]> git.pld-linux.org Git - packages/kernel.git/blame - grsecurity-2.1.9-2.6.16.9.patch
- try to fix ppc builds for external modules (untested yet)
[packages/kernel.git] / grsecurity-2.1.9-2.6.16.9.patch
CommitLineData
1a04c15d 1diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c
2--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ apply_relocate_add(Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs,
5
6 /* The small sections were sorted to the end of the segment.
7 The following should definitely cover them. */
8- gp = (u64)me->module_core + me->core_size - 0x8000;
9+ gp = (u64)me->module_core_rw + me->core_size_rw - 0x8000;
10 got = sechdrs[me->arch.gotsecindex].sh_addr;
11
12 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
13diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
14--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
15+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16@@ -1274,6 +1274,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
17 merely specific addresses, but regions of memory -- perhaps
18 this feature should be incorporated into all ports? */
19
20+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
21+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
22+#endif
23+
24 if (addr) {
25 addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(addr), len, limit);
26 if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
27@@ -1281,8 +1285,8 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
28 }
29
30 /* Next, try allocating at TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE. */
31- addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE),
32- len, limit);
33+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area_1 (PAGE_ALIGN(current->mm->mmap_base), len, limit);
34+
35 if (addr != (unsigned long) -ENOMEM)
36 return addr;
37
38diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
39--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
40+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
41@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
42 #include <linux/slab.h>
43 #include <linux/security.h>
44 #include <linux/signal.h>
45+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
46
47 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
48 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
49@@ -283,6 +284,9 @@ do_sys_ptrace(long request, long pid, lo
50 goto out_notsk;
51 }
52
53+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
54+ goto out;
55+
56 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
57 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
58 goto out;
59diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c
60--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
61+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/alpha/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
62@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
63 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/module.h>
66+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
67
68 #include <asm/system.h>
69 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
70@@ -56,6 +57,124 @@ __load_new_mm_context(struct mm_struct *
71 __reload_thread(pcb);
72 }
73
74+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
75+/*
76+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
77+ *
78+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
79+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
80+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
81+ */
82+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
83+{
84+
85+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
86+ int err;
87+
88+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
89+ unsigned int ldah, ldq, jmp;
90+
91+ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
92+ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
93+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
94+
95+ if (err)
96+ break;
97+
98+ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x277B0000U &&
99+ (ldq & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
100+ jmp == 0x6BFB0000U)
101+ {
102+ unsigned long r27, addr;
103+ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
104+ unsigned long addrl = ldq | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
105+
106+ addr = regs->r27 + ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
107+ err = get_user(r27, (unsigned long*)addr);
108+ if (err)
109+ break;
110+
111+ regs->r27 = r27;
112+ regs->pc = r27;
113+ return 2;
114+ }
115+ } while (0);
116+
117+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
118+ unsigned int ldah, lda, br;
119+
120+ err = get_user(ldah, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
121+ err |= get_user(lda, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+4));
122+ err |= get_user(br, (unsigned int *)(regs->pc+8));
123+
124+ if (err)
125+ break;
126+
127+ if ((ldah & 0xFFFF0000U)== 0x277B0000U &&
128+ (lda & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0xA77B0000U &&
129+ (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3E00000U)
130+ {
131+ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL;
132+ unsigned long addrh = (ldah | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL) << 16;
133+ unsigned long addrl = lda | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF0000UL;
134+
135+ regs->r27 += ((addrh ^ 0x80000000UL) + 0x80000000UL) + ((addrl ^ 0x8000UL) + 0x8000UL);
136+ regs->pc += 12 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
137+ return 2;
138+ }
139+ } while (0);
140+
141+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
142+ unsigned int br;
143+
144+ err = get_user(br, (unsigned int *)regs->pc);
145+
146+ if (!err && (br & 0xFFE00000U) == 0xC3800000U) {
147+ unsigned int br2, ldq, nop, jmp;
148+ unsigned long addr = br | 0xFFFFFFFFFFE00000UL, resolver;
149+
150+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + (((addr ^ 0x00100000UL) + 0x00100000UL) << 2);
151+ err = get_user(br2, (unsigned int *)addr);
152+ err |= get_user(ldq, (unsigned int *)(addr+4));
153+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(addr+8));
154+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned int *)(addr+12));
155+ err |= get_user(resolver, (unsigned long *)(addr+16));
156+
157+ if (err)
158+ break;
159+
160+ if (br2 == 0xC3600000U &&
161+ ldq == 0xA77B000CU &&
162+ nop == 0x47FF041FU &&
163+ jmp == 0x6B7B0000U)
164+ {
165+ regs->r28 = regs->pc+4;
166+ regs->r27 = addr+16;
167+ regs->pc = resolver;
168+ return 3;
169+ }
170+ }
171+ } while (0);
172+#endif
173+
174+ return 1;
175+}
176+
177+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
178+{
179+ unsigned long i;
180+
181+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
182+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
183+ unsigned int c;
184+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
185+ printk("???????? ");
186+ else
187+ printk("%08x ", c);
188+ }
189+ printk("\n");
190+}
191+#endif
192
193 /*
194 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
195@@ -133,8 +252,29 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, uns
196 good_area:
197 si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
198 if (cause < 0) {
199- if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
200+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
201+
202+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
203+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->pc)
204+ goto bad_area;
205+
206+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
207+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
208+
209+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
210+ case 2:
211+ case 3:
212+ return;
213+#endif
214+
215+ }
216+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)rdusp());
217+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
218+#else
219 goto bad_area;
220+#endif
221+
222+ }
223 } else if (!cause) {
224 /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
225 if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)))
226diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c
227--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
228+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/arm/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
229@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
230 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
231 return -ENOMEM;
232
233+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
234+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
235+#endif
236+
237 if (addr) {
238 if (do_align)
239 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
240@@ -76,7 +80,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
241 if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
242 start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
243 } else {
244- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
245+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
246 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
247 }
248
249@@ -93,8 +97,8 @@ full_search:
250 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
251 * some holes.
252 */
253- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
254- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
255+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
256+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
257 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
258 goto full_search;
259 }
260diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/boot/compressed/head.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/boot/compressed/head.S
261--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/boot/compressed/head.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
262+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/boot/compressed/head.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
263@@ -39,11 +39,13 @@ startup_32:
264 movl %eax,%gs
265
266 lss stack_start,%esp
267+ movl 0x000000,%ecx
268 xorl %eax,%eax
269 1: incl %eax # check that A20 really IS enabled
270 movl %eax,0x000000 # loop forever if it isn't
271 cmpl %eax,0x100000
272 je 1b
273+ movl %ecx,0x000000
274
275 /*
276 * Initialize eflags. Some BIOS's leave bits like NT set. This would
277diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig
278--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
279+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
280@@ -963,7 +963,7 @@ endchoice
281
282 config PCI_BIOS
283 bool
284- depends on !X86_VISWS && PCI && (PCI_GOBIOS || PCI_GOANY)
285+ depends on !X86_VISWS && PCI && PCI_GOBIOS
286 default y
287
288 config PCI_DIRECT
289diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.cpu linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.cpu
290--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.cpu 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
291+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.cpu 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
292@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ config X86_PPRO_FENCE
293
294 config X86_F00F_BUG
295 bool
296- depends on M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || M386
297+ depends on (M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || M386) && !PAX_KERNEXEC
298 default y
299
300 config X86_WP_WORKS_OK
301@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ config X86_CMPXCHG64
302
303 config X86_ALIGNMENT_16
304 bool
305- depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK6 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 || MGEODEGX1
306+ depends on MWINCHIP3D || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIPC6 || MCYRIXIII || X86_ELAN || MK8 || MK7 || MK6 || MPENTIUM4 || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMII || M686 || M586MMX || M586TSC || M586 || M486 || MVIAC3_2 || MGEODEGX1
307 default y
308
309 config X86_GOOD_APIC
310diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.debug linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.debug
311--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.debug 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
312+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/Kconfig.debug 2006-04-09 21:24:03.000000000 -0400
313@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ config DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
314
315 config DEBUG_RODATA
316 bool "Write protect kernel read-only data structures"
317- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
318+ depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && 0
319 help
320 Mark the kernel read-only data as write-protected in the pagetables,
321 in order to catch accidental (and incorrect) writes to such const
322diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/acpi/sleep.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/acpi/sleep.c
323--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/acpi/sleep.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
324+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/acpi/sleep.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
325@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
326 #include <linux/dmi.h>
327 #include <asm/smp.h>
328 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
329+#include <asm/desc.h>
330
331 /* address in low memory of the wakeup routine. */
332 unsigned long acpi_wakeup_address = 0;
333@@ -24,11 +25,22 @@ static void init_low_mapping(pgd_t * pgd
334 {
335 int pgd_ofs = 0;
336
337+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
338+ unsigned long cr0;
339+
340+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
341+#endif
342+
343 while ((pgd_ofs < pgd_limit)
344 && (pgd_ofs + USER_PTRS_PER_PGD < PTRS_PER_PGD)) {
345 set_pgd(pgd, *(pgd + USER_PTRS_PER_PGD));
346 pgd_ofs++, pgd++;
347 }
348+
349+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
350+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
351+#endif
352+
353 flush_tlb_all();
354 }
355
356@@ -55,7 +67,18 @@ int acpi_save_state_mem(void)
357 */
358 void acpi_restore_state_mem(void)
359 {
360+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
361+ unsigned long cr0;
362+
363+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
364+#endif
365+
366 zap_low_mappings();
367+
368+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
369+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
370+#endif
371+
372 }
373
374 /**
375diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apic.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apic.c
376--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apic.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
377+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apic.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
378@@ -1150,7 +1150,7 @@ inline void smp_local_timer_interrupt(st
379 {
380 profile_tick(CPU_PROFILING, regs);
381 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
382- update_process_times(user_mode_vm(regs));
383+ update_process_times(user_mode(regs));
384 #endif
385
386 /*
387diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c
388--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
389+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/apm.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
390@@ -589,9 +589,18 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call(u32 func, u32 eb
391 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
392 struct desc_struct *gdt;
393
394+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
395+ unsigned long cr0;
396+#endif
397+
398 cpus = apm_save_cpus();
399
400 cpu = get_cpu();
401+
402+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
403+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
404+#endif
405+
406 gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
407 save_desc_40 = gdt[0x40 / 8];
408 gdt[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
409@@ -603,6 +612,11 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call(u32 func, u32 eb
410 APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
411 local_irq_restore(flags);
412 gdt[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
413+
414+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
415+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
416+#endif
417+
418 put_cpu();
419 apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
420
421@@ -633,9 +647,18 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call_simple(u32 func,
422 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
423 struct desc_struct *gdt;
424
425+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
426+ unsigned long cr0;
427+#endif
428+
429 cpus = apm_save_cpus();
430
431 cpu = get_cpu();
432+
433+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
434+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
435+#endif
436+
437 gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
438 save_desc_40 = gdt[0x40 / 8];
439 gdt[0x40 / 8] = bad_bios_desc;
440@@ -647,6 +670,11 @@ static u8 apm_bios_call_simple(u32 func,
441 APM_DO_RESTORE_SEGS;
442 local_irq_restore(flags);
443 gdt[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
444+
445+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
446+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
447+#endif
448+
449 put_cpu();
450 apm_restore_cpus(cpus);
451 return error;
452diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/asm-offsets.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/asm-offsets.c
453--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/asm-offsets.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
454+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/asm-offsets.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
455@@ -68,5 +68,6 @@ void foo(void)
456 sizeof(struct tss_struct));
457
458 DEFINE(PAGE_SIZE_asm, PAGE_SIZE);
459+ DEFINE(PTRS_PER_PTE_asm, PTRS_PER_PTE);
460 DEFINE(VSYSCALL_BASE, __fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL));
461 }
462diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c
463--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
464+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/cpu/common.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
465@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
466 #include <linux/smp.h>
467 #include <linux/module.h>
468 #include <linux/percpu.h>
469-#include <linux/bootmem.h>
470 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
471 #include <asm/processor.h>
472 #include <asm/i387.h>
473@@ -19,9 +18,6 @@
474
475 #include "cpu.h"
476
477-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct Xgt_desc_struct, cpu_gdt_descr);
478-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_gdt_descr);
479-
480 DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, cpu_16bit_stack[CPU_16BIT_STACK_SIZE]);
481 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_16bit_stack);
482
483@@ -387,6 +383,10 @@ void __devinit identify_cpu(struct cpuin
484 if (this_cpu->c_init)
485 this_cpu->c_init(c);
486
487+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL)
488+ clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
489+#endif
490+
491 /* Disable the PN if appropriate */
492 squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
493
494@@ -573,11 +573,10 @@ void __init early_cpu_init(void)
495 void __devinit cpu_init(void)
496 {
497 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
498- struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
499+ struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu;
500 struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
501- struct desc_struct *gdt;
502+ struct desc_struct *gdt = get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu);
503 __u32 stk16_off = (__u32)&per_cpu(cpu_16bit_stack, cpu);
504- struct Xgt_desc_struct *cpu_gdt_descr = &per_cpu(cpu_gdt_descr, cpu);
505
506 if (cpu_test_and_set(cpu, cpu_initialized)) {
507 printk(KERN_WARNING "CPU#%d already initialized!\n", cpu);
508@@ -595,29 +594,11 @@ void __devinit cpu_init(void)
509 }
510
511 /*
512- * This is a horrible hack to allocate the GDT. The problem
513- * is that cpu_init() is called really early for the boot CPU
514- * (and hence needs bootmem) but much later for the secondary
515- * CPUs, when bootmem will have gone away
516- */
517- if (NODE_DATA(0)->bdata->node_bootmem_map) {
518- gdt = (struct desc_struct *)alloc_bootmem_pages(PAGE_SIZE);
519- /* alloc_bootmem_pages panics on failure, so no check */
520- memset(gdt, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
521- } else {
522- gdt = (struct desc_struct *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
523- if (unlikely(!gdt)) {
524- printk(KERN_CRIT "CPU%d failed to allocate GDT\n", cpu);
525- for (;;)
526- local_irq_enable();
527- }
528- }
529-
530- /*
531 * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
532 * and set up the GDT descriptor:
533 */
534- memcpy(gdt, cpu_gdt_table, GDT_SIZE);
535+ if (cpu)
536+ memcpy(gdt, cpu_gdt_table, GDT_SIZE);
537
538 /* Set up GDT entry for 16bit stack */
539 *(__u64 *)(&gdt[GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS]) |=
540@@ -625,10 +606,10 @@ void __devinit cpu_init(void)
541 ((((__u64)stk16_off) << 32) & 0xff00000000000000ULL) |
542 (CPU_16BIT_STACK_SIZE - 1);
543
544- cpu_gdt_descr->size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
545- cpu_gdt_descr->address = (unsigned long)gdt;
546+ cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
547+ cpu_gdt_descr[cpu].address = (unsigned long)gdt;
548
549- load_gdt(cpu_gdt_descr);
550+ load_gdt(&cpu_gdt_descr[cpu]);
551 load_idt(&idt_descr);
552
553 /*
554@@ -643,7 +624,7 @@ void __devinit cpu_init(void)
555 load_esp0(t, thread);
556 set_tss_desc(cpu,t);
557 load_TR_desc();
558- load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
559+ _load_LDT(&init_mm.context);
560
561 #ifdef CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT
562 /* Set up doublefault TSS pointer in the GDT */
563diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/doublefault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/doublefault.c
564--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/doublefault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
565+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/doublefault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
566@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
567
568 #define DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE (1024)
569 static unsigned long doublefault_stack[DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE];
570-#define STACK_START (unsigned long)(doublefault_stack+DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE)
571+#define STACK_START (unsigned long)(doublefault_stack+DOUBLEFAULT_STACKSIZE-2)
572
573 #define ptr_ok(x) ((x) > PAGE_OFFSET && (x) < PAGE_OFFSET + 0x1000000)
574
575diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi.c
576--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
577+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
578@@ -64,82 +64,58 @@ extern void * boot_ioremap(unsigned long
579
580 static unsigned long efi_rt_eflags;
581 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(efi_rt_lock);
582-static pgd_t efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[2];
583+static pgd_t __initdata efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[4];
584
585-static void efi_call_phys_prelog(void)
586+static void __init efi_call_phys_prelog(void)
587 {
588- unsigned long cr4;
589- unsigned long temp;
590- struct Xgt_desc_struct *cpu_gdt_descr;
591-
592 spin_lock(&efi_rt_lock);
593 local_irq_save(efi_rt_eflags);
594
595- cpu_gdt_descr = &per_cpu(cpu_gdt_descr, 0);
596+ efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0] = swapper_pg_dir[0];
597+ swapper_pg_dir[0] = swapper_pg_dir[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD];
598
599- /*
600- * If I don't have PSE, I should just duplicate two entries in page
601- * directory. If I have PSE, I just need to duplicate one entry in
602- * page directory.
603- */
604- cr4 = read_cr4();
605-
606- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PSE) {
607- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd =
608- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd;
609- swapper_pg_dir[0].pgd =
610- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET)].pgd;
611- } else {
612- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd =
613- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd;
614- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1].pgd =
615- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd;
616- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
617- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET)].pgd;
618- temp = PAGE_OFFSET + 0x400000;
619- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd =
620- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(temp)].pgd;
621- }
622+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_PAE
623+ efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1] = swapper_pg_dir[1];
624+ swapper_pg_dir[1] = swapper_pg_dir[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD+1];
625+ efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[2] = swapper_pg_dir[2];
626+ swapper_pg_dir[2] = swapper_pg_dir[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD+2];
627+ efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[3] = swapper_pg_dir[3];
628+ swapper_pg_dir[3] = swapper_pg_dir[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD+3];
629+#endif
630
631 /*
632 * After the lock is released, the original page table is restored.
633 */
634- local_flush_tlb();
635+ __flush_tlb_all();
636
637- cpu_gdt_descr->address = __pa(cpu_gdt_descr->address);
638- load_gdt(cpu_gdt_descr);
639+ cpu_gdt_descr[0].address = __pa(cpu_gdt_descr[0].address);
640+ load_gdt((struct Xgt_desc_struct *) __pa(&cpu_gdt_descr[0]));
641 }
642
643-static void efi_call_phys_epilog(void)
644+static void __init efi_call_phys_epilog(void)
645 {
646- unsigned long cr4;
647- struct Xgt_desc_struct *cpu_gdt_descr = &per_cpu(cpu_gdt_descr, 0);
648-
649- cpu_gdt_descr->address = __va(cpu_gdt_descr->address);
650- load_gdt(cpu_gdt_descr);
651+ cpu_gdt_descr[0].address =
652+ (unsigned long) __va(cpu_gdt_descr[0].address);
653+ load_gdt(&cpu_gdt_descr[0]);
654
655- cr4 = read_cr4();
656+ swapper_pg_dir[0] = efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0];
657
658- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PSE) {
659- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
660- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd;
661- } else {
662- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0)].pgd =
663- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[0].pgd;
664- swapper_pg_dir[pgd_index(0x400000)].pgd =
665- efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1].pgd;
666- }
667+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_PAE
668+ swapper_pg_dir[1] = efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[1];
669+ swapper_pg_dir[2] = efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[2];
670+ swapper_pg_dir[3] = efi_bak_pg_dir_pointer[3];
671+#endif
672
673 /*
674 * After the lock is released, the original page table is restored.
675 */
676- local_flush_tlb();
677+ __flush_tlb_all();
678
679 local_irq_restore(efi_rt_eflags);
680 spin_unlock(&efi_rt_lock);
681 }
682
683-static efi_status_t
684+static efi_status_t __init
685 phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned long memory_map_size,
686 unsigned long descriptor_size,
687 u32 descriptor_version,
688@@ -155,7 +131,7 @@ phys_efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigne
689 return status;
690 }
691
692-static efi_status_t
693+static efi_status_t __init
694 phys_efi_get_time(efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc)
695 {
696 efi_status_t status;
697diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi_stub.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi_stub.S
698--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi_stub.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
699+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/efi_stub.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
700@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
701
702 #include <linux/config.h>
703 #include <linux/linkage.h>
704+#include <linux/init.h>
705 #include <asm/page.h>
706 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
707
708@@ -22,7 +23,7 @@
709 * service functions will comply with gcc calling convention, too.
710 */
711
712-.text
713+__INIT
714 ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
715 /*
716 * 0. The function can only be called in Linux kernel. So CS has been
717@@ -38,9 +39,7 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
718 * The mapping of lower virtual memory has been created in prelog and
719 * epilog.
720 */
721- movl $1f, %edx
722- subl $__PAGE_OFFSET, %edx
723- jmp *%edx
724+ jmp 1f-__PAGE_OFFSET
725 1:
726
727 /*
728@@ -49,14 +48,8 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
729 * parameter 2, ..., param n. To make things easy, we save the return
730 * address of efi_call_phys in a global variable.
731 */
732- popl %edx
733- movl %edx, saved_return_addr
734- /* get the function pointer into ECX*/
735- popl %ecx
736- movl %ecx, efi_rt_function_ptr
737- movl $2f, %edx
738- subl $__PAGE_OFFSET, %edx
739- pushl %edx
740+ popl (saved_return_addr)
741+ popl (efi_rt_function_ptr)
742
743 /*
744 * 3. Clear PG bit in %CR0.
745@@ -75,9 +68,8 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
746 /*
747 * 5. Call the physical function.
748 */
749- jmp *%ecx
750+ call *(efi_rt_function_ptr-__PAGE_OFFSET)
751
752-2:
753 /*
754 * 6. After EFI runtime service returns, control will return to
755 * following instruction. We'd better readjust stack pointer first.
756@@ -87,37 +79,29 @@ ENTRY(efi_call_phys)
757 /*
758 * 7. Restore PG bit
759 */
760- movl %cr0, %edx
761- orl $0x80000000, %edx
762- movl %edx, %cr0
763- jmp 1f
764-1:
765 /*
766 * 8. Now restore the virtual mode from flat mode by
767 * adding EIP with PAGE_OFFSET.
768 */
769- movl $1f, %edx
770- jmp *%edx
771+ movl %cr0, %edx
772+ orl $0x80000000, %edx
773+ movl %edx, %cr0
774+ jmp 1f+__PAGE_OFFSET
775 1:
776
777 /*
778 * 9. Balance the stack. And because EAX contain the return value,
779 * we'd better not clobber it.
780 */
781- leal efi_rt_function_ptr, %edx
782- movl (%edx), %ecx
783- pushl %ecx
784+ pushl (efi_rt_function_ptr)
785
786 /*
787- * 10. Push the saved return address onto the stack and return.
788+ * 10. Return to the saved return address.
789 */
790- leal saved_return_addr, %edx
791- movl (%edx), %ecx
792- pushl %ecx
793- ret
794+ jmpl *(saved_return_addr)
795 .previous
796
797-.data
798+__INITDATA
799 saved_return_addr:
800 .long 0
801 efi_rt_function_ptr:
802diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S
803--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
804+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/entry.S 2006-04-09 21:24:03.000000000 -0400
805@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ VM_MASK = 0x00020000
806 #define resume_kernel restore_nocheck
807 #endif
808
809-#define SAVE_ALL \
810+#define __SAVE_ALL \
811 cld; \
812 pushl %es; \
813 pushl %ds; \
814@@ -97,6 +97,18 @@ VM_MASK = 0x00020000
815 movl %edx, %ds; \
816 movl %edx, %es;
817
818+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
819+#define SAVE_ALL \
820+ __SAVE_ALL \
821+ movl %cr0, %edx; \
822+ movl %edx, %esi; \
823+ orl $0x10000, %edx; \
824+ xorl %edx, %esi; \
825+ movl %edx, %cr0;
826+#else
827+#define SAVE_ALL __SAVE_ALL
828+#endif
829+
830 #define RESTORE_INT_REGS \
831 popl %ebx; \
832 popl %ecx; \
833@@ -146,7 +158,19 @@ ret_from_intr:
834 movl EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS and CS
835 movb CS(%esp), %al
836 testl $(VM_MASK | 3), %eax
837+
838+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
839+ jnz resume_userspace
840+
841+ movl %cr0, %edx
842+ xorl %esi, %edx
843+ movl %edx, %cr0
844+ jmp resume_kernel
845+#else
846 jz resume_kernel
847+#endif
848+
849+
850 ENTRY(resume_userspace)
851 cli # make sure we don't miss an interrupt
852 # setting need_resched or sigpending
853@@ -213,6 +237,13 @@ sysenter_past_esp:
854 movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
855 testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx
856 jne syscall_exit_work
857+
858+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
859+ pushl %eax
860+ call pax_randomize_kstack
861+ popl %eax
862+#endif
863+
864 /* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */
865 movl EIP(%esp), %edx
866 movl OLDESP(%esp), %ecx
867@@ -243,6 +274,10 @@ syscall_exit:
868 testw $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %cx # current->work
869 jne syscall_exit_work
870
871+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
872+ call pax_randomize_kstack
873+#endif
874+
875 restore_all:
876 movl EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS, SS and CS
877 # Warning: OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we
878@@ -398,7 +433,7 @@ syscall_badsys:
879 * Build the entry stubs and pointer table with
880 * some assembler magic.
881 */
882-.data
883+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
884 ENTRY(interrupt)
885 .text
886
887@@ -408,7 +443,7 @@ ENTRY(irq_entries_start)
888 ALIGN
889 1: pushl $vector-256
890 jmp common_interrupt
891-.data
892+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
893 .long 1b
894 .text
895 vector=vector+1
896@@ -459,6 +494,15 @@ error_code:
897 movl %ecx, %ds
898 movl %ecx, %es
899 movl %esp,%eax # pt_regs pointer
900+
901+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
902+ movl %cr0, %ecx
903+ movl %ecx, %esi
904+ orl $0x10000, %ecx
905+ xorl %ecx, %esi
906+ movl %ecx, %cr0
907+#endif
908+
909 call *%edi
910 jmp ret_from_exception
911
912@@ -554,6 +598,13 @@ nmi_stack_correct:
913 xorl %edx,%edx # zero error code
914 movl %esp,%eax # pt_regs pointer
915 call do_nmi
916+
917+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
918+ movl %cr0, %edx
919+ xorl %esi, %edx
920+ movl %edx, %cr0
921+#endif
922+
923 jmp restore_all
924
925 nmi_stack_fixup:
926@@ -584,6 +635,13 @@ nmi_16bit_stack:
927 FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK # %eax == %esp
928 xorl %edx,%edx # zero error code
929 call do_nmi
930+
931+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
932+ movl %cr0, %edx
933+ xorl %esi, %edx
934+ movl %edx, %cr0
935+#endif
936+
937 RESTORE_REGS
938 lss 12+4(%esp), %esp # back to 16bit stack
939 1: iret
940@@ -659,7 +717,6 @@ ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug)
941 pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug
942 jmp error_code
943
944-.section .rodata,"a"
945 #include "syscall_table.S"
946
947 syscall_table_size=(.-sys_call_table)
948diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/head.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/head.S
949--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
950+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/head.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
951@@ -48,6 +48,12 @@
952
953
954 /*
955+ * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
956+ */
957+ENTRY(stext)
958+ENTRY(_stext)
959+
960+/*
961 * 32-bit kernel entrypoint; only used by the boot CPU. On entry,
962 * %esi points to the real-mode code as a 32-bit pointer.
963 * CS and DS must be 4 GB flat segments, but we don't depend on
964@@ -67,6 +73,19 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
965 movl %eax,%fs
966 movl %eax,%gs
967
968+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
969+ movl $ __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET,%eax
970+ movw %ax,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 2)
971+ rorl $16,%eax
972+ movb %al,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 4)
973+ movb %ah,(cpu_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __KERNEL_CS + 7)
974+
975+ movb %al,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 4)
976+ movb %ah,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 7)
977+ rorl $16,%eax
978+ movw %ax,(boot_gdt_table - __PAGE_OFFSET + __BOOT_CS + 2)
979+#endif
980+
981 /*
982 * Clear BSS first so that there are no surprises...
983 * No need to cld as DF is already clear from cld above...
984@@ -114,24 +133,42 @@ ENTRY(startup_32)
985 * Warning: don't use %esi or the stack in this code. However, %esp
986 * can be used as a GPR if you really need it...
987 */
988-page_pde_offset = (__PAGE_OFFSET >> 20);
989-
990+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
991+page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 21) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE_asm));
992+#else
993+page_pde_offset = ((__PAGE_OFFSET >> 22) * (4096 / PTRS_PER_PTE_asm));
994+#endif
995 movl $(pg0 - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edi
996+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
997+ movl $(swapper_pm_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx
998+#else
999 movl $(swapper_pg_dir - __PAGE_OFFSET), %edx
1000- movl $0x007, %eax /* 0x007 = PRESENT+RW+USER */
1001+#endif
1002+ movl $0x063, %eax /* 0x063 = DIRTY+ACCESSED+PRESENT+RW */
1003 10:
1004- leal 0x007(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */
1005+ leal 0x063(%edi),%ecx /* Create PDE entry */
1006 movl %ecx,(%edx) /* Store identity PDE entry */
1007 movl %ecx,page_pde_offset(%edx) /* Store kernel PDE entry */
1008+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1009+ movl $0,4(%edx)
1010+ movl $0,page_pde_offset+4(%edx)
1011+ addl $8,%edx
1012+ movl $512, %ecx
1013+#else
1014 addl $4,%edx
1015 movl $1024, %ecx
1016+#endif
1017 11:
1018 stosl
1019+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1020+ movl $0,(%edi)
1021+ addl $4,%edi
1022+#endif
1023 addl $0x1000,%eax
1024 loop 11b
1025 /* End condition: we must map up to and including INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END */
1026- /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x007 is the attribute bits */
1027- leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x007)(%edi),%ebp
1028+ /* bytes beyond the end of our own page tables; the +0x063 is the attribute bits */
1029+ leal (INIT_MAP_BEYOND_END+0x063)(%edi),%ebp
1030 cmpl %ebp,%eax
1031 jb 10b
1032 movl %edi,(init_pg_tables_end - __PAGE_OFFSET)
1033@@ -154,6 +191,11 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
1034 movl %eax,%fs
1035 movl %eax,%gs
1036
1037+ /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */
1038+ xorl %ebx,%ebx
1039+ incl %ebx
1040+#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
1041+
1042 /*
1043 * New page tables may be in 4Mbyte page mode and may
1044 * be using the global pages.
1045@@ -169,26 +211,27 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
1046 * not yet offset PAGE_OFFSET..
1047 */
1048 #define cr4_bits mmu_cr4_features-__PAGE_OFFSET
1049+3:
1050 movl cr4_bits,%edx
1051 andl %edx,%edx
1052- jz 6f
1053+ jz 5f
1054 movl %cr4,%eax # Turn on paging options (PSE,PAE,..)
1055 orl %edx,%eax
1056 movl %eax,%cr4
1057
1058- btl $5, %eax # check if PAE is enabled
1059- jnc 6f
1060+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1061+ movl %ebx,%edi
1062
1063 /* Check if extended functions are implemented */
1064 movl $0x80000000, %eax
1065 cpuid
1066 cmpl $0x80000000, %eax
1067- jbe 6f
1068+ jbe 4f
1069 mov $0x80000001, %eax
1070 cpuid
1071 /* Execute Disable bit supported? */
1072 btl $20, %edx
1073- jnc 6f
1074+ jnc 4f
1075
1076 /* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
1077 movl $0xc0000080, %ecx
1078@@ -197,14 +240,12 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
1079 btsl $11, %eax
1080 /* Make changes effective */
1081 wrmsr
1082+ btsl $63,__supported_pte_mask-__PAGE_OFFSET
1083
1084-6:
1085- /* This is a secondary processor (AP) */
1086- xorl %ebx,%ebx
1087- incl %ebx
1088-
1089-3:
1090-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
1091+4:
1092+ movl %edi,%ebx
1093+#endif
1094+5:
1095
1096 /*
1097 * Enable paging
1098@@ -229,9 +270,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_32_smp)
1099
1100 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
1101 andl %ebx,%ebx
1102- jz 1f /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
1103- jmp checkCPUtype
1104-1:
1105+ jnz checkCPUtype /* Initial CPU cleans BSS */
1106 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
1107
1108 /*
1109@@ -412,32 +451,50 @@ ignore_int:
1110 #endif
1111 iret
1112
1113-/*
1114- * Real beginning of normal "text" segment
1115- */
1116-ENTRY(stext)
1117-ENTRY(_stext)
1118-
1119-/*
1120- * BSS section
1121- */
1122-.section ".bss.page_aligned","w"
1123+.section .swapper_pg_dir,"a",@progbits
1124 ENTRY(swapper_pg_dir)
1125+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1126+ .long swapper_pm_dir-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
1127+ .long 0
1128+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*8-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
1129+ .long 0
1130+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*16-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
1131+ .long 0
1132+ .long swapper_pm_dir+512*24-__PAGE_OFFSET+1
1133+ .long 0
1134+#else
1135 .fill 1024,4,0
1136+#endif
1137+
1138+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1139+.section .swapper_pm_dir,"a",@progbits
1140+ENTRY(swapper_pm_dir)
1141+ .fill 512,8,0
1142+ .fill 512,8,0
1143+ .fill 512,8,0
1144+ .fill 512,8,0
1145+#endif
1146+
1147+.section .empty_zero_page,"a",@progbits
1148 ENTRY(empty_zero_page)
1149 .fill 4096,1,0
1150
1151 /*
1152- * This starts the data section.
1153- */
1154-.data
1155+ * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
1156+ * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
1157+ * for this.
1158+ */
1159+.section .idt,"a",@progbits
1160+ENTRY(idt_table)
1161+ .fill 256,8,0
1162+
1163+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
1164+ready: .byte 0
1165
1166 ENTRY(stack_start)
1167- .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE
1168+ .long init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE-8
1169 .long __BOOT_DS
1170
1171-ready: .byte 0
1172-
1173 int_msg:
1174 .asciz "Unknown interrupt or fault at EIP %p %p %p\n"
1175
1176@@ -479,8 +536,8 @@ cpu_gdt_descr:
1177 .align L1_CACHE_BYTES
1178 ENTRY(boot_gdt_table)
1179 .fill GDT_ENTRY_BOOT_CS,8,0
1180- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1181- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1182+ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1183+ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1184
1185 /*
1186 * The Global Descriptor Table contains 28 quadwords, per-CPU.
1187@@ -500,10 +557,10 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
1188 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x53 reserved */
1189 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x5b reserved */
1190
1191- .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1192- .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1193- .quad 0x00cffa000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1194- .quad 0x00cff2000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1195+ .quad 0x00cf9b000000ffff /* 0x60 kernel 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1196+ .quad 0x00cf93000000ffff /* 0x68 kernel 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1197+ .quad 0x00cffb000000ffff /* 0x73 user 4GB code at 0x00000000 */
1198+ .quad 0x00cff3000000ffff /* 0x7b user 4GB data at 0x00000000 */
1199
1200 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x80 TSS descriptor */
1201 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0x88 LDT descriptor */
1202@@ -513,24 +570,30 @@ ENTRY(cpu_gdt_table)
1203 * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
1204 * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
1205 */
1206- .quad 0x00409a000000ffff /* 0x90 32-bit code */
1207- .quad 0x00009a000000ffff /* 0x98 16-bit code */
1208- .quad 0x000092000000ffff /* 0xa0 16-bit data */
1209- .quad 0x0000920000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */
1210- .quad 0x0000920000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */
1211+ .quad 0x00409b000000ffff /* 0x90 32-bit code */
1212+ .quad 0x00009b000000ffff /* 0x98 16-bit code */
1213+ .quad 0x000093000000ffff /* 0xa0 16-bit data */
1214+ .quad 0x0000930000000000 /* 0xa8 16-bit data */
1215+ .quad 0x0000930000000000 /* 0xb0 16-bit data */
1216
1217 /*
1218 * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
1219 * are set at run time. All have 64k limits.
1220 */
1221- .quad 0x00409a000000ffff /* 0xb8 APM CS code */
1222- .quad 0x00009a000000ffff /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
1223- .quad 0x004092000000ffff /* 0xc8 APM DS data */
1224+ .quad 0x00409b000000ffff /* 0xb8 APM CS code */
1225+ .quad 0x00009b000000ffff /* 0xc0 APM CS 16 code (16 bit) */
1226+ .quad 0x004093000000ffff /* 0xc8 APM DS data */
1227
1228- .quad 0x0000920000000000 /* 0xd0 - ESPFIX 16-bit SS */
1229+ .quad 0x0000930000000000 /* 0xd0 - ESPFIX 16-bit SS */
1230 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xd8 - unused */
1231 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xe0 - unused */
1232 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xe8 - unused */
1233 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf0 - unused */
1234 .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* 0xf8 - GDT entry 31: double-fault TSS */
1235
1236+ /* Be sure this is zeroed to avoid false validations in Xen */
1237+ .fill PAGE_SIZE_asm / 8 - GDT_ENTRIES,8,0
1238+
1239+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
1240+ .fill (NR_CPUS-1) * (PAGE_SIZE_asm / 8),8,0 /* other CPU's GDT */
1241+#endif
1242diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c
1243--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1244+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/i386_ksyms.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1245@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
1246 #include <asm/checksum.h>
1247 #include <asm/desc.h>
1248
1249+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_gdt_descr);
1250+
1251 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed);
1252 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed_interruptible);
1253 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__down_failed_trylock);
1254diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c
1255--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1256+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/init_task.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1257@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_task);
1258 * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux,
1259 * no more per-task TSS's.
1260 */
1261-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss) ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp = INIT_TSS;
1262+struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS] ____cacheline_internodealigned_in_smp = { [0 ... NR_CPUS-1] = INIT_TSS };
1263
1264diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c
1265--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1266+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ioport.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1267@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
1268 #include <linux/stddef.h>
1269 #include <linux/slab.h>
1270 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
1271+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1272
1273 /* Set EXTENT bits starting at BASE in BITMAP to value TURN_ON. */
1274 static void set_bitmap(unsigned long *bitmap, unsigned int base, unsigned int extent, int new_value)
1275@@ -64,9 +65,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
1276
1277 if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
1278 return -EINVAL;
1279+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
1280+ if (turn_on) {
1281+ gr_handle_ioperm();
1282+#else
1283 if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
1284+#endif
1285 return -EPERM;
1286-
1287+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
1288+ }
1289+#endif
1290 /*
1291 * If it's the first ioperm() call in this thread's lifetime, set the
1292 * IO bitmap up. ioperm() is much less timing critical than clone(),
1293@@ -88,7 +96,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long
1294 * because the ->io_bitmap_max value must match the bitmap
1295 * contents:
1296 */
1297- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
1298+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
1299
1300 set_bitmap(t->io_bitmap_ptr, from, num, !turn_on);
1301
1302@@ -142,8 +150,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_iopl(unsigned long u
1303 return -EINVAL;
1304 /* Trying to gain more privileges? */
1305 if (level > old) {
1306+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_IO
1307+ gr_handle_iopl();
1308+ return -EPERM;
1309+#else
1310 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
1311 return -EPERM;
1312+#endif
1313 }
1314 t->iopl = level << 12;
1315 regs->eflags = (regs->eflags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | t->iopl;
1316diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c
1317--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1318+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/irq.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1319@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ fastcall unsigned int do_IRQ(struct pt_r
1320 int arg1, arg2, ebx;
1321
1322 /* build the stack frame on the IRQ stack */
1323- isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx));
1324+ isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx)) - 2;
1325 irqctx->tinfo.task = curctx->tinfo.task;
1326 irqctx->tinfo.previous_esp = current_stack_pointer;
1327
1328@@ -119,10 +119,10 @@ fastcall unsigned int do_IRQ(struct pt_r
1329 * gcc's 3.0 and earlier don't handle that correctly.
1330 */
1331 static char softirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE]
1332- __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE)));
1333+ __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned")));
1334
1335 static char hardirq_stack[NR_CPUS * THREAD_SIZE]
1336- __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE)));
1337+ __attribute__((__aligned__(THREAD_SIZE), __section__(".bss.page_aligned")));
1338
1339 /*
1340 * allocate per-cpu stacks for hardirq and for softirq processing
1341@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_softirq(void)
1342 irqctx->tinfo.previous_esp = current_stack_pointer;
1343
1344 /* build the stack frame on the softirq stack */
1345- isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx));
1346+ isp = (u32*) ((char*)irqctx + sizeof(*irqctx)) - 2;
1347
1348 asm volatile(
1349 " xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
1350diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c
1351--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1352+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ldt.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1353@@ -103,6 +103,19 @@ int init_new_context(struct task_struct
1354 retval = copy_ldt(&mm->context, &old_mm->context);
1355 up(&old_mm->context.sem);
1356 }
1357+
1358+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1359+ if (!mm->context.user_cs_limit) {
1360+ mm->context.user_cs_base = 0UL;
1361+ mm->context.user_cs_limit = ~0UL;
1362+
1363+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
1364+ cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
1365+#endif
1366+
1367+ }
1368+#endif
1369+
1370 return retval;
1371 }
1372
1373@@ -160,7 +173,7 @@ static int read_default_ldt(void __user
1374 {
1375 int err;
1376 unsigned long size;
1377- void *address;
1378+ const void *address;
1379
1380 err = 0;
1381 address = &default_ldt[0];
1382@@ -215,6 +228,13 @@ static int write_ldt(void __user * ptr,
1383 }
1384 }
1385
1386+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1387+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (ldt_info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE)) {
1388+ error = -EINVAL;
1389+ goto out_unlock;
1390+ }
1391+#endif
1392+
1393 entry_1 = LDT_entry_a(&ldt_info);
1394 entry_2 = LDT_entry_b(&ldt_info);
1395 if (oldmode)
1396diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/module.c
1397--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1398+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1399@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
1400 #include <linux/fs.h>
1401 #include <linux/string.h>
1402 #include <linux/kernel.h>
1403+#include <asm/desc.h>
1404
1405 #if 0
1406 #define DEBUGP printk
1407@@ -32,9 +33,30 @@ void *module_alloc(unsigned long size)
1408 {
1409 if (size == 0)
1410 return NULL;
1411+
1412+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1413+ return vmalloc(size);
1414+#else
1415 return vmalloc_exec(size);
1416+#endif
1417+
1418 }
1419
1420+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1421+void *module_alloc_exec(unsigned long size)
1422+{
1423+ struct vm_struct *area;
1424+
1425+ if (size == 0)
1426+ return NULL;
1427+
1428+ area = __get_vm_area(size, 0, (unsigned long)&MODULES_VADDR, (unsigned long)&MODULES_END);
1429+ if (area)
1430+ return area->addr;
1431+
1432+ return NULL;
1433+}
1434+#endif
1435
1436 /* Free memory returned from module_alloc */
1437 void module_free(struct module *mod, void *module_region)
1438@@ -44,6 +66,45 @@ void module_free(struct module *mod, voi
1439 table entries. */
1440 }
1441
1442+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1443+void module_free_exec(struct module *mod, void *module_region)
1444+{
1445+ struct vm_struct **p, *tmp;
1446+
1447+ if (!module_region)
1448+ return;
1449+
1450+ if ((PAGE_SIZE-1) & (unsigned long)module_region) {
1451+ printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to module_free_exec() bad address (%p)\n", module_region);
1452+ WARN_ON(1);
1453+ return;
1454+ }
1455+
1456+ write_lock(&vmlist_lock);
1457+ for (p = &vmlist ; (tmp = *p) != NULL ;p = &tmp->next)
1458+ if (tmp->addr == module_region)
1459+ break;
1460+
1461+ if (tmp) {
1462+ unsigned long cr0;
1463+
1464+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
1465+ memset(tmp->addr, 0xCC, tmp->size);
1466+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
1467+
1468+ *p = tmp->next;
1469+ kfree(tmp);
1470+ }
1471+ write_unlock(&vmlist_lock);
1472+
1473+ if (!tmp) {
1474+ printk(KERN_ERR "Trying to module_free_exec() nonexistent vm area (%p)\n",
1475+ module_region);
1476+ WARN_ON(1);
1477+ }
1478+}
1479+#endif
1480+
1481 /* We don't need anything special. */
1482 int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
1483 Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
1484@@ -62,14 +123,16 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs,
1485 unsigned int i;
1486 Elf32_Rel *rel = (void *)sechdrs[relsec].sh_addr;
1487 Elf32_Sym *sym;
1488- uint32_t *location;
1489+ uint32_t *plocation, location;
1490
1491 DEBUGP("Applying relocate section %u to %u\n", relsec,
1492 sechdrs[relsec].sh_info);
1493 for (i = 0; i < sechdrs[relsec].sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
1494 /* This is where to make the change */
1495- location = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr
1496- + rel[i].r_offset;
1497+ plocation = (void *)sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
1498+ location = (uint32_t)plocation;
1499+ if (sechdrs[sechdrs[relsec].sh_info].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)
1500+ plocation = (void *)plocation + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1501 /* This is the symbol it is referring to. Note that all
1502 undefined symbols have been resolved. */
1503 sym = (Elf32_Sym *)sechdrs[symindex].sh_addr
1504@@ -78,11 +141,11 @@ int apply_relocate(Elf32_Shdr *sechdrs,
1505 switch (ELF32_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
1506 case R_386_32:
1507 /* We add the value into the location given */
1508- *location += sym->st_value;
1509+ *plocation += sym->st_value;
1510 break;
1511 case R_386_PC32:
1512 /* Add the value, subtract its postition */
1513- *location += sym->st_value - (uint32_t)location;
1514+ *plocation += sym->st_value - location;
1515 break;
1516 default:
1517 printk(KERN_ERR "module %s: Unknown relocation: %u\n",
1518diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
1519--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1520+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/process.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1521@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ void exit_thread(void)
1522 /* The process may have allocated an io port bitmap... nuke it. */
1523 if (unlikely(NULL != t->io_bitmap_ptr)) {
1524 int cpu = get_cpu();
1525- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1526+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1527
1528 kfree(t->io_bitmap_ptr);
1529 t->io_bitmap_ptr = NULL;
1530@@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ void flush_thread(void)
1531 {
1532 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1533
1534+ __asm__("mov %0,%%fs\n"
1535+ "mov %0,%%gs\n"
1536+ : : "r" (0) : "memory");
1537 memset(tsk->thread.debugreg, 0, sizeof(unsigned long)*8);
1538 memset(tsk->thread.tls_array, 0, sizeof(tsk->thread.tls_array));
1539 /*
1540@@ -426,7 +429,7 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl
1541 struct task_struct *tsk;
1542 int err;
1543
1544- childregs = task_pt_regs(p);
1545+ childregs = task_stack_page(p) + THREAD_SIZE - sizeof(struct pt_regs) - 8;
1546 *childregs = *regs;
1547 childregs->eax = 0;
1548 childregs->esp = esp;
1549@@ -469,6 +472,11 @@ int copy_thread(int nr, unsigned long cl
1550 if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
1551 goto out;
1552
1553+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1554+ if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE))
1555+ goto out;
1556+#endif
1557+
1558 desc = p->thread.tls_array + idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
1559 desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info);
1560 desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info);
1561@@ -633,7 +641,11 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t
1562 struct thread_struct *prev = &prev_p->thread,
1563 *next = &next_p->thread;
1564 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
1565- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1566+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1567+
1568+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1569+ unsigned long cr0;
1570+#endif
1571
1572 /* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */
1573
1574@@ -656,11 +668,19 @@ struct task_struct fastcall * __switch_t
1575 savesegment(fs, prev->fs);
1576 savesegment(gs, prev->gs);
1577
1578+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1579+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
1580+#endif
1581+
1582 /*
1583 * Load the per-thread Thread-Local Storage descriptor.
1584 */
1585 load_TLS(next, cpu);
1586
1587+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1588+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
1589+#endif
1590+
1591 /*
1592 * Restore %fs and %gs if needed.
1593 *
1594@@ -815,8 +835,18 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc
1595 struct desc_struct *desc;
1596 int cpu, idx;
1597
1598+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1599+ unsigned long cr0;
1600+#endif
1601+
1602 if (copy_from_user(&info, u_info, sizeof(info)))
1603 return -EFAULT;
1604+
1605+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1606+ if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE))
1607+ return -EINVAL;
1608+#endif
1609+
1610 idx = info.entry_number;
1611
1612 /*
1613@@ -848,8 +878,17 @@ asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(struc
1614 desc->a = LDT_entry_a(&info);
1615 desc->b = LDT_entry_b(&info);
1616 }
1617+
1618+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1619+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
1620+#endif
1621+
1622 load_TLS(t, cpu);
1623
1624+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1625+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
1626+#endif
1627+
1628 put_cpu();
1629
1630 return 0;
1631@@ -905,9 +944,27 @@ asmlinkage int sys_get_thread_area(struc
1632 return 0;
1633 }
1634
1635-unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
1636+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDKSTACK
1637+asmlinkage void pax_randomize_kstack(void)
1638 {
1639- if (randomize_va_space)
1640- sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
1641- return sp & ~0xf;
1642+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + smp_processor_id();
1643+ unsigned long time;
1644+
1645+ if (!randomize_va_space)
1646+ return;
1647+
1648+ rdtscl(time);
1649+
1650+ /* P4 seems to return a 0 LSB, ignore it */
1651+#ifdef CONFIG_MPENTIUM4
1652+ time &= 0x1EUL;
1653+ time <<= 2;
1654+#else
1655+ time &= 0xFUL;
1656+ time <<= 3;
1657+#endif
1658+
1659+ tss->esp0 ^= time;
1660+ current->thread.esp0 = tss->esp0;
1661 }
1662+#endif
1663diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
1664--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1665+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1666@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
1667 #include <linux/audit.h>
1668 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
1669 #include <linux/signal.h>
1670+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
1671
1672 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
1673 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
1674@@ -342,6 +343,11 @@ ptrace_set_thread_area(struct task_struc
1675 if (copy_from_user(&info, user_desc, sizeof(info)))
1676 return -EFAULT;
1677
1678+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1679+ if ((child->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (info.contents & MODIFY_LDT_CONTENTS_CODE))
1680+ return -EINVAL;
1681+#endif
1682+
1683 if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
1684 return -EINVAL;
1685
1686@@ -432,6 +438,17 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *chi
1687 if(addr == (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[5]) break;
1688 if(addr < (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[4] &&
1689 ((unsigned long) data) >= TASK_SIZE-3) break;
1690+
1691+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
1692+ if(addr >= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0] &&
1693+ addr <= (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[3]){
1694+ long reg = (addr - (long) &dummy->u_debugreg[0]) >> 2;
1695+ long type = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 4*reg)) & 3;
1696+ long align = (child->thread.debugreg[7] >> (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + 2 + 4*reg)) & 3;
1697+ if((type & 1) && (data & align))
1698+ break;
1699+ }
1700+#endif
1701
1702 /* Sanity-check data. Take one half-byte at once with
1703 * check = (val >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf. It contains the
1704@@ -645,7 +662,7 @@ void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *ts
1705 info.si_code = TRAP_BRKPT;
1706
1707 /* User-mode eip? */
1708- info.si_addr = user_mode_vm(regs) ? (void __user *) regs->eip : NULL;
1709+ info.si_addr = user_mode(regs) ? (void __user *) regs->eip : NULL;
1710
1711 /* Send us the fakey SIGTRAP */
1712 force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, tsk);
1713diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c
1714--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1715+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/reboot.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1716@@ -138,18 +138,18 @@ core_initcall(reboot_init);
1717 doesn't work with at least one type of 486 motherboard. It is easy
1718 to stop this code working; hence the copious comments. */
1719
1720-static unsigned long long
1721+static const unsigned long long
1722 real_mode_gdt_entries [3] =
1723 {
1724 0x0000000000000000ULL, /* Null descriptor */
1725- 0x00009a000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
1726- 0x000092000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
1727+ 0x00009b000000ffffULL, /* 16-bit real-mode 64k code at 0x00000000 */
1728+ 0x000093000100ffffULL /* 16-bit real-mode 64k data at 0x00000100 */
1729 };
1730
1731 static struct
1732 {
1733 unsigned short size __attribute__ ((packed));
1734- unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
1735+ const unsigned long long * base __attribute__ ((packed));
1736 }
1737 real_mode_gdt = { sizeof (real_mode_gdt_entries) - 1, real_mode_gdt_entries },
1738 real_mode_idt = { 0x3ff, NULL },
1739@@ -203,6 +203,10 @@ void machine_real_restart(unsigned char
1740 {
1741 unsigned long flags;
1742
1743+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1744+ unsigned long cr0;
1745+#endif
1746+
1747 local_irq_disable();
1748
1749 /* Write zero to CMOS register number 0x0f, which the BIOS POST
1750@@ -223,9 +227,17 @@ void machine_real_restart(unsigned char
1751 from the kernel segment. This assumes the kernel segment starts at
1752 virtual address PAGE_OFFSET. */
1753
1754+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1755+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
1756+#endif
1757+
1758 memcpy (swapper_pg_dir, swapper_pg_dir + USER_PGD_PTRS,
1759 sizeof (swapper_pg_dir [0]) * KERNEL_PGD_PTRS);
1760
1761+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1762+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
1763+#endif
1764+
1765 /*
1766 * Use `swapper_pg_dir' as our page directory.
1767 */
1768diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c
1769--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1770+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1771@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
1772 #include <asm/io.h>
1773 #include "setup_arch_pre.h"
1774 #include <bios_ebda.h>
1775+#include <asm/desc.h>
1776
1777 /* Forward Declaration. */
1778 void __init find_max_pfn(void);
1779@@ -86,7 +87,11 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data __initda
1780 struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data __read_mostly = { 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, 1, 0, 0, -1 };
1781 EXPORT_SYMBOL(boot_cpu_data);
1782
1783+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
1784+unsigned long mmu_cr4_features = X86_CR4_PAE;
1785+#else
1786 unsigned long mmu_cr4_features;
1787+#endif
1788
1789 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
1790 int acpi_disabled = 0;
1791@@ -1444,12 +1449,22 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, voi
1792 struct alt_instr *a;
1793 int diff, i, k;
1794 unsigned char **noptable = intel_nops;
1795+
1796+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1797+ unsigned long cr0;
1798+#endif
1799+
1800 for (i = 0; noptypes[i].cpuid >= 0; i++) {
1801 if (boot_cpu_has(noptypes[i].cpuid)) {
1802 noptable = noptypes[i].noptable;
1803 break;
1804 }
1805 }
1806+
1807+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1808+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
1809+#endif
1810+
1811 for (a = start; (void *)a < end; a++) {
1812 if (!boot_cpu_has(a->cpuid))
1813 continue;
1814@@ -1464,6 +1479,11 @@ void apply_alternatives(void *start, voi
1815 memcpy(a->instr + i, noptable[k], k);
1816 }
1817 }
1818+
1819+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
1820+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
1821+#endif
1822+
1823 }
1824
1825 void __init alternative_instructions(void)
1826@@ -1542,14 +1562,14 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
1827
1828 if (!MOUNT_ROOT_RDONLY)
1829 root_mountflags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
1830- init_mm.start_code = (unsigned long) _text;
1831- init_mm.end_code = (unsigned long) _etext;
1832+ init_mm.start_code = (unsigned long) _text + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1833+ init_mm.end_code = (unsigned long) _etext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
1834 init_mm.end_data = (unsigned long) _edata;
1835 init_mm.brk = init_pg_tables_end + PAGE_OFFSET;
1836
1837- code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text);
1838- code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext)-1;
1839- data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_etext);
1840+ code_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_text + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET);
1841+ code_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_etext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)-1;
1842+ data_resource.start = virt_to_phys(_data);
1843 data_resource.end = virt_to_phys(_edata)-1;
1844
1845 parse_cmdline_early(cmdline_p);
1846diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c
1847--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1848+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/signal.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1849@@ -350,7 +350,17 @@ static int setup_frame(int sig, struct k
1850 goto give_sigsegv;
1851 }
1852
1853+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1854+ restorer = frame->retcode;
1855+#else
1856 restorer = &__kernel_sigreturn;
1857+
1858+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1859+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1860+ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1861+#endif
1862+#endif
1863+
1864 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
1865 restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
1866
1867@@ -446,7 +456,18 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int sig, struc
1868 goto give_sigsegv;
1869
1870 /* Set up to return from userspace. */
1871+
1872+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1873+ restorer = frame->retcode;
1874+#else
1875 restorer = &__kernel_rt_sigreturn;
1876+
1877+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1878+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1879+ restorer -= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1880+#endif
1881+#endif
1882+
1883 if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
1884 restorer = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
1885 err |= __put_user(restorer, &frame->pretcode);
1886@@ -579,7 +600,7 @@ static void fastcall do_signal(struct pt
1887 * before reaching here, so testing against kernel
1888 * CS suffices.
1889 */
1890- if (!user_mode(regs))
1891+ if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
1892 return;
1893
1894 if (try_to_freeze())
1895diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S
1896--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1897+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/syscall_table.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1898@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
1899+.section .rodata,"a",@progbits
1900 ENTRY(sys_call_table)
1901 .long sys_restart_syscall /* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */
1902 .long sys_exit
1903diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c
1904--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1905+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sysenter.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1906@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ extern asmlinkage void sysenter_entry(vo
1907 void enable_sep_cpu(void)
1908 {
1909 int cpu = get_cpu();
1910- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
1911+ struct tss_struct *tss = init_tss + cpu;
1912
1913 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP)) {
1914 put_cpu();
1915@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ extern const char vsyscall_sysenter_star
1916
1917 int __init sysenter_setup(void)
1918 {
1919+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
1920 void *page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
1921
1922 __set_fixmap(FIX_VSYSCALL, __pa(page), PAGE_READONLY_EXEC);
1923@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ int __init sysenter_setup(void)
1924 memcpy(page,
1925 &vsyscall_sysenter_start,
1926 &vsyscall_sysenter_end - &vsyscall_sysenter_start);
1927+#endif
1928
1929 return 0;
1930 }
1931diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c
1932--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
1933+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/sys_i386.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
1934@@ -106,6 +106,191 @@ out:
1935 return err;
1936 }
1937
1938+unsigned long
1939+arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
1940+ unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
1941+{
1942+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
1943+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1944+ unsigned long start_addr, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
1945+
1946+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
1947+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
1948+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
1949+#endif
1950+
1951+ if (len > task_size)
1952+ return -ENOMEM;
1953+
1954+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1955+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
1956+#endif
1957+
1958+ if (addr) {
1959+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
1960+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
1961+ if (task_size - len >= addr &&
1962+ (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
1963+ return addr;
1964+ }
1965+ if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
1966+ start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
1967+ } else {
1968+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
1969+ mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
1970+ }
1971+
1972+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
1973+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE) && start_addr >= mm->mmap_base) {
1974+ start_addr = 0x00110000UL;
1975+
1976+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
1977+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
1978+ start_addr += mm->delta_mmap & 0x03FFFFFFUL;
1979+#endif
1980+
1981+ if (mm->start_brk <= start_addr && start_addr < mm->mmap_base)
1982+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
1983+ else
1984+ addr = start_addr;
1985+ }
1986+#endif
1987+
1988+full_search:
1989+ for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
1990+ /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
1991+ if (task_size - len < addr) {
1992+ /*
1993+ * Start a new search - just in case we missed
1994+ * some holes.
1995+ */
1996+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
1997+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
1998+ mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
1999+ goto full_search;
2000+ }
2001+ return -ENOMEM;
2002+ }
2003+ if (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start) {
2004+ /*
2005+ * Remember the place where we stopped the search:
2006+ */
2007+ mm->free_area_cache = addr + len;
2008+ return addr;
2009+ }
2010+ if (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)
2011+ mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;
2012+ addr = vma->vm_end;
2013+ if (mm->start_brk <= addr && addr < mm->mmap_base) {
2014+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
2015+ goto full_search;
2016+ }
2017+ }
2018+}
2019+
2020+unsigned long
2021+arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
2022+ const unsigned long len, const unsigned long pgoff,
2023+ const unsigned long flags)
2024+{
2025+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
2026+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2027+ unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
2028+
2029+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
2030+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2031+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
2032+#endif
2033+
2034+ /* requested length too big for entire address space */
2035+ if (len > task_size)
2036+ return -ENOMEM;
2037+
2038+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2039+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & MAP_EXECUTABLE))
2040+ goto bottomup;
2041+#endif
2042+
2043+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
2044+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
2045+#endif
2046+
2047+ /* requesting a specific address */
2048+ if (addr) {
2049+ addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
2050+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
2051+ if (task_size - len >= addr &&
2052+ (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
2053+ return addr;
2054+ }
2055+
2056+ /* check if free_area_cache is useful for us */
2057+ if (len <= mm->cached_hole_size) {
2058+ mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
2059+ mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
2060+ }
2061+
2062+ /* either no address requested or can't fit in requested address hole */
2063+ addr = mm->free_area_cache;
2064+
2065+ /* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */
2066+ if (addr > len) {
2067+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr-len);
2068+ if (!vma || addr <= vma->vm_start)
2069+ /* remember the address as a hint for next time */
2070+ return (mm->free_area_cache = addr-len);
2071+ }
2072+
2073+ if (mm->mmap_base < len)
2074+ goto bottomup;
2075+
2076+ addr = mm->mmap_base-len;
2077+
2078+ do {
2079+ /*
2080+ * Lookup failure means no vma is above this address,
2081+ * else if new region fits below vma->vm_start,
2082+ * return with success:
2083+ */
2084+ vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
2085+ if (!vma || addr+len <= vma->vm_start)
2086+ /* remember the address as a hint for next time */
2087+ return (mm->free_area_cache = addr);
2088+
2089+ /* remember the largest hole we saw so far */
2090+ if (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)
2091+ mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;
2092+
2093+ /* try just below the current vma->vm_start */
2094+ addr = vma->vm_start-len;
2095+ } while (len < vma->vm_start);
2096+
2097+bottomup:
2098+ /*
2099+ * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
2100+ * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
2101+ * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
2102+ * allocations.
2103+ */
2104+ mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
2105+
2106+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
2107+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
2108+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
2109+#endif
2110+
2111+ mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
2112+ mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
2113+ addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
2114+ /*
2115+ * Restore the topdown base:
2116+ */
2117+ mm->mmap_base = base;
2118+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
2119+ mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
2120+
2121+ return addr;
2122+}
2123
2124 struct sel_arg_struct {
2125 unsigned long n;
2126diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c
2127--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2128+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/traps.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2129@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
2130 #include <linux/utsname.h>
2131 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
2132 #include <linux/kexec.h>
2133+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
2134
2135 #ifdef CONFIG_EISA
2136 #include <linux/ioport.h>
2137@@ -58,18 +59,13 @@
2138
2139 asmlinkage int system_call(void);
2140
2141-struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
2142+const struct desc_struct default_ldt[] = { { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 },
2143 { 0, 0 }, { 0, 0 } };
2144
2145 /* Do we ignore FPU interrupts ? */
2146 char ignore_fpu_irq = 0;
2147
2148-/*
2149- * The IDT has to be page-aligned to simplify the Pentium
2150- * F0 0F bug workaround.. We have a special link segment
2151- * for this.
2152- */
2153-struct desc_struct idt_table[256] __attribute__((__section__(".data.idt"))) = { {0, 0}, };
2154+extern struct desc_struct idt_table[256];
2155
2156 asmlinkage void divide_error(void);
2157 asmlinkage void debug(void);
2158@@ -125,18 +121,22 @@ static inline unsigned long print_contex
2159 char *log_lvl)
2160 {
2161 unsigned long addr;
2162+ int i = kstack_depth_to_print;
2163
2164 #ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
2165 while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, (void *)ebp)) {
2166 addr = *(unsigned long *)(ebp + 4);
2167 print_addr_and_symbol(addr, log_lvl);
2168 ebp = *(unsigned long *)ebp;
2169+ --i;
2170 }
2171 #else
2172 while (valid_stack_ptr(tinfo, stack)) {
2173 addr = *stack++;
2174- if (__kernel_text_address(addr))
2175+ if (__kernel_text_address(addr)) {
2176 print_addr_and_symbol(addr, log_lvl);
2177+ --i;
2178+ }
2179 }
2180 #endif
2181 return ebp;
2182@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs
2183
2184 printk(KERN_EMERG "Code: ");
2185
2186- eip = (u8 __user *)regs->eip - 43;
2187+ eip = (u8 __user *)regs->eip - 43 + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2188 for (i = 0; i < 64; i++, eip++) {
2189 unsigned char c;
2190
2191@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs
2192 printk(" Bad EIP value.");
2193 break;
2194 }
2195- if (eip == (u8 __user *)regs->eip)
2196+ if (eip == (u8 __user *)regs->eip + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
2197 printk("<%02x> ", c);
2198 else
2199 printk("%02x ", c);
2200@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static void handle_BUG(struct pt_regs *r
2201 char c;
2202 unsigned long eip;
2203
2204- eip = regs->eip;
2205+ eip = regs->eip + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2206
2207 if (eip < PAGE_OFFSET)
2208 goto no_bug;
2209@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_reg
2210
2211 static inline void die_if_kernel(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
2212 {
2213- if (!user_mode_vm(regs))
2214+ if (!user_mode(regs))
2215 die(str, regs, err);
2216 }
2217
2218@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ static void __kprobes do_trap(int trapnr
2219 goto trap_signal;
2220 }
2221
2222- if (!user_mode(regs))
2223+ if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
2224 goto kernel_trap;
2225
2226 trap_signal: {
2227@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_general_prote
2228 long error_code)
2229 {
2230 int cpu = get_cpu();
2231- struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
2232+ struct tss_struct *tss = &init_tss[cpu];
2233 struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
2234
2235 /*
2236@@ -532,9 +532,25 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_general_prote
2237 if (regs->eflags & VM_MASK)
2238 goto gp_in_vm86;
2239
2240- if (!user_mode(regs))
2241+ if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
2242 goto gp_in_kernel;
2243
2244+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2245+ if (current->mm && (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
2246+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2247+ unsigned long limit;
2248+
2249+ down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
2250+ limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
2251+ if (limit < TASK_SIZE) {
2252+ track_exec_limit(mm, limit, TASK_SIZE, PROT_EXEC);
2253+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
2254+ return;
2255+ }
2256+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
2257+ }
2258+#endif
2259+
2260 current->thread.error_code = error_code;
2261 current->thread.trap_no = 13;
2262 force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
2263@@ -550,6 +566,13 @@ gp_in_kernel:
2264 if (notify_die(DIE_GPF, "general protection fault", regs,
2265 error_code, 13, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP)
2266 return;
2267+
2268+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2269+ if ((regs->xcs & 0xFFFF) == __KERNEL_CS)
2270+ die("PAX: suspicious general protection fault", regs, error_code);
2271+ else
2272+#endif
2273+
2274 die("general protection fault", regs, error_code);
2275 }
2276 }
2277@@ -775,7 +798,7 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_debug(struct
2278 * check for kernel mode by just checking the CPL
2279 * of CS.
2280 */
2281- if (!user_mode(regs))
2282+ if (!user_mode_novm(regs))
2283 goto clear_TF_reenable;
2284 }
2285
2286@@ -1065,7 +1088,19 @@ do { \
2287 */
2288 void set_intr_gate(unsigned int n, void *addr)
2289 {
2290+
2291+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2292+ unsigned long cr0;
2293+
2294+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
2295+#endif
2296+
2297 _set_gate(idt_table+n,14,0,addr,__KERNEL_CS);
2298+
2299+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2300+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
2301+#endif
2302+
2303 }
2304
2305 /*
2306diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
2307--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2308+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2309@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ struct pt_regs * fastcall save_v86_state
2310 do_exit(SIGSEGV);
2311 }
2312
2313- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
2314+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
2315 current->thread.esp0 = current->thread.saved_esp0;
2316 current->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
2317 load_esp0(tss, &current->thread);
2318@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm
2319 savesegment(fs, tsk->thread.saved_fs);
2320 savesegment(gs, tsk->thread.saved_gs);
2321
2322- tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
2323+ tss = init_tss + get_cpu();
2324 tsk->thread.esp0 = (unsigned long) &info->VM86_TSS_ESP0;
2325 if (cpu_has_sep)
2326 tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = 0;
2327diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
2328--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2329+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2330@@ -4,9 +4,18 @@
2331
2332 #define LOAD_OFFSET __PAGE_OFFSET
2333
2334+#include <linux/config.h>
2335+
2336 #include <asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h>
2337 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
2338 #include <asm/page.h>
2339+#include <asm/segment.h>
2340+
2341+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2342+#define PMD_SHIFT 21
2343+#else
2344+#define PMD_SHIFT 22
2345+#endif
2346
2347 OUTPUT_FORMAT("elf32-i386", "elf32-i386", "elf32-i386")
2348 OUTPUT_ARCH(i386)
2349@@ -15,67 +24,17 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
2350 SECTIONS
2351 {
2352 . = __KERNEL_START;
2353- phys_startup_32 = startup_32 - LOAD_OFFSET;
2354- /* read-only */
2355- _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
2356- .text : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2357- *(.text)
2358- SCHED_TEXT
2359- LOCK_TEXT
2360- KPROBES_TEXT
2361- *(.fixup)
2362- *(.gnu.warning)
2363- } = 0x9090
2364-
2365- _etext = .; /* End of text section */
2366-
2367- . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */
2368- __start___ex_table = .;
2369- __ex_table : AT(ADDR(__ex_table) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(__ex_table) }
2370- __stop___ex_table = .;
2371-
2372- RODATA
2373+ phys_startup_32 = startup_32 - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2374
2375- /* writeable */
2376- .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) { /* Data */
2377- *(.data)
2378- CONSTRUCTORS
2379+ .text.startup : AT(ADDR(.text.startup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2380+ BYTE(0xEA) /* jmp far */
2381+ LONG(phys_startup_32)
2382+ SHORT(__BOOT_CS)
2383 }
2384
2385- . = ALIGN(4096);
2386- __nosave_begin = .;
2387- .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.nosave) }
2388- . = ALIGN(4096);
2389- __nosave_end = .;
2390-
2391- . = ALIGN(4096);
2392- .data.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2393- *(.data.idt)
2394- }
2395-
2396- . = ALIGN(32);
2397- .data.cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2398- *(.data.cacheline_aligned)
2399- }
2400-
2401- /* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
2402- . = ALIGN(32);
2403- .data.read_mostly : AT(ADDR(.data.read_mostly) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.read_mostly) }
2404- _edata = .; /* End of data section */
2405-
2406- . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */
2407- .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2408- *(.data.init_task)
2409- }
2410-
2411 /* will be freed after init */
2412 . = ALIGN(4096); /* Init code and data */
2413 __init_begin = .;
2414- .init.text : AT(ADDR(.init.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2415- _sinittext = .;
2416- *(.init.text)
2417- _einittext = .;
2418- }
2419 .init.data : AT(ADDR(.init.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.init.data) }
2420 . = ALIGN(16);
2421 __setup_start = .;
2422@@ -107,9 +66,7 @@ SECTIONS
2423 .altinstr_replacement : AT(ADDR(.altinstr_replacement) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2424 *(.altinstr_replacement)
2425 }
2426- /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
2427- from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
2428- .exit.text : AT(ADDR(.exit.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.exit.text) }
2429+
2430 .exit.data : AT(ADDR(.exit.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.exit.data) }
2431 . = ALIGN(4096);
2432 __initramfs_start = .;
2433@@ -119,10 +76,108 @@ SECTIONS
2434 __per_cpu_start = .;
2435 .data.percpu : AT(ADDR(.data.percpu) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.percpu) }
2436 __per_cpu_end = .;
2437+
2438+ /* read-only */
2439+
2440 . = ALIGN(4096);
2441- __init_end = .;
2442+ .init.text (. - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : AT(ADDR(.init.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
2443+ _sinittext = .;
2444+ *(.init.text)
2445+ _einittext = .;
2446+ }
2447+
2448+ /* .exit.text is discard at runtime, not link time, to deal with references
2449+ from .altinstructions and .eh_frame */
2450+ .exit.text : AT(ADDR(.exit.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) { *(.exit.text) }
2451+
2452+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2453+ .text.align : AT(ADDR(.text.align) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
2454+ . = ALIGN(__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET - LOAD_OFFSET) - 1;
2455+ BYTE(0)
2456+ }
2457+#else
2458+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2459+#endif
2460+
2461+ __init_end = . + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2462 /* freed after init ends here */
2463-
2464+
2465+ _text = .; /* Text and read-only data */
2466+ .text : AT(ADDR(.text) - LOAD_OFFSET + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) {
2467+ *(.text)
2468+ SCHED_TEXT
2469+ LOCK_TEXT
2470+ KPROBES_TEXT
2471+ *(.fixup)
2472+ *(.gnu.warning)
2473+ } = 0x9090
2474+
2475+ _etext = .; /* End of text section */
2476+ . += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2477+ . = ALIGN(16); /* Exception table */
2478+ __start___ex_table = .;
2479+ __ex_table : AT(ADDR(__ex_table) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(__ex_table) }
2480+ __stop___ex_table = .;
2481+
2482+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2483+ .rodata.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.rodata.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2484+ *(.empty_zero_page)
2485+
2486+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2487+ *(.swapper_pm_dir)
2488+#endif
2489+
2490+ *(.swapper_pg_dir)
2491+ *(.idt)
2492+ }
2493+
2494+ RODATA
2495+
2496+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2497+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2498+ MODULES_VADDR = .;
2499+
2500+ .module.text : AT(ADDR(.module.text) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2501+ . += (4 * 1024 * 1024);
2502+ . = ALIGN(1 << PMD_SHIFT) - 1;
2503+ BYTE(0)
2504+ }
2505+
2506+ MODULES_END = .;
2507+#else
2508+ . = ALIGN(32);
2509+#endif
2510+
2511+ /* writeable */
2512+ .data : AT(ADDR(.data) - LOAD_OFFSET) { /* Data */
2513+ _data = .;
2514+ *(.data)
2515+ CONSTRUCTORS
2516+ }
2517+
2518+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2519+ __nosave_begin = .;
2520+ .data_nosave : AT(ADDR(.data_nosave) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.nosave) }
2521+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2522+ __nosave_end = .;
2523+
2524+ . = ALIGN(32);
2525+ .data.cacheline_aligned : AT(ADDR(.data.cacheline_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2526+ *(.data.cacheline_aligned)
2527+ }
2528+
2529+ /* rarely changed data like cpu maps */
2530+ . = ALIGN(32);
2531+ .data.read_mostly : AT(ADDR(.data.read_mostly) - LOAD_OFFSET) { *(.data.read_mostly) }
2532+
2533+ . = ALIGN(THREAD_SIZE); /* init_task */
2534+ .data.init_task : AT(ADDR(.data.init_task) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2535+ *(.data.init_task)
2536+ }
2537+
2538+ _edata = .; /* End of data section */
2539+
2540+ . = ALIGN(4096);
2541 __bss_start = .; /* BSS */
2542 .bss.page_aligned : AT(ADDR(.bss.page_aligned) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
2543 *(.bss.page_aligned)
2544diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c
2545--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2546+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mach-voyager/voyager_smp.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2547@@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ smp_local_timer_interrupt(struct pt_regs
2548 per_cpu(prof_counter, cpu);
2549 }
2550
2551- update_process_times(user_mode_vm(regs));
2552+ update_process_times(user_mode(regs));
2553 }
2554
2555 if( ((1<<cpu) & voyager_extended_vic_processors) == 0)
2556diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/boot_ioremap.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/boot_ioremap.c
2557--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/boot_ioremap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2558+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/boot_ioremap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2559@@ -8,53 +8,37 @@
2560 */
2561
2562
2563-/*
2564- * We need to use the 2-level pagetable functions, but CONFIG_X86_PAE
2565- * keeps that from happenning. If anyone has a better way, I'm listening.
2566- *
2567- * boot_pte_t is defined only if this all works correctly
2568- */
2569-
2570 #include <linux/config.h>
2571-#undef CONFIG_X86_PAE
2572 #include <asm/page.h>
2573 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
2574 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
2575 #include <linux/init.h>
2576 #include <linux/stddef.h>
2577
2578-/*
2579- * I'm cheating here. It is known that the two boot PTE pages are
2580- * allocated next to each other. I'm pretending that they're just
2581- * one big array.
2582- */
2583-
2584-#define BOOT_PTE_PTRS (PTRS_PER_PTE*2)
2585-#define boot_pte_index(address) \
2586- (((address) >> PAGE_SHIFT) & (BOOT_PTE_PTRS - 1))
2587-
2588-static inline boot_pte_t* boot_vaddr_to_pte(void *address)
2589-{
2590- boot_pte_t* boot_pg = (boot_pte_t*)pg0;
2591- return &boot_pg[boot_pte_index((unsigned long)address)];
2592-}
2593
2594 /*
2595 * This is only for a caller who is clever enough to page-align
2596 * phys_addr and virtual_source, and who also has a preference
2597 * about which virtual address from which to steal ptes
2598 */
2599-static void __boot_ioremap(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long nrpages,
2600- void* virtual_source)
2601+static void __init __boot_ioremap(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned int nrpages,
2602+ char* virtual_source)
2603 {
2604- boot_pte_t* pte;
2605- int i;
2606- char *vaddr = virtual_source;
2607+ pgd_t *pgd;
2608+ pud_t *pud;
2609+ pmd_t *pmd;
2610+ pte_t* pte;
2611+ unsigned int i;
2612+ unsigned long vaddr = (unsigned long)virtual_source;
2613+
2614+ pgd = pgd_offset_k(vaddr);
2615+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr);
2616+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
2617+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
2618
2619- pte = boot_vaddr_to_pte(virtual_source);
2620 for (i=0; i < nrpages; i++, phys_addr += PAGE_SIZE, pte++) {
2621 set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(phys_addr>>PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL));
2622- __flush_tlb_one(&vaddr[i*PAGE_SIZE]);
2623+ __flush_tlb_one(&virtual_source[i*PAGE_SIZE]);
2624 }
2625 }
2626
2627diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/extable.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/extable.c
2628--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/extable.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2629+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/extable.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2630@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs
2631 const struct exception_table_entry *fixup;
2632
2633 #ifdef CONFIG_PNPBIOS
2634- if (unlikely((regs->xcs & ~15) == (GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_BASE << 3)))
2635+ if (unlikely(regs->xcs == (GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_BASE << 3)))
2636 {
2637 extern u32 pnp_bios_fault_eip, pnp_bios_fault_esp;
2638 extern u32 pnp_bios_is_utter_crap;
2639diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/fault.c
2640--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
2641+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
2642@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
2643 #include <linux/highmem.h>
2644 #include <linux/module.h>
2645 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
2646+#include <linux/unistd.h>
2647+#include <linux/compiler.h>
2648+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
2649
2650 #include <asm/system.h>
2651 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
2652@@ -82,11 +85,13 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_
2653
2654 /* Unlikely, but must come before segment checks. */
2655 if (unlikely((regs->eflags & VM_MASK) != 0))
2656- return eip + (seg << 4);
2657+ return (eip & 0xFFFF) + (seg << 4);
2658
2659 /* By far the most common cases. */
2660- if (likely(seg == __USER_CS || seg == __KERNEL_CS))
2661+ if (likely(seg == __USER_CS))
2662 return eip;
2663+ if (likely(seg == __KERNEL_CS))
2664+ return eip + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
2665
2666 /* Check the segment exists, is within the current LDT/GDT size,
2667 that kernel/user (ring 0..3) has the appropriate privilege,
2668@@ -108,7 +113,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_segment_
2669 desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7);
2670 } else {
2671 /* Must disable preemption while reading the GDT. */
2672- desc = (u32 *)get_cpu_gdt_table(get_cpu());
2673+ desc = (u32 *)get_cpu_gdt_table(get_cpu());
2674 desc = (void *)desc + (seg & ~7);
2675 }
2676
2677@@ -214,6 +219,30 @@ static noinline void force_sig_info_faul
2678
2679 fastcall void do_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *, unsigned long);
2680
2681+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2682+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs);
2683+#endif
2684+
2685+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2686+static inline pmd_t * pax_get_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address)
2687+{
2688+ pgd_t *pgd;
2689+ pud_t *pud;
2690+ pmd_t *pmd;
2691+
2692+ pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
2693+ if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
2694+ return NULL;
2695+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
2696+ if (!pud_present(*pud))
2697+ return NULL;
2698+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
2699+ if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
2700+ return NULL;
2701+ return pmd;
2702+}
2703+#endif
2704+
2705 /*
2706 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
2707 * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
2708@@ -231,9 +260,15 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_page_fault(st
2709 struct mm_struct *mm;
2710 struct vm_area_struct * vma;
2711 unsigned long address;
2712- unsigned long page;
2713 int write, si_code;
2714
2715+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2716+ pmd_t *pmd;
2717+ pte_t *pte;
2718+ spinlock_t *ptl;
2719+ unsigned char pte_mask;
2720+#endif
2721+
2722 /* get the address */
2723 address = read_cr2();
2724
2725@@ -245,6 +280,7 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_page_fault(st
2726 local_irq_enable();
2727
2728 tsk = current;
2729+ mm = tsk->mm;
2730
2731 si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
2732
2733@@ -271,14 +307,12 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_page_fault(st
2734 goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
2735 }
2736
2737- mm = tsk->mm;
2738-
2739 /*
2740 * If we're in an interrupt, have no user context or are running in an
2741 * atomic region then we must not take the fault..
2742 */
2743 if (in_atomic() || !mm)
2744- goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
2745+ goto bad_area_nopax;
2746
2747 /* When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to
2748 * addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in the
2749@@ -298,10 +332,98 @@ fastcall void __kprobes do_page_fault(st
2750 if (!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)) {
2751 if ((error_code & 4) == 0 &&
2752 !search_exception_tables(regs->eip))
2753- goto bad_area_nosemaphore;
2754+ goto bad_area_nopax;
2755 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2756 }
2757
2758+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2759+ if (unlikely((error_code & 5) != 5 ||
2760+ (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) ||
2761+ !(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)))
2762+ goto not_pax_fault;
2763+
2764+ /* PaX: it's our fault, let's handle it if we can */
2765+
2766+ /* PaX: take a look at read faults before acquiring any locks */
2767+ if (unlikely(!(error_code & 2) && (regs->eip == address))) {
2768+ /* instruction fetch attempt from a protected page in user mode */
2769+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2770+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
2771+
2772+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2773+ case 2:
2774+ return;
2775+#endif
2776+
2777+ }
2778+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2779+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2780+ }
2781+
2782+ pmd = pax_get_pmd(mm, address);
2783+ if (unlikely(!pmd))
2784+ goto not_pax_fault;
2785+
2786+ pte = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
2787+ if (unlikely(!(pte_val(*pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) || pte_user(*pte))) {
2788+ pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
2789+ goto not_pax_fault;
2790+ }
2791+
2792+ if (unlikely((error_code & 2) && !pte_write(*pte))) {
2793+ /* write attempt to a protected page in user mode */
2794+ pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
2795+ goto not_pax_fault;
2796+ }
2797+
2798+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
2799+ if (likely(address > get_limit(regs->xcs) && cpu_isset(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask)))
2800+#else
2801+ if (likely(address > get_limit(regs->xcs)))
2802+#endif
2803+ {
2804+ set_pte(pte, pte_mkread(*pte));
2805+ __flush_tlb_one(address);
2806+ pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
2807+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2808+ return;
2809+ }
2810+
2811+ pte_mask = _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_USER | ((error_code & 2) << (_PAGE_BIT_DIRTY-1));
2812+
2813+ /*
2814+ * PaX: fill DTLB with user rights and retry
2815+ */
2816+ __asm__ __volatile__ (
2817+ "orb %2,%1\n"
2818+#if defined(CONFIG_M586) || defined(CONFIG_M586TSC)
2819+/*
2820+ * PaX: let this uncommented 'invlpg' remind us on the behaviour of Intel's
2821+ * (and AMD's) TLBs. namely, they do not cache PTEs that would raise *any*
2822+ * page fault when examined during a TLB load attempt. this is true not only
2823+ * for PTEs holding a non-present entry but also present entries that will
2824+ * raise a page fault (such as those set up by PaX, or the copy-on-write
2825+ * mechanism). in effect it means that we do *not* need to flush the TLBs
2826+ * for our target pages since their PTEs are simply not in the TLBs at all.
2827+
2828+ * the best thing in omitting it is that we gain around 15-20% speed in the
2829+ * fast path of the page fault handler and can get rid of tracing since we
2830+ * can no longer flush unintended entries.
2831+ */
2832+ "invlpg %0\n"
2833+#endif
2834+ "testb $0,%0\n"
2835+ "xorb %3,%1\n"
2836+ :
2837+ : "m" (*(char*)address), "m" (*(char*)pte), "q" (pte_mask), "i" (_PAGE_USER)
2838+ : "memory", "cc");
2839+ pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
2840+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2841+ return;
2842+
2843+not_pax_fault:
2844+#endif
2845+
2846 vma = find_vma(mm, address);
2847 if (!vma)
2848 goto bad_area;
2849@@ -387,6 +509,37 @@ bad_area:
2850 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2851
2852 bad_area_nosemaphore:
2853+
2854+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2855+ if (mm && (error_code & 4) && !(regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
2856+
2857+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
2858+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip == address)) {
2859+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2860+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2861+ }
2862+#endif
2863+
2864+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
2865+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !(error_code & 3) && (regs->eip + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE == address)) {
2866+
2867+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
2868+
2869+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2870+ case 2:
2871+ return;
2872+#endif
2873+
2874+ }
2875+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->eip, (void*)regs->esp);
2876+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
2877+ }
2878+#endif
2879+
2880+ }
2881+#endif
2882+
2883+bad_area_nopax:
2884 /* User mode accesses just cause a SIGSEGV */
2885 if (error_code & 4) {
2886 /*
2887@@ -450,28 +603,53 @@ no_context:
2888 #endif
2889 if (address < PAGE_SIZE)
2890 printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference");
2891+
2892+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
2893+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
2894+ else if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < (unsigned long)MODULES_END)
2895+#else
2896+ else if (init_mm.start_code <= address && address < init_mm.end_code)
2897+#endif
2898+ if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
2899+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
2900+ NIPQUAD(tsk->signal->curr_ip), tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
2901+ else
2902+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: %s:%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, attempted to modify kernel code",
2903+ tsk->comm, tsk->pid, tsk->uid, tsk->euid);
2904+#endif
2905+
2906 else
2907 printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request");
2908 printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n",address);
2909 printk(KERN_ALERT " printing eip:\n");
2910 printk("%08lx\n", regs->eip);
2911- page = read_cr3();
2912- page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> 22];
2913- printk(KERN_ALERT "*pde = %08lx\n", page);
2914- /*
2915- * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
2916- * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem.
2917- * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case
2918- * it's allocated already.
2919- */
2920+ {
2921+ unsigned long index = pgd_index(address);
2922+ pgd_t *pgd;
2923+ pud_t *pud;
2924+ pmd_t *pmd;
2925+ pte_t *pte;
2926+
2927+ pgd = index + (pgd_t *)__va(read_cr3());
2928+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pgd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pgd), (unsigned long long)pgd_val(*pgd));
2929+ if (pgd_present(*pgd)) {
2930+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
2931+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
2932+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pmd = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pmd), (unsigned long long)pmd_val(*pmd));
2933+ /*
2934+ * We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
2935+ * case, the page table might be allocated in highmem.
2936+ * And lets rather not kmap-atomic the pte, just in case
2937+ * it's allocated already.
2938+ */
2939 #ifndef CONFIG_HIGHPTE
2940- if (page & 1) {
2941- page &= PAGE_MASK;
2942- address &= 0x003ff000;
2943- page = ((unsigned long *) __va(page))[address >> PAGE_SHIFT];
2944- printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %08lx\n", page);
2945- }
2946+ if (pmd_present(*pmd) && !pmd_large(*pmd)) {
2947+ pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
2948+ printk(KERN_ALERT "*pte = %*llx\n", sizeof(*pte), (unsigned long long)pte_val(*pte));
2949+ }
2950 #endif
2951+ }
2952+ }
2953 tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
2954 tsk->thread.trap_no = 14;
2955 tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
2956@@ -521,7 +699,7 @@ vmalloc_fault:
2957 * Do _not_ use "tsk" here. We might be inside
2958 * an interrupt in the middle of a task switch..
