;
+	}
+#endif
 	err = move_addr_to_kernel(uservaddr, addrlen, address);
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto out_put;