- fix for 3.0.3

[packages/kernel.git] / kernel-apparmor.patch

From 0ae314bc92d8b22250f04f85e4bd36ee9ed30890 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 network controll

Add compatibility for v5 network rules.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_audit.h          |    4 +
 security/apparmor/Makefile         |   19 ++++-
 security/apparmor/include/net.h    |   40 +++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    3 +
 security/apparmor/lsm.c            |  112 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/net.c            |  170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/policy.c         |    1 +
 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c  |   48 ++++++++++-
 8 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 112a550..d5f3dd7 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 					u32 denied;
 					uid_t ouid;
 				} fs;
+				struct {
+					int type, protocol;
+					struct sock *sk;
+				} net;
 			};
 		} apparmor_audit_data;
 #endif
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 2dafe50..7cefef9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o sid.o file.o
+              resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
 
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
 
 
 # Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -44,9 +44,24 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 	sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
 	echo "};" >> $@
 
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names.
+# Transform lines from
+# #define AF_INET		2	/* Internet IP Protocol 	*/
+# to
+# [2] = "inet",
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN     $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+	sed $< >> $@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
+	  's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+).*/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+	echo "};" >> $@
+
+
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/af_names.h
 $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
 	$(call cmd,make-caps)
 $(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
 	$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
+	$(call cmd,make-af)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c7d599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+	u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+	u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+	u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
+		       int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+	/* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index aeda5cf..6776929 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include "capability.h"
 #include "domain.h"
 #include "file.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
 extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
  * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
  *
  * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data.  Each profile
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
+	struct aa_net net;
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 };
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ae3a698..05c018b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/file.h"
 #include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
 #include "include/path.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -651,6 +750,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.getprocattr =			apparmor_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =			apparmor_setprocattr,
 
+	.socket_create =		apparmor_socket_create,
+	.socket_bind =			apparmor_socket_bind,
+	.socket_connect =		apparmor_socket_connect,
+	.socket_listen =		apparmor_socket_listen,
+	.socket_accept =		apparmor_socket_accept,
+	.socket_sendmsg =		apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
+	.socket_recvmsg =		apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
+	.socket_getsockname =		apparmor_socket_getsockname,
+	.socket_getpeername =		apparmor_socket_getpeername,
+	.socket_getsockopt =		apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+	.socket_setsockopt =		apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+	.socket_shutdown =		apparmor_socket_shutdown,
+
 	.cred_alloc_blank =		apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
 	.cred_free =			apparmor_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			apparmor_cred_prepare,
@@ -949,4 +950,102 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	if (kern)
+		return 0;
+
+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
+				    NULL);
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+				struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+				   struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+				      int optname)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+}
+
 security_initcall(apparmor_init);

diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1765901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "af_names.h"
+
+static const char *sock_type_names[] = {
+	"unknown(0)",
+	"stream",
+	"dgram",
+	"raw",
+	"rdm",
+	"seqpacket",
+	"dccp",
+	"unknown(7)",
+	"unknown(8)",
+	"unknown(9)",
+	"packet",
+};
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]) {
+		audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " \"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net.family);
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+	if (sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]) {
+		audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad.net.type);
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad.net.protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_net - audit network access
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type:   network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
+ */
+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+		     int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
+{
+	int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	if (sk) {
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
+	} else {
+		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+	}
+	/* todo fill in socket addr info */
+
+	sa.aad.op = op,
+	sa.u.net.family = family;
+	sa.u.net.sk = sk;
+	sa.aad.net.type = type;
+	sa.aad.net.protocol = protocol;
+	sa.aad.error = error;
+
+	if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
+		u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net.family];
+		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+			   !(1 << sa.aad.net.type & audit_mask)))
+			return 0;
+		audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+	} else {
+		u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net.family];
+		u16 kill_mask = 0;
+		u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad.net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+
+		if (denied & kill_mask)
+			audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+		if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+		    AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+			return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
+	}
+
+	return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced  (NOT NULL)
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type:   network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
+		int protocol, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	u16 family_mask;
+	int error;
+
+	if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
+	if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
+		return 0;
+
+	family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
+
+	error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+
+	return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @sk: sock being revalidated  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+	int error = 0;
+
+	/* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
+	 * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
+	 */
+	if (in_interrupt())
+		return 0;
+
+	profile = __aa_current_profile();
+	if (!unconfined(profile))
+		error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+				    sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+
+	return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 4f0eade..4d5ce13 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 
 	aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
+	aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
 	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index e33aaf7..fa3f1b4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -190,6 +190,19 @@ fail:
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+		if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+			return 0;
+		if (data)
+			*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+		e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
 {
 	if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -468,7 +481,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
 	const char *name = NULL;
-	int error = -EPROTO;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	int i, error = -EPROTO;
 	kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
 	u32 tmp;
 
@@ -559,6 +573,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 	if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
 		goto fail;
 
+	size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+	if (size) {
+
+		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+			/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+			 * never request
+			 */
+			if (i > AF_MAX) {
+				u16 tmp;
+				if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+				    !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+					goto fail;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+			if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+			goto fail;
+		/*
+		 * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
+		 * by IPC
+		 */
+	}
+	profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+	profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+
 	/* get file rules */
 	profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
 	if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
-- 
1.7.0.4

From cdc6b35345e5bcfe92bb2b52ef003f94ceedd40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 interface