2959 */
2960- int index = pgd_index(address);
2961+ unsigned long index = pgd_index(address);
2962 unsigned long pgd_paddr;
2963 pgd_t *pgd, *pgd_k;
2964 pud_t *pud, *pud_k;
2965@@ -558,3 +736,105 @@ vmalloc_fault:
2966 return;
2967 }
2968 }
2969+
2970+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
2971+/*
2972+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->eip = fault address)
2973+ *
2974+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
2975+ * 2 when gcc trampoline was detected
2976+ */
2977+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
2978+{
2979+
2980+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2981+ static const unsigned char trans[8] = {6, 1, 2, 0, 13, 5, 3, 4};
2982+ int err;
2983+#endif
2984+
2985+ if (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
2986+ return 1;
2987+
2988+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
2989+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
2990+ return 1;
2991+
2992+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #1 */
2993+ unsigned char mov1, mov2;
2994+ unsigned short jmp;
2995+ unsigned long addr1, addr2;
2996+
2997+ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned char __user *)regs->eip);
2998+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->eip + 1));
2999+ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->eip + 5));
3000+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->eip + 6));
3001+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned short __user *)(regs->eip + 10));
3002+
3003+ if (err)
3004+ break;
3005+
3006+ if ((mov1 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
3007+ (mov2 & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
3008+ (mov1 & 0x07) != (mov2 & 0x07) &&
3009+ (jmp & 0xF8FF) == 0xE0FF &&
3010+ (mov2 & 0x07) == ((jmp>>8) & 0x07))
3011+ {
3012+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov1 & 0x07]] = addr1;
3013+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov2 & 0x07]] = addr2;
3014+ regs->eip = addr2;
3015+ return 2;
3016+ }
3017+ } while (0);
3018+
3019+ do { /* PaX: gcc trampoline emulation #2 */
3020+ unsigned char mov, jmp;
3021+ unsigned long addr1, addr2;
3022+
3023+ err = get_user(mov, (unsigned char __user *)regs->eip);
3024+ err |= get_user(addr1, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->eip + 1));
3025+ err |= get_user(jmp, (unsigned char __user *)(regs->eip + 5));
3026+ err |= get_user(addr2, (unsigned long __user *)(regs->eip + 6));
3027+
3028+ if (err)
3029+ break;
3030+
3031+ if ((mov & 0xF8) == 0xB8 &&
3032+ jmp == 0xE9)
3033+ {
3034+ ((unsigned long *)regs)[trans[mov & 0x07]] = addr1;
3035+ regs->eip += addr2 + 10;
3036+ return 2;
3037+ }
3038+ } while (0);
3039+#endif
3040+
3041+ return 1; /* PaX in action */
3042+}
3043+#endif
3044+
3045+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
3046+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
3047+{
3048+ long i;
3049+
3050+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3051+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
3052+ unsigned char c;
3053+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char __user *)pc+i))
3054+ printk("?? ");
3055+ else
3056+ printk("%02x ", c);
3057+ }
3058+ printk("\n");
3059+
3060+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP-4: ");
3061+ for (i = -1; i < 20; i++) {
3062+ unsigned long c;
3063+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)sp+i))
3064+ printk("???????? ");
3065+ else
3066+ printk("%08lx ", c);
3067+ }
3068+ printk("\n");
3069+}
3070+#endif
3071diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/hugetlbpage.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/hugetlbpage.c
3072--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/hugetlbpage.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3073+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/hugetlbpage.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3074@@ -133,7 +133,12 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
3075 {
3076 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
3077 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
3078- unsigned long start_addr;
3079+ unsigned long start_addr, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
3080+
3081+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
3082+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
3083+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
3084+#endif
3085
3086 if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
3087 start_addr = mm->free_area_cache;
3088@@ -147,7 +152,7 @@ full_search:
3089
3090 for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
3091 /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
3092- if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr) {
3093+ if (task_size - len < addr) {
3094 /*
3095 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
3096 * some holes.
3097@@ -175,9 +180,8 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
3098 {
3099 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
3100 struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev_vma;
3101- unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
3102+ unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr;
3103 unsigned long largest_hole = mm->cached_hole_size;
3104- int first_time = 1;
3105
3106 /* don't allow allocations above current base */
3107 if (mm->free_area_cache > base)
3108@@ -187,7 +191,7 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmappe
3109 largest_hole = 0;
3110 mm->free_area_cache = base;
3111 }
3112-try_again:
3113+
3114 /* make sure it can fit in the remaining address space */
3115 if (mm->free_area_cache < len)
3116 goto fail;
3117@@ -229,16 +233,6 @@ try_again:
3118
3119 fail:
3120 /*
3121- * if hint left us with no space for the requested
3122- * mapping then try again:
3123- */
3124- if (first_time) {
3125- mm->free_area_cache = base;
3126- largest_hole = 0;
3127- first_time = 0;
3128- goto try_again;
3129- }
3130- /*
3131 * A failed mmap() very likely causes application failure,
3132 * so fall back to the bottom-up function here. This scenario
3133 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
3134@@ -264,16 +258,23 @@ hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *f
3135 {
3136 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
3137 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
3138+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
3139
3140 if (len & ~HPAGE_MASK)
3141 return -EINVAL;
3142- if (len > TASK_SIZE)
3143+
3144+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
3145+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
3146+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
3147+#endif
3148+
3149+ if (len > task_size || addr > task_size - len)
3150 return -ENOMEM;
3151
3152 if (addr) {
3153 addr = ALIGN(addr, HPAGE_SIZE);
3154 vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
3155- if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
3156+ if (task_size - len >= addr &&
3157 (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
3158 return addr;
3159 }
3160diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/init.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/init.c
3161--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3162+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/init.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3163@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
3164 #include <asm/tlb.h>
3165 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
3166 #include <asm/sections.h>
3167+#include <asm/desc.h>
3168
3169 unsigned int __VMALLOC_RESERVE = 128 << 20;
3170
3171@@ -50,30 +51,6 @@ unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn
3172 static int noinline do_test_wp_bit(void);
3173
3174 /*
3175- * Creates a middle page table and puts a pointer to it in the
3176- * given global directory entry. This only returns the gd entry
3177- * in non-PAE compilation mode, since the middle layer is folded.
3178- */
3179-static pmd_t * __init one_md_table_init(pgd_t *pgd)
3180-{
3181- pud_t *pud;
3182- pmd_t *pmd_table;
3183-
3184-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
3185- pmd_table = (pmd_t *) alloc_bootmem_low_pages(PAGE_SIZE);
3186- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pmd_table) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
3187- pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
3188- if (pmd_table != pmd_offset(pud, 0))
3189- BUG();
3190-#else
3191- pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
3192- pmd_table = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
3193-#endif
3194-
3195- return pmd_table;
3196-}
3197-
3198-/*
3199 * Create a page table and place a pointer to it in a middle page
3200 * directory entry.
3201 */
3202@@ -81,7 +58,11 @@ static pte_t * __init one_page_table_ini
3203 {
3204 if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
3205 pte_t *page_table = (pte_t *) alloc_bootmem_low_pages(PAGE_SIZE);
3206+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
3207+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(page_table) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
3208+#else
3209 set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(page_table) | _PAGE_TABLE));
3210+#endif
3211 if (page_table != pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0))
3212 BUG();
3213
3214@@ -116,8 +97,6 @@ static void __init page_table_range_init
3215 pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx;
3216
3217 for ( ; (pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD) && (vaddr != end); pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
3218- if (pgd_none(*pgd))
3219- one_md_table_init(pgd);
3220 pud = pud_offset(pgd, vaddr);
3221 pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
3222 for (; (pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD) && (vaddr != end); pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
3223@@ -130,11 +109,22 @@ static void __init page_table_range_init
3224 }
3225 }
3226
3227-static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
3228+static inline int is_kernel_text(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
3229 {
3230- if (addr >= PAGE_OFFSET && addr <= (unsigned long)__init_end)
3231- return 1;
3232- return 0;
3233+ unsigned long etext;
3234+
3235+#if defined(CONFIG_MODULES) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
3236+ etext = (unsigned long)&MODULES_END - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
3237+#else
3238+ etext = (unsigned long)&_etext;
3239+#endif
3240+
3241+ if ((start > etext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET ||
3242+ end <= (unsigned long)_stext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) &&
3243+ (start > (unsigned long)_einittext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET ||
3244+ end <= (unsigned long)_sinittext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET))
3245+ return 0;
3246+ return 1;
3247 }
3248
3249 /*
3250@@ -146,26 +136,24 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
3251 {
3252 unsigned long pfn;
3253 pgd_t *pgd;
3254+ pud_t *pud;
3255 pmd_t *pmd;
3256 pte_t *pte;
3257- int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs;
3258+ unsigned int pgd_idx, pmd_idx, pte_ofs;
3259
3260 pgd_idx = pgd_index(PAGE_OFFSET);
3261 pgd = pgd_base + pgd_idx;
3262 pfn = 0;
3263
3264- for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD; pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
3265- pmd = one_md_table_init(pgd);
3266- if (pfn >= max_low_pfn)
3267- continue;
3268+ for (; pgd_idx < PTRS_PER_PGD && pfn < max_low_pfn; pgd++, pgd_idx++) {
3269+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, 0);
3270+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
3271 for (pmd_idx = 0; pmd_idx < PTRS_PER_PMD && pfn < max_low_pfn; pmd++, pmd_idx++) {
3272- unsigned int address = pfn * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_OFFSET;
3273+ unsigned long address = pfn * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_OFFSET;
3274
3275 /* Map with big pages if possible, otherwise create normal page tables. */
3276 if (cpu_has_pse) {
3277- unsigned int address2 = (pfn + PTRS_PER_PTE - 1) * PAGE_SIZE + PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE-1;
3278-
3279- if (is_kernel_text(address) || is_kernel_text(address2))
3280+ if (is_kernel_text(address, address + PMD_SIZE))
3281 set_pmd(pmd, pfn_pmd(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC));
3282 else
3283 set_pmd(pmd, pfn_pmd(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE));
3284@@ -174,7 +162,7 @@ static void __init kernel_physical_mappi
3285 pte = one_page_table_init(pmd);
3286
3287 for (pte_ofs = 0; pte_ofs < PTRS_PER_PTE && pfn < max_low_pfn; pte++, pfn++, pte_ofs++) {
3288- if (is_kernel_text(address))
3289+ if (is_kernel_text(address, address + PAGE_SIZE))
3290 set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC));
3291 else
3292 set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL));
3293@@ -341,13 +329,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void)
3294 unsigned long vaddr;
3295 pgd_t *pgd_base = swapper_pg_dir;
3296
3297-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
3298- int i;
3299- /* Init entries of the first-level page table to the zero page */
3300- for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++)
3301- set_pgd(pgd_base + i, __pgd(__pa(empty_zero_page) | _PAGE_PRESENT));
3302-#endif
3303-
3304 /* Enable PSE if available */
3305 if (cpu_has_pse) {
3306 set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PSE);
3307@@ -371,17 +352,6 @@ static void __init pagetable_init (void)
3308 page_table_range_init(vaddr, 0, pgd_base);
3309
3310 permanent_kmaps_init(pgd_base);
3311-
3312-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
3313- /*
3314- * Add low memory identity-mappings - SMP needs it when
3315- * starting up on an AP from real-mode. In the non-PAE
3316- * case we already have these mappings through head.S.
3317- * All user-space mappings are explicitly cleared after
3318- * SMP startup.
3319- */
3320- set_pgd(&pgd_base[0], pgd_base[USER_PTRS_PER_PGD]);
3321-#endif
3322 }
3323
3324 #ifdef CONFIG_SOFTWARE_SUSPEND
3325@@ -423,7 +393,6 @@ void zap_low_mappings (void)
3326 flush_tlb_all();
3327 }
3328
3329-static int disable_nx __initdata = 0;
3330 u64 __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~_PAGE_NX;
3331
3332 /*
3333@@ -437,11 +406,9 @@ u64 __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly =
3334 void __init noexec_setup(const char *str)
3335 {
3336 if (!strncmp(str, "on",2) && cpu_has_nx) {
3337- __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX;
3338- disable_nx = 0;
3339+ nx_enabled = 1;
3340 } else if (!strncmp(str,"off",3)) {
3341- disable_nx = 1;
3342- __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
3343+ nx_enabled = 0;
3344 }
3345 }
3346
3347@@ -450,17 +417,13 @@ int nx_enabled = 0;
3348
3349 static void __init set_nx(void)
3350 {
3351- unsigned int v[4], l, h;
3352+ if (!nx_enabled && cpu_has_nx) {
3353+ unsigned l, h;
3354
3355- if (cpu_has_pae && (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) > 0x80000001)) {
3356- cpuid(0x80000001, &v[0], &v[1], &v[2], &v[3]);
3357- if ((v[3] & (1 << 20)) && !disable_nx) {
3358- rdmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
3359- l |= EFER_NX;
3360- wrmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
3361- nx_enabled = 1;
3362- __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX;
3363- }
3364+ __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
3365+ rdmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
3366+ l &= ~EFER_NX;
3367+ wrmsr(MSR_EFER, l, h);
3368 }
3369 }
3370
3371@@ -512,14 +475,6 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
3372
3373 load_cr3(swapper_pg_dir);
3374
3375-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
3376- /*
3377- * We will bail out later - printk doesn't work right now so
3378- * the user would just see a hanging kernel.
3379- */
3380- if (cpu_has_pae)
3381- set_in_cr4(X86_CR4_PAE);
3382-#endif
3383 __flush_tlb_all();
3384
3385 kmap_init();
3386@@ -611,7 +566,7 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
3387 set_highmem_pages_init(bad_ppro);
3388
3389 codesize = (unsigned long) &_etext - (unsigned long) &_text;
3390- datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_etext;
3391+ datasize = (unsigned long) &_edata - (unsigned long) &_data;
3392 initsize = (unsigned long) &__init_end - (unsigned long) &__init_begin;
3393
3394 kclist_add(&kcore_mem, __va(0), max_low_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
3395@@ -628,10 +583,6 @@ void __init mem_init(void)
3396 (unsigned long) (totalhigh_pages << (PAGE_SHIFT-10))
3397 );
3398
3399-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
3400- if (!cpu_has_pae)
3401- panic("cannot execute a PAE-enabled kernel on a PAE-less CPU!");
3402-#endif
3403 if (boot_cpu_data.wp_works_ok < 0)
3404 test_wp_bit();
3405
3406@@ -724,6 +675,36 @@ void free_initmem(void)
3407 {
3408 unsigned long addr;
3409
3410+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
3411+ /* PaX: limit KERNEL_CS to actual size */
3412+ unsigned long limit;
3413+ int cpu;
3414+ pgd_t *pgd;
3415+ pud_t *pud;
3416+ pmd_t *pmd;
3417+
3418+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
3419+ limit = (unsigned long)&MODULES_END - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
3420+#else
3421+ limit = (unsigned long)&_etext;
3422+#endif
3423+ limit = (limit - 1UL) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
3424+
3425+ for (cpu = 0; cpu < NR_CPUS; cpu++) {
3426+ get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a = (get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].a & 0xFFFF0000UL) | (limit & 0x0FFFFUL);
3427+ get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b = (get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS].b & 0xFFF0FFFFUL) | (limit & 0xF0000UL);
3428+ }
3429+
3430+ /* PaX: make KERNEL_CS read-only */
3431+ for (addr = __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET; addr < (unsigned long)&_data; addr += PMD_SIZE) {
3432+ pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
3433+ pud = pud_offset(pgd, addr);
3434+ pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
3435+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(pmd_val(*pmd) & ~_PAGE_RW));
3436+ }
3437+ flush_tlb_all();
3438+#endif
3439+
3440 addr = (unsigned long)(&__init_begin);
3441 for (; addr < (unsigned long)(&__init_end); addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
3442 ClearPageReserved(virt_to_page(addr));
3443diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c
3444--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3445+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3446@@ -34,12 +34,18 @@
3447 * Leave an at least ~128 MB hole.
3448 */
3449 #define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024)
3450-#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
3451+#define MAX_GAP (task_size/6*5)
3452
3453 static inline unsigned long mmap_base(struct mm_struct *mm)
3454 {
3455 unsigned long gap = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur;
3456 unsigned long random_factor = 0;
3457+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
3458+
3459+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
3460+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
3461+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
3462+#endif
3463
3464 if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
3465 random_factor = get_random_int() % (1024*1024);
3466@@ -49,7 +55,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_base(st
3467 else if (gap > MAX_GAP)
3468 gap = MAX_GAP;
3469
3470- return PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE - gap - random_factor);
3471+ return PAGE_ALIGN(task_size - gap - random_factor);
3472 }
3473
3474 /*
3475@@ -66,10 +72,22 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
3476 (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) ||
3477 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) {
3478 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
3479+
3480+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3481+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
3482+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
3483+#endif
3484+
3485 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
3486 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
3487 } else {
3488 mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(mm);
3489+
3490+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3491+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
3492+ mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap + mm->delta_stack;
3493+#endif
3494+
3495 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
3496 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
3497 }
3498diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/pageattr.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/pageattr.c
3499--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/pageattr.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3500+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/mm/pageattr.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3501@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
3502 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
3503 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
3504 #include <asm/sections.h>
3505+#include <asm/desc.h>
3506
3507 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(cpa_lock);
3508 static struct list_head df_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(df_list);
3509@@ -77,7 +78,18 @@ static void set_pmd_pte(pte_t *kpte, uns
3510 struct page *page;
3511 unsigned long flags;
3512
3513+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
3514+ unsigned long cr0;
3515+
3516+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
3517+#endif
3518+
3519 set_pte_atomic(kpte, pte); /* change init_mm */
3520+
3521+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
3522+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
3523+#endif
3524+
3525 if (PTRS_PER_PMD > 1)
3526 return;
3527
3528@@ -104,7 +116,7 @@ static inline void revert_page(struct pa
3529 pte_t *linear;
3530
3531 ref_prot =
3532- ((address & LARGE_PAGE_MASK) < (unsigned long)&_etext)
3533+ ((address & LARGE_PAGE_MASK) < (unsigned long)&_etext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
3534 ? PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC : PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE;
3535
3536 linear = (pte_t *)
3537@@ -136,7 +148,7 @@ __change_page_attr(struct page *page, pg
3538 struct page *split;
3539
3540 ref_prot =
3541- ((address & LARGE_PAGE_MASK) < (unsigned long)&_etext)
3542+ ((address & LARGE_PAGE_MASK) < (unsigned long)&_etext + __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET)
3543 ? PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC : PAGE_KERNEL;
3544 split = split_large_page(address, prot, ref_prot);
3545 if (!split)
3546diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/oprofile/backtrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/oprofile/backtrace.c
3547--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/oprofile/backtrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3548+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/oprofile/backtrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3549@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ x86_backtrace(struct pt_regs * const reg
3550 head = (struct frame_head *)regs->ebp;
3551 #endif
3552
3553- if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
3554+ if (!user_mode(regs)) {
3555 while (depth-- && valid_kernel_stack(head, regs))
3556 head = dump_kernel_backtrace(head);
3557 return;
3558diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/power/cpu.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/power/cpu.c
3559--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3560+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/i386/power/cpu.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3561@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static void do_fpu_end(void)
3562 static void fix_processor_context(void)
3563 {
3564 int cpu = smp_processor_id();
3565- struct tss_struct * t = &per_cpu(init_tss, cpu);
3566+ struct tss_struct * t = init_tss + cpu;
3567
3568 set_tss_desc(cpu,t); /* This just modifies memory; should not be necessary. But... This is necessary, because 386 hardware has concept of busy TSS or some similar stupidity. */
3569
3570@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ void __restore_processor_state(struct sa
3571 write_cr4(ctxt->cr4);
3572 write_cr3(ctxt->cr3);
3573 write_cr2(ctxt->cr2);
3574- write_cr2(ctxt->cr0);
3575+ write_cr0(ctxt->cr0);
3576
3577 /*
3578 * now restore the descriptor tables to their proper values
3579diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c
3580--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3581+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/binfmt_elf32.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3582@@ -43,6 +43,17 @@ static void elf32_set_personality (void)
3583
3584 #define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, have_pt_gnu_stack) (!(have_pt_gnu_stack))
3585
3586+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
3587+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
3588+
3589+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
3590+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
3591+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
3592+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
3593+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) IA32_PAGE_SHIFT
3594+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - IA32_PAGE_SHIFT)
3595+#endif
3596+
3597 /* Ugly but avoids duplication */
3598 #include "../../../fs/binfmt_elf.c"
3599
3600diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h
3601--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3602+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/ia32/ia32priv.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3603@@ -305,7 +305,14 @@ struct old_linux32_dirent {
3604 #define ELF_DATA ELFDATA2LSB
3605 #define ELF_ARCH EM_386
3606
3607-#define IA32_STACK_TOP IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
3608+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
3609+#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
3610+#else
3611+#define __IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL
3612+#endif
3613+
3614+#define IA32_STACK_TOP (IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - __IA32_DELTA_STACK)
3615+
3616 #define IA32_GATE_OFFSET IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
3617 #define IA32_GATE_END IA32_PAGE_OFFSET + PAGE_SIZE
3618
3619diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c
3620--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3621+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3622@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ module_alloc (unsigned long size)
3623 void
3624 module_free (struct module *mod, void *module_region)
3625 {
3626- if (mod->arch.init_unw_table && module_region == mod->module_init) {
3627+ if (mod->arch.init_unw_table && module_region == mod->module_init_rx) {
3628 unw_remove_unwind_table(mod->arch.init_unw_table);
3629 mod->arch.init_unw_table = NULL;
3630 }
3631@@ -500,15 +500,39 @@ module_frob_arch_sections (Elf_Ehdr *ehd
3632 }
3633
3634 static inline int
3635+in_init_rx (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3636+{
3637+ return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rx < mod->init_size_rx;
3638+}
3639+
3640+static inline int
3641+in_init_rw (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3642+{
3643+ return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rw < mod->init_size_rw;
3644+}
3645+
3646+static inline int
3647 in_init (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3648 {
3649- return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_init < mod->init_size;
3650+ return in_init_rx(mod, value) || in_init_rw(mod, value);
3651+}
3652+
3653+static inline int
3654+in_core_rx (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3655+{
3656+ return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx < mod->core_size_rx;
3657+}
3658+
3659+static inline int
3660+in_core_rw (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3661+{
3662+ return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rw < mod->core_size_rw;
3663 }
3664
3665 static inline int
3666 in_core (const struct module *mod, uint64_t addr)
3667 {
3668- return addr - (uint64_t) mod->module_core < mod->core_size;
3669+ return in_core_rx(mod, value) || in_core_rw(mod, value);
3670 }
3671
3672 static inline int
3673@@ -692,7 +716,14 @@ do_reloc (struct module *mod, uint8_t r_
3674 break;
3675
3676 case RV_BDREL:
3677- val -= (uint64_t) (in_init(mod, val) ? mod->module_init : mod->module_core);
3678+ if (in_init_rx(mod, val))
3679+ val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rx;
3680+ else if (in_init_rw(mod, val))
3681+ val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_init_rw;
3682+ else if (in_core_rx(mod, val))
3683+ val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx;
3684+ else if (in_core_rw(mod, val))
3685+ val -= (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rw;
3686 break;
3687
3688 case RV_LTV:
3689@@ -826,15 +857,15 @@ apply_relocate_add (Elf64_Shdr *sechdrs,
3690 * addresses have been selected...
3691 */
3692 uint64_t gp;
3693- if (mod->core_size > MAX_LTOFF)
3694+ if (mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw > MAX_LTOFF)
3695 /*
3696 * This takes advantage of fact that SHF_ARCH_SMALL gets allocated
3697 * at the end of the module.
3698 */
3699- gp = mod->core_size - MAX_LTOFF / 2;
3700+ gp = mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw - MAX_LTOFF / 2;
3701 else
3702- gp = mod->core_size / 2;
3703- gp = (uint64_t) mod->module_core + ((gp + 7) & -8);
3704+ gp = (mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw) / 2;
3705+ gp = (uint64_t) mod->module_core_rx + ((gp + 7) & -8);
3706 mod->arch.gp = gp;
3707 DEBUGP("%s: placing gp at 0x%lx\n", __FUNCTION__, gp);
3708 }
3709diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
3710--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3711+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3712@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
3713 #include <linux/security.h>
3714 #include <linux/audit.h>
3715 #include <linux/signal.h>
3716+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
3717
3718 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
3719 #include <asm/processor.h>
3720@@ -1447,6 +1448,9 @@ sys_ptrace (long request, pid_t pid, uns
3721 if (pid == 1) /* no messing around with init! */
3722 goto out_tsk;
3723
3724+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request))
3725+ goto out_tsk;
3726+
3727 if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH) {
3728 ret = ptrace_attach(child);
3729 goto out_tsk;
3730diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c
3731--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3732+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/kernel/sys_ia64.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3733@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
3734 if (REGION_NUMBER(addr) == RGN_HPAGE)
3735 addr = 0;
3736 #endif
3737+
3738+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3739+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) && addr && filp)
3740+ addr = mm->free_area_cache;
3741+ else
3742+#endif
3743+
3744 if (!addr)
3745 addr = mm->free_area_cache;
3746
3747@@ -56,9 +63,9 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area (struct file *fil
3748 for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
3749 /* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
3750 if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr || RGN_MAP_LIMIT - len < REGION_OFFSET(addr)) {
3751- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
3752+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
3753 /* Start a new search --- just in case we missed some holes. */
3754- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
3755+ addr = mm->mmap_base;
3756 goto full_search;
3757 }
3758 return -ENOMEM;
3759diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c
3760--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3761+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3762@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
3763 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
3764 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
3765 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
3766+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
3767
3768 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
3769 #include <asm/processor.h>
3770@@ -51,6 +52,23 @@ mapped_kernel_page_is_present (unsigned
3771 return pte_present(pte);
3772 }
3773
3774+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3775+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
3776+{
3777+ unsigned long i;
3778+
3779+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3780+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
3781+ unsigned int c;
3782+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
3783+ printk("???????? ");
3784+ else
3785+ printk("%08x ", c);
3786+ }
3787+ printk("\n");
3788+}
3789+#endif
3790+
3791 void __kprobes
3792 ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *regs)
3793 {
3794@@ -113,9 +131,23 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long addres
3795 | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_W_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_WRITE_BIT)
3796 | (((isr >> IA64_ISR_R_BIT) & 1UL) << VM_READ_BIT));
3797
3798- if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask)
3799+ if ((vma->vm_flags & mask) != mask) {
3800+
3801+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3802+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (mask & VM_EXEC)) {
3803+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || address != regs->cr_iip)
3804+ goto bad_area;
3805+
3806+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
3807+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->cr_iip, (void*)regs->r12);
3808+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
3809+ }
3810+#endif
3811+
3812 goto bad_area;
3813
3814+ }
3815+
3816 survive:
3817 /*
3818 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
3819diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/init.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/init.c
3820--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/init.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3821+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ia64/mm/init.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3822@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
3823 #include <linux/swap.h>
3824 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
3825 #include <linux/bitops.h>
3826+#include <linux/a.out.h>
3827
3828-#include <asm/a.out.h>
3829 #include <asm/dma.h>
3830 #include <asm/ia32.h>
3831 #include <asm/io.h>
3832diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c
3833--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3834+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfn32.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3835@@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
3836 #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
3837 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
3838
3839+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
3840+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
3841+
3842+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3843+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3844+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3845+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3846+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3847+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3848+#endif
3849+
3850 #include <asm/processor.h>
3851 #include <linux/module.h>
3852 #include <linux/elfcore.h>
3853diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c
3854--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3855+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/binfmt_elfo32.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3856@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
3857 #undef ELF_ET_DYN_BASE
3858 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK32_SIZE / 3 * 2)
3859
3860+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
3861+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
3862+
3863+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3864+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3865+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3866+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3867+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
3868+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
3869+#endif
3870+
3871 #include <asm/processor.h>
3872 #include <linux/module.h>
3873 #include <linux/elfcore.h>
3874diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c
3875--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3876+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/kernel/syscall.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3877@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
3878 do_color_align = 0;
3879 if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
3880 do_color_align = 1;
3881+
3882+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
3883+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
3884+#endif
3885+
3886 if (addr) {
3887 if (do_color_align)
3888 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
3889@@ -99,7 +104,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
3890 (!vmm || addr + len <= vmm->vm_start))
3891 return addr;
3892 }
3893- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
3894+ addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
3895 if (do_color_align)
3896 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
3897 else
3898diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/mm/fault.c
3899--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3900+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/mips/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3901@@ -27,6 +27,23 @@
3902 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
3903 #include <asm/highmem.h> /* For VMALLOC_END */
3904
3905+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
3906+void pax_report_insns(void *pc)
3907+{
3908+ unsigned long i;
3909+
3910+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
3911+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
3912+ unsigned int c;
3913+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
3914+ printk("???????? ");
3915+ else
3916+ printk("%08x ", c);
3917+ }
3918+ printk("\n");
3919+}
3920+#endif
3921+
3922 /*
3923 * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
3924 * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
3925diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c
3926--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
3927+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
3928@@ -72,16 +72,38 @@
3929
3930 /* three functions to determine where in the module core
3931 * or init pieces the location is */
3932+static inline int is_init_rx(struct module *me, void *loc)
3933+{
3934+ return (loc >= me->module_init_rx &&
3935+ loc < (me->module_init_rx + me->init_size_rx));
3936+}
3937+
3938+static inline int is_init_rw(struct module *me, void *loc)
3939+{
3940+ return (loc >= me->module_init_rw &&
3941+ loc < (me->module_init_rw + me->init_size_rw));
3942+}
3943+
3944 static inline int is_init(struct module *me, void *loc)
3945 {
3946- return (loc >= me->module_init &&
3947- loc <= (me->module_init + me->init_size));
3948+ return is_init_rx(me, loc) || is_init_rw(me, loc);
3949+}
3950+
3951+static inline int is_core_rx(struct module *me, void *loc)
3952+{
3953+ return (loc >= me->module_core_rx &&
3954+ loc < (me->module_core_rx + me->core_size_rx));
3955+}
3956+
3957+static inline int is_core_rw(struct module *me, void *loc)
3958+{
3959+ return (loc >= me->module_core_rw &&
3960+ loc < (me->module_core_rw + me->core_size_rw));
3961 }
3962
3963 static inline int is_core(struct module *me, void *loc)
3964 {
3965- return (loc >= me->module_core &&
3966- loc <= (me->module_core + me->core_size));
3967+ return is_core_rx(me, loc) || is_core_rw(me, loc);
3968 }
3969
3970 static inline int is_local(struct module *me, void *loc)
3971@@ -289,21 +311,21 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(CONST Elf_
3972 }
3973
3974 /* align things a bit */
3975- me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
3976- me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size;
3977- me->core_size += gots * sizeof(struct got_entry);
3978-
3979- me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
3980- me->arch.fdesc_offset = me->core_size;
3981- me->core_size += fdescs * sizeof(Elf_Fdesc);
3982-
3983- me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 16);
3984- me->arch.stub_offset = me->core_size;
3985- me->core_size += stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
3986-
3987- me->init_size = ALIGN(me->init_size, 16);
3988- me->arch.init_stub_offset = me->init_size;
3989- me->init_size += init_stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
3990+ me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 16);
3991+ me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size_rw;
3992+ me->core_size_rw += gots * sizeof(struct got_entry);
3993+
3994+ me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 16);
3995+ me->arch.fdesc_offset = me->core_size_rw;
3996+ me->core_size_rw += fdescs * sizeof(Elf_Fdesc);
3997+
3998+ me->core_size_rx = ALIGN(me->core_size_rx, 16);
3999+ me->arch.stub_offset = me->core_size_rx;
4000+ me->core_size_rx += stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
4001+
4002+ me->init_size_rx = ALIGN(me->init_size_rx, 16);
4003+ me->arch.init_stub_offset = me->init_size_rx;
4004+ me->init_size_rx += init_stubs * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
4005
4006 me->arch.got_max = gots;
4007 me->arch.fdesc_max = fdescs;
4008@@ -323,7 +345,7 @@ static Elf64_Word get_got(struct module
4009
4010 BUG_ON(value == 0);
4011
4012- got = me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
4013+ got = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
4014 for (i = 0; got[i].addr; i++)
4015 if (got[i].addr == value)
4016 goto out;
4017@@ -341,7 +363,7 @@ static Elf64_Word get_got(struct module
4018 #ifdef __LP64__
4019 static Elf_Addr get_fdesc(struct module *me, unsigned long value)
4020 {
4021- Elf_Fdesc *fdesc = me->module_core + me->arch.fdesc_offset;
4022+ Elf_Fdesc *fdesc = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.fdesc_offset;
4023
4024 if (!value) {
4025 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: zero OPD requested!\n", me->name);
4026@@ -359,7 +381,7 @@ static Elf_Addr get_fdesc(struct module
4027
4028 /* Create new one */
4029 fdesc->addr = value;
4030- fdesc->gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
4031+ fdesc->gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
4032 return (Elf_Addr)fdesc;
4033 }
4034 #endif /* __LP64__ */
4035@@ -373,12 +395,12 @@ static Elf_Addr get_stub(struct module *
4036 if(init_section) {
4037 i = me->arch.init_stub_count++;
4038 BUG_ON(me->arch.init_stub_count > me->arch.init_stub_max);
4039- stub = me->module_init + me->arch.init_stub_offset +
4040+ stub = me->module_init_rx + me->arch.init_stub_offset +
4041 i * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
4042 } else {
4043 i = me->arch.stub_count++;
4044 BUG_ON(me->arch.stub_count > me->arch.stub_max);
4045- stub = me->module_core + me->arch.stub_offset +
4046+ stub = me->module_core_rx + me->arch.stub_offset +
4047 i * sizeof(struct stub_entry);
4048 }
4049
4050@@ -721,7 +743,7 @@ register_unwind_table(struct module *me,
4051
4052 table = (unsigned char *)sechdrs[me->arch.unwind_section].sh_addr;
4053 end = table + sechdrs[me->arch.unwind_section].sh_size;
4054- gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset;
4055+ gp = (Elf_Addr)me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset;
4056
4057 DEBUGP("register_unwind_table(), sect = %d at 0x%p - 0x%p (gp=0x%lx)\n",
4058 me->arch.unwind_section, table, end, gp);
4059diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
4060--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4061+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4062@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
4063 #include <linux/security.h>
4064 #include <linux/compat.h>
4065 #include <linux/signal.h>
4066+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
4067
4068 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
4069 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4070diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c
4071--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4072+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4073@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
4074 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
4075 return -ENOMEM;
4076 if (!addr)
4077- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4078+ addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
4079
4080 if (filp) {
4081 addr = get_shared_area(filp->f_mapping, addr, len, pgoff);
4082diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
4083--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4084+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4085@@ -711,9 +711,7 @@ void handle_interruption(int code, struc
4086
4087 down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4088 vma = find_vma(current->mm,regs->iaoq[0]);
4089- if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)
4090- && (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
4091-
4092+ if (vma && (regs->iaoq[0] >= vma->vm_start)) {
4093 fault_address = regs->iaoq[0];
4094 fault_space = regs->iasq[0];
4095
4096diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
4097--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4098+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4099@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
4100 #include <linux/sched.h>
4101 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
4102 #include <linux/module.h>
4103+#include <linux/unistd.h>
4104+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4105
4106 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
4107 #include <asm/traps.h>
4108@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct exception_data, ex
4109 static unsigned long
4110 parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsigned int inst)
4111 {
4112- if (code == 6 || code == 16)
4113+ if (code == 6 || code == 7 || code == 16)
4114 return VM_EXEC;
4115
4116 switch (inst & 0xf0000000) {
4117@@ -143,6 +145,116 @@ parisc_acctyp(unsigned long code, unsign
4118 }
4119 #endif
4120
4121+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4122+/*
4123+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (instruction_pointer(regs) = fault address)
4124+ *
4125+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
4126+ * 2 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
4127+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
4128+ */
4129+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
4130+{
4131+
4132+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4133+ int err;
4134+
4135+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation */
4136+ unsigned int bl, depwi;
4137+
4138+ err = get_user(bl, (unsigned int*)instruction_pointer(regs));
4139+ err |= get_user(depwi, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
4140+
4141+ if (err)
4142+ break;
4143+
4144+ if (bl == 0xEA9F1FDDU && depwi == 0xD6801C1EU) {
4145+ unsigned int ldw, bv, ldw2, addr = instruction_pointer(regs)-12;
4146+
4147+ err = get_user(ldw, (unsigned int*)addr);
4148+ err |= get_user(bv, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4149+ err |= get_user(ldw2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4150+
4151+ if (err)
4152+ break;
4153+
4154+ if (ldw == 0x0E801096U &&
4155+ bv == 0xEAC0C000U &&
4156+ ldw2 == 0x0E881095U)
4157+ {
4158+ unsigned int resolver, map;
4159+
4160+ err = get_user(resolver, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
4161+ err |= get_user(map, (unsigned int*)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
4162+ if (err)
4163+ break;
4164+
4165+ regs->gr[20] = instruction_pointer(regs)+8;
4166+ regs->gr[21] = map;
4167+ regs->gr[22] = resolver;
4168+ regs->iaoq[0] = resolver | 3UL;
4169+ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
4170+ return 3;
4171+ }
4172+ }
4173+ } while (0);
4174+#endif
4175+
4176+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
4177+
4178+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
4179+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
4180+ return 1;
4181+#endif
4182+
4183+ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
4184+ unsigned int ldi1, ldi2, bel, nop;
4185+
4186+ err = get_user(ldi1, (unsigned int *)instruction_pointer(regs));
4187+ err |= get_user(ldi2, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+4));
4188+ err |= get_user(bel, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+8));
4189+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int *)(instruction_pointer(regs)+12));
4190+
4191+ if (err)
4192+ break;
4193+
4194+ if ((ldi1 == 0x34190000U || ldi1 == 0x34190002U) &&
4195+ ldi2 == 0x3414015AU &&
4196+ bel == 0xE4008200U &&
4197+ nop == 0x08000240U)
4198+ {
4199+ regs->gr[25] = (ldi1 & 2) >> 1;
4200+ regs->gr[20] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
4201+ regs->gr[31] = regs->iaoq[1] + 16;
4202+ regs->sr[0] = regs->iasq[1];
4203+ regs->iaoq[0] = 0x100UL;
4204+ regs->iaoq[1] = regs->iaoq[0] + 4;
4205+ regs->iasq[0] = regs->sr[2];
4206+ regs->iasq[1] = regs->sr[2];
4207+ return 2;
4208+ }
4209+ } while (0);
4210+#endif
4211+
4212+ return 1;
4213+}
4214+
4215+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
4216+{
4217+ unsigned long i;
4218+
4219+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
4220+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
4221+ unsigned int c;
4222+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
4223+ printk("???????? ");
4224+ else
4225+ printk("%08x ", c);
4226+ }
4227+ printk("\n");
4228+}
4229+#endif
4230+
4231 void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long code,
4232 unsigned long address)
4233 {
4234@@ -168,8 +280,33 @@ good_area:
4235
4236 acc_type = parisc_acctyp(code,regs->iir);
4237
4238- if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type)
4239+ if ((vma->vm_flags & acc_type) != acc_type) {
4240+
4241+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4242+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (acc_type & VM_EXEC) &&
4243+ (address & ~3UL) == instruction_pointer(regs))
4244+ {
4245+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
4246+ switch(pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
4247+
4248+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4249+ case 3:
4250+ return;
4251+#endif
4252+
4253+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
4254+ case 2:
4255+ return;
4256+#endif
4257+
4258+ }
4259+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)instruction_pointer(regs), (void*)regs->gr[30]);
4260+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
4261+ }
4262+#endif
4263+
4264 goto bad_area;
4265+ }
4266
4267 /*
4268 * If for any reason at all we couldn't handle the fault, make
4269diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c
4270--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4271+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4272@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
4273 #include <linux/highmem.h>
4274 #include <linux/module.h>
4275 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
4276+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4277
4278 #include <asm/page.h>
4279 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4280@@ -105,6 +106,38 @@ static void do_dabr(struct pt_regs *regs
4281 }
4282 #endif /* !(CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE)*/
4283
4284+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4285+/*
4286+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
4287+ *
4288+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
4289+ */
4290+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
4291+{
4292+
4293+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
4294+ int err;
4295+#endif
4296+
4297+ return 1;
4298+}
4299+
4300+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
4301+{
4302+ unsigned long i;
4303+
4304+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
4305+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
4306+ unsigned int c;
4307+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
4308+ printk("???????? ");
4309+ else
4310+ printk("%08x ", c);
4311+ }
4312+ printk("\n");
4313+}
4314+#endif
4315+
4316 /*
4317 * For 600- and 800-family processors, the error_code parameter is DSISR
4318 * for a data fault, SRR1 for an instruction fault. For 400-family processors
4319@@ -333,6 +366,19 @@ bad_area:
4320 bad_area_nosemaphore:
4321 /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
4322 if (user_mode(regs)) {
4323+
4324+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4325+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
4326+ if (is_exec && (error_code & DSISR_PROTFAULT)) {
4327+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
4328+ }
4329+
4330+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
4331+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
4332+ }
4333+ }
4334+#endif
4335+
4336 _exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
4337 return 0;
4338 }
4339diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
4340--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4341+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4342@@ -76,10 +76,22 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
4343 */
4344 if (mmap_is_legacy()) {
4345 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4346+
4347+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
4348+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
4349+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
4350+#endif
4351+
4352 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
4353 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
4354 } else {
4355 mm->mmap_base = mmap_base();
4356+
4357+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
4358+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
4359+ mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap;
4360+#endif
4361+
4362 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
4363 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
4364 }
4365diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/kernel/module.c
4366--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4367+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4368@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ static uint32_t do_plt_call(void *locati
4369
4370 DEBUGP("Doing plt for call to 0x%x at 0x%x\n", val, (unsigned int)location);
4371 /* Init, or core PLT? */
4372- if (location >= mod->module_core
4373- && location < mod->module_core + mod->core_size)
4374+ if (location >= mod->module_core_rx
4375+ && location < mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx)
4376 entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.core_plt_section].sh_addr;
4377 else
4378 entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.init_plt_section].sh_addr;
4379diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c
4380--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4381+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/ppc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4382@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
4383 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
4384 #include <linux/highmem.h>
4385 #include <linux/module.h>
4386+#include <linux/slab.h>
4387+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
4388+#include <linux/compiler.h>
4389+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4390+#include <linux/unistd.h>
4391
4392 #include <asm/page.h>
4393 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4394@@ -51,6 +56,364 @@ unsigned long pte_misses; /* updated by
4395 unsigned long pte_errors; /* updated by do_page_fault() */
4396 unsigned int probingmem;
4397
4398+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
4399+void pax_syscall_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
4400+{
4401+ vma->vm_mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
4402+}
4403+
4404+static struct page* pax_syscall_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
4405+{
4406+ struct page* page;
4407+ unsigned int *kaddr;
4408+
4409+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
4410+ if (!page)
4411+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
4412+
4413+ kaddr = kmap(page);
4414+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
4415+ kaddr[0] = 0x44000002U; /* sc */
4416+ __flush_dcache_icache(kaddr);
4417+ kunmap(page);
4418+ if (type)
4419+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
4420+ return page;
4421+}
4422+
4423+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
4424+ .close = pax_syscall_close,
4425+ .nopage = pax_syscall_nopage,
4426+};
4427+
4428+static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
4429+{
4430+ int ret;
4431+
4432+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
4433+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
4434+ vma->vm_start = addr;
4435+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
4436+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
4437+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
4438+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
4439+
4440+ ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
4441+ if (ret)
4442+ return ret;
4443+
4444+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
4445+ return 0;
4446+}
4447+#endif
4448+
4449+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4450+/*
4451+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->nip = fault address)
4452+ *
4453+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
4454+ * 2 when patched GOT trampoline was detected
4455+ * 3 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
4456+ * 4 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
4457+ * 5 when sigreturn trampoline was detected
4458+ * 7 when rt_sigreturn trampoline was detected
4459+ */
4460+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
4461+{
4462+
4463+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
4464+ int err;
4465+#endif
4466+
4467+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4468+ do { /* PaX: patched GOT emulation */
4469+ unsigned int blrl;
4470+
4471+ err = get_user(blrl, (unsigned int*)regs->nip);
4472+
4473+ if (!err && blrl == 0x4E800021U) {
4474+ unsigned long temp = regs->nip;
4475+
4476+ regs->nip = regs->link & 0xFFFFFFFCUL;
4477+ regs->link = temp + 4UL;
4478+ return 2;
4479+ }
4480+ } while (0);
4481+
4482+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
4483+ unsigned int b;
4484+
4485+ err = get_user(b, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4486+
4487+ if (!err && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
4488+ regs->nip += (((b | 0xFC000000UL) ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
4489+ return 3;
4490+ }
4491+ } while (0);
4492+
4493+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #1 */
4494+ unsigned int li, b;
4495+
4496+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4497+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
4498+
4499+ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
4500+ unsigned int rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
4501+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
4502+
4503+ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
4504+ err = get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)addr);
4505+ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4506+ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4507+ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
4508+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
4509+ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
4510+ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
4511+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
4512+
4513+ if (err)
4514+ break;
4515+
4516+ if (rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
4517+ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
4518+ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
4519+ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
4520+ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
4521+ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
4522+ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
4523+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
4524+ {
4525+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4526+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4527+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
4528+ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4529+ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
4530+ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
4531+ return 4;
4532+ }
4533+ }
4534+ } while (0);
4535+
4536+#if 0
4537+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #2 */
4538+ unsigned int lis, lwzu, b, bctr;
4539+
4540+ err = get_user(lis, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4541+ err |= get_user(lwzu, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
4542+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+8));
4543+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+12));
4544+
4545+ if (err)
4546+ break;
4547+
4548+ if ((lis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U &&
4549+ (lwzu & 0xU) == 0xU &&
4550+ (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U &&
4551+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
4552+ {
4553+ unsigned int addis, addi, rlwinm, add, li2, addis2, mtctr, li3, addis3, bctr;
4554+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
4555+
4556+ addr = regs->nip + 12 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
4557+ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
4558+ err |= get_user(addi, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4559+ err |= get_user(rlwinm, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4560+ err |= get_user(add, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
4561+ err |= get_user(li2, (unsigned int*)(addr+16));
4562+ err |= get_user(addis2, (unsigned int*)(addr+20));
4563+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+24));
4564+ err |= get_user(li3, (unsigned int*)(addr+28));
4565+ err |= get_user(addis3, (unsigned int*)(addr+32));
4566+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+36));
4567+
4568+ if (err)
4569+ break;
4570+
4571+ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
4572+ (addi & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x396B0000U &&
4573+ rlwinm == 0x556C083CU &&
4574+ add == 0x7D6C5A14U &&
4575+ (li2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
4576+ (addis2 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
4577+ mtctr == 0x7D8903A6U &&
4578+ (li3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39800000U &&
4579+ (addis3 & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D8C0000U &&
4580+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
4581+ {
4582+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] =
4583+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = 3 * (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4584+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] = (((li3 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4585+ regs->gpr[PT_R12] += (addis3 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
4586+ regs->ctr = (((li2 | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4587+ regs->ctr += (addis2 & 0xFFFFU) << 16;
4588+ regs->nip = regs->ctr;
4589+ return 4;
4590+ }
4591+ }
4592+ } while (0);
4593+#endif
4594+
4595+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation #3 */
4596+ unsigned int li, b;
4597+
4598+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4599+ err |= get_user(b, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
4600+
4601+ if (!err && (li & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x39600000U && (b & 0xFC000003U) == 0x48000000U) {
4602+ unsigned int addis, lwz, mtctr, bctr;
4603+ unsigned long addr = b | 0xFC000000UL;
4604+
4605+ addr = regs->nip + 4 + ((addr ^ 0x02000000UL) + 0x02000000UL);
4606+ err = get_user(addis, (unsigned int*)addr);
4607+ err |= get_user(lwz, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
4608+ err |= get_user(mtctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
4609+ err |= get_user(bctr, (unsigned int*)(addr+12));
4610+
4611+ if (err)
4612+ break;
4613+
4614+ if ((addis & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x3D6B0000U &&
4615+ (lwz & 0xFFFF0000U) == 0x816B0000U &&
4616+ mtctr == 0x7D6903A6U &&
4617+ bctr == 0x4E800420U)
4618+ {
4619+ unsigned int r11;
4620+
4621+ addr = (addis << 16) + (((li | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4622+ addr += (((lwz | 0xFFFF0000UL) ^ 0x00008000UL) + 0x00008000UL);
4623+
4624+ err = get_user(r11, (unsigned int*)addr);
4625+ if (err)
4626+ break;
4627+
4628+ regs->gpr[PT_R11] = r11;
4629+ regs->ctr = r11;
4630+ regs->nip = r11;
4631+ return 4;
4632+ }
4633+ }
4634+ } while (0);
4635+#endif
4636+
4637+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
4638+ do { /* PaX: sigreturn emulation */
4639+ unsigned int li, sc;
4640+
4641+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4642+ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
4643+
4644+ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
4645+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
4646+ unsigned long call_syscall;
4647+
4648+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4649+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
4650+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4651+ if (likely(call_syscall))
4652+ goto emulate;
4653+
4654+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
4655+
4656+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4657+ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
4658+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
4659+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4660+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4661+ goto emulate;
4662+ }
4663+
4664+ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
4665+ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
4666+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4667+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4668+ return 1;
4669+ }
4670+
4671+ if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
4672+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4673+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4674+ return 1;
4675+ }
4676+
4677+ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
4678+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4679+
4680+emulate:
4681+ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_sigreturn;
4682+ regs->nip = call_syscall;
4683+ return 5;
4684+ }
4685+ } while (0);
4686+
4687+ do { /* PaX: rt_sigreturn emulation */
4688+ unsigned int li, sc;
4689+
4690+ err = get_user(li, (unsigned int *)regs->nip);
4691+ err |= get_user(sc, (unsigned int *)(regs->nip+4));
4692+
4693+ if (!err && li == 0x38000000U + __NR_rt_sigreturn && sc == 0x44000002U) {
4694+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
4695+ unsigned int call_syscall;
4696+
4697+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4698+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
4699+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4700+ if (likely(call_syscall))
4701+ goto rt_emulate;
4702+
4703+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
4704+
4705+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4706+ if (current->mm->call_syscall) {
4707+ call_syscall = current->mm->call_syscall;
4708+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4709+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4710+ goto rt_emulate;
4711+ }
4712+
4713+ call_syscall = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
4714+ if (!vma || (call_syscall & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
4715+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4716+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4717+ return 1;
4718+ }
4719+
4720+ if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_syscall)) {
4721+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4722+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
4723+ return 1;
4724+ }
4725+
4726+ current->mm->call_syscall = call_syscall;
4727+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
4728+
4729+rt_emulate:
4730+ regs->gpr[PT_R0] = __NR_rt_sigreturn;
4731+ regs->nip = call_syscall;
4732+ return 6;
4733+ }
4734+ } while (0);
4735+#endif
4736+
4737+ return 1;
4738+}
4739+
4740+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
4741+{
4742+ unsigned long i;
4743+
4744+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
4745+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
4746+ unsigned int c;
4747+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
4748+ printk("???????? ");
4749+ else
4750+ printk("%08x ", c);
4751+ }
4752+ printk("\n");
4753+}
4754+#endif
4755+
4756 /*
4757 * Check whether the instruction at regs->nip is a store using
4758 * an update addressing form which will update r1.
4759@@ -111,7 +474,7 @@ int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
4760 * indicate errors in DSISR but can validly be set in SRR1.
4761 */
4762 if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400)
4763- error_code &= 0x48200000;
4764+ error_code &= 0x58200000;
4765 else
4766 is_write = error_code & 0x02000000;
4767 #endif /* CONFIG_4xx || CONFIG_BOOKE */
4768@@ -205,15 +568,14 @@ good_area:
4769 } else if (TRAP(regs) == 0x400) {
4770 pte_t *ptep;
4771
4772-#if 0
4773+#if 1
4774 /* It would be nice to actually enforce the VM execute
4775 permission on CPUs which can do so, but far too
4776 much stuff in userspace doesn't get the permissions
4777 right, so we let any page be executed for now. */
4778 if (! (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
4779 goto bad_area;
4780-#endif
4781-
4782+#else
4783 /* Since 4xx/Book-E supports per-page execute permission,
4784 * we lazily flush dcache to icache. */
4785 ptep = NULL;
4786@@ -233,6 +595,7 @@ good_area:
4787 if (ptep != NULL)
4788 pte_unmap(ptep);
4789 #endif
4790+#endif
4791 /* a read */
4792 } else {
4793 /* protection fault */
4794@@ -278,6 +641,33 @@ bad_area:
4795
4796 /* User mode accesses cause a SIGSEGV */
4797 if (user_mode(regs)) {
4798+
4799+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4800+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) {
4801+ if ((TRAP(regs) == 0x400) && (regs->nip == address)) {
4802+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
4803+
4804+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
4805+ case 2:
4806+ case 3:
4807+ case 4:
4808+ return 0;
4809+#endif
4810+
4811+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT
4812+ case 5:
4813+ case 6:
4814+ return 0;
4815+#endif
4816+
4817+ }
4818+
4819+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->nip, (void*)regs->gpr[1]);
4820+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
4821+ }
4822+ }
4823+#endif
4824+
4825 _exception(SIGSEGV, regs, code, address);
4826 return 0;
4827 }
4828diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/s390/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/s390/kernel/module.c
4829--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/s390/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4830+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/s390/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4831@@ -164,11 +164,11 @@ module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
4832
4833 /* Increase core size by size of got & plt and set start
4834 offsets for got and plt. */
4835- me->core_size = ALIGN(me->core_size, 4);
4836- me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size;
4837- me->core_size += me->arch.got_size;
4838- me->arch.plt_offset = me->core_size;
4839- me->core_size += me->arch.plt_size;
4840+ me->core_size_rw = ALIGN(me->core_size_rw, 4);
4841+ me->arch.got_offset = me->core_size_rw;
4842+ me->core_size_rw += me->arch.got_size;
4843+ me->arch.plt_offset = me->core_size_rx;
4844+ me->core_size_rx += me->arch.plt_size;
4845 return 0;
4846 }
4847
4848@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4849 if (info->got_initialized == 0) {
4850 Elf_Addr *gotent;
4851
4852- gotent = me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset +
4853+ gotent = me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset +
4854 info->got_offset;
4855 *gotent = val;
4856 info->got_initialized = 1;
4857@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4858 else if (r_type == R_390_GOTENT ||
4859 r_type == R_390_GOTPLTENT)
4860 *(unsigned int *) loc =
4861- (val + (Elf_Addr) me->module_core - loc) >> 1;
4862+ (val + (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw - loc) >> 1;
4863 else if (r_type == R_390_GOT64 ||
4864 r_type == R_390_GOTPLT64)
4865 *(unsigned long *) loc = val;
4866@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4867 case R_390_PLTOFF64: /* 16 bit offset from GOT to PLT. */
4868 if (info->plt_initialized == 0) {
4869 unsigned int *ip;
4870- ip = me->module_core + me->arch.plt_offset +
4871+ ip = me->module_core_rx + me->arch.plt_offset +
4872 info->plt_offset;
4873 #ifndef CONFIG_64BIT
4874 ip[0] = 0x0d105810; /* basr 1,0; l 1,6(1); br 1 */
4875@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4876 val = me->arch.plt_offset - me->arch.got_offset +
4877 info->plt_offset + rela->r_addend;
4878 else
4879- val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core +
4880+ val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rx +
4881 me->arch.plt_offset + info->plt_offset +
4882 rela->r_addend - loc;
4883 if (r_type == R_390_PLT16DBL)
4884@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4885 case R_390_GOTOFF32: /* 32 bit offset to GOT. */
4886 case R_390_GOTOFF64: /* 64 bit offset to GOT. */
4887 val = val + rela->r_addend -
4888- ((Elf_Addr) me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset);
4889+ ((Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset);
4890 if (r_type == R_390_GOTOFF16)
4891 *(unsigned short *) loc = val;
4892 else if (r_type == R_390_GOTOFF32)
4893@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ apply_rela(Elf_Rela *rela, Elf_Addr base
4894 break;
4895 case R_390_GOTPC: /* 32 bit PC relative offset to GOT. */
4896 case R_390_GOTPCDBL: /* 32 bit PC rel. off. to GOT shifted by 1. */
4897- val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core + me->arch.got_offset +
4898+ val = (Elf_Addr) me->module_core_rw + me->arch.got_offset +
4899 rela->r_addend - loc;
4900 if (r_type == R_390_GOTPC)
4901 *(unsigned int *) loc = val;
4902diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
4903--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4904+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4905@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
4906 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4907 #include <linux/security.h>
4908 #include <linux/signal.h>
4909+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
4910
4911 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
4912 #include <asm/system.h>
4913@@ -300,6 +301,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs
4914 goto out;
4915 }
4916
4917+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) {
4918+ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
4919+ goto out_tsk;
4920+ }
4921+
4922 if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
4923 || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
4924 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
4925diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c
4926--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4927+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4928@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
4929 if (ARCH_SUN4C_SUN4 && len > 0x20000000)
4930 return -ENOMEM;
4931 if (!addr)
4932- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
4933+ addr = current->mm->mmap_base;
4934
4935 if (flags & MAP_SHARED)
4936 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr);
4937diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/Makefile linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/Makefile
4938--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/Makefile 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4939+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/Makefile 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4940@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ libs-y += arch/sparc/prom/ arch/sparc/li
4941 # Renaming is done to avoid confusing pattern matching rules in 2.5.45 (multy-)
4942 INIT_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(init-y))
4943 CORE_Y := $(core-y)
4944-CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
4945+CORE_Y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/ grsecurity/
4946 CORE_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(CORE_Y))
4947 DRIVERS_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(drivers-y))
4948 NET_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(net-y))
4949diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c
4950--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
4951+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
4952@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
4953 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
4954 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
4955 #include <linux/module.h>
4956+#include <linux/slab.h>
4957+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
4958+#include <linux/compiler.h>
4959+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
4960
4961 #include <asm/system.h>
4962 #include <asm/page.h>
4963@@ -217,6 +221,252 @@ static unsigned long compute_si_addr(str
4964 return safe_compute_effective_address(regs, insn);
4965 }
4966
4967+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
4968+void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
4969+{
4970+ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
4971+}
4972+
4973+static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
4974+{
4975+ struct page* page;
4976+ unsigned int *kaddr;
4977+
4978+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
4979+ if (!page)
4980+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
4981+
4982+ kaddr = kmap(page);
4983+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
4984+ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
4985+ flush_dcache_page(page);
4986+ kunmap(page);
4987+ if (type)
4988+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
4989+
4990+ return page;
4991+}
4992+
4993+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
4994+ .close = pax_emuplt_close,
4995+ .nopage = pax_emuplt_nopage,
4996+};
4997+
4998+static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
4999+{
5000+ int ret;
5001+
5002+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
5003+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
5004+ vma->vm_start = addr;
5005+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
5006+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
5007+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
5008+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
5009+
5010+ ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
5011+ if (ret)
5012+ return ret;
5013+
5014+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
5015+ return 0;
5016+}
5017+
5018+/*
5019+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->pc = fault address)
5020+ *
5021+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
5022+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
5023+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
5024+ */
5025+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
5026+{
5027+
5028+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5029+ int err;
5030+
5031+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
5032+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
5033+
5034+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
5035+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
5036+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
5037+
5038+ if (err)
5039+ break;
5040+
5041+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5042+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5043+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
5044+ {
5045+ unsigned int addr;
5046+
5047+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5048+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
5049+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
5050+ regs->pc = addr;
5051+ regs->npc = addr+4;
5052+ return 2;
5053+ }
5054+ } while (0);
5055+
5056+ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
5057+ unsigned int ba;
5058+
5059+ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
5060+
5061+ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
5062+ unsigned int addr;
5063+
5064+ addr = regs->pc + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
5065+ regs->pc = addr;
5066+ regs->npc = addr+4;
5067+ return 2;
5068+ }
5069+ }
5070+
5071+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
5072+ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
5073+
5074+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
5075+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
5076+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
5077+
5078+ if (err)
5079+ break;
5080+
5081+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5082+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
5083+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5084+ {
5085+ unsigned int addr;
5086+
5087+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5088+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
5089+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFE000U) ^ 0x00001000U) + 0x00001000U);
5090+ regs->pc = addr;
5091+ regs->npc = addr+4;
5092+ return 2;
5093+ }
5094+ } while (0);
5095+
5096+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
5097+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
5098+
5099+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
5100+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
5101+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+8));
5102+
5103+ if (err)
5104+ break;
5105+
5106+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5107+ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
5108+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5109+ {
5110+ unsigned int addr, save, call;
5111+
5112+ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
5113+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFC00000U) ^ 0x00200000U) + 0x00200000U) << 2);
5114+ else
5115+ addr = regs->pc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFF80000U) ^ 0x00040000U) + 0x00040000U) << 2);
5116+
5117+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
5118+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
5119+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
5120+ if (err)
5121+ break;
5122+
5123+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
5124+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
5125+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5126+ {
5127+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
5128+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
5129+
5130+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5131+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
5132+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5133+ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
5134+ goto emulate;
5135+
5136+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
5137+
5138+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5139+ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
5140+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
5141+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5142+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5143+ goto emulate;
5144+ }
5145+
5146+ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
5147+ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
5148+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5149+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5150+ return 1;
5151+ }
5152+
5153+ if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve)) {
5154+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5155+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5156+ return 1;
5157+ }
5158+
5159+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
5160+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5161+
5162+emulate:
5163+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5164+ regs->pc = call_dl_resolve;
5165+ regs->npc = addr+4;
5166+ return 3;
5167+ }
5168+ }
5169+ } while (0);
5170+
5171+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
5172+ unsigned int save, call, nop;
5173+
5174+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc-4));
5175+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->pc);
5176+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->pc+4));
5177+ if (err)
5178+ break;
5179+
5180+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
5181+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
5182+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5183+ {
5184+ unsigned int dl_resolve = regs->pc + ((((call | 0xC0000000U) ^ 0x20000000U) + 0x20000000U) << 2);
5185+
5186+ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->pc;
5187+ regs->pc = dl_resolve;
5188+ regs->npc = dl_resolve+4;
5189+ return 3;
5190+ }
5191+ } while (0);
5192+#endif
5193+
5194+ return 1;
5195+}
5196+
5197+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
5198+{
5199+ unsigned long i;
5200+
5201+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
5202+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
5203+ unsigned int c;
5204+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
5205+ printk("???????? ");
5206+ else
5207+ printk("%08x ", c);
5208+ }
5209+ printk("\n");
5210+}
5211+#endif
5212+
5213 asmlinkage void do_sparc_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int text_fault, int write,
5214 unsigned long address)
5215 {
5216@@ -280,6 +530,24 @@ good_area:
5217 if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
5218 goto bad_area;
5219 } else {
5220+
5221+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5222+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && text_fault && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
5223+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
5224+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
5225+
5226+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5227+ case 2:
5228+ case 3:
5229+ return;
5230+#endif
5231+
5232+ }
5233+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->pc, (void*)regs->u_regs[UREG_FP]);
5234+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
5235+ }
5236+#endif
5237+
5238 /* Allow reads even for write-only mappings */
5239 if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
5240 goto bad_area;
5241diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/init.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/init.c
5242--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5243+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/init.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5244@@ -333,17 +333,17 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
5245
5246 /* Initialize the protection map with non-constant, MMU dependent values. */
5247 protection_map[0] = PAGE_NONE;
5248- protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY;
5249- protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY;
5250- protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY;
5251+ protection_map[1] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
5252+ protection_map[2] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
5253+ protection_map[3] = PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC;
5254 protection_map[4] = PAGE_READONLY;
5255 protection_map[5] = PAGE_READONLY;
5256 protection_map[6] = PAGE_COPY;
5257 protection_map[7] = PAGE_COPY;
5258 protection_map[8] = PAGE_NONE;
5259- protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY;
5260- protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED;
5261- protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED;
5262+ protection_map[9] = PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC;
5263+ protection_map[10] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
5264+ protection_map[11] = PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC;
5265 protection_map[12] = PAGE_READONLY;
5266 protection_map[13] = PAGE_READONLY;
5267 protection_map[14] = PAGE_SHARED;
5268diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c
5269--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5270+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc/mm/srmmu.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5271@@ -2148,6 +2148,13 @@ void __init ld_mmu_srmmu(void)
5272 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED));
5273 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY));
5274 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY));
5275+
5276+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5277+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_shared_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC));
5278+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_copy_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC));
5279+ BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_readonly_noexec, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC));
5280+#endif
5281+
5282 BTFIXUPSET_INT(page_kernel, pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL));
5283 page_kernel = pgprot_val(SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL);
5284 pg_iobits = SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF;
5285diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
5286--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5287+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5288@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
5289 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
5290 #include <linux/audit.h>
5291 #include <linux/signal.h>
5292+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
5293
5294 #include <asm/asi.h>
5295 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
5296@@ -210,6 +211,11 @@ asmlinkage void do_ptrace(struct pt_regs
5297 goto out;
5298 }
5299
5300+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, (long)request)) {
5301+ pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
5302+ goto out_tsk;
5303+ }
5304+
5305 if ((current->personality == PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_SUNATTACH)
5306 || (current->personality != PER_SUNOS && request == PTRACE_ATTACH)) {
5307 if (ptrace_attach(child)) {
5308diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c
5309--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5310+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5311@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
5312 if (filp || (flags & MAP_SHARED))
5313 do_color_align = 1;
5314
5315+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5316+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
5317+#endif
5318+
5319 if (addr) {
5320 if (do_color_align)
5321 addr = COLOUR_ALIGN(addr, pgoff);
5322@@ -86,7 +90,7 @@ unsigned long arch_get_unmapped_area(str
5323
5324 if (len <= mm->cached_hole_size) {
5325 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
5326- mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
5327+ mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
5328 }
5329 start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
5330
5331@@ -105,8 +109,8 @@ full_search:
5332 vma = find_vma(mm, PAGE_OFFSET);
5333 }
5334 if (task_size < addr) {
5335- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
5336- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
5337+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
5338+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
5339 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
5340 goto full_search;
5341 }
5342diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
5343--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5344+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5345@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@
5346 #include <linux/init.h>
5347 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
5348 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
5349+#include <linux/slab.h>
5350+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
5351+#include <linux/compiler.h>
5352+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
5353
5354 #include <asm/page.h>
5355 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
5356@@ -251,6 +255,369 @@ cannot_handle:
5357 unhandled_fault (address, current, regs);
5358 }
5359
5360+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5361+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5362+static void pax_emuplt_close(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
5363+{
5364+ vma->vm_mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
5365+}
5366+
5367+static struct page* pax_emuplt_nopage(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, int *type)
5368+{
5369+ struct page* page;
5370+ unsigned int *kaddr;
5371+
5372+ page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
5373+ if (!page)
5374+ return NOPAGE_OOM;
5375+
5376+ kaddr = kmap(page);
5377+ memset(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
5378+ kaddr[0] = 0x9DE3BFA8U; /* save */
5379+ flush_dcache_page(page);
5380+ kunmap(page);
5381+ if (type)
5382+ *type = VM_FAULT_MAJOR;
5383+ return page;
5384+}
5385+
5386+static struct vm_operations_struct pax_vm_ops = {
5387+ .close = pax_emuplt_close,
5388+ .nopage = pax_emuplt_nopage,
5389+};
5390+
5391+static int pax_insert_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
5392+{
5393+ int ret;
5394+
5395+ memset(vma, 0, sizeof(*vma));
5396+ vma->vm_mm = current->mm;
5397+ vma->vm_start = addr;
5398+ vma->vm_end = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
5399+ vma->vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_EXEC | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYEXEC;
5400+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
5401+ vma->vm_ops = &pax_vm_ops;
5402+
5403+ ret = insert_vm_struct(current->mm, vma);
5404+ if (ret)
5405+ return ret;
5406+
5407+ ++current->mm->total_vm;
5408+ return 0;
5409+}
5410+#endif
5411+
5412+/*
5413+ * PaX: decide what to do with offenders (regs->tpc = fault address)
5414+ *
5415+ * returns 1 when task should be killed
5416+ * 2 when patched PLT trampoline was detected
5417+ * 3 when unpatched PLT trampoline was detected
5418+ */
5419+static int pax_handle_fetch_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
5420+{
5421+
5422+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5423+ int err;
5424+
5425+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #1 */
5426+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, jmpl;
5427+
5428+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5429+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5430+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5431+
5432+ if (err)
5433+ break;
5434+
5435+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5436+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5437+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U)
5438+ {
5439+ unsigned long addr;
5440+
5441+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5442+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1];
5443+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
5444+ regs->tpc = addr;
5445+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5446+ return 2;
5447+ }
5448+ } while (0);
5449+
5450+ { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #2 */
5451+ unsigned int ba;
5452+
5453+ err = get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5454+
5455+ if (!err && (ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U) {
5456+ unsigned long addr;
5457+
5458+ addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
5459+ regs->tpc = addr;
5460+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5461+ return 2;
5462+ }
5463+ }
5464+
5465+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #3 */
5466+ unsigned int sethi, jmpl, nop;
5467+
5468+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5469+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5470+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5471+
5472+ if (err)
5473+ break;
5474+
5475+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5476+ (jmpl & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x81C06000U &&
5477+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5478+ {
5479+ unsigned long addr;
5480+
5481+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5482+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
5483+ addr += (((jmpl | 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE000UL) ^ 0x00001000UL) + 0x00001000UL);
5484+ regs->tpc = addr;
5485+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5486+ return 2;
5487+ }
5488+ } while (0);
5489+
5490+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #4 */
5491+ unsigned int mov1, call, mov2;
5492+
5493+ err = get_user(mov1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5494+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5495+ err |= get_user(mov2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5496+
5497+ if (err)
5498+ break;
5499+
5500+ if (mov1 == 0x8210000FU &&
5501+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
5502+ mov2 == 0x9E100001U)
5503+ {
5504+ unsigned long addr;
5505+
5506+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC];
5507+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
5508+ regs->tpc = addr;
5509+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5510+ return 2;
5511+ }
5512+ } while (0);
5513+
5514+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #5 */
5515+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, or1, or2, sllx, jmpl, nop;
5516+
5517+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5518+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5519+ err |= get_user(or1, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5520+ err |= get_user(or2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
5521+ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
5522+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
5523+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+24));
5524+
5525+ if (err)
5526+ break;
5527+
5528+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5529+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
5530+ (or1 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x82106000U &&
5531+ (or2 & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
5532+ sllx == 0x83287020 &&
5533+ jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
5534+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5535+ {
5536+ unsigned long addr;
5537+
5538+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = ((sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or1 & 0x000003FFU);
5539+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
5540+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or2 & 0x000003FFU);
5541+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
5542+ regs->tpc = addr;
5543+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5544+ return 2;
5545+ }
5546+ } while (0);
5547+
5548+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #6 */
5549+ unsigned int sethi1, sethi2, sllx, or, jmpl, nop;
5550+
5551+ err = get_user(sethi1, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5552+ err |= get_user(sethi2, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5553+ err |= get_user(sllx, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5554+ err |= get_user(or, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+12));
5555+ err |= get_user(jmpl, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+16));
5556+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+20));
5557+
5558+ if (err)
5559+ break;
5560+
5561+ if ((sethi1 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5562+ (sethi2 & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x0B000000U &&
5563+ sllx == 0x83287020 &&
5564+ (or & 0xFFFFE000U) == 0x8A116000U &&
5565+ jmpl == 0x81C04005U &&
5566+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5567+ {
5568+ unsigned long addr;
5569+
5570+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi1 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5571+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] <<= 32;
5572+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G5] = ((sethi2 & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10) | (or & 0x3FFU);
5573+ addr = regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] + regs->u_regs[UREG_G5];
5574+ regs->tpc = addr;
5575+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5576+ return 2;
5577+ }
5578+ } while (0);
5579+
5580+ do { /* PaX: patched PLT emulation #7 */
5581+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
5582+
5583+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5584+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5585+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5586+
5587+ if (err)
5588+ break;
5589+
5590+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5591+ (ba & 0xFFF00000U) == 0x30600000U &&
5592+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5593+ {
5594+ unsigned long addr;
5595+
5596+ addr = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5597+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = addr;
5598+ addr = regs->tpc + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
5599+ regs->tpc = addr;
5600+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5601+ return 2;
5602+ }
5603+ } while (0);
5604+
5605+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 1 */
5606+ unsigned int sethi, ba, nop;
5607+
5608+ err = get_user(sethi, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5609+ err |= get_user(ba, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5610+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+8));
5611+
5612+ if (err)
5613+ break;
5614+
5615+ if ((sethi & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x03000000U &&
5616+ ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U || (ba & 0xFFF80000U) == 0x30680000U) &&
5617+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5618+ {
5619+ unsigned long addr;
5620+ unsigned int save, call;
5621+
5622+ if ((ba & 0xFFC00000U) == 0x30800000U)
5623+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFC00000UL) ^ 0x00200000UL) + 0x00200000UL) << 2);
5624+ else
5625+ addr = regs->tpc + 4 + ((((ba | 0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000UL) ^ 0x00040000UL) + 0x00040000UL) << 2);
5626+
5627+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)addr);
5628+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)(addr+4));
5629+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(addr+8));
5630+ if (err)
5631+ break;
5632+
5633+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
5634+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
5635+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5636+ {
5637+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
5638+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
5639+
5640+ down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5641+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
5642+ up_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5643+ if (likely(call_dl_resolve))
5644+ goto emulate;
5645+
5646+ vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
5647+
5648+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5649+ if (current->mm->call_dl_resolve) {
5650+ call_dl_resolve = current->mm->call_dl_resolve;
5651+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5652+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5653+ goto emulate;
5654+ }
5655+
5656+ call_dl_resolve = get_unmapped_area(NULL, 0UL, PAGE_SIZE, 0UL, MAP_PRIVATE);
5657+ if (!vma || (call_dl_resolve & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
5658+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5659+ if (vma) kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5660+ return 1;
5661+ }
5662+
5663+ if (pax_insert_vma(vma, call_dl_resolve)) {
5664+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5665+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
5666+ return 1;
5667+ }
5668+
5669+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = call_dl_resolve;
5670+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
5671+
5672+emulate:
5673+ regs->u_regs[UREG_G1] = (sethi & 0x003FFFFFU) << 10;
5674+ regs->tpc = call_dl_resolve;
5675+ regs->tnpc = addr+4;
5676+ return 3;
5677+ }
5678+ }
5679+ } while (0);
5680+
5681+ do { /* PaX: unpatched PLT emulation step 2 */
5682+ unsigned int save, call, nop;
5683+
5684+ err = get_user(save, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc-4));
5685+ err |= get_user(call, (unsigned int*)regs->tpc);
5686+ err |= get_user(nop, (unsigned int*)(regs->tpc+4));
5687+ if (err)
5688+ break;
5689+
5690+ if (save == 0x9DE3BFA8U &&
5691+ (call & 0xC0000000U) == 0x40000000U &&
5692+ nop == 0x01000000U)
5693+ {
5694+ unsigned long dl_resolve = regs->tpc + ((((call | 0xFFFFFFFFC0000000UL) ^ 0x20000000UL) + 0x20000000UL) << 2);
5695+
5696+ regs->u_regs[UREG_RETPC] = regs->tpc;
5697+ regs->tpc = dl_resolve;
5698+ regs->tnpc = dl_resolve+4;
5699+ return 3;
5700+ }
5701+ } while (0);
5702+#endif
5703+
5704+ return 1;
5705+}
5706+
5707+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
5708+{
5709+ unsigned long i;
5710+
5711+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
5712+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
5713+ unsigned int c;
5714+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned int*)pc+i))
5715+ printk("???????? ");
5716+ else
5717+ printk("%08x ", c);
5718+ }
5719+ printk("\n");
5720+}
5721+#endif
5722+
5723 asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
5724 {
5725 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
5726@@ -293,8 +660,10 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fau
5727 goto intr_or_no_mm;
5728
5729 if (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT)) {
5730- if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV))
5731+ if (!(regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)) {
5732 regs->tpc &= 0xffffffff;
5733+ regs->tnpc &= 0xffffffff;
5734+ }
5735 address &= 0xffffffff;
5736 }
5737
5738@@ -311,6 +680,29 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_sparc64_fau
5739 if (!vma)
5740 goto bad_area;
5741
5742+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5743+ /* PaX: detect ITLB misses on non-exec pages */
5744+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && vma->vm_start <= address &&
5745+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) && (fault_code & FAULT_CODE_ITLB))
5746+ {
5747+ if (address != regs->tpc)
5748+ goto good_area;
5749+
5750+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
5751+ switch (pax_handle_fetch_fault(regs)) {
5752+
5753+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUPLT
5754+ case 2:
5755+ case 3:
5756+ return;
5757+#endif
5758+
5759+ }
5760+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->tpc, (void*)(regs->u_regs[UREG_FP] + STACK_BIAS));
5761+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
5762+ }
5763+#endif
5764+
5765 /* Pure DTLB misses do not tell us whether the fault causing
5766 * load/store/atomic was a write or not, it only says that there
5767 * was no match. So in such a case we (carefully) read the
5768diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/v850/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/v850/kernel/module.c
5769--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/v850/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5770+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/v850/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5771@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ static uint32_t do_plt_call (void *locat
5772 tramp[1] = ((val >> 16) & 0xffff) + 0x610000; /* ...; jmp r1 */
5773
5774 /* Init, or core PLT? */
5775- if (location >= mod->module_core
5776- && location < mod->module_core + mod->core_size)
5777+ if (location >= mod->module_core_rx
5778+ && location < mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx)
5779 entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.core_plt_section].sh_addr;
5780 else
5781 entry = (void *)sechdrs[mod->arch.init_plt_section].sh_addr;
5782diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/boot/compressed/head.S linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/boot/compressed/head.S
5783--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/boot/compressed/head.S 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5784+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/boot/compressed/head.S 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5785@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ startup_32:
5786 movl %eax,%gs
5787
5788 lss stack_start,%esp
5789+ movl 0x000000,%ecx
5790 xorl %eax,%eax
5791 1: incl %eax # check that A20 really IS enabled
5792 movl %eax,0x000000 # loop forever if it isn't
5793 cmpl %eax,0x100000
5794 je 1b
5795+ movl %ecx,0x000000
5796
5797 /*
5798 * Initialize eflags. Some BIOS's leave bits like NT set. This would
5799diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c
5800--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5801+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32_binfmt.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5802@@ -186,6 +186,17 @@ struct elf_prpsinfo
5803 //#include <asm/ia32.h>
5804 #include <linux/elf.h>
5805
5806+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
5807+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x08048000UL
5808+
5809+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5810+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
5811+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5812+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
5813+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
5814+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
5815+#endif
5816+
5817 typedef struct user_i387_ia32_struct elf_fpregset_t;
5818 typedef struct user32_fxsr_struct elf_fpxregset_t;
5819
5820diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/mmap32.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/mmap32.c
5821--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/mmap32.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5822+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/ia32/mmap32.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5823@@ -68,10 +68,22 @@ void ia32_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
5824 (current->personality & ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT) ||
5825 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) {
5826 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
5827+
5828+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5829+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
5830+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
5831+#endif
5832+
5833 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
5834 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
5835 } else {
5836 mm->mmap_base = mmap_base(mm);
5837+
5838+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5839+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
5840+ mm->mmap_base -= mm->delta_mmap + mm->delta_stack;
5841+#endif
5842+
5843 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
5844 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area_topdown;
5845 }
5846diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
5847--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5848+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5849@@ -835,9 +835,3 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t
5850 return 1;
5851 }
5852
5853-unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
5854-{
5855- if (randomize_va_space)
5856- sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
5857- return sp & ~0xf;
5858-}
5859diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
5860--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5861+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5862@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
5863 #include <linux/audit.h>
5864 #include <linux/seccomp.h>
5865 #include <linux/signal.h>
5866+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
5867
5868 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5869 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
5870diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c
5871--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5872+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/setup64.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5873@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ struct desc_ptr idt_descr = { 256 * 16,
5874 char boot_cpu_stack[IRQSTACKSIZE] __attribute__((section(".bss.page_aligned")));
5875
5876 unsigned long __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0UL;
5877-static int do_not_nx __cpuinitdata = 0;
5878
5879 /* noexec=on|off
5880 Control non executable mappings for 64bit processes.
5881@@ -50,16 +49,14 @@ int __init nonx_setup(char *str)
5882 {
5883 if (!strncmp(str, "on", 2)) {
5884 __supported_pte_mask |= _PAGE_NX;
5885- do_not_nx = 0;
5886 } else if (!strncmp(str, "off", 3)) {
5887- do_not_nx = 1;
5888 __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
5889 }
5890 return 0;
5891 }
5892 __setup("noexec=", nonx_setup); /* parsed early actually */
5893
5894-int force_personality32 = READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
5895+int force_personality32;
5896
5897 /* noexec32=on|off
5898 Control non executable heap for 32bit processes.
5899@@ -173,7 +170,7 @@ void __cpuinit check_efer(void)
5900 unsigned long efer;
5901
5902 rdmsrl(MSR_EFER, efer);
5903- if (!(efer & EFER_NX) || do_not_nx) {
5904+ if (!(efer & EFER_NX)) {
5905 __supported_pte_mask &= ~_PAGE_NX;
5906 }
5907 }
5908diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
5909--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5910+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/kernel/sys_x86_64.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5911@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ out:
5912 return error;
5913 }
5914
5915-static void find_start_end(unsigned long flags, unsigned long *begin,
5916- unsigned long *end)
5917+static void find_start_end(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
5918+ unsigned long *begin, unsigned long *end)
5919 {
5920 if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) && (flags & MAP_32BIT)) {
5921 /* This is usually used needed to map code in small
5922@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long
5923 *begin = 0x40000000;
5924 *end = 0x80000000;
5925 } else {
5926- *begin = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
5927+ *begin = mm->mmap_base;
5928 *end = TASK_SIZE;
5929 }
5930 }
5931@@ -93,11 +93,15 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
5932 unsigned long start_addr;
5933 unsigned long begin, end;
5934
5935- find_start_end(flags, &begin, &end);
5936+ find_start_end(mm, flags, &begin, &end);
5937
5938 if (len > end)
5939 return -ENOMEM;
5940
5941+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
5942+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
5943+#endif
5944+
5945 if (addr) {
5946 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
5947 vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
5948diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c
5949--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
5950+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/fault.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
5951@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
5952 #include <linux/compiler.h>
5953 #include <linux/module.h>
5954 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
5955+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
5956
5957 #include <asm/system.h>
5958 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
5959@@ -292,6 +293,33 @@ static int vmalloc_fault(unsigned long a
5960 return 0;
5961 }
5962
5963+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
5964+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp)
5965+{
5966+ long i;
5967+
5968+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at PC: ");
5969+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
5970+ unsigned char c;
5971+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned char __user *)pc+i))
5972+ printk("?? ");
5973+ else
5974+ printk("%02x ", c);
5975+ }
5976+ printk("\n");
5977+
5978+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: bytes at SP-8: ");
5979+ for (i = -1; i < 10; i++) {
5980+ unsigned long c;
5981+ if (get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)sp+i))
5982+ printk("???????????????? ");
5983+ else
5984+ printk("%016lx ", c);
5985+ }
5986+ printk("\n");
5987+}
5988+#endif
5989+
5990 int page_fault_trace = 0;
5991 int exception_trace = 1;
5992
5993@@ -416,6 +444,8 @@ asmlinkage void __kprobes do_page_fault(
5994 good_area:
5995 info.si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
5996 write = 0;
5997+ if ((error_code & PF_INSTR) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
5998+ goto bad_area;
5999 switch (error_code & (PF_PROT|PF_WRITE)) {
6000 default: /* 3: write, present */
6001 /* fall through */
6002@@ -482,7 +512,14 @@ bad_area_nosemaphore:
6003 tsk->comm, tsk->pid, address, regs->rip,
6004 regs->rsp, error_code);
6005 }
6006-
6007+
6008+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6009+ if (mm && (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (error_code & 16)) {
6010+ pax_report_fault(regs, (void*)regs->rip, (void*)regs->rsp);
6011+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
6012+ }
6013+#endif
6014+
6015 tsk->thread.cr2 = address;
6016 /* Kernel addresses are always protection faults */
6017 tsk->thread.error_code = error_code | (address >= TASK_SIZE);
6018diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/mmap.c
6019--- linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6020+++ linux-2.6.16.2/arch/x86_64/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6021@@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_str
6022 unsigned rnd = get_random_int() & 0xfffffff;
6023 mm->mmap_base += ((unsigned long)rnd) << PAGE_SHIFT;
6024 }
6025+
6026+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
6027+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
6028+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
6029+#endif
6030+
6031 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
6032 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
6033 }
6034diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c
6035--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6036+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/agp/frontend.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6037@@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ static int agpioc_reserve_wrap(struct ag
6038 if (copy_from_user(&reserve, arg, sizeof(struct agp_region)))
6039 return -EFAULT;
6040
6041- if ((unsigned) reserve.seg_count >= ~0U/sizeof(struct agp_segment))
6042+ if ((unsigned) reserve.seg_count >= ~0U/sizeof(struct agp_segment_priv))
6043 return -EFAULT;
6044
6045 client = agp_find_client_by_pid(reserve.pid);
6046diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/keyboard.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/keyboard.c
6047--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6048+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6049@@ -607,6 +607,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u
6050 kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) &&
6051 value != KVAL(K_SAK))
6052 return; /* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */
6053+
6054+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP)
6055+ {
6056+ void *func = fn_handler[value];
6057+ if (func == fn_show_state || func == fn_show_ptregs ||
6058+ func == fn_show_mem)
6059+ return;
6060+ }
6061+#endif
6062+
6063 fn_handler[value](vc, regs);
6064 }
6065
6066diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/mem.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/mem.c
6067--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/mem.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6068+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/mem.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6069@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
6070 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
6071 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
6072 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
6073+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6074
6075 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
6076 #include <asm/io.h>
6077@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@
6078 # include <linux/efi.h>
6079 #endif
6080
6081+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6082+extern struct file_operations grsec_fops;
6083+#endif
6084+
6085 /*
6086 * Architectures vary in how they handle caching for addresses
6087 * outside of main memory.
6088@@ -180,6 +185,11 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file * f
6089 if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, &count))
6090 return -EFAULT;
6091
6092+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
6093+ gr_handle_mem_write();
6094+ return -EPERM;
6095+#endif
6096+
6097 written = 0;
6098
6099 #ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
6100@@ -258,6 +268,11 @@ static int mmap_mem(struct file * file,
6101 size,
6102 vma->vm_page_prot);
6103
6104+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
6105+ if (gr_handle_mem_mmap(vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, vma))
6106+ return -EPERM;
6107+#endif
6108+
6109 /* Remap-pfn-range will mark the range VM_IO and VM_RESERVED */
6110 if (remap_pfn_range(vma,
6111 vma->vm_start,
6112@@ -487,6 +502,11 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *
6113 ssize_t written;
6114 char * kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
6115
6116+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
6117+ gr_handle_kmem_write();
6118+ return -EPERM;
6119+#endif
6120+
6121 if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
6122
6123 wrote = count;
6124@@ -613,7 +633,23 @@ static inline size_t read_zero_pagealign
6125 count = size;
6126
6127 zap_page_range(vma, addr, count, NULL);
6128- zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, PAGE_COPY);
6129+ zeromap_page_range(vma, addr, count, vma->vm_page_prot);
6130+
6131+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6132+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
6133+ unsigned long addr_m;
6134+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
6135+
6136+ addr_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
6137+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, addr_m);
6138+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == addr_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
6139+ addr_m = addr + vma->vm_mirror;
6140+ zap_page_range(vma_m, addr_m, count, NULL);
6141+ } else
6142+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: read_zero bug, %08lx, %08lx\n",
6143+ addr, vma->vm_start);
6144+ }
6145+#endif
6146
6147 size -= count;
6148 buf += count;
6149@@ -762,6 +798,16 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *
6150
6151 static int open_port(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
6152 {
6153+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM
6154+ gr_handle_open_port();
6155+ return -EPERM;
6156+#endif
6157+
6158+ return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
6159+}
6160+
6161+static int open_mem(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
6162+{
6163 return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
6164 }
6165
6166@@ -769,7 +815,6 @@ static int open_port(struct inode * inod
6167 #define full_lseek null_lseek
6168 #define write_zero write_null
6169 #define read_full read_zero
6170-#define open_mem open_port
6171 #define open_kmem open_mem
6172 #define open_oldmem open_mem
6173
6174@@ -891,6 +936,11 @@ static int memory_open(struct inode * in
6175 filp->f_op = &oldmem_fops;
6176 break;
6177 #endif
6178+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6179+ case 13:
6180+ filp->f_op = &grsec_fops;
6181+ break;
6182+#endif
6183 default:
6184 return -ENXIO;
6185 }
6186@@ -923,6 +973,9 @@ static const struct {
6187 #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
6188 {12,"oldmem", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP, &oldmem_fops},
6189 #endif
6190+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6191+ {13,"grsec", S_IRUSR | S_IWUGO, &grsec_fops},
6192+#endif
6193 };
6194
6195 static struct class *mem_class;
6196diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/random.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/random.c
6197--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/random.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6198+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/random.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6199@@ -249,8 +249,13 @@
6200 /*
6201 * Configuration information
6202 */
6203+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
6204+#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 256
6205+#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 64
6206+#else
6207 #define INPUT_POOL_WORDS 128
6208 #define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS 32
6209+#endif
6210 #define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512
6211
6212 /*
6213@@ -1659,3 +1664,25 @@ randomize_range(unsigned long start, uns
6214 return 0;
6215 return PAGE_ALIGN(get_random_int() % range + start);
6216 }
6217+
6218+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC)
6219+unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void)
6220+{
6221+ static time_t rekey_time;
6222+ static __u32 secret[12];
6223+ time_t t;
6224+
6225+ /*
6226+ * Pick a random secret every REKEY_INTERVAL seconds.
6227+ */
6228+ t = get_seconds();
6229+ if (!rekey_time || (t - rekey_time) > REKEY_INTERVAL) {
6230+ rekey_time = t;
6231+ get_random_bytes(secret, sizeof(secret));
6232+ }
6233+
6234+ secret[1] = half_md4_transform(secret+8, secret);
6235+ secret[0] = half_md4_transform(secret+8, secret);
6236+ return *(unsigned long *)secret;
6237+}
6238+#endif
6239diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c
6240--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6241+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/char/vt_ioctl.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6242@@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ do_kdsk_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbentry __
6243 case KDSKBENT:
6244 if (!perm)
6245 return -EPERM;
6246+
6247+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6248+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
6249+ return -EPERM;
6250+#endif
6251+
6252 if (!i && v == K_NOSUCHMAP) {
6253 /* disallocate map */
6254 key_map = key_maps[s];
6255@@ -236,6 +242,13 @@ do_kdgkb_ioctl(int cmd, struct kbsentry
6256 goto reterr;
6257 }
6258
6259+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
6260+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
6261+ ret = -EPERM;
6262+ goto reterr;
6263+ }
6264+#endif
6265+
6266 q = func_table[i];
6267 first_free = funcbufptr + (funcbufsize - funcbufleft);
6268 for (j = i+1; j < MAX_NR_FUNC && !func_table[j]; j++)
6269diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c
6270--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6271+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/ieee1394/ohci1394.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6272@@ -162,9 +162,9 @@ printk(level "%s: " fmt "\n" , OHCI1394_
6273 printk(level "%s: fw-host%d: " fmt "\n" , OHCI1394_DRIVER_NAME, ohci->host->id , ## args)
6274
6275 /* Module Parameters */
6276-static int phys_dma = 1;
6277+static int phys_dma = 0;
6278 module_param(phys_dma, int, 0644);
6279-MODULE_PARM_DESC(phys_dma, "Enable physical dma (default = 1).");
6280+MODULE_PARM_DESC(phys_dma, "Enable physical dma (default = 0).");
6281
6282 static void dma_trm_tasklet(unsigned long data);
6283 static void dma_trm_reset(struct dma_trm_ctx *d);
6284diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c
6285--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6286+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/mtd/devices/doc2001.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6287@@ -423,6 +423,8 @@ static int doc_read_ecc (struct mtd_info
6288 /* Don't allow read past end of device */
6289 if (from >= this->totlen)
6290 return -EINVAL;
6291+ if (!len)
6292+ return -EINVAL;
6293
6294 /* Don't allow a single read to cross a 512-byte block boundary */
6295 if (from + len > ((from | 0x1ff) + 1))
6296diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c
6297--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6298+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/net/wan/sdla_ppp.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6299@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan
6300 sdla_t* card = wandev->private;
6301 struct net_device* dev;
6302 volatile ppp_private_area_t *ppp_priv_area;
6303- ppp_flags_t *flags = card->flags;
6304+ ppp_flags_t *flags;
6305 unsigned long timeout;
6306
6307 /* sanity checks */
6308@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ static int update(struct wan_device *wan
6309
6310 ppp_priv_area->update_comms_stats = 2;
6311 ppp_priv_area->timer_int_enabled |= TMR_INT_ENABLED_UPDATE;
6312+ flags = card->flags;
6313 flags->imask |= PPP_INTR_TIMER;
6314
6315 /* wait a maximum of 1 second for the statistics to be updated */
6316diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pci/proc.c
6317--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pci/proc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6318+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pci/proc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6319@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ static struct file_operations proc_pci_o
6320
6321 static void legacy_proc_init(void)
6322 {
6323+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
6324+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
6325+ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR, NULL);
6326+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
6327+ struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
6328+#endif
6329+#else
6330 struct proc_dir_entry * entry = create_proc_entry("pci", 0, NULL);
6331+#endif
6332 if (entry)
6333 entry->proc_fops = &proc_pci_operations;
6334 }
6335@@ -598,7 +606,15 @@ static int __init pci_proc_init(void)
6336 {
6337 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
6338 struct pci_dev *dev = NULL;
6339+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
6340+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
6341+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus);
6342+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
6343+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, proc_bus);
6344+#endif
6345+#else
6346 proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir("pci", proc_bus);
6347+#endif
6348 entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir);
6349 if (entry)
6350 entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations;
6351diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c
6352--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6353+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/pnp/pnpbios/bioscalls.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6354@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ set_base(gdt[(selname) >> 3], (u32)(addr
6355 set_limit(gdt[(selname) >> 3], size); \
6356 } while(0)
6357
6358-static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409200 };
6359+static struct desc_struct bad_bios_desc = { 0, 0x00409300 };
6360
6361 /*
6362 * At some point we want to use this stack frame pointer to unwind
6363@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
6364 struct desc_struct save_desc_40;
6365 int cpu;
6366
6367+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
6368+ unsigned long cr0;
6369+#endif
6370+
6371 /*
6372 * PnP BIOSes are generally not terribly re-entrant.
6373 * Also, don't rely on them to save everything correctly.
6374@@ -107,6 +111,10 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
6375 /* On some boxes IRQ's during PnP BIOS calls are deadly. */
6376 spin_lock_irqsave(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
6377
6378+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
6379+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
6380+#endif
6381+
6382 /* The lock prevents us bouncing CPU here */
6383 if (ts1_size)
6384 Q2_SET_SEL(smp_processor_id(), PNP_TS1, ts1_base, ts1_size);
6385@@ -142,9 +150,14 @@ static inline u16 call_pnp_bios(u16 func
6386 "i" (0)
6387 : "memory"
6388 );
6389- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
6390
6391 get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[0x40 / 8] = save_desc_40;
6392+
6393+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
6394+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
6395+#endif
6396+
6397+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pnp_bios_lock, flags);
6398 put_cpu();
6399
6400 /* If we get here and this is set then the PnP BIOS faulted on us. */
6401diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/scsi/libata-scsi.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/scsi/libata-scsi.c
6402--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/scsi/libata-scsi.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6403+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/scsi/libata-scsi.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6404@@ -1553,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_80(struct at
6405 return 0;
6406 }
6407
6408-static const char * const inq_83_str = "Linux ATA-SCSI simulator";
6409+static const char inq_83_str[] = "Linux ATA-SCSI simulator";
6410
6411 /**
6412 * ata_scsiop_inq_83 - Simulate INQUIRY EVPD page 83, device identity
6413@@ -1572,13 +1572,13 @@ unsigned int ata_scsiop_inq_83(struct at
6414 unsigned int buflen)
6415 {
6416 rbuf[1] = 0x83; /* this page code */
6417- rbuf[3] = 4 + strlen(inq_83_str); /* page len */
6418+ rbuf[3] = 3 + sizeof(inq_83_str); /* page len */
6419
6420 /* our one and only identification descriptor (vendor-specific) */
6421- if (buflen > (strlen(inq_83_str) + 4 + 4 - 1)) {
6422+ if (buflen >= (sizeof(inq_83_str) + 4 + 4 - 1)) {
6423 rbuf[4 + 0] = 2; /* code set: ASCII */
6424- rbuf[4 + 3] = strlen(inq_83_str);
6425- memcpy(rbuf + 4 + 4, inq_83_str, strlen(inq_83_str));
6426+ rbuf[4 + 3] = sizeof(inq_83_str)-1;
6427+ memcpy(rbuf + 4 + 4, inq_83_str, sizeof(inq_83_str)-1);
6428 }
6429
6430 return 0;
6431diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/video/vesafb.c linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/video/vesafb.c
6432--- linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6433+++ linux-2.6.16.2/drivers/video/vesafb.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6434@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static int __init vesafb_probe(struct pl
6435 size_remap = size_total;
6436 vesafb_fix.smem_len = size_remap;
6437
6438-#ifndef __i386__
6439+#if !defined(__i386__) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC)
6440 screen_info.vesapm_seg = 0;
6441 #endif
6442
6443diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_aout.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_aout.c
6444--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6445+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_aout.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6446@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
6447 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
6448 #include <linux/personality.h>
6449 #include <linux/init.h>
6450+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6451
6452 #include <asm/system.h>
6453 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
6454@@ -123,10 +124,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st
6455 /* If the size of the dump file exceeds the rlimit, then see what would happen
6456 if we wrote the stack, but not the data area. */
6457 #ifdef __sparc__
6458+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize, 1);
6459 if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize) >
6460 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
6461 dump.u_dsize = 0;
6462 #else
6463+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
6464 if ((dump.u_dsize+dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
6465 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
6466 dump.u_dsize = 0;
6467@@ -134,10 +137,12 @@ static int aout_core_dump(long signr, st
6468
6469 /* Make sure we have enough room to write the stack and data areas. */
6470 #ifdef __sparc__
6471+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, dump.u_ssize, 1);
6472 if ((dump.u_ssize) >
6473 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
6474 dump.u_ssize = 0;
6475 #else
6476+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, (dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE, 1);
6477 if ((dump.u_ssize+1) * PAGE_SIZE >
6478 current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur)
6479 dump.u_ssize = 0;
6480@@ -287,6 +292,8 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
6481 rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
6482 if (rlim >= RLIM_INFINITY)
6483 rlim = ~0;
6484+
6485+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, ex.a_data + ex.a_bss, 1);
6486 if (ex.a_data + ex.a_bss > rlim)
6487 return -ENOMEM;
6488
6489@@ -319,6 +326,28 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
6490 current->mm->mmap = NULL;
6491 compute_creds(bprm);
6492 current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
6493+
6494+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
6495+ current->mm->pax_flags = 0UL;
6496+#endif
6497+
6498+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6499+ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) {
6500+ current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6501+
6502+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6503+ if (N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
6504+ current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6505+#endif
6506+
6507+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6508+ if (!(N_FLAGS(ex) & F_PAX_MPROTECT))
6509+ current->mm->pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6510+#endif
6511+
6512+ }
6513+#endif
6514+
6515 #ifdef __sparc__
6516 if (N_MAGIC(ex) == NMAGIC) {
6517 loff_t pos = fd_offset;
6518@@ -414,7 +443,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux
6519
6520 down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6521 error = do_mmap(bprm->file, N_DATADDR(ex), ex.a_data,
6522- PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
6523+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
6524 MAP_FIXED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE,
6525 fd_offset + ex.a_text);
6526 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
6527diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_elf.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_elf.c
6528--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
6529+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_elf.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
6530@@ -38,11 +38,16 @@
6531 #include <linux/security.h>
6532 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
6533 #include <linux/random.h>
6534+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
6535
6536 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
6537 #include <asm/param.h>
6538 #include <asm/page.h>
6539
6540+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6541+#include <asm/desc.h>
6542+#endif
6543+
6544 #include <linux/elf.h>
6545
6546 static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm, struct pt_regs * regs);
6547@@ -90,6 +95,8 @@ static struct linux_binfmt elf_format =
6548
6549 static int set_brk(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
6550 {
6551+ unsigned long e = end;
6552+
6553 start = ELF_PAGEALIGN(start);
6554 end = ELF_PAGEALIGN(end);
6555 if (end > start) {
6556@@ -100,7 +107,7 @@ static int set_brk(unsigned long start,
6557 if (BAD_ADDR(addr))
6558 return addr;
6559 }
6560- current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = end;
6561+ current->mm->start_brk = current->mm->brk = e;
6562 return 0;
6563 }
6564
6565@@ -316,10 +323,9 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
6566 {
6567 struct elf_phdr *elf_phdata;
6568 struct elf_phdr *eppnt;
6569- unsigned long load_addr = 0;
6570- int load_addr_set = 0;
6571+ unsigned long load_addr = 0, min_addr, max_addr, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
6572 unsigned long last_bss = 0, elf_bss = 0;
6573- unsigned long error = ~0UL;
6574+ unsigned long error = -EINVAL;
6575 int retval, i, size;
6576
6577 /* First of all, some simple consistency checks */
6578@@ -358,59 +364,80 @@ static unsigned long load_elf_interp(str
6579 goto out_close;
6580 }
6581
6582+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6583+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6584+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6585+#endif
6586+
6587 eppnt = elf_phdata;
6588+ min_addr = task_size;
6589+ max_addr = 0;
6590+ error = -ENOMEM;
6591+
6592 for (i=0; i<interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
6593- if (eppnt->p_type == PT_LOAD) {
6594- int elf_type = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE;
6595- int elf_prot = 0;
6596- unsigned long vaddr = 0;
6597- unsigned long k, map_addr;
6598-
6599- if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_R) elf_prot = PROT_READ;
6600- if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_W) elf_prot |= PROT_WRITE;
6601- if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_X) elf_prot |= PROT_EXEC;
6602- vaddr = eppnt->p_vaddr;
6603- if (interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set)
6604- elf_type |= MAP_FIXED;
6605-
6606- map_addr = elf_map(interpreter, load_addr + vaddr, eppnt, elf_prot, elf_type);
6607- error = map_addr;
6608- if (BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
6609- goto out_close;
6610-
6611- if (!load_addr_set && interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN) {
6612- load_addr = map_addr - ELF_PAGESTART(vaddr);
6613- load_addr_set = 1;
6614- }
6615-
6616- /*
6617- * Check to see if the section's size will overflow the
6618- * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
6619- * <= p_memsize so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
6620- */
6621- k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr;
6622- if (k > TASK_SIZE || eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz ||
6623- eppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE || TASK_SIZE - eppnt->p_memsz < k) {
6624- error = -ENOMEM;
6625+ if (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
6626+ continue;
6627+
6628+ /*
6629+ * Check to see if the section's size will overflow the
6630+ * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
6631+ * <= p_memsize so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
6632+ */
6633+ if (eppnt->p_filesz > eppnt->p_memsz || eppnt->p_vaddr >= eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_memsz)
6634+ goto out_close;
6635+
6636+ if (min_addr > ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr))
6637+ min_addr = ELF_PAGESTART(eppnt->p_vaddr);
6638+ if (max_addr < ELF_PAGEALIGN(eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_memsz))
6639+ max_addr = ELF_PAGEALIGN(eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_memsz);
6640+ }
6641+ if (min_addr >= max_addr)
6642 goto out_close;
6643- }
6644
6645- /*
6646- * Find the end of the file mapping for this phdr, and keep
6647- * track of the largest address we see for this.
6648- */
6649- k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
6650- if (k > elf_bss)
6651- elf_bss = k;
6652-
6653- /*
6654- * Do the same thing for the memory mapping - between
6655- * elf_bss and last_bss is the bss section.
6656- */
6657- k = load_addr + eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr;
6658- if (k > last_bss)
6659- last_bss = k;
6660- }
6661+ eppnt = elf_phdata;
6662+ for (i=0; i<interp_elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, eppnt++) {
6663+ int elf_type = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_FIXED;
6664+ int elf_prot = 0;
6665+ unsigned long vaddr;
6666+ unsigned long k, map_addr;
6667+
6668+ if (eppnt->p_type != PT_LOAD)
6669+ continue;
6670+
6671+ if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_R) elf_prot = PROT_READ;
6672+ if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_W) elf_prot |= PROT_WRITE;
6673+ if (eppnt->p_flags & PF_X) elf_prot |= PROT_EXEC;
6674+ vaddr = eppnt->p_vaddr;
6675+
6676+ if (!load_addr && interp_elf_ex->e_type == ET_DYN) {
6677+ load_addr = get_unmapped_area(interpreter, 0, max_addr - min_addr, 0, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_EXECUTABLE);
6678+
6679+ if (load_addr > task_size)
6680+ goto out_close;
6681+
6682+ load_addr -= min_addr;
6683+ }
6684+
6685+ map_addr = elf_map(interpreter, load_addr + vaddr, eppnt, elf_prot, elf_type);
6686+ error = map_addr;
6687+ if (BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
6688+ goto out_close;
6689+
6690+ /*
6691+ * Find the end of the file mapping for this phdr, and keep
6692+ * track of the largest address we see for this.
6693+ */
6694+ k = load_addr + eppnt->p_vaddr + eppnt->p_filesz;
6695+ if (k > elf_bss)
6696+ elf_bss = k;
6697+
6698+ /*
6699+ * Do the same thing for the memory mapping - between
6700+ * elf_bss and last_bss is the bss section.
6701+ */
6702+ k = load_addr + eppnt->p_memsz + eppnt->p_vaddr;
6703+ if (k > last_bss)
6704+ last_bss = k;
6705 }
6706
6707 /*
6708@@ -447,7 +474,7 @@ out:
6709 static unsigned long load_aout_interp(struct exec * interp_ex,
6710 struct file * interpreter)
6711 {
6712- unsigned long text_data, elf_entry = ~0UL;
6713+ unsigned long text_data, elf_entry = -EINVAL;
6714 char __user * addr;
6715 loff_t offset;
6716
6717@@ -491,6 +518,180 @@ out:
6718 return elf_entry;
6719 }
6720
6721+#if (defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE)
6722+static unsigned long pax_parse_softmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
6723+{
6724+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6725+
6726+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6727+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC)
6728+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6729+#endif
6730+
6731+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6732+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC)
6733+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6734+#endif
6735+
6736+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
6737+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6738+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6739+#endif
6740+
6741+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
6742+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6743+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6744+#endif
6745+
6746+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6747+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP)
6748+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6749+#endif
6750+
6751+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6752+ if (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_MPROTECT)
6753+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6754+#endif
6755+
6756+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
6757+ if (randomize_va_space && (elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP))
6758+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
6759+#endif
6760+
6761+ return pax_flags;
6762+}
6763+#endif
6764+
6765+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
6766+static unsigned long pax_parse_hardmode(const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
6767+{
6768+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6769+
6770+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6771+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC))
6772+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6773+#endif
6774+
6775+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6776+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC))
6777+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6778+#endif
6779+
6780+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
6781+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6782+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6783+#endif
6784+
6785+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
6786+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6787+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6788+#endif
6789+
6790+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6791+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP))
6792+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6793+#endif
6794+
6795+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6796+ if (!(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT))
6797+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6798+#endif
6799+
6800+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK)
6801+ if (randomize_va_space && !(elf_phdata->p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP))
6802+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
6803+#endif
6804+
6805+ return pax_flags;
6806+}
6807+#endif
6808+
6809+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
6810+static unsigned long pax_parse_ei_pax(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex)
6811+{
6812+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6813+
6814+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
6815+ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
6816+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6817+#endif
6818+
6819+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6820+ if (!(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6821+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6822+#endif
6823+
6824+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
6825+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6826+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
6827+#endif
6828+
6829+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
6830+ if (pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6831+ pax_flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
6832+#endif
6833+
6834+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
6835+ if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && (elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP))
6836+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
6837+#endif
6838+
6839+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
6840+ if ((pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_MPROTECT))
6841+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
6842+#endif
6843+
6844+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6845+ if (randomize_va_space && !(elf_ex->e_ident[EI_PAX] & EF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
6846+ pax_flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
6847+#endif
6848+
6849+ return pax_flags;
6850+}
6851+#endif
6852+
6853+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
6854+static long pax_parse_elf_flags(const struct elfhdr * const elf_ex, const struct elf_phdr * const elf_phdata)
6855+{
6856+ unsigned long pax_flags = 0UL;
6857+
6858+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
6859+ unsigned long i;
6860+#endif
6861+
6862+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX
6863+ pax_flags = pax_parse_ei_pax(elf_ex);
6864+#endif
6865+
6866+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
6867+ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++)
6868+ if (elf_phdata[i].p_type == PT_PAX_FLAGS) {
6869+ if (((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_PAGEEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOPAGEEXEC)) ||
6870+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_SEGMEXEC) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOSEGMEXEC)) ||
6871+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_EMUTRAMP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOEMUTRAMP)) ||
6872+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_MPROTECT) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NOMPROTECT)) ||
6873+ ((elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_RANDMMAP) && (elf_phdata[i].p_flags & PF_NORANDMMAP)))
6874+ return -EINVAL;
6875+
6876+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
6877+ if (pax_softmode)
6878+ pax_flags = pax_parse_softmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
6879+ else
6880+#endif
6881+
6882+ pax_flags = pax_parse_hardmode(&elf_phdata[i]);
6883+ break;
6884+ }
6885+#endif
6886+
6887+ if (0 > pax_check_flags(&pax_flags))
6888+ return -EINVAL;
6889+
6890+ current->mm->pax_flags = pax_flags;
6891+ return 0;
6892+}
6893+#endif
6894+
6895 /*
6896 * These are the functions used to load ELF style executables and shared
6897 * libraries. There is no binary dependent code anywhere else.
6898@@ -522,7 +723,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6899 char * elf_interpreter = NULL;
6900 unsigned int interpreter_type = INTERPRETER_NONE;
6901 unsigned char ibcs2_interpreter = 0;
6902- unsigned long error;
6903+ unsigned long error = 0;
6904 struct elf_phdr * elf_ppnt, *elf_phdata;
6905 unsigned long elf_bss, elf_brk;
6906 int elf_exec_fileno;
6907@@ -540,6 +741,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6908 struct elfhdr interp_elf_ex;
6909 struct exec interp_ex;
6910 } *loc;
6911+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
6912
6913 loc = kmalloc(sizeof(*loc), GFP_KERNEL);
6914 if (!loc) {
6915@@ -765,14 +967,88 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
6916 current->mm->end_code = 0;
6917 current->mm->mmap = NULL;
6918 current->flags &= ~PF_FORKNOEXEC;
6919+
6920+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
6921+ current->mm->pax_flags = 0UL;
6922+#endif
6923+
6924+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
6925+ current->mm->call_dl_resolve = 0UL;
6926+#endif
6927+
6928+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
6929+ current->mm->call_syscall = 0UL;
6930+#endif
6931+
6932+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6933+ current->mm->delta_mmap = 0UL;
6934+ current->mm->delta_exec = 0UL;
6935+ current->mm->delta_stack = 0UL;
6936+#endif
6937+
6938 current->mm->def_flags = def_flags;
6939
6940+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_EI_PAX) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS)
6941+ if (0 > pax_parse_elf_flags(&loc->elf_ex, elf_phdata)) {
6942+ send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
6943+ goto out_free_dentry;
6944+ }
6945+#endif
6946+
6947+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
6948+ pax_set_initial_flags(bprm);
6949+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
6950+ if (pax_set_initial_flags_func)
6951+ (pax_set_initial_flags_func)(bprm);
6952+#endif
6953+
6954+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
6955+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
6956+ current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
6957+#endif
6958+
6959+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
6960+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
6961+ int cpu = get_cpu();
6962+
6963+ current->mm->context.user_cs_base = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6964+ current->mm->context.user_cs_limit = -SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6965+ set_user_cs(current->mm, cpu);
6966+ put_cpu();
6967+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
6968+ }
6969+#endif
6970+
6971+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6972+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
6973+#define pax_delta_mask(delta, lsb, len) (((delta) & ((1UL << (len)) - 1)) << (lsb))
6974+
6975+ current->mm->delta_mmap = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(current));
6976+ current->mm->delta_exec = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(current));
6977+ current->mm->delta_stack = pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(current), PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(current));
6978+ }
6979+#endif
6980+
6981+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6982+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
6983+ executable_stack = EXSTACK_DEFAULT;
6984+#endif
6985+
6986 /* Do this immediately, since STACK_TOP as used in setup_arg_pages
6987 may depend on the personality. */
6988 SET_PERSONALITY(loc->elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter);
6989+
6990+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
6991+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)))
6992+#endif
6993+
6994 if (elf_read_implies_exec(loc->elf_ex, executable_stack))
6995 current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
6996
6997+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
6998+ if (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP))
6999+#endif
7000+
7001 if ( !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
7002 current->flags |= PF_RANDOMIZE;
7003 arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);
7004@@ -844,6 +1120,15 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
7005 base, as well as whatever program they might try to exec. This
7006 is because the brk will follow the loader, and is not movable. */
7007 load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr);
7008+
7009+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
7010+ /* PaX: randomize base address at the default exe base if requested */
7011+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) {
7012+ load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(current) - vaddr + current->mm->delta_exec);
7013+ elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
7014+ }
7015+#endif
7016+
7017 }
7018
7019 error = elf_map(bprm->file, load_bias + vaddr, elf_ppnt, elf_prot, elf_flags);
7020@@ -871,9 +1156,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
7021 * allowed task size. Note that p_filesz must always be
7022 * <= p_memsz so it is only necessary to check p_memsz.
7023 */
7024- if (k > TASK_SIZE || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
7025- elf_ppnt->p_memsz > TASK_SIZE ||
7026- TASK_SIZE - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
7027+ if (k > task_size || elf_ppnt->p_filesz > elf_ppnt->p_memsz ||
7028+ elf_ppnt->p_memsz > task_size ||
7029+ task_size - elf_ppnt->p_memsz < k) {
7030 /* set_brk can never work. Avoid overflows. */
7031 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
7032 goto out_free_dentry;
7033@@ -900,6 +1185,12 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
7034 start_data += load_bias;
7035 end_data += load_bias;
7036
7037+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
7038+ if (randomize_va_space)
7039+ elf_brk += PAGE_SIZE + pax_delta_mask(pax_get_random_long(), 4, PAGE_SHIFT);
7040+#undef pax_delta_mask
7041+#endif
7042+
7043 /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
7044 * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before
7045 * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
7046@@ -928,7 +1219,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
7047 printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to load interpreter %.128s\n",
7048 elf_interpreter);
7049 force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
7050- retval = -ENOEXEC; /* Nobody gets to see this, but.. */
7051+ retval = elf_entry; /* Nobody gets to see this, but.. */
7052 goto out_free_dentry;
7053 }
7054 reloc_func_desc = interp_load_addr;
7055@@ -1152,7 +1443,7 @@ static int dump_seek(struct file *file,
7056 *
7057 * I think we should skip something. But I am not sure how. H.J.
7058 */
7059-static int maydump(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
7060+static int maydump(struct vm_area_struct *vma, long signr)
7061 {
7062 /* Do not dump I/O mapped devices or special mappings */
7063 if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_RESERVED))
7064@@ -1163,7 +1454,7 @@ static int maydump(struct vm_area_struct
7065 return vma->vm_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0;
7066
7067 /* If it hasn't been written to, don't write it out */
7068- if (!vma->anon_vma)
7069+ if (signr != SIGKILL && !vma->anon_vma)
7070 return 0;
7071
7072 return 1;
7073@@ -1217,8 +1508,11 @@ static int writenote(struct memelfnote *
7074 #undef DUMP_SEEK
7075
7076 #define DUMP_WRITE(addr, nr) \
7077+ do { \
7078+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + (nr), 1); \
7079 if ((size += (nr)) > limit || !dump_write(file, (addr), (nr))) \
7080- goto end_coredump;
7081+ goto end_coredump; \
7082+ } while (0);
7083 #define DUMP_SEEK(off) \
7084 if (!dump_seek(file, (off))) \
7085 goto end_coredump;
7086@@ -1569,7 +1863,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
7087 phdr.p_offset = offset;
7088 phdr.p_vaddr = vma->vm_start;
7089 phdr.p_paddr = 0;
7090- phdr.p_filesz = maydump(vma) ? sz : 0;
7091+ phdr.p_filesz = maydump(vma, signr) ? sz : 0;
7092 phdr.p_memsz = sz;
7093 offset += phdr.p_filesz;
7094 phdr.p_flags = vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PF_R : 0;
7095@@ -1602,7 +1896,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
7096 for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma != NULL; vma = vma->vm_next) {
7097 unsigned long addr;
7098
7099- if (!maydump(vma))
7100+ if (!maydump(vma, signr))
7101 continue;
7102
7103 for (addr = vma->vm_start;
7104@@ -1621,6 +1915,7 @@ static int elf_core_dump(long signr, str
7105 void *kaddr;
7106 flush_cache_page(vma, addr, page_to_pfn(page));
7107 kaddr = kmap(page);
7108+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, size + PAGE_SIZE, 1);
7109 if ((size += PAGE_SIZE) > limit ||
7110 !dump_write(file, kaddr,
7111 PAGE_SIZE)) {
7112diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_flat.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_flat.c
7113--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7114+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_flat.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7115@@ -541,7 +541,9 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
7116 realdatastart = (unsigned long) -ENOMEM;
7117 printk("Unable to allocate RAM for process data, errno %d\n",
7118 (int)-datapos);
7119+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7120 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
7121+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7122 return realdatastart;
7123 }
7124 datapos = realdatastart + MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long);
7125@@ -562,8 +564,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
7126 }
7127 if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
7128 printk("Unable to read data+bss, errno %d\n", (int)-result);
7129+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7130 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len);
7131 do_munmap(current->mm, realdatastart, data_len + extra);
7132+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7133 return result;
7134 }
7135
7136@@ -625,8 +629,10 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_b
7137 }
7138 if (result >= (unsigned long)-4096) {
7139 printk("Unable to read code+data+bss, errno %d\n",(int)-result);
7140+ down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7141 do_munmap(current->mm, textpos, text_len + data_len + extra +
7142 MAX_SHARED_LIBS * sizeof(unsigned long));
7143+ up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
7144 return result;
7145 }
7146 }
7147diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_misc.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_misc.c
7148--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7149+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/binfmt_misc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7150@@ -112,9 +112,11 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux
7151 struct files_struct *files = NULL;
7152
7153 retval = -ENOEXEC;
7154- if (!enabled)
7155+ if (!enabled || bprm->misc)
7156 goto _ret;
7157
7158+ bprm->misc++;
7159+
7160 /* to keep locking time low, we copy the interpreter string */
7161 read_lock(&entries_lock);
7162 fmt = check_file(bprm);
7163diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/buffer.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/buffer.c
7164--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/buffer.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7165+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/buffer.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7166@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
7167 #include <linux/bitops.h>
7168 #include <linux/mpage.h>
7169 #include <linux/bit_spinlock.h>
7170+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7171
7172 static int fsync_buffers_list(spinlock_t *lock, struct list_head *list);
7173 static void invalidate_bh_lrus(void);
7174@@ -2166,6 +2167,7 @@ static int __generic_cont_expand(struct
7175
7176 err = -EFBIG;
7177 limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
7178+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, (unsigned long) size, 1);
7179 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && size > (loff_t)limit) {
7180 send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
7181 goto out;
7182diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/compat.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/compat.c
7183--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/compat.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7184+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/compat.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7185@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
7186 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
7187 #include <linux/acct.h>
7188 #include <linux/mm.h>
7189+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7190
7191 #include <net/sock.h> /* siocdevprivate_ioctl */
7192
7193@@ -1472,6 +1473,11 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
7194 struct file *file;
7195 int retval;
7196 int i;
7197+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7198+ struct file *old_exec_file;
7199+ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
7200+ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
7201+#endif
7202
7203 retval = -ENOMEM;
7204 bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
7205@@ -1490,6 +1496,15 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
7206 bprm->file = file;
7207 bprm->filename = filename;
7208 bprm->interp = filename;
7209+
7210+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
7211+ retval = -EAGAIN;
7212+ if (gr_handle_nproc())
7213+ goto out_file;
7214+ retval = -EACCES;
7215+ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt))
7216+ goto out_file;
7217+
7218 bprm->mm = mm_alloc();
7219 retval = -ENOMEM;
7220 if (!bprm->mm)
7221@@ -1528,10 +1543,39 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
7222 if (retval < 0)
7223 goto out;
7224
7225+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
7226+ retval = -EACCES;
7227+ goto out;
7228+ }
7229+
7230+ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
7231+ retval = -EACCES;
7232+ goto out;
7233+ }
7234+
7235+ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
7236+
7237+ gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, (char __user * __user *)argv);
7238+
7239+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7240+ old_acl = current->acl;
7241+ memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
7242+ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
7243+ get_file(file);
7244+ current->exec_file = file;
7245+#endif
7246+
7247+ gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
7248+
7249 retval = search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
7250 if (retval >= 0) {
7251 free_arg_pages(bprm);
7252
7253+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7254+ if (old_exec_file)
7255+ fput(old_exec_file);
7256+#endif
7257+
7258 /* execve success */
7259 security_bprm_free(bprm);
7260 acct_update_integrals(current);
7261@@ -1539,6 +1583,13 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
7262 return retval;
7263 }
7264
7265+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7266+ current->acl = old_acl;
7267+ memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
7268+ fput(current->exec_file);
7269+ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
7270+#endif
7271+
7272 out:
7273 /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
7274 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
7275diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/dcache.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/dcache.c
7276--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/dcache.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7277+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/dcache.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7278@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ already_unhashed:
7279 *
7280 * "buflen" should be positive. Caller holds the dcache_lock.
7281 */
7282-static char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
7283+char * __d_path( struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
7284 struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
7285 char *buffer, int buflen)
7286 {
7287diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/exec.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/exec.c
7288--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/exec.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7289+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/exec.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7290@@ -49,6 +49,8 @@
7291 #include <linux/rmap.h>
7292 #include <linux/acct.h>
7293 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
7294+#include <linux/random.h>
7295+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7296
7297 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
7298 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
7299@@ -67,6 +69,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
7300 static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
7301 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(binfmt_lock);
7302
7303+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
7304+unsigned int pax_softmode;
7305+#endif
7306+
7307+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
7308+void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
7309+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_set_initial_flags_func);
7310+#endif
7311+
7312 int register_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
7313 {
7314 struct linux_binfmt ** tmp = &formats;
7315@@ -312,6 +323,10 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str
7316 if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
7317 goto out;
7318
7319+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7320+ if (page_count(page) == 1)
7321+#endif
7322+
7323 flush_dcache_page(page);
7324 pte = get_locked_pte(mm, address, &ptl);
7325 if (!pte)
7326@@ -321,9 +336,21 @@ void install_arg_page(struct vm_area_str
7327 goto out;
7328 }
7329 inc_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
7330+
7331+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7332+ if (page_count(page) == 1)
7333+#endif
7334+
7335 lru_cache_add_active(page);
7336 set_pte_at(mm, address, pte, pte_mkdirty(pte_mkwrite(mk_pte(
7337 page, vma->vm_page_prot))));
7338+
7339+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7340+ if (page_count(page) != 1)
7341+ page_add_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
7342+ else
7343+#endif
7344+
7345 page_add_new_anon_rmap(page, vma, address);
7346 pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
7347
7348@@ -346,6 +373,10 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
7349 int i, ret;
7350 long arg_size;
7351
7352+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7353+ struct vm_area_struct *mpnt_m = NULL;
7354+#endif
7355+
7356 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
7357 /* Move the argument and environment strings to the bottom of the
7358 * stack space.
7359@@ -410,6 +441,18 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
7360
7361 memset(mpnt, 0, sizeof(*mpnt));
7362
7363+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7364+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (VM_STACK_FLAGS & VM_MAYEXEC)) {
7365+ mpnt_m = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
7366+ if (!mpnt_m) {
7367+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
7368+ return -ENOMEM;
7369+ }
7370+
7371+ memset(mpnt_m, 0, sizeof(*mpnt_m));
7372+ }
7373+#endif
7374+
7375 down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
7376 {
7377 mpnt->vm_mm = mm;
7378@@ -430,13 +473,50 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
7379 else
7380 mpnt->vm_flags = VM_STACK_FLAGS;
7381 mpnt->vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
7382+
7383+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
7384+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
7385+ mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(mpnt->vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x7];
7386+ else
7387+#endif
7388+
7389 mpnt->vm_page_prot = protection_map[mpnt->vm_flags & 0x7];
7390 if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt))) {
7391 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
7392 kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt);
7393+
7394+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7395+ if (mpnt_m)
7396+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m);
7397+#endif
7398+
7399 return ret;
7400 }
7401 mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = vma_pages(mpnt);
7402+
7403+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7404+ if (mpnt_m) {
7405+ *mpnt_m = *mpnt;
7406+ if (!(mpnt->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
7407+ mpnt_m->vm_flags &= ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
7408+ mpnt_m->vm_page_prot = PAGE_NONE;
7409+ }
7410+ mpnt_m->vm_start += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
7411+ mpnt_m->vm_end += SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
7412+ if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, mpnt_m))) {
7413+ up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
7414+ kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, mpnt_m);
7415+ return ret;
7416+ }
7417+ mpnt_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
7418+ mpnt->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
7419+ mpnt_m->vm_mirror = mpnt->vm_start - mpnt_m->vm_start;
7420+ mpnt->vm_mirror = mpnt_m->vm_start - mpnt->vm_start;
7421+ mpnt_m->vm_pgoff = mpnt->vm_pgoff;
7422+ mm->total_vm += vma_pages(mpnt_m);
7423+ }
7424+#endif
7425+
7426 }
7427
7428 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
7429@@ -444,6 +524,14 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm
7430 if (page) {
7431 bprm->page[i] = NULL;
7432 install_arg_page(mpnt, page, stack_base);
7433+
7434+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
7435+ if (mpnt_m) {
7436+ page_cache_get(page);
7437+ install_arg_page(mpnt_m, page, stack_base + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE);
7438+ }
7439+#endif
7440+
7441 }
7442 stack_base += PAGE_SIZE;
7443 }
7444@@ -1141,6 +1229,11 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
7445 struct file *file;
7446 int retval;
7447 int i;
7448+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7449+ struct file *old_exec_file;
7450+ struct acl_subject_label *old_acl;
7451+ struct rlimit old_rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
7452+#endif
7453
7454 retval = -ENOMEM;
7455 bprm = kmalloc(sizeof(*bprm), GFP_KERNEL);
7456@@ -1153,10 +1246,29 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
7457 if (IS_ERR(file))
7458 goto out_kfree;
7459
7460+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&current->user->processes), 1);
7461+
7462+ if (gr_handle_nproc()) {
7463+ allow_write_access(file);
7464+ fput(file);
7465+ return -EAGAIN;
7466+ }
7467+
7468+ if (!gr_acl_handle_execve(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt)) {
7469+ allow_write_access(file);
7470+ fput(file);
7471+ return -EACCES;
7472+ }
7473+
7474 sched_exec();
7475
7476 bprm->p = PAGE_SIZE*MAX_ARG_PAGES-sizeof(void *);
7477
7478+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
7479+ if (randomize_va_space)
7480+ bprm->p -= (pax_get_random_long() & ~(sizeof(void *)-1)) & ~PAGE_MASK;
7481+#endif
7482+
7483 bprm->file = file;
7484 bprm->filename = filename;
7485 bprm->interp = filename;
7486@@ -1198,8 +1310,38 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
7487 if (retval < 0)
7488 goto out;
7489
7490+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file)) {
7491+ retval = -EACCES;
7492+ goto out;
7493+ }
7494+
7495+ if (gr_check_crash_exec(file)) {
7496+ retval = -EACCES;
7497+ goto out;
7498+ }
7499+
7500+ gr_log_chroot_exec(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
7501+
7502+ gr_handle_exec_args(bprm, argv);
7503+
7504+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7505+ old_acl = current->acl;
7506+ memcpy(old_rlim, current->signal->rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
7507+ old_exec_file = current->exec_file;
7508+ get_file(file);
7509+ current->exec_file = file;
7510+#endif
7511+
7512+ retval = gr_set_proc_label(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
7513+ if (retval < 0)
7514+ goto out_fail;
7515+
7516 retval = search_binary_handler(bprm,regs);
7517 if (retval >= 0) {
7518+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7519+ if (old_exec_file)
7520+ fput(old_exec_file);
7521+#endif
7522 free_arg_pages(bprm);
7523
7524 /* execve success */
7525@@ -1209,6 +1351,14 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
7526 return retval;
7527 }
7528
7529+out_fail:
7530+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
7531+ current->acl = old_acl;
7532+ memcpy(current->signal->rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(old_rlim));
7533+ fput(current->exec_file);
7534+ current->exec_file = old_exec_file;
7535+#endif
7536+
7537 out:
7538 /* Something went wrong, return the inode and free the argument pages*/
7539 for (i = 0 ; i < MAX_ARG_PAGES ; i++) {
7540@@ -1369,6 +1519,114 @@ static void format_corename(char *corena
7541 *out_ptr = 0;
7542 }
7543
7544+int pax_check_flags(unsigned long * flags)
7545+{
7546+ int retval = 0;
7547+
7548+#if !defined(__i386__) || !defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
7549+ if (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
7550+ {
7551+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
7552+ retval = -EINVAL;
7553+ }
7554+#endif
7555+
7556+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
7557+
7558+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
7559+ && (*flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
7560+#endif
7561+
7562+ )
7563+ {
7564+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
7565+ retval = -EINVAL;
7566+ }
7567+
7568+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
7569+
7570+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
7571+ && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
7572+#endif
7573+
7574+ )
7575+ {
7576+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
7577+ retval = -EINVAL;
7578+ }
7579+
7580+ if ((*flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP)
7581+
7582+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_EMUTRAMP
7583+ && !(*flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
7584+#endif
7585+
7586+ )
7587+ {
7588+ *flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
7589+ retval = -EINVAL;
7590+ }
7591+
7592+ return retval;
7593+}
7594+
7595+EXPORT_SYMBOL(pax_check_flags);
7596+
7597+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
7598+void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp)
7599+{
7600+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
7601+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
7602+ char* buffer_exec = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
7603+ char* buffer_fault = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC);
7604+ char* path_exec=NULL;
7605+ char* path_fault=NULL;
7606+ unsigned long start=0UL, end=0UL, offset=0UL;
7607+
7608+ if (buffer_exec && buffer_fault) {
7609+ struct vm_area_struct* vma, * vma_exec=NULL, * vma_fault=NULL;
7610+
7611+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
7612+ vma = mm->mmap;
7613+ while (vma && (!vma_exec || !vma_fault)) {
7614+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file)
7615+ vma_exec = vma;
7616+ if (vma->vm_start <= (unsigned long)pc && (unsigned long)pc < vma->vm_end)
7617+ vma_fault = vma;
7618+ vma = vma->vm_next;
7619+ }
7620+ if (vma_exec) {
7621+ path_exec = d_path(vma_exec->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_exec->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_exec, PAGE_SIZE);
7622+ if (IS_ERR(path_exec))
7623+ path_exec = "<path too long>";
7624+ }
7625+ if (vma_fault) {
7626+ start = vma_fault->vm_start;
7627+ end = vma_fault->vm_end;
7628+ offset = vma_fault->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
7629+ if (vma_fault->vm_file) {
7630+ path_fault = d_path(vma_fault->vm_file->f_dentry, vma_fault->vm_file->f_vfsmnt, buffer_fault, PAGE_SIZE);
7631+ if (IS_ERR(path_fault))
7632+ path_fault = "<path too long>";
7633+ } else
7634+ path_fault = "<anonymous mapping>";
7635+ }
7636+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
7637+ }
7638+ if (tsk->signal->curr_ip)
7639+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: From %u.%u.%u.%u: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", NIPQUAD(tsk->signal->curr_ip), path_fault, start, end, offset);
7640+ else
7641+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: execution attempt in: %s, %08lx-%08lx %08lx\n", path_fault, start, end, offset);
7642+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: terminating task: %s(%s):%d, uid/euid: %u/%u, "
7643+ "PC: %p, SP: %p\n", path_exec, tsk->comm, tsk->pid,
7644+ tsk->uid, tsk->euid, pc, sp);
7645+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer_exec);
7646+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer_fault);
7647+ pax_report_insns(pc, sp);
7648+ do_coredump(SIGKILL, SIGKILL, regs);
7649+}
7650+#endif
7651+
7652 static void zap_threads (struct mm_struct *mm)
7653 {
7654 struct task_struct *g, *p;
7655@@ -1486,6 +1744,10 @@ int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_cod
7656 */
7657 clear_thread_flag(TIF_SIGPENDING);
7658
7659+ if (signr == SIGKILL || signr == SIGILL)
7660+ gr_handle_brute_attach(current);
7661+
7662+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_CORE, binfmt->min_coredump, 1);
7663 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CORE].rlim_cur < binfmt->min_coredump)
7664 goto fail_unlock;
7665
7666diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/fcntl.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/fcntl.c
7667--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/fcntl.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7668+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/fcntl.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7669@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
7670 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
7671 #include <linux/signal.h>
7672 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
7673+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7674
7675 #include <asm/poll.h>
7676 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
7677@@ -63,6 +64,7 @@ static int locate_fd(struct files_struct
7678 struct fdtable *fdt;
7679
7680 error = -EINVAL;
7681+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, orig_start, 0);
7682 if (orig_start >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
7683 goto out;
7684
7685@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ repeat:
7686 }
7687
7688 error = -EMFILE;
7689+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
7690 if (newfd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
7691 goto out;
7692
7693@@ -142,6 +145,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_dup2(unsigned int ol
7694 struct files_struct * files = current->files;
7695 struct fdtable *fdt;
7696
7697+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, newfd, 0);
7698+
7699 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
7700 if (!(file = fcheck(oldfd)))
7701 goto out_unlock;
7702@@ -428,7 +433,8 @@ static inline int sigio_perm(struct task
7703 return (((fown->euid == 0) ||
7704 (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
7705 (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
7706- !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig));
7707+ !security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, sig) &&
7708+ !gr_check_protected_task(p) && !gr_pid_is_chrooted(p));
7709 }
7710
7711 static void send_sigio_to_task(struct task_struct *p,
7712diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/fs/Kconfig
7713--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/Kconfig 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7714+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7715@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ config PROC_FS
7716
7717 config PROC_KCORE
7718 bool "/proc/kcore support" if !ARM
7719- depends on PROC_FS && MMU
7720+ depends on PROC_FS && MMU && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
7721
7722 config PROC_VMCORE
7723 bool "/proc/vmcore support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
7724diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namei.c
7725--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namei.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
7726+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namei.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
7727@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
7728 #include <linux/file.h>
7729 #include <linux/fcntl.h>
7730 #include <linux/namei.h>
7731+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
7732 #include <asm/namei.h>
7733 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
7734
7735@@ -608,6 +609,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct
7736 err = security_inode_follow_link(path->dentry, nd);
7737 if (err)
7738 goto loop;
7739+
7740+ if (gr_handle_follow_link(path->dentry->d_parent->d_inode,
7741+ path->dentry->d_inode, path->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7742+ err = -EACCES;
7743+ goto loop;
7744+ }
7745+
7746 current->link_count++;
7747 current->total_link_count++;
7748 nd->depth++;
7749@@ -951,11 +959,18 @@ return_reval:
7750 break;
7751 }
7752 return_base:
7753+ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7754+ path_release(nd);
7755+ return -ENOENT;
7756+ }
7757 return 0;
7758 out_dput:
7759 dput_path(&next, nd);
7760 break;
7761 }
7762+ if (!gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(nd->dentry, nd->mnt))
7763+ err = -ENOENT;
7764+
7765 path_release(nd);
7766 return_err:
7767 return err;
7768@@ -1596,6 +1611,17 @@ int open_namei(int dfd, const char *path
7769 nd, flag);
7770 if (error)
7771 return error;
7772+
7773+ if (gr_handle_rawio(nd->dentry->d_inode)) {
7774+ error = -EPERM;
7775+ goto exit;
7776+ }
7777+
7778+ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
7779+ error = -EACCES;
7780+ goto exit;
7781+ }
7782+
7783 goto ok;
7784 }
7785
7786@@ -1630,9 +1656,16 @@ do_last:
7787
7788 /* Negative dentry, just create the file */
7789 if (!path.dentry->d_inode) {
7790+ if (!gr_acl_handle_creat(path.dentry, nd->dentry, nd->mnt, flag, mode)) {
7791+ error = -EACCES;
7792+ mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7793+ goto exit_dput;
7794+ }
7795 if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
7796 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7797 error = vfs_create(dir->d_inode, path.dentry, mode, nd);
7798+ if (!error)
7799+ gr_handle_create(path.dentry, nd->mnt);
7800 mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7801 dput(nd->dentry);
7802 nd->dentry = path.dentry;
7803@@ -1647,6 +1680,23 @@ do_last:
7804 /*
7805 * It already exists.
7806 */
7807+
7808+ if (gr_handle_rawio(path.dentry->d_inode)) {
7809+ mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7810+ error = -EPERM;
7811+ goto exit_dput;
7812+ }
7813+ if (!gr_acl_handle_open(path.dentry, nd->mnt, flag)) {
7814+ mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7815+ error = -EACCES;
7816+ goto exit_dput;
7817+ }
7818+ if (gr_handle_fifo(path.dentry, nd->mnt, dir, flag, acc_mode)) {
7819+ mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7820+ error = -EACCES;
7821+ goto exit_dput;
7822+ }
7823+
7824 mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
7825
7826 error = -EEXIST;
7827@@ -1700,6 +1750,13 @@ do_link:
7828 error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, nd);
7829 if (error)
7830 goto exit_dput;
7831+
7832+ if (gr_handle_follow_link(path.dentry->d_parent->d_inode, path.dentry->d_inode,
7833+ path.dentry, nd->mnt)) {
7834+ error = -EACCES;
7835+ goto exit_dput;
7836+ }
7837+
7838 error = __do_follow_link(&path, nd);
7839 if (error)
7840 return error;
7841@@ -1820,6 +1877,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
7842 if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
7843 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7844 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7845+ if (gr_handle_chroot_mknod(dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7846+ error = -EPERM;
7847+ dput(dentry);
7848+ mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7849+ path_release(&nd);
7850+ goto out;
7851+ }
7852+
7853+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
7854+ error = -EACCES;
7855+ dput(dentry);
7856+ mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7857+ path_release(&nd);
7858+ goto out;
7859+ }
7860+
7861 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
7862 case 0: case S_IFREG:
7863 error = vfs_create(nd.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,&nd);
7864@@ -1837,6 +1910,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mknodat(int dfd, con
7865 default:
7866 error = -EINVAL;
7867 }
7868+
7869+ if (!error)
7870+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7871+
7872 dput(dentry);
7873 }
7874 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7875@@ -1891,9 +1968,19 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mkdirat(int dfd, con
7876 dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1);
7877 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7878 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7879+ error = 0;
7880 if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.dentry->d_inode))
7881 mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
7882- error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
7883+
7884+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mkdir(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
7885+ error = -EACCES;
7886+
7887+ if (!error)
7888+ error = vfs_mkdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
7889+
7890+ if (!error)
7891+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7892+
7893 dput(dentry);
7894 }
7895 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7896@@ -1977,6 +2064,8 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
7897 char * name;
7898 struct dentry *dentry;
7899 struct nameidata nd;
7900+ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
7901+ dev_t saved_dev = 0;
7902
7903 name = getname(pathname);
7904 if(IS_ERR(name))
7905@@ -2001,7 +2090,21 @@ static long do_rmdir(int dfd, const char
7906 dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
7907 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7908 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7909- error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7910+ error = 0;
7911+ if (dentry->d_inode) {
7912+ if (dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
7913+ saved_ino = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
7914+ saved_dev = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
7915+ }
7916+
7917+ if (!gr_acl_handle_rmdir(dentry, nd.mnt))
7918+ error = -EACCES;
7919+ }
7920+
7921+ if (!error)
7922+ error = vfs_rmdir(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7923+ if (!error && (saved_dev || saved_ino))
7924+ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
7925 dput(dentry);
7926 }
7927 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7928@@ -2060,6 +2163,8 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
7929 struct dentry *dentry;
7930 struct nameidata nd;
7931 struct inode *inode = NULL;
7932+ ino_t saved_ino = 0;
7933+ dev_t saved_dev = 0;
7934
7935 name = getname(pathname);
7936 if(IS_ERR(name))
7937@@ -2075,13 +2180,26 @@ static long do_unlinkat(int dfd, const c
7938 dentry = lookup_hash(&nd);
7939 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7940 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7941+ error = 0;
7942 /* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
7943 if (nd.last.name[nd.last.len])
7944 goto slashes;
7945 inode = dentry->d_inode;
7946- if (inode)
7947+ if (inode) {
7948+ if (inode->i_nlink <= 1) {
7949+ saved_ino = inode->i_ino;
7950+ saved_dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
7951+ }
7952+
7953+ if (!gr_acl_handle_unlink(dentry, nd.mnt))
7954+ error = -EACCES;
7955+
7956 atomic_inc(&inode->i_count);
7957- error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7958+ }
7959+ if (!error)
7960+ error = vfs_unlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
7961+ if (!error && (saved_ino || saved_dev))
7962+ gr_handle_delete(saved_ino, saved_dev);
7963 exit2:
7964 dput(dentry);
7965 }
7966@@ -2159,7 +2277,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_symlinkat(const char
7967 dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
7968 error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
7969 if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
7970- error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
7971+ error = 0;
7972+ if (!gr_acl_handle_symlink(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, from))
7973+ error = -EACCES;
7974+
7975+ if (!error)
7976+ error = vfs_symlink(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from, S_IALLUGO);
7977+
7978+ if (!error)
7979+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
7980 dput(dentry);
7981 }
7982 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
7983@@ -2251,7 +2377,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
7984 new_dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 0);
7985 error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
7986 if (!IS_ERR(new_dentry)) {
7987- error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
7988+ error = 0;
7989+ if (gr_handle_hardlink(old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt,
7990+ old_nd.dentry->d_inode,
7991+ old_nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode, to))
7992+ error = -EPERM;
7993+ if (!gr_acl_handle_link(new_dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt,
7994+ old_nd.dentry, old_nd.mnt, to))
7995+ error = -EACCES;
7996+ if (!error)
7997+ error = vfs_link(old_nd.dentry, nd.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry);
7998+
7999+ if (!error)
8000+ gr_handle_create(new_dentry, nd.mnt);
8001+
8002 dput(new_dentry);
8003 }
8004 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
8005@@ -2477,8 +2616,16 @@ static int do_rename(int olddfd, const c
8006 if (new_dentry == trap)
8007 goto exit5;
8008
8009- error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
8010+ error = gr_acl_handle_rename(new_dentry, newnd.dentry, newnd.mnt,
8011+ old_dentry, old_dir->d_inode, oldnd.mnt,
8012+ newname);
8013+
8014+ if (!error)
8015+ error = vfs_rename(old_dir->d_inode, old_dentry,
8016 new_dir->d_inode, new_dentry);
8017+ if (!error)
8018+ gr_handle_rename(old_dir->d_inode, newnd.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry,
8019+ new_dentry, oldnd.mnt, new_dentry->d_inode ? 1 : 0);
8020 exit5:
8021 dput(new_dentry);
8022 exit4:
8023diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namespace.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namespace.c
8024--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namespace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8025+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/namespace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8026@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
8027 #include <linux/namei.h>
8028 #include <linux/security.h>
8029 #include <linux/mount.h>
8030+#include <linux/sched.h>
8031+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8032 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
8033 #include <asm/unistd.h>
8034 #include "pnode.h"
8035@@ -562,6 +564,8 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
8036 DQUOT_OFF(sb);
8037 retval = do_remount_sb(sb, MS_RDONLY, NULL, 0);
8038 unlock_kernel();
8039+
8040+ gr_log_remount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
8041 }
8042 up_write(&sb->s_umount);
8043 return retval;
8044@@ -582,6 +586,9 @@ static int do_umount(struct vfsmount *mn
8045 security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
8046 up_write(&namespace_sem);
8047 release_mounts(&umount_list);
8048+
8049+ gr_log_unmount(mnt->mnt_devname, retval);
8050+
8051 return retval;
8052 }
8053
8054@@ -1308,6 +1315,11 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
8055 if (retval)
8056 goto dput_out;
8057
8058+ if (gr_handle_chroot_mount(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, dev_name)) {
8059+ retval = -EPERM;
8060+ goto dput_out;
8061+ }
8062+
8063 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
8064 retval = do_remount(&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
8065 data_page);
8066@@ -1322,6 +1334,9 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
8067 dev_name, data_page);
8068 dput_out:
8069 path_release(&nd);
8070+
8071+ gr_log_mount(dev_name, dir_name, retval);
8072+
8073 return retval;
8074 }
8075
8076@@ -1574,6 +1589,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_pivot_root(const cha
8077 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
8078 return -EPERM;
8079
8080+ if (gr_handle_chroot_pivot())
8081+ return -EPERM;
8082+
8083 lock_kernel();
8084
8085 error = __user_walk(new_root, LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY,
8086diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/open.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/open.c
8087--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/open.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8088+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/open.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8089@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
8090 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
8091 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
8092 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
8093+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8094
8095 #include <asm/unistd.h>
8096
8097@@ -206,6 +207,9 @@ int do_truncate(struct dentry *dentry, l
8098 if (length < 0)
8099 return -EINVAL;
8100
8101+ if (filp && !gr_acl_handle_truncate(dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt))
8102+ return -EACCES;
8103+
8104 newattrs.ia_size = length;
8105 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE | time_attrs;
8106 if (filp) {
8107@@ -400,6 +404,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_utime(char __user *
8108 (error = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
8109 goto dput_and_out;
8110 }
8111+
8112+ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
8113+ error = -EACCES;
8114+ goto dput_and_out;
8115+ }
8116+
8117 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
8118 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
8119 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
8120@@ -453,6 +463,12 @@ long do_utimes(int dfd, char __user *fil
8121 (error = vfs_permission(&nd, MAY_WRITE)) != 0)
8122 goto dput_and_out;
8123 }
8124+
8125+ if (!gr_acl_handle_utime(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
8126+ error = -EACCES;
8127+ goto dput_and_out;
8128+ }
8129+
8130 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
8131 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
8132 mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
8133@@ -519,6 +535,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, c
8134 if(!res && (mode & S_IWOTH) && IS_RDONLY(nd.dentry->d_inode)
8135 && !special_file(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
8136 res = -EROFS;
8137+
8138+ if (!res && !gr_acl_handle_access(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode))
8139+ res = -EACCES;
8140+
8141 path_release(&nd);
8142 }
8143
8144@@ -547,6 +567,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __u
8145 if (error)
8146 goto dput_and_out;
8147
8148+ gr_log_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
8149+
8150 set_fs_pwd(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
8151
8152 dput_and_out:
8153@@ -577,6 +599,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int
8154 goto out_putf;
8155
8156 error = file_permission(file, MAY_EXEC);
8157+
8158+ if (!error && !gr_chroot_fchdir(dentry, mnt))
8159+ error = -EPERM;
8160+
8161+ if (!error)
8162+ gr_log_chdir(dentry, mnt);
8163+
8164 if (!error)
8165 set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
8166 out_putf:
8167@@ -602,8 +631,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __
8168 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
8169 goto dput_and_out;
8170
8171+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chroot(nd.dentry, nd.mnt))
8172+ goto dput_and_out;
8173+
8174 set_fs_root(current->fs, nd.mnt, nd.dentry);
8175 set_fs_altroot();
8176+
8177+ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
8178+
8179+ gr_handle_chroot_chdir(nd.dentry, nd.mnt);
8180+
8181 error = 0;
8182 dput_and_out:
8183 path_release(&nd);
8184@@ -632,9 +669,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int
8185 err = -EPERM;
8186 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
8187 goto out_putf;
8188+
8189+ if (!gr_acl_handle_fchmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
8190+ err = -EACCES;
8191+ goto out_putf;
8192+ }
8193+
8194 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
8195 if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
8196 mode = inode->i_mode;
8197+
8198+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(dentry, file->f_vfsmnt, mode)) {
8199+ err = -EPERM;
8200+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
8201+ goto out_putf;
8202+ }
8203+
8204 newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
8205 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
8206 err = notify_change(dentry, &newattrs);
8207@@ -667,9 +717,21 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmodat(int dfd, co
8208 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
8209 goto dput_and_out;
8210
8211+ if (!gr_acl_handle_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
8212+ error = -EACCES;
8213+ goto dput_and_out;
8214+ };
8215+
8216 mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
8217 if (mode == (mode_t) -1)
8218 mode = inode->i_mode;
8219+
8220+ if (gr_handle_chroot_chmod(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
8221+ error = -EACCES;
8222+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
8223+ goto dput_and_out;
8224+ }
8225+
8226 newattrs.ia_mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | (inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO);
8227 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE | ATTR_CTIME;
8228 error = notify_change(nd.dentry, &newattrs);
8229@@ -686,7 +748,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chmod(const char __u
8230 return sys_fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode);
8231 }
8232
8233-static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group)
8234+static int chown_common(struct dentry * dentry, uid_t user, gid_t group, struct vfsmount *mnt)
8235 {
8236 struct inode * inode;
8237 int error;
8238@@ -703,6 +765,12 @@ static int chown_common(struct dentry *
8239 error = -EPERM;
8240 if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
8241 goto out;
8242+
8243+ if (!gr_acl_handle_chown(dentry, mnt)) {
8244+ error = -EACCES;
8245+ goto out;
8246+ }
8247+
8248 newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_CTIME;
8249 if (user != (uid_t) -1) {
8250 newattrs.ia_valid |= ATTR_UID;
8251@@ -728,7 +796,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chown(const char __u
8252
8253 error = user_path_walk(filename, &nd);
8254 if (!error) {
8255- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
8256+ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
8257 path_release(&nd);
8258 }
8259 return error;
8260@@ -747,7 +815,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchownat(int dfd, co
8261 follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
8262 error = __user_walk_fd(dfd, filename, follow, &nd);
8263 if (!error) {
8264- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
8265+ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
8266 path_release(&nd);
8267 }
8268 out:
8269@@ -761,7 +829,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lchown(const char __
8270
8271 error = user_path_walk_link(filename, &nd);
8272 if (!error) {
8273- error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group);
8274+ error = chown_common(nd.dentry, user, group, nd.mnt);
8275 path_release(&nd);
8276 }
8277 return error;
8278@@ -775,7 +843,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int
8279
8280 file = fget(fd);
8281 if (file) {
8282- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
8283+ error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user,
8284+ group, file->f_vfsmnt);
8285 fput(file);
8286 }
8287 return error;
8288@@ -979,6 +1048,7 @@ repeat:
8289 * N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
8290 * will limit the total number of files that can be opened.
8291 */
8292+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_NOFILE, fd, 0);
8293 if (fd >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NOFILE].rlim_cur)
8294 goto out;
8295
8296diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/array.c
8297--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/array.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8298+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/array.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8299@@ -293,6 +293,21 @@ static inline char *task_cap(struct task
8300 cap_t(p->cap_effective));
8301 }
8302
8303+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
8304+static inline char *task_pax(struct task_struct *p, char *buffer)
8305+{
8306+ if (p->mm)
8307+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t%c%c%c%c%c\n",
8308+ p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC ? 'P' : 'p',
8309+ p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP ? 'E' : 'e',
8310+ p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT ? 'M' : 'm',
8311+ p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP ? 'R' : 'r',
8312+ p->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 'S' : 's');
8313+ else
8314+ return buffer + sprintf(buffer, "PaX:\t-----\n");
8315+}
8316+#endif
8317+
8318 int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
8319 {
8320 char * orig = buffer;
8321@@ -311,9 +326,20 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *
8322 #if defined(CONFIG_S390)
8323 buffer = task_show_regs(task, buffer);
8324 #endif
8325+
8326+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
8327+ buffer = task_pax(task, buffer);
8328+#endif
8329+
8330 return buffer - orig;
8331 }
8332
8333+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8334+#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS(_mm) (_mm != NULL && _mm != current->mm && \
8335+ (_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
8336+ _mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
8337+#endif
8338+
8339 static int do_task_stat(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer, int whole)
8340 {
8341 unsigned long vsize, eip, esp, wchan = ~0UL;
8342@@ -400,6 +426,19 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru
8343 stime = task->stime;
8344 }
8345
8346+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8347+ if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm)) {
8348+ eip = 0;
8349+ esp = 0;
8350+ wchan = 0;
8351+ }
8352+#endif
8353+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
8354+ wchan = 0;
8355+ eip =0;
8356+ esp =0;
8357+#endif
8358+
8359 /* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
8360 /* to make it look like a "normal" Unix priority/nice value */
8361 priority = task_prio(task);
8362@@ -440,9 +479,15 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct task_stru
8363 vsize,
8364 mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0,
8365 rsslim,
8366+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8367+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 1 : (mm ? mm->start_code : 0),
8368+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 1 : (mm ? mm->end_code : 0),
8369+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0 : (mm ? mm->start_stack : 0),
8370+#else
8371 mm ? mm->start_code : 0,
8372 mm ? mm->end_code : 0,
8373 mm ? mm->start_stack : 0,
8374+#endif
8375 esp,
8376 eip,
8377 /* The signal information here is obsolete.