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/Kconfig              |    9 +
 security/apparmor/Makefile             |    1 +
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c      |  287 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c         |   18 ++-
 security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h |    6 +
 5 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
 	  boot.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+	bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
+	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4.  It is
+          recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
+          is desired.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 7cefef9..0bb604b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
               resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24) += apparmorfs-24.o
 
 clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc8c744
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/secrutiy/apparmor interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * This file contain functions providing an interface for <= AppArmor 2.4
+ * compatibility.  It is dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+ * being set (see Makefile).
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+/* apparmor/matching */
+static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	const char matching[] = "pattern=aadfa audit perms=crwxamlk/ "
+	    "user::other";
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
+				       sizeof(matching) - 1);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops = {
+	.read = aa_matching_read,
+};
+
+/* apparmor/features */
+static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	const char features[] = "file=3.1 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
+	    "change_hat=1.5 change_profile=1.1 " "aanamespaces=1.1 rlimit=1.1";
+
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
+				       sizeof(features) - 1);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops = {
+	.read = aa_features_read,
+};
+
+/**
+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
+ * while switching current namespace.
+ *
+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+					     struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct aa_namespace *parent;
+
+	/* is next namespace a child */
+	if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+		struct aa_namespace *next;
+		next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+		read_lock(&next->lock);
+		return next;
+	}
+
+	/* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
+	parent = ns->parent;
+	while (parent) {
+		read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+		list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
+			read_lock(&ns->lock);
+			return ns;
+		}
+		if (parent == root)
+			return NULL;
+		ns = parent;
+		parent = parent->parent;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace to start in   (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+					  struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+	for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
+		if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+			return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+						struct aa_profile, base.list);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *parent;
+	struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
+
+	/* is next profile a child */
+	if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+		return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+					base.list);
+
+	/* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
+	parent = p->parent;
+	while (parent) {
+		list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
+					     base.list)
+				return p;
+		p = parent;
+		parent = parent->parent;
+	}
+
+	/* is next another profile in the namespace */
+	list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+		return p;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
+ * @root: root namespace  (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: current profile  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+				       struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
+	if (next)
+		return next;
+
+	/* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
+	return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
+ *
+ * acquires first ns->lock
+ */
+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+	__acquires(root->lock)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+	loff_t l = *pos;
+	f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
+
+
+	/* find the first profile */
+	read_lock(&root->lock);
+	profile = __first_profile(root, root);
+
+	/* skip to position */
+	for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
+		profile = next_profile(root, profile);
+
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @p: profile previously returned
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
+ *
+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
+ */
+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+	(*pos)++;
+
+	return next_profile(root, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
+ * @p: the last profile writen
+ *
+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
+ */
+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+	__releases(root->lock)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
+
+	if (profile) {
+		for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
+			read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+	}
+	read_unlock(&root->lock);
+	aa_put_namespace(root);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to file
+ * @p: current position (profile)    (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
+	struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+
+	if (profile->ns != root)
+		seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
+	seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
+		   COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
+	.start = p_start,
+	.next = p_next,
+	.stop = p_stop,
+	.show = seq_show_profile,
+};
+
+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
+}
+
+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
+	.open = profiles_open,
+	.read = seq_read,
+	.llseek = seq_lseek,
+	.release = profiles_release,
+};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 0848292..28c52ac 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -187,7 +187,11 @@ void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
 		aafs_remove(".remove");
 		aafs_remove(".replace");
 		aafs_remove(".load");
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+		aafs_remove("profiles");
+		aafs_remove("matching");
+		aafs_remove("features");
+#endif
 		securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
 		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
 	}
@@ -218,7 +222,17 @@ int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
 		aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
 		goto error;
 	}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+	error = aafs_create("matching", 0444, &aa_fs_matching_fops);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+	error = aafs_create("features", 0444, &aa_fs_features_fops);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
+#endif
+	error = aafs_create("profiles", 0440, &aa_fs_profiles_fops);
+	if (error)
+		goto error;
 	error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
 	if (error)
 		goto error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index cb1e93a..14f955c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -17,4 +17,10 @@
 
 extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops;
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
-- 
1.7.0.4

From f17b28f64b963c47e76737f7bb7f58ce3a7c5249 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2010 06:57:08 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: Allow dfa backward compatibility with broken userspace

The apparmor_parser when compiling policy could generate invalid dfas
that did not have sufficient padding to avoid invalid references, when
used by the kernel.  The kernels check to verify the next/check table
size was broken meaning invalid dfas were being created by userspace
and not caught.

To remain compatible with old tools that are not fixed, pad the loaded
dfas next/check table.  The dfa's themselves are valid except for the
high padding for potentially invalid transitions (high bounds error),
which have a maximimum is 256 entries.  So just allocate an extra null filled
256 entries for the next/check tables.  This will guarentee all bounds
are good and invalid transitions go to the null (0) state.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/match.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 06d764c..cf92856 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -57,8 +57,17 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 	if (bsize < tsize)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* Pad table allocation for next/check by 256 entries to remain
+	 * backwards compatible with old (buggy) tools and remain safe without
+	 * run time checks
+	 */
+	if (th.td_id == YYTD_ID_NXT || th.td_id == YYTD_ID_CHK)
+		tsize += 256 * th.td_flags;
+
 	table = kvmalloc(tsize);
 	if (table) {
+		/* ensure the pad is clear, else there will be errors */
+		memset(table, 0, tsize);
 		*table = th;
 		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
 			UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
@@ -134,11 +143,19 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
 		goto out;
 
 	if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+		int warning = 0;
 		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
 			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
 				goto out;
 			/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
 			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
+				if (warning)
+					continue;
+				printk(KERN_WARNING "AppArmor DFA next/check "
+				       "upper bounds error fixed, upgrade "
+				       "user space tools \n");
+				warning = 1;
+			} else if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= trans_count) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
 				       "bounds error\n");
 				goto out;
-- 
1.7.0.4