8378@@ -488,3 +533,14 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *t
8379 return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n",
8380 size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0);
8381 }
8382+
8383+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8384+int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
8385+{
8386+ int len;
8387+
8388+ len = sprintf(buffer, "%u.%u.%u.%u\n", NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
8389+ return len;
8390+}
8391+#endif
8392+
8393diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/base.c
8394--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/base.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8395+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/base.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8396@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
8397 #include <linux/cpuset.h>
8398 #include <linux/audit.h>
8399 #include <linux/poll.h>
8400+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8401 #include "internal.h"
8402
8403 /*
8404@@ -124,6 +125,9 @@ enum pid_directory_inos {
8405 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
8406 PROC_TGID_LOGINUID,
8407 #endif
8408+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8409+ PROC_TGID_IPADDR,
8410+#endif
8411 PROC_TGID_OOM_SCORE,
8412 PROC_TGID_OOM_ADJUST,
8413 PROC_TID_INO,
8414@@ -201,6 +205,9 @@ static struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[
8415 E(PROC_TGID_ROOT, "root", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
8416 E(PROC_TGID_EXE, "exe", S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO),
8417 E(PROC_TGID_MOUNTS, "mounts", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
8418+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8419+ E(PROC_TGID_IPADDR, "ipaddr", S_IFREG|S_IRUSR),
8420+#endif
8421 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
8422 E(PROC_TGID_SMAPS, "smaps", S_IFREG|S_IRUGO),
8423 #endif
8424@@ -403,7 +410,7 @@ static int proc_task_root_link(struct in
8425 (task->parent == current && \
8426 (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
8427 (task->state == TASK_STOPPED || task->state == TASK_TRACED) && \
8428- security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
8429+ security_ptrace(current,task) == 0 && !gr_handle_proc_ptrace(task)))
8430
8431 static int proc_pid_environ(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
8432 {
8433@@ -581,9 +588,25 @@ static int proc_check_root(struct inode
8434
8435 static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
8436 {
8437+ int ret = -EACCES;
8438+ struct task_struct *task;
8439+
8440 if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
8441- return -EACCES;
8442- return proc_check_root(inode);
8443+ goto out;
8444+
8445+ ret = proc_check_root(inode);
8446+ if (ret)
8447+ goto out;
8448+
8449+ task = proc_task(inode);
8450+
8451+ if (!task)
8452+ goto out;
8453+
8454+ ret = gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(task);
8455+
8456+out:
8457+ return ret;
8458 }
8459
8460 static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
8461@@ -1330,6 +1353,9 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode
8462 inode->i_uid = task->euid;
8463 inode->i_gid = task->egid;
8464 }
8465+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8466+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
8467+#endif
8468 security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
8469
8470 out:
8471@@ -1358,7 +1384,9 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry
8472 if (pid_alive(task)) {
8473 if (proc_type(inode) == PROC_TGID_INO || proc_type(inode) == PROC_TID_INO || task_dumpable(task)) {
8474 inode->i_uid = task->euid;
8475+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8476 inode->i_gid = task->egid;
8477+#endif
8478 } else {
8479 inode->i_uid = 0;
8480 inode->i_gid = 0;
8481@@ -1681,6 +1709,12 @@ static struct dentry *proc_pident_lookup
8482 inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
8483 ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_status;
8484 break;
8485+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8486+ case PROC_TGID_IPADDR:
8487+ inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
8488+ ei->op.proc_read = proc_pid_ipaddr;
8489+ break;
8490+#endif
8491 case PROC_TID_STAT:
8492 inode->i_fop = &proc_info_file_operations;
8493 ei->op.proc_read = proc_tid_stat;
8494@@ -1985,6 +2019,22 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in
8495 if (!task)
8496 goto out;
8497
8498+ if (gr_check_hidden_task(task)) {
8499+ put_task_struct(task);
8500+ goto out;
8501+ }
8502+
8503+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8504+ if (current->uid && (task->uid != current->uid)
8505+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8506+ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
8507+#endif
8508+ ) {
8509+ put_task_struct(task);
8510+ goto out;
8511+ }
8512+#endif
8513+
8514 inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task, PROC_TGID_INO);
8515
8516
8517@@ -1992,7 +2042,15 @@ struct dentry *proc_pid_lookup(struct in
8518 put_task_struct(task);
8519 goto out;
8520 }
8521+
8522+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8523+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
8524+#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8525+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXGRP;
8526+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
8527+#else
8528 inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
8529+#endif
8530 inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
8531 inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
8532 inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
8533@@ -2084,6 +2142,9 @@ out:
8534 static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsigned long version, unsigned int *tgids)
8535 {
8536 struct task_struct *p;
8537+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8538+ struct task_struct *tmp = current;
8539+#endif
8540 int nr_tgids = 0;
8541
8542 index--;
8543@@ -2104,6 +2165,18 @@ static int get_tgid_list(int index, unsi
8544 int tgid = p->pid;
8545 if (!pid_alive(p))
8546 continue;
8547+ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(p))
8548+ continue;
8549+ if (gr_check_hidden_task(p))
8550+ continue;
8551+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8552+ if (tmp->uid && (p->uid != tmp->uid)
8553+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8554+ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
8555+#endif
8556+ )
8557+ continue;
8558+#endif
8559 if (--index >= 0)
8560 continue;
8561 tgids[nr_tgids] = tgid;
8562diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/inode.c
8563--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/inode.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8564+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/inode.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8565@@ -168,7 +168,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe
8566 if (de->mode) {
8567 inode->i_mode = de->mode;
8568 inode->i_uid = de->uid;
8569+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
8570+ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
8571+#else
8572 inode->i_gid = de->gid;
8573+#endif
8574 }
8575 if (de->size)
8576 inode->i_size = de->size;
8577diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/internal.h linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/internal.h
8578--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/internal.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8579+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/internal.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8580@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ extern int proc_tid_stat(struct task_str
8581 extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct task_struct *, char *);
8582 extern int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *, char *);
8583 extern int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *, char *);
8584+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
8585+extern int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
8586+#endif
8587
8588 void free_proc_entry(struct proc_dir_entry *de);
8589
8590diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/proc_misc.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
8591--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8592+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8593@@ -708,6 +708,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t
8594 void __init proc_misc_init(void)
8595 {
8596 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
8597+ int gr_mode = 0;
8598+
8599 static struct {
8600 char *name;
8601 int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
8602@@ -723,7 +725,9 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
8603 {"stram", stram_read_proc},
8604 #endif
8605 {"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
8606+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8607 {"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc},
8608+#endif
8609 {"locks", locks_read_proc},
8610 {"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
8611 {NULL,}
8612@@ -731,31 +735,49 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
8613 for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
8614 create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
8615
8616+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8617+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR;
8618+#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8619+ gr_mode = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP;
8620+#endif
8621+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8622+ create_proc_read_entry("cmdline", gr_mode, NULL, &cmdline_read_proc, NULL);
8623+#endif
8624+
8625 proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
8626
8627 /* And now for trickier ones */
8628 entry = create_proc_entry("kmsg", S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
8629 if (entry)
8630 entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
8631+
8632+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8633+ create_seq_entry("devices", gr_mode, &proc_devinfo_operations);
8634+#else
8635 create_seq_entry("devices", 0, &proc_devinfo_operations);
8636+#endif
8637 create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
8638 create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
8639 create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
8640 create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);
8641 #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
8642+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8643+ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
8644+#else
8645 create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
8646 #endif
8647+#endif
8648 create_seq_entry("buddyinfo",S_IRUGO, &fragmentation_file_operations);
8649 create_seq_entry("vmstat",S_IRUGO, &proc_vmstat_file_operations);
8650 create_seq_entry("zoneinfo",S_IRUGO, &proc_zoneinfo_file_operations);
8651 create_seq_entry("diskstats", 0, &proc_diskstats_operations);
8652 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
8653- create_seq_entry("modules", 0, &proc_modules_operations);
8654+ create_seq_entry("modules", gr_mode, &proc_modules_operations);
8655 #endif
8656 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
8657 create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations);
8658 #endif
8659-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_KCORE
8660+#if defined(CONFIG_PROC_KCORE) && !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD)
8661 proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
8662 if (proc_root_kcore) {
8663 proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
8664diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/root.c
8665--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/root.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8666+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/root.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8667@@ -53,7 +53,13 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
8668 return;
8669 }
8670 proc_misc_init();
8671+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8672+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
8673+#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8674+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL);
8675+#else
8676 proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", NULL);
8677+#endif
8678 proc_net_stat = proc_mkdir("net/stat", NULL);
8679
8680 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
8681@@ -77,7 +83,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
8682 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
8683 proc_device_tree_init();
8684 #endif
8685+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
8686+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
8687+ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
8688+#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
8689+ proc_bus = proc_mkdir_mode("bus", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP, NULL);
8690+#endif
8691+#else
8692 proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
8693+#endif
8694 }
8695
8696 static int proc_root_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat
8697diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/task_mmu.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
8698--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8699+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/proc/task_mmu.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8700@@ -43,15 +43,27 @@ char *task_mem(struct mm_struct *mm, cha
8701 "VmStk:\t%8lu kB\n"
8702 "VmExe:\t%8lu kB\n"
8703 "VmLib:\t%8lu kB\n"
8704- "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n",
8705- hiwater_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8706+ "VmPTE:\t%8lu kB\n"
8707+
8708+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
8709+ "CsBase:\t%8lx\nCsLim:\t%8lx\n"
8710+#endif
8711+
8712+ ,hiwater_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8713 (total_vm - mm->reserved_vm) << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8714 mm->locked_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8715 hiwater_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8716 total_rss << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8717 data << (PAGE_SHIFT-10),
8718 mm->stack_vm << (PAGE_SHIFT-10), text, lib,
8719- (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10);
8720+ (PTRS_PER_PTE*sizeof(pte_t)*mm->nr_ptes) >> 10
8721+
8722+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
8723+ , mm->context.user_cs_base, mm->context.user_cs_limit
8724+#endif
8725+
8726+ );
8727+
8728 return buffer;
8729 }
8730
8731@@ -118,6 +130,12 @@ struct mem_size_stats
8732 unsigned long private_dirty;
8733 };
8734
8735+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8736+#define PAX_RAND_FLAGS(_mm) (_mm != NULL && _mm != current->mm && \
8737+ (_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP || \
8738+ _mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))
8739+#endif
8740+
8741 static int show_map_internal(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct mem_size_stats *mss)
8742 {
8743 struct task_struct *task = m->private;
8744@@ -136,13 +154,30 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_
8745 }
8746
8747 seq_printf(m, "%08lx-%08lx %c%c%c%c %08lx %02x:%02x %lu %n",
8748+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8749+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_start,
8750+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_end,
8751+#else
8752 vma->vm_start,
8753 vma->vm_end,
8754+#endif
8755+
8756+#if 0
8757+ flags & VM_MAYREAD ? flags & VM_READ ? 'R' : '+' : flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
8758+ flags & VM_MAYWRITE ? flags & VM_WRITE ? 'W' : '+' : flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
8759+ flags & VM_MAYEXEC ? flags & VM_EXEC ? 'X' : '+' : flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
8760+#else
8761 flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
8762 flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
8763 flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',
8764+#endif
8765+
8766 flags & VM_MAYSHARE ? 's' : 'p',
8767+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8768+ PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm) ? 0UL : vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
8769+#else
8770 vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT,
8771+#endif
8772 MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), ino, &len);
8773
8774 /*
8775@@ -154,13 +189,13 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_
8776 seq_path(m, file->f_vfsmnt, file->f_dentry, "\n");
8777 } else {
8778 if (mm) {
8779- if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_brk &&
8780- vma->vm_end >= mm->brk) {
8781+ if (vma->vm_start <= mm->brk && vma->vm_end >= mm->start_brk) {
8782 pad_len_spaces(m, len);
8783 seq_puts(m, "[heap]");
8784 } else {
8785- if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
8786- vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
8787+ if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN | VM_GROWSUP)) ||
8788+ (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
8789+ vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack)) {
8790
8791 pad_len_spaces(m, len);
8792 seq_puts(m, "[stack]");
8793@@ -173,7 +208,25 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_
8794 }
8795 seq_putc(m, '\n');
8796
8797- if (mss)
8798+
8799+ if (mss) {
8800+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
8801+ if (PAX_RAND_FLAGS(mm))
8802+ seq_printf(m,
8803+ "Size: %8lu kB\n"
8804+ "Rss: %8lu kB\n"
8805+ "Shared_Clean: %8lu kB\n"
8806+ "Shared_Dirty: %8lu kB\n"
8807+ "Private_Clean: %8lu kB\n"
8808+ "Private_Dirty: %8lu kB\n",
8809+ 0UL,
8810+ 0UL,
8811+ 0UL,
8812+ 0UL,
8813+ 0UL,
8814+ 0UL);
8815+ else
8816+#endif
8817 seq_printf(m,
8818 "Size: %8lu kB\n"
8819 "Rss: %8lu kB\n"
8820@@ -187,6 +240,7 @@ static int show_map_internal(struct seq_
8821 mss->shared_dirty >> 10,
8822 mss->private_clean >> 10,
8823 mss->private_dirty >> 10);
8824+ }
8825
8826 if (m->count < m->size) /* vma is copied successfully */
8827 m->version = (vma != get_gate_vma(task))? vma->vm_start: 0;
8828diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/readdir.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/readdir.c
8829--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/readdir.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8830+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/readdir.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8831@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
8832 #include <linux/security.h>
8833 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
8834 #include <linux/unistd.h>
8835+#include <linux/namei.h>
8836+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8837
8838 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
8839
8840@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ struct old_linux_dirent {
8841
8842 struct readdir_callback {
8843 struct old_linux_dirent __user * dirent;
8844+ struct file * file;
8845 int result;
8846 };
8847
8848@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ static int fillonedir(void * __buf, cons
8849
8850 if (buf->result)
8851 return -EINVAL;
8852+
8853+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8854+ return 0;
8855+
8856 buf->result++;
8857 dirent = buf->dirent;
8858 if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, dirent,
8859@@ -107,6 +114,7 @@ asmlinkage long old_readdir(unsigned int
8860
8861 buf.result = 0;
8862 buf.dirent = dirent;
8863+ buf.file = file;
8864
8865 error = vfs_readdir(file, fillonedir, &buf);
8866 if (error >= 0)
8867@@ -133,6 +141,7 @@ struct linux_dirent {
8868 struct getdents_callback {
8869 struct linux_dirent __user * current_dir;
8870 struct linux_dirent __user * previous;
8871+ struct file * file;
8872 int count;
8873 int error;
8874 };
8875@@ -147,6 +156,10 @@ static int filldir(void * __buf, const c
8876 buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
8877 if (reclen > buf->count)
8878 return -EINVAL;
8879+
8880+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8881+ return 0;
8882+
8883 dirent = buf->previous;
8884 if (dirent) {
8885 if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
8886@@ -191,6 +204,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents(unsigned in
8887
8888 buf.current_dir = dirent;
8889 buf.previous = NULL;
8890+ buf.file = file;
8891 buf.count = count;
8892 buf.error = 0;
8893
8894@@ -217,6 +231,7 @@ out:
8895 struct getdents_callback64 {
8896 struct linux_dirent64 __user * current_dir;
8897 struct linux_dirent64 __user * previous;
8898+ struct file * file;
8899 int count;
8900 int error;
8901 };
8902@@ -231,6 +246,10 @@ static int filldir64(void * __buf, const
8903 buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail.. */
8904 if (reclen > buf->count)
8905 return -EINVAL;
8906+
8907+ if (!gr_acl_handle_filldir(buf->file, name, namlen, ino))
8908+ return 0;
8909+
8910 dirent = buf->previous;
8911 if (dirent) {
8912 if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
8913@@ -277,6 +296,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_getdents64(unsigned
8914
8915 buf.current_dir = dirent;
8916 buf.previous = NULL;
8917+ buf.file = file;
8918 buf.count = count;
8919 buf.error = 0;
8920
8921diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c linux-2.6.16.2/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c
8922--- linux-2.6.16.2/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
8923+++ linux-2.6.16.2/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_file.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8924@@ -413,6 +413,11 @@ linvfs_file_mmap(
8925 vattr_t va = { .va_mask = XFS_AT_UPDATIME };
8926 int error;
8927
8928+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
8929+ if (vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
8930+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
8931+#endif
8932+
8933 vma->vm_ops = &linvfs_file_vm_ops;
8934
8935 #ifdef CONFIG_XFS_DMAPI
8936diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c
8937--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
8938+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_alloc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
8939@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
8940+#include <linux/kernel.h>
8941+#include <linux/mm.h>
8942+#include <linux/slab.h>
8943+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
8944+#include <linux/gracl.h>
8945+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
8946+
8947+static unsigned long alloc_stack_next = 1;
8948+static unsigned long alloc_stack_size = 1;
8949+static void **alloc_stack;
8950+
8951+static __inline__ int
8952+alloc_pop(void)
8953+{
8954+ if (alloc_stack_next == 1)
8955+ return 0;
8956+
8957+ kfree(alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 2]);
8958+
8959+ alloc_stack_next--;
8960+
8961+ return 1;
8962+}
8963+
8964+static __inline__ void
8965+alloc_push(void *buf)
8966+{
8967+ if (alloc_stack_next >= alloc_stack_size)
8968+ BUG();
8969+
8970+ alloc_stack[alloc_stack_next - 1] = buf;
8971+
8972+ alloc_stack_next++;
8973+
8974+ return;
8975+}
8976+
8977+void *
8978+acl_alloc(unsigned long len)
8979+{
8980+ void *ret;
8981+
8982+ if (len > PAGE_SIZE)
8983+ BUG();
8984+
8985+ ret = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
8986+
8987+ if (ret)
8988+ alloc_push(ret);
8989+
8990+ return ret;
8991+}
8992+
8993+void
8994+acl_free_all(void)
8995+{
8996+ if (gr_acl_is_enabled() || !alloc_stack)
8997+ return;
8998+
8999+ while (alloc_pop()) ;
9000+
9001+ if (alloc_stack) {
9002+ if ((alloc_stack_size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9003+ kfree(alloc_stack);
9004+ else
9005+ vfree(alloc_stack);
9006+ }
9007+
9008+ alloc_stack = NULL;
9009+ alloc_stack_size = 1;
9010+ alloc_stack_next = 1;
9011+
9012+ return;
9013+}
9014+
9015+int
9016+acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size)
9017+{
9018+ if ((size * sizeof (void *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9019+ alloc_stack =
9020+ (void **) kmalloc(size * sizeof (void *), GFP_KERNEL);
9021+ else
9022+ alloc_stack = (void **) vmalloc(size * sizeof (void *));
9023+
9024+ alloc_stack_size = size;
9025+
9026+ if (!alloc_stack)
9027+ return 0;
9028+ else
9029+ return 1;
9030+}
9031diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl.c
9032--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
9033+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
9034@@ -0,0 +1,3532 @@
9035+#include <linux/kernel.h>
9036+#include <linux/module.h>
9037+#include <linux/sched.h>
9038+#include <linux/mm.h>
9039+#include <linux/file.h>
9040+#include <linux/fs.h>
9041+#include <linux/namei.h>
9042+#include <linux/mount.h>
9043+#include <linux/tty.h>
9044+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
9045+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
9046+#include <linux/slab.h>
9047+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
9048+#include <linux/types.h>
9049+#include <linux/capability.h>
9050+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
9051+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
9052+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
9053+#include <linux/gracl.h>
9054+#include <linux/gralloc.h>
9055+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
9056+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
9057+#include <linux/percpu.h>
9058+
9059+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
9060+#include <asm/errno.h>
9061+#include <asm/mman.h>
9062+
9063+static struct acl_role_db acl_role_set;
9064+static struct name_db name_set;
9065+static struct inodev_db inodev_set;
9066+
9067+/* for keeping track of userspace pointers used for subjects, so we
9068+ can share references in the kernel as well
9069+*/
9070+
9071+static struct dentry *real_root;
9072+static struct vfsmount *real_root_mnt;
9073+
9074+static struct acl_subj_map_db subj_map_set;
9075+
9076+static struct acl_role_label *default_role;
9077+
9078+static u16 acl_sp_role_value;
9079+
9080+extern char *gr_shared_page[4];
9081+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_dev_sem);
9082+rwlock_t gr_inode_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
9083+
9084+struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
9085+
9086+static unsigned int gr_status = GR_STATUS_INIT;
9087+
9088+extern int chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum);
9089+extern void gr_clear_learn_entries(void);
9090+
9091+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
9092+extern void gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
9093+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
9094+#endif
9095+
9096+extern char * __d_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9097+ struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt,
9098+ char *buffer, int buflen);
9099+
9100+unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
9101+unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
9102+
9103+static struct sprole_pw **acl_special_roles = NULL;
9104+static __u16 num_sprole_pws = 0;
9105+
9106+static struct acl_role_label *kernel_role = NULL;
9107+
9108+static unsigned int gr_auth_attempts = 0;
9109+static unsigned long gr_auth_expires = 0UL;
9110+
9111+extern int gr_init_uidset(void);
9112+extern void gr_free_uidset(void);
9113+extern void gr_remove_uid(uid_t uid);
9114+extern int gr_find_uid(uid_t uid);
9115+
9116+__inline__ int
9117+gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
9118+{
9119+ return (gr_status & GR_READY);
9120+}
9121+
9122+char gr_roletype_to_char(void)
9123+{
9124+ switch (current->role->roletype &
9125+ (GR_ROLE_DEFAULT | GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP |
9126+ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
9127+ case GR_ROLE_DEFAULT:
9128+ return 'D';
9129+ case GR_ROLE_USER:
9130+ return 'U';
9131+ case GR_ROLE_GROUP:
9132+ return 'G';
9133+ case GR_ROLE_SPECIAL:
9134+ return 'S';
9135+ }
9136+
9137+ return 'X';
9138+}
9139+
9140+__inline__ int
9141+gr_acl_tpe_check(void)
9142+{
9143+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
9144+ return 0;
9145+ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_TPE)
9146+ return 1;
9147+ else
9148+ return 0;
9149+}
9150+
9151+int
9152+gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
9153+{
9154+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
9155+ if (inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) &&
9156+ grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
9157+ !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
9158+ return 1;
9159+#endif
9160+ return 0;
9161+}
9162+
9163+static int
9164+gr_streq(const char *a, const char *b, const unsigned int lena, const unsigned int lenb)
9165+{
9166+ int i;
9167+ unsigned long *l1;
9168+ unsigned long *l2;
9169+ unsigned char *c1;
9170+ unsigned char *c2;
9171+ int num_longs;
9172+
9173+ if (likely(lena != lenb))
9174+ return 0;
9175+
9176+ l1 = (unsigned long *)a;
9177+ l2 = (unsigned long *)b;
9178+
9179+ num_longs = lena / sizeof(unsigned long);
9180+
9181+ for (i = num_longs; i--; l1++, l2++) {
9182+ if (unlikely(*l1 != *l2))
9183+ return 0;
9184+ }
9185+
9186+ c1 = (unsigned char *) l1;
9187+ c2 = (unsigned char *) l2;
9188+
9189+ i = lena - (num_longs * sizeof(unsigned long));
9190+
9191+ for (; i--; c1++, c2++) {
9192+ if (unlikely(*c1 != *c2))
9193+ return 0;
9194+ }
9195+
9196+ return 1;
9197+}
9198+
9199+static char *
9200+gen_full_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9201+ struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *rootmnt, char *buf, int buflen)
9202+{
9203+ char *end = buf + buflen;
9204+ char *retval;
9205+ int namelen = 0;
9206+
9207+ *--end = '\0';
9208+
9209+ retval = end - 1;
9210+ *retval = '/';
9211+
9212+ if (dentry == root && vfsmnt == rootmnt)
9213+ return retval;
9214+ if (dentry != vfsmnt->mnt_root && !IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
9215+ namelen = strlen(dentry->d_name.name);
9216+ buflen -= namelen;
9217+ if (buflen < 2)
9218+ goto err;
9219+ if (dentry->d_parent != root || vfsmnt != rootmnt)
9220+ buflen--;
9221+ }
9222+
9223+ retval = __d_path(dentry->d_parent, vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
9224+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(retval)))
9225+err:
9226+ retval = strcpy(buf, "<path too long>");
9227+ else if (namelen != 0) {
9228+ end = buf + buflen - 1; // accounts for null termination
9229+ if (dentry->d_parent != root || vfsmnt != rootmnt)
9230+ *end++ = '/'; // accounted for above with buflen--
9231+ memcpy(end, dentry->d_name.name, namelen);
9232+ }
9233+
9234+ return retval;
9235+}
9236+
9237+static char *
9238+__d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9239+ char *buf, int buflen)
9240+{
9241+ char *res;
9242+
9243+ /* we can use real_root, real_root_mnt, because this is only called
9244+ by the RBAC system */
9245+ res = gen_full_path((struct dentry *)dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, real_root, real_root_mnt, buf, buflen);
9246+
9247+ return res;
9248+}
9249+
9250+static char *
9251+d_real_path(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *vfsmnt,
9252+ char *buf, int buflen)
9253+{
9254+ char *res;
9255+ struct dentry *root;
9256+ struct vfsmount *rootmnt;
9257+
9258+ /* we can't use real_root, real_root_mnt, because they belong only to the RBAC system */
9259+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9260+ root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
9261+ rootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
9262+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9263+
9264+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
9265+ res = gen_full_path((struct dentry *)dentry, (struct vfsmount *)vfsmnt, root, rootmnt, buf, buflen);
9266+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
9267+
9268+ dput(root);
9269+ mntput(rootmnt);
9270+ return res;
9271+}
9272+
9273+static char *
9274+gr_to_filename_rbac(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9275+{
9276+ char *ret;
9277+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
9278+ ret = __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()),
9279+ PAGE_SIZE);
9280+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
9281+ return ret;
9282+}
9283+
9284+char *
9285+gr_to_filename_nolock(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9286+{
9287+ return __d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0],smp_processor_id()),
9288+ PAGE_SIZE);
9289+}
9290+
9291+char *
9292+gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9293+{
9294+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
9295+ PAGE_SIZE);
9296+}
9297+
9298+char *
9299+gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9300+{
9301+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[1], smp_processor_id()),
9302+ PAGE_SIZE);
9303+}
9304+
9305+char *
9306+gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9307+{
9308+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[2], smp_processor_id()),
9309+ PAGE_SIZE);
9310+}
9311+
9312+char *
9313+gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
9314+{
9315+ return d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[3], smp_processor_id()),
9316+ PAGE_SIZE);
9317+}
9318+
9319+__inline__ __u32
9320+to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode)
9321+{
9322+ /* masks off auditable permission flags, then shifts them to create
9323+ auditing flags, and adds the special case of append auditing if
9324+ we're requesting write */
9325+ return (((reqmode & GR_AUDIT_READ) << 10) | ((reqmode & GR_WRITE) ? GR_AUDIT_APPEND : 0));
9326+}
9327+
9328+struct acl_subject_label *
9329+lookup_subject_map(const struct acl_subject_label *userp)
9330+{
9331+ unsigned int index = shash(userp, subj_map_set.s_size);
9332+ struct subject_map *match;
9333+
9334+ match = subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9335+
9336+ while (match && match->user != userp)
9337+ match = match->next;
9338+
9339+ if (match != NULL)
9340+ return match->kernel;
9341+ else
9342+ return NULL;
9343+}
9344+
9345+static void
9346+insert_subj_map_entry(struct subject_map *subjmap)
9347+{
9348+ unsigned int index = shash(subjmap->user, subj_map_set.s_size);
9349+ struct subject_map **curr;
9350+
9351+ subjmap->prev = NULL;
9352+
9353+ curr = &subj_map_set.s_hash[index];
9354+ if (*curr != NULL)
9355+ (*curr)->prev = subjmap;
9356+
9357+ subjmap->next = *curr;
9358+ *curr = subjmap;
9359+
9360+ return;
9361+}
9362+
9363+static struct acl_role_label *
9364+lookup_acl_role_label(const struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
9365+ const gid_t gid)
9366+{
9367+ unsigned int index = rhash(uid, GR_ROLE_USER, acl_role_set.r_size);
9368+ struct acl_role_label *match;
9369+ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
9370+ unsigned int x;
9371+
9372+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9373+
9374+ while (match) {
9375+ if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_USER)) {
9376+ for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
9377+ if (match->domain_children[x] == uid)
9378+ goto found;
9379+ }
9380+ } else if (match->uidgid == uid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_USER)
9381+ break;
9382+ match = match->next;
9383+ }
9384+found:
9385+ if (match == NULL) {
9386+ try_group:
9387+ index = rhash(gid, GR_ROLE_GROUP, acl_role_set.r_size);
9388+ match = acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9389+
9390+ while (match) {
9391+ if ((match->roletype & (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) == (GR_ROLE_DOMAIN | GR_ROLE_GROUP)) {
9392+ for (x = 0; x < match->domain_child_num; x++) {
9393+ if (match->domain_children[x] == gid)
9394+ goto found2;
9395+ }
9396+ } else if (match->uidgid == gid && match->roletype & GR_ROLE_GROUP)
9397+ break;
9398+ match = match->next;
9399+ }
9400+found2:
9401+ if (match == NULL)
9402+ match = default_role;
9403+ if (match->allowed_ips == NULL)
9404+ return match;
9405+ else {
9406+ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
9407+ if (likely
9408+ ((ntohl(task->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
9409+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
9410+ return match;
9411+ }
9412+ match = default_role;
9413+ }
9414+ } else if (match->allowed_ips == NULL) {
9415+ return match;
9416+ } else {
9417+ for (ipp = match->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
9418+ if (likely
9419+ ((ntohl(task->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
9420+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask)))
9421+ return match;
9422+ }
9423+ goto try_group;
9424+ }
9425+
9426+ return match;
9427+}
9428+
9429+struct acl_subject_label *
9430+lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9431+ const struct acl_role_label *role)
9432+{
9433+ unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, role->subj_hash_size);
9434+ struct acl_subject_label *match;
9435+
9436+ match = role->subj_hash[index];
9437+
9438+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9439+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9440+ match = match->next;
9441+ }
9442+
9443+ if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9444+ return match;
9445+ else
9446+ return NULL;
9447+}
9448+
9449+static struct acl_object_label *
9450+lookup_acl_obj_label(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9451+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9452+{
9453+ unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, subj->obj_hash_size);
9454+ struct acl_object_label *match;
9455+
9456+ match = subj->obj_hash[index];
9457+
9458+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9459+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9460+ match = match->next;
9461+ }
9462+
9463+ if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9464+ return match;
9465+ else
9466+ return NULL;
9467+}
9468+
9469+static struct acl_object_label *
9470+lookup_acl_obj_label_create(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev,
9471+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9472+{
9473+ unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, subj->obj_hash_size);
9474+ struct acl_object_label *match;
9475+
9476+ match = subj->obj_hash[index];
9477+
9478+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9479+ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9480+ match = match->next;
9481+ }
9482+
9483+ if (match && (match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9484+ return match;
9485+
9486+ match = subj->obj_hash[index];
9487+
9488+ while (match && (match->inode != ino || match->device != dev ||
9489+ (match->mode & GR_DELETED))) {
9490+ match = match->next;
9491+ }
9492+
9493+ if (match && !(match->mode & GR_DELETED))
9494+ return match;
9495+ else
9496+ return NULL;
9497+}
9498+
9499+static struct name_entry *
9500+lookup_name_entry(const char *name)
9501+{
9502+ unsigned int len = strlen(name);
9503+ unsigned int key = full_name_hash(name, len);
9504+ unsigned int index = key % name_set.n_size;
9505+ struct name_entry *match;
9506+
9507+ match = name_set.n_hash[index];
9508+
9509+ while (match && (match->key != key || !gr_streq(match->name, name, match->len, len)))
9510+ match = match->next;
9511+
9512+ return match;
9513+}
9514+
9515+static struct inodev_entry *
9516+lookup_inodev_entry(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
9517+{
9518+ unsigned int index = fhash(ino, dev, inodev_set.i_size);
9519+ struct inodev_entry *match;
9520+
9521+ match = inodev_set.i_hash[index];
9522+
9523+ while (match && (match->nentry->inode != ino || match->nentry->device != dev))
9524+ match = match->next;
9525+
9526+ return match;
9527+}
9528+
9529+static void
9530+insert_inodev_entry(struct inodev_entry *entry)
9531+{
9532+ unsigned int index = fhash(entry->nentry->inode, entry->nentry->device,
9533+ inodev_set.i_size);
9534+ struct inodev_entry **curr;
9535+
9536+ entry->prev = NULL;
9537+
9538+ curr = &inodev_set.i_hash[index];
9539+ if (*curr != NULL)
9540+ (*curr)->prev = entry;
9541+
9542+ entry->next = *curr;
9543+ *curr = entry;
9544+
9545+ return;
9546+}
9547+
9548+static void
9549+__insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role, uid_t uidgid)
9550+{
9551+ unsigned int index =
9552+ rhash(uidgid, role->roletype & (GR_ROLE_USER | GR_ROLE_GROUP), acl_role_set.r_size);
9553+ struct acl_role_label **curr;
9554+
9555+ role->prev = NULL;
9556+
9557+ curr = &acl_role_set.r_hash[index];
9558+ if (*curr != NULL)
9559+ (*curr)->prev = role;
9560+
9561+ role->next = *curr;
9562+ *curr = role;
9563+
9564+ return;
9565+}
9566+
9567+static void
9568+insert_acl_role_label(struct acl_role_label *role)
9569+{
9570+ int i;
9571+
9572+ if (role->roletype & GR_ROLE_DOMAIN) {
9573+ for (i = 0; i < role->domain_child_num; i++)
9574+ __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->domain_children[i]);
9575+ } else
9576+ __insert_acl_role_label(role, role->uidgid);
9577+}
9578+
9579+static int
9580+insert_name_entry(char *name, const ino_t inode, const dev_t device)
9581+{
9582+ struct name_entry **curr, *nentry;
9583+ struct inodev_entry *ientry;
9584+ unsigned int len = strlen(name);
9585+ unsigned int key = full_name_hash(name, len);
9586+ unsigned int index = key % name_set.n_size;
9587+
9588+ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
9589+
9590+ while (*curr && ((*curr)->key != key || !gr_streq((*curr)->name, name, (*curr)->len, len)))
9591+ curr = &((*curr)->next);
9592+
9593+ if (*curr != NULL)
9594+ return 1;
9595+
9596+ nentry = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct name_entry));
9597+ if (nentry == NULL)
9598+ return 0;
9599+ ientry = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct inodev_entry));
9600+ if (ientry == NULL)
9601+ return 0;
9602+ ientry->nentry = nentry;
9603+
9604+ nentry->key = key;
9605+ nentry->name = name;
9606+ nentry->inode = inode;
9607+ nentry->device = device;
9608+ nentry->len = len;
9609+
9610+ nentry->prev = NULL;
9611+ curr = &name_set.n_hash[index];
9612+ if (*curr != NULL)
9613+ (*curr)->prev = nentry;
9614+ nentry->next = *curr;
9615+ *curr = nentry;
9616+
9617+ /* insert us into the table searchable by inode/dev */
9618+ insert_inodev_entry(ientry);
9619+
9620+ return 1;
9621+}
9622+
9623+static void
9624+insert_acl_obj_label(struct acl_object_label *obj,
9625+ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
9626+{
9627+ unsigned int index =
9628+ fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, subj->obj_hash_size);
9629+ struct acl_object_label **curr;
9630+
9631+
9632+ obj->prev = NULL;
9633+
9634+ curr = &subj->obj_hash[index];
9635+ if (*curr != NULL)
9636+ (*curr)->prev = obj;
9637+
9638+ obj->next = *curr;
9639+ *curr = obj;
9640+
9641+ return;
9642+}
9643+
9644+static void
9645+insert_acl_subj_label(struct acl_subject_label *obj,
9646+ struct acl_role_label *role)
9647+{
9648+ unsigned int index = fhash(obj->inode, obj->device, role->subj_hash_size);
9649+ struct acl_subject_label **curr;
9650+
9651+ obj->prev = NULL;
9652+
9653+ curr = &role->subj_hash[index];
9654+ if (*curr != NULL)
9655+ (*curr)->prev = obj;
9656+
9657+ obj->next = *curr;
9658+ *curr = obj;
9659+
9660+ return;
9661+}
9662+
9663+/* allocating chained hash tables, so optimal size is where lambda ~ 1 */
9664+
9665+static void *
9666+create_table(__u32 * len, int elementsize)
9667+{
9668+ unsigned int table_sizes[] = {
9669+ 7, 13, 31, 61, 127, 251, 509, 1021, 2039, 4093, 8191, 16381,
9670+ 32749, 65521, 131071, 262139, 524287, 1048573, 2097143,
9671+ 4194301, 8388593, 16777213, 33554393, 67108859, 134217689,
9672+ 268435399, 536870909, 1073741789, 2147483647
9673+ };
9674+ void *newtable = NULL;
9675+ unsigned int pwr = 0;
9676+
9677+ while ((pwr < ((sizeof (table_sizes) / sizeof (table_sizes[0])) - 1)) &&
9678+ table_sizes[pwr] <= *len)
9679+ pwr++;
9680+
9681+ if (table_sizes[pwr] <= *len)
9682+ return newtable;
9683+
9684+ if ((table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9685+ newtable =
9686+ kmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize, GFP_KERNEL);
9687+ else
9688+ newtable = vmalloc(table_sizes[pwr] * elementsize);
9689+
9690+ *len = table_sizes[pwr];
9691+
9692+ return newtable;
9693+}
9694+
9695+static int
9696+init_variables(const struct gr_arg *arg)
9697+{
9698+ unsigned int stacksize;
9699+
9700+ subj_map_set.s_size = arg->role_db.num_subjects;
9701+ acl_role_set.r_size = arg->role_db.num_roles + arg->role_db.num_domain_children;
9702+ name_set.n_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
9703+ inodev_set.i_size = arg->role_db.num_objects;
9704+
9705+ if (!subj_map_set.s_size || !acl_role_set.r_size ||
9706+ !name_set.n_size || !inodev_set.i_size)
9707+ return 1;
9708+
9709+ if (!gr_init_uidset())
9710+ return 1;
9711+
9712+ /* set up the stack that holds allocation info */
9713+
9714+ stacksize = arg->role_db.num_pointers + 5;
9715+
9716+ if (!acl_alloc_stack_init(stacksize))
9717+ return 1;
9718+
9719+ /* grab reference for the real root dentry and vfsmount */
9720+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9721+ real_root_mnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
9722+ real_root = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
9723+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
9724+
9725+
9726+ subj_map_set.s_hash =
9727+ (struct subject_map **) create_table(&subj_map_set.s_size, sizeof(void *));
9728+ acl_role_set.r_hash =
9729+ (struct acl_role_label **) create_table(&acl_role_set.r_size, sizeof(void *));
9730+ name_set.n_hash = (struct name_entry **) create_table(&name_set.n_size, sizeof(void *));
9731+ inodev_set.i_hash =
9732+ (struct inodev_entry **) create_table(&inodev_set.i_size, sizeof(void *));
9733+
9734+ if (!subj_map_set.s_hash || !acl_role_set.r_hash ||
9735+ !name_set.n_hash || !inodev_set.i_hash)
9736+ return 1;
9737+
9738+ memset(subj_map_set.s_hash, 0,
9739+ sizeof(struct subject_map *) * subj_map_set.s_size);
9740+ memset(acl_role_set.r_hash, 0,
9741+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *) * acl_role_set.r_size);
9742+ memset(name_set.n_hash, 0,
9743+ sizeof (struct name_entry *) * name_set.n_size);
9744+ memset(inodev_set.i_hash, 0,
9745+ sizeof (struct inodev_entry *) * inodev_set.i_size);
9746+
9747+ return 0;
9748+}
9749+
9750+/* free information not needed after startup
9751+ currently contains user->kernel pointer mappings for subjects
9752+*/
9753+
9754+static void
9755+free_init_variables(void)
9756+{
9757+ __u32 i;
9758+
9759+ if (subj_map_set.s_hash) {
9760+ for (i = 0; i < subj_map_set.s_size; i++) {
9761+ if (subj_map_set.s_hash[i]) {
9762+ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash[i]);
9763+ subj_map_set.s_hash[i] = NULL;
9764+ }
9765+ }
9766+
9767+ if ((subj_map_set.s_size * sizeof (struct subject_map *)) <=
9768+ PAGE_SIZE)
9769+ kfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
9770+ else
9771+ vfree(subj_map_set.s_hash);
9772+ }
9773+
9774+ return;
9775+}
9776+
9777+static void
9778+free_variables(void)
9779+{
9780+ struct acl_subject_label *s;
9781+ struct acl_role_label *r;
9782+ struct task_struct *task, *task2;
9783+ unsigned int i, x;
9784+
9785+ gr_clear_learn_entries();
9786+
9787+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
9788+ do_each_thread(task2, task) {
9789+ task->acl_sp_role = 0;
9790+ task->acl_role_id = 0;
9791+ task->acl = NULL;
9792+ task->role = NULL;
9793+ } while_each_thread(task2, task);
9794+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
9795+
9796+ /* release the reference to the real root dentry and vfsmount */
9797+ if (real_root)
9798+ dput(real_root);
9799+ real_root = NULL;
9800+ if (real_root_mnt)
9801+ mntput(real_root_mnt);
9802+ real_root_mnt = NULL;
9803+
9804+ /* free all object hash tables */
9805+
9806+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
9807+ if (r->subj_hash == NULL)
9808+ break;
9809+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(r, s, x)
9810+ if (s->obj_hash == NULL)
9811+ break;
9812+ if ((s->obj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9813+ kfree(s->obj_hash);
9814+ else
9815+ vfree(s->obj_hash);
9816+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(s, x)
9817+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(r, s)
9818+ if (s->obj_hash == NULL)
9819+ break;
9820+ if ((s->obj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_object_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9821+ kfree(s->obj_hash);
9822+ else
9823+ vfree(s->obj_hash);
9824+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(s)
9825+ if ((r->subj_hash_size * sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *)) <= PAGE_SIZE)
9826+ kfree(r->subj_hash);
9827+ else
9828+ vfree(r->subj_hash);
9829+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
9830+
9831+ acl_free_all();
9832+
9833+ if (acl_role_set.r_hash) {
9834+ if ((acl_role_set.r_size * sizeof (struct acl_role_label *)) <=
9835+ PAGE_SIZE)
9836+ kfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
9837+ else
9838+ vfree(acl_role_set.r_hash);
9839+ }
9840+ if (name_set.n_hash) {
9841+ if ((name_set.n_size * sizeof (struct name_entry *)) <=
9842+ PAGE_SIZE)
9843+ kfree(name_set.n_hash);
9844+ else
9845+ vfree(name_set.n_hash);
9846+ }
9847+
9848+ if (inodev_set.i_hash) {
9849+ if ((inodev_set.i_size * sizeof (struct inodev_entry *)) <=
9850+ PAGE_SIZE)
9851+ kfree(inodev_set.i_hash);
9852+ else
9853+ vfree(inodev_set.i_hash);
9854+ }
9855+
9856+ gr_free_uidset();
9857+
9858+ memset(&name_set, 0, sizeof (struct name_db));
9859+ memset(&inodev_set, 0, sizeof (struct inodev_db));
9860+ memset(&acl_role_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_role_db));
9861+ memset(&subj_map_set, 0, sizeof (struct acl_subj_map_db));
9862+
9863+ default_role = NULL;
9864+
9865+ return;
9866+}
9867+
9868+static __u32
9869+count_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp)
9870+{
9871+ struct acl_object_label o_tmp;
9872+ __u32 num = 0;
9873+
9874+ while (userp) {
9875+ if (copy_from_user(&o_tmp, userp,
9876+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
9877+ break;
9878+
9879+ userp = o_tmp.prev;
9880+ num++;
9881+ }
9882+
9883+ return num;
9884+}
9885+
9886+static struct acl_subject_label *
9887+do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role);
9888+
9889+static int
9890+copy_user_glob(struct acl_object_label *obj)
9891+{
9892+ struct acl_object_label *g_tmp, **guser;
9893+ unsigned int len;
9894+ char *tmp;
9895+
9896+ if (obj->globbed == NULL)
9897+ return 0;
9898+
9899+ guser = &obj->globbed;
9900+ while (*guser) {
9901+ g_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
9902+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label));
9903+ if (g_tmp == NULL)
9904+ return -ENOMEM;
9905+
9906+ if (copy_from_user(g_tmp, *guser,
9907+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
9908+ return -EFAULT;
9909+
9910+ len = strnlen_user(g_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
9911+
9912+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
9913+ return -EINVAL;
9914+
9915+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
9916+ return -ENOMEM;
9917+
9918+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, g_tmp->filename, len))
9919+ return -EFAULT;
9920+
9921+ g_tmp->filename = tmp;
9922+
9923+ *guser = g_tmp;
9924+ guser = &(g_tmp->next);
9925+ }
9926+
9927+ return 0;
9928+}
9929+
9930+static int
9931+copy_user_objs(struct acl_object_label *userp, struct acl_subject_label *subj,
9932+ struct acl_role_label *role)
9933+{
9934+ struct acl_object_label *o_tmp;
9935+ unsigned int len;
9936+ int ret;
9937+ char *tmp;
9938+
9939+ while (userp) {
9940+ if ((o_tmp = (struct acl_object_label *)
9941+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_object_label))) == NULL)
9942+ return -ENOMEM;
9943+
9944+ if (copy_from_user(o_tmp, userp,
9945+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label)))
9946+ return -EFAULT;
9947+
9948+ userp = o_tmp->prev;
9949+
9950+ len = strnlen_user(o_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
9951+
9952+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
9953+ return -EINVAL;
9954+
9955+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
9956+ return -ENOMEM;
9957+
9958+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, o_tmp->filename, len))
9959+ return -EFAULT;
9960+
9961+ o_tmp->filename = tmp;
9962+
9963+ insert_acl_obj_label(o_tmp, subj);
9964+ if (!insert_name_entry(o_tmp->filename, o_tmp->inode,
9965+ o_tmp->device))
9966+ return -ENOMEM;
9967+
9968+ ret = copy_user_glob(o_tmp);
9969+ if (ret)
9970+ return ret;
9971+
9972+ if (o_tmp->nested) {
9973+ o_tmp->nested = do_copy_user_subj(o_tmp->nested, role);
9974+ if (IS_ERR(o_tmp->nested))
9975+ return PTR_ERR(o_tmp->nested);
9976+
9977+ /* insert into nested subject list */
9978+ o_tmp->nested->next = role->hash->first;
9979+ role->hash->first = o_tmp->nested;
9980+ }
9981+ }
9982+
9983+ return 0;
9984+}
9985+
9986+static __u32
9987+count_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp)
9988+{
9989+ struct acl_subject_label s_tmp;
9990+ __u32 num = 0;
9991+
9992+ while (userp) {
9993+ if (copy_from_user(&s_tmp, userp,
9994+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
9995+ break;
9996+
9997+ userp = s_tmp.prev;
9998+ /* do not count nested subjects against this count, since
9999+ they are not included in the hash table, but are
10000+ attached to objects. We have already counted
10001+ the subjects in userspace for the allocation
10002+ stack
10003+ */
10004+ if (!(s_tmp.mode & GR_NESTED))
10005+ num++;
10006+ }
10007+
10008+ return num;
10009+}
10010+
10011+static int
10012+copy_user_allowedips(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
10013+{
10014+ struct role_allowed_ip *ruserip, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
10015+
10016+ ruserip = rolep->allowed_ips;
10017+
10018+ while (ruserip) {
10019+ rlast = rtmp;
10020+
10021+ if ((rtmp = (struct role_allowed_ip *)
10022+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip))) == NULL)
10023+ return -ENOMEM;
10024+
10025+ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, ruserip,
10026+ sizeof (struct role_allowed_ip)))
10027+ return -EFAULT;
10028+
10029+ ruserip = rtmp->prev;
10030+
10031+ if (!rlast) {
10032+ rtmp->prev = NULL;
10033+ rolep->allowed_ips = rtmp;
10034+ } else {
10035+ rlast->next = rtmp;
10036+ rtmp->prev = rlast;
10037+ }
10038+
10039+ if (!ruserip)
10040+ rtmp->next = NULL;
10041+ }
10042+
10043+ return 0;
10044+}
10045+
10046+static int
10047+copy_user_transitions(struct acl_role_label *rolep)
10048+{
10049+ struct role_transition *rusertp, *rtmp = NULL, *rlast;
10050+
10051+ unsigned int len;
10052+ char *tmp;
10053+
10054+ rusertp = rolep->transitions;
10055+
10056+ while (rusertp) {
10057+ rlast = rtmp;
10058+
10059+ if ((rtmp = (struct role_transition *)
10060+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct role_transition))) == NULL)
10061+ return -ENOMEM;
10062+
10063+ if (copy_from_user(rtmp, rusertp,
10064+ sizeof (struct role_transition)))
10065+ return -EFAULT;
10066+
10067+ rusertp = rtmp->prev;
10068+
10069+ len = strnlen_user(rtmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10070+
10071+ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN)
10072+ return -EINVAL;
10073+
10074+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10075+ return -ENOMEM;
10076+
10077+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, rtmp->rolename, len))
10078+ return -EFAULT;
10079+
10080+ rtmp->rolename = tmp;
10081+
10082+ if (!rlast) {
10083+ rtmp->prev = NULL;
10084+ rolep->transitions = rtmp;
10085+ } else {
10086+ rlast->next = rtmp;
10087+ rtmp->prev = rlast;
10088+ }
10089+
10090+ if (!rusertp)
10091+ rtmp->next = NULL;
10092+ }
10093+
10094+ return 0;
10095+}
10096+
10097+static struct acl_subject_label *
10098+do_copy_user_subj(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
10099+{
10100+ struct acl_subject_label *s_tmp = NULL, *s_tmp2;
10101+ unsigned int len;
10102+ char *tmp;
10103+ __u32 num_objs;
10104+ struct acl_ip_label **i_tmp, *i_utmp2;
10105+ struct gr_hash_struct ghash;
10106+ struct subject_map *subjmap;
10107+ unsigned int i_num;
10108+ int err;
10109+
10110+ s_tmp = lookup_subject_map(userp);
10111+
10112+ /* we've already copied this subject into the kernel, just return
10113+ the reference to it, and don't copy it over again
10114+ */
10115+ if (s_tmp)
10116+ return(s_tmp);
10117+
10118+ if ((s_tmp = (struct acl_subject_label *)
10119+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_subject_label))) == NULL)
10120+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10121+
10122+ subjmap = (struct subject_map *)kmalloc(sizeof (struct subject_map), GFP_KERNEL);
10123+ if (subjmap == NULL)
10124+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10125+
10126+ subjmap->user = userp;
10127+ subjmap->kernel = s_tmp;
10128+ insert_subj_map_entry(subjmap);
10129+
10130+ if (copy_from_user(s_tmp, userp,
10131+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
10132+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10133+
10134+ len = strnlen_user(s_tmp->filename, PATH_MAX);
10135+
10136+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX)
10137+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
10138+
10139+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL)
10140+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10141+
10142+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, s_tmp->filename, len))
10143+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10144+
10145+ s_tmp->filename = tmp;
10146+
10147+ if (!strcmp(s_tmp->filename, "/"))
10148+ role->root_label = s_tmp;
10149+
10150+ if (copy_from_user(&ghash, s_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct)))
10151+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10152+
10153+ /* copy user and group transition tables */
10154+
10155+ if (s_tmp->user_trans_num) {
10156+ uid_t *uidlist;
10157+
10158+ uidlist = (uid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t));
10159+ if (uidlist == NULL)
10160+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10161+ if (copy_from_user(uidlist, s_tmp->user_transitions, s_tmp->user_trans_num * sizeof(uid_t)))
10162+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10163+
10164+ s_tmp->user_transitions = uidlist;
10165+ }
10166+
10167+ if (s_tmp->group_trans_num) {
10168+ gid_t *gidlist;
10169+
10170+ gidlist = (gid_t *)acl_alloc(s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t));
10171+ if (gidlist == NULL)
10172+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10173+ if (copy_from_user(gidlist, s_tmp->group_transitions, s_tmp->group_trans_num * sizeof(gid_t)))
10174+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10175+
10176+ s_tmp->group_transitions = gidlist;
10177+ }
10178+
10179+ /* set up object hash table */
10180+ num_objs = count_user_objs(ghash.first);
10181+
10182+ s_tmp->obj_hash_size = num_objs;
10183+ s_tmp->obj_hash =
10184+ (struct acl_object_label **)
10185+ create_table(&(s_tmp->obj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
10186+
10187+ if (!s_tmp->obj_hash)
10188+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10189+
10190+ memset(s_tmp->obj_hash, 0,
10191+ s_tmp->obj_hash_size *
10192+ sizeof (struct acl_object_label *));
10193+
10194+ /* add in objects */
10195+ err = copy_user_objs(ghash.first, s_tmp, role);
10196+
10197+ if (err)
10198+ return ERR_PTR(err);
10199+
10200+ /* set pointer for parent subject */
10201+ if (s_tmp->parent_subject) {
10202+ s_tmp2 = do_copy_user_subj(s_tmp->parent_subject, role);
10203+
10204+ if (IS_ERR(s_tmp2))
10205+ return s_tmp2;
10206+
10207+ s_tmp->parent_subject = s_tmp2;
10208+ }
10209+
10210+ /* add in ip acls */
10211+
10212+ if (!s_tmp->ip_num) {
10213+ s_tmp->ips = NULL;
10214+ goto insert;
10215+ }
10216+
10217+ i_tmp =
10218+ (struct acl_ip_label **) acl_alloc(s_tmp->ip_num *
10219+ sizeof (struct
10220+ acl_ip_label *));
10221+
10222+ if (!i_tmp)
10223+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10224+
10225+ for (i_num = 0; i_num < s_tmp->ip_num; i_num++) {
10226+ *(i_tmp + i_num) =
10227+ (struct acl_ip_label *)
10228+ acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_ip_label));
10229+ if (!*(i_tmp + i_num))
10230+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10231+
10232+ if (copy_from_user
10233+ (&i_utmp2, s_tmp->ips + i_num,
10234+ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label *)))
10235+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10236+
10237+ if (copy_from_user
10238+ (*(i_tmp + i_num), i_utmp2,
10239+ sizeof (struct acl_ip_label)))
10240+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10241+
10242+ if ((*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface == NULL)
10243+ continue;
10244+
10245+ len = strnlen_user((*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface, IFNAMSIZ);
10246+ if (!len || len >= IFNAMSIZ)
10247+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
10248+ tmp = acl_alloc(len);
10249+ if (tmp == NULL)
10250+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10251+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, (*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface, len))
10252+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
10253+ (*(i_tmp + i_num))->iface = tmp;
10254+ }
10255+
10256+ s_tmp->ips = i_tmp;
10257+
10258+insert:
10259+ if (!insert_name_entry(s_tmp->filename, s_tmp->inode,
10260+ s_tmp->device))
10261+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
10262+
10263+ return s_tmp;
10264+}
10265+
10266+static int
10267+copy_user_subjs(struct acl_subject_label *userp, struct acl_role_label *role)
10268+{
10269+ struct acl_subject_label s_pre;
10270+ struct acl_subject_label * ret;
10271+ int err;
10272+
10273+ while (userp) {
10274+ if (copy_from_user(&s_pre, userp,
10275+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label)))
10276+ return -EFAULT;
10277+
10278+ /* do not add nested subjects here, add
10279+ while parsing objects
10280+ */
10281+
10282+ if (s_pre.mode & GR_NESTED) {
10283+ userp = s_pre.prev;
10284+ continue;
10285+ }
10286+
10287+ ret = do_copy_user_subj(userp, role);
10288+
10289+ err = PTR_ERR(ret);
10290+ if (IS_ERR(ret))
10291+ return err;
10292+
10293+ insert_acl_subj_label(ret, role);
10294+
10295+ userp = s_pre.prev;
10296+ }
10297+
10298+ return 0;
10299+}
10300+
10301+static int
10302+copy_user_acl(struct gr_arg *arg)
10303+{
10304+ struct acl_role_label *r_tmp = NULL, **r_utmp, *r_utmp2;
10305+ struct sprole_pw *sptmp;
10306+ struct gr_hash_struct *ghash;
10307+ uid_t *domainlist;
10308+ unsigned int r_num;
10309+ unsigned int len;
10310+ char *tmp;
10311+ int err = 0;
10312+ __u16 i;
10313+ __u32 num_subjs;
10314+
10315+ /* we need a default and kernel role */
10316+ if (arg->role_db.num_roles < 2)
10317+ return -EINVAL;
10318+
10319+ /* copy special role authentication info from userspace */
10320+
10321+ num_sprole_pws = arg->num_sprole_pws;
10322+ acl_special_roles = (struct sprole_pw **) acl_alloc(num_sprole_pws * sizeof(struct sprole_pw *));
10323+
10324+ if (!acl_special_roles) {
10325+ err = -ENOMEM;
10326+ goto cleanup;
10327+ }
10328+
10329+ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
10330+ sptmp = (struct sprole_pw *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct sprole_pw));
10331+ if (!sptmp) {
10332+ err = -ENOMEM;
10333+ goto cleanup;
10334+ }
10335+ if (copy_from_user(sptmp, arg->sprole_pws + i,
10336+ sizeof (struct sprole_pw))) {
10337+ err = -EFAULT;
10338+ goto cleanup;
10339+ }
10340+
10341+ len =
10342+ strnlen_user(sptmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10343+
10344+ if (!len || len >= GR_SPROLE_LEN) {
10345+ err = -EINVAL;
10346+ goto cleanup;
10347+ }
10348+
10349+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
10350+ err = -ENOMEM;
10351+ goto cleanup;
10352+ }
10353+
10354+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, sptmp->rolename, len)) {
10355+ err = -EFAULT;
10356+ goto cleanup;
10357+ }
10358+
10359+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
10360+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Copying special role %s\n", tmp);
10361+#endif
10362+ sptmp->rolename = tmp;
10363+ acl_special_roles[i] = sptmp;
10364+ }
10365+
10366+ r_utmp = (struct acl_role_label **) arg->role_db.r_table;
10367+
10368+ for (r_num = 0; r_num < arg->role_db.num_roles; r_num++) {
10369+ r_tmp = acl_alloc(sizeof (struct acl_role_label));
10370+
10371+ if (!r_tmp) {
10372+ err = -ENOMEM;
10373+ goto cleanup;
10374+ }
10375+
10376+ if (copy_from_user(&r_utmp2, r_utmp + r_num,
10377+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label *))) {
10378+ err = -EFAULT;
10379+ goto cleanup;
10380+ }
10381+
10382+ if (copy_from_user(r_tmp, r_utmp2,
10383+ sizeof (struct acl_role_label))) {
10384+ err = -EFAULT;
10385+ goto cleanup;
10386+ }
10387+
10388+ len = strnlen_user(r_tmp->rolename, GR_SPROLE_LEN);
10389+
10390+ if (!len || len >= PATH_MAX) {
10391+ err = -EINVAL;
10392+ goto cleanup;
10393+ }
10394+
10395+ if ((tmp = (char *) acl_alloc(len)) == NULL) {
10396+ err = -ENOMEM;
10397+ goto cleanup;
10398+ }
10399+ if (copy_from_user(tmp, r_tmp->rolename, len)) {
10400+ err = -EFAULT;
10401+ goto cleanup;
10402+ }
10403+ r_tmp->rolename = tmp;
10404+
10405+ if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, "default")
10406+ && (r_tmp->roletype & GR_ROLE_DEFAULT)) {
10407+ default_role = r_tmp;
10408+ } else if (!strcmp(r_tmp->rolename, ":::kernel:::")) {
10409+ kernel_role = r_tmp;
10410+ }
10411+
10412+ if ((ghash = (struct gr_hash_struct *) acl_alloc(sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) == NULL) {
10413+ err = -ENOMEM;
10414+ goto cleanup;
10415+ }
10416+ if (copy_from_user(ghash, r_tmp->hash, sizeof(struct gr_hash_struct))) {
10417+ err = -EFAULT;
10418+ goto cleanup;
10419+ }
10420+
10421+ r_tmp->hash = ghash;
10422+
10423+ num_subjs = count_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first);
10424+
10425+ r_tmp->subj_hash_size = num_subjs;
10426+ r_tmp->subj_hash =
10427+ (struct acl_subject_label **)
10428+ create_table(&(r_tmp->subj_hash_size), sizeof(void *));
10429+
10430+ if (!r_tmp->subj_hash) {
10431+ err = -ENOMEM;
10432+ goto cleanup;
10433+ }
10434+
10435+ err = copy_user_allowedips(r_tmp);
10436+ if (err)
10437+ goto cleanup;
10438+
10439+ /* copy domain info */
10440+ if (r_tmp->domain_children != NULL) {
10441+ domainlist = acl_alloc(r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t));
10442+ if (domainlist == NULL) {
10443+ err = -ENOMEM;
10444+ goto cleanup;
10445+ }
10446+ if (copy_from_user(domainlist, r_tmp->domain_children, r_tmp->domain_child_num * sizeof(uid_t))) {
10447+ err = -EFAULT;
10448+ goto cleanup;
10449+ }
10450+ r_tmp->domain_children = domainlist;
10451+ }
10452+
10453+ err = copy_user_transitions(r_tmp);
10454+ if (err)
10455+ goto cleanup;
10456+
10457+ memset(r_tmp->subj_hash, 0,
10458+ r_tmp->subj_hash_size *
10459+ sizeof (struct acl_subject_label *));
10460+
10461+ err = copy_user_subjs(r_tmp->hash->first, r_tmp);
10462+
10463+ if (err)
10464+ goto cleanup;
10465+
10466+ /* set nested subject list to null */
10467+ r_tmp->hash->first = NULL;
10468+
10469+ insert_acl_role_label(r_tmp);
10470+ }
10471+
10472+ goto return_err;
10473+ cleanup:
10474+ free_variables();
10475+ return_err:
10476+ return err;
10477+
10478+}
10479+
10480+static int
10481+gracl_init(struct gr_arg *args)
10482+{
10483+ int error = 0;
10484+
10485+ memcpy(gr_system_salt, args->salt, GR_SALT_LEN);
10486+ memcpy(gr_system_sum, args->sum, GR_SHA_LEN);
10487+
10488+ if (init_variables(args)) {
10489+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_INITF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
10490+ error = -ENOMEM;
10491+ free_variables();
10492+ goto out;
10493+ }
10494+
10495+ error = copy_user_acl(args);
10496+ free_init_variables();
10497+ if (error) {
10498+ free_variables();
10499+ goto out;
10500+ }
10501+
10502+ if ((error = gr_set_acls(0))) {
10503+ free_variables();
10504+ goto out;
10505+ }
10506+
10507+ gr_status |= GR_READY;
10508+ out:
10509+ return error;
10510+}
10511+
10512+/* derived from glibc fnmatch() 0: match, 1: no match*/
10513+
10514+static int
10515+glob_match(const char *p, const char *n)
10516+{
10517+ char c;
10518+
10519+ while ((c = *p++) != '\0') {
10520+ switch (c) {
10521+ case '?':
10522+ if (*n == '\0')
10523+ return 1;
10524+ else if (*n == '/')
10525+ return 1;
10526+ break;
10527+ case '\\':
10528+ if (*n != c)
10529+ return 1;
10530+ break;
10531+ case '*':
10532+ for (c = *p++; c == '?' || c == '*'; c = *p++) {
10533+ if (*n == '/')
10534+ return 1;
10535+ else if (c == '?') {
10536+ if (*n == '\0')
10537+ return 1;
10538+ else
10539+ ++n;
10540+ }
10541+ }
10542+ if (c == '\0') {
10543+ return 0;
10544+ } else {
10545+ const char *endp;
10546+
10547+ if ((endp = strchr(n, '/')) == NULL)
10548+ endp = n + strlen(n);
10549+
10550+ if (c == '[') {
10551+ for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
10552+ if (!glob_match(p, n))
10553+ return 0;
10554+ } else if (c == '/') {
10555+ while (*n != '\0' && *n != '/')
10556+ ++n;
10557+ if (*n == '/' && !glob_match(p, n + 1))
10558+ return 0;
10559+ } else {
10560+ for (--p; n < endp; ++n)
10561+ if (*n == c && !glob_match(p, n))
10562+ return 0;
10563+ }
10564+
10565+ return 1;
10566+ }
10567+ case '[':
10568+ {
10569+ int not;
10570+ char cold;
10571+
10572+ if (*n == '\0' || *n == '/')
10573+ return 1;
10574+
10575+ not = (*p == '!' || *p == '^');
10576+ if (not)
10577+ ++p;
10578+
10579+ c = *p++;
10580+ for (;;) {
10581+ unsigned char fn = (unsigned char)*n;
10582+
10583+ if (c == '\0')
10584+ return 1;
10585+ else {
10586+ if (c == fn)
10587+ goto matched;
10588+ cold = c;
10589+ c = *p++;
10590+
10591+ if (c == '-' && *p != ']') {
10592+ unsigned char cend = *p++;
10593+
10594+ if (cend == '\0')
10595+ return 1;
10596+
10597+ if (cold <= fn && fn <= cend)
10598+ goto matched;
10599+
10600+ c = *p++;
10601+ }
10602+ }
10603+
10604+ if (c == ']')
10605+ break;
10606+ }
10607+ if (!not)
10608+ return 1;
10609+ break;
10610+ matched:
10611+ while (c != ']') {
10612+ if (c == '\0')
10613+ return 1;
10614+
10615+ c = *p++;
10616+ }
10617+ if (not)
10618+ return 1;
10619+ }
10620+ break;
10621+ default:
10622+ if (c != *n)
10623+ return 1;
10624+ }
10625+
10626+ ++n;
10627+ }
10628+
10629+ if (*n == '\0')
10630+ return 0;
10631+
10632+ if (*n == '/')
10633+ return 0;
10634+
10635+ return 1;
10636+}
10637+
10638+static struct acl_object_label *
10639+chk_glob_label(struct acl_object_label *globbed,
10640+ struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, char **path)
10641+{
10642+ struct acl_object_label *tmp;
10643+
10644+ if (*path == NULL)
10645+ *path = gr_to_filename_nolock(dentry, mnt);
10646+
10647+ tmp = globbed;
10648+
10649+ while (tmp) {
10650+ if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, *path))
10651+ return tmp;
10652+ tmp = tmp->next;
10653+ }
10654+
10655+ return NULL;
10656+}
10657+
10658+static struct acl_object_label *
10659+__full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
10660+ const ino_t curr_ino, const dev_t curr_dev,
10661+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
10662+{
10663+ struct acl_subject_label *tmpsubj;
10664+ struct acl_object_label *retval;
10665+ struct acl_object_label *retval2;
10666+
10667+ tmpsubj = (struct acl_subject_label *) subj;
10668+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10669+ do {
10670+ retval = lookup_acl_obj_label(curr_ino, curr_dev, tmpsubj);
10671+ if (retval) {
10672+ if (retval->globbed) {
10673+ retval2 = chk_glob_label(retval->globbed, (struct dentry *)orig_dentry,
10674+ (struct vfsmount *)orig_mnt, path);
10675+ if (retval2)
10676+ retval = retval2;
10677+ }
10678+ break;
10679+ }
10680+ } while ((tmpsubj = tmpsubj->parent_subject));
10681+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10682+
10683+ return retval;
10684+}
10685+
10686+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10687+full_lookup(const struct dentry *orig_dentry, const struct vfsmount *orig_mnt,
10688+ const struct dentry *curr_dentry,
10689+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char **path)
10690+{
10691+ return __full_lookup(orig_dentry, orig_mnt,
10692+ curr_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10693+ curr_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj, path);
10694+}
10695+
10696+static struct acl_object_label *
10697+__chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10698+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
10699+{
10700+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
10701+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
10702+ struct acl_object_label *retval;
10703+
10704+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
10705+
10706+ for (;;) {
10707+ if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
10708+ break;
10709+
10710+ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
10711+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
10712+ break;
10713+
10714+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10715+ if (retval != NULL)
10716+ goto out;
10717+
10718+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
10719+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
10720+ continue;
10721+ }
10722+
10723+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10724+ if (retval != NULL)
10725+ goto out;
10726+
10727+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
10728+ }
10729+
10730+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, dentry, subj, &path);
10731+
10732+ if (retval == NULL)
10733+ retval = full_lookup(l_dentry, l_mnt, real_root, subj, &path);
10734+out:
10735+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
10736+ return retval;
10737+}
10738+
10739+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10740+chk_obj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10741+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj)
10742+{
10743+ char *path = NULL;
10744+ return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
10745+}
10746+
10747+static __inline__ struct acl_object_label *
10748+chk_obj_create_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10749+ const struct acl_subject_label *subj, char *path)
10750+{
10751+ return __chk_obj_label(l_dentry, l_mnt, subj, path);
10752+}
10753+
10754+static struct acl_subject_label *
10755+chk_subj_label(const struct dentry *l_dentry, const struct vfsmount *l_mnt,
10756+ const struct acl_role_label *role)
10757+{
10758+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *) l_dentry;
10759+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *) l_mnt;
10760+ struct acl_subject_label *retval;
10761+
10762+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
10763+
10764+ for (;;) {
10765+ if (dentry == real_root && mnt == real_root_mnt)
10766+ break;
10767+ if (dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
10768+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
10769+ break;
10770+
10771+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10772+ retval =
10773+ lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10774+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10775+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10776+ if (retval != NULL)
10777+ goto out;
10778+
10779+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
10780+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
10781+ continue;
10782+ }
10783+
10784+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10785+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10786+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10787+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10788+ if (retval != NULL)
10789+ goto out;
10790+
10791+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
10792+ }
10793+
10794+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10795+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
10796+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10797+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10798+
10799+ if (unlikely(retval == NULL)) {
10800+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10801+ retval = lookup_acl_subj_label(real_root->d_inode->i_ino,
10802+ real_root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
10803+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10804+ }
10805+out:
10806+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
10807+
10808+ return retval;
10809+}
10810+
10811+static void
10812+gr_log_learn(const struct task_struct *task, const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode)
10813+{
10814+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
10815+ task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
10816+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
10817+ 1, 1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), (unsigned long) mode, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
10818+
10819+ return;
10820+}
10821+
10822+static void
10823+gr_log_learn_id_change(const struct task_struct *task, const char type, const unsigned int real,
10824+ const unsigned int effective, const unsigned int fs)
10825+{
10826+ security_learn(GR_ID_LEARN_MSG, task->role->rolename, task->role->roletype,
10827+ task->uid, task->gid, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename1(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
10828+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : task->acl->filename, task->acl->filename,
10829+ type, real, effective, fs, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
10830+
10831+ return;
10832+}
10833+
10834+__u32
10835+gr_check_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
10836+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
10837+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
10838+ const struct dentry * old_dentry, const struct vfsmount * old_mnt)
10839+{
10840+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
10841+ __u32 oldmode, newmode;
10842+ __u32 needmode;
10843+
10844+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
10845+ return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10846+
10847+ obj = chk_obj_label(old_dentry, old_mnt, current->acl);
10848+ oldmode = obj->mode;
10849+
10850+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
10851+ oldmode |= (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10852+
10853+ needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS;
10854+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
10855+ needmode |= GR_SETID | GR_AUDIT_SETID;
10856+
10857+ newmode =
10858+ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
10859+ oldmode | needmode);
10860+
10861+ needmode = newmode & (GR_FIND | GR_APPEND | GR_WRITE | GR_EXEC |
10862+ GR_SETID | GR_READ | GR_FIND | GR_DELETE |
10863+ GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
10864+
10865+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID) && !(newmode & GR_SETID))
10866+ goto bad;
10867+
10868+ if ((oldmode & needmode) != needmode)
10869+ goto bad;
10870+
10871+ needmode = oldmode & (GR_NOPTRACE | GR_PTRACERD | GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDITS);
10872+ if ((newmode & needmode) != needmode)
10873+ goto bad;
10874+
10875+ if ((newmode & (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK)) == (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK))
10876+ return newmode;
10877+bad:
10878+ needmode = oldmode;
10879+ if (old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))
10880+ needmode |= GR_SETID;
10881+
10882+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
10883+ gr_log_learn(current, old_dentry, old_mnt, needmode);
10884+ return (GR_CREATE | GR_LINK);
10885+ } else if (newmode & GR_SUPPRESS)
10886+ return GR_SUPPRESS;
10887+ else
10888+ return 0;
10889+}
10890+
10891+__u32
10892+gr_search_file(const struct dentry * dentry, const __u32 mode,
10893+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
10894+{
10895+ __u32 retval = mode;
10896+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
10897+ struct acl_object_label *currobj;
10898+
10899+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
10900+ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
10901+
10902+ curracl = current->acl;
10903+
10904+ currobj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, curracl);
10905+ retval = currobj->mode & mode;
10906+
10907+ if (unlikely
10908+ ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) && !(mode & GR_NOPTRACE)
10909+ && (retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))))) {
10910+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
10911+
10912+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
10913+
10914+ retval = new_mode;
10915+
10916+ if (new_mode & GR_EXEC && curracl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN)
10917+ new_mode |= GR_INHERIT;
10918+
10919+ if (!(mode & GR_NOLEARN))
10920+ gr_log_learn(current, dentry, mnt, new_mode);
10921+ }
10922+
10923+ return retval;
10924+}
10925+
10926+__u32
10927+gr_check_create(const struct dentry * new_dentry, const struct dentry * parent,
10928+ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const __u32 mode)
10929+{
10930+ struct name_entry *match;
10931+ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
10932+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
10933+ char *path;
10934+ __u32 retval;
10935+
10936+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
10937+ return (mode & ~GR_AUDITS);
10938+
10939+ preempt_disable();
10940+ path = gr_to_filename_rbac(new_dentry, mnt);
10941+ match = lookup_name_entry(path);
10942+
10943+ if (!match)
10944+ goto check_parent;
10945+
10946+ curracl = current->acl;
10947+
10948+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
10949+ matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label_create(match->inode, match->device, curracl);
10950+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
10951+
10952+ if (matchpo) {
10953+ if ((matchpo->mode & mode) !=
10954+ (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS))
10955+ && curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
10956+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
10957+
10958+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
10959+
10960+ gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
10961+
10962+ preempt_enable();
10963+ return new_mode;
10964+ }
10965+ preempt_enable();
10966+ return (matchpo->mode & mode);
10967+ }
10968+
10969+ check_parent:
10970+ curracl = current->acl;
10971+
10972+ matchpo = chk_obj_create_label(parent, mnt, curracl, path);
10973+ retval = matchpo->mode & mode;
10974+
10975+ if ((retval != (mode & ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS)))
10976+ && (curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) {
10977+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
10978+
10979+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
10980+
10981+ gr_log_learn(current, new_dentry, mnt, new_mode);
10982+ preempt_enable();
10983+ return new_mode;
10984+ }
10985+
10986+ preempt_enable();
10987+ return retval;
10988+}
10989+
10990+int
10991+gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *task)
10992+{
10993+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
10994+ return 0;
10995+
10996+ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCFIND) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_VIEW))
10997+ return 1;
10998+
10999+ return 0;
11000+}
11001+
11002+int
11003+gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
11004+{
11005+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task))
11006+ return 0;
11007+
11008+ if ((task->acl->mode & GR_PROTECTED) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KILL) &&
11009+ task->acl != current->acl)
11010+ return 1;
11011+
11012+ return 0;
11013+}
11014+
11015+void
11016+gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
11017+{
11018+ tsk->signal->used_accept = 0;
11019+ tsk->acl_sp_role = 0;
11020+ tsk->acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
11021+ tsk->acl = current->acl;
11022+ tsk->role = current->role;
11023+ tsk->signal->curr_ip = current->signal->curr_ip;
11024+ if (current->exec_file)
11025+ get_file(current->exec_file);
11026+ tsk->exec_file = current->exec_file;
11027+ tsk->is_writable = current->is_writable;
11028+ if (unlikely(current->signal->used_accept))
11029+ current->signal->curr_ip = 0;
11030+
11031+ return;
11032+}
11033+
11034+static void
11035+gr_set_proc_res(struct task_struct *task)
11036+{
11037+ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
11038+ unsigned short i;
11039+
11040+ proc = task->acl;
11041+
11042+ if (proc->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11043+ return;
11044+
11045+ for (i = 0; i < (GR_NLIMITS - 1); i++) {
11046+ if (!(proc->resmask & (1 << i)))
11047+ continue;
11048+
11049+ task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_cur = proc->res[i].rlim_cur;
11050+ task->signal->rlim[i].rlim_max = proc->res[i].rlim_max;
11051+ }
11052+
11053+ return;
11054+}
11055+
11056+int
11057+gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
11058+{
11059+ unsigned int i;
11060+ __u16 num;
11061+ uid_t *uidlist;
11062+ int curuid;
11063+ int realok = 0;
11064+ int effectiveok = 0;
11065+ int fsok = 0;
11066+
11067+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11068+ return 0;
11069+
11070+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11071+ gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'u', real, effective, fs);
11072+
11073+ num = current->acl->user_trans_num;
11074+ uidlist = current->acl->user_transitions;
11075+
11076+ if (uidlist == NULL)
11077+ return 0;
11078+
11079+ if (real == -1)
11080+ realok = 1;
11081+ if (effective == -1)
11082+ effectiveok = 1;
11083+ if (fs == -1)
11084+ fsok = 1;
11085+
11086+ if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
11087+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11088+ curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
11089+ if (real == curuid)
11090+ realok = 1;
11091+ if (effective == curuid)
11092+ effectiveok = 1;
11093+ if (fs == curuid)
11094+ fsok = 1;
11095+ }
11096+ } else if (current->acl->user_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
11097+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11098+ curuid = (int)uidlist[i];
11099+ if (real == curuid)
11100+ break;
11101+ if (effective == curuid)
11102+ break;
11103+ if (fs == curuid)
11104+ break;
11105+ }
11106+ /* not in deny list */
11107+ if (i == num) {
11108+ realok = 1;
11109+ effectiveok = 1;
11110+ fsok = 1;
11111+ }
11112+ }
11113+
11114+ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
11115+ return 0;
11116+ else {
11117+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
11118+ return 1;
11119+ }
11120+}
11121+
11122+int
11123+gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
11124+{
11125+ unsigned int i;
11126+ __u16 num;
11127+ gid_t *gidlist;
11128+ int curgid;
11129+ int realok = 0;
11130+ int effectiveok = 0;
11131+ int fsok = 0;
11132+
11133+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11134+ return 0;
11135+
11136+ if (current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
11137+ gr_log_learn_id_change(current, 'g', real, effective, fs);
11138+
11139+ num = current->acl->group_trans_num;
11140+ gidlist = current->acl->group_transitions;
11141+
11142+ if (gidlist == NULL)
11143+ return 0;
11144+
11145+ if (real == -1)
11146+ realok = 1;
11147+ if (effective == -1)
11148+ effectiveok = 1;
11149+ if (fs == -1)
11150+ fsok = 1;
11151+
11152+ if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_ALLOW) {
11153+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11154+ curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
11155+ if (real == curgid)
11156+ realok = 1;
11157+ if (effective == curgid)
11158+ effectiveok = 1;
11159+ if (fs == curgid)
11160+ fsok = 1;
11161+ }
11162+ } else if (current->acl->group_trans_type & GR_ID_DENY) {
11163+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
11164+ curgid = (int)gidlist[i];
11165+ if (real == curgid)
11166+ break;
11167+ if (effective == curgid)
11168+ break;
11169+ if (fs == curgid)
11170+ break;
11171+ }
11172+ /* not in deny list */
11173+ if (i == num) {
11174+ realok = 1;
11175+ effectiveok = 1;
11176+ fsok = 1;
11177+ }
11178+ }
11179+
11180+ if (realok && effectiveok && fsok)
11181+ return 0;
11182+ else {
11183+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG, realok ? (effectiveok ? (fsok ? 0 : fs) : effective) : real);
11184+ return 1;
11185+ }
11186+}
11187+
11188+void
11189+gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid, const uid_t gid)
11190+{
11191+ struct acl_role_label *role = task->role;
11192+ struct acl_subject_label *subj = NULL;
11193+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11194+ struct file *filp;
11195+
11196+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11197+ return;
11198+
11199+ filp = task->exec_file;
11200+
11201+ /* kernel process, we'll give them the kernel role */
11202+ if (unlikely(!filp)) {
11203+ task->role = kernel_role;
11204+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
11205+ return;
11206+ } else if (!task->role || !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
11207+ role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, uid, gid);
11208+
11209+ /* perform subject lookup in possibly new role
11210+ we can use this result below in the case where role == task->role
11211+ */
11212+ subj = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, role);
11213+
11214+ /* if we changed uid/gid, but result in the same role
11215+ and are using inheritance, don't lose the inherited subject
11216+ if current subject is other than what normal lookup
11217+ would result in, we arrived via inheritance, don't
11218+ lose subject
11219+ */
11220+ if (role != task->role || (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
11221+ (subj == task->acl)))
11222+ task->acl = subj;
11223+
11224+ task->role = role;
11225+
11226+ task->is_writable = 0;
11227+
11228+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11229+ by the default ACL */
11230+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
11231+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11232+ task->is_writable = 1;
11233+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
11234+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11235+ task->is_writable = 1;
11236+
11237+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11238+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set role label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
11239+#endif
11240+
11241+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
11242+
11243+ return;
11244+}
11245+
11246+int
11247+gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11248+{
11249+ struct task_struct *task = current;
11250+ struct acl_subject_label *newacl;
11251+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11252+ __u32 retmode;
11253+
11254+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11255+ return 0;
11256+
11257+ newacl = chk_subj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role);
11258+
11259+ task_lock(task);
11260+ if (((task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(task->acl->mode &
11261+ GR_POVERRIDE) && (task->acl != newacl) &&
11262+ !(task->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
11263+ !gr_search_file(dentry, GR_PTRACERD, mnt) &&
11264+ !(task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))) ||
11265+ (atomic_read(&task->fs->count) > 1 ||
11266+ atomic_read(&task->files->count) > 1 ||
11267+ atomic_read(&task->sighand->count) > 1)) {
11268+ task_unlock(task);
11269+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
11270+ return -EACCES;
11271+ }
11272+ task_unlock(task);
11273+
11274+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
11275+ retmode = obj->mode & (GR_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT);
11276+
11277+ if (!(task->acl->mode & GR_INHERITLEARN) &&
11278+ ((newacl->mode & GR_LEARN) || !(retmode & GR_INHERIT))) {
11279+ if (obj->nested)
11280+ task->acl = obj->nested;
11281+ else
11282+ task->acl = newacl;
11283+ } else if (retmode & GR_INHERIT && retmode & GR_AUDIT_INHERIT)
11284+ gr_log_str_fs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG, task->acl->filename, dentry, mnt);
11285+
11286+ task->is_writable = 0;
11287+
11288+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11289+ by the default ACL */
11290+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, default_role->root_label);
11291+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11292+ task->is_writable = 1;
11293+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->role->root_label);
11294+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11295+ task->is_writable = 1;
11296+
11297+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
11298+
11299+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11300+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Set subject label for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
11301+#endif
11302+ return 0;
11303+}
11304+
11305+static void
11306+do_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
11307+{
11308+ struct acl_object_label *matchpo;
11309+ struct acl_subject_label *matchps;
11310+ struct acl_subject_label *subj;
11311+ struct acl_role_label *role;
11312+ unsigned int i, x;
11313+
11314+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role, i)
11315+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role, subj, x)
11316+ if ((matchpo = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dev, subj)) != NULL)
11317+ matchpo->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11318+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,x)
11319+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role, subj)
11320+ if (subj->inode == ino && subj->device == dev)
11321+ subj->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11322+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj)
11323+ if ((matchps = lookup_acl_subj_label(ino, dev, role)) != NULL)
11324+ matchps->mode |= GR_DELETED;
11325+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,i)
11326+
11327+ return;
11328+}
11329+
11330+void
11331+gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
11332+{
11333+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11334+ return;
11335+
11336+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11337+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)lookup_inodev_entry(ino, dev)))
11338+ do_handle_delete(ino, dev);
11339+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11340+
11341+ return;
11342+}
11343+
11344+static void
11345+update_acl_obj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11346+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
11347+ struct acl_subject_label *subj)
11348+{
11349+ unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, subj->obj_hash_size);
11350+ struct acl_object_label *match;
11351+
11352+ match = subj->obj_hash[index];
11353+
11354+ while (match && (match->inode != oldinode ||
11355+ match->device != olddevice ||
11356+ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
11357+ match = match->next;
11358+
11359+ if (match && (match->inode == oldinode)
11360+ && (match->device == olddevice)
11361+ && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
11362+ if (match->prev == NULL) {
11363+ subj->obj_hash[index] = match->next;
11364+ if (match->next != NULL)
11365+ match->next->prev = NULL;
11366+ } else {
11367+ match->prev->next = match->next;
11368+ if (match->next != NULL)
11369+ match->next->prev = match->prev;
11370+ }
11371+ match->prev = NULL;
11372+ match->next = NULL;
11373+ match->inode = newinode;
11374+ match->device = newdevice;
11375+ match->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
11376+
11377+ insert_acl_obj_label(match, subj);
11378+ }
11379+
11380+ return;
11381+}
11382+
11383+static void
11384+update_acl_subj_label(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11385+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice,
11386+ struct acl_role_label *role)
11387+{
11388+ unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, role->subj_hash_size);
11389+ struct acl_subject_label *match;
11390+
11391+ match = role->subj_hash[index];
11392+
11393+ while (match && (match->inode != oldinode ||
11394+ match->device != olddevice ||
11395+ !(match->mode & GR_DELETED)))
11396+ match = match->next;
11397+
11398+ if (match && (match->inode == oldinode)
11399+ && (match->device == olddevice)
11400+ && (match->mode & GR_DELETED)) {
11401+ if (match->prev == NULL) {
11402+ role->subj_hash[index] = match->next;
11403+ if (match->next != NULL)
11404+ match->next->prev = NULL;
11405+ } else {
11406+ match->prev->next = match->next;
11407+ if (match->next != NULL)
11408+ match->next->prev = match->prev;
11409+ }
11410+ match->prev = NULL;
11411+ match->next = NULL;
11412+ match->inode = newinode;
11413+ match->device = newdevice;
11414+ match->mode &= ~GR_DELETED;
11415+
11416+ insert_acl_subj_label(match, role);
11417+ }
11418+
11419+ return;
11420+}
11421+
11422+static void
11423+update_inodev_entry(const ino_t oldinode, const dev_t olddevice,
11424+ const ino_t newinode, const dev_t newdevice)
11425+{
11426+ unsigned int index = fhash(oldinode, olddevice, inodev_set.i_size);
11427+ struct inodev_entry *match;
11428+
11429+ match = inodev_set.i_hash[index];
11430+
11431+ while (match && (match->nentry->inode != oldinode ||
11432+ match->nentry->device != olddevice))
11433+ match = match->next;
11434+
11435+ if (match && (match->nentry->inode == oldinode)
11436+ && (match->nentry->device == olddevice)) {
11437+ if (match->prev == NULL) {
11438+ inodev_set.i_hash[index] = match->next;
11439+ if (match->next != NULL)
11440+ match->next->prev = NULL;
11441+ } else {
11442+ match->prev->next = match->next;
11443+ if (match->next != NULL)
11444+ match->next->prev = match->prev;
11445+ }
11446+ match->prev = NULL;
11447+ match->next = NULL;
11448+ match->nentry->inode = newinode;
11449+ match->nentry->device = newdevice;
11450+
11451+ insert_inodev_entry(match);
11452+ }
11453+
11454+ return;
11455+}
11456+
11457+static void
11458+do_handle_create(const struct name_entry *matchn, const struct dentry *dentry,
11459+ const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11460+{
11461+ struct acl_subject_label *subj;
11462+ struct acl_role_label *role;
11463+ unsigned int i, x;
11464+
11465+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role, i)
11466+ update_acl_subj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11467+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11468+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, role);
11469+
11470+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role, subj)
11471+ if ((subj->inode == dentry->d_inode->i_ino) &&
11472+ (subj->device == dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev)) {
11473+ subj->inode = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
11474+ subj->device = dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
11475+ }
11476+ FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj)
11477+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role, subj, x)
11478+ update_acl_obj_label(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11479+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11480+ dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj);
11481+ FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,x)
11482+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,i)
11483+
11484+ update_inodev_entry(matchn->inode, matchn->device,
11485+ dentry->d_inode->i_ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11486+
11487+ return;
11488+}
11489+
11490+void
11491+gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
11492+{
11493+ struct name_entry *matchn;
11494+
11495+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11496+ return;
11497+
11498+ preempt_disable();
11499+ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename_rbac(dentry, mnt));
11500+
11501+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn)) {
11502+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11503+ do_handle_create(matchn, dentry, mnt);
11504+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11505+ }
11506+ preempt_enable();
11507+
11508+ return;
11509+}
11510+
11511+void
11512+gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
11513+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
11514+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
11515+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
11516+{
11517+ struct name_entry *matchn;
11518+
11519+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
11520+ return;
11521+
11522+ preempt_disable();
11523+ matchn = lookup_name_entry(gr_to_filename_rbac(new_dentry, mnt));
11524+
11525+ /* we wouldn't have to check d_inode if it weren't for
11526+ NFS silly-renaming
11527+ */
11528+
11529+ write_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
11530+ if (unlikely(replace && new_dentry->d_inode)) {
11531+ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11532+ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
11533+ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
11534+ do_handle_delete(new_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11535+ new_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11536+ }
11537+
11538+ if (unlikely(lookup_inodev_entry(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11539+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) &&
11540+ (old_dentry->d_inode->i_nlink <= 1)))
11541+ do_handle_delete(old_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
11542+ old_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev);
11543+
11544+ if (unlikely((unsigned long)matchn))
11545+ do_handle_create(matchn, old_dentry, mnt);
11546+
11547+ write_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
11548+ preempt_enable();
11549+
11550+ return;
11551+}
11552+
11553+static int
11554+lookup_special_role_auth(__u16 mode, const char *rolename, unsigned char **salt,
11555+ unsigned char **sum)
11556+{
11557+ struct acl_role_label *r;
11558+ struct role_allowed_ip *ipp;
11559+ struct role_transition *trans;
11560+ unsigned int i;
11561+ int found = 0;
11562+
11563+ /* check transition table */
11564+
11565+ for (trans = current->role->transitions; trans; trans = trans->next) {
11566+ if (!strcmp(rolename, trans->rolename)) {
11567+ found = 1;
11568+ break;
11569+ }
11570+ }
11571+
11572+ if (!found)
11573+ return 0;
11574+
11575+ /* handle special roles that do not require authentication
11576+ and check ip */
11577+
11578+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
11579+ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
11580+ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL)) {
11581+ found = 0;
11582+ if (r->allowed_ips != NULL) {
11583+ for (ipp = r->allowed_ips; ipp; ipp = ipp->next) {
11584+ if ((ntohl(current->signal->curr_ip) & ipp->netmask) ==
11585+ (ntohl(ipp->addr) & ipp->netmask))
11586+ found = 1;
11587+ }
11588+ } else
11589+ found = 2;
11590+ if (!found)
11591+ return 0;
11592+
11593+ if (((mode == SPROLE) && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_NOPW)) ||
11594+ ((mode == SPROLEPAM) && (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_PAM))) {
11595+ *salt = NULL;
11596+ *sum = NULL;
11597+ return 1;
11598+ }
11599+ }
11600+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
11601+
11602+ for (i = 0; i < num_sprole_pws; i++) {
11603+ if (!strcmp(rolename, acl_special_roles[i]->rolename)) {
11604+ *salt = acl_special_roles[i]->salt;
11605+ *sum = acl_special_roles[i]->sum;
11606+ return 1;
11607+ }
11608+ }
11609+
11610+ return 0;
11611+}
11612+
11613+static void
11614+assign_special_role(char *rolename)
11615+{
11616+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11617+ struct acl_role_label *r;
11618+ struct acl_role_label *assigned = NULL;
11619+ struct task_struct *tsk;
11620+ struct file *filp;
11621+ unsigned int i;
11622+
11623+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(r, i)
11624+ if (!strcmp(rolename, r->rolename) &&
11625+ (r->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL))
11626+ assigned = r;
11627+ FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(r,i)
11628+
11629+ if (!assigned)
11630+ return;
11631+
11632+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11633+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11634+
11635+ tsk = current->parent;
11636+ if (tsk == NULL)
11637+ goto out_unlock;
11638+
11639+ filp = tsk->exec_file;
11640+ if (filp == NULL)
11641+ goto out_unlock;
11642+
11643+ tsk->is_writable = 0;
11644+
11645+ tsk->acl_sp_role = 1;
11646+ tsk->acl_role_id = ++acl_sp_role_value;
11647+ tsk->role = assigned;
11648+ tsk->acl = chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role);
11649+
11650+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
11651+ by the default ACL */
11652+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
11653+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11654+ tsk->is_writable = 1;
11655+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, tsk->role->root_label);
11656+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
11657+ tsk->is_writable = 1;
11658+
11659+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
11660+ printk(KERN_ALERT "Assigning special role:%s subject:%s to process (%s:%d)\n", tsk->role->rolename, tsk->acl->filename, tsk->comm, tsk->pid);
11661+#endif
11662+
11663+out_unlock:
11664+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11665+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11666+ return;
11667+}
11668+
11669+int gr_check_secure_terminal(struct task_struct *task)
11670+{
11671+ struct task_struct *p, *p2, *p3;
11672+ struct files_struct *files;
11673+ struct fdtable *fdt;
11674+ struct file *our_file = NULL, *file;
11675+ int i;
11676+
11677+ if (task->signal->tty == NULL)
11678+ return 1;
11679+
11680+ files = get_files_struct(task);
11681+ if (files != NULL) {
11682+ rcu_read_lock();
11683+ fdt = files_fdtable(files);
11684+ for (i=0; i < fdt->max_fds; i++) {
11685+ file = fcheck_files(files, i);
11686+ if (file && (our_file == NULL) && (file->private_data == task->signal->tty)) {
11687+ get_file(file);
11688+ our_file = file;
11689+ }
11690+ }
11691+ rcu_read_unlock();
11692+ put_files_struct(files);
11693+ }
11694+
11695+ if (our_file == NULL)
11696+ return 1;
11697+
11698+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11699+ do_each_thread(p2, p) {
11700+ files = get_files_struct(p);
11701+ if (files == NULL ||
11702+ (p->signal && p->signal->tty == task->signal->tty)) {
11703+ if (files != NULL)
11704+ put_files_struct(files);
11705+ continue;
11706+ }
11707+ rcu_read_lock();
11708+ fdt = files_fdtable(files);
11709+ for (i=0; i < fdt->max_fds; i++) {
11710+ file = fcheck_files(files, i);
11711+ if (file && S_ISCHR(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
11712+ file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev == our_file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_rdev) {
11713+ p3 = task;
11714+ while (p3->pid > 0) {
11715+ if (p3 == p)
11716+ break;
11717+ p3 = p3->parent;
11718+ }
11719+ if (p3 == p)
11720+ break;
11721+ gr_log_ttysniff(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG, p);
11722+ gr_handle_alertkill(p);
11723+ rcu_read_unlock();
11724+ put_files_struct(files);
11725+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11726+ fput(our_file);
11727+ return 0;
11728+ }
11729+ }
11730+ rcu_read_unlock();
11731+ put_files_struct(files);
11732+ } while_each_thread(p2, p);
11733+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11734+
11735+ fput(our_file);
11736+ return 1;
11737+}
11738+
11739+ssize_t
11740+write_grsec_handler(struct file *file, const char * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
11741+{
11742+ struct gr_arg_wrapper uwrap;
11743+ unsigned char *sprole_salt;
11744+ unsigned char *sprole_sum;
11745+ int error = sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper);
11746+ int error2 = 0;
11747+
11748+ down(&gr_dev_sem);
11749+
11750+ if ((gr_status & GR_READY) && !(current->acl->mode & GR_KERNELAUTH)) {
11751+ error = -EPERM;
11752+ goto out;
11753+ }
11754+
11755+ if (count != sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper)) {
11756+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEV_ACL_MSG, (int)count, (int)sizeof(struct gr_arg_wrapper));
11757+ error = -EINVAL;
11758+ goto out;
11759+ }
11760+
11761+
11762+ if (gr_auth_expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), gr_auth_expires)) {
11763+ gr_auth_expires = 0;
11764+ gr_auth_attempts = 0;
11765+ }
11766+
11767+ if (copy_from_user(&uwrap, buf, sizeof (struct gr_arg_wrapper))) {
11768+ error = -EFAULT;
11769+ goto out;
11770+ }
11771+
11772+ if ((uwrap.version != GRSECURITY_VERSION) || (uwrap.size != sizeof(struct gr_arg))) {
11773+ error = -EINVAL;
11774+ goto out;
11775+ }
11776+
11777+ if (copy_from_user(gr_usermode, uwrap.arg, sizeof (struct gr_arg))) {
11778+ error = -EFAULT;
11779+ goto out;
11780+ }
11781+
11782+ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != SPROLEPAM &&
11783+ gr_auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
11784+ time_after(gr_auth_expires, get_seconds())) {
11785+ error = -EBUSY;
11786+ goto out;
11787+ }
11788+
11789+ /* if non-root trying to do anything other than use a special role,
11790+ do not attempt authentication, do not count towards authentication
11791+ locking
11792+ */
11793+
11794+ if (gr_usermode->mode != SPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != STATUS &&
11795+ gr_usermode->mode != UNSPROLE && gr_usermode->mode != SPROLEPAM &&
11796+ current->uid) {
11797+ error = -EPERM;
11798+ goto out;
11799+ }
11800+
11801+ /* ensure pw and special role name are null terminated */
11802+
11803+ gr_usermode->pw[GR_PW_LEN - 1] = '\0';
11804+ gr_usermode->sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN - 1] = '\0';
11805+
11806+ /* Okay.
11807+ * We have our enough of the argument structure..(we have yet
11808+ * to copy_from_user the tables themselves) . Copy the tables
11809+ * only if we need them, i.e. for loading operations. */
11810+
11811+ switch (gr_usermode->mode) {
11812+ case STATUS:
11813+ if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
11814+ error = 1;
11815+ if (!gr_check_secure_terminal(current))
11816+ error = 3;
11817+ } else
11818+ error = 2;
11819+ goto out;
11820+ case SHUTDOWN:
11821+ if ((gr_status & GR_READY)
11822+ && !(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11823+ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
11824+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG);
11825+ free_variables();
11826+ memset(gr_usermode, 0, sizeof (struct gr_arg));
11827+ memset(gr_system_salt, 0, GR_SALT_LEN);
11828+ memset(gr_system_sum, 0, GR_SHA_LEN);
11829+ } else if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
11830+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG);
11831+ error = -EPERM;
11832+ } else {
11833+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG);
11834+ error = -EAGAIN;
11835+ }
11836+ break;
11837+ case ENABLE:
11838+ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY) && !(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode)))
11839+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11840+ else {
11841+ if (gr_status & GR_READY)
11842+ error = -EAGAIN;
11843+ else
11844+ error = error2;
11845+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11846+ }
11847+ break;
11848+ case RELOAD:
11849+ if (!(gr_status & GR_READY)) {
11850+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11851+ error = -EAGAIN;
11852+ } else if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11853+ lock_kernel();
11854+ gr_status &= ~GR_READY;
11855+ free_variables();
11856+ if (!(error2 = gracl_init(gr_usermode))) {
11857+ unlock_kernel();
11858+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11859+ } else {
11860+ unlock_kernel();
11861+ error = error2;
11862+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11863+ }
11864+ } else {
11865+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG, GR_VERSION);
11866+ error = -EPERM;
11867+ }
11868+ break;
11869+ case SEGVMOD:
11870+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
11871+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG);
11872+ error = -EAGAIN;
11873+ break;
11874+ }
11875+
11876+ if (!(chkpw(gr_usermode, gr_system_salt, gr_system_sum))) {
11877+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG);
11878+ if (gr_usermode->segv_device && gr_usermode->segv_inode) {
11879+ struct acl_subject_label *segvacl;
11880+ segvacl =
11881+ lookup_acl_subj_label(gr_usermode->segv_inode,
11882+ gr_usermode->segv_device,
11883+ current->role);
11884+ if (segvacl) {
11885+ segvacl->crashes = 0;
11886+ segvacl->expires = 0;
11887+ }
11888+ } else if (gr_find_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid) >= 0) {
11889+ gr_remove_uid(gr_usermode->segv_uid);
11890+ }
11891+ } else {
11892+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG);
11893+ error = -EPERM;
11894+ }
11895+ break;
11896+ case SPROLE:
11897+ case SPROLEPAM:
11898+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
11899+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
11900+ error = -EAGAIN;
11901+ break;
11902+ }
11903+
11904+ if (current->role->expires && time_after_eq(get_seconds(), current->role->expires)) {
11905+ current->role->expires = 0;
11906+ current->role->auth_attempts = 0;
11907+ }
11908+
11909+ if (current->role->auth_attempts >= CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES &&
11910+ time_after(current->role->expires, get_seconds())) {
11911+ error = -EBUSY;
11912+ goto out;
11913+ }
11914+
11915+ if (lookup_special_role_auth
11916+ (gr_usermode->mode, gr_usermode->sp_role, &sprole_salt, &sprole_sum)
11917+ && ((!sprole_salt && !sprole_sum)
11918+ || !(chkpw(gr_usermode, sprole_salt, sprole_sum)))) {
11919+ char *p = "";
11920+ assign_special_role(gr_usermode->sp_role);
11921+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11922+ if (current->parent)
11923+ p = current->parent->role->rolename;
11924+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11925+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG,
11926+ p, acl_sp_role_value);
11927+ } else {
11928+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->sp_role);
11929+ error = -EPERM;
11930+ if(!(current->role->auth_attempts++))
11931+ current->role->expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
11932+
11933+ goto out;
11934+ }
11935+ break;
11936+ case UNSPROLE:
11937+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY))) {
11938+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG);
11939+ error = -EAGAIN;
11940+ break;
11941+ }
11942+
11943+ if (current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_SPECIAL) {
11944+ char *p = "";
11945+ int i = 0;
11946+
11947+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11948+ if (current->parent) {
11949+ p = current->parent->role->rolename;
11950+ i = current->parent->acl_role_id;
11951+ }
11952+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
11953+
11954+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG, p, i);
11955+ gr_set_acls(1);
11956+ } else {
11957+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG, current->role->rolename);
11958+ error = -EPERM;
11959+ goto out;
11960+ }
11961+ break;
11962+ default:
11963+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG, gr_usermode->mode);
11964+ error = -EINVAL;
11965+ break;
11966+ }
11967+
11968+ if (error != -EPERM)
11969+ goto out;
11970+
11971+ if(!(gr_auth_attempts++))
11972+ gr_auth_expires = get_seconds() + CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT;
11973+
11974+ out:
11975+ up(&gr_dev_sem);
11976+ return error;
11977+}
11978+
11979+int
11980+gr_set_acls(const int type)
11981+{
11982+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
11983+ struct task_struct *task, *task2;
11984+ struct file *filp;
11985+ struct acl_role_label *role = current->role;
11986+ __u16 acl_role_id = current->acl_role_id;
11987+
11988+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
11989+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
11990+ do_each_thread(task2, task) {
11991+ /* check to see if we're called from the exit handler,
11992+ if so, only replace ACLs that have inherited the admin
11993+ ACL */
11994+
11995+ if (type && (task->role != role ||
11996+ task->acl_role_id != acl_role_id))
11997+ continue;
11998+
11999+ task->acl_role_id = 0;
12000+ task->acl_sp_role = 0;
12001+
12002+ if ((filp = task->exec_file)) {
12003+ task->role = lookup_acl_role_label(task, task->uid, task->gid);
12004+
12005+ task->acl =
12006+ chk_subj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
12007+ task->role);
12008+ if (task->acl) {
12009+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
12010+ curr = task->acl;
12011+
12012+ task->is_writable = 0;
12013+ /* ignore additional mmap checks for processes that are writable
12014+ by the default ACL */
12015+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
12016+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
12017+ task->is_writable = 1;
12018+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, task->role->root_label);
12019+ if (unlikely(obj->mode & GR_WRITE))
12020+ task->is_writable = 1;
12021+
12022+ gr_set_proc_res(task);
12023+
12024+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_DEBUG
12025+ printk(KERN_ALERT "gr_set_acls for (%s:%d): role:%s, subject:%s\n", task->comm, task->pid, task->role->rolename, task->acl->filename);
12026+#endif
12027+ } else {
12028+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12029+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12030+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DEFACL_MSG, task->comm, task->pid);
12031+ return 1;
12032+ }
12033+ } else {
12034+ // it's a kernel process
12035+ task->role = kernel_role;
12036+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
12037+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
12038+ task->acl->mode &= ~GR_PROCFIND;
12039+#endif
12040+ }
12041+ } while_each_thread(task2, task);
12042+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12043+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12044+ return 0;
12045+}
12046+
12047+void
12048+gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
12049+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
12050+{
12051+ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
12052+
12053+ if (unlikely((gr_status & GR_READY) &&
12054+ task->acl && (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))))
12055+ goto skip_reslog;
12056+
12057+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
12058+ gr_log_resource(task, res, wanted, gt);
12059+#endif
12060+ skip_reslog:
12061+
12062+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !wanted))
12063+ return;
12064+
12065+ acl = task->acl;
12066+
12067+ if (likely(!acl || !(acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) ||
12068+ !(acl->resmask & (1 << (unsigned short) res))))
12069+ return;
12070+
12071+ if (wanted >= acl->res[res].rlim_cur) {
12072+ unsigned long res_add;
12073+
12074+ res_add = wanted;
12075+ switch (res) {
12076+ case RLIMIT_CPU:
12077+ res_add += GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP;
12078+ break;
12079+ case RLIMIT_FSIZE:
12080+ res_add += GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP;
12081+ break;
12082+ case RLIMIT_DATA:
12083+ res_add += GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP;
12084+ break;
12085+ case RLIMIT_STACK:
12086+ res_add += GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP;
12087+ break;
12088+ case RLIMIT_CORE:
12089+ res_add += GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP;
12090+ break;
12091+ case RLIMIT_RSS:
12092+ res_add += GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP;
12093+ break;
12094+ case RLIMIT_NPROC:
12095+ res_add += GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP;
12096+ break;
12097+ case RLIMIT_NOFILE:
12098+ res_add += GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP;
12099+ break;
12100+ case RLIMIT_MEMLOCK:
12101+ res_add += GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP;
12102+ break;
12103+ case RLIMIT_AS:
12104+ res_add += GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP;
12105+ break;
12106+ case RLIMIT_LOCKS:
12107+ res_add += GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP;
12108+ break;
12109+ }
12110+
12111+ acl->res[res].rlim_cur = res_add;
12112+
12113+ if (wanted > acl->res[res].rlim_max)
12114+ acl->res[res].rlim_max = res_add;
12115+
12116+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
12117+ task->role->roletype, acl->filename,
12118+ acl->res[res].rlim_cur, acl->res[res].rlim_max,
12119+ "", (unsigned long) res);
12120+ }
12121+
12122+ return;
12123+}
12124+
12125+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
12126+void
12127+pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
12128+{
12129+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12130+ struct acl_subject_label *proc;
12131+ unsigned long flags;
12132+
12133+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12134+ return;
12135+
12136+ flags = pax_get_flags(task);
12137+
12138+ proc = task->acl;
12139+
12140+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_PAGEEXEC)
12141+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
12142+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_SEGMEXEC)
12143+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
12144+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_RANDMMAP)
12145+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
12146+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_EMUTRAMP)
12147+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
12148+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_DISABLE_MPROTECT)
12149+ flags &= ~MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
12150+
12151+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_PAGEEXEC)
12152+ flags |= MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC;
12153+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_SEGMEXEC)
12154+ flags |= MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC;
12155+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_RANDMMAP)
12156+ flags |= MF_PAX_RANDMMAP;
12157+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_EMUTRAMP)
12158+ flags |= MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP;
12159+ if (proc->pax_flags & GR_PAX_ENABLE_MPROTECT)
12160+ flags |= MF_PAX_MPROTECT;
12161+
12162+ pax_set_flags(task, flags);
12163+
12164+ return;
12165+}
12166+#endif
12167+
12168+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
12169+extern struct proc_dir_entry *proc_sys_root;
12170+
12171+/* the following function is called under the BKL */
12172+
12173+__u32
12174+gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
12175+ const void *newval)
12176+{
12177+ struct proc_dir_entry *tmp;
12178+ struct nameidata nd;
12179+ const char *proc_sys = "/proc/sys";
12180+ char *path;
12181+ struct acl_object_label *obj;
12182+ unsigned short len = 0, pos = 0, depth = 0, i;
12183+ __u32 err = 0;
12184+ __u32 mode = 0;
12185+
12186+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12187+ return 1;
12188+
12189+ path = per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id());
12190+
12191+ if (oldval)
12192+ mode |= GR_READ;
12193+ if (newval)
12194+ mode |= GR_WRITE;
12195+
12196+ /* convert the requested sysctl entry into a pathname */
12197+
12198+ for (tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root; tmp = tmp->parent) {
12199+ len += strlen(tmp->name);
12200+ len++;
12201+ depth++;
12202+ }
12203+
12204+ if ((len + depth + strlen(proc_sys) + 1) > PAGE_SIZE)
12205+ return 0; /* deny */
12206+
12207+ memset(path, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
12208+
12209+ memcpy(path, proc_sys, strlen(proc_sys));
12210+
12211+ pos += strlen(proc_sys);
12212+
12213+ for (; depth > 0; depth--) {
12214+ path[pos] = '/';
12215+ pos++;
12216+ for (i = 1, tmp = table->de; tmp != proc_sys_root;
12217+ tmp = tmp->parent) {
12218+ if (depth == i) {
12219+ memcpy(path + pos, tmp->name,
12220+ strlen(tmp->name));
12221+ pos += strlen(tmp->name);
12222+ }
12223+ i++;
12224+ }
12225+ }
12226+
12227+ err = path_lookup(path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd);
12228+
12229+ if (err)
12230+ goto out;
12231+
12232+ obj = chk_obj_label(nd.dentry, nd.mnt, current->acl);
12233+ err = obj->mode & (mode | to_gr_audit(mode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
12234+
12235+ if (unlikely((current->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) &&
12236+ ((err & mode) != mode))) {
12237+ __u32 new_mode = mode;
12238+
12239+ new_mode &= ~(GR_AUDITS | GR_SUPPRESS);
12240+
12241+ err = new_mode;
12242+ gr_log_learn(current, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, new_mode);
12243+ } else if ((err & mode) != mode && !(err & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
12244+ gr_log_str4(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "denied",
12245+ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
12246+ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
12247+ err = 0;
12248+ } else if ((err & mode) != mode) {
12249+ err = 0;
12250+ } else if (((err & mode) == mode) && (err & GR_AUDITS)) {
12251+ gr_log_str4(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG, "successful",
12252+ path, (mode & GR_READ) ? " reading" : "",
12253+ (mode & GR_WRITE) ? " writing" : "");
12254+ }
12255+
12256+ path_release(&nd);
12257+
12258+ out:
12259+ return err;
12260+}
12261+#endif
12262+
12263+int
12264+gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
12265+{
12266+ struct file *filp;
12267+ struct task_struct *tmp = task;
12268+ struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
12269+ __u32 retmode;
12270+
12271+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12272+ return 0;
12273+
12274+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12275+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12276+ filp = task->exec_file;
12277+
12278+ while (tmp->pid > 0) {
12279+ if (tmp == curtemp)
12280+ break;
12281+ tmp = tmp->parent;
12282+ }
12283+
12284+ if (!filp || (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE))) {
12285+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12286+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12287+ return 1;
12288+ }
12289+
12290+ retmode = gr_search_file(filp->f_dentry, GR_NOPTRACE, filp->f_vfsmnt);
12291+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12292+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12293+
12294+ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE)
12295+ return 1;
12296+
12297+ if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) && !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD)
12298+ && (current->acl != task->acl || (current->acl != current->role->root_label
12299+ && current->pid != task->pid)))
12300+ return 1;
12301+
12302+ return 0;
12303+}
12304+
12305+int
12306+gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
12307+{
12308+ struct task_struct *tmp = task;
12309+ struct task_struct *curtemp = current;
12310+ __u32 retmode;
12311+
12312+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12313+ return 0;
12314+
12315+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
12316+ while (tmp->pid > 0) {
12317+ if (tmp == curtemp)
12318+ break;
12319+ tmp = tmp->parent;
12320+ }
12321+
12322+ if (tmp->pid == 0 && !(current->acl->mode & GR_RELAXPTRACE)) {
12323+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12324+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12325+ return 1;
12326+ }
12327+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
12328+
12329+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12330+ if (unlikely(!task->exec_file)) {
12331+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12332+ return 0;
12333+ }
12334+
12335+ retmode = gr_search_file(task->exec_file->f_dentry, GR_PTRACERD | GR_NOPTRACE, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt);
12336+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
12337+
12338+ if (retmode & GR_NOPTRACE) {
12339+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12340+ return 1;
12341+ }
12342+
12343+ if (retmode & GR_PTRACERD) {
12344+ switch (request) {
12345+ case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
12346+ case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
12347+ case PTRACE_POKEUSR:
12348+#if !defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && !defined(CONFIG_PPC64) && !defined(CONFIG_PARISC) && !defined(CONFIG_ALPHA) && !defined(CONFIG_IA64)
12349+ case PTRACE_SETREGS:
12350+ case PTRACE_SETFPREGS:
12351+#endif
12352+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
12353+ case PTRACE_SETFPXREGS:
12354+#endif
12355+#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
12356+ case PTRACE_SETVRREGS:
12357+#endif
12358+ return 1;
12359+ default:
12360+ return 0;
12361+ }
12362+ } else if (!(current->acl->mode & GR_POVERRIDE) &&
12363+ !(current->role->roletype & GR_ROLE_GOD) &&
12364+ (current->acl != task->acl)) {
12365+ gr_log_ptrace(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG, task);
12366+ return 1;
12367+ }
12368+
12369+ return 0;
12370+}
12371+
12372+static int is_writable_mmap(const struct file *filp)
12373+{
12374+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12375+ struct acl_object_label *obj, *obj2;
12376+
12377+ if (gr_status & GR_READY && !(task->acl->mode & GR_OVERRIDE) &&
12378+ !task->is_writable && S_ISREG(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
12379+ obj = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt, default_role->root_label);
12380+ obj2 = chk_obj_label(filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt,
12381+ task->role->root_label);
12382+ if (unlikely((obj->mode & GR_WRITE) || (obj2->mode & GR_WRITE))) {
12383+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG, filp->f_dentry, filp->f_vfsmnt);
12384+ return 1;
12385+ }
12386+ }
12387+ return 0;
12388+}
12389+
12390+int
12391+gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
12392+{
12393+ __u32 mode;
12394+
12395+ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
12396+ return 1;
12397+
12398+ if (is_writable_mmap(file))
12399+ return 0;
12400+
12401+ mode =
12402+ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
12403+ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
12404+ file->f_vfsmnt);
12405+
12406+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file))
12407+ return 0;
12408+
12409+ if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12410+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12411+ return 0;
12412+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
12413+ return 0;
12414+ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
12415+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12416+ return 1;
12417+ }
12418+
12419+ return 1;
12420+}
12421+
12422+int
12423+gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
12424+{
12425+ __u32 mode;
12426+
12427+ if (unlikely(!file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC)))
12428+ return 1;
12429+
12430+ if (is_writable_mmap(file))
12431+ return 0;
12432+
12433+ mode =
12434+ gr_search_file(file->f_dentry,
12435+ GR_EXEC | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | GR_SUPPRESS,
12436+ file->f_vfsmnt);
12437+
12438+ if (!gr_tpe_allow(file))
12439+ return 0;
12440+
12441+ if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12442+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12443+ return 0;
12444+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_EXEC))) {
12445+ return 0;
12446+ } else if (unlikely(mode & GR_EXEC && mode & GR_AUDIT_EXEC)) {
12447+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
12448+ return 1;
12449+ }
12450+
12451+ return 1;
12452+}
12453+
12454+void
12455+gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
12456+{
12457+ unsigned long runtime;
12458+ unsigned long cputime;
12459+ unsigned int wday, cday;
12460+ __u8 whr, chr;
12461+ __u8 wmin, cmin;
12462+ __u8 wsec, csec;
12463+
12464+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY) || !task->acl ||
12465+ !(task->acl->mode & GR_PROCACCT)))
12466+ return;
12467+
12468+ runtime = xtime.tv_sec - task->start_time.tv_sec;
12469+ wday = runtime / (3600 * 24);
12470+ runtime -= wday * (3600 * 24);
12471+ whr = runtime / 3600;
12472+ runtime -= whr * 3600;
12473+ wmin = runtime / 60;
12474+ runtime -= wmin * 60;
12475+ wsec = runtime;
12476+
12477+ cputime = (task->utime + task->stime) / HZ;
12478+ cday = cputime / (3600 * 24);
12479+ cputime -= cday * (3600 * 24);
12480+ chr = cputime / 3600;
12481+ cputime -= chr * 3600;
12482+ cmin = cputime / 60;
12483+ cputime -= cmin * 60;
12484+ csec = cputime;
12485+
12486+ gr_log_procacct(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG, task, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, code);
12487+
12488+ return;
12489+}
12490+
12491+void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
12492+{
12493+ if (gr_status & GR_READY) {
12494+ task->role = kernel_role;
12495+ task->acl = kernel_role->root_label;
12496+ }
12497+ return;
12498+}
12499+
12500+int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name, const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino)
12501+{
12502+ struct task_struct *task = current;
12503+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
12504+ struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
12505+ struct acl_object_label *obj, *tmp;
12506+ struct acl_subject_label *subj;
12507+ unsigned int bufsize;
12508+ int is_not_root;
12509+ char *path;
12510+
12511+ if (unlikely(!(gr_status & GR_READY)))
12512+ return 1;
12513+
12514+ if (task->acl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
12515+ return 1;
12516+
12517+ subj = task->acl;
12518+ do {
12519+ obj = lookup_acl_obj_label(ino, dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev, subj);
12520+ if (obj != NULL)
12521+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12522+ } while ((subj = subj->parent_subject));
12523+
12524+ obj = chk_obj_label(dentry, mnt, task->acl);
12525+ if (obj->globbed == NULL)
12526+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12527+
12528+ is_not_root = ((obj->filename[0] == '/') &&
12529+ (obj->filename[1] == '\0')) ? 0 : 1;
12530+ bufsize = PAGE_SIZE - namelen - is_not_root;
12531+
12532+ /* check bufsize > PAGE_SIZE || bufsize == 0 */
12533+ if (unlikely((bufsize - 1) > (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
12534+ return 1;
12535+
12536+ preempt_disable();
12537+ path = d_real_path(dentry, mnt, per_cpu_ptr(gr_shared_page[0], smp_processor_id()),
12538+ bufsize);
12539+
12540+ bufsize = strlen(path);
12541+
12542+ /* if base is "/", don't append an additional slash */
12543+ if (is_not_root)
12544+ *(path + bufsize) = '/';
12545+ memcpy(path + bufsize + is_not_root, name, namelen);
12546+ *(path + bufsize + namelen + is_not_root) = '\0';
12547+
12548+ tmp = obj->globbed;
12549+ while (tmp) {
12550+ if (!glob_match(tmp->filename, path)) {
12551+ preempt_enable();
12552+ return (tmp->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12553+ }
12554+ tmp = tmp->next;
12555+ }
12556+ preempt_enable();
12557+ return (obj->mode & GR_FIND) ? 1 : 0;
12558+}
12559+
12560+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
12561+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
12562+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
12563+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
12564+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
12565+#endif
12566+
12567diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c
12568--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
12569+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_cap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
12570@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
12571+#include <linux/kernel.h>
12572+#include <linux/module.h>
12573+#include <linux/sched.h>
12574+#include <linux/capability.h>
12575+#include <linux/gracl.h>
12576+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12577+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
12578+
12579+static const char *captab_log[] = {
12580+ "CAP_CHOWN",
12581+ "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE",
12582+ "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH",
12583+ "CAP_FOWNER",
12584+ "CAP_FSETID",
12585+ "CAP_KILL",
12586+ "CAP_SETGID",
12587+ "CAP_SETUID",
12588+ "CAP_SETPCAP",
12589+ "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE",
12590+ "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE",
12591+ "CAP_NET_BROADCAST",
12592+ "CAP_NET_ADMIN",
12593+ "CAP_NET_RAW",
12594+ "CAP_IPC_LOCK",
12595+ "CAP_IPC_OWNER",
12596+ "CAP_SYS_MODULE",
12597+ "CAP_SYS_RAWIO",
12598+ "CAP_SYS_CHROOT",
12599+ "CAP_SYS_PTRACE",
12600+ "CAP_SYS_PACCT",
12601+ "CAP_SYS_ADMIN",
12602+ "CAP_SYS_BOOT",
12603+ "CAP_SYS_NICE",
12604+ "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE",
12605+ "CAP_SYS_TIME",
12606+ "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG",
12607+ "CAP_MKNOD",
12608+ "CAP_LEASE"
12609+};
12610+
12611+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
12612+
12613+int
12614+gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
12615+{
12616+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
12617+ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
12618+
12619+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
12620+ return 1;
12621+
12622+ curracl = task->acl;
12623+
12624+ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
12625+ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
12626+
12627+ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
12628+ if (!(cap_mask & (1 << cap)) && (curracl->cap_mask & (1 << cap)))
12629+ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (1 << cap);
12630+ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
12631+ }
12632+
12633+ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
12634+ return 1;
12635+
12636+ curracl = task->acl;
12637+
12638+ if ((curracl->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN))
12639+ && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap)) {
12640+ security_learn(GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG, task->role->rolename,
12641+ task->role->roletype, task->uid,
12642+ task->gid, task->exec_file ?
12643+ gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry,
12644+ task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : curracl->filename,
12645+ curracl->filename, 0UL,
12646+ 0UL, "", (unsigned long) cap, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip));
12647+ return 1;
12648+ }
12649+
12650+ if ((cap >= 0) && (cap < (sizeof(captab_log)/sizeof(captab_log[0]))) && cap_raised(task->cap_effective, cap))
12651+ gr_log_cap(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CAP_ACL_MSG, task, captab_log[cap]);
12652+
12653+ return 0;
12654+}
12655+
12656+int
12657+gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
12658+{
12659+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
12660+ __u32 cap_drop = 0, cap_mask = 0;
12661+
12662+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
12663+ return 1;
12664+
12665+ curracl = current->acl;
12666+
12667+ cap_drop = curracl->cap_lower;
12668+ cap_mask = curracl->cap_mask;
12669+
12670+ while ((curracl = curracl->parent_subject)) {
12671+ cap_drop |= curracl->cap_lower & (cap_mask & ~curracl->cap_mask);
12672+ cap_mask |= curracl->cap_mask;
12673+ }
12674+
12675+ if (!cap_raised(cap_drop, cap))
12676+ return 1;
12677+
12678+ return 0;
12679+}
12680+
12681diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c
12682--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
12683+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_fs.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
12684@@ -0,0 +1,423 @@
12685+#include <linux/kernel.h>
12686+#include <linux/sched.h>
12687+#include <linux/types.h>
12688+#include <linux/fs.h>
12689+#include <linux/file.h>
12690+#include <linux/stat.h>
12691+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
12692+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
12693+#include <linux/gracl.h>
12694+
12695+__u32
12696+gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
12697+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
12698+{
12699+ __u32 mode;
12700+
12701+ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
12702+ return GR_FIND;
12703+
12704+ mode =
12705+ gr_search_file(dentry, GR_FIND | GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
12706+
12707+ if (unlikely(mode & GR_FIND && mode & GR_AUDIT_FIND)) {
12708+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
12709+ return mode;
12710+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12711+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt);
12712+ return 0;
12713+ } else if (unlikely(!(mode & GR_FIND)))
12714+ return 0;
12715+
12716+ return GR_FIND;
12717+}
12718+
12719+__u32
12720+gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
12721+ const int fmode)
12722+{
12723+ __u32 reqmode = GR_FIND;
12724+ __u32 mode;
12725+
12726+ if (unlikely(!dentry->d_inode))
12727+ return reqmode;
12728+
12729+ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
12730+ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
12731+ else if (unlikely(fmode & FMODE_WRITE))
12732+ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
12733+ if (likely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
12734+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12735+
12736+ mode =
12737+ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
12738+ mnt);
12739+
12740+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12741+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12742+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12743+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12744+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12745+ return reqmode;
12746+ } else
12747+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12748+ {
12749+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12750+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12751+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12752+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12753+ return 0;
12754+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12755+ return 0;
12756+
12757+ return reqmode;
12758+}
12759+
12760+__u32
12761+gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
12762+ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
12763+ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
12764+ const int imode)
12765+{
12766+ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
12767+ __u32 mode;
12768+
12769+ if (unlikely(fmode & O_APPEND))
12770+ reqmode |= GR_APPEND;
12771+ if (unlikely((fmode & FMODE_READ) && !(fmode & O_DIRECTORY)))
12772+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12773+ if (unlikely((fmode & O_CREAT) && (imode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID))))
12774+ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
12775+
12776+ mode =
12777+ gr_check_create(dentry, p_dentry, p_mnt,
12778+ reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
12779+
12780+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12781+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
12782+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12783+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12784+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12785+ return reqmode;
12786+ } else
12787+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12788+ {
12789+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG, dentry, p_mnt,
12790+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12791+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : reqmode &
12792+ GR_APPEND ? " appending" : "");
12793+ return 0;
12794+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12795+ return 0;
12796+
12797+ return reqmode;
12798+}
12799+
12800+__u32
12801+gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
12802+ const int fmode)
12803+{
12804+ __u32 mode, reqmode = GR_FIND;
12805+
12806+ if ((fmode & S_IXOTH) && !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
12807+ reqmode |= GR_EXEC;
12808+ if (fmode & S_IWOTH)
12809+ reqmode |= GR_WRITE;
12810+ if (fmode & S_IROTH)
12811+ reqmode |= GR_READ;
12812+
12813+ mode =
12814+ gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS,
12815+ mnt);
12816+
12817+ if (unlikely(((mode & reqmode) == reqmode) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12818+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12819+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12820+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
12821+ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
12822+ return reqmode;
12823+ } else
12824+ if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS)))
12825+ {
12826+ gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG, dentry, mnt,
12827+ reqmode & GR_READ ? " reading" : "",
12828+ reqmode & GR_WRITE ? " writing" : "",
12829+ reqmode & GR_EXEC ? " executing" : "");
12830+ return 0;
12831+ } else if (unlikely((mode & reqmode) != reqmode))
12832+ return 0;
12833+
12834+ return reqmode;
12835+}
12836+
12837+static __u32 generic_fs_handler(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
12838+{
12839+ __u32 mode;
12840+
12841+ mode = gr_search_file(dentry, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS, mnt);
12842+
12843+ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12844+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
12845+ return mode;
12846+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12847+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, dentry, mnt);
12848+ return 0;
12849+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
12850+ return 0;
12851+
12852+ return (reqmode);
12853+}
12854+
12855+__u32
12856+gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
12857+{
12858+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG);
12859+}
12860+
12861+__u32
12862+gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12863+{
12864+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_DELETE , GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG);
12865+}
12866+
12867+__u32
12868+gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12869+{
12870+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG);
12871+}
12872+
12873+__u32
12874+gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12875+{
12876+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG);
12877+}
12878+
12879+__u32
12880+gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
12881+ mode_t mode)
12882+{
12883+ if (unlikely(dentry->d_inode && S_ISSOCK(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)))
12884+ return 1;
12885+
12886+ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
12887+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
12888+ GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
12889+ } else {
12890+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG);
12891+ }
12892+}
12893+
12894+__u32
12895+gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
12896+ mode_t mode)
12897+{
12898+ if (unlikely((mode != (mode_t)-1) && (mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))) {
12899+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE | GR_SETID,
12900+ GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
12901+ } else {
12902+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG);
12903+ }
12904+}
12905+
12906+__u32
12907+gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12908+{
12909+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_WRITE, GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG);
12910+}
12911+
12912+__u32
12913+gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12914+{
12915+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_EXEC, GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG);
12916+}
12917+
12918+__u32
12919+gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
12920+{
12921+ return generic_fs_handler(dentry, mnt, GR_READ | GR_WRITE,
12922+ GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG);
12923+}
12924+
12925+/* hardlinks require at minimum create permission,
12926+ any additional privilege required is based on the
12927+ privilege of the file being linked to
12928+*/
12929+__u32
12930+gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
12931+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
12932+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
12933+ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
12934+ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
12935+{
12936+ __u32 mode;
12937+ __u32 needmode = GR_CREATE | GR_LINK;
12938+ __u32 needaudit = GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_LINK;
12939+
12940+ mode =
12941+ gr_check_link(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, old_dentry,
12942+ old_mnt);
12943+
12944+ if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) == needmode) && (mode & needaudit))) {
12945+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
12946+ return mode;
12947+ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12948+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_LINK_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, to);
12949+ return 0;
12950+ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
12951+ return 0;
12952+
12953+ return 1;
12954+}
12955+
12956+__u32
12957+gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
12958+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
12959+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
12960+{
12961+ __u32 needmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
12962+ __u32 mode;
12963+
12964+ mode =
12965+ gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
12966+ GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE |
12967+ GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS);
12968+
12969+ if (unlikely(mode & GR_WRITE && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12970+ gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
12971+ return mode;
12972+ } else if (unlikely(((mode & needmode) != needmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12973+ gr_log_fs_str_rbac(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG, from, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
12974+ return 0;
12975+ } else if (unlikely((mode & needmode) != needmode))
12976+ return 0;
12977+
12978+ return (GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE);
12979+}
12980+
12981+static __u32 generic_fs_create_handler(const struct dentry *new_dentry, const struct dentry *parent_dentry, const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt, __u32 reqmode, const char *fmt)
12982+{
12983+ __u32 mode;
12984+
12985+ mode = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt, reqmode | to_gr_audit(reqmode) | GR_SUPPRESS);
12986+
12987+ if (unlikely(((mode & (reqmode)) == (reqmode)) && mode & GR_AUDITS)) {
12988+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
12989+ return mode;
12990+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode) && !(mode & GR_SUPPRESS))) {
12991+ gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, fmt, new_dentry, parent_mnt);
12992+ return 0;
12993+ } else if (unlikely((mode & (reqmode)) != (reqmode)))
12994+ return 0;
12995+
12996+ return (reqmode);
12997+}
12998+
12999+__u32
13000+gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
13001+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
13002+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
13003+ const int mode)
13004+{
13005+ __u32 reqmode = GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE;
13006+ if (unlikely(mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)))
13007+ reqmode |= GR_SETID;
13008+
13009+ return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13010+ reqmode, GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG);
13011+}
13012+
13013+__u32
13014+gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
13015+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
13016+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt)
13017+{
13018+ return generic_fs_create_handler(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13019+ GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE, GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG);
13020+}
13021+
13022+#define RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(old, new) \
13023+ (((old & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) && \
13024+ ((new & (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)) == (GR_WRITE | GR_READ)))
13025+
13026+int
13027+gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
13028+ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
13029+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
13030+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
13031+ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
13032+ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
13033+{
13034+ __u32 comp1, comp2;
13035+ int error = 0;
13036+
13037+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13038+ return 0;
13039+
13040+ if (!new_dentry->d_inode) {
13041+ comp1 = gr_check_create(new_dentry, parent_dentry, parent_mnt,
13042+ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
13043+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_SUPPRESS);
13044+ comp2 = gr_search_file(old_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
13045+ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13046+ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
13047+ GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
13048+ } else {
13049+ comp1 = gr_search_file(new_dentry, GR_READ | GR_WRITE |
13050+ GR_CREATE | GR_DELETE |
13051+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13052+ GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE |
13053+ GR_SUPPRESS, parent_mnt);
13054+ comp2 =
13055+ gr_search_file(old_dentry,
13056+ GR_READ | GR_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_READ |
13057+ GR_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE |
13058+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_SUPPRESS, old_mnt);
13059+ }
13060+
13061+ if (RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) &&
13062+ ((comp1 & GR_AUDITS) || (comp2 & GR_AUDITS)))
13063+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
13064+ else if (!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2) && !(comp1 & GR_SUPPRESS)
13065+ && !(comp2 & GR_SUPPRESS)) {
13066+ gr_log_fs_rbac_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG, old_dentry, old_mnt, newname);
13067+ error = -EACCES;
13068+ } else if (unlikely(!RENAME_CHECK_SUCCESS(comp1, comp2)))
13069+ error = -EACCES;
13070+
13071+ return error;
13072+}
13073+
13074+void
13075+gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
13076+{
13077+ u16 id;
13078+ char *rolename;
13079+ struct file *exec_file;
13080+
13081+ if (unlikely(current->acl_sp_role && gr_acl_is_enabled())) {
13082+ id = current->acl_role_id;
13083+ rolename = current->role->rolename;
13084+ gr_set_acls(1);
13085+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG, rolename, id);
13086+ }
13087+
13088+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
13089+ exec_file = current->exec_file;
13090+ current->exec_file = NULL;
13091+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
13092+
13093+ if (exec_file)
13094+ fput(exec_file);
13095+}
13096+
13097+int
13098+gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
13099+{
13100+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13101+ return 0;
13102+
13103+ if (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTPROCFD)
13104+ return -EACCES;
13105+
13106+ return 0;
13107+}
13108diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c
13109--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13110+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_ip.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
13111@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
13112+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13113+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
13114+#include <asm/errno.h>
13115+#include <net/sock.h>
13116+#include <linux/file.h>
13117+#include <linux/fs.h>
13118+#include <linux/net.h>
13119+#include <linux/in.h>
13120+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
13121+#include <linux/ip.h>
13122+#include <linux/udp.h>
13123+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13124+#include <linux/types.h>
13125+#include <linux/sched.h>
13126+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
13127+#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
13128+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13129+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
13130+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13131+
13132+#define GR_BIND 0x01
13133+#define GR_CONNECT 0x02
13134+#define GR_INVERT 0x04
13135+
13136+static const char * gr_protocols[256] = {
13137+ "ip", "icmp", "igmp", "ggp", "ipencap", "st", "tcp", "cbt",
13138+ "egp", "igp", "bbn-rcc", "nvp", "pup", "argus", "emcon", "xnet",
13139+ "chaos", "udp", "mux", "dcn", "hmp", "prm", "xns-idp", "trunk-1",
13140+ "trunk-2", "leaf-1", "leaf-2", "rdp", "irtp", "iso-tp4", "netblt", "mfe-nsp",
13141+ "merit-inp", "sep", "3pc", "idpr", "xtp", "ddp", "idpr-cmtp", "tp++",
13142+ "il", "ipv6", "sdrp", "ipv6-route", "ipv6-frag", "idrp", "rsvp", "gre",
13143+ "mhrp", "bna", "ipv6-crypt", "ipv6-auth", "i-nlsp", "swipe", "narp", "mobile",
13144+ "tlsp", "skip", "ipv6-icmp", "ipv6-nonxt", "ipv6-opts", "unknown:61", "cftp", "unknown:63",
13145+ "sat-expak", "kryptolan", "rvd", "ippc", "unknown:68", "sat-mon", "visa", "ipcv",
13146+ "cpnx", "cphb", "wsn", "pvp", "br-sat-mon", "sun-nd", "wb-mon", "wb-expak",
13147+ "iso-ip", "vmtp", "secure-vmtp", "vines", "ttp", "nfsnet-igp", "dgp", "tcf",
13148+ "eigrp", "ospf", "sprite-rpc", "larp", "mtp", "ax.25", "ipip", "micp",
13149+ "scc-sp", "etherip", "encap", "unknown:99", "gmtp", "ifmp", "pnni", "pim",
13150+ "aris", "scps", "qnx", "a/n", "ipcomp", "snp", "compaq-peer", "ipx-in-ip",
13151+ "vrrp", "pgm", "unknown:114", "l2tp", "ddx", "iatp", "stp", "srp",
13152+ "uti", "smp", "sm", "ptp", "isis", "fire", "crtp", "crdup",
13153+ "sscopmce", "iplt", "sps", "pipe", "sctp", "fc", "unkown:134", "unknown:135",
13154+ "unknown:136", "unknown:137", "unknown:138", "unknown:139", "unknown:140", "unknown:141", "unknown:142", "unknown:143",
13155+ "unknown:144", "unknown:145", "unknown:146", "unknown:147", "unknown:148", "unknown:149", "unknown:150", "unknown:151",
13156+ "unknown:152", "unknown:153", "unknown:154", "unknown:155", "unknown:156", "unknown:157", "unknown:158", "unknown:159",
13157+ "unknown:160", "unknown:161", "unknown:162", "unknown:163", "unknown:164", "unknown:165", "unknown:166", "unknown:167",
13158+ "unknown:168", "unknown:169", "unknown:170", "unknown:171", "unknown:172", "unknown:173", "unknown:174", "unknown:175",
13159+ "unknown:176", "unknown:177", "unknown:178", "unknown:179", "unknown:180", "unknown:181", "unknown:182", "unknown:183",
13160+ "unknown:184", "unknown:185", "unknown:186", "unknown:187", "unknown:188", "unknown:189", "unknown:190", "unknown:191",
13161+ "unknown:192", "unknown:193", "unknown:194", "unknown:195", "unknown:196", "unknown:197", "unknown:198", "unknown:199",
13162+ "unknown:200", "unknown:201", "unknown:202", "unknown:203", "unknown:204", "unknown:205", "unknown:206", "unknown:207",
13163+ "unknown:208", "unknown:209", "unknown:210", "unknown:211", "unknown:212", "unknown:213", "unknown:214", "unknown:215",
13164+ "unknown:216", "unknown:217", "unknown:218", "unknown:219", "unknown:220", "unknown:221", "unknown:222", "unknown:223",
13165+ "unknown:224", "unknown:225", "unknown:226", "unknown:227", "unknown:228", "unknown:229", "unknown:230", "unknown:231",
13166+ "unknown:232", "unknown:233", "unknown:234", "unknown:235", "unknown:236", "unknown:237", "unknown:238", "unknown:239",
13167+ "unknown:240", "unknown:241", "unknown:242", "unknown:243", "unknown:244", "unknown:245", "unknown:246", "unknown:247",
13168+ "unknown:248", "unknown:249", "unknown:250", "unknown:251", "unknown:252", "unknown:253", "unknown:254", "unknown:255",
13169+ };
13170+
13171+static const char * gr_socktypes[11] = {
13172+ "unknown:0", "stream", "dgram", "raw", "rdm", "seqpacket", "unknown:6",
13173+ "unknown:7", "unknown:8", "unknown:9", "packet"
13174+ };
13175+
13176+const char *
13177+gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto)
13178+{
13179+ return gr_protocols[proto];
13180+}
13181+
13182+const char *
13183+gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type)
13184+{
13185+ return gr_socktypes[type];
13186+}
13187+
13188+int
13189+gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type, const int protocol)
13190+{
13191+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13192+
13193+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13194+ goto exit;
13195+
13196+ if ((domain < 0) || (type < 0) || (protocol < 0) || (domain != PF_INET)
13197+ || (domain >= NPROTO) || (type >= SOCK_MAX) || (protocol > 255))
13198+ goto exit; // let the kernel handle it
13199+
13200+ curr = current->acl;
13201+
13202+ if (!curr->ips)
13203+ goto exit;
13204+
13205+ if ((curr->ip_type & (1 << type)) &&
13206+ (curr->ip_proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32))))
13207+ goto exit;
13208+
13209+ if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
13210+ /* we don't place acls on raw sockets , and sometimes
13211+ dgram/ip sockets are opened for ioctl and not
13212+ bind/connect, so we'll fake a bind learn log */
13213+ if (type == SOCK_RAW || type == SOCK_PACKET) {
13214+ __u32 fakeip = 0;
13215+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13216+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13217+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13218+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13219+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13220+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13221+ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
13222+ protocol, GR_CONNECT,
13223+NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
13224+ } else if ((type == SOCK_DGRAM) && (protocol == IPPROTO_IP)) {
13225+ __u32 fakeip = 0;
13226+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13227+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13228+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13229+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13230+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13231+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13232+ NIPQUAD(fakeip), 0, type,
13233+ protocol, GR_BIND, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
13234+ }
13235+ /* we'll log when they use connect or bind */
13236+ goto exit;
13237+ }
13238+
13239+ gr_log_str3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK_MSG, "inet",
13240+ gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
13241+
13242+ return 0;
13243+ exit:
13244+ return 1;
13245+}
13246+
13247+int check_ip_policy(struct acl_ip_label *ip, __u32 ip_addr, __u16 ip_port, __u8 protocol, const int mode, const int type, __u32 our_addr, __u32 our_netmask)
13248+{
13249+ if ((ip->mode & mode) &&
13250+ (ip_port >= ip->low) &&
13251+ (ip_port <= ip->high) &&
13252+ ((ntohl(ip_addr) & our_netmask) ==
13253+ (ntohl(our_addr) & our_netmask))
13254+ && (ip->proto[protocol / 32] & (1 << (protocol % 32)))
13255+ && (ip->type & (1 << type))) {
13256+ if (ip->mode & GR_INVERT)
13257+ return 2; // specifically denied
13258+ else
13259+ return 1; // allowed
13260+ }
13261+
13262+ return 0; // not specifically allowed, may continue parsing
13263+}
13264+
13265+static int
13266+gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct sock *sk,
13267+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr, const int type)
13268+{
13269+ char iface[IFNAMSIZ] = {0};
13270+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13271+ struct acl_ip_label *ip;
13272+ struct net_device *dev;
13273+ struct in_device *idev;
13274+ unsigned long i;
13275+ int ret;
13276+ __u32 ip_addr = 0;
13277+ __u32 our_addr;
13278+ __u32 our_netmask;
13279+ char *p;
13280+ __u16 ip_port = 0;
13281+
13282+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled() || sk->sk_family != PF_INET))
13283+ return 1;
13284+
13285+ curr = current->acl;
13286+
13287+ if (!curr->ips)
13288+ return 1;
13289+
13290+ ip_addr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
13291+ ip_port = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
13292+
13293+ if (curr->mode & (GR_LEARN | GR_INHERITLEARN)) {
13294+ security_learn(GR_IP_LEARN_MSG, current->role->rolename,
13295+ current->role->roletype, current->uid,
13296+ current->gid, current->exec_file ?
13297+ gr_to_filename(current->exec_file->f_dentry,
13298+ current->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) :
13299+ curr->filename, curr->filename,
13300+ NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, type,
13301+ sk->sk_protocol, mode, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
13302+ return 1;
13303+ }
13304+
13305+ for (i = 0; i < curr->ip_num; i++) {
13306+ ip = *(curr->ips + i);
13307+ if (ip->iface != NULL) {
13308+ strncpy(iface, ip->iface, IFNAMSIZ - 1);
13309+ p = strchr(iface, ':');
13310+ if (p != NULL)
13311+ *p = '\0';
13312+ dev = dev_get_by_name(iface);
13313+ if (dev == NULL)
13314+ continue;
13315+ idev = in_dev_get(dev);
13316+ if (idev == NULL) {
13317+ dev_put(dev);
13318+ continue;
13319+ }
13320+ rcu_read_lock();
13321+ for_ifa(idev) {
13322+ if (!strcmp(ip->iface, ifa->ifa_label)) {
13323+ our_addr = ifa->ifa_address;
13324+ our_netmask = 0xffffffff;
13325+ ret = check_ip_policy(ip, ip_addr, ip_port, sk->sk_protocol, mode, type, our_addr, our_netmask);
13326+ if (ret == 1) {
13327+ rcu_read_unlock();
13328+ in_dev_put(idev);
13329+ dev_put(dev);
13330+ return 1;
13331+ } else if (ret == 2) {
13332+ rcu_read_unlock();
13333+ in_dev_put(idev);
13334+ dev_put(dev);
13335+ goto denied;
13336+ }
13337+ }
13338+ } endfor_ifa(idev);
13339+ rcu_read_unlock();
13340+ in_dev_put(idev);
13341+ dev_put(dev);
13342+ } else {
13343+ our_addr = ip->addr;
13344+ our_netmask = ip->netmask;
13345+ ret = check_ip_policy(ip, ip_addr, ip_port, sk->sk_protocol, mode, type, our_addr, our_netmask);
13346+ if (ret == 1)
13347+ return 1;
13348+ else if (ret == 2)
13349+ goto denied;
13350+ }
13351+ }
13352+
13353+denied:
13354+ if (mode == GR_BIND)
13355+ gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
13356+ else if (mode == GR_CONNECT)
13357+ gr_log_int5_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG, NIPQUAD(ip_addr), ip_port, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(sk->sk_protocol));
13358+
13359+ return 0;
13360+}
13361+
13362+int
13363+gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13364+{
13365+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
13366+}
13367+
13368+int
13369+gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13370+{
13371+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, addr, sock->type);
13372+}
13373+
13374+int gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
13375+{
13376+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
13377+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
13378+
13379+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
13380+ addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
13381+
13382+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
13383+}
13384+
13385+int gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
13386+{
13387+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
13388+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
13389+
13390+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_sk(sk)->saddr;
13391+ addr.sin_port = inet_sk(sk)->sport;
13392+
13393+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_BIND, sock->sk, &addr, sock->type);
13394+}
13395+
13396+int
13397+gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
13398+{
13399+ if (addr)
13400+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, addr, SOCK_DGRAM);
13401+ else {
13402+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
13403+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
13404+
13405+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet->daddr;
13406+ sin.sin_port = inet->dport;
13407+
13408+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
13409+ }
13410+}
13411+
13412+int
13413+gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
13414+{
13415+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
13416+
13417+ if (unlikely(skb->len < sizeof (struct udphdr)))
13418+ return 1; // skip this packet
13419+
13420+ sin.sin_addr.s_addr = skb->nh.iph->saddr;
13421+ sin.sin_port = skb->h.uh->source;
13422+
13423+ return gr_search_connectbind(GR_CONNECT, sk, &sin, SOCK_DGRAM);
13424+}
13425diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c
13426--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13427+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_learn.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
13428@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
13429+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13430+#include <linux/mm.h>
13431+#include <linux/sched.h>
13432+#include <linux/poll.h>
13433+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13434+#include <linux/string.h>
13435+#include <linux/file.h>
13436+#include <linux/types.h>
13437+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
13438+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13439+
13440+extern ssize_t write_grsec_handler(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
13441+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
13442+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
13443+
13444+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(learn_wait);
13445+static int gr_learn_attached;
13446+
13447+/* use a 512k buffer */
13448+#define LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE (512 * 1024)
13449+
13450+static spinlock_t gr_learn_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
13451+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_learn_user_sem);
13452+
13453+/* we need to maintain two buffers, so that the kernel context of grlearn
13454+ uses a semaphore around the userspace copying, and the other kernel contexts
13455+ use a spinlock when copying into the buffer, since they cannot sleep
13456+*/
13457+static char *learn_buffer;
13458+static char *learn_buffer_user;
13459+static int learn_buffer_len;
13460+static int learn_buffer_user_len;
13461+
13462+static ssize_t
13463+read_learn(struct file *file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
13464+{
13465+ DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
13466+ ssize_t retval = 0;
13467+
13468+ add_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
13469+ set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
13470+ do {
13471+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13472+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13473+ if (learn_buffer_len)
13474+ break;
13475+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13476+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13477+ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
13478+ retval = -EAGAIN;
13479+ goto out;
13480+ }
13481+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
13482+ retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
13483+ goto out;
13484+ }
13485+
13486+ schedule();
13487+ } while (1);
13488+
13489+ memcpy(learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer, learn_buffer_len);
13490+ learn_buffer_user_len = learn_buffer_len;
13491+ retval = learn_buffer_len;
13492+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13493+
13494+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13495+
13496+ if (copy_to_user(buf, learn_buffer_user, learn_buffer_user_len))
13497+ retval = -EFAULT;
13498+
13499+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13500+out:
13501+ set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
13502+ remove_wait_queue(&learn_wait, &wait);
13503+ return retval;
13504+}
13505+
13506+static unsigned int
13507+poll_learn(struct file * file, poll_table * wait)
13508+{
13509+ poll_wait(file, &learn_wait, wait);
13510+
13511+ if (learn_buffer_len)
13512+ return (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
13513+
13514+ return 0;
13515+}
13516+
13517+void
13518+gr_clear_learn_entries(void)
13519+{
13520+ char *tmp;
13521+
13522+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13523+ if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
13524+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13525+ tmp = learn_buffer;
13526+ learn_buffer = NULL;
13527+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13528+ vfree(learn_buffer);
13529+ }
13530+ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
13531+ vfree(learn_buffer_user);
13532+ learn_buffer_user = NULL;
13533+ }
13534+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13535+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13536+
13537+ return;
13538+}
13539+
13540+void
13541+gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...)
13542+{
13543+ va_list args;
13544+ unsigned int len;
13545+
13546+ if (!gr_learn_attached)
13547+ return;
13548+
13549+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13550+
13551+ /* leave a gap at the end so we know when it's "full" but don't have to
13552+ compute the exact length of the string we're trying to append
13553+ */
13554+ if (learn_buffer_len > LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - 16384) {
13555+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13556+ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
13557+ return;
13558+ }
13559+ if (learn_buffer == NULL) {
13560+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13561+ return;
13562+ }
13563+
13564+ va_start(args, fmt);
13565+ len = vsnprintf(learn_buffer + learn_buffer_len, LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE - learn_buffer_len, fmt, args);
13566+ va_end(args);
13567+
13568+ learn_buffer_len += len + 1;
13569+
13570+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13571+ wake_up_interruptible(&learn_wait);
13572+
13573+ return;
13574+}
13575+
13576+static int
13577+open_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
13578+{
13579+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ && gr_learn_attached)
13580+ return -EBUSY;
13581+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
13582+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13583+ if (learn_buffer == NULL)
13584+ learn_buffer = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
13585+ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
13586+ learn_buffer_user = vmalloc(LEARN_BUFFER_SIZE);
13587+ if (learn_buffer == NULL)
13588+ return -ENOMEM;
13589+ if (learn_buffer_user == NULL)
13590+ return -ENOMEM;
13591+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13592+ learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
13593+ gr_learn_attached = 1;
13594+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13595+ }
13596+ return 0;
13597+}
13598+
13599+static int
13600+close_learn(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
13601+{
13602+ char *tmp;
13603+
13604+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
13605+ down(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13606+ if (learn_buffer != NULL) {
13607+ spin_lock(&gr_learn_lock);
13608+ tmp = learn_buffer;
13609+ learn_buffer = NULL;
13610+ spin_unlock(&gr_learn_lock);
13611+ vfree(tmp);
13612+ }
13613+ if (learn_buffer_user != NULL) {
13614+ vfree(learn_buffer_user);
13615+ learn_buffer_user = NULL;
13616+ }
13617+ learn_buffer_len = 0;
13618+ learn_buffer_user_len = 0;
13619+ gr_learn_attached = 0;
13620+ up(&gr_learn_user_sem);
13621+ }
13622+
13623+ return 0;
13624+}
13625+
13626+struct file_operations grsec_fops = {
13627+ .read = read_learn,
13628+ .write = write_grsec_handler,
13629+ .open = open_learn,
13630+ .release = close_learn,
13631+ .poll = poll_learn,
13632+};
13633diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_res.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_res.c
13634--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13635+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_res.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
13636@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
13637+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13638+#include <linux/sched.h>
13639+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13640+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13641+
13642+static const char *restab_log[] = {
13643+ [RLIMIT_CPU] = "RLIMIT_CPU",
13644+ [RLIMIT_FSIZE] = "RLIMIT_FSIZE",
13645+ [RLIMIT_DATA] = "RLIMIT_DATA",
13646+ [RLIMIT_STACK] = "RLIMIT_STACK",
13647+ [RLIMIT_CORE] = "RLIMIT_CORE",
13648+ [RLIMIT_RSS] = "RLIMIT_RSS",
13649+ [RLIMIT_NPROC] = "RLIMIT_NPROC",
13650+ [RLIMIT_NOFILE] = "RLIMIT_NOFILE",
13651+ [RLIMIT_MEMLOCK] = "RLIMIT_MEMLOCK",
13652+ [RLIMIT_AS] = "RLIMIT_AS",
13653+ [RLIMIT_LOCKS] = "RLIMIT_LOCKS",
13654+ [RLIMIT_LOCKS + 1] = "RLIMIT_CRASH"
13655+};
13656+
13657+void
13658+gr_log_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
13659+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
13660+{
13661+ if (res == RLIMIT_NPROC &&
13662+ (cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
13663+ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)))
13664+ return;
13665+ else if (res == RLIMIT_MEMLOCK &&
13666+ cap_raised(task->cap_effective, CAP_IPC_LOCK))
13667+ return;
13668+
13669+ preempt_disable();
13670+
13671+ if (unlikely(((gt && wanted > task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur) ||
13672+ (!gt && wanted >= task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur)) &&
13673+ task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY))
13674+ gr_log_res_ulong2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_RESOURCE_MSG, task, wanted, restab_log[res], task->signal->rlim[res].rlim_cur);
13675+ preempt_enable_no_resched();
13676+
13677+ return;
13678+}
13679diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c
13680--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13681+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_segv.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
13682@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
13683+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13684+#include <linux/mm.h>
13685+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
13686+#include <asm/errno.h>
13687+#include <asm/mman.h>
13688+#include <net/sock.h>
13689+#include <linux/file.h>
13690+#include <linux/fs.h>
13691+#include <linux/net.h>
13692+#include <linux/in.h>
13693+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
13694+#include <linux/slab.h>
13695+#include <linux/types.h>
13696+#include <linux/sched.h>
13697+#include <linux/timer.h>
13698+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13699+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
13700+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13701+
13702+static struct crash_uid *uid_set;
13703+static unsigned short uid_used;
13704+static spinlock_t gr_uid_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
13705+extern rwlock_t gr_inode_lock;
13706+extern struct acl_subject_label *
13707+ lookup_acl_subj_label(const ino_t inode, const dev_t dev,
13708+ struct acl_role_label *role);
13709+extern int specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t);
13710+
13711+int
13712+gr_init_uidset(void)
13713+{
13714+ uid_set =
13715+ kmalloc(GR_UIDTABLE_MAX * sizeof (struct crash_uid), GFP_KERNEL);
13716+ uid_used = 0;
13717+
13718+ return uid_set ? 1 : 0;
13719+}
13720+
13721+void
13722+gr_free_uidset(void)
13723+{
13724+ if (uid_set)
13725+ kfree(uid_set);
13726+
13727+ return;
13728+}
13729+
13730+int
13731+gr_find_uid(const uid_t uid)
13732+{
13733+ struct crash_uid *tmp = uid_set;
13734+ uid_t buid;
13735+ int low = 0, high = uid_used - 1, mid;
13736+
13737+ while (high >= low) {
13738+ mid = (low + high) >> 1;
13739+ buid = tmp[mid].uid;
13740+ if (buid == uid)
13741+ return mid;
13742+ if (buid > uid)
13743+ high = mid - 1;
13744+ if (buid < uid)
13745+ low = mid + 1;
13746+ }
13747+
13748+ return -1;
13749+}
13750+
13751+static __inline__ void
13752+gr_insertsort(void)
13753+{
13754+ unsigned short i, j;
13755+ struct crash_uid index;
13756+
13757+ for (i = 1; i < uid_used; i++) {
13758+ index = uid_set[i];
13759+ j = i;
13760+ while ((j > 0) && uid_set[j - 1].uid > index.uid) {
13761+ uid_set[j] = uid_set[j - 1];
13762+ j--;
13763+ }
13764+ uid_set[j] = index;
13765+ }
13766+
13767+ return;
13768+}
13769+
13770+static __inline__ void
13771+gr_insert_uid(const uid_t uid, const unsigned long expires)
13772+{
13773+ int loc;
13774+
13775+ if (uid_used == GR_UIDTABLE_MAX)
13776+ return;
13777+
13778+ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
13779+
13780+ if (loc >= 0) {
13781+ uid_set[loc].expires = expires;
13782+ return;
13783+ }
13784+
13785+ uid_set[uid_used].uid = uid;
13786+ uid_set[uid_used].expires = expires;
13787+ uid_used++;
13788+
13789+ gr_insertsort();
13790+
13791+ return;
13792+}
13793+
13794+void
13795+gr_remove_uid(const unsigned short loc)
13796+{
13797+ unsigned short i;
13798+
13799+ for (i = loc + 1; i < uid_used; i++)
13800+ uid_set[i - 1] = uid_set[i];
13801+
13802+ uid_used--;
13803+
13804+ return;
13805+}
13806+
13807+int
13808+gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
13809+{
13810+ int loc;
13811+ int ret = 0;
13812+
13813+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13814+ return 0;
13815+
13816+ spin_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
13817+ loc = gr_find_uid(uid);
13818+
13819+ if (loc < 0)
13820+ goto out_unlock;
13821+
13822+ if (time_before_eq(uid_set[loc].expires, get_seconds()))
13823+ gr_remove_uid(loc);
13824+ else
13825+ ret = 1;
13826+
13827+out_unlock:
13828+ spin_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13829+ return ret;
13830+}
13831+
13832+static __inline__ int
13833+proc_is_setxid(const struct task_struct *task)
13834+{
13835+ if (task->uid != task->euid || task->uid != task->suid ||
13836+ task->uid != task->fsuid)
13837+ return 1;
13838+ if (task->gid != task->egid || task->gid != task->sgid ||
13839+ task->gid != task->fsgid)
13840+ return 1;
13841+
13842+ return 0;
13843+}
13844+static __inline__ int
13845+gr_fake_force_sig(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
13846+{
13847+ unsigned long int flags;
13848+ int ret;
13849+
13850+ spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
13851+ if (sigismember(&t->blocked, sig) || t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) {
13852+ t->sighand->action[sig-1].sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
13853+ sigdelset(&t->blocked, sig);
13854+ recalc_sigpending_tsk(t);
13855+ }
13856+ ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, (void*)1L, t);
13857+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
13858+
13859+ return ret;
13860+}
13861+
13862+void
13863+gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
13864+{
13865+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13866+ struct acl_subject_label *curr2;
13867+ struct task_struct *tsk, *tsk2;
13868+
13869+ if (sig != SIGSEGV && sig != SIGKILL && sig != SIGBUS && sig != SIGILL)
13870+ return;
13871+
13872+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13873+ return;
13874+
13875+ curr = task->acl;
13876+
13877+ if (!(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)))
13878+ return;
13879+
13880+ if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
13881+ curr->expires = 0;
13882+ curr->crashes = 0;
13883+ }
13884+
13885+ curr->crashes++;
13886+
13887+ if (!curr->expires)
13888+ curr->expires = get_seconds() + curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max;
13889+
13890+ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
13891+ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
13892+ if (task->uid && proc_is_setxid(task)) {
13893+ gr_log_crash1(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
13894+ spin_lock(&gr_uid_lock);
13895+ gr_insert_uid(task->uid, curr->expires);
13896+ spin_unlock(&gr_uid_lock);
13897+ curr->expires = 0;
13898+ curr->crashes = 0;
13899+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
13900+ do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
13901+ if (tsk != task && tsk->uid == task->uid)
13902+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
13903+ } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
13904+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
13905+ } else {
13906+ gr_log_crash2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG, task, curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_max);
13907+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
13908+ do_each_thread(tsk2, tsk) {
13909+ if (likely(tsk != task)) {
13910+ curr2 = tsk->acl;
13911+
13912+ if (curr2->device == curr->device &&
13913+ curr2->inode == curr->inode)
13914+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, tsk);
13915+ }
13916+ } while_each_thread(tsk2, tsk);
13917+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
13918+ }
13919+ }
13920+
13921+ return;
13922+}
13923+
13924+int
13925+gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
13926+{
13927+ struct acl_subject_label *curr;
13928+
13929+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13930+ return 0;
13931+
13932+ read_lock(&gr_inode_lock);
13933+ curr = lookup_acl_subj_label(filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_ino,
13934+ filp->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev,
13935+ current->role);
13936+ read_unlock(&gr_inode_lock);
13937+
13938+ if (!curr || !(curr->resmask & (1 << GR_CRASH_RES)) ||
13939+ (!curr->crashes && !curr->expires))
13940+ return 0;
13941+
13942+ if ((curr->crashes >= curr->res[GR_CRASH_RES].rlim_cur) &&
13943+ time_after(curr->expires, get_seconds()))
13944+ return 1;
13945+ else if (time_before_eq(curr->expires, get_seconds())) {
13946+ curr->crashes = 0;
13947+ curr->expires = 0;
13948+ }
13949+
13950+ return 0;
13951+}
13952+
13953+void
13954+gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
13955+{
13956+ struct acl_subject_label *curracl;
13957+ __u32 curr_ip;
13958+ struct task_struct *p, *p2;
13959+
13960+ if (unlikely(!gr_acl_is_enabled()))
13961+ return;
13962+
13963+ curracl = task->acl;
13964+ curr_ip = task->signal->curr_ip;
13965+
13966+ if ((curracl->mode & GR_KILLIPPROC) && curr_ip) {
13967+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
13968+ do_each_thread(p2, p) {
13969+ if (p->signal->curr_ip == curr_ip)
13970+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, p);
13971+ } while_each_thread(p2, p);
13972+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
13973+ } else if (curracl->mode & GR_KILLPROC)
13974+ gr_fake_force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
13975+
13976+ return;
13977+}
13978diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c
13979--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
13980+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/gracl_shm.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
13981@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
13982+#include <linux/kernel.h>
13983+#include <linux/mm.h>
13984+#include <linux/sched.h>
13985+#include <linux/file.h>
13986+#include <linux/ipc.h>
13987+#include <linux/gracl.h>
13988+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
13989+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
13990+
13991+int
13992+gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
13993+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
13994+{
13995+ struct task_struct *task;
13996+
13997+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
13998+ return 1;
13999+
14000+ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_cprid);
14001+
14002+ if (unlikely(!task))
14003+ task = find_task_by_pid(shm_lapid);
14004+
14005+ if (unlikely(task && (time_before((unsigned long)task->start_time.tv_sec, (unsigned long)shm_createtime) ||
14006+ (task->pid == shm_lapid)) &&
14007+ (task->acl->mode & GR_PROTSHM) &&
14008+ (task->acl != current->acl))) {
14009+ gr_log_int3(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG, cuid, shm_cprid, shmid);
14010+ return 0;
14011+ }
14012+
14013+ return 1;
14014+}
14015diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c
14016--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14017+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chdir.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14018@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
14019+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14020+#include <linux/sched.h>
14021+#include <linux/fs.h>
14022+#include <linux/file.h>
14023+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
14024+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14025+
14026+void
14027+gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14028+{
14029+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
14030+ if ((grsec_enable_chdir && grsec_enable_group &&
14031+ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid)) || (grsec_enable_chdir &&
14032+ !grsec_enable_group)) {
14033+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14034+ }
14035+#endif
14036+ return;
14037+}
14038diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c
14039--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14040+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_chroot.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14041@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
14042+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14043+#include <linux/module.h>
14044+#include <linux/sched.h>
14045+#include <linux/file.h>
14046+#include <linux/fs.h>
14047+#include <linux/mount.h>
14048+#include <linux/types.h>
14049+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14050+
14051+int
14052+gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid)
14053+{
14054+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
14055+ struct pid *spid = NULL;
14056+
14057+ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_unix))
14058+ return 1;
14059+
14060+ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
14061+ return 1;
14062+
14063+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14064+
14065+ spid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
14066+ if (spid) {
14067+ struct task_struct *p;
14068+ p = pid_task(&spid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14069+ task_lock(p);
14070+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
14071+ task_unlock(p);
14072+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14073+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG);
14074+ return 0;
14075+ }
14076+ task_unlock(p);
14077+ }
14078+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14079+#endif
14080+ return 1;
14081+}
14082+
14083+int
14084+gr_handle_chroot_nice(void)
14085+{
14086+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
14087+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14088+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG);
14089+ return -EPERM;
14090+ }
14091+#endif
14092+ return 0;
14093+}
14094+
14095+int
14096+gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p, const int niceval)
14097+{
14098+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
14099+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_nice && (niceval < task_nice(p))
14100+ && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14101+ gr_log_str_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG, p->comm, p->pid);
14102+ return -EACCES;
14103+ }
14104+#endif
14105+ return 0;
14106+}
14107+
14108+int
14109+gr_handle_chroot_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
14110+{
14111+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
14112+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
14113+ inode && S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
14114+ return 1;
14115+#endif
14116+ return 0;
14117+}
14118+
14119+int
14120+gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p)
14121+{
14122+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
14123+ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_findtask || !proc_is_chrooted(current) || !p)
14124+ return 0;
14125+
14126+ task_lock(p);
14127+ if ((p->exit_state & (EXIT_ZOMBIE | EXIT_DEAD)) ||
14128+ !have_same_root(current, p)) {
14129+ task_unlock(p);
14130+ return 1;
14131+ }
14132+ task_unlock(p);
14133+#endif
14134+ return 0;
14135+}
14136+
14137+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_pid_is_chrooted);
14138+
14139+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR)
14140+int gr_is_outside_chroot(const struct dentry *u_dentry, const struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
14141+{
14142+ struct dentry *dentry = (struct dentry *)u_dentry;
14143+ struct vfsmount *mnt = (struct vfsmount *)u_mnt;
14144+ struct dentry *realroot;
14145+ struct vfsmount *realrootmnt;
14146+ struct dentry *currentroot;
14147+ struct vfsmount *currentmnt;
14148+ int ret = 1;
14149+
14150+ read_lock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
14151+ realrootmnt = mntget(child_reaper->fs->rootmnt);
14152+ realroot = dget(child_reaper->fs->root);
14153+ read_unlock(&child_reaper->fs->lock);
14154+
14155+ read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
14156+ currentmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
14157+ currentroot = dget(current->fs->root);
14158+ read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
14159+
14160+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
14161+ for (;;) {
14162+ if (unlikely((dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
14163+ || (dentry == currentroot && mnt == currentmnt)))
14164+ break;
14165+ if (unlikely(dentry == mnt->mnt_root || IS_ROOT(dentry))) {
14166+ if (mnt->mnt_parent == mnt)
14167+ break;
14168+ dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
14169+ mnt = mnt->mnt_parent;
14170+ continue;
14171+ }
14172+ dentry = dentry->d_parent;
14173+ }
14174+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
14175+
14176+ dput(currentroot);
14177+ mntput(currentmnt);
14178+
14179+ /* access is outside of chroot */
14180+ if (dentry == realroot && mnt == realrootmnt)
14181+ ret = 0;
14182+
14183+ dput(realroot);
14184+ mntput(realrootmnt);
14185+ return ret;
14186+}
14187+#endif
14188+
14189+int
14190+gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt)
14191+{
14192+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
14193+ if (!grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir)
14194+ return 1;
14195+
14196+ if (!proc_is_chrooted(current))
14197+ return 1;
14198+ else if (!gr_is_outside_chroot(u_dentry, u_mnt)) {
14199+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG, u_dentry, u_mnt);
14200+ return 0;
14201+ }
14202+#endif
14203+ return 1;
14204+}
14205+
14206+int
14207+gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
14208+ const time_t shm_createtime)
14209+{
14210+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
14211+ struct pid *pid = NULL;
14212+ time_t starttime;
14213+
14214+ if (unlikely(!grsec_enable_chroot_shmat))
14215+ return 1;
14216+
14217+ if (likely(!proc_is_chrooted(current)))
14218+ return 1;
14219+
14220+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
14221+
14222+ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_cprid);
14223+ if (pid) {
14224+ struct task_struct *p;
14225+ p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14226+ task_lock(p);
14227+ starttime = p->start_time.tv_sec;
14228+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p) &&
14229+ time_before((unsigned long)starttime, (unsigned long)shm_createtime))) {
14230+ task_unlock(p);
14231+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14232+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
14233+ return 0;
14234+ }
14235+ task_unlock(p);
14236+ } else {
14237+ pid = find_pid(PIDTYPE_PID, shm_lapid);
14238+ if (pid) {
14239+ struct task_struct *p;
14240+ p = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, PIDTYPE_PID);
14241+ task_lock(p);
14242+ if (unlikely(!have_same_root(current, p))) {
14243+ task_unlock(p);
14244+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14245+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG);
14246+ return 0;
14247+ }
14248+ task_unlock(p);
14249+ }
14250+ }
14251+
14252+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
14253+#endif
14254+ return 1;
14255+}
14256+
14257+void
14258+gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14259+{
14260+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
14261+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_execlog && proc_is_chrooted(current))
14262+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14263+#endif
14264+ return;
14265+}
14266+
14267+int
14268+gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
14269+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
14270+{
14271+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
14272+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mknod && !S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISREG(mode) &&
14273+ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14274+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14275+ return -EPERM;
14276+ }
14277+#endif
14278+ return 0;
14279+}
14280+
14281+int
14282+gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
14283+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const char *dev_name)
14284+{
14285+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
14286+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_mount && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14287+ gr_log_str_fs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG, dev_name, dentry, mnt);
14288+ return -EPERM;
14289+ }
14290+#endif
14291+ return 0;
14292+}
14293+
14294+int
14295+gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void)
14296+{
14297+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
14298+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_pivot && proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14299+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG);
14300+ return -EPERM;
14301+ }
14302+#endif
14303+ return 0;
14304+}
14305+
14306+int
14307+gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14308+{
14309+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
14310+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_double && proc_is_chrooted(current) &&
14311+ !gr_is_outside_chroot(dentry, mnt)) {
14312+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14313+ return -EPERM;
14314+ }
14315+#endif
14316+ return 0;
14317+}
14318+
14319+void
14320+gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task)
14321+{
14322+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
14323+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_caps && proc_is_chrooted(task)) {
14324+ task->cap_permitted =
14325+ cap_drop(task->cap_permitted, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14326+ task->cap_inheritable =
14327+ cap_drop(task->cap_inheritable, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14328+ task->cap_effective =
14329+ cap_drop(task->cap_effective, GR_CHROOT_CAPS);
14330+ }
14331+#endif
14332+ return;
14333+}
14334+
14335+int
14336+gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op)
14337+{
14338+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
14339+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl && proc_is_chrooted(current)
14340+ && (op & 002))
14341+ return -EACCES;
14342+#endif
14343+ return 0;
14344+}
14345+
14346+void
14347+gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
14348+{
14349+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
14350+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chdir)
14351+ set_fs_pwd(current->fs, mnt, dentry);
14352+#endif
14353+ return;
14354+}
14355+
14356+int
14357+gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
14358+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode)
14359+{
14360+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
14361+ if (grsec_enable_chroot_chmod &&
14362+ ((mode & S_ISUID) || ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP))) &&
14363+ proc_is_chrooted(current)) {
14364+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG, dentry, mnt);
14365+ return -EPERM;
14366+ }
14367+#endif
14368+ return 0;
14369+}
14370+
14371+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
14372+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_caps);
14373+#endif
14374diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
14375--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14376+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14377@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
14378+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14379+#include <linux/module.h>
14380+#include <linux/config.h>
14381+#include <linux/sched.h>
14382+#include <linux/file.h>
14383+#include <linux/fs.h>
14384+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
14385+#include <linux/net.h>
14386+#include <linux/in.h>
14387+#include <linux/ip.h>
14388+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
14389+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
14390+
14391+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
14392+void
14393+pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
14394+{
14395+ return;
14396+}
14397+#endif
14398+
14399+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
14400+__u32
14401+gr_handle_sysctl(const struct ctl_table * table, __u32 mode)
14402+{
14403+ return mode;
14404+}
14405+#endif
14406+
14407+int
14408+gr_acl_is_enabled(void)
14409+{
14410+ return 0;
14411+}
14412+
14413+int
14414+gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode)
14415+{
14416+ return 0;
14417+}
14418+
14419+void
14420+gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code)
14421+{
14422+ return;
14423+}
14424+
14425+int
14426+gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request)
14427+{
14428+ return 0;
14429+}
14430+
14431+int
14432+gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task)
14433+{
14434+ return 0;
14435+}
14436+
14437+void
14438+gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task,
14439+ const int res, const unsigned long wanted, const int gt)
14440+{
14441+ return;
14442+}
14443+
14444+int
14445+gr_set_acls(const int type)
14446+{
14447+ return 0;
14448+}
14449+
14450+int
14451+gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk)
14452+{
14453+ return 0;
14454+}
14455+
14456+int
14457+gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task)
14458+{
14459+ return 0;
14460+}
14461+
14462+void
14463+gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk)
14464+{
14465+ return;
14466+}
14467+
14468+void
14469+gr_set_pax_flags(struct task_struct *task)
14470+{
14471+ return;
14472+}
14473+
14474+int
14475+gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14476+{
14477+ return 0;
14478+}
14479+
14480+void
14481+gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev)
14482+{
14483+ return;
14484+}
14485+
14486+void
14487+gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
14488+{
14489+ return;
14490+}
14491+
14492+void
14493+gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig)
14494+{
14495+ return;
14496+}
14497+
14498+int
14499+gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp)
14500+{
14501+ return 0;
14502+}
14503+
14504+int
14505+gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid)
14506+{
14507+ return 0;
14508+}
14509+
14510+void
14511+gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
14512+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
14513+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
14514+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace)
14515+{
14516+ return;
14517+}
14518+
14519+int
14520+gr_search_socket(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
14521+{
14522+ return 1;
14523+}
14524+
14525+int
14526+gr_search_connectbind(const int mode, const struct socket *sock,
14527+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14528+{
14529+ return 1;
14530+}
14531+
14532+int
14533+gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap)
14534+{
14535+ return 1;
14536+}
14537+
14538+int
14539+gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap)
14540+{
14541+ return 1;
14542+}
14543+
14544+void
14545+gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task)
14546+{
14547+ return;
14548+}
14549+
14550+__u32
14551+gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14552+{
14553+ return 1;
14554+}
14555+
14556+__u32
14557+gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry * dentry,
14558+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14559+{
14560+ return 1;
14561+}
14562+
14563+__u32
14564+gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14565+ const int fmode)
14566+{
14567+ return 1;
14568+}
14569+
14570+__u32
14571+gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14572+{
14573+ return 1;
14574+}
14575+
14576+__u32
14577+gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14578+{
14579+ return 1;
14580+}
14581+
14582+int
14583+gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot,
14584+ unsigned int *vm_flags)
14585+{
14586+ return 1;
14587+}
14588+
14589+__u32
14590+gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry * dentry,
14591+ const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14592+{
14593+ return 1;
14594+}
14595+
14596+__u32
14597+gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14598+{
14599+ return 1;
14600+}
14601+
14602+__u32
14603+gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry * dentry,
14604+ const struct vfsmount * mnt, const int fmode)
14605+{
14606+ return 1;
14607+}
14608+
14609+__u32
14610+gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14611+ mode_t mode)
14612+{
14613+ return 1;
14614+}
14615+
14616+__u32
14617+gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt,
14618+ mode_t mode)
14619+{
14620+ return 1;
14621+}
14622+
14623+__u32
14624+gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14625+{
14626+ return 1;
14627+}
14628+
14629+void
14630+grsecurity_init(void)
14631+{
14632+ return;
14633+}
14634+
14635+__u32
14636+gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14637+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14638+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
14639+ const int mode)
14640+{
14641+ return 1;
14642+}
14643+
14644+__u32
14645+gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14646+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14647+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt)
14648+{
14649+ return 1;
14650+}
14651+
14652+__u32
14653+gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14654+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14655+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt, const char *from)
14656+{
14657+ return 1;
14658+}
14659+
14660+__u32
14661+gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry * new_dentry,
14662+ const struct dentry * parent_dentry,
14663+ const struct vfsmount * parent_mnt,
14664+ const struct dentry * old_dentry,
14665+ const struct vfsmount * old_mnt, const char *to)
14666+{
14667+ return 1;
14668+}
14669+
14670+int
14671+gr_acl_handle_rename(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
14672+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
14673+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
14674+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
14675+ const struct inode *old_parent_inode,
14676+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname)
14677+{
14678+ return 0;
14679+}
14680+
14681+int
14682+gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
14683+ const int namelen, const ino_t ino)
14684+{
14685+ return 1;
14686+}
14687+
14688+int
14689+gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
14690+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid, const int shmid)
14691+{
14692+ return 1;
14693+}
14694+
14695+int
14696+gr_search_bind(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14697+{
14698+ return 1;
14699+}
14700+
14701+int
14702+gr_search_accept(const struct socket *sock)
14703+{
14704+ return 1;
14705+}
14706+
14707+int
14708+gr_search_listen(const struct socket *sock)
14709+{
14710+ return 1;
14711+}
14712+
14713+int
14714+gr_search_connect(const struct socket *sock, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14715+{
14716+ return 1;
14717+}
14718+
14719+__u32
14720+gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry * dentry, const struct vfsmount * mnt)
14721+{
14722+ return 1;
14723+}
14724+
14725+__u32
14726+gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry * dentry,
14727+ const struct dentry * p_dentry,
14728+ const struct vfsmount * p_mnt, const int fmode,
14729+ const int imode)
14730+{
14731+ return 1;
14732+}
14733+
14734+void
14735+gr_acl_handle_exit(void)
14736+{
14737+ return;
14738+}
14739+
14740+int
14741+gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file, const unsigned long prot)
14742+{
14743+ return 1;
14744+}
14745+
14746+void
14747+gr_set_role_label(const uid_t uid, const gid_t gid)
14748+{
14749+ return;
14750+}
14751+
14752+int
14753+gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task)
14754+{
14755+ return 0;
14756+}
14757+
14758+int
14759+gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
14760+{
14761+ return 1;
14762+}
14763+
14764+int
14765+gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr)
14766+{
14767+ return 1;
14768+}
14769+
14770+void
14771+gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task)
14772+{
14773+ return;
14774+}
14775+
14776+int
14777+gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
14778+{
14779+ return 0;
14780+}
14781+
14782+int
14783+gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs)
14784+{
14785+ return 0;
14786+}
14787+
14788+
14789+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_task_is_capable);
14790+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_learn_resource);
14791+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_set_kernel_label);
14792+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
14793+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_user_change);
14794+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_check_group_change);
14795+#endif
14796diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c
14797--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14798+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_exec.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14799@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
14800+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14801+#include <linux/sched.h>
14802+#include <linux/file.h>
14803+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
14804+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
14805+#include <linux/fs.h>
14806+#include <linux/types.h>
14807+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
14808+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14809+#include <linux/capability.h>
14810+
14811+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
14812+
14813+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
14814+static char gr_exec_arg_buf[132];
14815+static DECLARE_MUTEX(gr_exec_arg_sem);
14816+#endif
14817+
14818+int
14819+gr_handle_nproc(void)
14820+{
14821+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
14822+ if (grsec_enable_execve && current->user &&
14823+ (atomic_read(&current->user->processes) >
14824+ current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) &&
14825+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
14826+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_NPROC_MSG);
14827+ return -EAGAIN;
14828+ }
14829+#endif
14830+ return 0;
14831+}
14832+
14833+void
14834+gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char __user *__user *argv)
14835+{
14836+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
14837+ char *grarg = gr_exec_arg_buf;
14838+ unsigned int i, x, execlen = 0;
14839+ char c;
14840+
14841+ if (!((grsec_enable_execlog && grsec_enable_group &&
14842+ in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid))
14843+ || (grsec_enable_execlog && !grsec_enable_group)))
14844+ return;
14845+
14846+ down(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
14847+ memset(grarg, 0, sizeof(gr_exec_arg_buf));
14848+
14849+ if (unlikely(argv == NULL))
14850+ goto log;
14851+
14852+ for (i = 0; i < bprm->argc && execlen < 128; i++) {
14853+ const char __user *p;
14854+ unsigned int len;
14855+
14856+ if (copy_from_user(&p, argv + i, sizeof(p)))
14857+ goto log;
14858+ if (!p)
14859+ goto log;
14860+ len = strnlen_user(p, 128 - execlen);
14861+ if (len > 128 - execlen)
14862+ len = 128 - execlen;
14863+ else if (len > 0)
14864+ len--;
14865+ if (copy_from_user(grarg + execlen, p, len))
14866+ goto log;
14867+
14868+ /* rewrite unprintable characters */
14869+ for (x = 0; x < len; x++) {
14870+ c = *(grarg + execlen + x);
14871+ if (c < 32 || c > 126)
14872+ *(grarg + execlen + x) = ' ';
14873+ }
14874+
14875+ execlen += len;
14876+ *(grarg + execlen) = ' ';
14877+ *(grarg + execlen + 1) = '\0';
14878+ execlen++;
14879+ }
14880+
14881+ log:
14882+ gr_log_fs_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG, bprm->file->f_dentry,
14883+ bprm->file->f_vfsmnt, grarg);
14884+ up(&gr_exec_arg_sem);
14885+#endif
14886+ return;
14887+}
14888diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
14889--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14890+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14891@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
14892+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14893+#include <linux/sched.h>
14894+#include <linux/fs.h>
14895+#include <linux/file.h>
14896+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14897+
14898+int
14899+gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt,
14900+ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag, const int acc_mode)
14901+{
14902+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
14903+ if (grsec_enable_fifo && S_ISFIFO(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) &&
14904+ !(flag & O_EXCL) && (dir->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
14905+ (dentry->d_inode->i_uid != dir->d_inode->i_uid) &&
14906+ (current->fsuid != dentry->d_inode->i_uid)) {
14907+ if (!generic_permission(dentry->d_inode, acc_mode, NULL))
14908+ gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FIFO_MSG, dentry, mnt, dentry->d_inode->i_uid, dentry->d_inode->i_gid);
14909+ return -EACCES;
14910+ }
14911+#endif
14912+ return 0;
14913+}
14914diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c
14915--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14916+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_fork.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14917@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
14918+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14919+#include <linux/sched.h>
14920+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
14921+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
14922+
14923+void
14924+gr_log_forkfail(const int retval)
14925+{
14926+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
14927+ if (grsec_enable_forkfail)
14928+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_FAILFORK_MSG, retval);
14929+#endif
14930+ return;
14931+}
14932diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_init.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_init.c
14933--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
14934+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_init.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
14935@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
14936+#include <linux/kernel.h>
14937+#include <linux/sched.h>
14938+#include <linux/mm.h>
14939+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
14940+#include <linux/gracl.h>
14941+#include <linux/slab.h>
14942+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
14943+#include <linux/percpu.h>
14944+
14945+int grsec_enable_shm;
14946+int grsec_enable_link;
14947+int grsec_enable_dmesg;
14948+int grsec_enable_fifo;
14949+int grsec_enable_execve;
14950+int grsec_enable_execlog;
14951+int grsec_enable_signal;
14952+int grsec_enable_forkfail;
14953+int grsec_enable_time;
14954+int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
14955+int grsec_enable_group;
14956+int grsec_audit_gid;
14957+int grsec_enable_chdir;
14958+int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
14959+int grsec_enable_mount;
14960+int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
14961+int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
14962+int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
14963+int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
14964+int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
14965+int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
14966+int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
14967+int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
14968+int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
14969+int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
14970+int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
14971+int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
14972+int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
14973+int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
14974+int grsec_enable_tpe;
14975+int grsec_tpe_gid;
14976+int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
14977+int grsec_enable_randpid;
14978+int grsec_enable_socket_all;
14979+int grsec_socket_all_gid;
14980+int grsec_enable_socket_client;
14981+int grsec_socket_client_gid;
14982+int grsec_enable_socket_server;
14983+int grsec_socket_server_gid;
14984+int grsec_lock;
14985+
14986+spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
14987+unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime = 0;
14988+unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
14989+
14990+spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
14991+
14992+rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock = RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
14993+
14994+char *gr_shared_page[4];
14995+
14996+char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
14997+char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
14998+char *gr_alert_log_buf;
14999+char *gr_audit_log_buf;
15000+
15001+extern struct gr_arg *gr_usermode;
15002+extern unsigned char *gr_system_salt;
15003+extern unsigned char *gr_system_sum;
15004+
15005+void
15006+grsecurity_init(void)
15007+{
15008+ int j;
15009+ /* create the per-cpu shared pages */
15010+
15011+ preempt_disable();
15012+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
15013+ gr_shared_page[j] = (char *)__alloc_percpu(PAGE_SIZE);
15014+ if (gr_shared_page[j] == NULL) {
15015+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity shared page");
15016+ return;
15017+ }
15018+ }
15019+ preempt_enable();
15020+
15021+ /* allocate log buffers */
15022+ gr_alert_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
15023+ if (!gr_alert_log_fmt) {
15024+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log format buffer");
15025+ return;
15026+ }
15027+ gr_audit_log_fmt = kmalloc(512, GFP_KERNEL);
15028+ if (!gr_audit_log_fmt) {
15029+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log format buffer");
15030+ return;
15031+ }
15032+ gr_alert_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
15033+ if (!gr_alert_log_buf) {
15034+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity alert log buffer");
15035+ return;
15036+ }
15037+ gr_audit_log_buf = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
15038+ if (!gr_audit_log_buf) {
15039+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity audit log buffer");
15040+ return;
15041+ }
15042+
15043+ /* allocate memory for authentication structure */
15044+ gr_usermode = kmalloc(sizeof(struct gr_arg), GFP_KERNEL);
15045+ gr_system_salt = kmalloc(GR_SALT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
15046+ gr_system_sum = kmalloc(GR_SHA_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
15047+
15048+ if (!gr_usermode || !gr_system_salt || !gr_system_sum) {
15049+ panic("Unable to allocate grsecurity authentication structure");
15050+ return;
15051+ }
15052+
15053+#if !defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON)
15054+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
15055+ grsec_lock = 1;
15056+#endif
15057+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
15058+ grsec_enable_shm = 1;
15059+#endif
15060+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
15061+ grsec_enable_audit_textrel = 1;
15062+#endif
15063+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
15064+ grsec_enable_group = 1;
15065+ grsec_audit_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID;
15066+#endif
15067+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
15068+ grsec_enable_chdir = 1;
15069+#endif
15070+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15071+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc = 1;
15072+#endif
15073+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15074+ grsec_enable_mount = 1;
15075+#endif
15076+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15077+ grsec_enable_link = 1;
15078+#endif
15079+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
15080+ grsec_enable_dmesg = 1;
15081+#endif
15082+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
15083+ grsec_enable_fifo = 1;
15084+#endif
15085+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
15086+ grsec_enable_execve = 1;
15087+#endif
15088+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
15089+ grsec_enable_execlog = 1;
15090+#endif
15091+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
15092+ grsec_enable_signal = 1;
15093+#endif
15094+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
15095+ grsec_enable_forkfail = 1;
15096+#endif
15097+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
15098+ grsec_enable_time = 1;
15099+#endif
15100+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
15101+ grsec_enable_chroot_findtask = 1;
15102+#endif
15103+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
15104+ grsec_enable_chroot_unix = 1;
15105+#endif
15106+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
15107+ grsec_enable_chroot_mount = 1;
15108+#endif
15109+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
15110+ grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir = 1;
15111+#endif
15112+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
15113+ grsec_enable_chroot_shmat = 1;
15114+#endif
15115+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
15116+ grsec_enable_chroot_double = 1;
15117+#endif
15118+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
15119+ grsec_enable_chroot_pivot = 1;
15120+#endif
15121+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
15122+ grsec_enable_chroot_chdir = 1;
15123+#endif
15124+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
15125+ grsec_enable_chroot_chmod = 1;
15126+#endif
15127+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
15128+ grsec_enable_chroot_mknod = 1;
15129+#endif
15130+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
15131+ grsec_enable_chroot_nice = 1;
15132+#endif
15133+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
15134+ grsec_enable_chroot_execlog = 1;
15135+#endif
15136+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
15137+ grsec_enable_chroot_caps = 1;
15138+#endif
15139+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
15140+ grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl = 1;
15141+#endif
15142+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
15143+ grsec_enable_tpe = 1;
15144+ grsec_tpe_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID;
15145+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
15146+ grsec_enable_tpe_all = 1;
15147+#endif
15148+#endif
15149+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
15150+ grsec_enable_randpid = 1;
15151+#endif
15152+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
15153+ grsec_enable_socket_all = 1;
15154+ grsec_socket_all_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID;
15155+#endif
15156+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
15157+ grsec_enable_socket_client = 1;
15158+ grsec_socket_client_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID;
15159+#endif
15160+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
15161+ grsec_enable_socket_server = 1;
15162+ grsec_socket_server_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID;
15163+#endif
15164+#endif
15165+
15166+ return;
15167+}
15168diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c
15169--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15170+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_ipc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15171@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
15172+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15173+#include <linux/sched.h>
15174+#include <linux/types.h>
15175+#include <linux/ipc.h>
15176+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15177+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15178+
15179+void
15180+gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg)
15181+{
15182+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15183+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15184+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15185+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (ret >= 0)
15186+ && (msgflg & IPC_CREAT))
15187+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG);
15188+#endif
15189+ return;
15190+}
15191+
15192+void
15193+gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15194+{
15195+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15196+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15197+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15198+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15199+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15200+#endif
15201+ return;
15202+}
15203+
15204+void
15205+gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg)
15206+{
15207+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15208+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15209+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15210+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
15211+ && (semflg & IPC_CREAT))
15212+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG);
15213+#endif
15214+ return;
15215+}
15216+
15217+void
15218+gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15219+{
15220+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15221+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15222+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15223+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15224+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15225+#endif
15226+ return;
15227+}
15228+
15229+void
15230+gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size)
15231+{
15232+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15233+ if (((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15234+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) || (grsec_enable_audit_ipc &&
15235+ !grsec_enable_group)) && (err >= 0)
15236+ && (shmflg & IPC_CREAT))
15237+ gr_log_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG, size);
15238+#endif
15239+ return;
15240+}
15241+
15242+void
15243+gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid)
15244+{
15245+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
15246+ if ((grsec_enable_group && in_group_p(grsec_audit_gid) &&
15247+ grsec_enable_audit_ipc) ||
15248+ (grsec_enable_audit_ipc && !grsec_enable_group))
15249+ gr_log_int_int(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG, uid, cuid);
15250+#endif
15251+ return;
15252+}
15253diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_link.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_link.c
15254--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15255+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_link.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15256@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
15257+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15258+#include <linux/sched.h>
15259+#include <linux/fs.h>
15260+#include <linux/file.h>
15261+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15262+
15263+int
15264+gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
15265+ const struct inode *inode,
15266+ const struct dentry *dentry, const struct vfsmount *mnt)
15267+{
15268+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15269+ if (grsec_enable_link && S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
15270+ (parent->i_mode & S_ISVTX) && (parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid) &&
15271+ (parent->i_mode & S_IWOTH) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid)) {
15272+ gr_log_fs_int2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYMLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid);
15273+ return -EACCES;
15274+ }
15275+#endif
15276+ return 0;
15277+}
15278+
15279+int
15280+gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
15281+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
15282+ struct inode *inode, const int mode, const char *to)
15283+{
15284+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
15285+ if (grsec_enable_link && current->fsuid != inode->i_uid &&
15286+ (!S_ISREG(mode) || (mode & S_ISUID) ||
15287+ ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) ||
15288+ (generic_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE, NULL))) &&
15289+ !capable(CAP_FOWNER) && current->uid) {
15290+ gr_log_fs_int2_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_HARDLINK_MSG, dentry, mnt, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, to);
15291+ return -EPERM;
15292+ }
15293+#endif
15294+ return 0;
15295+}
15296diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_log.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_log.c
15297--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15298+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_log.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15299@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
15300+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15301+#include <linux/sched.h>
15302+#include <linux/file.h>
15303+#include <linux/tty.h>
15304+#include <linux/fs.h>
15305+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15306+
15307+#define BEGIN_LOCKS(x) \
15308+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); \
15309+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
15310+ if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
15311+ spin_lock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
15312+ else \
15313+ spin_lock(&grsec_audit_lock)
15314+
15315+#define END_LOCKS(x) \
15316+ if (x != GR_DO_AUDIT) \
15317+ spin_unlock(&grsec_alert_lock); \
15318+ else \
15319+ spin_unlock(&grsec_audit_lock); \
15320+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
15321+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); \
15322+ if (x == GR_DONT_AUDIT) \
15323+ gr_handle_alertkill(current)
15324+
15325+enum {
15326+ FLOODING,
15327+ NO_FLOODING
15328+};
15329+
15330+extern char *gr_alert_log_fmt;
15331+extern char *gr_audit_log_fmt;
15332+extern char *gr_alert_log_buf;
15333+extern char *gr_audit_log_buf;
15334+
15335+static int gr_log_start(int audit)
15336+{
15337+ char *loglevel = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? KERN_INFO : KERN_ALERT;
15338+ char *fmt = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_fmt : gr_alert_log_fmt;
15339+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15340+
15341+ if (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT)
15342+ goto set_fmt;
15343+
15344+ if (!grsec_alert_wtime || jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime > CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) {
15345+ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
15346+ grsec_alert_fyet = 0;
15347+ } else if ((jiffies - grsec_alert_wtime < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME * HZ) && (grsec_alert_fyet < CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST)) {
15348+ grsec_alert_fyet++;
15349+ } else if (grsec_alert_fyet == CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST) {
15350+ grsec_alert_wtime = jiffies;
15351+ grsec_alert_fyet++;
15352+ printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: more alerts, logging disabled for %d seconds\n", CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME);
15353+ return FLOODING;
15354+ } else return FLOODING;
15355+
15356+set_fmt:
15357+ memset(buf, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
15358+ if (current->signal->curr_ip && gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
15359+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
15360+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip), current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
15361+ } else if (current->signal->curr_ip) {
15362+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: From %u.%u.%u.%u: ");
15363+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, NIPQUAD(current->signal->curr_ip));
15364+ } else if (gr_acl_is_enabled()) {
15365+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: (%.64s:%c:%.950s) ");
15366+ snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, fmt, current->role->rolename, gr_roletype_to_char(), current->acl->filename);
15367+ } else {
15368+ sprintf(fmt, "%s%s", loglevel, "grsec: ");
15369+ strcpy(buf, fmt);
15370+ }
15371+
15372+ return NO_FLOODING;
15373+}
15374+
15375+static void gr_log_middle(int audit, const char *msg, va_list ap)
15376+{
15377+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15378+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15379+
15380+ vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
15381+
15382+ return;
15383+}
15384+
15385+static void gr_log_middle_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, ...)
15386+{
15387+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15388+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15389+ va_list ap;
15390+
15391+ va_start(ap, msg);
15392+ vsnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, msg, ap);
15393+ va_end(ap);
15394+
15395+ return;
15396+}
15397+
15398+static void gr_log_end(int audit)
15399+{
15400+ char *buf = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? gr_audit_log_buf : gr_alert_log_buf;
15401+ unsigned int len = strlen(buf);
15402+
15403+ snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 1, DEFAULTSECMSG, DEFAULTSECARGS(current));
15404+ printk("%s\n", buf);
15405+
15406+ return;
15407+}
15408+
15409+void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...)
15410+{
15411+ int logtype;
15412+ char *result = (audit == GR_DO_AUDIT) ? "successful" : "denied";
15413+ char *str1, *str2, *str3;
15414+ int num1, num2;
15415+ unsigned long ulong1, ulong2;
15416+ struct dentry *dentry;
15417+ struct vfsmount *mnt;
15418+ struct file *file;
15419+ struct task_struct *task;
15420+ va_list ap;
15421+
15422+ BEGIN_LOCKS(audit);
15423+ logtype = gr_log_start(audit);
15424+ if (logtype == FLOODING) {
15425+ END_LOCKS(audit);
15426+ return;
15427+ }
15428+ va_start(ap, argtypes);
15429+ switch (argtypes) {
15430+ case GR_TTYSNIFF:
15431+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15432+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip), gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid);
15433+ break;
15434+ case GR_RBAC:
15435+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15436+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15437+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15438+ break;
15439+ case GR_RBAC_STR:
15440+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15441+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15442+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15443+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
15444+ break;
15445+ case GR_STR_RBAC:
15446+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15447+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15448+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15449+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15450+ break;
15451+ case GR_RBAC_MODE2:
15452+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15453+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15454+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15455+ str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15456+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2);
15457+ break;
15458+ case GR_RBAC_MODE3:
15459+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15460+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15461+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15462+ str2 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15463+ str3 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15464+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, result, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1, str2, str3);
15465+ break;
15466+ case GR_FILENAME:
15467+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15468+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15469+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15470+ break;
15471+ case GR_STR_FILENAME:
15472+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15473+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15474+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15475+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt));
15476+ break;
15477+ case GR_FILENAME_STR:
15478+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15479+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15480+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15481+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), str1);
15482+ break;
15483+ case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT:
15484+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15485+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15486+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15487+ num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
15488+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2);
15489+ break;
15490+ case GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR:
15491+ dentry = va_arg(ap, struct dentry *);
15492+ mnt = va_arg(ap, struct vfsmount *);
15493+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15494+ num2 = va_arg(ap, int);
15495+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15496+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_to_filename(dentry, mnt), num1, num2, str1);
15497+ break;
15498+ case GR_TEXTREL:
15499+ file = va_arg(ap, struct file *);
15500+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15501+ ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15502+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, file ? gr_to_filename(file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt) : "<anonymous mapping>", ulong1, ulong2);
15503+ break;
15504+ case GR_PTRACE:
15505+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15506+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, task->exec_file ? gr_to_filename(task->exec_file->f_dentry, task->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "(none)", task->comm, task->pid);
15507+ break;
15508+ case GR_RESOURCE:
15509+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15510+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15511+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15512+ ulong2 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15513+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, ulong1, str1, ulong2, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15514+ break;
15515+ case GR_CAP:
15516+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15517+ str1 = va_arg(ap, char *);
15518+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, str1, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15519+ break;
15520+ case GR_SIG:
15521+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15522+ num1 = va_arg(ap, int);
15523+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, num1, gr_task_fullpath0(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath0(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15524+ break;
15525+ case GR_CRASH1:
15526+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15527+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15528+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, task->uid, ulong1);
15529+ break;
15530+ case GR_CRASH2:
15531+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15532+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15533+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid, ulong1);
15534+ break;
15535+ case GR_PSACCT:
15536+ {
15537+ unsigned int wday, cday;
15538+ __u8 whr, chr;
15539+ __u8 wmin, cmin;
15540+ __u8 wsec, csec;
15541+ char cur_tty[64] = { 0 };
15542+ char parent_tty[64] = { 0 };
15543+
15544+ task = va_arg(ap, struct task_struct *);
15545+ wday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
15546+ cday = va_arg(ap, unsigned int);
15547+ whr = va_arg(ap, int);
15548+ chr = va_arg(ap, int);
15549+ wmin = va_arg(ap, int);
15550+ cmin = va_arg(ap, int);
15551+ wsec = va_arg(ap, int);
15552+ csec = va_arg(ap, int);
15553+ ulong1 = va_arg(ap, unsigned long);
15554+
15555+ gr_log_middle_varargs(audit, msg, gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, task->pid, NIPQUAD(task->signal->curr_ip), tty_name(task->signal->tty, cur_tty), task->uid, task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, wday, whr, wmin, wsec, cday, chr, cmin, csec, (task->flags & PF_SIGNALED) ? "killed by signal" : "exited", ulong1, gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, NIPQUAD(task->parent->signal->curr_ip), tty_name(task->parent->signal->tty, parent_tty), task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid);
15556+ }
15557+ break;
15558+ default:
15559+ gr_log_middle(audit, msg, ap);
15560+ }
15561+ va_end(ap);
15562+ gr_log_end(audit);
15563+ END_LOCKS(audit);
15564+}
15565diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c
15566--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15567+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mem.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15568@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
15569+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15570+#include <linux/sched.h>
15571+#include <linux/mm.h>
15572+#include <linux/mman.h>
15573+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15574+
15575+void
15576+gr_handle_ioperm(void)
15577+{
15578+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPERM_MSG);
15579+ return;
15580+}
15581+
15582+void
15583+gr_handle_iopl(void)
15584+{
15585+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_IOPL_MSG);
15586+ return;
15587+}
15588+
15589+void
15590+gr_handle_mem_write(void)
15591+{
15592+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG);
15593+ return;
15594+}
15595+
15596+void
15597+gr_handle_kmem_write(void)
15598+{
15599+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_KMEM_MSG);
15600+ return;
15601+}
15602+
15603+void
15604+gr_handle_open_port(void)
15605+{
15606+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG);
15607+ return;
15608+}
15609+
15610+int
15611+gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
15612+{
15613+ unsigned long start, end;
15614+
15615+ start = offset;
15616+ end = start + vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
15617+
15618+ if (start > end) {
15619+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
15620+ return -EPERM;
15621+ }
15622+
15623+ /* allowed ranges : ISA I/O BIOS */
15624+ if ((start >= __pa(high_memory))
15625+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
15626+ || (start >= 0x000a0000 && end <= 0x00100000)
15627+ || (start >= 0x00000000 && end <= 0x00001000)
15628+#endif
15629+ )
15630+ return 0;
15631+
15632+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) {
15633+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG);
15634+ return -EPERM;
15635+ } else
15636+ vma->vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
15637+
15638+ return 0;
15639+}
15640diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c
15641--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15642+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_mount.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15643@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
15644+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15645+#include <linux/sched.h>
15646+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15647+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15648+
15649+void
15650+gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval)
15651+{
15652+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15653+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15654+ gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
15655+#endif
15656+ return;
15657+}
15658+
15659+void
15660+gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval)
15661+{
15662+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15663+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15664+ gr_log_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, devname ? devname : "none");
15665+#endif
15666+ return;
15667+}
15668+
15669+void
15670+gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval)
15671+{
15672+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
15673+ if (grsec_enable_mount && (retval >= 0))
15674+ gr_log_str_str(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG, from, to);
15675+#endif
15676+ return;
15677+}
15678diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c
15679--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15680+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_rand.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15681@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
15682+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15683+#include <linux/sched.h>
15684+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
15685+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15686+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15687+
15688+extern int pid_max;
15689+
15690+int
15691+gr_random_pid(void)
15692+{
15693+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
15694+ int pid;
15695+
15696+ if (grsec_enable_randpid && current->fs->root) {
15697+ /* return a pid in the range 1 ... pid_max - 1
15698+ optimize this so we don't have to do a real division
15699+ */
15700+ pid = 1 + (get_random_long() % pid_max);
15701+ if (pid == pid_max)
15702+ pid = pid_max - 1;
15703+ return pid;
15704+ }
15705+#endif
15706+ return 0;
15707+}
15708diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c
15709--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15710+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sig.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15711@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
15712+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15713+#include <linux/sched.h>
15714+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15715+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15716+
15717+void
15718+gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t)
15719+{
15720+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
15721+ if (grsec_enable_signal && ((sig == SIGSEGV) || (sig == SIGILL) ||
15722+ (sig == SIGABRT) || (sig == SIGBUS))) {
15723+ if (t->pid == current->pid) {
15724+ gr_log_int(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG, sig);
15725+ } else {
15726+ gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG, t, sig);
15727+ }
15728+ }
15729+#endif
15730+ return;
15731+}
15732+
15733+int
15734+gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig)
15735+{
15736+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15737+ if (current->pid > 1 && gr_check_protected_task(p)) {
15738+ gr_log_sig(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SIG_ACL_MSG, p, sig);
15739+ return -EPERM;
15740+ } else if (gr_pid_is_chrooted((struct task_struct *)p)) {
15741+ return -EPERM;
15742+ }
15743+#endif
15744+ return 0;
15745+}
15746+
15747+void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p)
15748+{
15749+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
15750+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
15751+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
15752+ if (p->parent && p->parent->exec_file == p->exec_file)
15753+ p->parent->brute = 1;
15754+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
15755+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
15756+#endif
15757+ return;
15758+}
15759+
15760+void gr_handle_brute_check(void)
15761+{
15762+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
15763+ if (current->brute) {
15764+ set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
15765+ schedule_timeout(30 * HZ);
15766+ }
15767+#endif
15768+ return;
15769+}
15770+
15771diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c
15772--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
15773+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sock.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
15774@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
15775+#include <linux/kernel.h>
15776+#include <linux/module.h>
15777+#include <linux/sched.h>
15778+#include <linux/file.h>
15779+#include <linux/net.h>
15780+#include <linux/in.h>
15781+#include <linux/ip.h>
15782+#include <net/sock.h>
15783+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
15784+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
15785+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
15786+#include <linux/gracl.h>
15787+
15788+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH_MODULE)
15789+extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
15790+EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp_v4_lookup);
15791+#endif
15792+
15793+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_cap_rtnetlink);
15794+
15795+extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb);
15796+extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk, const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
15797+
15798+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_recvmsg);
15799+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_search_udp_sendmsg);
15800+
15801+#ifdef CONFIG_UNIX_MODULE
15802+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_unix);
15803+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_acl_handle_mknod);
15804+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_chroot_unix);
15805+EXPORT_SYMBOL(gr_handle_create);
15806+#endif
15807+
15808+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15809+#define gr_conn_table_size 32749
15810+struct conn_table_entry {
15811+ struct conn_table_entry *next;
15812+ struct signal_struct *sig;
15813+};
15814+
15815+struct conn_table_entry *gr_conn_table[gr_conn_table_size];
15816+spinlock_t gr_conn_table_lock = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
15817+
15818+extern const char * gr_socktype_to_name(unsigned char type);
15819+extern const char * gr_proto_to_name(unsigned char proto);
15820+
15821+static __inline__ int
15822+conn_hash(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 sport, __u16 dport, unsigned int size)
15823+{
15824+ return ((daddr + saddr + (sport << 8) + (dport << 16)) % size);
15825+}
15826+
15827+static __inline__ int
15828+conn_match(const struct signal_struct *sig, __u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
15829+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
15830+{
15831+ if (unlikely(sig->gr_saddr == saddr && sig->gr_daddr == daddr &&
15832+ sig->gr_sport == sport && sig->gr_dport == dport))
15833+ return 1;
15834+ else
15835+ return 0;
15836+}
15837+
15838+static void gr_add_to_task_ip_table_nolock(struct signal_struct *sig, struct conn_table_entry *newent)
15839+{
15840+ struct conn_table_entry **match;
15841+ unsigned int index;
15842+
15843+ index = conn_hash(sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr,
15844+ sig->gr_sport, sig->gr_dport,
15845+ gr_conn_table_size);
15846+
15847+ newent->sig = sig;
15848+
15849+ match = &gr_conn_table[index];
15850+ newent->next = *match;
15851+ *match = newent;
15852+
15853+ return;
15854+}
15855+
15856+static void gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(struct signal_struct *sig)
15857+{
15858+ struct conn_table_entry *match, *last = NULL;
15859+ unsigned int index;
15860+
15861+ index = conn_hash(sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr,
15862+ sig->gr_sport, sig->gr_dport,
15863+ gr_conn_table_size);
15864+
15865+ match = gr_conn_table[index];
15866+ while (match && !conn_match(match->sig,
15867+ sig->gr_saddr, sig->gr_daddr, sig->gr_sport,
15868+ sig->gr_dport)) {
15869+ last = match;
15870+ match = match->next;
15871+ }
15872+
15873+ if (match) {
15874+ if (last)
15875+ last->next = match->next;
15876+ else
15877+ gr_conn_table[index] = NULL;
15878+ kfree(match);
15879+ }
15880+
15881+ return;
15882+}
15883+
15884+static struct signal_struct * gr_lookup_task_ip_table(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
15885+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
15886+{
15887+ struct conn_table_entry *match;
15888+ unsigned int index;
15889+
15890+ index = conn_hash(saddr, daddr, sport, dport, gr_conn_table_size);
15891+
15892+ match = gr_conn_table[index];
15893+ while (match && !conn_match(match->sig, saddr, daddr, sport, dport))
15894+ match = match->next;
15895+
15896+ if (match)
15897+ return match->sig;
15898+ else
15899+ return NULL;
15900+}
15901+
15902+#endif
15903+
15904+void gr_update_task_in_ip_table(struct task_struct *task, const struct inet_sock *inet)
15905+{
15906+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15907+ struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal;
15908+ struct conn_table_entry *newent;
15909+
15910+ newent = kmalloc(sizeof(struct conn_table_entry), GFP_ATOMIC);
15911+ if (newent == NULL)
15912+ return;
15913+
15914+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15915+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(sig);
15916+ sig->gr_saddr = inet->rcv_saddr;
15917+ sig->gr_daddr = inet->daddr;
15918+ sig->gr_sport = inet->sport;
15919+ sig->gr_dport = inet->dport;
15920+ gr_add_to_task_ip_table_nolock(sig, newent);
15921+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15922+#endif
15923+ return;
15924+}
15925+
15926+void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *task)
15927+{
15928+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15929+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15930+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(task->signal);
15931+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15932+#endif
15933+ return;
15934+}
15935+
15936+void
15937+gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk)
15938+{
15939+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
15940+ struct signal_struct *p, *set;
15941+ const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
15942+
15943+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP))
15944+ return;
15945+
15946+ set = current->signal;
15947+
15948+ spin_lock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15949+ p = gr_lookup_task_ip_table(inet->daddr, inet->rcv_saddr,
15950+ inet->dport, inet->sport);
15951+ if (unlikely(p != NULL)) {
15952+ set->curr_ip = p->curr_ip;
15953+ set->used_accept = 1;
15954+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table_nolock(p);
15955+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15956+ return;
15957+ }
15958+ spin_unlock(&gr_conn_table_lock);
15959+
15960+ set->curr_ip = inet->daddr;
15961+ set->used_accept = 1;
15962+#endif
15963+ return;
15964+}
15965+
15966+int
15967+gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type, const int protocol)
15968+{
15969+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
15970+ if (grsec_enable_socket_all && in_group_p(grsec_socket_all_gid) &&
15971+ (family != AF_UNIX) && (family != AF_LOCAL)) {
15972+ gr_log_int_str2(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SOCK2_MSG, family, gr_socktype_to_name(type), gr_proto_to_name(protocol));
15973+ return -EACCES;
15974+ }
15975+#endif
15976+ return 0;
15977+}
15978+
15979+int
15980+gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck)
15981+{
15982+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
15983+ if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
15984+ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
15985+ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
15986+ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
15987+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
15988+ return -EACCES;
15989+ }
15990+#endif
15991+ return 0;
15992+}
15993+
15994+int
15995+gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct sock *sck)
15996+{
15997+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
15998+ if (grsec_enable_socket_server &&
15999+ in_group_p(grsec_socket_server_gid) &&
16000+ sck && (sck->sk_family != AF_UNIX) &&
16001+ (sck->sk_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16002+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_BIND_MSG);
16003+ return -EACCES;
16004+ }
16005+#endif
16006+ return 0;
16007+}
16008+
16009+int
16010+gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck)
16011+{
16012+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
16013+ if (grsec_enable_socket_client && in_group_p(grsec_socket_client_gid) &&
16014+ sck && (sck->sa_family != AF_UNIX) &&
16015+ (sck->sa_family != AF_LOCAL)) {
16016+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_CONNECT_MSG);
16017+ return -EACCES;
16018+ }
16019+#endif
16020+ return 0;
16021+}
16022+
16023+__u32
16024+gr_cap_rtnetlink(void)
16025+{
16026+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16027+ if (!gr_acl_is_enabled())
16028+ return current->cap_effective;
16029+ else if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
16030+ gr_task_is_capable(current, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
16031+ return current->cap_effective;
16032+ else
16033+ return 0;
16034+#else
16035+ return current->cap_effective;
16036+#endif
16037+}
16038diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c
16039--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16040+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16041@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
16042+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16043+#include <linux/sched.h>
16044+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
16045+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
16046+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16047+
16048+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
16049+int grsec_modstop;
16050+#endif
16051+
16052+int
16053+gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name, const int op)
16054+{
16055+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
16056+ if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && grsec_lock && (op & 002)) {
16057+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name);
16058+ return -EACCES;
16059+ }
16060+#endif
16061+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
16062+ if (!strcmp(dirname, "grsecurity") && !strcmp(name, "disable_modules") &&
16063+ grsec_modstop && (op & 002)) {
16064+ gr_log_str(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_SYSCTL_MSG, name);
16065+ return -EACCES;
16066+ }
16067+#endif
16068+ return 0;
16069+}
16070+
16071+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP)
16072+enum {GS_LINK=1, GS_FIFO, GS_EXECVE, GS_EXECLOG, GS_SIGNAL,
16073+GS_FORKFAIL, GS_TIME, GS_CHROOT_SHMAT, GS_CHROOT_UNIX, GS_CHROOT_MNT,
16074+GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR, GS_CHROOT_DBL, GS_CHROOT_PVT, GS_CHROOT_CD, GS_CHROOT_CM,
16075+GS_CHROOT_MK, GS_CHROOT_NI, GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG, GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
16076+GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL, GS_TPE, GS_TPE_GID, GS_TPE_ALL, GS_SIDCAPS,
16077+GS_RANDPID, GS_SOCKET_ALL, GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID, GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
16078+GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID, GS_SOCKET_SERVER, GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID,
16079+GS_GROUP, GS_GID, GS_ACHDIR, GS_AMOUNT, GS_AIPC, GS_DMSG,
16080+GS_TEXTREL, GS_FINDTASK, GS_SHM, GS_LOCK, GS_MODSTOP};
16081+
16082+
16083+ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
16084+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
16085+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_LINK
16086+ {
16087+ .ctl_name = GS_LINK,
16088+ .procname = "linking_restrictions",
16089+ .data = &grsec_enable_link,
16090+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16091+ .mode = 0600,
16092+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16093+ },
16094+#endif
16095+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FIFO
16096+ {
16097+ .ctl_name = GS_FIFO,
16098+ .procname = "fifo_restrictions",
16099+ .data = &grsec_enable_fifo,
16100+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16101+ .mode = 0600,
16102+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16103+ },
16104+#endif
16105+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
16106+ {
16107+ .ctl_name = GS_EXECVE,
16108+ .procname = "execve_limiting",
16109+ .data = &grsec_enable_execve,
16110+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16111+ .mode = 0600,
16112+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16113+ },
16114+#endif
16115+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
16116+ {
16117+ .ctl_name = GS_EXECLOG,
16118+ .procname = "exec_logging",
16119+ .data = &grsec_enable_execlog,
16120+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16121+ .mode = 0600,
16122+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16123+ },
16124+#endif
16125+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
16126+ {
16127+ .ctl_name = GS_SIGNAL,
16128+ .procname = "signal_logging",
16129+ .data = &grsec_enable_signal,
16130+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16131+ .mode = 0600,
16132+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16133+ },
16134+#endif
16135+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
16136+ {
16137+ .ctl_name = GS_FORKFAIL,
16138+ .procname = "forkfail_logging",
16139+ .data = &grsec_enable_forkfail,
16140+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16141+ .mode = 0600,
16142+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16143+ },
16144+#endif
16145+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
16146+ {
16147+ .ctl_name = GS_TIME,
16148+ .procname = "timechange_logging",
16149+ .data = &grsec_enable_time,
16150+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16151+ .mode = 0600,
16152+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16153+ },
16154+#endif
16155+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
16156+ {
16157+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SHMAT,
16158+ .procname = "chroot_deny_shmat",
16159+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_shmat,
16160+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16161+ .mode = 0600,
16162+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16163+ },
16164+#endif
16165+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
16166+ {
16167+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_UNIX,
16168+ .procname = "chroot_deny_unix",
16169+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_unix,
16170+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16171+ .mode = 0600,
16172+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16173+ },
16174+#endif
16175+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
16176+ {
16177+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MNT,
16178+ .procname = "chroot_deny_mount",
16179+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mount,
16180+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16181+ .mode = 0600,
16182+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16183+ },
16184+#endif
16185+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
16186+ {
16187+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_FCHDIR,
16188+ .procname = "chroot_deny_fchdir",
16189+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir,
16190+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16191+ .mode = 0600,
16192+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16193+ },
16194+#endif
16195+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
16196+ {
16197+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_DBL,
16198+ .procname = "chroot_deny_chroot",
16199+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_double,
16200+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16201+ .mode = 0600,
16202+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16203+ },
16204+#endif
16205+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
16206+ {
16207+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_PVT,
16208+ .procname = "chroot_deny_pivot",
16209+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_pivot,
16210+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16211+ .mode = 0600,
16212+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16213+ },
16214+#endif
16215+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
16216+ {
16217+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CD,
16218+ .procname = "chroot_enforce_chdir",
16219+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chdir,
16220+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16221+ .mode = 0600,
16222+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16223+ },
16224+#endif
16225+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
16226+ {
16227+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CM,
16228+ .procname = "chroot_deny_chmod",
16229+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_chmod,
16230+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16231+ .mode = 0600,
16232+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16233+ },
16234+#endif
16235+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
16236+ {
16237+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_MK,
16238+ .procname = "chroot_deny_mknod",
16239+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_mknod,
16240+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16241+ .mode = 0600,
16242+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16243+ },
16244+#endif
16245+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
16246+ {
16247+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_NI,
16248+ .procname = "chroot_restrict_nice",
16249+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_nice,
16250+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16251+ .mode = 0600,
16252+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16253+ },
16254+#endif
16255+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
16256+ {
16257+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_EXECLOG,
16258+ .procname = "chroot_execlog",
16259+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_execlog,
16260+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16261+ .mode = 0600,
16262+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16263+ },
16264+#endif
16265+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
16266+ {
16267+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_CAPS,
16268+ .procname = "chroot_caps",
16269+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_caps,
16270+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16271+ .mode = 0600,
16272+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16273+ },
16274+#endif
16275+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
16276+ {
16277+ .ctl_name = GS_CHROOT_SYSCTL,
16278+ .procname = "chroot_deny_sysctl",
16279+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl,
16280+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16281+ .mode = 0600,
16282+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16283+ },
16284+#endif
16285+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE
16286+ {
16287+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE,
16288+ .procname = "tpe",
16289+ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe,
16290+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16291+ .mode = 0600,
16292+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16293+ },
16294+ {
16295+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_GID,
16296+ .procname = "tpe_gid",
16297+ .data = &grsec_tpe_gid,
16298+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16299+ .mode = 0600,
16300+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16301+ },
16302+#endif
16303+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
16304+ {
16305+ .ctl_name = GS_TPE_ALL,
16306+ .procname = "tpe_restrict_all",
16307+ .data = &grsec_enable_tpe_all,
16308+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16309+ .mode = 0600,
16310+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16311+ },
16312+#endif
16313+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
16314+ {
16315+ .ctl_name = GS_RANDPID,
16316+ .procname = "rand_pids",
16317+ .data = &grsec_enable_randpid,
16318+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16319+ .mode = 0600,
16320+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16321+ },
16322+#endif
16323+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
16324+ {
16325+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL,
16326+ .procname = "socket_all",
16327+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_all,
16328+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16329+ .mode = 0600,
16330+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16331+ },
16332+ {
16333+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_ALL_GID,
16334+ .procname = "socket_all_gid",
16335+ .data = &grsec_socket_all_gid,
16336+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16337+ .mode = 0600,
16338+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16339+ },
16340+#endif
16341+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
16342+ {
16343+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT,
16344+ .procname = "socket_client",
16345+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_client,
16346+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16347+ .mode = 0600,
16348+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16349+ },
16350+ {
16351+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID,
16352+ .procname = "socket_client_gid",
16353+ .data = &grsec_socket_client_gid,
16354+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16355+ .mode = 0600,
16356+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16357+ },
16358+#endif
16359+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
16360+ {
16361+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER,
16362+ .procname = "socket_server",
16363+ .data = &grsec_enable_socket_server,
16364+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16365+ .mode = 0600,
16366+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16367+ },
16368+ {
16369+ .ctl_name = GS_SOCKET_SERVER_GID,
16370+ .procname = "socket_server_gid",
16371+ .data = &grsec_socket_server_gid,
16372+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16373+ .mode = 0600,
16374+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16375+ },
16376+#endif
16377+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
16378+ {
16379+ .ctl_name = GS_GROUP,
16380+ .procname = "audit_group",
16381+ .data = &grsec_enable_group,
16382+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16383+ .mode = 0600,
16384+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16385+ },
16386+ {
16387+ .ctl_name = GS_GID,
16388+ .procname = "audit_gid",
16389+ .data = &grsec_audit_gid,
16390+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16391+ .mode = 0600,
16392+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16393+ },
16394+#endif
16395+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
16396+ {
16397+ .ctl_name = GS_ACHDIR,
16398+ .procname = "audit_chdir",
16399+ .data = &grsec_enable_chdir,
16400+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16401+ .mode = 0600,
16402+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16403+ },
16404+#endif
16405+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
16406+ {
16407+ .ctl_name = GS_AMOUNT,
16408+ .procname = "audit_mount",
16409+ .data = &grsec_enable_mount,
16410+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16411+ .mode = 0600,
16412+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16413+ },
16414+#endif
16415+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
16416+ {
16417+ .ctl_name = GS_AIPC,
16418+ .procname = "audit_ipc",
16419+ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_ipc,
16420+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16421+ .mode = 0600,
16422+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16423+ },
16424+#endif
16425+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
16426+ {
16427+ .ctl_name = GS_TEXTREL,
16428+ .procname = "audit_textrel",
16429+ .data = &grsec_enable_audit_textrel,
16430+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16431+ .mode = 0600,
16432+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16433+ },
16434+#endif
16435+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
16436+ {
16437+ .ctl_name = GS_DMSG,
16438+ .procname = "dmesg",
16439+ .data = &grsec_enable_dmesg,
16440+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16441+ .mode = 0600,
16442+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16443+ },
16444+#endif
16445+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
16446+ {
16447+ .ctl_name = GS_FINDTASK,
16448+ .procname = "chroot_findtask",
16449+ .data = &grsec_enable_chroot_findtask,
16450+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16451+ .mode = 0600,
16452+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16453+ },
16454+#endif
16455+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
16456+ {
16457+ .ctl_name = GS_SHM,
16458+ .procname = "destroy_unused_shm",
16459+ .data = &grsec_enable_shm,
16460+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16461+ .mode = 0600,
16462+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16463+ },
16464+#endif
16465+ {
16466+ .ctl_name = GS_LOCK,
16467+ .procname = "grsec_lock",
16468+ .data = &grsec_lock,
16469+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16470+ .mode = 0600,
16471+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16472+ },
16473+#endif
16474+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
16475+ {
16476+ .ctl_name = GS_MODSTOP,
16477+ .procname = "disable_modules",
16478+ .data = &grsec_modstop,
16479+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
16480+ .mode = 0600,
16481+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
16482+ },
16483+#endif
16484+ { .ctl_name = 0 }
16485+};
16486+#endif
16487+
16488+int gr_check_modstop(void)
16489+{
16490+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
16491+ if (grsec_modstop == 1) {
16492+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_STOPMOD_MSG);
16493+ return 1;
16494+ }
16495+#endif
16496+ return 0;
16497+}
16498diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c
16499--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16500+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_textrel.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16501@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
16502+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16503+#include <linux/sched.h>
16504+#include <linux/mm.h>
16505+#include <linux/file.h>
16506+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16507+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
16508+
16509+void
16510+gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct * vma)
16511+{
16512+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
16513+ if (grsec_enable_audit_textrel)
16514+ gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(GR_DO_AUDIT, GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG, vma->vm_file, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff);
16515+#endif
16516+ return;
16517+}
16518diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_time.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_time.c
16519--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16520+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_time.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16521@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
16522+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16523+#include <linux/sched.h>
16524+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16525+
16526+void
16527+gr_log_timechange(void)
16528+{
16529+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TIME
16530+ if (grsec_enable_time)
16531+ gr_log_noargs(GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD, GR_TIME_MSG);
16532+#endif
16533+ return;
16534+}
16535diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c
16536--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16537+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsec_tpe.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16538@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
16539+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16540+#include <linux/sched.h>
16541+#include <linux/file.h>
16542+#include <linux/fs.h>
16543+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
16544+
16545+extern int gr_acl_tpe_check(void);
16546+
16547+int
16548+gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file)
16549+{
16550+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
16551+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
16552+
16553+ if (current->uid && ((grsec_enable_tpe &&
16554+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
16555+ !in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)
16556+#else
16557+ in_group_p(grsec_tpe_gid)
16558+#endif
16559+ ) || gr_acl_tpe_check()) &&
16560+ (inode->i_uid || (!inode->i_uid && ((inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) ||
16561+ (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))))) {
16562+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
16563+ return 0;
16564+ }
16565+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
16566+ if (current->uid && grsec_enable_tpe && grsec_enable_tpe_all &&
16567+ ((inode->i_uid && (inode->i_uid != current->uid)) ||
16568+ (inode->i_mode & S_IWGRP) || (inode->i_mode & S_IWOTH))) {
16569+ gr_log_fs_generic(GR_DONT_AUDIT, GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG, file->f_dentry, file->f_vfsmnt);
16570+ return 0;
16571+ }
16572+#endif
16573+#endif
16574+ return 1;
16575+}
16576diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsum.c linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsum.c
16577--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsum.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16578+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/grsum.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16579@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
16580+#include <linux/kernel.h>
16581+#include <linux/sched.h>
16582+#include <linux/mm.h>
16583+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
16584+#include <linux/crypto.h>
16585+#include <linux/gracl.h>
16586+
16587+
16588+#if !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MODULE) || !defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256) || defined(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MODULE)
16589+#error "crypto and sha256 must be built into the kernel"
16590+#endif
16591+
16592+int
16593+chkpw(struct gr_arg *entry, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *sum)
16594+{
16595+ char *p;
16596+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
16597+ unsigned char temp_sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
16598+ struct scatterlist sg[2];
16599+ volatile int retval = 0;
16600+ volatile int dummy = 0;
16601+ unsigned int i;
16602+
16603+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha256", 0);
16604+ if (tfm == NULL) {
16605+ /* should never happen, since sha256 should be built in */
16606+ return 1;
16607+ }
16608+
16609+ crypto_digest_init(tfm);
16610+
16611+ p = salt;
16612+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
16613+ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
16614+ sg[0].length = GR_SALT_LEN;
16615+
16616+ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
16617+
16618+ p = entry->pw;
16619+ sg[0].page = virt_to_page(p);
16620+ sg[0].offset = ((long) p & ~PAGE_MASK);
16621+ sg[0].length = strlen(entry->pw);
16622+
16623+ crypto_digest_update(tfm, sg, 1);
16624+
16625+ crypto_digest_final(tfm, temp_sum);
16626+
16627+ memset(entry->pw, 0, GR_PW_LEN);
16628+
16629+ for (i = 0; i < GR_SHA_LEN; i++)
16630+ if (sum[i] != temp_sum[i])
16631+ retval = 1;
16632+ else
16633+ dummy = 1; // waste a cycle
16634+
16635+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
16636+
16637+ return retval;
16638+}
16639diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Kconfig
16640--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Kconfig 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
16641+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
16642@@ -0,0 +1,888 @@
16643+#
16644+# grecurity configuration
16645+#
16646+
16647+menu "Grsecurity"
16648+
16649+config GRKERNSEC
16650+ bool "Grsecurity"
16651+ select CRYPTO
16652+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
16653+ help
16654+ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features
16655+ that will enhance the security of your system. It is highly
16656+ recommended that you say Y here and read through the help
16657+ for each option so that you fully understand the features and
16658+ can evaluate their usefulness for your machine.
16659+
16660+choice
16661+ prompt "Security Level"
16662+ depends GRKERNSEC
16663+ default GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
16664+
16665+config GRKERNSEC_LOW
16666+ bool "Low"
16667+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
16668+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
16669+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
16670+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
16671+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
16672+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
16673+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
16674+ select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
16675+
16676+ help
16677+ If you choose this option, several of the grsecurity options will
16678+ be enabled that will give you greater protection against a number
16679+ of attacks, while assuring that none of your software will have any
16680+ conflicts with the additional security measures. If you run a lot
16681+ of unusual software, or you are having problems with the higher
16682+ security levels, you should say Y here. With this option, the
16683+ following features are enabled:
16684+
16685+ - Linking restrictions
16686+ - FIFO restrictions
16687+ - Randomized PIDs
16688+ - Enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC on execve
16689+ - Restricted dmesg
16690+ - Enforced chdir("/") on chroot
16691+ - Runtime module disabling
16692+
16693+config GRKERNSEC_MEDIUM
16694+ bool "Medium"
16695+ select PAX
16696+ select PAX_EI_PAX
16697+ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
16698+ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
16699+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
16700+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
16701+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
16702+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
16703+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
16704+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
16705+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
16706+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
16707+ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
16708+ select GRKERNSEC_TIME
16709+ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
16710+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
16711+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
16712+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
16713+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
16714+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
16715+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
16716+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
16717+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC
16718+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
16719+ select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
16720+ select PAX_RANDUSTACK
16721+ select PAX_ASLR
16722+ select PAX_RANDMMAP
16723+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64)
16724+
16725+ help
16726+ If you say Y here, several features in addition to those included
16727+ in the low additional security level will be enabled. These
16728+ features provide even more security to your system, though in rare
16729+ cases they may be incompatible with very old or poorly written
16730+ software. If you enable this option, make sure that your auth
16731+ service (identd) is running as gid 1001. With this option,
16732+ the following features (in addition to those provided in the
16733+ low additional security level) will be enabled:
16734+
16735+ - Randomized TCP source ports
16736+ - Failed fork logging
16737+ - Time change logging
16738+ - Signal logging
16739+ - Deny mounts in chroot
16740+ - Deny double chrooting
16741+ - Deny sysctl writes in chroot
16742+ - Deny mknod in chroot
16743+ - Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot
16744+ - Deny pivot_root in chroot
16745+ - Denied writes of /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port
16746+ - /proc restrictions with special GID set to 10 (usually wheel)
16747+ - Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
16748+
16749+config GRKERNSEC_HIGH
16750+ bool "High"
16751+ select GRKERNSEC_LINK
16752+ select GRKERNSEC_FIFO
16753+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
16754+ select GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
16755+ select GRKERNSEC_DMESG
16756+ select GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
16757+ select GRKERNSEC_TIME
16758+ select GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
16759+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
16760+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
16761+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
16762+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
16763+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
16764+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
16765+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
16766+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
16767+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
16768+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
16769+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
16770+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC
16771+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP if (PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR)
16772+ select GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
16773+ select GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
16774+ select GRKERNSEC_SHM if (SYSVIPC)
16775+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
16776+ select GRKERNSEC_KMEM
16777+ select GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
16778+ select GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
16779+ select GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
16780+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
16781+ select GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
16782+ select GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
16783+ select GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP if (MODULES)
16784+ select PAX
16785+ select PAX_RANDUSTACK
16786+ select PAX_ASLR
16787+ select PAX_RANDMMAP
16788+ select PAX_NOEXEC
16789+ select PAX_MPROTECT
16790+ select PAX_EI_PAX
16791+ select PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
16792+ select PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
16793+ select PAX_KERNEXEC if (!X86_64 && !MODULES && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS)
16794+ select PAX_RANDKSTACK if (X86_TSC && !X86_64)
16795+ select PAX_SEGMEXEC if (X86 && !X86_64)
16796+ select PAX_PAGEEXEC if (!X86)
16797+ select PAX_EMUPLT if (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
16798+ select PAX_DLRESOLVE if (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
16799+ select PAX_SYSCALL if (PPC32)
16800+ select PAX_EMUTRAMP if (PARISC)
16801+ select PAX_EMUSIGRT if (PARISC)
16802+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if (X86 && !X86_64)
16803+ select PAX_ETEXECRELOCS if (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
16804+ help
16805+ If you say Y here, many of the features of grsecurity will be
16806+ enabled, which will protect you against many kinds of attacks
16807+ against your system. The heightened security comes at a cost
16808+ of an increased chance of incompatibilities with rare software
16809+ on your machine. Since this security level enables PaX, you should
16810+ view <http://pax.grsecurity.net> and read about the PaX
16811+ project. While you are there, download chpax and run it on
16812+ binaries that cause problems with PaX. Also remember that
16813+ since the /proc restrictions are enabled, you must run your
16814+ identd as gid 1001. This security level enables the following
16815+ features in addition to those listed in the low and medium
16816+ security levels:
16817+
16818+ - Additional /proc restrictions
16819+ - Chmod restrictions in chroot
16820+ - No signals, ptrace, or viewing of processes outside of chroot
16821+ - Capability restrictions in chroot
16822+ - Deny fchdir out of chroot
16823+ - Priority restrictions in chroot
16824+ - Segmentation-based implementation of PaX
16825+ - Mprotect restrictions
16826+ - Removal of addresses from /proc/<pid>/[smaps|maps|stat]
16827+ - Kernel stack randomization
16828+ - Mount/unmount/remount logging
16829+ - Kernel symbol hiding
16830+ - Destroy unused shared memory
16831+ - Prevention of memory exhaustion-based exploits
16832+config GRKERNSEC_CUSTOM
16833+ bool "Custom"
16834+ help
16835+ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure every grsecurity
16836+ option, which allows you to enable many more features that aren't
16837+ covered in the basic security levels. These additional features
16838+ include TPE, socket restrictions, and the sysctl system for
16839+ grsecurity. It is advised that you read through the help for
16840+ each option to determine its usefulness in your situation.
16841+
16842+endchoice
16843+
16844+menu "Address Space Protection"
16845+depends on GRKERNSEC
16846+
16847+config GRKERNSEC_KMEM
16848+ bool "Deny writing to /dev/kmem, /dev/mem, and /dev/port"
16849+ help
16850+ If you say Y here, /dev/kmem and /dev/mem won't be allowed to
16851+ be written to via mmap or otherwise to modify the running kernel.
16852+ /dev/port will also not be allowed to be opened. If you have module
16853+ support disabled, enabling this will close up four ways that are
16854+ currently used to insert malicious code into the running kernel.
16855+ Even with all these features enabled, we still highly recommend that
16856+ you use the RBAC system, as it is still possible for an attacker to
16857+ modify the running kernel through privileged I/O granted by ioperm/iopl.
16858+ If you are not using XFree86, you may be able to stop this additional
16859+ case by enabling the 'Disable privileged I/O' option. Though nothing
16860+ legitimately writes to /dev/kmem, XFree86 does need to write to /dev/mem,
16861+ but only to video memory, which is the only writing we allow in this
16862+ case. If /dev/kmem or /dev/mem are mmaped without PROT_WRITE, they will
16863+ not be allowed to mprotect it with PROT_WRITE later.
16864+ It is highly recommended that you say Y here if you meet all the
16865+ conditions above.
16866+
16867+config GRKERNSEC_IO
16868+ bool "Disable privileged I/O"
16869+ depends on X86
16870+ select RTC
16871+ help
16872+ If you say Y here, all ioperm and iopl calls will return an error.
16873+ Ioperm and iopl can be used to modify the running kernel.
16874+ Unfortunately, some programs need this access to operate properly,
16875+ the most notable of which are XFree86 and hwclock. hwclock can be
16876+ remedied by having RTC support in the kernel, so CONFIG_RTC is
16877+ enabled if this option is enabled, to ensure that hwclock operates
16878+ correctly. XFree86 still will not operate correctly with this option
16879+ enabled, so DO NOT CHOOSE Y IF YOU USE XFree86. If you use XFree86
16880+ and you still want to protect your kernel against modification,
16881+ use the RBAC system.
16882+
16883+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_MEMMAP
16884+ bool "Remove addresses from /proc/<pid>/[smaps|maps|stat]"
16885+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC || PAX_ASLR
16886+ help
16887+ If you say Y here, the /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/stat files will
16888+ give no information about the addresses of its mappings if
16889+ PaX features that rely on random addresses are enabled on the task.
16890+ If you use PaX it is greatly recommended that you say Y here as it
16891+ closes up a hole that makes the full ASLR useless for suid
16892+ binaries.
16893+
16894+config GRKERNSEC_BRUTE
16895+ bool "Deter exploit bruteforcing"
16896+ help
16897+ If you say Y here, attempts to bruteforce exploits against forking
16898+ daemons such as apache or sshd will be deterred. When a child of a
16899+ forking daemon is killed by PaX or crashes due to an illegal
16900+ instruction, the parent process will be delayed 30 seconds upon every
16901+ subsequent fork until the administrator is able to assess the
16902+ situation and restart the daemon. It is recommended that you also
16903+ enable signal logging in the auditing section so that logs are
16904+ generated when a process performs an illegal instruction.
16905+
16906+config GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP
16907+ bool "Runtime module disabling"
16908+ depends on MODULES
16909+ help
16910+ If you say Y here, you will be able to disable the ability to (un)load
16911+ modules at runtime. This feature is useful if you need the ability
16912+ to load kernel modules at boot time, but do not want to allow an
16913+ attacker to load a rootkit kernel module into the system, or to remove
16914+ a loaded kernel module important to system functioning. You should
16915+ enable the /dev/mem protection feature as well, since rootkits can be
16916+ inserted into the kernel via other methods than kernel modules. Since
16917+ an untrusted module could still be loaded by modifying init scripts and
16918+ rebooting the system, it is also recommended that you enable the RBAC
16919+ system. If you enable this option, a sysctl option with name
16920+ "disable_modules" will be created. Setting this option to "1" disables
16921+ module loading. After this option is set, no further writes to it are
16922+ allowed until the system is rebooted.
16923+
16924+config GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
16925+ bool "Hide kernel symbols"
16926+ help
16927+ If you say Y here, getting information on loaded modules, and
16928+ displaying all kernel symbols through a syscall will be restricted
16929+ to users with CAP_SYS_MODULE. This option is only effective
16930+ provided the following conditions are met:
16931+ 1) The kernel using grsecurity is not precompiled by some distribution
16932+ 2) You are using the RBAC system and hiding other files such as your
16933+ kernel image and System.map
16934+ 3) You have the additional /proc restrictions enabled, which removes
16935+ /proc/kcore
16936+ If the above conditions are met, this option will aid to provide a
16937+ useful protection against local and remote kernel exploitation of
16938+ overflows and arbitrary read/write vulnerabilities.
16939+
16940+endmenu
16941+menu "Role Based Access Control Options"
16942+depends on GRKERNSEC
16943+
16944+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_HIDEKERN
16945+ bool "Hide kernel processes"
16946+ help
16947+ If you say Y here, all kernel threads will be hidden to all
16948+ processes but those whose subject has the "view hidden processes"
16949+ flag.
16950+
16951+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_MAXTRIES
16952+ int "Maximum tries before password lockout"
16953+ default 3
16954+ help
16955+ This option enforces the maximum number of times a user can attempt
16956+ to authorize themselves with the grsecurity RBAC system before being
16957+ denied the ability to attempt authorization again for a specified time.
16958+ The lower the number, the harder it will be to brute-force a password.
16959+
16960+config GRKERNSEC_ACL_TIMEOUT
16961+ int "Time to wait after max password tries, in seconds"
16962+ default 30
16963+ help
16964+ This option specifies the time the user must wait after attempting to
16965+ authorize to the RBAC system with the maximum number of invalid
16966+ passwords. The higher the number, the harder it will be to brute-force
16967+ a password.
16968+
16969+endmenu
16970+menu "Filesystem Protections"
16971+depends on GRKERNSEC
16972+
16973+config GRKERNSEC_PROC
16974+ bool "Proc restrictions"
16975+ help
16976+ If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
16977+ will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. You MUST
16978+ choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction.
16979+ Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to
16980+ see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
16981+ view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
16982+ the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as
16983+ a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify here.
16984+
16985+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
16986+ bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
16987+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
16988+ help
16989+ If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
16990+ processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related information,
16991+ and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
16992+
16993+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
16994+ bool "Allow special group"
16995+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
16996+ help
16997+ If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
16998+ able to view all processes, network-related information, and
16999+ kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want
17000+ to run identd as a non-root user.
17001+
17002+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
17003+ int "GID for special group"
17004+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
17005+ default 1001
17006+
17007+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
17008+ bool "Additional restrictions"
17009+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
17010+ help
17011+ If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
17012+ /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and
17013+ slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits.
17014+
17015+config GRKERNSEC_LINK
17016+ bool "Linking restrictions"
17017+ help
17018+ If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
17019+ will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
17020+ world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
17021+ symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
17022+ able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
17023+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
17024+
17025+config GRKERNSEC_FIFO
17026+ bool "FIFO restrictions"
17027+ help
17028+ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
17029+ own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
17030+ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the sysctl
17031+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
17032+ created.
17033+
17034+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17035+ bool "Chroot jail restrictions"
17036+ help
17037+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose several options that will
17038+ make breaking out of a chrooted jail much more difficult. If you
17039+ encounter no software incompatibilities with the following options, it
17040+ is recommended that you enable each one.
17041+
17042+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MOUNT
17043+ bool "Deny mounts"
17044+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17045+ help
17046+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
17047+ mount or remount filesystems. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
17048+ sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_mount" is created.
17049+
17050+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_DOUBLE
17051+ bool "Deny double-chroots"
17052+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17053+ help
17054+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chroot
17055+ again outside the chroot. This is a widely used method of breaking
17056+ out of a chroot jail and should not be allowed. If the sysctl
17057+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17058+ "chroot_deny_chroot" is created.
17059+
17060+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_PIVOT
17061+ bool "Deny pivot_root in chroot"
17062+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17063+ help
17064+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to use
17065+ a function called pivot_root() that was introduced in Linux 2.3.41. It
17066+ works similar to chroot in that it changes the root filesystem. This
17067+ function could be misused in a chrooted process to attempt to break out
17068+ of the chroot, and therefore should not be allowed. If the sysctl
17069+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_pivot" is
17070+ created.
17071+
17072+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHDIR
17073+ bool "Enforce chdir(\"/\") on all chroots"
17074+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17075+ help
17076+ If you say Y here, the current working directory of all newly-chrooted
17077+ applications will be set to the the root directory of the chroot.
17078+ The man page on chroot(2) states:
17079+ Note that this call does not change the current working
17080+ directory, so that `.' can be outside the tree rooted at
17081+ `/'. In particular, the super-user can escape from a
17082+ `chroot jail' by doing `mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..'.
17083+
17084+ It is recommended that you say Y here, since it's not known to break
17085+ any software. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
17086+ name "chroot_enforce_chdir" is created.
17087+
17088+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CHMOD
17089+ bool "Deny (f)chmod +s"
17090+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17091+ help
17092+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to chmod
17093+ or fchmod files to make them have suid or sgid bits. This protects
17094+ against another published method of breaking a chroot. If the sysctl
17095+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_chmod" is
17096+ created.
17097+
17098+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FCHDIR
17099+ bool "Deny fchdir out of chroot"
17100+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17101+ help
17102+ If you say Y here, a well-known method of breaking chroots by fchdir'ing
17103+ to a file descriptor of the chrooting process that points to a directory
17104+ outside the filesystem will be stopped. If the sysctl option
17105+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_fchdir" is created.
17106+
17107+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_MKNOD
17108+ bool "Deny mknod"
17109+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17110+ help
17111+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be allowed to
17112+ mknod. The problem with using mknod inside a chroot is that it
17113+ would allow an attacker to create a device entry that is the same
17114+ as one on the physical root of your system, which could range from
17115+ anything from the console device to a device for your harddrive (which
17116+ they could then use to wipe the drive or steal data). It is recommended
17117+ that you say Y here, unless you run into software incompatibilities.
17118+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17119+ "chroot_deny_mknod" is created.
17120+
17121+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SHMAT
17122+ bool "Deny shmat() out of chroot"
17123+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17124+ help
17125+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to attach
17126+ to shared memory segments that were created outside of the chroot jail.
17127+ It is recommended that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled,
17128+ a sysctl option with name "chroot_deny_shmat" is created.
17129+
17130+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
17131+ bool "Deny access to abstract AF_UNIX sockets out of chroot"
17132+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17133+ help
17134+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
17135+ connect to abstract (meaning not belonging to a filesystem) Unix
17136+ domain sockets that were bound outside of a chroot. It is recommended
17137+ that you say Y here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
17138+ with name "chroot_deny_unix" is created.
17139+
17140+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_FINDTASK
17141+ bool "Protect outside processes"
17142+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17143+ help
17144+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to
17145+ kill, send signals with fcntl, ptrace, capget, setpgid, getpgid,
17146+ getsid, or view any process outside of the chroot. If the sysctl
17147+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_findtask" is
17148+ created.
17149+
17150+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_NICE
17151+ bool "Restrict priority changes"
17152+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17153+ help
17154+ If you say Y here, processes inside a chroot will not be able to raise
17155+ the priority of processes in the chroot, or alter the priority of
17156+ processes outside the chroot. This provides more security than simply
17157+ removing CAP_SYS_NICE from the process' capability set. If the
17158+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "chroot_restrict_nice"
17159+ is created.
17160+
17161+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_SYSCTL
17162+ bool "Deny sysctl writes"
17163+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17164+ help
17165+ If you say Y here, an attacker in a chroot will not be able to
17166+ write to sysctl entries, either by sysctl(2) or through a /proc
17167+ interface. It is strongly recommended that you say Y here. If the
17168+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17169+ "chroot_deny_sysctl" is created.
17170+
17171+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_CAPS
17172+ bool "Capability restrictions"
17173+ depends on GRKERNSEC_CHROOT
17174+ help
17175+ If you say Y here, the capabilities on all root processes within a
17176+ chroot jail will be lowered to stop module insertion, raw i/o,
17177+ system and net admin tasks, rebooting the system, modifying immutable
17178+ files, modifying IPC owned by another, and changing the system time.
17179+ This is left an option because it can break some apps. Disable this
17180+ if your chrooted apps are having problems performing those kinds of
17181+ tasks. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
17182+ name "chroot_caps" is created.
17183+
17184+endmenu
17185+menu "Kernel Auditing"
17186+depends on GRKERNSEC
17187+
17188+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
17189+ bool "Single group for auditing"
17190+ help
17191+ If you say Y here, the exec, chdir, (un)mount, and ipc logging features
17192+ will only operate on a group you specify. This option is recommended
17193+ if you only want to watch certain users instead of having a large
17194+ amount of logs from the entire system. If the sysctl option is enabled,
17195+ a sysctl option with name "audit_group" is created.
17196+
17197+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GID
17198+ int "GID for auditing"
17199+ depends on GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_GROUP
17200+ default 1007
17201+
17202+config GRKERNSEC_EXECLOG
17203+ bool "Exec logging"
17204+ help
17205+ If you say Y here, all execve() calls will be logged (since the
17206+ other exec*() calls are frontends to execve(), all execution
17207+ will be logged). Useful for shell-servers that like to keep track
17208+ of their users. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with
17209+ name "exec_logging" is created.
17210+ WARNING: This option when enabled will produce a LOT of logs, especially
17211+ on an active system.
17212+
17213+config GRKERNSEC_RESLOG
17214+ bool "Resource logging"
17215+ help
17216+ If you say Y here, all attempts to overstep resource limits will
17217+ be logged with the resource name, the requested size, and the current
17218+ limit. It is highly recommended that you say Y here.
17219+
17220+config GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_EXECLOG
17221+ bool "Log execs within chroot"
17222+ help
17223+ If you say Y here, all executions inside a chroot jail will be logged
17224+ to syslog. This can cause a large amount of logs if certain
17225+ applications (eg. djb's daemontools) are installed on the system, and
17226+ is therefore left as an option. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
17227+ sysctl option with name "chroot_execlog" is created.
17228+
17229+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_CHDIR
17230+ bool "Chdir logging"
17231+ help
17232+ If you say Y here, all chdir() calls will be logged. If the sysctl
17233+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_chdir" is created.
17234+
17235+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_MOUNT
17236+ bool "(Un)Mount logging"
17237+ help
17238+ If you say Y here, all mounts and unmounts will be logged. If the
17239+ sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "audit_mount" is
17240+ created.
17241+
17242+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_IPC
17243+ bool "IPC logging"
17244+ help
17245+ If you say Y here, creation and removal of message queues, semaphores,
17246+ and shared memory will be logged. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
17247+ sysctl option with name "audit_ipc" is created.
17248+
17249+config GRKERNSEC_SIGNAL
17250+ bool "Signal logging"
17251+ help
17252+ If you say Y here, certain important signals will be logged, such as
17253+ SIGSEGV, which will as a result inform you of when a error in a program
17254+ occurred, which in some cases could mean a possible exploit attempt.
17255+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17256+ "signal_logging" is created.
17257+
17258+config GRKERNSEC_FORKFAIL
17259+ bool "Fork failure logging"
17260+ help
17261+ If you say Y here, all failed fork() attempts will be logged.
17262+ This could suggest a fork bomb, or someone attempting to overstep
17263+ their process limit. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
17264+ with name "forkfail_logging" is created.
17265+
17266+config GRKERNSEC_TIME
17267+ bool "Time change logging"
17268+ help
17269+ If you say Y here, any changes of the system clock will be logged.
17270+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17271+ "timechange_logging" is created.
17272+
17273+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
17274+ bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support"
17275+ help
17276+ If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
17277+ directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
17278+ The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
17279+ This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote response
17280+ to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the
17281+ process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
17282+ the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
17283+
17284+config GRKERNSEC_AUDIT_TEXTREL
17285+ bool 'ELF text relocations logging (READ HELP)'
17286+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT
17287+ help
17288+ If you say Y here, text relocations will be logged with the filename
17289+ of the offending library or binary. The purpose of the feature is
17290+ to help Linux distribution developers get rid of libraries and
17291+ binaries that need text relocations which hinder the future progress
17292+ of PaX. Only Linux distribution developers should say Y here, and
17293+ never on a production machine, as this option creates an information
17294+ leak that could aid an attacker in defeating the randomization of
17295+ a single memory region. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
17296+ option with name "audit_textrel" is created.
17297+
17298+endmenu
17299+
17300+menu "Executable Protections"
17301+depends on GRKERNSEC
17302+
17303+config GRKERNSEC_EXECVE
17304+ bool "Enforce RLIMIT_NPROC on execs"
17305+ help
17306+ If you say Y here, users with a resource limit on processes will
17307+ have the value checked during execve() calls. The current system
17308+ only checks the system limit during fork() calls. If the sysctl option
17309+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "execve_limiting" is created.
17310+
17311+config GRKERNSEC_SHM
17312+ bool "Destroy unused shared memory"
17313+ depends on SYSVIPC
17314+ help
17315+ If you say Y here, shared memory will be destroyed when no one is
17316+ attached to it. Otherwise, resources involved with the shared
17317+ memory can be used up and not be associated with any process (as the
17318+ shared memory still exists, and the creating process has exited). If
17319+ the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17320+ "destroy_unused_shm" is created.
17321+
17322+config GRKERNSEC_DMESG
17323+ bool "Dmesg(8) restriction"
17324+ help
17325+ If you say Y here, non-root users will not be able to use dmesg(8)
17326+ to view up to the last 4kb of messages in the kernel's log buffer.
17327+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "dmesg" is
17328+ created.
17329+
17330+config GRKERNSEC_RANDPID
17331+ bool "Randomized PIDs"
17332+ help
17333+ If you say Y here, all PIDs created on the system will be
17334+ pseudo-randomly generated. This is extremely effective along
17335+ with the /proc restrictions to disallow an attacker from guessing
17336+ pids of daemons, etc. PIDs are also used in some cases as part
17337+ of a naming system for temporary files, so this option would keep
17338+ those filenames from being predicted as well. We also use code
17339+ to make sure that PID numbers aren't reused too soon. If the sysctl
17340+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "rand_pids" is created.
17341+
17342+config GRKERNSEC_TPE
17343+ bool "Trusted Path Execution (TPE)"
17344+ help
17345+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a gid to add to the
17346+ supplementary groups of users you want to mark as "untrusted."
17347+ These users will not be able to execute any files that are not in
17348+ root-owned directories writable only by root. If the sysctl option
17349+ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe" is created.
17350+
17351+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_ALL
17352+ bool "Partially restrict non-root users"
17353+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
17354+ help
17355+ If you say Y here, All non-root users other than the ones in the
17356+ group specified in the main TPE option will only be allowed to
17357+ execute files in directories they own that are not group or
17358+ world-writable, or in directories owned by root and writable only by
17359+ root. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
17360+ "tpe_restrict_all" is created.
17361+
17362+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
17363+ bool "Invert GID option"
17364+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE
17365+ help
17366+ If you say Y here, the group you specify in the TPE configuration will
17367+ decide what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for. This
17368+ option is useful if you want TPE restrictions to be applied to most
17369+ users on the system.
17370+
17371+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
17372+ int "GID for untrusted users"
17373+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && !GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
17374+ default 1005
17375+ help
17376+ If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
17377+ GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
17378+ If you have not selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
17379+ GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *enabled* for.
17380+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid"
17381+ is created.
17382+
17383+config GRKERNSEC_TPE_GID
17384+ int "GID for trusted users"
17385+ depends on GRKERNSEC_TPE && GRKERNSEC_TPE_INVERT
17386+ default 1005
17387+ help
17388+ If you have selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
17389+ GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *disabled* for.
17390+ If you have not selected the "Invert GID option" above, setting this
17391+ GID determines what group TPE restrictions will be *enabled* for.
17392+ If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "tpe_gid"
17393+ is created.
17394+
17395+endmenu
17396+menu "Network Protections"
17397+depends on GRKERNSEC
17398+
17399+config GRKERNSEC_RANDNET
17400+ bool "Larger entropy pools"
17401+ help
17402+ If you say Y here, the entropy pools used for many features of Linux
17403+ and grsecurity will be doubled in size. Since several grsecurity
17404+ features use additional randomness, it is recommended that you say Y
17405+ here. Saying Y here has a similar effect as modifying
17406+ /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize.
17407+
17408+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
17409+ bool "Socket restrictions"
17410+ help
17411+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose from several options.
17412+ If you assign a GID on your system and add it to the supplementary
17413+ groups of users you want to restrict socket access to, this patch
17414+ will perform up to three things, based on the option(s) you choose.
17415+
17416+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
17417+ bool "Deny any sockets to group"
17418+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
17419+ help
17420+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
17421+ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine or run server
17422+ applications from your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
17423+ sysctl option with name "socket_all" is created.
17424+
17425+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL_GID
17426+ int "GID to deny all sockets for"
17427+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_ALL
17428+ default 1004
17429+ help
17430+ Here you can choose the GID to disable socket access for. Remember to
17431+ add the users you want socket access disabled for to the GID
17432+ specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option
17433+ with name "socket_all_gid" is created.
17434+
17435+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
17436+ bool "Deny client sockets to group"
17437+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
17438+ help
17439+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
17440+ be unable to connect to other hosts from your machine, but will be
17441+ able to run servers. If this option is enabled, all users in the group
17442+ you specify will have to use passive mode when initiating ftp transfers
17443+ from the shell on your machine. If the sysctl option is enabled, a
17444+ sysctl option with name "socket_client" is created.
17445+
17446+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT_GID
17447+ int "GID to deny client sockets for"
17448+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_CLIENT
17449+ default 1003
17450+ help
17451+ Here you can choose the GID to disable client socket access for.
17452+ Remember to add the users you want client socket access disabled for to
17453+ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
17454+ option with name "socket_client_gid" is created.
17455+
17456+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
17457+ bool "Deny server sockets to group"
17458+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET
17459+ help
17460+ If you say Y here, you will be able to choose a GID of whose users will
17461+ be unable to run server applications from your machine. If the sysctl
17462+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "socket_server" is created.
17463+
17464+config GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER_GID
17465+ int "GID to deny server sockets for"
17466+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SOCKET_SERVER
17467+ default 1002
17468+ help
17469+ Here you can choose the GID to disable server socket access for.
17470+ Remember to add the users you want server socket access disabled for to
17471+ the GID specified here. If the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl
17472+ option with name "socket_server_gid" is created.
17473+
17474+endmenu
17475+menu "Sysctl support"
17476+depends on GRKERNSEC && SYSCTL
17477+
17478+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
17479+ bool "Sysctl support"
17480+ help
17481+ If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
17482+ grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
17483+ kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
17484+ to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries
17485+ are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
17486+ All features enabled in the kernel configuration are disabled at boot
17487+ if you do not say Y to the "Turn on features by default" option.
17488+ All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock entry should
17489+ be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
17490+ *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
17491+
17492+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
17493+ bool "Turn on features by default"
17494+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
17495+ help
17496+ If you say Y here, instead of having all features enabled in the
17497+ kernel configuration disabled at boot time, the features will be
17498+ enabled at boot time. It is recommended you say Y here unless
17499+ there is some reason you would want all sysctl-tunable features to
17500+ be disabled by default. As mentioned elsewhere, it is important
17501+ to enable the grsec_lock entry once you have finished modifying
17502+ the sysctl entries.
17503+
17504+endmenu
17505+menu "Logging Options"
17506+depends on GRKERNSEC
17507+
17508+config GRKERNSEC_FLOODTIME
17509+ int "Seconds in between log messages (minimum)"
17510+ default 10
17511+ help
17512+ This option allows you to enforce the number of seconds between
17513+ grsecurity log messages. The default should be suitable for most
17514+ people, however, if you choose to change it, choose a value small enough
17515+ to allow informative logs to be produced, but large enough to
17516+ prevent flooding.
17517+
17518+config GRKERNSEC_FLOODBURST
17519+ int "Number of messages in a burst (maximum)"
17520+ default 4
17521+ help
17522+ This option allows you to choose the maximum number of messages allowed
17523+ within the flood time interval you chose in a separate option. The
17524+ default should be suitable for most people, however if you find that
17525+ many of your logs are being interpreted as flooding, you may want to
17526+ raise this value.
17527+
17528+endmenu
17529+
17530+endmenu
17531diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Makefile linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Makefile
17532--- linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
17533+++ linux-2.6.16.2/grsecurity/Makefile 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17534@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
17535+# grsecurity's ACL system was originally written in 2001 by Michael Dalton
17536+# during 2001-2005 it has been completely redesigned by Brad Spengler
17537+# into an RBAC system
17538+#
17539+# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
17540+# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL v2 or higher
17541+
17542+obj-y = grsec_chdir.o grsec_chroot.o grsec_exec.o grsec_fifo.o grsec_fork.o \
17543+ grsec_mount.o grsec_rand.o grsec_sig.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o \
17544+ grsec_time.o grsec_tpe.o grsec_ipc.o grsec_link.o grsec_textrel.o
17545+
17546+obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o grsum.o gracl.o gracl_ip.o gracl_segv.o \
17547+ gracl_cap.o gracl_alloc.o gracl_shm.o grsec_mem.o gracl_fs.o \
17548+ gracl_learn.o grsec_log.o
17549+obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_RESLOG) += gracl_res.o
17550+
17551+ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
17552+obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
17553+endif
17554+
17555diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h
17556--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17557+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17558@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ struct exec
17559 set_personality (((BFPM->sh_bang || EX.ah.entry < 0x100000000L \
17560 ? ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT : 0) | PER_OSF4))
17561
17562-#define STACK_TOP \
17563+#define __STACK_TOP \
17564 (current->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x80000000 : 0x00120000000UL)
17565
17566 #endif
17567diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/elf.h
17568--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17569+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17570@@ -91,6 +91,17 @@ typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_N
17571
17572 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x1000000)
17573
17574+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17575+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 0x10000 : 0x120000000UL)
17576+
17577+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17578+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
17579+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17580+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 28)
17581+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17582+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality & ADDR_LIMIT_32BIT ? 14 : 19)
17583+#endif
17584+
17585 /* $0 is set by ld.so to a pointer to a function which might be
17586 registered using atexit. This provides a mean for the dynamic
17587 linker to call DT_FINI functions for shared libraries that have
17588diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/page.h
17589--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17590+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17591@@ -96,6 +96,15 @@ typedef unsigned long pgprot_t;
17592 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
17593 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
17594
17595+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17596+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
17597+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
17598+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17599+#else
17600+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
17601+#endif
17602+#endif
17603+
17604 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
17605
17606 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
17607diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h
17608--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17609+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-alpha/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17610@@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
17611 #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS)
17612 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
17613 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW)
17614+
17615+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17616+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOE)
17617+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
17618+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_FOW | _PAGE_FOE)
17619+#else
17620+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
17621+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
17622+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
17623+#endif
17624+
17625 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | _PAGE_ASM | _PAGE_KRE | _PAGE_KWE)
17626
17627 #define _PAGE_NORMAL(x) __pgprot(_PAGE_VALID | __ACCESS_BITS | (x))
17628diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/a.out.h
17629--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17630+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17631@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct exec
17632 #define M_ARM 103
17633
17634 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17635-#define STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \
17636+#define __STACK_TOP ((current->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? \
17637 TASK_SIZE : TASK_SIZE_26)
17638 #endif
17639
17640diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/elf.h
17641--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17642+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-arm/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17643@@ -56,6 +56,17 @@ typedef struct user_fp elf_fpregset_t;
17644
17645 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
17646
17647+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17648+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x00008000UL
17649+
17650+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17651+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
17652+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17653+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
17654+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17655+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk->personality == PER_LINUX_32BIT) ? 16 : 10)
17656+#endif
17657+
17658 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be
17659 registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI. A value of 0 means we
17660 have no such handler. */
17661diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/a.out.h
17662--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17663+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17664@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ struct exec
17665
17666 #ifdef __KERNEL__
17667
17668-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17669+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17670+#define __STACK_TOP ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)?TASK_SIZE/2:TASK_SIZE)
17671+#else
17672+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
17673+#endif
17674
17675 #endif
17676
17677diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/auxvec.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/auxvec.h
17678--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/auxvec.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17679+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/auxvec.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17680@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@
17681 * Architecture-neutral AT_ values in 0-17, leave some room
17682 * for more of them, start the x86-specific ones at 32.
17683 */
17684+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
17685 #define AT_SYSINFO 32
17686 #define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR 33
17687+#endif
17688
17689 #endif
17690diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/desc.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/desc.h
17691--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17692+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/desc.h 2006-04-09 21:24:03.000000000 -0400
17693@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
17694
17695 #include <linux/preempt.h>
17696 #include <linux/smp.h>
17697-#include <linux/percpu.h>
17698+#include <linux/sched.h>
17699
17700 #include <asm/mmu.h>
17701+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
17702+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
17703
17704-extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[GDT_ENTRIES];
17705+extern struct desc_struct cpu_gdt_table[NR_CPUS][PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct desc_struct)];
17706
17707 DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, cpu_16bit_stack[CPU_16BIT_STACK_SIZE]);
17708
17709@@ -24,13 +26,53 @@ struct Xgt_desc_struct {
17710 unsigned short pad;
17711 } __attribute__ ((packed));
17712
17713-extern struct Xgt_desc_struct idt_descr;
17714-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct Xgt_desc_struct, cpu_gdt_descr);
17715-
17716+extern struct Xgt_desc_struct idt_descr, cpu_gdt_descr[NR_CPUS];
17717
17718 static inline struct desc_struct *get_cpu_gdt_table(unsigned int cpu)
17719 {
17720- return (struct desc_struct *)per_cpu(cpu_gdt_descr, cpu).address;
17721+ return cpu_gdt_table[cpu];
17722+}
17723+
17724+#define pax_open_kernel(cr0) \
17725+do { \
17726+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr0); \
17727+ preempt_disable(); \
17728+ cr0 = read_cr0(); \
17729+ write_cr0(cr0 & ~0x10000UL); \
17730+} while(0)
17731+
17732+#define pax_close_kernel(cr0) \
17733+do { \
17734+ typecheck(unsigned long,cr0); \
17735+ write_cr0(cr0); \
17736+ preempt_enable_no_resched(); \
17737+} while(0)
17738+
17739+static inline void set_user_cs(struct mm_struct *mm, int cpu)
17740+{
17741+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17742+ unsigned long base = mm->context.user_cs_base;
17743+ unsigned long limit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
17744+
17745+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17746+ unsigned long cr0;
17747+
17748+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
17749+#endif
17750+
17751+ if (likely(limit)) {
17752+ limit -= 1UL;
17753+ limit >>= 12;
17754+ }
17755+
17756+ get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].a = (limit & 0xFFFFUL) | (base << 16);
17757+ get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS].b = (limit & 0xF0000UL) | 0xC0FB00UL | (base & 0xFF000000UL) | ((base >> 16) & 0xFFUL);
17758+
17759+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17760+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
17761+#endif
17762+
17763+#endif
17764 }
17765
17766 #define load_TR_desc() __asm__ __volatile__("ltr %w0"::"q" (GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8))
17767@@ -50,7 +92,7 @@ static inline struct desc_struct *get_cp
17768 * This is the ldt that every process will get unless we need
17769 * something other than this.
17770 */
17771-extern struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
17772+extern const struct desc_struct default_ldt[];
17773 extern void set_intr_gate(unsigned int irq, void * addr);
17774
17775 #define _set_tssldt_desc(n,addr,limit,type) \
17776@@ -64,7 +106,7 @@ __asm__ __volatile__ ("movw %w3,0(%2)\n\
17777 "rorl $16,%1" \
17778 : "=m"(*(n)) : "q" (addr), "r"(n), "ir"(limit), "i"(type))
17779
17780-static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, void *addr)
17781+static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int entry, const void *addr)
17782 {
17783 _set_tssldt_desc(&get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[entry], (int)addr,
17784 offsetof(struct tss_struct, __cacheline_filler) - 1, 0x89);
17785@@ -72,11 +114,28 @@ static inline void __set_tss_desc(unsign
17786
17787 #define set_tss_desc(cpu,addr) __set_tss_desc(cpu, GDT_ENTRY_TSS, addr)
17788
17789-static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, void *addr, unsigned int size)
17790+static inline void __set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
17791 {
17792 _set_tssldt_desc(&get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
17793 }
17794
17795+static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned int cpu, const void *addr, unsigned int size)
17796+{
17797+
17798+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17799+ unsigned long cr0;
17800+
17801+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
17802+#endif
17803+
17804+ _set_tssldt_desc(&get_cpu_gdt_table(cpu)[GDT_ENTRY_LDT], (int)addr, ((size << 3)-1), 0x82);
17805+
17806+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
17807+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
17808+#endif
17809+
17810+}
17811+
17812 #define LDT_entry_a(info) \
17813 ((((info)->base_addr & 0x0000ffff) << 16) | ((info)->limit & 0x0ffff))
17814
17815@@ -90,7 +149,7 @@ static inline void set_ldt_desc(unsigned
17816 ((info)->seg_32bit << 22) | \
17817 ((info)->limit_in_pages << 23) | \
17818 ((info)->useable << 20) | \
17819- 0x7000)
17820+ 0x7100)
17821
17822 #define LDT_empty(info) (\
17823 (info)->base_addr == 0 && \
17824@@ -134,7 +193,7 @@ static inline void clear_LDT(void)
17825 */
17826 static inline void load_LDT_nolock(mm_context_t *pc, int cpu)
17827 {
17828- void *segments = pc->ldt;
17829+ const void *segments = pc->ldt;
17830 int count = pc->size;
17831
17832 if (likely(!count)) {
17833@@ -162,6 +221,22 @@ static inline unsigned long get_desc_bas
17834 return base;
17835 }
17836
17837+static inline void _load_LDT(mm_context_t *pc)
17838+{
17839+ int cpu = get_cpu();
17840+ const void *segments = pc->ldt;
17841+ int count = pc->size;
17842+
17843+ if (likely(!count)) {
17844+ segments = &default_ldt[0];
17845+ count = 5;
17846+ }
17847+
17848+ __set_ldt_desc(cpu, segments, count);
17849+ load_LDT_desc();
17850+ put_cpu();
17851+}
17852+
17853 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
17854
17855 #endif
17856diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/elf.h
17857--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17858+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17859@@ -71,7 +71,22 @@ typedef struct user_fxsr_struct elf_fpxr
17860 the loader. We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
17861 that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. */
17862
17863+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17864+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3*2 : TASK_SIZE/3*2)
17865+#else
17866 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
17867+#endif
17868+
17869+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
17870+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000000UL
17871+
17872+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17873+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
17874+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17875+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15
17876+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
17877+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC ? 15 : 16)
17878+#endif
17879
17880 /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
17881 now struct_user_regs, they are different) */
17882@@ -131,7 +146,14 @@ extern int dump_task_extended_fpu (struc
17883
17884 #define VSYSCALL_BASE (__fix_to_virt(FIX_VSYSCALL))
17885 #define VSYSCALL_EHDR ((const struct elfhdr *) VSYSCALL_BASE)
17886+
17887+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOVSYSCALL
17888+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17889+#define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall - SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE : (unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
17890+#else
17891 #define VSYSCALL_ENTRY ((unsigned long) &__kernel_vsyscall)
17892+#endif
17893+
17894 extern void __kernel_vsyscall;
17895
17896 #define ARCH_DLINFO \
17897@@ -187,3 +209,5 @@ do { \
17898 #endif
17899
17900 #endif
17901+
17902+#endif
17903diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/i387.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/i387.h
17904--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/i387.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17905+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/i387.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17906@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ extern void init_fpu(struct task_struct
17907 */
17908 #define restore_fpu(tsk) \
17909 alternative_input( \
17910- "nop ; frstor %1", \
17911- "fxrstor %1", \
17912+ "nop ; frstor %2", \
17913+ "fxrstor %2", \
17914 X86_FEATURE_FXSR, \
17915 "m" ((tsk)->thread.i387.fxsave))
17916
17917diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h
17918--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17919+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mach-default/apm.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17920@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32
17921 __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
17922 "pushl %%edi\n\t"
17923 "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
17924- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17925+ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17926 "setc %%al\n\t"
17927 "popl %%ebp\n\t"
17928 "popl %%edi\n\t"
17929@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline u8 apm_bios_call_simple_as
17930 __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS
17931 "pushl %%edi\n\t"
17932 "pushl %%ebp\n\t"
17933- "lcall *%%cs:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17934+ "lcall *%%ss:apm_bios_entry\n\t"
17935 "setc %%bl\n\t"
17936 "popl %%ebp\n\t"
17937 "popl %%edi\n\t"
17938diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mman.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mman.h
17939--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17940+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mman.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17941@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
17942 #define MAP_POPULATE 0x8000 /* populate (prefault) pagetables */
17943 #define MAP_NONBLOCK 0x10000 /* do not block on IO */
17944
17945+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
17946+#define MAP_MIRROR 0x20000
17947+#endif
17948+
17949 #define MCL_CURRENT 1 /* lock all current mappings */
17950 #define MCL_FUTURE 2 /* lock all future mappings */
17951
17952diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h
17953--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17954+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu_context.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17955@@ -46,6 +46,13 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
17956 */
17957 if (unlikely(prev->context.ldt != next->context.ldt))
17958 load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
17959+
17960+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
17961+ cpu_clear(cpu, prev->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17962+ cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17963+#endif
17964+
17965+ set_user_cs(next, cpu);
17966 }
17967 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
17968 else {
17969@@ -58,6 +65,12 @@ static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_s
17970 */
17971 load_cr3(next->pgd);
17972 load_LDT_nolock(&next->context, cpu);
17973+
17974+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
17975+ cpu_set(cpu, next->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
17976+#endif
17977+
17978+ set_user_cs(next, cpu);
17979 }
17980 }
17981 #endif
17982diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu.h
17983--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
17984+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/mmu.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
17985@@ -12,6 +12,17 @@ typedef struct {
17986 int size;
17987 struct semaphore sem;
17988 void *ldt;
17989+
17990+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
17991+ unsigned long user_cs_base;
17992+ unsigned long user_cs_limit;
17993+
17994+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
17995+ cpumask_t cpu_user_cs_mask;
17996+#endif
17997+
17998+#endif
17999+
18000 } mm_context_t;
18001
18002 #endif
18003diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/module.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/module.h
18004--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/module.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18005+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/module.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18006@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ struct mod_arch_specific
18007 #define MODULE_STACKSIZE ""
18008 #endif
18009
18010-#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE
18011+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
18012+#define MODULE_GRSEC "GRSECURITY "
18013+#else
18014+#define MODULE_GRSEC ""
18015+#endif
18016+
18017+#define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC MODULE_PROC_FAMILY MODULE_REGPARM MODULE_STACKSIZE MODULE_GRSEC
18018
18019 #endif /* _ASM_I386_MODULE_H */
18020diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/page.h
18021--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18022+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/page.h 2006-04-09 21:24:03.000000000 -0400
18023@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ typedef struct { unsigned long long pgpr
18024 typedef struct { unsigned long pte_low; } pte_t;
18025 typedef struct { unsigned long pgd; } pgd_t;
18026 typedef struct { unsigned long pgprot; } pgprot_t;
18027-#define boot_pte_t pte_t /* or would you rather have a typedef */
18028 #define pte_val(x) ((x).pte_low)
18029 #define HPAGE_SHIFT 22
18030 #endif
18031@@ -118,6 +117,15 @@ extern int page_is_ram(unsigned long pag
18032 #endif
18033 #define __KERNEL_START (__PAGE_OFFSET + __PHYSICAL_START)
18034
18035+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
18036+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (__PAGE_OFFSET + ((__PHYSICAL_START + ~(4*1024*1024)) & (4*1024*1024)))
18037+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
18038+extern unsigned char MODULES_VADDR[];
18039+extern unsigned char MODULES_END[];
18040+#endif
18041+#else
18042+#define __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET (0)
18043+#endif
18044
18045 #define PAGE_OFFSET ((unsigned long)__PAGE_OFFSET)
18046 #define VMALLOC_RESERVE ((unsigned long)__VMALLOC_RESERVE)
18047@@ -139,6 +147,19 @@ extern int page_is_ram(unsigned long pag
18048 ((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \
18049 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18050
18051+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
18052+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18053+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18054+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
18055+#else
18056+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC|MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC))?0:VM_EXEC))
18057+#endif
18058+#endif
18059+
18060+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18061+#define CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT 1
18062+#endif
18063+
18064 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18065
18066 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
18067diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h
18068--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18069+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgalloc.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18070@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
18071
18072 #include <linux/config.h>
18073 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
18074+#include <asm/desc.h>
18075 #include <linux/threads.h>
18076 #include <linux/mm.h> /* for struct page */
18077
18078 #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
18079- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
18080+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE + __pa(pte)))
18081
18082 #define pmd_populate(mm, pmd, pte) \
18083 set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE + \
18084diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h
18085--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18086+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18087@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ struct vm_area_struct;
18088 */
18089 #define ZERO_PAGE(vaddr) (virt_to_page(empty_zero_page))
18090 extern unsigned long empty_zero_page[1024];
18091-extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[1024];
18092 extern kmem_cache_t *pgd_cache;
18093 extern kmem_cache_t *pmd_cache;
18094 extern spinlock_t pgd_lock;
18095@@ -59,6 +58,11 @@ void paging_init(void);
18096 # include <asm/pgtable-2level-defs.h>
18097 #endif
18098
18099+extern pgd_t swapper_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD];
18100+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
18101+extern pmd_t swapper_pm_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD][PTRS_PER_PMD];
18102+#endif
18103+
18104 #define PGDIR_SIZE (1UL << PGDIR_SHIFT)
18105 #define PGDIR_MASK (~(PGDIR_SIZE-1))
18106
18107@@ -68,9 +72,11 @@ void paging_init(void);
18108 #define USER_PGD_PTRS (PAGE_OFFSET >> PGDIR_SHIFT)
18109 #define KERNEL_PGD_PTRS (PTRS_PER_PGD-USER_PGD_PTRS)
18110
18111+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_PAE
18112 #define TWOLEVEL_PGDIR_SHIFT 22
18113 #define BOOT_USER_PGD_PTRS (__PAGE_OFFSET >> TWOLEVEL_PGDIR_SHIFT)
18114 #define BOOT_KERNEL_PGD_PTRS (1024-BOOT_USER_PGD_PTRS)
18115+#endif
18116
18117 /* Just any arbitrary offset to the start of the vmalloc VM area: the
18118 * current 8MB value just means that there will be a 8MB "hole" after the
18119@@ -141,17 +147,26 @@ void paging_init(void);
18120
18121 #define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC \
18122 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18123-#define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \
18124- __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18125 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC \
18126 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18127-#define PAGE_COPY \
18128- PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18129 #define PAGE_READONLY \
18130 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18131 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC \
18132 __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18133
18134+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18135+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18136+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18137+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18138+#else
18139+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18140+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC \
18141+ __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18142+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18143+#endif
18144+
18145+#define PAGE_COPY \
18146+ PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18147 #define _PAGE_KERNEL \
18148 (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18149 #define _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \
18150@@ -176,18 +191,18 @@ extern unsigned long long __PAGE_KERNEL,
18151 * This is the closest we can get..
18152 */
18153 #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
18154-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY
18155-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
18156-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY
18157+#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
18158+#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18159+#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18160 #define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
18161 #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
18162 #define __P110 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
18163 #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_EXEC
18164
18165 #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
18166-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY
18167-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
18168-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED
18169+#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
18170+#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
18171+#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
18172 #define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
18173 #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
18174 #define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
18175@@ -434,6 +449,9 @@ extern void noexec_setup(const char *str
18176
18177 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
18178
18179+#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA
18180+#define HAVE_ARCH_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN
18181+
18182 #ifdef CONFIG_FLATMEM
18183 #define kern_addr_valid(addr) (1)
18184 #endif /* CONFIG_FLATMEM */
18185diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/processor.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/processor.h
18186--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18187+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/processor.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18188@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
18189 #include <linux/cache.h>
18190 #include <linux/config.h>
18191 #include <linux/threads.h>
18192-#include <asm/percpu.h>
18193
18194 /* flag for disabling the tsc */
18195 extern int tsc_disable;
18196@@ -90,8 +89,6 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {
18197
18198 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 boot_cpu_data;
18199 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 new_cpu_data;
18200-extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
18201-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct tss_struct, init_tss);
18202
18203 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
18204 extern struct cpuinfo_x86 cpu_data[];
18205@@ -320,10 +317,19 @@ extern int bootloader_type;
18206 */
18207 #define TASK_SIZE (PAGE_OFFSET)
18208
18209+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
18210+#define SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE ((PAGE_OFFSET) / 2)
18211+#endif
18212+
18213 /* This decides where the kernel will search for a free chunk of vm
18214 * space during mmap's.
18215 */
18216+
18217+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
18218+#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) ? SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE/3 : TASK_SIZE/3))
18219+#else
18220 #define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (PAGE_ALIGN(TASK_SIZE / 3))
18221+#endif
18222
18223 #define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
18224
18225@@ -439,6 +445,9 @@ struct tss_struct {
18226
18227 #define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN 16
18228
18229+extern struct tss_struct doublefault_tss;
18230+extern struct tss_struct init_tss[NR_CPUS];
18231+
18232 struct thread_struct {
18233 /* cached TLS descriptors. */
18234 struct desc_struct tls_array[GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES];
18235@@ -467,6 +476,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
18236 };
18237
18238 #define INIT_THREAD { \
18239+ .esp0 = sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack - 8, \
18240 .vm86_info = NULL, \
18241 .sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS, \
18242 .io_bitmap_ptr = NULL, \
18243@@ -479,7 +489,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
18244 * be within the limit.
18245 */
18246 #define INIT_TSS { \
18247- .esp0 = sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack, \
18248+ .esp0 = sizeof(init_stack) + (long)&init_stack - 8, \
18249 .ss0 = __KERNEL_DS, \
18250 .ss1 = __KERNEL_CS, \
18251 .io_bitmap_base = INVALID_IO_BITMAP_OFFSET, \
18252@@ -555,11 +565,7 @@ void show_trace(struct task_struct *task
18253 unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
18254
18255 #define THREAD_SIZE_LONGS (THREAD_SIZE/sizeof(unsigned long))
18256-#define KSTK_TOP(info) \
18257-({ \
18258- unsigned long *__ptr = (unsigned long *)(info); \
18259- (unsigned long)(&__ptr[THREAD_SIZE_LONGS]); \
18260-})
18261+#define KSTK_TOP(info) ((info)->task.thread.esp0)
18262
18263 /*
18264 * The below -8 is to reserve 8 bytes on top of the ring0 stack.
18265@@ -574,7 +580,7 @@ unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_stru
18266 #define task_pt_regs(task) \
18267 ({ \
18268 struct pt_regs *__regs__; \
18269- __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)(KSTK_TOP(task_stack_page(task))-8); \
18270+ __regs__ = (struct pt_regs *)((task)->thread.esp0); \
18271 __regs__ - 1; \
18272 })
18273
18274@@ -698,7 +704,7 @@ static inline void rep_nop(void)
18275 static inline void prefetch(const void *x)
18276 {
18277 alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
18278- "prefetchnta (%1)",
18279+ "prefetchnta (%2)",
18280 X86_FEATURE_XMM,
18281 "r" (x));
18282 }
18283@@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static inline void prefetch(const void *
18284 static inline void prefetchw(const void *x)
18285 {
18286 alternative_input(ASM_NOP4,
18287- "prefetchw (%1)",
18288+ "prefetchw (%2)",
18289 X86_FEATURE_3DNOW,
18290 "r" (x));
18291 }
18292diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/ptrace.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/ptrace.h
18293--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/ptrace.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18294+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/ptrace.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18295@@ -65,17 +65,18 @@ struct task_struct;
18296 extern void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs, int error_code);
18297
18298 /*
18299- * user_mode_vm(regs) determines whether a register set came from user mode.
18300+ * user_mode(regs) determines whether a register set came from user mode.
18301 * This is true if V8086 mode was enabled OR if the register set was from
18302 * protected mode with RPL-3 CS value. This tricky test checks that with
18303 * one comparison. Many places in the kernel can bypass this full check
18304- * if they have already ruled out V8086 mode, so user_mode(regs) can be used.
18305+ * if they have already ruled out V8086 mode, so user_mode_novm(regs) can
18306+ * be used.
18307 */
18308-static inline int user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
18309+static inline int user_mode_novm(struct pt_regs *regs)
18310 {
18311 return (regs->xcs & 3) != 0;
18312 }
18313-static inline int user_mode_vm(struct pt_regs *regs)
18314+static inline int user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
18315 {
18316 return ((regs->xcs & 3) | (regs->eflags & VM_MASK)) != 0;
18317 }
18318diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/system.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/system.h
18319--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/system.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18320+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-i386/system.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18321@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
18322 #include <linux/kernel.h>
18323 #include <asm/segment.h>
18324 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
18325+#include <asm/page.h>
18326 #include <linux/bitops.h> /* for LOCK_PREFIX */
18327
18328 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18329@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_limit(un
18330 unsigned long __limit;
18331 __asm__("lsll %1,%0"
18332 :"=r" (__limit):"r" (segment));
18333- return __limit+1;
18334+ return __limit;
18335 }
18336
18337 #define nop() __asm__ __volatile__ ("nop")
18338@@ -379,15 +380,15 @@ struct alt_instr {
18339 asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \
18340 ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \
18341 " .align 4\n" \
18342- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \
18343+ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \
18344 " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \
18345 " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \
18346 " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \
18347 " .byte 664f-663f\n" /* replacementlen */ \
18348 ".previous\n" \
18349- ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \
18350+ ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"a\"\n" \
18351 "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \
18352- ".previous" :: "i" (feature) : "memory")
18353+ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET) : "memory")
18354
18355 /*
18356 * Alternative inline assembly with input.
18357@@ -403,15 +404,15 @@ struct alt_instr {
18358 asm volatile ("661:\n\t" oldinstr "\n662:\n" \
18359 ".section .altinstructions,\"a\"\n" \
18360 " .align 4\n" \
18361- " .long 661b\n" /* label */ \
18362+ " .long 661b + %c1\n" /* label */ \
18363 " .long 663f\n" /* new instruction */ \
18364 " .byte %c0\n" /* feature bit */ \
18365 " .byte 662b-661b\n" /* sourcelen */ \
18366 " .byte 664f-663f\n" /* replacementlen */ \
18367 ".previous\n" \
18368- ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"ax\"\n" \
18369+ ".section .altinstr_replacement,\"a\"\n" \
18370 "663:\n\t" newinstr "\n664:\n" /* replacement */ \
18371- ".previous" :: "i" (feature), ##input)
18372+ ".previous" :: "i" (feature), "i" (__KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET), ##input)
18373
18374 /*
18375 * Force strict CPU ordering.
18376@@ -557,6 +558,6 @@ static inline void sched_cacheflush(void
18377 wbinvd();
18378 }
18379
18380-extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
18381+#define arch_align_stack(x) (x)
18382
18383 #endif
18384diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/elf.h
18385--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18386+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18387@@ -163,6 +163,16 @@ typedef elf_greg_t elf_gregset_t[ELF_NGR
18388 typedef struct ia64_fpreg elf_fpreg_t;
18389 typedef elf_fpreg_t elf_fpregset_t[ELF_NFPREG];
18390
18391+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18392+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 0x08048000UL : 0x4000000000000000UL)
18393+
18394+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18395+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
18396+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18397+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
18398+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18399+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) ((tsk)->personality == PER_LINUX32 ? 16 : 3*PAGE_SHIFT - 13)
18400+#endif
18401
18402
18403 struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration... */
18404diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/page.h
18405--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18406+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18407@@ -219,4 +219,13 @@ get_order (unsigned long size)
18408 (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) != 0) \
18409 ? VM_EXEC : 0))
18410
18411+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18412+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18413+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18414+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18415+#else
18416+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18417+#endif
18418+#endif
18419+
18420 #endif /* _ASM_IA64_PAGE_H */
18421diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h
18422--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18423+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18424@@ -144,6 +144,17 @@
18425 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
18426 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
18427 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
18428+
18429+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18430+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_RW)
18431+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
18432+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_3 | _PAGE_AR_R)
18433+#else
18434+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18435+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18436+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
18437+#endif
18438+
18439 #define PAGE_GATE __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_X_RX)
18440 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(__DIRTY_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RWX)
18441 #define PAGE_KERNELRX __pgprot(__ACCESS_BITS | _PAGE_PL_0 | _PAGE_AR_RX)
18442diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/processor.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/processor.h
18443--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18444+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/processor.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18445@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ struct thread_struct {
18446 .on_ustack = 0, \
18447 .ksp = 0, \
18448 .map_base = DEFAULT_MAP_BASE, \
18449- .rbs_bot = STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \
18450+ .rbs_bot = __STACK_TOP - DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE, \
18451 .task_size = DEFAULT_TASK_SIZE, \
18452 .last_fph_cpu = -1, \
18453 INIT_THREAD_IA32 \
18454diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h
18455--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18456+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ia64/ustack.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18457@@ -11,6 +11,6 @@
18458 #define MAX_USER_STACK_SIZE (RGN_MAP_LIMIT/2)
18459 /* Make a default stack size of 2GB */
18460 #define DEFAULT_USER_STACK_SIZE (1UL << 31)
18461-#define STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
18462+#define __STACK_TOP (0x6000000000000000UL + RGN_MAP_LIMIT)
18463
18464 #endif /* _ASM_IA64_USTACK_H */
18465diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/a.out.h
18466--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18467+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18468@@ -36,10 +36,10 @@ struct exec
18469 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18470
18471 #ifdef CONFIG_32BIT
18472-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18473+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18474 #endif
18475 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
18476-#define STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
18477+#define __STACK_TOP (current->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR ? TASK_SIZE32 : TASK_SIZE)
18478 #endif
18479
18480 #endif
18481diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/elf.h
18482--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18483+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18484@@ -331,4 +331,15 @@ extern int dump_task_fpu(struct task_str
18485 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
18486 #endif
18487
18488+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18489+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 0x00400000UL : 0x00400000UL)
18490+
18491+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18492+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
18493+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18494+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
18495+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18496+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (((tsk)->thread.mflags & MF_32BIT_ADDR) ? 27-PAGE_SHIFT : 36-PAGE_SHIFT)
18497+#endif
18498+
18499 #endif /* _ASM_ELF_H */
18500diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/page.h
18501--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18502+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-mips/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18503@@ -151,6 +151,15 @@ typedef struct { unsigned long pgprot; }
18504 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18505 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18506
18507+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18508+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18509+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18510+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18511+#else
18512+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18513+#endif
18514+#endif
18515+
18516 #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE)
18517 #define CAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - UNCAC_BASE + PAGE_OFFSET)
18518
18519diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h
18520--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18521+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18522@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ struct exec
18523 /* XXX: STACK_TOP actually should be STACK_BOTTOM for parisc.
18524 * prumpf */
18525
18526-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18527+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18528
18529 #endif
18530
18531diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/elf.h
18532--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18533+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18534@@ -337,6 +337,17 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration..
18535
18536 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE + 0x01000000)
18537
18538+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18539+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
18540+
18541+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18542+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
18543+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18544+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
18545+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18546+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
18547+#endif
18548+
18549 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
18550 instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
18551 but it's not easy, and we've already done it here. */
18552diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/page.h
18553--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18554+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18555@@ -150,6 +150,15 @@ extern int npmem_ranges;
18556 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18557 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18558
18559+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18560+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18561+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18562+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18563+#else
18564+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18565+#endif
18566+#endif
18567+
18568 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18569
18570 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
18571diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h
18572--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18573+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-parisc/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18574@@ -212,6 +212,17 @@ extern void *vmalloc_start;
18575 #define PAGE_EXECREAD __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
18576 #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_EXECREAD
18577 #define PAGE_RWX __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_EXEC |_PAGE_ACCESSED)
18578+
18579+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18580+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_WRITE | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18581+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18582+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18583+#else
18584+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18585+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
18586+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18587+#endif
18588+
18589 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL)
18590 #define PAGE_KERNEL_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL & ~_PAGE_WRITE)
18591 #define PAGE_KERNEL_UNC __pgprot(_PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_NO_CACHE)
18592diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/a.out.h
18593--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18594+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18595@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ struct exec
18596 #define STACK_TOP_USER64 TASK_SIZE_USER64
18597 #define STACK_TOP_USER32 TASK_SIZE_USER32
18598
18599-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
18600+#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
18601 STACK_TOP_USER32 : STACK_TOP_USER64)
18602
18603 #else /* __powerpc64__ */
18604
18605-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18606+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18607
18608 #endif /* __powerpc64__ */
18609 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18610diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h
18611--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18612+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18613@@ -176,6 +176,26 @@ typedef elf_vrreg_t elf_vrregset_t32[ELF
18614
18615 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (0x08000000)
18616
18617+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18618+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (0x10000000UL)
18619+
18620+#ifdef __powerpc64__
18621+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18622+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 16 : 28)
18623+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18624+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 16 : 28)
18625+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18626+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 16 : 28)
18627+#else
18628+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18629+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 15
18630+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18631+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 15
18632+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18633+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 15
18634+#endif
18635+#endif
18636+
18637 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18638
18639 /* Common routine for both 32-bit and 64-bit processes */
18640diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h
18641--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18642+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-powerpc/page_64.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18643@@ -169,6 +169,15 @@ extern unsigned int HPAGE_SHIFT;
18644 (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
18645 VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS32 : VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS64)
18646
18647+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18648+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18649+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18650+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18651+#else
18652+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18653+#endif
18654+#endif
18655+
18656 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
18657
18658 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18659diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/page.h
18660--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18661+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18662@@ -175,5 +175,14 @@ extern __inline__ int get_order(unsigned
18663 /* We do define AT_SYSINFO_EHDR but don't use the gate mecanism */
18664 #define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
18665
18666+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18667+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18668+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18669+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18670+#else
18671+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18672+#endif
18673+#endif
18674+
18675 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18676 #endif /* _PPC_PAGE_H */
18677diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h
18678--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18679+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-ppc/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18680@@ -441,11 +441,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
18681
18682 #define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE)
18683 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
18684-#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
18685+#define PAGE_READONLY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
18686 #define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW)
18687-#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC)
18688+#define PAGE_SHARED_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
18689 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER)
18690-#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC)
18691+#define PAGE_COPY_X __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_HWEXEC)
18692+
18693+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !defined(CONFIG_40x) && !defined(CONFIG_44x)
18694+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_GUARDED)
18695+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
18696+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_GUARDED)
18697+#else
18698+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18699+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
18700+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18701+#endif
18702
18703 #define PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(_PAGE_RAM)
18704 #define PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE __pgprot(_PAGE_IO)
18705@@ -457,21 +467,21 @@ extern unsigned long ioremap_bot, iorema
18706 * This is the closest we can get..
18707 */
18708 #define __P000 PAGE_NONE
18709-#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_X
18710-#define __P010 PAGE_COPY
18711-#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_X
18712-#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY
18713+#define __P001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
18714+#define __P010 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18715+#define __P011 PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC
18716+#define __P100 PAGE_READONLY_X
18717 #define __P101 PAGE_READONLY_X
18718-#define __P110 PAGE_COPY
18719+#define __P110 PAGE_COPY_X
18720 #define __P111 PAGE_COPY_X
18721
18722 #define __S000 PAGE_NONE
18723-#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_X
18724-#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED
18725-#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_X
18726-#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY
18727+#define __S001 PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC
18728+#define __S010 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
18729+#define __S011 PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC
18730+#define __S100 PAGE_READONLY_X
18731 #define __S101 PAGE_READONLY_X
18732-#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED
18733+#define __S110 PAGE_SHARED_X
18734 #define __S111 PAGE_SHARED_X
18735
18736 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
18737diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h
18738--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18739+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18740@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head
18741
18742 #include <asm/page.h>
18743
18744-#define STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
18745+#define __STACK_TOP (PAGE_OFFSET - PAGE_SIZE)
18746
18747 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18748
18749diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/elf.h
18750--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18751+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18752@@ -145,6 +145,17 @@ typedef struct {
18753
18754 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE)
18755
18756+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18757+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) 0x10000UL
18758+
18759+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18760+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) 16
18761+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18762+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) 16
18763+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18764+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) 16
18765+#endif
18766+
18767 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
18768 instruction set this cpu supports. This can NOT be done in userspace
18769 on Sparc. */
18770diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/page.h
18771--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18772+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18773@@ -162,6 +162,15 @@ extern unsigned long pfn_base;
18774 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18775 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18776
18777+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18778+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18779+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18780+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18781+#else
18782+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18783+#endif
18784+#endif
18785+
18786 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18787
18788 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
18789diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h
18790--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18791+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18792@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_none)
18793 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared)
18794 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy)
18795 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly)
18796+
18797+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18798+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_shared_noexec)
18799+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_copy_noexec)
18800+BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_readonly_noexec)
18801+#endif
18802+
18803 BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
18804
18805 #define PMD_SHIFT SUN4C_PMD_SHIFT
18806@@ -71,6 +78,16 @@ BTFIXUPDEF_INT(page_kernel)
18807 #define PAGE_COPY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy))
18808 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly))
18809
18810+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18811+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_shared_noexec))
18812+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_copy_noexec))
18813+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(BTFIXUP_INT(page_readonly_noexec))
18814+#else
18815+# define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18816+# define PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC PAGE_COPY
18817+# define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18818+#endif
18819+
18820 extern unsigned long page_kernel;
18821
18822 #ifdef MODULE
18823diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h
18824--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18825+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/pgtsrmmu.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18826@@ -115,6 +115,16 @@
18827 SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
18828 #define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18829 SRMMU_EXEC | SRMMU_REF)
18830+
18831+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18832+#define SRMMU_PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18833+ SRMMU_WRITE | SRMMU_REF)
18834+#define SRMMU_PAGE_COPY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18835+ SRMMU_REF)
18836+#define SRMMU_PAGE_RDONLY_NOEXEC __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | \
18837+ SRMMU_REF)
18838+#endif
18839+
18840 #define SRMMU_PAGE_KERNEL __pgprot(SRMMU_VALID | SRMMU_CACHE | SRMMU_PRIV | \
18841 SRMMU_DIRTY | SRMMU_REF)
18842
18843diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h
18844--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18845+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc/uaccess.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18846@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
18847 * No one can read/write anything from userland in the kernel space by setting
18848 * large size and address near to PAGE_OFFSET - a fault will break his intentions.
18849 */
18850-#define __user_ok(addr, size) ({ (void)(size); (addr) < STACK_TOP; })
18851+#define __user_ok(addr, size) ({ (void)(size); (addr) < __STACK_TOP; })
18852 #define __kernel_ok (segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))
18853 #define __access_ok(addr,size) (__user_ok((addr) & get_fs().seg,(size)))
18854 #define access_ok(type, addr, size) \
18855diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h
18856--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18857+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18858@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ struct relocation_info /* used when head
18859
18860 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18861
18862-#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
18863+#define __STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0xf0000000 : 0x80000000000L)
18864
18865 #endif
18866
18867diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h
18868--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18869+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18870@@ -140,6 +140,16 @@ typedef struct {
18871 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x0000010000000000UL
18872 #endif
18873
18874+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18875+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 0x10000UL : 0x100000UL)
18876+
18877+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
18878+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
18879+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) (PAGE_SHIFT + 1)
18880+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 14 : 28 )
18881+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18882+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? 15 : 29 )
18883+#endif
18884
18885 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
18886 instruction set this cpu supports. */
18887diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/page.h
18888--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18889+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-sparc64/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18890@@ -145,6 +145,15 @@ extern unsigned long page_to_pfn(struct
18891 #define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \
18892 VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18893
18894+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18895+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18896+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18897+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18898+#else
18899+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18900+#endif
18901+#endif
18902+
18903 #endif /* !(__KERNEL__) */
18904
18905 #include <asm-generic/page.h>
18906diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h
18907--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18908+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18909@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ struct exec
18910
18911 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18912 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
18913-#define STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18914+#define __STACK_TOP TASK_SIZE
18915 #endif
18916
18917 #endif /* __A_OUT_GNU_H__ */
18918diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h
18919--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18920+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18921@@ -89,6 +89,17 @@ typedef struct user_i387_struct elf_fpre
18922
18923 #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE / 3)
18924
18925+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
18926+#define PAX_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 0x08048000UL : 0x400000UL)
18927+
18928+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18929+#define PAX_DELTA_MMAP_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18930+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18931+#define PAX_DELTA_EXEC_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18932+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LSB(tsk) PAGE_SHIFT
18933+#define PAX_DELTA_STACK_LEN(tsk) (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? 16 : 32)
18934+#endif
18935+
18936 /* regs is struct pt_regs, pr_reg is elf_gregset_t (which is
18937 now struct_user_regs, they are different). Assumes current is the process
18938 getting dumped. */
18939diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/ia32.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/ia32.h
18940--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/ia32.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18941+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/ia32.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18942@@ -157,7 +157,13 @@ struct ustat32 {
18943 char f_fpack[6];
18944 };
18945
18946-#define IA32_STACK_TOP IA32_PAGE_OFFSET
18947+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
18948+#define IA32_DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
18949+#else
18950+#define IA32_DELTA_STACK 0UL
18951+#endif
18952+
18953+#define IA32_STACK_TOP (IA32_PAGE_OFFSET - IA32_DELTA_STACK)
18954
18955 #ifdef __KERNEL__
18956 struct user_desc;
18957diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/page.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/page.h
18958--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18959+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/page.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18960@@ -136,6 +136,15 @@ typedef struct { unsigned long pgprot; }
18961 (((current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) ? VM_EXEC : 0 ) | \
18962 VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC)
18963
18964+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
18965+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
18966+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)?0:VM_MAYEXEC) | \
18967+ ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18968+#else
18969+#define __VM_STACK_FLAGS (VM_MAYEXEC | ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)?0:VM_EXEC))
18970+#endif
18971+#endif
18972+
18973 #define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1
18974
18975 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
18976diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h
18977--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18978+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgalloc.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18979@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
18980 #include <linux/mm.h>
18981
18982 #define pmd_populate_kernel(mm, pmd, pte) \
18983- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
18984+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(pte)))
18985 #define pud_populate(mm, pud, pmd) \
18986 set_pud(pud, __pud(_PAGE_TABLE | __pa(pmd)))
18987 #define pgd_populate(mm, pgd, pud) \
18988diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h
18989--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
18990+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/pgtable.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
18991@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_f
18992 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18993 #define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
18994 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_ACCESSED)
18995+
18996+#define PAGE_READONLY_NOEXEC PAGE_READONLY
18997+#define PAGE_SHARED_NOEXEC PAGE_SHARED
18998+
18999 #define __PAGE_KERNEL \
19000 (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_NX)
19001 #define __PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC \
19002@@ -268,7 +272,13 @@ static inline pte_t pfn_pte(unsigned lon
19003 #define __LARGE_PTE (_PAGE_PSE|_PAGE_PRESENT)
19004 static inline int pte_user(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_USER; }
19005 static inline int pte_read(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_USER; }
19006-static inline int pte_exec(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_USER; }
19007+extern inline int pte_exec(pte_t pte)
19008+{
19009+ if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
19010+ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_NX;
19011+ else
19012+ return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_USER;
19013+}
19014 static inline int pte_dirty(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; }
19015 static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; }
19016 static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_RW; }
19017@@ -276,12 +286,26 @@ static inline int pte_file(pte_t pte) {
19018 static inline int pte_huge(pte_t pte) { return (pte_val(pte) & __LARGE_PTE) == __LARGE_PTE; }
19019
19020 static inline pte_t pte_rdprotect(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_USER)); return pte; }
19021-static inline pte_t pte_exprotect(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_USER)); return pte; }
19022+extern inline pte_t pte_exprotect(pte_t pte)
19023+{
19024+ if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
19025+ set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_NX));
19026+ else
19027+ set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_USER));
19028+ return pte;
19029+}
19030 static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_DIRTY)); return pte; }
19031 static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_ACCESSED)); return pte; }
19032 static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_RW)); return pte; }
19033 static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_USER)); return pte; }
19034-static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_USER)); return pte; }
19035+extern inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)
19036+{
19037+ if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX)
19038+ set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_NX));
19039+ else
19040+ set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_USER));
19041+ return pte;
19042+}
19043 static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_DIRTY)); return pte; }
19044 static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_ACCESSED)); return pte; }
19045 static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte) { set_pte(&pte, __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_RW)); return pte; }
19046diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/system.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/system.h
19047--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/system.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
19048+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/asm-x86_64/system.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19049@@ -372,6 +372,6 @@ static inline unsigned long __cmpxchg(vo
19050
19051 void cpu_idle_wait(void);
19052
19053-extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
19054+#define arch_align_stack(x) (x)
19055
19056 #endif
19057diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/a.out.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/a.out.h
19058--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/a.out.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
19059+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/a.out.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19060@@ -7,6 +7,16 @@
19061
19062 #include <asm/a.out.h>
19063
19064+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDUSTACK
19065+#define __DELTA_STACK (current->mm->delta_stack)
19066+#else
19067+#define __DELTA_STACK 0UL
19068+#endif
19069+
19070+#ifndef STACK_TOP
19071+#define STACK_TOP (__STACK_TOP - __DELTA_STACK)
19072+#endif
19073+
19074 #endif /* __STRUCT_EXEC_OVERRIDE__ */
19075
19076 /* these go in the N_MACHTYPE field */
19077@@ -37,6 +47,14 @@ enum machine_type {
19078 M_MIPS2 = 152 /* MIPS R6000/R4000 binary */
19079 };
19080
19081+/* Constants for the N_FLAGS field */
19082+#define F_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
19083+#define F_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
19084+#define F_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
19085+#define F_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
19086+/*#define F_PAX_RANDEXEC 16*/ /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
19087+#define F_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
19088+
19089 #if !defined (N_MAGIC)
19090 #define N_MAGIC(exec) ((exec).a_info & 0xffff)
19091 #endif
19092diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/binfmts.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/binfmts.h
19093--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/binfmts.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
19094+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/binfmts.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19095@@ -7,10 +7,10 @@ struct pt_regs;
19096
19097 /*
19098 * MAX_ARG_PAGES defines the number of pages allocated for arguments
19099- * and envelope for the new program. 32 should suffice, this gives
19100- * a maximum env+arg of 128kB w/4KB pages!
19101+ * and envelope for the new program. 33 should suffice, this gives
19102+ * a maximum env+arg of 132kB w/4KB pages!
19103 */
19104-#define MAX_ARG_PAGES 32
19105+#define MAX_ARG_PAGES 33
19106
19107 /* sizeof(linux_binprm->buf) */
19108 #define BINPRM_BUF_SIZE 128
19109@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
19110 unsigned interp_flags;
19111 unsigned interp_data;
19112 unsigned long loader, exec;
19113+ int misc;
19114 };
19115
19116 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP_BIT 0
19117@@ -87,5 +88,8 @@ extern void compute_creds(struct linux_b
19118 extern int do_coredump(long signr, int exit_code, struct pt_regs * regs);
19119 extern int set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new);
19120
19121+void pax_report_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void *pc, void *sp);
19122+void pax_report_insns(void *pc, void *sp);
19123+
19124 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
19125 #endif /* _LINUX_BINFMTS_H */
19126diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/capability.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/capability.h
19127--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/capability.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
19128+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/capability.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19129@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(ke
19130 #define cap_is_fs_cap(c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK)
19131
19132 extern int capable(int cap);
19133+extern int capable_nolog(int cap);
19134
19135 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
19136
19137diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/elf.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/elf.h
19138--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/elf.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
19139+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/elf.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19140@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
19141 #include <linux/auxvec.h>
19142 #include <asm/elf.h>
19143
19144+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
19145+#undef elf_read_implies_exec
19146+#endif
19147+
19148 #ifndef elf_read_implies_exec
19149 /* Executables for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will
19150 have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically.
19151@@ -46,6 +50,16 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword;
19152
19153 #define PT_GNU_STACK (PT_LOOS + 0x474e551)
19154
19155+#define PT_PAX_FLAGS (PT_LOOS + 0x5041580)
19156+
19157+/* Constants for the e_flags field */
19158+#define EF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 1 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
19159+#define EF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 2 /* Emulate trampolines */
19160+#define EF_PAX_MPROTECT 4 /* Restrict mprotect() */
19161+#define EF_PAX_RANDMMAP 8 /* Randomize mmap() base */
19162+/*#define EF_PAX_RANDEXEC 16*/ /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
19163+#define EF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 32 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
19164+
19165 /* These constants define the different elf file types */
19166 #define ET_NONE 0
19167 #define ET_REL 1
19168@@ -138,6 +152,8 @@ typedef __s64 Elf64_Sxword;
19169 #define DT_DEBUG 21
19170 #define DT_TEXTREL 22
19171 #define DT_JMPREL 23
19172+#define DT_FLAGS 30
19173+ #define DF_TEXTREL 0x00000004
19174 #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000
19175 #define DT_HIPROC 0x7fffffff
19176
19177@@ -267,6 +283,19 @@ typedef struct elf64_hdr {
19178 #define PF_W 0x2
19179 #define PF_X 0x1
19180
19181+#define PF_PAGEEXEC (1U << 4) /* Enable PAGEEXEC */
19182+#define PF_NOPAGEEXEC (1U << 5) /* Disable PAGEEXEC */
19183+#define PF_SEGMEXEC (1U << 6) /* Enable SEGMEXEC */
19184+#define PF_NOSEGMEXEC (1U << 7) /* Disable SEGMEXEC */
19185+#define PF_MPROTECT (1U << 8) /* Enable MPROTECT */
19186+#define PF_NOMPROTECT (1U << 9) /* Disable MPROTECT */
19187+/*#define PF_RANDEXEC (1U << 10)*/ /* Enable RANDEXEC */
19188+/*#define PF_NORANDEXEC (1U << 11)*/ /* Disable RANDEXEC */
19189+#define PF_EMUTRAMP (1U << 12) /* Enable EMUTRAMP */
19190+#define PF_NOEMUTRAMP (1U << 13) /* Disable EMUTRAMP */
19191+#define PF_RANDMMAP (1U << 14) /* Enable RANDMMAP */
19192+#define PF_NORANDMMAP (1U << 15) /* Disable RANDMMAP */
19193+
19194 typedef struct elf32_phdr{
19195 Elf32_Word p_type;
19196 Elf32_Off p_offset;
19197@@ -359,6 +388,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {
19198 #define EI_OSABI 7
19199 #define EI_PAD 8
19200
19201+#define EI_PAX 14
19202+
19203 #define ELFMAG0 0x7f /* EI_MAG */
19204 #define ELFMAG1 'E'
19205 #define ELFMAG2 'L'
19206@@ -415,6 +446,7 @@ extern Elf32_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
19207 #define elfhdr elf32_hdr
19208 #define elf_phdr elf32_phdr
19209 #define elf_note elf32_note
19210+#define elf_dyn Elf32_Dyn
19211
19212 #else
19213
19214@@ -422,6 +454,7 @@ extern Elf64_Dyn _DYNAMIC [];
19215 #define elfhdr elf64_hdr
19216 #define elf_phdr elf64_phdr
19217 #define elf_note elf64_note
19218+#define elf_dyn Elf64_Dyn
19219
19220 #endif
19221
19222diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gracl.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gracl.h
19223--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gracl.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19224+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gracl.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19225@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
19226+#ifndef GR_ACL_H
19227+#define GR_ACL_H
19228+
19229+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
19230+#include <linux/resource.h>
19231+#include <linux/dcache.h>
19232+#include <asm/resource.h>
19233+
19234+/* Major status information */
19235+
19236+#define GR_VERSION "grsecurity 2.1.9"
19237+#define GRSECURITY_VERSION 0x219
19238+
19239+enum {
19240+
19241+ SHUTDOWN = 0,
19242+ ENABLE = 1,
19243+ SPROLE = 2,
19244+ RELOAD = 3,
19245+ SEGVMOD = 4,
19246+ STATUS = 5,
19247+ UNSPROLE = 6,
19248+ PASSSET = 7,
19249+ SPROLEPAM = 8
19250+};
19251+
19252+/* Password setup definitions
19253+ * kernel/grhash.c */
19254+enum {
19255+ GR_PW_LEN = 128,
19256+ GR_SALT_LEN = 16,
19257+ GR_SHA_LEN = 32,
19258+};
19259+
19260+enum {
19261+ GR_SPROLE_LEN = 64,
19262+};
19263+
19264+#define GR_NLIMITS (RLIMIT_LOCKS + 2)
19265+
19266+/* Begin Data Structures */
19267+
19268+struct sprole_pw {
19269+ unsigned char *rolename;
19270+ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
19271+ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN]; /* 256-bit SHA hash of the password */
19272+};
19273+
19274+struct name_entry {
19275+ __u32 key;
19276+ ino_t inode;
19277+ dev_t device;
19278+ char *name;
19279+ __u16 len;
19280+ struct name_entry *prev;
19281+ struct name_entry *next;
19282+};
19283+
19284+struct inodev_entry {
19285+ struct name_entry *nentry;
19286+ struct inodev_entry *prev;
19287+ struct inodev_entry *next;
19288+};
19289+
19290+struct acl_role_db {
19291+ struct acl_role_label **r_hash;
19292+ __u32 r_size;
19293+};
19294+
19295+struct inodev_db {
19296+ struct inodev_entry **i_hash;
19297+ __u32 i_size;
19298+};
19299+
19300+struct name_db {
19301+ struct name_entry **n_hash;
19302+ __u32 n_size;
19303+};
19304+
19305+struct crash_uid {
19306+ uid_t uid;
19307+ unsigned long expires;
19308+};
19309+
19310+struct gr_hash_struct {
19311+ void **table;
19312+ void **nametable;
19313+ void *first;
19314+ __u32 table_size;
19315+ __u32 used_size;
19316+ int type;
19317+};
19318+
19319+/* Userspace Grsecurity ACL data structures */
19320+
19321+struct acl_subject_label {
19322+ char *filename;
19323+ ino_t inode;
19324+ dev_t device;
19325+ __u32 mode;
19326+ __u32 cap_mask;
19327+ __u32 cap_lower;
19328+
19329+ struct rlimit res[GR_NLIMITS];
19330+ __u16 resmask;
19331+
19332+ __u8 user_trans_type;
19333+ __u8 group_trans_type;
19334+ uid_t *user_transitions;
19335+ gid_t *group_transitions;
19336+ __u16 user_trans_num;
19337+ __u16 group_trans_num;
19338+
19339+ __u32 ip_proto[8];
19340+ __u32 ip_type;
19341+ struct acl_ip_label **ips;
19342+ __u32 ip_num;
19343+
19344+ __u32 crashes;
19345+ unsigned long expires;
19346+
19347+ struct acl_subject_label *parent_subject;
19348+ struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
19349+ struct acl_subject_label *prev;
19350+ struct acl_subject_label *next;
19351+
19352+ struct acl_object_label **obj_hash;
19353+ __u32 obj_hash_size;
19354+ __u16 pax_flags;
19355+};
19356+
19357+struct role_allowed_ip {
19358+ __u32 addr;
19359+ __u32 netmask;
19360+
19361+ struct role_allowed_ip *prev;
19362+ struct role_allowed_ip *next;
19363+};
19364+
19365+struct role_transition {
19366+ char *rolename;
19367+
19368+ struct role_transition *prev;
19369+ struct role_transition *next;
19370+};
19371+
19372+struct acl_role_label {
19373+ char *rolename;
19374+ uid_t uidgid;
19375+ __u16 roletype;
19376+
19377+ __u16 auth_attempts;
19378+ unsigned long expires;
19379+
19380+ struct acl_subject_label *root_label;
19381+ struct gr_hash_struct *hash;
19382+
19383+ struct acl_role_label *prev;
19384+ struct acl_role_label *next;
19385+
19386+ struct role_transition *transitions;
19387+ struct role_allowed_ip *allowed_ips;
19388+ uid_t *domain_children;
19389+ __u16 domain_child_num;
19390+
19391+ struct acl_subject_label **subj_hash;
19392+ __u32 subj_hash_size;
19393+};
19394+
19395+struct user_acl_role_db {
19396+ struct acl_role_label **r_table;
19397+ __u32 num_pointers; /* Number of allocations to track */
19398+ __u32 num_roles; /* Number of roles */
19399+ __u32 num_domain_children; /* Number of domain children */
19400+ __u32 num_subjects; /* Number of subjects */
19401+ __u32 num_objects; /* Number of objects */
19402+};
19403+
19404+struct acl_object_label {
19405+ char *filename;
19406+ ino_t inode;
19407+ dev_t device;
19408+ __u32 mode;
19409+
19410+ struct acl_subject_label *nested;
19411+ struct acl_object_label *globbed;
19412+
19413+ /* next two structures not used */
19414+
19415+ struct acl_object_label *prev;
19416+ struct acl_object_label *next;
19417+};
19418+
19419+struct acl_ip_label {
19420+ char *iface;
19421+ __u32 addr;
19422+ __u32 netmask;
19423+ __u16 low, high;
19424+ __u8 mode;
19425+ __u32 type;
19426+ __u32 proto[8];
19427+
19428+ /* next two structures not used */
19429+
19430+ struct acl_ip_label *prev;
19431+ struct acl_ip_label *next;
19432+};
19433+
19434+struct gr_arg {
19435+ struct user_acl_role_db role_db;
19436+ unsigned char pw[GR_PW_LEN];
19437+ unsigned char salt[GR_SALT_LEN];
19438+ unsigned char sum[GR_SHA_LEN];
19439+ unsigned char sp_role[GR_SPROLE_LEN];
19440+ struct sprole_pw *sprole_pws;
19441+ dev_t segv_device;
19442+ ino_t segv_inode;
19443+ uid_t segv_uid;
19444+ __u16 num_sprole_pws;
19445+ __u16 mode;
19446+};
19447+
19448+struct gr_arg_wrapper {
19449+ struct gr_arg *arg;
19450+ __u32 version;
19451+ __u32 size;
19452+};
19453+
19454+struct subject_map {
19455+ struct acl_subject_label *user;
19456+ struct acl_subject_label *kernel;
19457+ struct subject_map *prev;
19458+ struct subject_map *next;
19459+};
19460+
19461+struct acl_subj_map_db {
19462+ struct subject_map **s_hash;
19463+ __u32 s_size;
19464+};
19465+
19466+/* End Data Structures Section */
19467+
19468+/* Hash functions generated by empirical testing by Brad Spengler
19469+ Makes good use of the low bits of the inode. Generally 0-1 times
19470+ in loop for successful match. 0-3 for unsuccessful match.
19471+ Shift/add algorithm with modulus of table size and an XOR*/
19472+
19473+static __inline__ unsigned int
19474+rhash(const uid_t uid, const __u16 type, const unsigned int sz)
19475+{
19476+ return (((uid << type) + (uid ^ type)) % sz);
19477+}
19478+
19479+ static __inline__ unsigned int
19480+shash(const struct acl_subject_label *userp, const unsigned int sz)
19481+{
19482+ return ((const unsigned long)userp % sz);
19483+}
19484+
19485+static __inline__ unsigned int
19486+fhash(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev, const unsigned int sz)
19487+{
19488+ return (((ino + dev) ^ ((ino << 13) + (ino << 23) + (dev << 9))) % sz);
19489+}
19490+
19491+static __inline__ unsigned int
19492+nhash(const char *name, const __u16 len, const unsigned int sz)
19493+{
19494+ return full_name_hash(name, len) % sz;
19495+}
19496+
19497+#define FOR_EACH_ROLE_START(role,iter) \
19498+ role = NULL; \
19499+ iter = 0; \
19500+ while (iter < acl_role_set.r_size) { \
19501+ if (role == NULL) \
19502+ role = acl_role_set.r_hash[iter]; \
19503+ if (role == NULL) { \
19504+ iter++; \
19505+ continue; \
19506+ }
19507+
19508+#define FOR_EACH_ROLE_END(role,iter) \
19509+ role = role->next; \
19510+ if (role == NULL) \
19511+ iter++; \
19512+ }
19513+
19514+#define FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_START(role,subj,iter) \
19515+ subj = NULL; \
19516+ iter = 0; \
19517+ while (iter < role->subj_hash_size) { \
19518+ if (subj == NULL) \
19519+ subj = role->subj_hash[iter]; \
19520+ if (subj == NULL) { \
19521+ iter++; \
19522+ continue; \
19523+ }
19524+
19525+#define FOR_EACH_SUBJECT_END(subj,iter) \
19526+ subj = subj->next; \
19527+ if (subj == NULL) \
19528+ iter++; \
19529+ }
19530+
19531+
19532+#define FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_START(role,subj) \
19533+ subj = role->hash->first; \
19534+ while (subj != NULL) {
19535+
19536+#define FOR_EACH_NESTED_SUBJECT_END(subj) \
19537+ subj = subj->next; \
19538+ }
19539+
19540+#endif
19541+
19542diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gralloc.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gralloc.h
19543--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gralloc.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19544+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/gralloc.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19545@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
19546+#ifndef __GRALLOC_H
19547+#define __GRALLOC_H
19548+
19549+void acl_free_all(void);
19550+int acl_alloc_stack_init(unsigned long size);
19551+void *acl_alloc(unsigned long len);
19552+
19553+#endif
19554diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grdefs.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grdefs.h
19555--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grdefs.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19556+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grdefs.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19557@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
19558+#ifndef GRDEFS_H
19559+#define GRDEFS_H
19560+
19561+/* Begin grsecurity status declarations */
19562+
19563+enum {
19564+ GR_READY = 0x01,
19565+ GR_STATUS_INIT = 0x00 // disabled state
19566+};
19567+
19568+/* Begin ACL declarations */
19569+
19570+/* Role flags */
19571+
19572+enum {
19573+ GR_ROLE_USER = 0x0001,
19574+ GR_ROLE_GROUP = 0x0002,
19575+ GR_ROLE_DEFAULT = 0x0004,
19576+ GR_ROLE_SPECIAL = 0x0008,
19577+ GR_ROLE_AUTH = 0x0010,
19578+ GR_ROLE_NOPW = 0x0020,
19579+ GR_ROLE_GOD = 0x0040,
19580+ GR_ROLE_LEARN = 0x0080,
19581+ GR_ROLE_TPE = 0x0100,
19582+ GR_ROLE_DOMAIN = 0x0200,
19583+ GR_ROLE_PAM = 0x0400
19584+};
19585+
19586+/* ACL Subject and Object mode flags */
19587+enum {
19588+ GR_DELETED = 0x80000000
19589+};
19590+
19591+/* ACL Object-only mode flags */
19592+enum {
19593+ GR_READ = 0x00000001,
19594+ GR_APPEND = 0x00000002,
19595+ GR_WRITE = 0x00000004,
19596+ GR_EXEC = 0x00000008,
19597+ GR_FIND = 0x00000010,
19598+ GR_INHERIT = 0x00000020,
19599+ GR_SETID = 0x00000040,
19600+ GR_CREATE = 0x00000080,
19601+ GR_DELETE = 0x00000100,
19602+ GR_LINK = 0x00000200,
19603+ GR_AUDIT_READ = 0x00000400,
19604+ GR_AUDIT_APPEND = 0x00000800,
19605+ GR_AUDIT_WRITE = 0x00001000,
19606+ GR_AUDIT_EXEC = 0x00002000,
19607+ GR_AUDIT_FIND = 0x00004000,
19608+ GR_AUDIT_INHERIT= 0x00008000,
19609+ GR_AUDIT_SETID = 0x00010000,
19610+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE = 0x00020000,
19611+ GR_AUDIT_DELETE = 0x00040000,
19612+ GR_AUDIT_LINK = 0x00080000,
19613+ GR_PTRACERD = 0x00100000,
19614+ GR_NOPTRACE = 0x00200000,
19615+ GR_SUPPRESS = 0x00400000,
19616+ GR_NOLEARN = 0x00800000
19617+};
19618+
19619+#define GR_AUDITS (GR_AUDIT_READ | GR_AUDIT_WRITE | GR_AUDIT_APPEND | GR_AUDIT_EXEC | \
19620+ GR_AUDIT_FIND | GR_AUDIT_INHERIT | GR_AUDIT_SETID | \
19621+ GR_AUDIT_CREATE | GR_AUDIT_DELETE | GR_AUDIT_LINK)
19622+
19623+/* ACL subject-only mode flags */
19624+enum {
19625+ GR_KILL = 0x00000001,
19626+ GR_VIEW = 0x00000002,
19627+ GR_PROTECTED = 0x00000004,
19628+ GR_LEARN = 0x00000008,
19629+ GR_OVERRIDE = 0x00000010,
19630+ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
19631+ GR_DUMMY = 0x00000020,
19632+ GR_PROTSHM = 0x00000040,
19633+ GR_KILLPROC = 0x00000080,
19634+ GR_KILLIPPROC = 0x00000100,
19635+ /* just a placeholder, this mode is only used in userspace */
19636+ GR_NOTROJAN = 0x00000200,
19637+ GR_PROTPROCFD = 0x00000400,
19638+ GR_PROCACCT = 0x00000800,
19639+ GR_RELAXPTRACE = 0x00001000,
19640+ GR_NESTED = 0x00002000,
19641+ GR_INHERITLEARN = 0x00004000,
19642+ GR_PROCFIND = 0x00008000,
19643+ GR_POVERRIDE = 0x00010000,
19644+ GR_KERNELAUTH = 0x00020000,
19645+};
19646+
19647+enum {
19648+ GR_PAX_ENABLE_SEGMEXEC = 0x0001,
19649+ GR_PAX_ENABLE_PAGEEXEC = 0x0002,
19650+ GR_PAX_ENABLE_MPROTECT = 0x0004,
19651+ GR_PAX_ENABLE_RANDMMAP = 0x0008,
19652+ GR_PAX_ENABLE_EMUTRAMP = 0x0010,
19653+ GR_PAX_DISABLE_SEGMEXEC = 0x8001,
19654+ GR_PAX_DISABLE_PAGEEXEC = 0x8002,
19655+ GR_PAX_DISABLE_MPROTECT = 0x8004,
19656+ GR_PAX_DISABLE_RANDMMAP = 0x8008,
19657+ GR_PAX_DISABLE_EMUTRAMP = 0x8010,
19658+};
19659+
19660+enum {
19661+ GR_ID_USER = 0x01,
19662+ GR_ID_GROUP = 0x02,
19663+};
19664+
19665+enum {
19666+ GR_ID_ALLOW = 0x01,
19667+ GR_ID_DENY = 0x02,
19668+};
19669+
19670+#define GR_CRASH_RES 11
19671+#define GR_UIDTABLE_MAX 500
19672+
19673+/* begin resource learning section */
19674+enum {
19675+ GR_RLIM_CPU_BUMP = 60,
19676+ GR_RLIM_FSIZE_BUMP = 50000,
19677+ GR_RLIM_DATA_BUMP = 10000,
19678+ GR_RLIM_STACK_BUMP = 1000,
19679+ GR_RLIM_CORE_BUMP = 10000,
19680+ GR_RLIM_RSS_BUMP = 500000,
19681+ GR_RLIM_NPROC_BUMP = 1,
19682+ GR_RLIM_NOFILE_BUMP = 5,
19683+ GR_RLIM_MEMLOCK_BUMP = 50000,
19684+ GR_RLIM_AS_BUMP = 500000,
19685+ GR_RLIM_LOCKS_BUMP = 2
19686+};
19687+
19688+#endif
19689diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grinternal.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grinternal.h
19690--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grinternal.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19691+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grinternal.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19692@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
19693+#ifndef __GRINTERNAL_H
19694+#define __GRINTERNAL_H
19695+
19696+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
19697+
19698+#include <linux/fs.h>
19699+#include <linux/gracl.h>
19700+#include <linux/grdefs.h>
19701+#include <linux/grmsg.h>
19702+
19703+extern void gr_add_learn_entry(const char *fmt, ...);
19704+extern __u32 gr_search_file(const struct dentry *dentry, const __u32 mode,
19705+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19706+extern __u32 gr_check_create(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
19707+ const struct dentry *parent,
19708+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u32 mode);
19709+extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
19710+extern __u32 to_gr_audit(const __u32 reqmode);
19711+extern int gr_set_acls(const int type);
19712+
19713+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
19714+extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
19715+
19716+extern void gr_handle_alertkill(struct task_struct *task);
19717+extern char *gr_to_filename(const struct dentry *dentry,
19718+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19719+extern char *gr_to_filename1(const struct dentry *dentry,
19720+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19721+extern char *gr_to_filename2(const struct dentry *dentry,
19722+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19723+extern char *gr_to_filename3(const struct dentry *dentry,
19724+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
19725+
19726+extern int grsec_enable_link;
19727+extern int grsec_enable_fifo;
19728+extern int grsec_enable_execve;
19729+extern int grsec_enable_shm;
19730+extern int grsec_enable_execlog;
19731+extern int grsec_enable_signal;
19732+extern int grsec_enable_forkfail;
19733+extern int grsec_enable_time;
19734+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_shmat;
19735+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_findtask;
19736+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mount;
19737+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_double;
19738+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_pivot;
19739+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chdir;
19740+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_chmod;
19741+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_mknod;
19742+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_fchdir;
19743+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_nice;
19744+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_execlog;
19745+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_caps;
19746+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_sysctl;
19747+extern int grsec_enable_chroot_unix;
19748+extern int grsec_enable_tpe;
19749+extern int grsec_tpe_gid;
19750+extern int grsec_enable_tpe_all;
19751+extern int grsec_enable_sidcaps;
19752+extern int grsec_enable_randpid;
19753+extern int grsec_enable_socket_all;
19754+extern int grsec_socket_all_gid;
19755+extern int grsec_enable_socket_client;
19756+extern int grsec_socket_client_gid;
19757+extern int grsec_enable_socket_server;
19758+extern int grsec_socket_server_gid;
19759+extern int grsec_audit_gid;
19760+extern int grsec_enable_group;
19761+extern int grsec_enable_audit_ipc;
19762+extern int grsec_enable_audit_textrel;
19763+extern int grsec_enable_mount;
19764+extern int grsec_enable_chdir;
19765+extern int grsec_lock;
19766+
19767+extern struct task_struct *child_reaper;
19768+
19769+extern spinlock_t grsec_alert_lock;
19770+extern unsigned long grsec_alert_wtime;
19771+extern unsigned long grsec_alert_fyet;
19772+
19773+extern spinlock_t grsec_audit_lock;
19774+
19775+extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
19776+
19777+#define gr_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
19778+ gr_to_filename2(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
19779+ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
19780+
19781+#define gr_parent_task_fullpath(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
19782+ gr_to_filename3(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
19783+ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
19784+
19785+#define gr_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->exec_file ? \
19786+ gr_to_filename(tsk->exec_file->f_dentry, \
19787+ tsk->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
19788+
19789+#define gr_parent_task_fullpath0(tsk) (tsk->parent->exec_file ? \
19790+ gr_to_filename1(tsk->parent->exec_file->f_dentry, \
19791+ tsk->parent->exec_file->f_vfsmnt) : "/")
19792+
19793+#define proc_is_chrooted(tsk_a) ((tsk_a->pid > 1) && (tsk_a->fs != NULL) && \
19794+ ((tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev != \
19795+ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) || \
19796+ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino != \
19797+ child_reaper->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino)))
19798+
19799+#define have_same_root(tsk_a,tsk_b) ((tsk_a->fs != NULL) && (tsk_b->fs != NULL) && \
19800+ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev == \
19801+ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev) && \
19802+ (tsk_a->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino == \
19803+ tsk_b->fs->root->d_inode->i_ino))
19804+
19805+#define DEFAULTSECARGS(task) gr_task_fullpath(task), task->comm, \
19806+ task->pid, task->uid, \
19807+ task->euid, task->gid, task->egid, \
19808+ gr_parent_task_fullpath(task), \
19809+ task->parent->comm, task->parent->pid, \
19810+ task->parent->uid, task->parent->euid, \
19811+ task->parent->gid, task->parent->egid
19812+
19813+#define GR_CHROOT_CAPS ( \
19814+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_ADMIN) | \
19815+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_MODULE) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) | \
19816+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_PACCT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) | \
19817+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_BOOT) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TIME) | \
19818+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_NET_RAW) | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG) | \
19819+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
19820+
19821+#define security_learn(normal_msg,args...) \
19822+({ \
19823+ read_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
19824+ gr_add_learn_entry(normal_msg "\n", ## args); \
19825+ read_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock); \
19826+})
19827+
19828+enum {
19829+ GR_DO_AUDIT,
19830+ GR_DONT_AUDIT,
19831+ GR_DONT_AUDIT_GOOD
19832+};
19833+
19834+enum {
19835+ GR_TTYSNIFF,
19836+ GR_RBAC,
19837+ GR_RBAC_STR,
19838+ GR_STR_RBAC,
19839+ GR_RBAC_MODE2,
19840+ GR_RBAC_MODE3,
19841+ GR_FILENAME,
19842+ GR_NOARGS,
19843+ GR_ONE_INT,
19844+ GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR,
19845+ GR_ONE_STR,
19846+ GR_STR_INT,
19847+ GR_TWO_INT,
19848+ GR_THREE_INT,
19849+ GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR,
19850+ GR_TWO_STR,
19851+ GR_THREE_STR,
19852+ GR_FOUR_STR,
19853+ GR_STR_FILENAME,
19854+ GR_FILENAME_STR,
19855+ GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT,
19856+ GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR,
19857+ GR_TEXTREL,
19858+ GR_PTRACE,
19859+ GR_RESOURCE,
19860+ GR_CAP,
19861+ GR_SIG,
19862+ GR_CRASH1,
19863+ GR_CRASH2,
19864+ GR_PSACCT
19865+};
19866+
19867+#define gr_log_ttysniff(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TTYSNIFF, task)
19868+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC, dentry, mnt)
19869+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
19870+#define gr_log_fs_str_rbac(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_RBAC, str, dentry, mnt)
19871+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE2, dentry, mnt, str1, str2)
19872+#define gr_log_fs_rbac_mode3(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RBAC_MODE3, dentry, mnt, str1, str2, str3)
19873+#define gr_log_fs_generic(audit, msg, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME, dentry, mnt)
19874+#define gr_log_noargs(audit, msg) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_NOARGS)
19875+#define gr_log_int(audit, msg, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT, num)
19876+#define gr_log_int_str2(audit, msg, num, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_INT_TWO_STR, num, str1, str2)
19877+#define gr_log_str(audit, msg, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_ONE_STR, str)
19878+#define gr_log_str_int(audit, msg, str, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_INT, str, num)
19879+#define gr_log_int_int(audit, msg, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_INT, num1, num2)
19880+#define gr_log_int3(audit, msg, num1, num2, num3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_INT, num1, num2, num3)
19881+#define gr_log_int5_str2(audit, msg, num1, num2, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FIVE_INT_TWO_STR, num1, num2, str1, str2)
19882+#define gr_log_str_str(audit, msg, str1, str2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TWO_STR, str1, str2)
19883+#define gr_log_str3(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_THREE_STR, str1, str2, str3)
19884+#define gr_log_str4(audit, msg, str1, str2, str3, str4) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FOUR_STR, str1, str2, str3, str4)
19885+#define gr_log_str_fs(audit, msg, str, dentry, mnt) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_STR_FILENAME, str, dentry, mnt)
19886+#define gr_log_fs_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_STR, dentry, mnt, str)
19887+#define gr_log_fs_int2(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT, dentry, mnt, num1, num2)
19888+#define gr_log_fs_int2_str(audit, msg, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_FILENAME_TWO_INT_STR, dentry, mnt, num1, num2, str)
19889+#define gr_log_textrel_ulong_ulong(audit, msg, file, ulong1, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_TEXTREL, file, ulong1, ulong2)
19890+#define gr_log_ptrace(audit, msg, task) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PTRACE, task)
19891+#define gr_log_res_ulong2_str(audit, msg, task, ulong1, str, ulong2) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_RESOURCE, task, ulong1, str, ulong2)
19892+#define gr_log_cap(audit, msg, task, str) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CAP, task, str)
19893+#define gr_log_sig(audit, msg, task, num) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_SIG, task, num)
19894+#define gr_log_crash1(audit, msg, task, ulong) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH1, task, ulong)
19895+#define gr_log_crash2(audit, msg, task, ulong1) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_CRASH2, task, ulong1)
19896+#define gr_log_procacct(audit, msg, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9) gr_log_varargs(audit, msg, GR_PSACCT, task, num1, num2, num3, num4, num5, num6, num7, num8, num9)
19897+
19898+extern void gr_log_varargs(int audit, const char *msg, int argtypes, ...);
19899+
19900+#endif
19901+
19902+#endif
19903diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grmsg.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grmsg.h
19904--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grmsg.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
19905+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grmsg.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
19906@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
19907+#define DEFAULTSECMSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
19908+#define GR_ACL_PROCACCT_MSG "%.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u run time:[%ud %uh %um %us] cpu time:[%ud %uh %um %us] %s with exit code %ld, parent %.256s[%.16s:%d] IP:%u.%u.%u.%u TTY:%.64s uid/euid:%u/%u gid/egid:%u/%u"
19909+#define GR_PTRACE_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s(%.16s:%d) by "
19910+#define GR_STOPMOD_MSG "denied modification of module state by "
19911+#define GR_IOPERM_MSG "denied use of ioperm() by "
19912+#define GR_IOPL_MSG "denied use of iopl() by "
19913+#define GR_SHMAT_ACL_MSG "denied attach of shared memory of UID %u, PID %d, ID %u by "
19914+#define GR_UNIX_CHROOT_MSG "denied connect() to abstract AF_UNIX socket outside of chroot by "
19915+#define GR_SHMAT_CHROOT_MSG "denied attach of shared memory outside of chroot by "
19916+#define GR_KMEM_MSG "denied write of /dev/kmem by "
19917+#define GR_PORT_OPEN_MSG "denied open of /dev/port by "
19918+#define GR_MEM_WRITE_MSG "denied write of /dev/mem by "
19919+#define GR_MEM_MMAP_MSG "denied mmap write of /dev/[k]mem by "
19920+#define GR_SYMLINK_MSG "not following symlink %.950s owned by %d.%d by "
19921+#define GR_LEARN_AUDIT_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%lu\t%.4095s\t%lu\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19922+#define GR_ID_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%c\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19923+#define GR_HIDDEN_ACL_MSG "%s access to hidden file %.950s by "
19924+#define GR_OPEN_ACL_MSG "%s open of %.950s for%s%s by "
19925+#define GR_CREATE_ACL_MSG "%s create of %.950s for%s%s by "
19926+#define GR_FIFO_MSG "denied writing FIFO %.950s of %d.%d by "
19927+#define GR_MKNOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied mknod of %.950s from chroot by "
19928+#define GR_MKNOD_ACL_MSG "%s mknod of %.950s by "
19929+#define GR_UNIXCONNECT_ACL_MSG "%s connect() to the unix domain socket %.950s by "
19930+#define GR_TTYSNIFF_ACL_MSG "terminal being sniffed by IP:%u.%u.%u.%u %.480s[%.16s:%d], parent %.480s[%.16s:%d] against "
19931+#define GR_MKDIR_ACL_MSG "%s mkdir of %.950s by "
19932+#define GR_RMDIR_ACL_MSG "%s rmdir of %.950s by "
19933+#define GR_UNLINK_ACL_MSG "%s unlink of %.950s by "
19934+#define GR_SYMLINK_ACL_MSG "%s symlink from %.480s to %.480s by "
19935+#define GR_HARDLINK_MSG "denied hardlink of %.930s (owned by %d.%d) to %.30s for "
19936+#define GR_LINK_ACL_MSG "%s link of %.480s to %.480s by "
19937+#define GR_INHERIT_ACL_MSG "successful inherit of %.480s's ACL for %.480s by "
19938+#define GR_RENAME_ACL_MSG "%s rename of %.480s to %.480s by "
19939+#define GR_PTRACE_EXEC_ACL_MSG "denied ptrace of %.950s by "
19940+#define GR_NPROC_MSG "denied overstep of process limit by "
19941+#define GR_EXEC_ACL_MSG "%s execution of %.950s by "
19942+#define GR_EXEC_TPE_MSG "denied untrusted exec of %.950s by "
19943+#define GR_SEGVSTART_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning uid %u from login for %lu seconds"
19944+#define GR_SEGVNOSUID_ACL_MSG "possible exploit bruteforcing on " DEFAULTSECMSG " banning execution for %lu seconds"
19945+#define GR_MOUNT_CHROOT_MSG "denied mount of %.30s as %.930s from chroot by "
19946+#define GR_PIVOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied pivot_root from chroot by "
19947+#define GR_TRUNCATE_ACL_MSG "%s truncate of %.950s by "
19948+#define GR_ATIME_ACL_MSG "%s access time change of %.950s by "
19949+#define GR_ACCESS_ACL_MSG "%s access of %.950s for%s%s%s by "
19950+#define GR_CHROOT_CHROOT_MSG "denied double chroot to %.950s by "
19951+#define GR_FCHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s fchmod of %.950s by "
19952+#define GR_CHMOD_CHROOT_MSG "denied chmod +s of %.950s by "
19953+#define GR_CHMOD_ACL_MSG "%s chmod of %.950s by "
19954+#define GR_CHROOT_FCHDIR_MSG "denied fchdir outside of chroot to %.950s by "
19955+#define GR_CHOWN_ACL_MSG "%s chown of %.950s by "
19956+#define GR_WRITLIB_ACL_MSG "denied load of writable library %.950s by "
19957+#define GR_INITF_ACL_MSG "init_variables() failed %s by "
19958+#define GR_DISABLED_ACL_MSG "Error loading %s, trying to run kernel with acls disabled. To disable acls at startup use <kernel image name> gracl=off from your boot loader"
19959+#define GR_DEV_ACL_MSG "/dev/grsec: %d bytes sent %d required, being fed garbaged by "
19960+#define GR_SHUTS_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth success for "
19961+#define GR_SHUTF_ACL_MSG "shutdown auth failure for "
19962+#define GR_SHUTI_ACL_MSG "ignoring shutdown for disabled RBAC system for "
19963+#define GR_SEGVMODS_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth success for "
19964+#define GR_SEGVMODF_ACL_MSG "segvmod auth failure for "
19965+#define GR_SEGVMODI_ACL_MSG "ignoring segvmod for disabled RBAC system for "
19966+#define GR_ENABLE_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system loaded by "
19967+#define GR_ENABLEF_ACL_MSG "unable to load %s for "
19968+#define GR_RELOADI_ACL_MSG "ignoring reload request for disabled RBAC system"
19969+#define GR_RELOAD_ACL_MSG "%s RBAC system reloaded by "
19970+#define GR_RELOADF_ACL_MSG "failed reload of %s for "
19971+#define GR_SPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring change to special role for disabled RBAC system for "
19972+#define GR_SPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful change to special role %s (id %d) by "
19973+#define GR_SPROLEL_ACL_MSG "special role %s (id %d) exited by "
19974+#define GR_SPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role %s failure for "
19975+#define GR_UNSPROLEI_ACL_MSG "ignoring unauth of special role for disabled RBAC system for "
19976+#define GR_UNSPROLES_ACL_MSG "successful unauth of special role %s (id %d) by "
19977+#define GR_UNSPROLEF_ACL_MSG "special role unauth of %s failure for "
19978+#define GR_INVMODE_ACL_MSG "invalid mode %d by "
19979+#define GR_PRIORITY_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change of process (%.16s:%d) by "
19980+#define GR_FAILFORK_MSG "failed fork with errno %d by "
19981+#define GR_NICE_CHROOT_MSG "denied priority change by "
19982+#define GR_UNISIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to "
19983+#define GR_DUALSIGLOG_MSG "signal %d sent to " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
19984+#define GR_SIG_ACL_MSG "denied send of signal %d to protected task " DEFAULTSECMSG " by "
19985+#define GR_SYSCTL_MSG "denied modification of grsecurity sysctl value : %.32s by "
19986+#define GR_SYSCTL_ACL_MSG "%s sysctl of %.950s for%s%s by "
19987+#define GR_TIME_MSG "time set by "
19988+#define GR_DEFACL_MSG "fatal: unable to find subject for (%.16s:%d), loaded by "
19989+#define GR_MMAP_ACL_MSG "%s executable mmap of %.950s by "
19990+#define GR_MPROTECT_ACL_MSG "%s executable mprotect of %.950s by "
19991+#define GR_SOCK_MSG "denied socket(%.16s,%.16s,%.16s) by "
19992+#define GR_SOCK2_MSG "denied socket(%d,%.16s,%.16s) by "
19993+#define GR_BIND_MSG "denied bind() by "
19994+#define GR_CONNECT_MSG "denied connect() by "
19995+#define GR_BIND_ACL_MSG "denied bind() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
19996+#define GR_CONNECT_ACL_MSG "denied connect() to %u.%u.%u.%u port %u sock type %.16s protocol %.16s by "
19997+#define GR_IP_LEARN_MSG "%s\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%.4095s\t%.4095s\t%u.%u.%u.%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u\t%u.%u.%u.%u"
19998+#define GR_EXEC_CHROOT_MSG "exec of %.980s within chroot by process "
19999+#define GR_CAP_ACL_MSG "use of %s denied for "
20000+#define GR_USRCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to uid %u denied for "
20001+#define GR_GRPCHANGE_ACL_MSG "change to gid %u denied for "
20002+#define GR_REMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "remount of %.30s by "
20003+#define GR_UNMOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "unmount of %.30s by "
20004+#define GR_MOUNT_AUDIT_MSG "mount of %.30s to %.64s by "
20005+#define GR_CHDIR_AUDIT_MSG "chdir to %.980s by "
20006+#define GR_EXEC_AUDIT_MSG "exec of %.930s (%.128s) by "
20007+#define GR_MSGQ_AUDIT_MSG "message queue created by "
20008+#define GR_MSGQR_AUDIT_MSG "message queue of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
20009+#define GR_SEM_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore created by "
20010+#define GR_SEMR_AUDIT_MSG "semaphore of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
20011+#define GR_SHM_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of size %d created by "
20012+#define GR_SHMR_AUDIT_MSG "shared memory of uid:%u euid:%u removed by "
20013+#define GR_RESOURCE_MSG "denied resource overstep by requesting %lu for %.16s against limit %lu for "
20014+#define GR_TEXTREL_AUDIT_MSG "text relocation in %s, VMA:0x%08lx 0x%08lx by "
20015diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grsecurity.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grsecurity.h
20016--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grsecurity.h 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
20017+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/grsecurity.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20018@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
20019+#ifndef GR_SECURITY_H
20020+#define GR_SECURITY_H
20021+#include <linux/fs.h>
20022+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
20023+#include <linux/gracl.h>
20024+
20025+extern void gr_handle_brute_attach(struct task_struct *p);
20026+extern void gr_handle_brute_check(void);
20027+
20028+extern char gr_roletype_to_char(void);
20029+
20030+extern int gr_check_user_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
20031+extern int gr_check_group_change(int real, int effective, int fs);
20032+
20033+extern void gr_del_task_from_ip_table(struct task_struct *p);
20034+
20035+extern int gr_pid_is_chrooted(struct task_struct *p);
20036+extern int gr_handle_chroot_nice(void);
20037+extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
20038+extern int gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(struct task_struct *p,
20039+ const int niceval);
20040+extern int gr_chroot_fchdir(struct dentry *u_dentry, struct vfsmount *u_mnt);
20041+extern int gr_handle_chroot_chroot(const struct dentry *dentry,
20042+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20043+extern void gr_handle_chroot_caps(struct task_struct *task);
20044+extern void gr_handle_chroot_chdir(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
20045+extern int gr_handle_chroot_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
20046+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
20047+extern int gr_handle_chroot_mknod(const struct dentry *dentry,
20048+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int mode);
20049+extern int gr_handle_chroot_mount(const struct dentry *dentry,
20050+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
20051+ const char *dev_name);
20052+extern int gr_handle_chroot_pivot(void);
20053+extern int gr_handle_chroot_unix(const pid_t pid);
20054+
20055+extern int gr_handle_rawio(const struct inode *inode);
20056+extern int gr_handle_nproc(void);
20057+
20058+extern void gr_handle_ioperm(void);
20059+extern void gr_handle_iopl(void);
20060+
20061+extern int gr_tpe_allow(const struct file *file);
20062+
20063+extern int gr_random_pid(void);
20064+
20065+extern void gr_log_forkfail(const int retval);
20066+extern void gr_log_timechange(void);
20067+extern void gr_log_signal(const int sig, const struct task_struct *t);
20068+extern void gr_log_chdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
20069+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20070+extern void gr_log_chroot_exec(const struct dentry *dentry,
20071+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20072+extern void gr_handle_exec_args(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char **argv);
20073+extern void gr_log_remount(const char *devname, const int retval);
20074+extern void gr_log_unmount(const char *devname, const int retval);
20075+extern void gr_log_mount(const char *from, const char *to, const int retval);
20076+extern void gr_log_msgget(const int ret, const int msgflg);
20077+extern void gr_log_msgrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
20078+extern void gr_log_semget(const int err, const int semflg);
20079+extern void gr_log_semrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
20080+extern void gr_log_shmget(const int err, const int shmflg, const size_t size);
20081+extern void gr_log_shmrm(const uid_t uid, const uid_t cuid);
20082+extern void gr_log_textrel(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
20083+
20084+extern int gr_handle_follow_link(const struct inode *parent,
20085+ const struct inode *inode,
20086+ const struct dentry *dentry,
20087+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20088+extern int gr_handle_fifo(const struct dentry *dentry,
20089+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
20090+ const struct dentry *dir, const int flag,
20091+ const int acc_mode);
20092+extern int gr_handle_hardlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
20093+ const struct vfsmount *mnt,
20094+ struct inode *inode,
20095+ const int mode, const char *to);
20096+
20097+extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
20098+extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
20099+extern void gr_learn_resource(const struct task_struct *task, const int limit,
20100+ const unsigned long wanted, const int gt);
20101+extern void gr_copy_label(struct task_struct *tsk);
20102+extern void gr_handle_crash(struct task_struct *task, const int sig);
20103+extern int gr_handle_signal(const struct task_struct *p, const int sig);
20104+extern int gr_check_crash_uid(const uid_t uid);
20105+extern int gr_check_protected_task(const struct task_struct *task);
20106+extern int gr_acl_handle_mmap(const struct file *file,
20107+ const unsigned long prot);
20108+extern int gr_acl_handle_mprotect(const struct file *file,
20109+ const unsigned long prot);
20110+extern int gr_check_hidden_task(const struct task_struct *tsk);
20111+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_truncate(const struct dentry *dentry,
20112+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20113+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_utime(const struct dentry *dentry,
20114+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20115+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_access(const struct dentry *dentry,
20116+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
20117+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_fchmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
20118+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
20119+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chmod(const struct dentry *dentry,
20120+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode);
20121+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_chown(const struct dentry *dentry,
20122+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20123+extern int gr_handle_ptrace(struct task_struct *task, const long request);
20124+extern int gr_handle_proc_ptrace(struct task_struct *task);
20125+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_execve(const struct dentry *dentry,
20126+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20127+extern int gr_check_crash_exec(const struct file *filp);
20128+extern int gr_acl_is_enabled(void);
20129+extern void gr_set_kernel_label(struct task_struct *task);
20130+extern void gr_set_role_label(struct task_struct *task, const uid_t uid,
20131+ const gid_t gid);
20132+extern int gr_set_proc_label(const struct dentry *dentry,
20133+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20134+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_hidden_file(const struct dentry *dentry,
20135+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20136+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_open(const struct dentry *dentry,
20137+ const struct vfsmount *mnt, const int fmode);
20138+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_creat(const struct dentry *dentry,
20139+ const struct dentry *p_dentry,
20140+ const struct vfsmount *p_mnt, const int fmode,
20141+ const int imode);
20142+extern void gr_handle_create(const struct dentry *dentry,
20143+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20144+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mknod(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
20145+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20146+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
20147+ const int mode);
20148+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_mkdir(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
20149+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20150+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt);
20151+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_rmdir(const struct dentry *dentry,
20152+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20153+extern void gr_handle_delete(const ino_t ino, const dev_t dev);
20154+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unlink(const struct dentry *dentry,
20155+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20156+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_symlink(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
20157+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20158+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
20159+ const char *from);
20160+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
20161+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20162+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
20163+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
20164+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *to);
20165+extern int gr_acl_handle_rename(struct dentry *new_dentry,
20166+ struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20167+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
20168+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
20169+ struct inode *old_parent_inode,
20170+ struct vfsmount *old_mnt, const char *newname);
20171+extern void gr_handle_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
20172+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
20173+ struct dentry *new_dentry,
20174+ struct vfsmount *mnt, const __u8 replace);
20175+extern __u32 gr_check_link(const struct dentry *new_dentry,
20176+ const struct dentry *parent_dentry,
20177+ const struct vfsmount *parent_mnt,
20178+ const struct dentry *old_dentry,
20179+ const struct vfsmount *old_mnt);
20180+extern int gr_acl_handle_filldir(const struct file *file, const char *name,
20181+ const unsigned int namelen, const ino_t ino);
20182+
20183+extern __u32 gr_acl_handle_unix(const struct dentry *dentry,
20184+ const struct vfsmount *mnt);
20185+extern void gr_acl_handle_exit(void);
20186+extern void gr_acl_handle_psacct(struct task_struct *task, const long code);
20187+extern int gr_acl_handle_procpidmem(const struct task_struct *task);
20188+extern __u32 gr_cap_rtnetlink(void);
20189+
20190+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
20191+extern void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task);
20192+#else
20193+static inline void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task)
20194+{
20195+ return;
20196+}
20197+#endif
20198+
20199+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20200+extern void gr_handle_mem_write(void);
20201+extern void gr_handle_kmem_write(void);
20202+extern void gr_handle_open_port(void);
20203+extern int gr_handle_mem_mmap(const unsigned long offset,
20204+ struct vm_area_struct *vma);
20205+
20206+extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void);
20207+#define get_random_long() pax_get_random_long()
20208+
20209+extern int grsec_enable_dmesg;
20210+extern int grsec_enable_randsrc;
20211+extern int grsec_enable_shm;
20212+#endif
20213+
20214+#endif
20215diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mman.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mman.h
20216--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mman.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20217+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mman.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20218@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ static inline unsigned long
20219 calc_vm_flag_bits(unsigned long flags)
20220 {
20221 return _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_GROWSDOWN, VM_GROWSDOWN ) |
20222+
20223+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20224+ _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_MIRROR, VM_MIRROR) |
20225+#endif
20226+
20227 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_DENYWRITE, VM_DENYWRITE ) |
20228 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_EXECUTABLE, VM_EXECUTABLE) |
20229 _calc_vm_trans(flags, MAP_LOCKED, VM_LOCKED );
20230diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mm.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mm.h
20231--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mm.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20232+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/mm.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20233@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
20234 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
20235 #include <asm/processor.h>
20236 #include <asm/atomic.h>
20237+#include <asm/mman.h>
20238
20239 #define nth_page(page,n) pfn_to_page(page_to_pfn((page)) + (n))
20240
20241@@ -111,8 +112,43 @@ struct vm_area_struct {
20242 #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
20243 struct mempolicy *vm_policy; /* NUMA policy for the VMA */
20244 #endif
20245+
20246+ unsigned long vm_mirror; /* PaX: mirror distance */
20247 };
20248
20249+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20250+extern unsigned int pax_softmode;
20251+#endif
20252+
20253+extern int pax_check_flags(unsigned long *);
20254+
20255+/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
20256+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
20257+static inline unsigned long pax_get_flags(struct task_struct *tsk)
20258+{
20259+ if (likely(tsk->mm))
20260+ return tsk->mm->pax_flags;
20261+ else
20262+ return 0UL;
20263+}
20264+
20265+/* if tsk != current then task_lock must be held on it */
20266+static inline long pax_set_flags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags)
20267+{
20268+ if (likely(tsk->mm)) {
20269+ tsk->mm->pax_flags = flags;
20270+ return 0;
20271+ }
20272+ return -EINVAL;
20273+}
20274+#endif
20275+
20276+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
20277+extern void pax_set_initial_flags(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
20278+#elif defined(CONFIG_PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS)
20279+extern void (*pax_set_initial_flags_func)(struct linux_binprm * bprm);
20280+#endif
20281+
20282 /*
20283 * This struct defines the per-mm list of VMAs for uClinux. If CONFIG_MMU is
20284 * disabled, then there's a single shared list of VMAs maintained by the
20285@@ -167,6 +203,18 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void
20286 #define VM_MAPPED_COPY 0x01000000 /* T if mapped copy of data (nommu mmap) */
20287 #define VM_INSERTPAGE 0x02000000 /* The vma has had "vm_insert_page()" done on it */
20288
20289+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20290+#define VM_MIRROR 0x04000000 /* vma is mirroring another */
20291+#endif
20292+
20293+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
20294+#define VM_MAYNOTWRITE 0x08000000 /* vma cannot be granted VM_WRITE any more */
20295+#endif
20296+
20297+#ifdef __VM_STACK_FLAGS
20298+#define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS (0x00000033 | __VM_STACK_FLAGS)
20299+#endif
20300+
20301 #ifndef VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS /* arch can override this */
20302 #define VM_STACK_DEFAULT_FLAGS VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS
20303 #endif
20304@@ -1057,5 +1105,11 @@ void drop_slab(void);
20305 extern int randomize_va_space;
20306 #endif
20307
20308+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
20309+extern void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
20310+#else
20311+static inline void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot) {}
20312+#endif
20313+
20314 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
20315 #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
20316diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/module.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/module.h
20317--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/module.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20318+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/module.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20319@@ -263,16 +263,16 @@ struct module
20320 int (*init)(void);
20321
20322 /* If this is non-NULL, vfree after init() returns */
20323- void *module_init;
20324+ void *module_init_rx, *module_init_rw;
20325
20326 /* Here is the actual code + data, vfree'd on unload. */
20327- void *module_core;
20328+ void *module_core_rx, *module_core_rw;
20329
20330 /* Here are the sizes of the init and core sections */
20331- unsigned long init_size, core_size;
20332+ unsigned long init_size_rw, core_size_rw;
20333
20334 /* The size of the executable code in each section. */
20335- unsigned long init_text_size, core_text_size;
20336+ unsigned long init_size_rx, core_size_rx;
20337
20338 /* Arch-specific module values */
20339 struct mod_arch_specific arch;
20340diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/moduleloader.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/moduleloader.h
20341--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/moduleloader.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20342+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/moduleloader.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20343@@ -17,9 +17,21 @@ int module_frob_arch_sections(Elf_Ehdr *
20344 sections. Returns NULL on failure. */
20345 void *module_alloc(unsigned long size);
20346
20347+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
20348+void *module_alloc_exec(unsigned long size);
20349+#else
20350+#define module_alloc_exec(x) module_alloc(x)
20351+#endif
20352+
20353 /* Free memory returned from module_alloc. */
20354 void module_free(struct module *mod, void *module_region);
20355
20356+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
20357+void module_free_exec(struct module *mod, void *module_region);
20358+#else
20359+#define module_free_exec(x, y) module_free(x, y)
20360+#endif
20361+
20362 /* Apply the given relocation to the (simplified) ELF. Return -error
20363 or 0. */
20364 int apply_relocate(Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
20365diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/random.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/random.h
20366--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/random.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20367+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/random.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20368@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_numbe
20369 extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
20370 __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
20371
20372+extern unsigned long pax_get_random_long(void);
20373+
20374 #ifndef MODULE
20375 extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
20376 #endif
20377diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sched.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sched.h
20378--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sched.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20379+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sched.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20380@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
20381 #include <linux/auxvec.h> /* For AT_VECTOR_SIZE */
20382
20383 struct exec_domain;
20384+struct linux_binprm;
20385
20386 /*
20387 * cloning flags:
20388@@ -348,8 +349,34 @@ struct mm_struct {
20389 /* aio bits */
20390 rwlock_t ioctx_list_lock;
20391 struct kioctx *ioctx_list;
20392+
20393+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_NOEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_ASLR)
20394+ unsigned long pax_flags;
20395+#endif
20396+
20397+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_DLRESOLVE
20398+ unsigned long call_dl_resolve;
20399+#endif
20400+
20401+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC32) && defined(CONFIG_PAX_EMUSIGRT)
20402+ unsigned long call_syscall;
20403+#endif
20404+
20405+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ASLR
20406+ unsigned long delta_mmap; /* randomized offset */
20407+ unsigned long delta_exec; /* randomized offset */
20408+ unsigned long delta_stack; /* randomized offset */
20409+#endif
20410+
20411 };
20412
20413+#define MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC 0x01000000 /* Paging based non-executable pages */
20414+#define MF_PAX_EMUTRAMP 0x02000000 /* Emulate trampolines */
20415+#define MF_PAX_MPROTECT 0x04000000 /* Restrict mprotect() */
20416+#define MF_PAX_RANDMMAP 0x08000000 /* Randomize mmap() base */
20417+/*#define MF_PAX_RANDEXEC 0x10000000*/ /* Randomize ET_EXEC base */
20418+#define MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC 0x20000000 /* Segmentation based non-executable pages */
20419+
20420 struct sighand_struct {
20421 atomic_t count;
20422 struct k_sigaction action[_NSIG];
20423@@ -454,6 +481,15 @@ struct signal_struct {
20424 struct key *session_keyring; /* keyring inherited over fork */
20425 struct key *process_keyring; /* keyring private to this process */
20426 #endif
20427+
20428+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20429+ u32 curr_ip;
20430+ u32 gr_saddr;
20431+ u32 gr_daddr;
20432+ u16 gr_sport;
20433+ u16 gr_dport;
20434+ u8 used_accept:1;
20435+#endif
20436 };
20437
20438 /* Context switch must be unlocked if interrupts are to be enabled */
20439@@ -869,6 +905,16 @@ struct task_struct {
20440 nodemask_t mems_allowed;
20441 int cpuset_mems_generation;
20442 #endif
20443+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20444+ /* grsecurity */
20445+ struct acl_subject_label *acl;
20446+ struct acl_role_label *role;
20447+ struct file *exec_file;
20448+ u16 acl_role_id;
20449+ u8 acl_sp_role:1;
20450+ u8 is_writable:1;
20451+ u8 brute:1;
20452+#endif
20453 atomic_t fs_excl; /* holding fs exclusive resources */
20454 struct rcu_head rcu;
20455 };
20456@@ -1377,6 +1423,12 @@ extern void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct
20457 static inline void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
20458 {
20459 mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
20460+
20461+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
20462+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
20463+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
20464+#endif
20465+
20466 mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area;
20467 mm->unmap_area = arch_unmap_area;
20468 }
20469diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/shm.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/shm.h
20470--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/shm.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20471+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/shm.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20472@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ struct shmid_kernel /* private to the ke
20473 pid_t shm_cprid;
20474 pid_t shm_lprid;
20475 struct user_struct *mlock_user;
20476+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20477+ time_t shm_createtime;
20478+ pid_t shm_lapid;
20479+#endif
20480 };
20481
20482 /* shm_mode upper byte flags */
20483diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sysctl.h linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sysctl.h
20484--- linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sysctl.h 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20485+++ linux-2.6.16.2/include/linux/sysctl.h 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20486@@ -148,8 +148,20 @@ enum
20487 KERN_ACPI_VIDEO_FLAGS=71, /* int: flags for setting up video after ACPI sleep */
20488 KERN_IA64_UNALIGNED=72, /* int: ia64 unaligned userland trap enable */
20489 KERN_FBSPLASH=73, /* string: path to fbsplash helper */
20490+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20491+ KERN_GRSECURITY=98, /* grsecurity */
20492+#endif
20493+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20494+ KERN_PAX=99, /* PaX control */
20495+#endif
20496+
20497 };
20498
20499+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20500+enum {
20501+ PAX_SOFTMODE=1 /* PaX: disable/enable soft mode */
20502+};
20503+#endif
20504
20505 /* CTL_VM names: */
20506 enum
20507diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/init/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/init/Kconfig
20508--- linux-2.6.16.2/init/Kconfig 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20509+++ linux-2.6.16.2/init/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20510@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ menuconfig EMBEDDED
20511 config KALLSYMS
20512 bool "Load all symbols for debugging/kksymoops" if EMBEDDED
20513 default y
20514+ depends on !GRKERNSEC_HIDESYM
20515 help
20516 Say Y here to let the kernel print out symbolic crash information and
20517 symbolic stack backtraces. This increases the size of the kernel
20518diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/init/main.c linux-2.6.16.2/init/main.c
20519--- linux-2.6.16.2/init/main.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20520+++ linux-2.6.16.2/init/main.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20521@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static inline void mark_rodata_ro(void)
20522 #ifdef CONFIG_TC
20523 extern void tc_init(void);
20524 #endif
20525+extern void grsecurity_init(void);
20526
20527 enum system_states system_state;
20528 EXPORT_SYMBOL(system_state);
20529@@ -150,6 +151,15 @@ static int __init maxcpus(char *str)
20530
20531 __setup("maxcpus=", maxcpus);
20532
20533+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
20534+static int __init setup_pax_softmode(char *str)
20535+{
20536+ get_option(&str, &pax_softmode);
20537+ return 1;
20538+}
20539+__setup("pax_softmode=", setup_pax_softmode);
20540+#endif
20541+
20542 static char * argv_init[MAX_INIT_ARGS+2] = { "init", NULL, };
20543 char * envp_init[MAX_INIT_ENVS+2] = { "HOME=/", "TERM=linux", NULL, };
20544 static const char *panic_later, *panic_param;
20545@@ -699,6 +709,8 @@ static int init(void * unused)
20546 prepare_namespace();
20547 }
20548
20549+ grsecurity_init();
20550+
20551 /*
20552 * Ok, we have completed the initial bootup, and
20553 * we're essentially up and running. Get rid of the
20554diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/msg.c linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/msg.c
20555--- linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/msg.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20556+++ linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/msg.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20557@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
20558 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20559 #include <linux/audit.h>
20560 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
20561+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20562 #include <asm/current.h>
20563 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20564 #include "util.h"
20565@@ -233,6 +234,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgget (key_t key, i
20566 msg_unlock(msq);
20567 }
20568 up(&msg_ids.sem);
20569+
20570+ gr_log_msgget(ret, msgflg);
20571+
20572 return ret;
20573 }
20574
20575@@ -484,6 +488,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, i
20576 break;
20577 }
20578 case IPC_RMID:
20579+ gr_log_msgrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
20580+
20581 freeque (msq, msqid);
20582 break;
20583 }
20584diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/sem.c linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/sem.c
20585--- linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/sem.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20586+++ linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/sem.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20587@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
20588 #include <linux/audit.h>
20589 #include <linux/capability.h>
20590 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
20591+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20592 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20593 #include "util.h"
20594
20595@@ -243,6 +244,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_semget (key_t key, i
20596 }
20597
20598 up(&sem_ids.sem);
20599+
20600+ gr_log_semget(err, semflg);
20601+
20602 return err;
20603 }
20604
20605@@ -834,6 +838,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int se
20606
20607 switch(cmd){
20608 case IPC_RMID:
20609+ gr_log_semrm(ipcp->uid, ipcp->cuid);
20610+
20611 freeary(sma, semid);
20612 err = 0;
20613 break;
20614diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/shm.c linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/shm.c
20615--- linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/shm.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20616+++ linux-2.6.16.2/ipc/shm.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20617@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
20618 #include <linux/capability.h>
20619 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
20620 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
20621+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20622
20623 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20624
20625@@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st
20626 static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it);
20627 #endif
20628
20629+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20630+extern int gr_handle_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
20631+ const time_t shm_createtime, const uid_t cuid,
20632+ const int shmid);
20633+extern int gr_chroot_shmat(const pid_t shm_cprid, const pid_t shm_lapid,
20634+ const time_t shm_createtime);
20635+#endif
20636+
20637 size_t shm_ctlmax = SHMMAX;
20638 size_t shm_ctlall = SHMALL;
20639 int shm_ctlmni = SHMMNI;
20640@@ -146,6 +155,17 @@ static void shm_close (struct vm_area_st
20641 shp->shm_lprid = current->tgid;
20642 shp->shm_dtim = get_seconds();
20643 shp->shm_nattch--;
20644+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
20645+ if (grsec_enable_shm) {
20646+ if (shp->shm_nattch == 0) {
20647+ shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
20648+ shm_destroy(shp);
20649+ } else
20650+ shm_unlock(shp);
20651+ up(&shm_ids.sem);
20652+ return;
20653+ }
20654+#endif
20655 if(shp->shm_nattch == 0 &&
20656 shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_DEST)
20657 shm_destroy (shp);
20658@@ -243,6 +263,9 @@ static int newseg (key_t key, int shmflg
20659 shp->shm_lprid = 0;
20660 shp->shm_atim = shp->shm_dtim = 0;
20661 shp->shm_ctim = get_seconds();
20662+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20663+ shp->shm_createtime = get_seconds();
20664+#endif
20665 shp->shm_segsz = size;
20666 shp->shm_nattch = 0;
20667 shp->id = shm_buildid(id,shp->shm_perm.seq);
20668@@ -298,6 +321,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmget (key_t key, s
20669 }
20670 up(&shm_ids.sem);
20671
20672+ gr_log_shmget(err, shmflg, size);
20673+
20674 return err;
20675 }
20676
20677@@ -603,6 +628,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, i
20678 if (err)
20679 goto out_unlock_up;
20680
20681+ gr_log_shmrm(shp->shm_perm.uid, shp->shm_perm.cuid);
20682+
20683 if (shp->shm_nattch){
20684 shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
20685 /* Do not find it any more */
20686@@ -747,9 +774,27 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *sh
20687 return err;
20688 }
20689
20690+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20691+ if (!gr_handle_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime,
20692+ shp->shm_perm.cuid, shmid)) {
20693+ shm_unlock(shp);
20694+ return -EACCES;
20695+ }
20696+
20697+ if (!gr_chroot_shmat(shp->shm_cprid, shp->shm_lapid, shp->shm_createtime)) {
20698+ shm_unlock(shp);
20699+ return -EACCES;
20700+ }
20701+#endif
20702+
20703 file = shp->shm_file;
20704 size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
20705 shp->shm_nattch++;
20706+
20707+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20708+ shp->shm_lapid = current->pid;
20709+#endif
20710+
20711 shm_unlock(shp);
20712
20713 down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
20714@@ -916,3 +961,24 @@ static int sysvipc_shm_proc_show(struct
20715 shp->shm_ctim);
20716 }
20717 #endif
20718+
20719+void gr_shm_exit(struct task_struct *task)
20720+{
20721+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SHM
20722+ int i;
20723+ struct shmid_kernel *shp;
20724+
20725+ if (!grsec_enable_shm)
20726+ return;
20727+
20728+ for (i = 0; i <= shm_ids.max_id; i++) {
20729+ shp = shm_get(i);
20730+ if (shp && (shp->shm_cprid == task->pid) &&
20731+ (shp->shm_nattch <= 0)) {
20732+ shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
20733+ shm_destroy(shp);
20734+ }
20735+ }
20736+#endif
20737+ return;
20738+}
20739diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/capability.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/capability.c
20740--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/capability.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20741+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/capability.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20742@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
20743 #include <linux/module.h>
20744 #include <linux/security.h>
20745 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
20746+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20747 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20748
20749 unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
20750diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/configs.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/configs.c
20751--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/configs.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20752+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/configs.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20753@@ -89,8 +89,16 @@ static int __init ikconfig_init(void)
20754 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
20755
20756 /* create the current config file */
20757+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
20758+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
20759+ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, &proc_root);
20760+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
20761+ entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, &proc_root);
20762+#endif
20763+#else
20764 entry = create_proc_entry("config.gz", S_IFREG | S_IRUGO,
20765 &proc_root);
20766+#endif
20767 if (!entry)
20768 return -ENOMEM;
20769
20770diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/exit.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/exit.c
20771--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/exit.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20772+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/exit.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20773@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@
20774 #include <linux/signal.h>
20775 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
20776 #include <linux/mutex.h>
20777+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20778+
20779+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20780+extern rwlock_t grsec_exec_file_lock;
20781+#endif
20782
20783 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20784 #include <asm/unistd.h>
20785@@ -234,6 +239,15 @@ static void reparent_to_init(void)
20786 {
20787 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
20788
20789+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20790+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
20791+ if (current->exec_file) {
20792+ fput(current->exec_file);
20793+ current->exec_file = NULL;
20794+ }
20795+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
20796+#endif
20797+
20798 ptrace_unlink(current);
20799 /* Reparent to init */
20800 REMOVE_LINKS(current);
20801@@ -241,6 +255,8 @@ static void reparent_to_init(void)
20802 current->real_parent = child_reaper;
20803 SET_LINKS(current);
20804
20805+ gr_set_kernel_label(current);
20806+
20807 /* Set the exit signal to SIGCHLD so we signal init on exit */
20808 current->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
20809
20810@@ -337,6 +353,17 @@ void daemonize(const char *name, ...)
20811 vsnprintf(current->comm, sizeof(current->comm), name, args);
20812 va_end(args);
20813
20814+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
20815+ write_lock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
20816+ if (current->exec_file) {
20817+ fput(current->exec_file);
20818+ current->exec_file = NULL;
20819+ }
20820+ write_unlock(&grsec_exec_file_lock);
20821+#endif
20822+
20823+ gr_set_kernel_label(current);
20824+
20825 /*
20826 * If we were started as result of loading a module, close all of the
20827 * user space pages. We don't need them, and if we didn't close them
20828@@ -852,9 +879,14 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long co
20829 exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
20830 acct_process(code);
20831 }
20832+
20833+ gr_acl_handle_psacct(tsk, code);
20834+ gr_acl_handle_exit();
20835+
20836 exit_mm(tsk);
20837
20838 exit_sem(tsk);
20839+ gr_shm_exit(tsk);
20840 __exit_files(tsk);
20841 __exit_fs(tsk);
20842 exit_namespace(tsk);
20843diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/fork.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/fork.c
20844--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/fork.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20845+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/fork.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20846@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
20847 #include <linux/rmap.h>
20848 #include <linux/acct.h>
20849 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
20850+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
20851
20852 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
20853 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
20854@@ -200,8 +201,8 @@ static inline int dup_mmap(struct mm_str
20855 mm->locked_vm = 0;
20856 mm->mmap = NULL;
20857 mm->mmap_cache = NULL;
20858- mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->mmap_base;
20859- mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
20860+ mm->free_area_cache = oldmm->free_area_cache;
20861+ mm->cached_hole_size = oldmm->cached_hole_size;
20862 mm->map_count = 0;
20863 cpus_clear(mm->cpu_vm_mask);
20864 mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
20865@@ -326,7 +327,7 @@ static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct
20866 spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
20867 rwlock_init(&mm->ioctx_list_lock);
20868 mm->ioctx_list = NULL;
20869- mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
20870+ mm->free_area_cache = ~0UL;
20871 mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
20872
20873 if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) {
20874@@ -946,6 +947,9 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon
20875 goto fork_out;
20876
20877 retval = -EAGAIN;
20878+
20879+ gr_learn_resource(p, RLIMIT_NPROC, atomic_read(&p->user->processes), 0);
20880+
20881 if (atomic_read(&p->user->processes) >=
20882 p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
20883 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
20884@@ -1055,6 +1059,8 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon
20885 if (retval)
20886 goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespace;
20887
20888+ gr_copy_label(p);
20889+
20890 p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
20891 /*
20892 * Clear TID on mm_release()?
20893@@ -1239,6 +1245,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_count:
20894 bad_fork_free:
20895 free_task(p);
20896 fork_out:
20897+ gr_log_forkfail(retval);
20898+
20899 return ERR_PTR(retval);
20900 }
20901
20902@@ -1296,6 +1304,9 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
20903
20904 if (pid < 0)
20905 return -EAGAIN;
20906+
20907+ gr_handle_brute_check();
20908+
20909 if (unlikely(current->ptrace)) {
20910 trace = fork_traceflag (clone_flags);
20911 if (trace)
20912diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/futex.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/futex.c
20913--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/futex.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20914+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/futex.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20915@@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ static int get_futex_key(unsigned long u
20916 struct page *page;
20917 int err;
20918
20919+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
20920+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (uaddr >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE))
20921+ return -EFAULT;
20922+#endif
20923+
20924 /*
20925 * The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
20926 */
20927diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kallsyms.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kallsyms.c
20928--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kallsyms.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20929+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kallsyms.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20930@@ -301,7 +301,6 @@ static unsigned long get_ksymbol_core(st
20931
20932 static void reset_iter(struct kallsym_iter *iter, loff_t new_pos)
20933 {
20934- iter->name[0] = '\0';
20935 iter->nameoff = get_symbol_offset(new_pos);
20936 iter->pos = new_pos;
20937 }
20938@@ -380,7 +379,7 @@ static int kallsyms_open(struct inode *i
20939 struct kallsym_iter *iter;
20940 int ret;
20941
20942- iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
20943+ iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
20944 if (!iter)
20945 return -ENOMEM;
20946 reset_iter(iter, 0);
20947@@ -411,7 +410,15 @@ static int __init kallsyms_init(void)
20948 {
20949 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
20950
20951+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
20952+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
20953+ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL);
20954+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
20955+ entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
20956+#endif
20957+#else
20958 entry = create_proc_entry("kallsyms", 0444, NULL);
20959+#endif
20960 if (entry)
20961 entry->proc_fops = &kallsyms_operations;
20962 return 0;
20963diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kprobes.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kprobes.c
20964--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kprobes.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20965+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/kprobes.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20966@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ kprobe_opcode_t __kprobes *get_insn_slot
20967 * kernel image and loaded module images reside. This is required
20968 * so x86_64 can correctly handle the %rip-relative fixups.
20969 */
20970- kip->insns = module_alloc(PAGE_SIZE);
20971+ kip->insns = module_alloc_exec(PAGE_SIZE);
20972 if (!kip->insns) {
20973 kfree(kip);
20974 return NULL;
20975diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/module.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/module.c
20976--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/module.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
20977+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/module.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
20978@@ -39,10 +39,15 @@
20979 #include <linux/device.h>
20980 #include <linux/string.h>
20981 #include <linux/sched.h>
20982+#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
20983 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
20984 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
20985 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
20986
20987+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
20988+#include <asm/desc.h>
20989+#endif
20990+
20991 #if 0
20992 #define DEBUGP printk
20993 #else
20994@@ -66,6 +71,8 @@ static LIST_HEAD(modules);
20995 static DECLARE_MUTEX(notify_mutex);
20996 static struct notifier_block * module_notify_list;
20997
20998+extern int gr_check_modstop(void);
20999+
21000 int register_module_notifier(struct notifier_block * nb)
21001 {
21002 int err;
21003@@ -576,6 +583,9 @@ sys_delete_module(const char __user *nam
21004 char name[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
21005 int ret, forced = 0;
21006
21007+ if (gr_check_modstop())
21008+ return -EPERM;
21009+
21010 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
21011 return -EPERM;
21012
21013@@ -1178,13 +1188,15 @@ static void free_module(struct module *m
21014 module_unload_free(mod);
21015
21016 /* This may be NULL, but that's OK */
21017- module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
21018+ module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
21019+ module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
21020 kfree(mod->args);
21021 if (mod->percpu)
21022 percpu_modfree(mod->percpu);
21023
21024 /* Finally, free the core (containing the module structure) */
21025- module_free(mod, mod->module_core);
21026+ module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_core_rx);
21027+ module_free(mod, mod->module_core_rw);
21028 }
21029
21030 void *__symbol_get(const char *symbol)
21031@@ -1341,11 +1353,14 @@ static void layout_sections(struct modul
21032 || strncmp(secstrings + s->sh_name,
21033 ".init", 5) == 0)
21034 continue;
21035- s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size, s);
21036+ if ((s->sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21037+ s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size_rw, s);
21038+ else
21039+ s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->core_size_rx, s);
21040 DEBUGP("\t%s\n", secstrings + s->sh_name);
21041 }
21042 if (m == 0)
21043- mod->core_text_size = mod->core_size;
21044+ mod->core_size_rx = mod->core_size_rx;
21045 }
21046
21047 DEBUGP("Init section allocation order:\n");
21048@@ -1359,12 +1374,15 @@ static void layout_sections(struct modul
21049 || strncmp(secstrings + s->sh_name,
21050 ".init", 5) != 0)
21051 continue;
21052- s->sh_entsize = (get_offset(&mod->init_size, s)
21053- | INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
21054+ if ((s->sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(s->sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21055+ s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->init_size_rw, s);
21056+ else
21057+ s->sh_entsize = get_offset(&mod->init_size_rx, s);
21058+ s->sh_entsize |= INIT_OFFSET_MASK;
21059 DEBUGP("\t%s\n", secstrings + s->sh_name);
21060 }
21061 if (m == 0)
21062- mod->init_text_size = mod->init_size;
21063+ mod->init_size_rx = mod->init_size_rx;
21064 }
21065 }
21066
21067@@ -1545,6 +1563,10 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21068 struct exception_table_entry *extable;
21069 mm_segment_t old_fs;
21070
21071+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21072+ unsigned long cr0;
21073+#endif
21074+
21075 DEBUGP("load_module: umod=%p, len=%lu, uargs=%p\n",
21076 umod, len, uargs);
21077 if (len < sizeof(*hdr))
21078@@ -1704,21 +1726,57 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21079 layout_sections(mod, hdr, sechdrs, secstrings);
21080
21081 /* Do the allocs. */
21082- ptr = module_alloc(mod->core_size);
21083+ ptr = module_alloc(mod->core_size_rw);
21084 if (!ptr) {
21085 err = -ENOMEM;
21086 goto free_percpu;
21087 }
21088- memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size);
21089- mod->module_core = ptr;
21090+ memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size_rw);
21091+ mod->module_core_rw = ptr;
21092+
21093+ ptr = module_alloc(mod->init_size_rw);
21094+ if (!ptr && mod->init_size_rw) {
21095+ err = -ENOMEM;
21096+ goto free_core_rw;
21097+ }
21098+ memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size_rw);
21099+ mod->module_init_rw = ptr;
21100+
21101+ ptr = module_alloc_exec(mod->core_size_rx);
21102+ if (!ptr) {
21103+ err = -ENOMEM;
21104+ goto free_init_rw;
21105+ }
21106+
21107+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21108+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21109+#endif
21110+
21111+ memset(ptr, 0, mod->core_size_rx);
21112+
21113+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21114+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21115+#endif
21116+
21117+ mod->module_core_rx = ptr;
21118
21119- ptr = module_alloc(mod->init_size);
21120- if (!ptr && mod->init_size) {
21121+ ptr = module_alloc_exec(mod->init_size_rx);
21122+ if (!ptr && mod->init_size_rx) {
21123 err = -ENOMEM;
21124- goto free_core;
21125+ goto free_core_rx;
21126 }
21127- memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size);
21128- mod->module_init = ptr;
21129+
21130+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21131+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21132+#endif
21133+
21134+ memset(ptr, 0, mod->init_size_rx);
21135+
21136+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21137+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21138+#endif
21139+
21140+ mod->module_init_rx = ptr;
21141
21142 /* Transfer each section which specifies SHF_ALLOC */
21143 DEBUGP("final section addresses:\n");
21144@@ -1728,17 +1786,44 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21145 if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21146 continue;
21147
21148- if (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & INIT_OFFSET_MASK)
21149- dest = mod->module_init
21150- + (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
21151- else
21152- dest = mod->module_core + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
21153+ if (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & INIT_OFFSET_MASK) {
21154+ if ((sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21155+ dest = mod->module_init_rw
21156+ + (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
21157+ else
21158+ dest = mod->module_init_rx
21159+ + (sechdrs[i].sh_entsize & ~INIT_OFFSET_MASK);
21160+ } else {
21161+ if ((sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) || !(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21162+ dest = mod->module_core_rw + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
21163+ else
21164+ dest = mod->module_core_rx + sechdrs[i].sh_entsize;
21165+ }
21166
21167- if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS)
21168- memcpy(dest, (void *)sechdrs[i].sh_addr,
21169- sechdrs[i].sh_size);
21170+ if (sechdrs[i].sh_type != SHT_NOBITS) {
21171+
21172+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21173+ if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) && (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21174+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21175+#endif
21176+
21177+ memcpy(dest, (void *)sechdrs[i].sh_addr, sechdrs[i].sh_size);
21178+
21179+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21180+ if (!(sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_WRITE) && (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21181+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21182+#endif
21183+
21184+ }
21185 /* Update sh_addr to point to copy in image. */
21186- sechdrs[i].sh_addr = (unsigned long)dest;
21187+
21188+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21189+ if (sechdrs[i].sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR)
21190+ sechdrs[i].sh_addr = (unsigned long)dest - __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
21191+ else
21192+#endif
21193+
21194+ sechdrs[i].sh_addr = (unsigned long)dest;
21195 DEBUGP("\t0x%lx %s\n", sechdrs[i].sh_addr, secstrings + sechdrs[i].sh_name);
21196 }
21197 /* Module has been moved. */
21198@@ -1761,8 +1846,18 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21199 #endif
21200
21201 /* Fix up syms, so that st_value is a pointer to location. */
21202+
21203+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21204+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21205+#endif
21206+
21207 err = simplify_symbols(sechdrs, symindex, strtab, versindex, pcpuindex,
21208 mod);
21209+
21210+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21211+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21212+#endif
21213+
21214 if (err < 0)
21215 goto cleanup;
21216
21217@@ -1798,11 +1893,20 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21218 if (!(sechdrs[info].sh_flags & SHF_ALLOC))
21219 continue;
21220
21221+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21222+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21223+#endif
21224+
21225 if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_REL)
21226 err = apply_relocate(sechdrs, strtab, symindex, i,mod);
21227 else if (sechdrs[i].sh_type == SHT_RELA)
21228 err = apply_relocate_add(sechdrs, strtab, symindex, i,
21229 mod);
21230+
21231+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21232+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21233+#endif
21234+
21235 if (err < 0)
21236 goto cleanup;
21237 }
21238@@ -1816,14 +1920,31 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21239 /* Set up and sort exception table */
21240 mod->num_exentries = sechdrs[exindex].sh_size / sizeof(*mod->extable);
21241 mod->extable = extable = (void *)sechdrs[exindex].sh_addr;
21242+
21243+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21244+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21245+#endif
21246+
21247 sort_extable(extable, extable + mod->num_exentries);
21248
21249+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21250+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21251+#endif
21252+
21253 /* Finally, copy percpu area over. */
21254 percpu_modcopy(mod->percpu, (void *)sechdrs[pcpuindex].sh_addr,
21255 sechdrs[pcpuindex].sh_size);
21256
21257+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21258+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
21259+#endif
21260+
21261 add_kallsyms(mod, sechdrs, symindex, strindex, secstrings);
21262
21263+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21264+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
21265+#endif
21266+
21267 err = module_finalize(hdr, sechdrs, mod);
21268 if (err < 0)
21269 goto cleanup;
21270@@ -1837,12 +1958,12 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21271 * Do it before processing of module parameters, so the module
21272 * can provide parameter accessor functions of its own.
21273 */
21274- if (mod->module_init)
21275- flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_init,
21276- (unsigned long)mod->module_init
21277- + mod->init_size);
21278- flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_core,
21279- (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size);
21280+ if (mod->module_init_rx)
21281+ flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_init_rx,
21282+ (unsigned long)mod->module_init_rx
21283+ + mod->init_size_rx);
21284+ flush_icache_range((unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx,
21285+ (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx + mod->core_size_rx);
21286
21287 set_fs(old_fs);
21288
21289@@ -1890,9 +2011,13 @@ static struct module *load_module(void _
21290 module_arch_cleanup(mod);
21291 cleanup:
21292 module_unload_free(mod);
21293- module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
21294- free_core:
21295- module_free(mod, mod->module_core);
21296+ module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
21297+ free_core_rx:
21298+ module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_core_rx);
21299+ free_init_rw:
21300+ module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
21301+ free_core_rw:
21302+ module_free(mod, mod->module_core_rw);
21303 free_percpu:
21304 if (percpu)
21305 percpu_modfree(percpu);
21306@@ -1928,6 +2053,9 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
21307 struct module *mod;
21308 int ret = 0;
21309
21310+ if (gr_check_modstop())
21311+ return -EPERM;
21312+
21313 /* Must have permission */
21314 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
21315 return -EPERM;
21316@@ -1979,10 +2107,12 @@ sys_init_module(void __user *umod,
21317 mod->state = MODULE_STATE_LIVE;
21318 /* Drop initial reference. */
21319 module_put(mod);
21320- module_free(mod, mod->module_init);
21321- mod->module_init = NULL;
21322- mod->init_size = 0;
21323- mod->init_text_size = 0;
21324+ module_free(mod, mod->module_init_rw);
21325+ module_free_exec(mod, mod->module_init_rx);
21326+ mod->module_init_rw = NULL;
21327+ mod->module_init_rx = NULL;
21328+ mod->init_size_rw = 0;
21329+ mod->init_size_rx = 0;
21330 up(&module_mutex);
21331
21332 return 0;
21333@@ -2013,10 +2143,14 @@ static const char *get_ksymbol(struct mo
21334 unsigned long nextval;
21335
21336 /* At worse, next value is at end of module */
21337- if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size))
21338- nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_init+mod->init_text_size;
21339- else
21340- nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core+mod->core_text_size;
21341+ if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx))
21342+ nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_init_rw;
21343+ else if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw))
21344+ nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rx;
21345+ else if (within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx))
21346+ nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rw;
21347+ else
21348+ nextval = (unsigned long)mod->module_core_rw+mod->core_size_rw;
21349
21350 /* Scan for closest preceeding symbol, and next symbol. (ELF
21351 starts real symbols at 1). */
21352@@ -2057,8 +2191,10 @@ const char *module_address_lookup(unsign
21353 struct module *mod;
21354
21355 list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list) {
21356- if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_size)
21357- || within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_size)) {
21358+ if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx)
21359+ || within(addr, mod->module_init_rw, mod->init_size_rw)
21360+ || within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx)
21361+ || within(addr, mod->module_core_rw, mod->core_size_rw)) {
21362 *modname = mod->name;
21363 return get_ksymbol(mod, addr, size, offset);
21364 }
21365@@ -2069,7 +2205,7 @@ const char *module_address_lookup(unsign
21366 struct module *module_get_kallsym(unsigned int symnum,
21367 unsigned long *value,
21368 char *type,
21369- char namebuf[128])
21370+ char namebuf[KSYM_NAME_LEN+1])
21371 {
21372 struct module *mod;
21373
21374@@ -2080,7 +2216,7 @@ struct module *module_get_kallsym(unsign
21375 *type = mod->symtab[symnum].st_info;
21376 strncpy(namebuf,
21377 mod->strtab + mod->symtab[symnum].st_name,
21378- 127);
21379+ KSYM_NAME_LEN);
21380 up(&module_mutex);
21381 return mod;
21382 }
21383@@ -2157,7 +2293,7 @@ static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, vo
21384 {
21385 struct module *mod = list_entry(p, struct module, list);
21386 seq_printf(m, "%s %lu",
21387- mod->name, mod->init_size + mod->core_size);
21388+ mod->name, mod->init_size_rx + mod->init_size_rw + mod->core_size_rx + mod->core_size_rw);
21389 print_unload_info(m, mod);
21390
21391 /* Informative for users. */
21392@@ -2166,7 +2302,7 @@ static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, vo
21393 mod->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING ? "Loading":
21394 "Live");
21395 /* Used by oprofile and other similar tools. */
21396- seq_printf(m, " 0x%p", mod->module_core);
21397+ seq_printf(m, " 0x%p 0x%p", mod->module_core_rx, mod->module_core_rw);
21398
21399 seq_printf(m, "\n");
21400 return 0;
21401@@ -2214,9 +2350,13 @@ struct module *__module_text_address(uns
21402 {
21403 struct module *mod;
21404
21405+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21406+ addr += __KERNEL_TEXT_OFFSET;
21407+#endif
21408+
21409 list_for_each_entry(mod, &modules, list)
21410- if (within(addr, mod->module_init, mod->init_text_size)
21411- || within(addr, mod->module_core, mod->core_text_size))
21412+ if (within(addr, mod->module_init_rx, mod->init_size_rx)
21413+ || within(addr, mod->module_core_rx, mod->core_size_rx))
21414 return mod;
21415 return NULL;
21416 }
21417diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/pid.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/pid.c
21418--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/pid.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21419+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/pid.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21420@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
21421 #include <linux/init.h>
21422 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
21423 #include <linux/hash.h>
21424+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21425
21426 #define pid_hashfn(nr) hash_long((unsigned long)nr, pidhash_shift)
21427 static struct hlist_head *pid_hash[PIDTYPE_MAX];
21428@@ -76,7 +77,9 @@ int alloc_pidmap(void)
21429 int i, offset, max_scan, pid, last = last_pid;
21430 pidmap_t *map;
21431
21432- pid = last + 1;
21433+ pid = gr_random_pid();
21434+ if (!pid)
21435+ pid = last_pid + 1;
21436 if (pid >= pid_max)
21437 pid = RESERVED_PIDS;
21438 offset = pid & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
21439@@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ void fastcall detach_pid(task_t *task, e
21440 task_t *find_task_by_pid_type(int type, int nr)
21441 {
21442 struct pid *pid;
21443+ task_t *task = NULL;
21444
21445 pid = find_pid(type, nr);
21446 if (!pid)
21447 return NULL;
21448
21449- return pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type);
21450+ task = pid_task(&pid->pid_list, type);
21451+
21452+ if (gr_pid_is_chrooted(task))
21453+ return NULL;
21454+
21455+ return task;
21456 }
21457
21458 EXPORT_SYMBOL(find_task_by_pid_type);
21459diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c
21460--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21461+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21462@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
21463 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
21464 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21465 #include <linux/errno.h>
21466+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21467
21468 static int check_clock(const clockid_t which_clock)
21469 {
21470@@ -1128,6 +1129,7 @@ static void check_process_timers(struct
21471 __group_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk);
21472 return;
21473 }
21474+ gr_learn_resource(tsk, RLIMIT_CPU, psecs, 1);
21475 if (psecs >= sig->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur) {
21476 /*
21477 * At the soft limit, send a SIGXCPU every second.
21478diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/printk.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/printk.c
21479--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/printk.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21480+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/printk.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21481@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
21482 #include <linux/security.h>
21483 #include <linux/bootmem.h>
21484 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
21485+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21486
21487 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21488
21489@@ -223,6 +224,11 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf
21490 char c;
21491 int error = 0;
21492
21493+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_DMESG
21494+ if (grsec_enable_dmesg && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
21495+ return -EPERM;
21496+#endif
21497+
21498 error = security_syslog(type);
21499 if (error)
21500 return error;
21501diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/ptrace.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/ptrace.c
21502--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21503+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/ptrace.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21504@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
21505 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
21506 #include <linux/security.h>
21507 #include <linux/signal.h>
21508+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21509
21510 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
21511 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21512@@ -131,10 +132,10 @@ static int may_attach(struct task_struct
21513 (current->uid != task->uid) ||
21514 (current->gid != task->egid) ||
21515 (current->gid != task->sgid) ||
21516- (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
21517+ (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
21518 return -EPERM;
21519 smp_rmb();
21520- if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
21521+ if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
21522 return -EPERM;
21523
21524 return security_ptrace(current, task);
21525@@ -498,6 +499,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ptrace(long request,
21526 if (ret < 0)
21527 goto out_put_task_struct;
21528
21529+ if (gr_handle_ptrace(child, request)) {
21530+ ret = -EPERM;
21531+ goto out_put_task_struct;
21532+ }
21533+
21534 ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
21535 if (ret < 0)
21536 goto out_put_task_struct;
21537diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/resource.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/resource.c
21538--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/resource.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21539+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/resource.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21540@@ -136,10 +136,27 @@ static int __init ioresources_init(void)
21541 {
21542 struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
21543
21544+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
21545+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
21546+ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR, NULL);
21547+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
21548+ entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
21549+#endif
21550+#else
21551 entry = create_proc_entry("ioports", 0, NULL);
21552+#endif
21553 if (entry)
21554 entry->proc_fops = &proc_ioports_operations;
21555+
21556+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
21557+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
21558+ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR, NULL);
21559+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
21560+ entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, NULL);
21561+#endif
21562+#else
21563 entry = create_proc_entry("iomem", 0, NULL);
21564+#endif
21565 if (entry)
21566 entry->proc_fops = &proc_iomem_operations;
21567 return 0;
21568diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sched.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sched.c
21569--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sched.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21570+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sched.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21571@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
21572 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
21573 #include <linux/times.h>
21574 #include <linux/acct.h>
21575+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21576 #include <asm/tlb.h>
21577
21578 #include <asm/unistd.h>
21579@@ -3537,7 +3538,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_nice(int increment)
21580 if (nice > 19)
21581 nice = 19;
21582
21583- if (increment < 0 && !can_nice(current, nice))
21584+ if (increment < 0 && (!can_nice(current, nice) ||
21585+ gr_handle_chroot_nice()))
21586 return -EPERM;
21587
21588 retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice);
21589diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/signal.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/signal.c
21590--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/signal.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21591+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/signal.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21592@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
21593 #include <linux/signal.h>
21594 #include <linux/audit.h>
21595 #include <linux/capability.h>
21596+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21597 #include <asm/param.h>
21598 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21599 #include <asm/unistd.h>
21600@@ -380,6 +381,7 @@ void __exit_signal(struct task_struct *t
21601 }
21602 if (tsk == sig->curr_target)
21603 sig->curr_target = next_thread(tsk);
21604+ gr_del_task_from_ip_table(tsk);
21605 tsk->signal = NULL;
21606 /*
21607 * Accumulate here the counters for all threads but the
21608@@ -681,16 +683,18 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
21609 return error;
21610 error = -EPERM;
21611 if ((info == SEND_SIG_NOINFO || (!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info)))
21612- && ((sig != SIGCONT) ||
21613+ && ((((sig != SIGCONT) ||
21614 (current->signal->session != t->signal->session))
21615 && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
21616 && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
21617- && !capable(CAP_KILL))
21618+ && !capable(CAP_KILL)) || gr_handle_signal(t, sig)))
21619 return error;
21620
21621 error = security_task_kill(t, info, sig);
21622- if (!error)
21623+ if (!error) {
21624 audit_signal_info(sig, t); /* Let audit system see the signal */
21625+ gr_log_signal(sig, t);
21626+ }
21627 return error;
21628 }
21629
21630@@ -870,7 +874,7 @@ out_set:
21631 (((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&(sigptr)->signal, (sig)))
21632
21633
21634-static int
21635+int
21636 specific_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *t)
21637 {
21638 int ret = 0;
21639@@ -916,6 +920,10 @@ force_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *
21640 }
21641 recalc_sigpending_tsk(t);
21642 ret = specific_send_sig_info(sig, info, t);
21643+
21644+ gr_log_signal(sig, t);
21645+ gr_handle_crash(t, sig);
21646+
21647 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
21648
21649 return ret;
21650diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sys.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sys.c
21651--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sys.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21652+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sys.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21653@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
21654 #include <linux/tty.h>
21655 #include <linux/signal.h>
21656 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
21657+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21658
21659 #include <linux/compat.h>
21660 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
21661@@ -225,16 +226,33 @@ int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct no
21662 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier);
21663
21664 #ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY
21665+extern int gr_task_is_capable(struct task_struct *task, const int cap);
21666+extern int gr_is_capable_nolog(const int cap);
21667 int capable(int cap)
21668 {
21669- if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
21670+ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(current, cap)) {
21671+ current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
21672+ return 1;
21673+ }
21674+ return 0;
21675+}
21676+int capable_nolog(int cap)
21677+{
21678+ if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap) && gr_is_capable_nolog(cap)) {
21679 current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
21680 return 1;
21681 }
21682 return 0;
21683 }
21684 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
21685+#else
21686+int capable_nolog(int cap)
21687+{
21688+ return capable(cap);
21689+}
21690+
21691 #endif
21692+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
21693
21694 static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
21695 {
21696@@ -249,6 +267,12 @@ static int set_one_prio(struct task_stru
21697 error = -EACCES;
21698 goto out;
21699 }
21700+
21701+ if (gr_handle_chroot_setpriority(p, niceval)) {
21702+ error = -EACCES;
21703+ goto out;
21704+ }
21705+
21706 no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
21707 if (no_nice) {
21708 error = no_nice;
21709@@ -638,6 +662,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setregid(gid_t rgid,
21710 if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
21711 (egid != (gid_t) -1 && egid != old_rgid))
21712 current->sgid = new_egid;
21713+
21714+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, new_rgid);
21715+
21716 current->fsgid = new_egid;
21717 current->egid = new_egid;
21718 current->gid = new_rgid;
21719@@ -667,6 +694,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
21720 current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
21721 smp_wmb();
21722 }
21723+
21724+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, gid);
21725+
21726 current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
21727 }
21728 else if ((gid == current->gid) || (gid == current->sgid))
21729@@ -708,6 +738,9 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int
21730 current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
21731 smp_wmb();
21732 }
21733+
21734+ gr_set_role_label(current, new_ruid, current->gid);
21735+
21736 current->uid = new_ruid;
21737 return 0;
21738 }
21739@@ -811,6 +844,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
21740 } else if ((uid != current->uid) && (uid != new_suid))
21741 return -EPERM;
21742
21743+ if (gr_check_crash_uid(uid))
21744+ return -EPERM;
21745+
21746 if (old_euid != uid)
21747 {
21748 current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;
21749@@ -916,8 +952,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid
21750 current->egid = egid;
21751 }
21752 current->fsgid = current->egid;
21753- if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
21754+ if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
21755+ gr_set_role_label(current, current->uid, rgid);
21756 current->gid = rgid;
21757+ }
21758 if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
21759 current->sgid = sgid;
21760
21761diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sysctl.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sysctl.c
21762--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sysctl.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21763+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/sysctl.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21764@@ -54,6 +54,14 @@ extern int proc_nr_files(ctl_table *tabl
21765 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
21766
21767 #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
21768+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21769+#include <linux/grinternal.h>
21770+
21771+extern __u32 gr_handle_sysctl(const ctl_table *table, const void *oldval,
21772+ const void *newval);
21773+extern int gr_handle_sysctl_mod(const char *dirname, const char *name,
21774+ const int op);
21775+extern int gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(const int op);
21776
21777 /* External variables not in a header file. */
21778 extern int C_A_D;
21779@@ -157,6 +165,22 @@ extern ctl_table inotify_table[];
21780 #ifdef HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
21781 int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;
21782 #endif
21783+extern ctl_table grsecurity_table[];
21784+
21785+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
21786+static ctl_table pax_table[] = {
21787+ {
21788+ .ctl_name = PAX_SOFTMODE,
21789+ .procname = "softmode",
21790+ .data = &pax_softmode,
21791+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
21792+ .mode = 0600,
21793+ .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
21794+ },
21795+
21796+ { .ctl_name = 0 }
21797+};
21798+#endif
21799
21800 /* /proc declarations: */
21801
21802@@ -683,6 +707,25 @@ static ctl_table kern_table[] = {
21803 .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
21804 },
21805 #endif
21806+
21807+#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL) || defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_MODSTOP)
21808+ {
21809+ .ctl_name = KERN_GRSECURITY,
21810+ .procname = "grsecurity",
21811+ .mode = 0500,
21812+ .child = grsecurity_table,
21813+ },
21814+#endif
21815+
21816+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SOFTMODE
21817+ {
21818+ .ctl_name = KERN_PAX,
21819+ .procname = "pax",
21820+ .mode = 0500,
21821+ .child = pax_table,
21822+ },
21823+#endif
21824+
21825 { .ctl_name = 0 }
21826 };
21827
21828@@ -1181,6 +1224,10 @@ static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
21829 static inline int ctl_perm(ctl_table *table, int op)
21830 {
21831 int error;
21832+ if (table->de && gr_handle_sysctl_mod(table->de->parent->name, table->de->name, op))
21833+ return -EACCES;
21834+ if (gr_handle_chroot_sysctl(op))
21835+ return -EACCES;
21836 error = security_sysctl(table, op);
21837 if (error)
21838 return error;
21839@@ -1217,6 +1264,10 @@ repeat:
21840 table = table->child;
21841 goto repeat;
21842 }
21843+
21844+ if (!gr_handle_sysctl(table, oldval, newval))
21845+ return -EACCES;
21846+
21847 error = do_sysctl_strategy(table, name, nlen,
21848 oldval, oldlenp,
21849 newval, newlen, context);
21850diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/time.c linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/time.c
21851--- linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/time.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21852+++ linux-2.6.16.2/kernel/time.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21853@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
21854 #include <linux/security.h>
21855 #include <linux/fs.h>
21856 #include <linux/module.h>
21857+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21858
21859 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21860 #include <asm/unistd.h>
21861@@ -93,6 +94,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_stime(time_t __user
21862 return err;
21863
21864 do_settimeofday(&tv);
21865+
21866+ gr_log_timechange();
21867+
21868 return 0;
21869 }
21870
21871@@ -199,6 +203,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_settimeofday(struct
21872 return -EFAULT;
21873 }
21874
21875+ gr_log_timechange();
21876+
21877 return do_sys_settimeofday(tv ? &new_ts : NULL, tz ? &new_tz : NULL);
21878 }
21879
21880diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/localversion-grsec linux-2.6.16.2/localversion-grsec
21881--- linux-2.6.16.2/localversion-grsec 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
21882+++ linux-2.6.16.2/localversion-grsec 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21883@@ -0,0 +1 @@
21884+-grsec
21885diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/Makefile linux-2.6.16.2/Makefile
21886--- linux-2.6.16.2/Makefile 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21887+++ linux-2.6.16.2/Makefile 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21888@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ export MODLIB
21889
21890
21891 ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
21892-core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
21893+core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/ grsecurity/
21894
21895 vmlinux-dirs := $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
21896 $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
21897diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/filemap.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/filemap.c
21898--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/filemap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21899+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/filemap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21900@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
21901 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
21902 #include <linux/security.h>
21903 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
21904+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21905 #include "filemap.h"
21906 /*
21907 * FIXME: remove all knowledge of the buffer layer from the core VM
21908@@ -1587,7 +1588,13 @@ int generic_file_mmap(struct file * file
21909 struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
21910
21911 if (!mapping->a_ops->readpage)
21912- return -ENOEXEC;
21913+ return -ENODEV;
21914+
21915+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
21916+ if (vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)
21917+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vma->vm_flags & 0x0f];
21918+#endif
21919+
21920 file_accessed(file);
21921 vma->vm_ops = &generic_file_vm_ops;
21922 return 0;
21923@@ -1809,6 +1816,7 @@ inline int generic_write_checks(struct f
21924 *pos = i_size_read(inode);
21925
21926 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY) {
21927+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE,*pos, 0);
21928 if (*pos >= limit) {
21929 send_sig(SIGXFSZ, current, 0);
21930 return -EFBIG;
21931diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/madvise.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/madvise.c
21932--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/madvise.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21933+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/madvise.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21934@@ -15,9 +15,46 @@
21935 * We can potentially split a vm area into separate
21936 * areas, each area with its own behavior.
21937 */
21938+
21939+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
21940+static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
21941+ struct vm_area_struct **prev,
21942+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior);
21943+
21944+static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
21945+ struct vm_area_struct **prev,
21946+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior)
21947+{
21948+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
21949+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
21950+ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
21951+ int error;
21952+
21953+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
21954+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
21955+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
21956+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
21957+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
21958+ error = __madvise_behavior(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, behavior);
21959+ if (error)
21960+ return error;
21961+ } else {
21962+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: madvise bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
21963+ return -ENOMEM;
21964+ }
21965+ }
21966+
21967+ return __madvise_behavior(vma, prev, start, end, behavior);
21968+}
21969+
21970+static long __madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
21971+ struct vm_area_struct **prev,
21972+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior)
21973+#else
21974 static long madvise_behavior(struct vm_area_struct * vma,
21975 struct vm_area_struct **prev,
21976 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, int behavior)
21977+#endif
21978 {
21979 struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
21980 int error = 0;
21981diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/memory.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/memory.c
21982--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/memory.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
21983+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/memory.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
21984@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
21985 #include <linux/rmap.h>
21986 #include <linux/module.h>
21987 #include <linux/init.h>
21988+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
21989
21990 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
21991 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
21992@@ -321,6 +322,11 @@ int __pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, pm
21993
21994 int __pte_alloc_kernel(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long address)
21995 {
21996+
21997+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
21998+ unsigned long cr0;
21999+#endif
22000+
22001 pte_t *new = pte_alloc_one_kernel(&init_mm, address);
22002 if (!new)
22003 return -ENOMEM;
22004@@ -328,8 +334,19 @@ int __pte_alloc_kernel(pmd_t *pmd, unsig
22005 spin_lock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
22006 if (pmd_present(*pmd)) /* Another has populated it */
22007 pte_free_kernel(new);
22008- else
22009+ else {
22010+
22011+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
22012+ pax_open_kernel(cr0);
22013+#endif
22014+
22015 pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, new);
22016+
22017+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
22018+ pax_close_kernel(cr0);
22019+#endif
22020+
22021+ }
22022 spin_unlock(&init_mm.page_table_lock);
22023 return 0;
22024 }
22025@@ -1424,6 +1441,93 @@ static inline void cow_user_page(struct
22026 copy_user_highpage(dst, src, va);
22027 }
22028
22029+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22030+/* PaX: if vma is mirrored, synchronize the mirror's PTE
22031+ *
22032+ * the ptl of the lower mapped page is held on entry and is not released on exit
22033+ * or inside to ensure atomic changes to the PTE states (swapout, mremap, munmap, etc)
22034+ */
22035+static void pax_mirror_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct * vma,
22036+ unsigned long address, pte_t *pte)
22037+{
22038+ unsigned long address_m, pfn_m;
22039+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
22040+ pte_t * pte_m, entry_m;
22041+ struct page * page_m = NULL;
22042+
22043+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
22044+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
22045+ BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m);
22046+
22047+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
22048+
22049+ {
22050+ pgd_t *pgd_m;
22051+ pud_t *pud_m;
22052+ pmd_t *pmd_m;
22053+
22054+ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
22055+ pud_m = pud_offset(pgd_m, address_m);
22056+ pmd_m = pmd_offset(pud_m, address_m);
22057+ pte_m = pte_offset_map_nested(pmd_m, address_m);
22058+ }
22059+
22060+ if (pte_present(*pte_m)) {
22061+ page_m = vm_normal_page(vma_m, address_m, *pte_m);
22062+ if (page_m) {
22063+ flush_cache_page(vma_m, address_m, pfn_m);
22064+ flush_icache_page(vma_m, page_m);
22065+ }
22066+ }
22067+
22068+ if (pte_present(*pte_m))
22069+ entry_m = ptep_clear_flush(vma_m, address_m, pte_m);
22070+ else
22071+ entry_m = ptep_get_and_clear(mm, address_m, pte_m);
22072+
22073+ if (pte_none(entry_m)) {
22074+ } else if (pte_present(entry_m)) {
22075+ if (page_m) {
22076+ page_remove_rmap(page_m);
22077+ page_cache_release(page_m);
22078+ if (PageAnon(page_m))
22079+ dec_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
22080+ else
22081+ dec_mm_counter(mm, file_rss);
22082+ }
22083+ } else if (!pte_file(entry_m)) {
22084+ free_swap_and_cache(pte_to_swp_entry(entry_m));
22085+ } else {
22086+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: bug in mirror_fault: %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
22087+ address, vma->vm_start, address_m, vma_m->vm_start);
22088+ }
22089+
22090+ pfn_m = pte_pfn(*pte);
22091+ page_m = vm_normal_page(vma, address, *pte);
22092+ entry_m = pfn_pte(pfn_m, vma_m->vm_page_prot);
22093+ if (pte_write(*pte))
22094+ entry_m = maybe_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(entry_m), vma_m);
22095+ if (page_m) {
22096+ page_cache_get(page_m);
22097+ /*
22098+ * we can test PAGE_MAPPING_ANON without holding page_map_lock because
22099+ * we hold the page table lock and have a reference to page_m
22100+ */
22101+ if (PageAnon(page_m)) {
22102+ page_add_anon_rmap(page_m, vma_m, address_m);
22103+ inc_mm_counter(mm, anon_rss);
22104+ } else {
22105+ page_add_file_rmap(page_m);
22106+ inc_mm_counter(mm, file_rss);
22107+ }
22108+ }
22109+ set_pte_at(mm, address_m, pte_m, entry_m);
22110+ update_mmu_cache(vma_m, address_m, entry_m);
22111+ lazy_mmu_prot_update(entry_m);
22112+ pte_unmap_nested(pte_m);
22113+}
22114+#endif
22115+
22116 /*
22117 * This routine handles present pages, when users try to write
22118 * to a shared page. It is done by copying the page to a new address
22119@@ -1514,6 +1618,12 @@ gotten:
22120 /* Free the old page.. */
22121 new_page = old_page;
22122 ret |= VM_FAULT_WRITE;
22123+
22124+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22125+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22126+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
22127+#endif
22128+
22129 }
22130 if (new_page)
22131 page_cache_release(new_page);
22132@@ -1764,6 +1874,7 @@ int vmtruncate(struct inode * inode, lof
22133
22134 do_expand:
22135 limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur;
22136+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_FSIZE, offset, 1);
22137 if (limit != RLIM_INFINITY && offset > limit)
22138 goto out_sig;
22139 if (offset > inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes)
22140@@ -1953,6 +2064,12 @@ again:
22141 /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
22142 update_mmu_cache(vma, address, pte);
22143 lazy_mmu_prot_update(pte);
22144+
22145+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22146+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22147+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
22148+#endif
22149+
22150 unlock:
22151 pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
22152 out:
22153@@ -2015,6 +2132,12 @@ static int do_anonymous_page(struct mm_s
22154 /* No need to invalidate - it was non-present before */
22155 update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
22156 lazy_mmu_prot_update(entry);
22157+
22158+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22159+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22160+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
22161+#endif
22162+
22163 unlock:
22164 pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
22165 return VM_FAULT_MINOR;
22166@@ -2140,6 +2263,12 @@ retry:
22167 /* no need to invalidate: a not-present page shouldn't be cached */
22168 update_mmu_cache(vma, address, entry);
22169 lazy_mmu_prot_update(entry);
22170+
22171+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22172+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22173+ pax_mirror_fault(mm, vma, address, page_table);
22174+#endif
22175+
22176 unlock:
22177 pte_unmap_unlock(page_table, ptl);
22178 return ret;
22179@@ -2271,6 +2400,50 @@ int __handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *
22180 if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))
22181 return hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, address, write_access);
22182
22183+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22184+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
22185+ unsigned long address_m;
22186+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m;
22187+ pgd_t *pgd_m;
22188+ pud_t *pud_m;
22189+ pmd_t *pmd_m = NULL;
22190+ pte_t *pte_m = NULL;
22191+
22192+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
22193+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, address_m);
22194+
22195+ /* PaX: sanity checks */
22196+ if (!vma_m) {
22197+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug, %08lx, %p, %08lx, %p\n",
22198+ address, vma, address_m, vma_m);
22199+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
22200+ } else if (!(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
22201+ vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
22202+ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start != vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start)
22203+ {
22204+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: fault bug2, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
22205+ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
22206+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
22207+ }
22208+
22209+ if (address_m < address) {
22210+ address += vma->vm_mirror;
22211+ vma = vma_m;
22212+ }
22213+
22214+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
22215+ pgd_m = pgd_offset(mm, address_m);
22216+ pud_m = pud_alloc(mm, pgd_m, address_m);
22217+ if (pud_m)
22218+ pmd_m = pmd_alloc(mm, pud_m, address_m);
22219+ if (pmd_m)
22220+ pte_m = pte_alloc_map(mm, pmd_m, address_m);
22221+ if (!pud_m || !pmd_m || !pte_m)
22222+ return VM_FAULT_OOM;
22223+ pte_unmap(pte_m);
22224+ }
22225+#endif
22226+
22227 pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
22228 pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
22229 if (!pud)
22230diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mempolicy.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mempolicy.c
22231--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mempolicy.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
22232+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mempolicy.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
22233@@ -355,6 +355,12 @@ check_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsign
22234 if (prev && prev->vm_end < vma->vm_start)
22235 return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
22236 }
22237+
22238+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22239+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22240+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
22241+#endif
22242+
22243 if (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma) &&
22244 ((flags & MPOL_MF_STRICT) ||
22245 ((flags & (MPOL_MF_MOVE | MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL)) &&
22246diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mlock.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mlock.c
22247--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mlock.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
22248+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mlock.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
22249@@ -10,14 +10,85 @@
22250 #include <linux/mm.h>
22251 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
22252 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
22253+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22254
22255+static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
22256+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
22257
22258 static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
22259 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
22260 {
22261 struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
22262- pgoff_t pgoff;
22263 int pages;
22264+ int ret;
22265+
22266+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22267+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL, *prev_m;
22268+ unsigned long start_m = 0UL, end_m = 0UL, newflags_m = 0UL;
22269+
22270+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
22271+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
22272+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(mm, start_m, &prev_m);
22273+ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != start_m || !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
22274+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mlock bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
22275+ return -ENOMEM;
22276+ }
22277+
22278+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
22279+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
22280+ if (newflags & VM_LOCKED)
22281+ newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
22282+ else
22283+ newflags_m = vma_m->vm_flags & ~VM_LOCKED;
22284+ ret = __mlock_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags_m);
22285+ if (ret)
22286+ return ret;
22287+ }
22288+#endif
22289+
22290+ ret = __mlock_fixup(vma, prev, start, end, newflags);
22291+ if (ret)
22292+ return ret;
22293+
22294+ /*
22295+ * vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode.
22296+ * It's okay if try_to_unmap_one unmaps a page just after we
22297+ * set VM_LOCKED, make_pages_present below will bring it back.
22298+ */
22299+ vma->vm_flags = newflags;
22300+
22301+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22302+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22303+ vma_m->vm_flags = newflags_m;
22304+#endif
22305+
22306+ /*
22307+ * Keep track of amount of locked VM.
22308+ */
22309+ pages = (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22310+ if (newflags & VM_LOCKED) {
22311+ pages = -pages;
22312+ if (!(newflags & VM_IO))
22313+ ret = make_pages_present(start, end);
22314+ }
22315+
22316+ mm->locked_vm -= pages;
22317+
22318+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22319+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)
22320+ mm->locked_vm -= pages;
22321+#endif
22322+
22323+ if (ret == -ENOMEM)
22324+ ret = -EAGAIN;
22325+ return ret;
22326+}
22327+
22328+static int __mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **prev,
22329+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
22330+{
22331+ struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
22332+ pgoff_t pgoff;
22333 int ret = 0;
22334
22335 if (newflags == vma->vm_flags) {
22336@@ -30,7 +101,7 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st
22337 vma->vm_file, pgoff, vma_policy(vma));
22338 if (*prev) {
22339 vma = *prev;
22340- goto success;
22341+ goto out;
22342 }
22343
22344 *prev = vma;
22345@@ -41,31 +112,9 @@ static int mlock_fixup(struct vm_area_st
22346 goto out;
22347 }
22348
22349- if (end != vma->vm_end) {
22350+ if (end != vma->vm_end)
22351 ret = split_vma(mm, vma, end, 0);
22352- if (ret)
22353- goto out;
22354- }
22355
22356-success:
22357- /*
22358- * vm_flags is protected by the mmap_sem held in write mode.
22359- * It's okay if try_to_unmap_one unmaps a page just after we
22360- * set VM_LOCKED, make_pages_present below will bring it back.
22361- */
22362- vma->vm_flags = newflags;
22363-
22364- /*
22365- * Keep track of amount of locked VM.
22366- */
22367- pages = (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22368- if (newflags & VM_LOCKED) {
22369- pages = -pages;
22370- if (!(newflags & VM_IO))
22371- ret = make_pages_present(start, end);
22372- }
22373-
22374- vma->vm_mm->locked_vm -= pages;
22375 out:
22376 if (ret == -ENOMEM)
22377 ret = -EAGAIN;
22378@@ -84,6 +133,17 @@ static int do_mlock(unsigned long start,
22379 return -EINVAL;
22380 if (end == start)
22381 return 0;
22382+
22383+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22384+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22385+ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
22386+ return -EINVAL;
22387+ } else
22388+#endif
22389+
22390+ if (end > TASK_SIZE)
22391+ return -EINVAL;
22392+
22393 vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
22394 if (!vma || vma->vm_start > start)
22395 return -ENOMEM;
22396@@ -141,6 +201,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlock(unsigned long
22397 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
22398
22399 /* check against resource limits */
22400+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, (current->mm->locked_vm << PAGE_SHIFT) + len, 1);
22401 if ((locked <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
22402 error = do_mlock(start, len, 1);
22403 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
22404@@ -173,6 +234,16 @@ static int do_mlockall(int flags)
22405 for (vma = current->mm->mmap; vma ; vma = prev->vm_next) {
22406 unsigned int newflags;
22407
22408+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22409+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22410+ if (vma->vm_end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
22411+ break;
22412+ } else
22413+#endif
22414+
22415+ if (vma->vm_end > TASK_SIZE)
22416+ break;
22417+
22418 newflags = vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED;
22419 if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT))
22420 newflags &= ~VM_LOCKED;
22421@@ -202,6 +273,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_mlockall(int flags)
22422 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
22423
22424 ret = -ENOMEM;
22425+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, current->mm->total_vm, 1);
22426 if (!(flags & MCL_CURRENT) || (current->mm->total_vm <= lock_limit) ||
22427 capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
22428 ret = do_mlockall(flags);
22429diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mmap.c
22430--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
22431+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
22432@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
22433 #include <linux/mount.h>
22434 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
22435 #include <linux/rmap.h>
22436+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
22437
22438 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
22439 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
22440@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
22441 __S000, __S001, __S010, __S011, __S100, __S101, __S110, __S111
22442 };
22443
22444+EXPORT_SYMBOL(protection_map);
22445+
22446 int sysctl_overcommit_memory = OVERCOMMIT_GUESS; /* heuristic overcommit */
22447 int sysctl_overcommit_ratio = 50; /* default is 50% */
22448 int sysctl_max_map_count __read_mostly = DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT;
22449@@ -234,6 +237,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigne
22450
22451 /* Check against rlimit.. */
22452 rlim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_DATA].rlim_cur;
22453+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_DATA, brk - mm->start_data, 1);
22454 if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && brk - mm->start_data > rlim)
22455 goto out;
22456
22457@@ -612,11 +616,17 @@ again: remove_next = 1 + (end > next->
22458 * If the vma has a ->close operation then the driver probably needs to release
22459 * per-vma resources, so we don't attempt to merge those.
22460 */
22461+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22462+#define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED | VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIRROR)
22463+#else
22464 #define VM_SPECIAL (VM_IO | VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_RESERVED | VM_PFNMAP)
22465+#endif
22466
22467 static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
22468 struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags)
22469 {
22470+ if ((vma->vm_flags | vm_flags) & VM_SPECIAL)
22471+ return 0;
22472 if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
22473 return 0;
22474 if (vma->vm_file != file)
22475@@ -868,10 +878,55 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *m
22476 * The caller must hold down_write(current->mm->mmap_sem).
22477 */
22478
22479+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22480+static unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
22481+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
22482+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff);
22483+
22484 unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
22485 unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
22486 unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
22487 {
22488+ unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
22489+
22490+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR)
22491+ return ret;
22492+
22493+ if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
22494+ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || (addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len)))
22495+ return ret;
22496+
22497+ ret = __do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
22498+
22499+ if ((current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) && ret < TASK_SIZE && ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
22500+
22501+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
22502+ && (!(current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) || ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && file && !(prot & PROT_WRITE)))
22503+#endif
22504+
22505+ )
22506+ {
22507+ unsigned long ret_m;
22508+ prot = prot & PROT_EXEC ? prot & ~PROT_WRITE : PROT_NONE;
22509+ ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, ret + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, prot, flags | MAP_MIRROR | MAP_FIXED, ret);
22510+ if (ret_m >= TASK_SIZE) {
22511+ do_munmap(current->mm, ret, len);
22512+ ret = ret_m;
22513+ }
22514+ }
22515+
22516+ return ret;
22517+}
22518+
22519+static unsigned long __do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
22520+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
22521+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
22522+#else
22523+unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file * file, unsigned long addr,
22524+ unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
22525+ unsigned long flags, unsigned long pgoff)
22526+#endif
22527+{
22528 struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
22529 struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
22530 struct inode *inode;
22531@@ -882,6 +937,28 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22532 int accountable = 1;
22533 unsigned long charged = 0, reqprot = prot;
22534
22535+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22536+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m = NULL;
22537+
22538+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
22539+ /* PaX: sanity checks, to be removed when proved to be stable */
22540+ if (file || len || ((flags & MAP_TYPE) != MAP_PRIVATE))
22541+ return -EINVAL;
22542+
22543+ vma_m = find_vma(mm, pgoff);
22544+
22545+ if (!vma_m || is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma_m) ||
22546+ vma_m->vm_start != pgoff ||
22547+ (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL) ||
22548+ (prot & PROT_WRITE))
22549+ return -EINVAL;
22550+
22551+ file = vma_m->vm_file;
22552+ pgoff = vma_m->vm_pgoff;
22553+ len = vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start;
22554+ }
22555+#endif
22556+
22557 if (file) {
22558 if (is_file_hugepages(file))
22559 accountable = 0;
22560@@ -922,7 +999,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22561 /* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
22562 * that it represents a valid section of the address space.
22563 */
22564- addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
22565+ addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags | ((prot & PROT_EXEC) ? MAP_EXECUTABLE : 0));
22566 if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
22567 return addr;
22568
22569@@ -933,6 +1010,24 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22570 vm_flags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
22571 mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
22572
22573+ if (file && (file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC))
22574+ vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
22575+
22576+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
22577+ if (mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
22578+
22579+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
22580+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) {
22581+ if ((prot & (PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_EXEC)
22582+ vm_flags &= ~(VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC);
22583+ else
22584+ vm_flags &= ~(VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE);
22585+ }
22586+#endif
22587+
22588+ }
22589+#endif
22590+
22591 if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) {
22592 if (!can_do_mlock())
22593 return -EPERM;
22594@@ -945,6 +1040,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22595 locked += mm->locked_vm;
22596 lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
22597 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
22598+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
22599 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
22600 return -EAGAIN;
22601 }
22602@@ -992,6 +1088,11 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22603 /*
22604 * Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
22605 */
22606+
22607+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22608+ if (!(flags & MAP_MIRROR))
22609+#endif
22610+
22611 pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22612 break;
22613 default:
22614@@ -1003,14 +1104,17 @@ unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file
22615 if (error)
22616 return error;
22617
22618+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mmap(file, prot))
22619+ return -EACCES;
22620+
22621 /* Clear old maps */
22622 error = -ENOMEM;
22623-munmap_back:
22624 vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
22625 if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
22626 if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
22627 return -ENOMEM;
22628- goto munmap_back;
22629+ vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
22630+ BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
22631 }
22632
22633 /* Check against address space limit. */
22634@@ -1059,6 +1163,13 @@ munmap_back:
22635 vma->vm_start = addr;
22636 vma->vm_end = addr + len;
22637 vma->vm_flags = vm_flags;
22638+
22639+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
22640+ if ((file || !(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC)) && (vm_flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
22641+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(vm_flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
22642+ else
22643+#endif
22644+
22645 vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[vm_flags & 0x0f];
22646 vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
22647
22648@@ -1083,6 +1194,14 @@ munmap_back:
22649 goto free_vma;
22650 }
22651
22652+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22653+ if (flags & MAP_MIRROR) {
22654+ vma_m->vm_flags |= VM_MIRROR;
22655+ vma_m->vm_mirror = vma->vm_start - vma_m->vm_start;
22656+ vma->vm_mirror = vma_m->vm_start - vma->vm_start;
22657+ }
22658+#endif
22659+
22660 /* We set VM_ACCOUNT in a shared mapping's vm_flags, to inform
22661 * shmem_zero_setup (perhaps called through /dev/zero's ->mmap)
22662 * that memory reservation must be checked; but that reservation
22663@@ -1118,6 +1237,7 @@ munmap_back:
22664 out:
22665 mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22666 vm_stat_account(mm, vm_flags, file, len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
22667+ track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, vm_flags);
22668 if (vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
22669 mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22670 make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
22671@@ -1172,6 +1292,10 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
22672 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
22673 return -ENOMEM;
22674
22675+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
22676+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
22677+#endif
22678+
22679 if (addr) {
22680 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
22681 vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
22682@@ -1182,7 +1306,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp
22683 if (len > mm->cached_hole_size) {
22684 start_addr = addr = mm->free_area_cache;
22685 } else {
22686- start_addr = addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
22687+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
22688 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
22689 }
22690
22691@@ -1194,9 +1318,8 @@ full_search:
22692 * Start a new search - just in case we missed
22693 * some holes.
22694 */
22695- if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
22696- addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
22697- start_addr = addr;
22698+ if (start_addr != mm->mmap_base) {
22699+ start_addr = addr = mm->mmap_base;
22700 mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
22701 goto full_search;
22702 }
22703@@ -1221,7 +1344,7 @@ void arch_unmap_area(struct mm_struct *m
22704 /*
22705 * Is this a new hole at the lowest possible address?
22706 */
22707- if (addr >= TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE && addr < mm->free_area_cache) {
22708+ if (addr >= mm->mmap_base && addr < mm->free_area_cache) {
22709 mm->free_area_cache = addr;
22710 mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
22711 }
22712@@ -1239,12 +1362,16 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct fi
22713 {
22714 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
22715 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
22716- unsigned long addr = addr0;
22717+ unsigned long base = mm->mmap_base, addr = addr0;
22718
22719 /* requested length too big for entire address space */
22720 if (len > TASK_SIZE)
22721 return -ENOMEM;
22722
22723+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
22724+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP) || !filp)
22725+#endif
22726+
22727 /* requesting a specific address */
22728 if (addr) {
22729 addr = PAGE_ALIGN(addr);
22730@@ -1302,13 +1429,21 @@ bottomup:
22731 * can happen with large stack limits and large mmap()
22732 * allocations.
22733 */
22734+ mm->mmap_base = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
22735+
22736+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RANDMMAP
22737+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_RANDMMAP)
22738+ mm->mmap_base += mm->delta_mmap;
22739+#endif
22740+
22741+ mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
22742 mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
22743- mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
22744 addr = arch_get_unmapped_area(filp, addr0, len, pgoff, flags);
22745 /*
22746 * Restore the topdown base:
22747 */
22748- mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
22749+ mm->mmap_base = base;
22750+ mm->free_area_cache = base;
22751 mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
22752
22753 return addr;
22754@@ -1324,8 +1459,10 @@ void arch_unmap_area_topdown(struct mm_s
22755 mm->free_area_cache = addr;
22756
22757 /* dont allow allocations above current base */
22758- if (mm->free_area_cache > mm->mmap_base)
22759+ if (mm->free_area_cache > mm->mmap_base) {
22760 mm->free_area_cache = mm->mmap_base;
22761+ mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
22762+ }
22763 }
22764
22765 unsigned long
22766@@ -1458,6 +1595,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
22767 return -ENOMEM;
22768
22769 /* Stack limit test */
22770+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_STACK, size, 1);
22771 if (size > rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur)
22772 return -ENOMEM;
22773
22774@@ -1467,6 +1605,7 @@ static int acct_stack_growth(struct vm_a
22775 unsigned long limit;
22776 locked = mm->locked_vm + grow;
22777 limit = rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22778+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
22779 if (locked > limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
22780 return -ENOMEM;
22781 }
22782@@ -1584,13 +1723,49 @@ int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *
22783 if (address < vma->vm_start) {
22784 unsigned long size, grow;
22785
22786+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22787+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m = NULL;
22788+ unsigned long address_m = 0UL;
22789+
22790+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
22791+ address_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
22792+ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, address_m);
22793+ if (!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != address_m ||
22794+ !(vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) ||
22795+ vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start !=
22796+ vma_m->vm_end - vma_m->vm_start ||
22797+ vma->anon_vma != vma_m->anon_vma) {
22798+ printk(KERN_ERR "PAX: VMMIRROR: expand bug, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx, %08lx\n",
22799+ address, vma->vm_start, vma_m->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma_m->vm_end);
22800+ anon_vma_unlock(vma);
22801+ return -EFAULT;
22802+ }
22803+ address_m = address + vma->vm_mirror;
22804+ }
22805+#endif
22806+
22807 size = vma->vm_end - address;
22808 grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22809
22810+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22811+ if (vma_m)
22812+ error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, 2*grow);
22813+ else
22814+#endif
22815+
22816 error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
22817 if (!error) {
22818 vma->vm_start = address;
22819 vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
22820+ track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
22821+
22822+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22823+ if (vma_m) {
22824+ vma_m->vm_start = address_m;
22825+ vma_m->vm_pgoff -= grow;
22826+ }
22827+#endif
22828+
22829 }
22830 }
22831 anon_vma_unlock(vma);
22832@@ -1752,7 +1927,24 @@ int split_vma(struct mm_struct * mm, str
22833 * work. This now handles partial unmappings.
22834 * Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
22835 */
22836+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22837+static int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len);
22838+
22839+int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
22840+{
22841+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22842+ int ret = __do_munmap(mm, start + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, len);
22843+ if (ret)
22844+ return ret;
22845+ }
22846+
22847+ return __do_munmap(mm, start, len);
22848+}
22849+
22850+static int __do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
22851+#else
22852 int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, size_t len)
22853+#endif
22854 {
22855 unsigned long end;
22856 struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev, *last;
22857@@ -1806,6 +1998,8 @@ int do_munmap(struct mm_struct *mm, unsi
22858 /* Fix up all other VM information */
22859 remove_vma_list(mm, vma);
22860
22861+ track_exec_limit(mm, start, end, 0UL);
22862+
22863 return 0;
22864 }
22865
22866@@ -1818,6 +2012,12 @@ asmlinkage long sys_munmap(unsigned long
22867
22868 profile_munmap(addr);
22869
22870+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22871+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) &&
22872+ (len > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE || addr > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE-len))
22873+ return -EINVAL;
22874+#endif
22875+
22876 down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
22877 ret = do_munmap(mm, addr, len);
22878 up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
22879@@ -1839,11 +2039,35 @@ static inline void verify_mm_writelocked
22880 * anonymous maps. eventually we may be able to do some
22881 * brk-specific accounting here.
22882 */
22883+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22884+static unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
22885+
22886+unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
22887+{
22888+ unsigned long ret;
22889+
22890+ ret = __do_brk(addr, len);
22891+ if (ret == addr && (current->mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC | MF_PAX_MPROTECT)) == MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
22892+ unsigned long ret_m;
22893+
22894+ ret_m = __do_mmap_pgoff(NULL, addr + SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE, 0UL, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_MIRROR, addr);
22895+ if (ret_m > TASK_SIZE) {
22896+ do_munmap(current->mm, addr, len);
22897+ ret = ret_m;
22898+ }
22899+ }
22900+
22901+ return ret;
22902+}
22903+
22904+static unsigned long __do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
22905+#else
22906 unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
22907+#endif
22908 {
22909 struct mm_struct * mm = current->mm;
22910 struct vm_area_struct * vma, * prev;
22911- unsigned long flags;
22912+ unsigned long flags, task_size = TASK_SIZE;
22913 struct rb_node ** rb_link, * rb_parent;
22914 pgoff_t pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22915
22916@@ -1851,7 +2075,12 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
22917 if (!len)
22918 return addr;
22919
22920- if ((addr + len) > TASK_SIZE || (addr + len) < addr)
22921+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
22922+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
22923+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
22924+#endif
22925+
22926+ if ((addr + len) > task_size || (addr + len) < addr)
22927 return -EINVAL;
22928
22929 /*
22930@@ -1863,6 +2092,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
22931 locked += mm->locked_vm;
22932 lock_limit = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_MEMLOCK].rlim_cur;
22933 lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
22934+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, locked << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
22935 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
22936 return -EAGAIN;
22937 }
22938@@ -1876,12 +2106,12 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
22939 /*
22940 * Clear old maps. this also does some error checking for us
22941 */
22942- munmap_back:
22943 vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
22944 if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len) {
22945 if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len))
22946 return -ENOMEM;
22947- goto munmap_back;
22948+ vma = find_vma_prepare(mm, addr, &prev, &rb_link, &rb_parent);
22949+ BUG_ON(vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len);
22950 }
22951
22952 /* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
22953@@ -1896,6 +2126,18 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
22954
22955 flags = VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
22956
22957+#if defined(CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC) || defined(CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
22958+ if (mm->pax_flags & (MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC | MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)) {
22959+ flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
22960+
22961+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
22962+ if (mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT)
22963+ flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
22964+#endif
22965+
22966+ }
22967+#endif
22968+
22969 /* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
22970 if (vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
22971 NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL))
22972@@ -1916,6 +2158,13 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr,
22973 vma->vm_end = addr + len;
22974 vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
22975 vma->vm_flags = flags;
22976+
22977+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
22978+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (flags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
22979+ vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[(flags | VM_EXEC) & 0x0f];
22980+ else
22981+#endif
22982+
22983 vma->vm_page_prot = protection_map[flags & 0x0f];
22984 vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
22985 out:
22986@@ -1924,6 +2173,7 @@ out:
22987 mm->locked_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22988 make_pages_present(addr, addr + len);
22989 }
22990+ track_exec_limit(mm, addr, addr + len, flags);
22991 return addr;
22992 }
22993
22994@@ -2056,7 +2306,7 @@ int may_expand_vm(struct mm_struct *mm,
22995 unsigned long lim;
22996
22997 lim = current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_AS].rlim_cur >> PAGE_SHIFT;
22998-
22999+ gr_learn_resource(current, RLIMIT_AS, (cur + npages) << PAGE_SHIFT, 1);
23000 if (cur + npages > lim)
23001 return 0;
23002 return 1;
23003diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mprotect.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mprotect.c
23004--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mprotect.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23005+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mprotect.c 2006-04-09 21:24:03.000000000 -0400
23006@@ -19,11 +19,18 @@
23007 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
23008 #include <linux/personality.h>
23009 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
23010+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23011+
23012+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
23013+#include <linux/elf.h>
23014+#include <linux/fs.h>
23015+#endif
23016
23017 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
23018 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
23019 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
23020 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
23021+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
23022
23023 static void change_pte_range(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmd,
23024 unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, pgprot_t newprot)
23025@@ -98,6 +105,94 @@ static void change_protection(struct vm_
23026 flush_tlb_range(vma, start, end);
23027 }
23028
23029+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
23030+/* called while holding the mmap semaphor for writing */
23031+static inline void establish_user_cs_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
23032+{
23033+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, start);
23034+
23035+ for (; vma && vma->vm_start < end; vma = vma->vm_next)
23036+ change_protection(vma, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_page_prot);
23037+
23038+}
23039+
23040+void track_exec_limit(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long prot)
23041+{
23042+ unsigned long oldlimit, newlimit = 0UL;
23043+
23044+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC))
23045+ return;
23046+
23047+ spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
23048+ oldlimit = mm->context.user_cs_limit;
23049+ if ((prot & VM_EXEC) && oldlimit < end)
23050+ /* USER_CS limit moved up */
23051+ newlimit = end;
23052+ else if (!(prot & VM_EXEC) && start < oldlimit && oldlimit <= end)
23053+ /* USER_CS limit moved down */
23054+ newlimit = start;
23055+
23056+ if (newlimit) {
23057+ mm->context.user_cs_limit = newlimit;
23058+
23059+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
23060+ wmb();
23061+ cpus_clear(mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
23062+ cpu_set(smp_processor_id(), mm->context.cpu_user_cs_mask);
23063+#endif
23064+
23065+ set_user_cs(mm, smp_processor_id());
23066+ }
23067+ spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
23068+ if (newlimit == end)
23069+ establish_user_cs_limit(mm, oldlimit, end);
23070+}
23071+#endif
23072+
23073+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
23074+static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
23075+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags);
23076+
23077+static int mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
23078+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
23079+{
23080+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
23081+ struct vm_area_struct * vma_m, * prev_m;
23082+ unsigned long start_m, end_m;
23083+ int error;
23084+
23085+ start_m = vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror;
23086+ vma_m = find_vma_prev(vma->vm_mm, start_m, &prev_m);
23087+ if (vma_m && vma_m->vm_start == start_m && (vma_m->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR)) {
23088+ start_m = start + vma->vm_mirror;
23089+ end_m = end + vma->vm_mirror;
23090+
23091+ if (vma_m->vm_start >= SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE && !(newflags & VM_EXEC))
23092+ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, vma_m->vm_flags & ~(VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC));
23093+ else
23094+ error = __mprotect_fixup(vma_m, &prev_m, start_m, end_m, newflags);
23095+ if (error)
23096+ return error;
23097+ } else {
23098+ printk("PAX: VMMIRROR: mprotect bug in %s, %08lx\n", current->comm, vma->vm_start);
23099+ return -ENOMEM;
23100+ }
23101+ }
23102+
23103+ return __mprotect_fixup(vma, pprev, start, end, newflags);
23104+}
23105+
23106+static int __mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
23107+ unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned int newflags)
23108+{
23109+ struct mm_struct * mm = vma->vm_mm;
23110+ unsigned long oldflags = vma->vm_flags;
23111+ long nrpages = (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
23112+ unsigned long charged = 0;
23113+ pgprot_t newprot;
23114+ pgoff_t pgoff;
23115+ int error;
23116+#else
23117 static int
23118 mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_area_struct **pprev,
23119 unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
23120@@ -114,6 +209,7 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
23121 *pprev = vma;
23122 return 0;
23123 }
23124+#endif
23125
23126 /*
23127 * If we make a private mapping writable we increase our commit;
23128@@ -132,6 +228,12 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vm_area_struct *vm
23129 }
23130 }
23131
23132+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC
23133+ if (!(mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && (newflags & (VM_READ|VM_WRITE)))
23134+ newprot = protection_map[(newflags | VM_EXEC) & 0xf];
23135+ else
23136+#endif
23137+
23138 newprot = protection_map[newflags & 0xf];
23139
23140 /*
23141@@ -176,6 +278,69 @@ fail:
23142 return error;
23143 }
23144
23145+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
23146+/* PaX: non-PIC ELF libraries need relocations on their executable segments
23147+ * therefore we'll grant them VM_MAYWRITE once during their life.
23148+ *
23149+ * The checks favour ld-linux.so behaviour which operates on a per ELF segment
23150+ * basis because we want to allow the common case and not the special ones.
23151+ */
23152+static inline void pax_handle_maywrite(struct vm_area_struct * vma, unsigned long start)
23153+{
23154+ struct elfhdr elf_h;
23155+ struct elf_phdr elf_p, p_dyn;
23156+ elf_dyn dyn;
23157+ unsigned long i, j = 65536UL / sizeof(struct elf_phdr);
23158+
23159+#ifndef CONFIG_PAX_NOELFRELOCS
23160+ if ((vma->vm_start != start) ||
23161+ !vma->vm_file ||
23162+ !(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC) ||
23163+ (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
23164+#endif
23165+
23166+ return;
23167+
23168+ if (sizeof(elf_h) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, 0UL, (char*)&elf_h, sizeof(elf_h)) ||
23169+ memcmp(elf_h.e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG) ||
23170+
23171+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
23172+ (elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN && elf_h.e_type != ET_EXEC) ||
23173+#else
23174+ elf_h.e_type != ET_DYN ||
23175+#endif
23176+
23177+ !elf_check_arch(&elf_h) ||
23178+ elf_h.e_phentsize != sizeof(struct elf_phdr) ||
23179+ elf_h.e_phnum > j)
23180+ return;
23181+
23182+ for (i = 0UL; i < elf_h.e_phnum; i++) {
23183+ if (sizeof(elf_p) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, elf_h.e_phoff + i*sizeof(elf_p), (char*)&elf_p, sizeof(elf_p)))
23184+ return;
23185+ if (elf_p.p_type == PT_DYNAMIC) {
23186+ p_dyn = elf_p;
23187+ j = i;
23188+ }
23189+ }
23190+ if (elf_h.e_phnum <= j)
23191+ return;
23192+
23193+ i = 0UL;
23194+ do {
23195+ if (sizeof(dyn) != kernel_read(vma->vm_file, p_dyn.p_offset + i*sizeof(dyn), (char*)&dyn, sizeof(dyn)))
23196+ return;
23197+ if (dyn.d_tag == DT_TEXTREL || (dyn.d_tag == DT_FLAGS && (dyn.d_un.d_val & DF_TEXTREL))) {
23198+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYNOTWRITE;
23199+ gr_log_textrel(vma);
23200+ return;
23201+ }
23202+ i++;
23203+ } while (dyn.d_tag != DT_NULL);
23204+ return;
23205+}
23206+#endif
23207+
23208 asmlinkage long
23209 sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len, unsigned long prot)
23210 {
23211@@ -195,6 +360,17 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
23212 end = start + len;
23213 if (end <= start)
23214 return -ENOMEM;
23215+
23216+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
23217+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC) {
23218+ if (end > SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE)
23219+ return -EINVAL;
23220+ } else
23221+#endif
23222+
23223+ if (end > TASK_SIZE)
23224+ return -EINVAL;
23225+
23226 if (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM))
23227 return -EINVAL;
23228
23229@@ -235,6 +411,16 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
23230 if (start > vma->vm_start)
23231 prev = vma;
23232
23233+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
23234+ if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
23235+ pax_handle_maywrite(vma, start);
23236+#endif
23237+
23238+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mprotect(vma->vm_file, prot)) {
23239+ error = -EACCES;
23240+ goto out;
23241+ }
23242+
23243 for (nstart = start ; ; ) {
23244 unsigned long newflags;
23245
23246@@ -253,6 +439,12 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
23247 goto out;
23248 }
23249
23250+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MPROTECT
23251+ /* PaX: disallow write access after relocs are done, hopefully noone else needs it... */
23252+ if ((vma->vm_mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_MPROTECT) && !(prot & PROT_WRITE) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYNOTWRITE))
23253+ newflags &= ~VM_MAYWRITE;
23254+#endif
23255+
23256 error = security_file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
23257 if (error)
23258 goto out;
23259@@ -276,6 +468,9 @@ sys_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t
23260 goto out;
23261 }
23262 }
23263+
23264+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, start, end, vm_flags);
23265+
23266 out:
23267 up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
23268 return error;
23269diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mremap.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mremap.c
23270--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mremap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23271+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/mremap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23272@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ static void move_ptes(struct vm_area_str
23273 pte = ptep_clear_flush(vma, old_addr, old_pte);
23274 /* ZERO_PAGE can be dependant on virtual addr */
23275 pte = move_pte(pte, new_vma->vm_page_prot, old_addr, new_addr);
23276+
23277+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_TRACK_EXEC_LIMIT
23278+ if ((mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_PAGEEXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
23279+ pte_exprotect(pte);
23280+#endif
23281+
23282 set_pte_at(mm, new_addr, new_pte, pte);
23283 }
23284
23285@@ -253,6 +259,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23286 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
23287 unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
23288 unsigned long charged = 0;
23289+ unsigned long task_size = TASK_SIZE;
23290
23291 if (flags & ~(MREMAP_FIXED | MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
23292 goto out;
23293@@ -271,6 +278,15 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23294 if (!new_len)
23295 goto out;
23296
23297+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
23298+ if (current->mm->pax_flags & MF_PAX_SEGMEXEC)
23299+ task_size = SEGMEXEC_TASK_SIZE;
23300+#endif
23301+
23302+ if (new_len > task_size || addr > task_size-new_len ||
23303+ old_len > task_size || addr > task_size-old_len)
23304+ goto out;
23305+
23306 /* new_addr is only valid if MREMAP_FIXED is specified */
23307 if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
23308 if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
23309@@ -278,16 +294,13 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23310 if (!(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
23311 goto out;
23312
23313- if (new_len > TASK_SIZE || new_addr > TASK_SIZE - new_len)
23314+ if (new_addr > task_size - new_len)
23315 goto out;
23316
23317 /* Check if the location we're moving into overlaps the
23318 * old location at all, and fail if it does.
23319 */
23320- if ((new_addr <= addr) && (new_addr+new_len) > addr)
23321- goto out;
23322-
23323- if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
23324+ if (addr + old_len > new_addr && new_addr + new_len > addr)
23325 goto out;
23326
23327 ret = do_munmap(mm, new_addr, new_len);
23328@@ -321,6 +334,14 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23329 ret = -EINVAL;
23330 goto out;
23331 }
23332+
23333+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
23334+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
23335+ ret = -EINVAL;
23336+ goto out;
23337+ }
23338+#endif
23339+
23340 /* We can't remap across vm area boundaries */
23341 if (old_len > vma->vm_end - addr)
23342 goto out;
23343@@ -354,7 +375,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23344 if (old_len == vma->vm_end - addr &&
23345 !((flags & MREMAP_FIXED) && (addr != new_addr)) &&
23346 (old_len != new_len || !(flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE))) {
23347- unsigned long max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
23348+ unsigned long max_addr = task_size;
23349 if (vma->vm_next)
23350 max_addr = vma->vm_next->vm_start;
23351 /* can we just expand the current mapping? */
23352@@ -372,6 +393,7 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23353 addr + new_len);
23354 }
23355 ret = addr;
23356+ track_exec_limit(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len, vma->vm_flags);
23357 goto out;
23358 }
23359 }
23360@@ -382,8 +404,8 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23361 */
23362 ret = -ENOMEM;
23363 if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
23364+ unsigned long map_flags = 0;
23365 if (!(flags & MREMAP_FIXED)) {
23366- unsigned long map_flags = 0;
23367 if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
23368 map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
23369
23370@@ -393,7 +415,12 @@ unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long ad
23371 if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
23372 goto out;
23373 }
23374+ map_flags = vma->vm_flags;
23375 ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
23376+ if (!(ret & ~PAGE_MASK)) {
23377+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, addr, addr + old_len, 0UL);
23378+ track_exec_limit(current->mm, new_addr, new_addr + new_len, map_flags);
23379+ }
23380 }
23381 out:
23382 if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
23383diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/rmap.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/rmap.c
23384--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/rmap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23385+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/rmap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23386@@ -108,6 +108,19 @@ int anon_vma_prepare(struct vm_area_stru
23387 list_add(&vma->anon_vma_node, &anon_vma->head);
23388 allocated = NULL;
23389 }
23390+
23391+#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
23392+ if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MIRROR) {
23393+ struct vm_area_struct *vma_m;
23394+
23395+ vma_m = find_vma(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
23396+ BUG_ON(!vma_m || vma_m->vm_start != vma->vm_start + vma->vm_mirror);
23397+ BUG_ON(vma_m->anon_vma || vma->vm_pgoff != vma_m->vm_pgoff);
23398+ vma_m->anon_vma = anon_vma;
23399+ __anon_vma_link(vma_m);
23400+ }
23401+#endif
23402+
23403 spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
23404
23405 if (locked)
23406diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/mm/vmalloc.c linux-2.6.16.2/mm/vmalloc.c
23407--- linux-2.6.16.2/mm/vmalloc.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23408+++ linux-2.6.16.2/mm/vmalloc.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23409@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_node(uns
23410
23411 write_lock(&vmlist_lock);
23412 for (p = &vmlist; (tmp = *p) != NULL ;p = &tmp->next) {
23413+ if (addr > end - size)
23414+ goto out;
23415 if ((unsigned long)tmp->addr < addr) {
23416 if((unsigned long)tmp->addr + tmp->size >= addr)
23417 addr = ALIGN(tmp->size +
23418@@ -204,8 +206,6 @@ struct vm_struct *__get_vm_area_node(uns
23419 if (size + addr <= (unsigned long)tmp->addr)
23420 goto found;
23421 addr = ALIGN(tmp->size + (unsigned long)tmp->addr, align);
23422- if (addr > end - size)
23423- goto out;
23424 }
23425
23426 found:
23427diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
23428--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23429+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23430@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
23431 #include <linux/config.h>
23432 #include <linux/module.h>
23433 #include <linux/jhash.h>
23434+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23435
23436 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
23437 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
23438diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
23439--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23440+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23441@@ -19,11 +19,14 @@
23442 #include <linux/sched.h>
23443 #include <linux/slab.h>
23444 #include <linux/wait.h>
23445+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23446
23447 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
23448 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
23449 #include <net/ip.h>
23450
23451+extern void gr_update_task_in_ip_table(struct task_struct *task, const struct inet_sock *inet);
23452+
23453 /*
23454 * Allocate and initialize a new local port bind bucket.
23455 * The bindhash mutex for snum's hash chain must be held here.
23456@@ -314,6 +317,8 @@ ok:
23457 }
23458 spin_unlock(&head->lock);
23459
23460+ gr_update_task_in_ip_table(current, inet_sk(sk));
23461+
23462 if (tw) {
23463 inet_twsk_deschedule(tw, death_row);;
23464 inet_twsk_put(tw);
23465diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c
23466--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
23467+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_stealth.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23468@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
23469+/* Kernel module to add stealth support.
23470+ *
23471+ * Copyright (C) 2002,2005 Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
23472+ *
23473+ */
23474+
23475+#include <linux/kernel.h>
23476+#include <linux/module.h>
23477+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
23478+#include <linux/net.h>
23479+#include <linux/sched.h>
23480+#include <linux/inet.h>
23481+#include <linux/stddef.h>
23482+
23483+#include <net/ip.h>
23484+#include <net/sock.h>
23485+#include <net/tcp.h>
23486+#include <net/udp.h>
23487+#include <net/route.h>
23488+#include <net/inet_common.h>
23489+
23490+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
23491+
23492+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
23493+
23494+extern struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif);
23495+
23496+static int
23497+match(const struct sk_buff *skb,
23498+ const struct net_device *in,
23499+ const struct net_device *out,
23500+ const void *matchinfo,
23501+ int offset,
23502+ int *hotdrop)
23503+{
23504+ struct iphdr *ip = skb->nh.iph;
23505+ struct tcphdr th;
23506+ struct udphdr uh;
23507+ struct sock *sk = NULL;
23508+
23509+ if (!ip || offset) return 0;
23510+
23511+ switch(ip->protocol) {
23512+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
23513+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &th, sizeof(th)) < 0) {
23514+ *hotdrop = 1;
23515+ return 0;
23516+ }
23517+ if (!(th.syn && !th.ack)) return 0;
23518+ sk = inet_lookup_listener(&tcp_hashinfo, ip->daddr, ntohs(th.dest), ((struct rtable*)skb->dst)->rt_iif);
23519+ break;
23520+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
23521+ if (skb_copy_bits(skb, skb->nh.iph->ihl*4, &uh, sizeof(uh)) < 0) {
23522+ *hotdrop = 1;
23523+ return 0;
23524+ }
23525+ sk = udp_v4_lookup(ip->saddr, uh.source, ip->daddr, uh.dest, skb->dev->ifindex);
23526+ break;
23527+ default:
23528+ return 0;
23529+ }
23530+
23531+ if(!sk) // port is being listened on, match this
23532+ return 1;
23533+ else {
23534+ sock_put(sk);
23535+ return 0;
23536+ }
23537+}
23538+
23539+/* Called when user tries to insert an entry of this type. */
23540+static int
23541+checkentry(const char *tablename,
23542+ const struct ipt_ip *ip,
23543+ void *matchinfo,
23544+ unsigned int matchsize,
23545+ unsigned int hook_mask)
23546+{
23547+ if (matchsize != IPT_ALIGN(0))
23548+ return 0;
23549+
23550+ if(((ip->proto == IPPROTO_TCP && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)) ||
23551+ ((ip->proto == IPPROTO_UDP) && !(ip->invflags & IPT_INV_PROTO)))
23552+ && (hook_mask & (1 << NF_IP_LOCAL_IN)))
23553+ return 1;
23554+
23555+ printk("stealth: Only works on TCP and UDP for the INPUT chain.\n");
23556+
23557+ return 0;
23558+}
23559+
23560+
23561+static struct ipt_match stealth_match = {
23562+ .name = "stealth",
23563+ .match = &match,
23564+ .checkentry = &checkentry,
23565+ .destroy = NULL,
23566+ .me = THIS_MODULE
23567+};
23568+
23569+static int __init init(void)
23570+{
23571+ return ipt_register_match(&stealth_match);
23572+}
23573+
23574+static void __exit fini(void)
23575+{
23576+ ipt_unregister_match(&stealth_match);
23577+}
23578+
23579+module_init(init);
23580+module_exit(fini);
23581diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig
23582--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23583+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23584@@ -313,6 +313,21 @@ config IP_NF_MATCH_POLICY
23585
23586 To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N.
23587
23588+config IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH
23589+ tristate "stealth match support"
23590+ depends on IP_NF_IPTABLES
23591+ help
23592+ Enabling this option will drop all syn packets coming to unserved tcp
23593+ ports as well as all packets coming to unserved udp ports. If you
23594+ are using your system to route any type of packets (ie. via NAT)
23595+ you should put this module at the end of your ruleset, since it will
23596+ drop packets that aren't going to ports that are listening on your
23597+ machine itself, it doesn't take into account that the packet might be
23598+ destined for someone on your internal network if you're using NAT for
23599+ instance.
23600+
23601+ To compile it as a module, choose M here. If unsure, say N.
23602+
23603 # `filter', generic and specific targets
23604 config IP_NF_FILTER
23605 tristate "Packet filtering"
23606@@ -607,4 +622,3 @@ config IP_NF_ARP_MANGLE
23607 hardware and network addresses.
23608
23609 endmenu
23610-
23611diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile
23612--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23613+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/netfilter/Makefile 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23614@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_AH_ESP) += ipt_
23615 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TTL) += ipt_ttl.o
23616 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ADDRTYPE) += ipt_addrtype.o
23617 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_POLICY) += ipt_policy.o
23618+obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_STEALTH) += ipt_stealth.o
23619
23620 # targets
23621 obj-$(CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT) += ipt_REJECT.o
23622diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
23623--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23624+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23625@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
23626 #include <linux/jhash.h>
23627 #include <linux/init.h>
23628 #include <linux/times.h>
23629+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23630
23631 #include <net/icmp.h>
23632 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
23633diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/udp.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/udp.c
23634--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/udp.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23635+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/ipv4/udp.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23636@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
23637 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
23638 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
23639 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
23640+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23641 #include <net/sock.h>
23642 #include <net/udp.h>
23643 #include <net/icmp.h>
23644@@ -110,6 +111,12 @@
23645 #include <net/checksum.h>
23646 #include <net/xfrm.h>
23647
23648+extern int gr_search_udp_recvmsg(const struct sock *sk,
23649+ const struct sk_buff *skb);
23650+extern int gr_search_udp_sendmsg(const struct sock *sk,
23651+ const struct sockaddr_in *addr);
23652+
23653+
23654 /*
23655 * Snmp MIB for the UDP layer
23656 */
23657@@ -266,8 +273,7 @@ static struct sock *udp_v4_lookup_longwa
23658 return result;
23659 }
23660
23661-static __inline__ struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport,
23662- u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif)
23663+struct sock *udp_v4_lookup(u32 saddr, u16 sport, u32 daddr, u16 dport, int dif)
23664 {
23665 struct sock *sk;
23666
23667@@ -542,9 +548,16 @@ int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, stru
23668 dport = usin->sin_port;
23669 if (dport == 0)
23670 return -EINVAL;
23671+
23672+ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, usin))
23673+ return -EPERM;
23674 } else {
23675 if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
23676 return -EDESTADDRREQ;
23677+
23678+ if (!gr_search_udp_sendmsg(sk, NULL))
23679+ return -EPERM;
23680+
23681 daddr = inet->daddr;
23682 dport = inet->dport;
23683 /* Open fast path for connected socket.
23684@@ -798,6 +811,11 @@ try_again:
23685 if (!skb)
23686 goto out;
23687
23688+ if (!gr_search_udp_recvmsg(sk, skb)) {
23689+ err = -EPERM;
23690+ goto out_free;
23691+ }
23692+
23693 copied = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
23694 if (copied > len) {
23695 copied = len;
23696diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/socket.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/socket.c
23697--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/socket.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23698+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/socket.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23699@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
23700 #include <linux/compat.h>
23701 #include <linux/kmod.h>
23702 #include <linux/audit.h>
23703+#include <linux/in.h>
23704
23705 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO
23706 #include <linux/wireless.h> /* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */
23707@@ -97,6 +98,21 @@
23708 #include <net/sock.h>
23709 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
23710
23711+extern void gr_attach_curr_ip(const struct sock *sk);
23712+extern int gr_handle_sock_all(const int family, const int type,
23713+ const int protocol);
23714+extern int gr_handle_sock_server(const struct sockaddr *sck);
23715+extern int gr_handle_sock_server_other(const struct socket *sck);
23716+extern int gr_handle_sock_client(const struct sockaddr *sck);
23717+extern int gr_search_connect(const struct socket * sock,
23718+ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
23719+extern int gr_search_bind(const struct socket * sock,
23720+ const struct sockaddr_in * addr);
23721+extern int gr_search_listen(const struct socket * sock);
23722+extern int gr_search_accept(const struct socket * sock);
23723+extern int gr_search_socket(const int domain, const int type,
23724+ const int protocol);
23725+
23726 static int sock_no_open(struct inode *irrelevant, struct file *dontcare);
23727 static ssize_t sock_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, char __user *buf,
23728 size_t size, loff_t pos);
23729@@ -1194,6 +1210,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_socket(int family, i
23730 int retval;
23731 struct socket *sock;
23732
23733+ if(!gr_search_socket(family, type, protocol)) {
23734+ retval = -EACCES;
23735+ goto out;
23736+ }
23737+
23738+ if (gr_handle_sock_all(family, type, protocol)) {
23739+ retval = -EACCES;
23740+ goto out;
23741+ }
23742+
23743 retval = sock_create(family, type, protocol, &sock);
23744 if (retval < 0)
23745 goto out;
23746@@ -1289,11 +1315,23 @@ asmlinkage long sys_bind(int fd, struct
23747 {
23748 struct socket *sock;
23749 char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
23750+ struct sockaddr *sck;
23751 int err;
23752
23753 if((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd,&err))!=NULL)
23754 {
23755 if((err=move_addr_to_kernel(umyaddr,addrlen,address))>=0) {
23756+ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
23757+ if (!gr_search_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
23758+ sockfd_put(sock);
23759+ return -EACCES;
23760+ }
23761+
23762+ if (gr_handle_sock_server(sck)) {
23763+ sockfd_put(sock);
23764+ return -EACCES;
23765+ }
23766+
23767 err = security_socket_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
23768 if (err) {
23769 sockfd_put(sock);
23770@@ -1330,6 +1368,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_listen(int fd, int b
23771 return err;
23772 }
23773
23774+ if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) {
23775+ sockfd_put(sock);
23776+ return -EPERM;
23777+ }
23778+
23779+ if(!gr_search_listen(sock)) {
23780+ sockfd_put(sock);
23781+ return -EPERM;
23782+ }
23783+
23784 err=sock->ops->listen(sock, backlog);
23785 sockfd_put(sock);
23786 }
23787@@ -1366,6 +1414,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
23788 newsock->type = sock->type;
23789 newsock->ops = sock->ops;
23790
23791+ if (gr_handle_sock_server_other(sock)) {
23792+ err = -EPERM;
23793+ goto out_release;
23794+ }
23795+
23796+ if(!gr_search_accept(sock)) {
23797+ err = -EPERM;
23798+ goto out_release;
23799+ }
23800+
23801 /*
23802 * We don't need try_module_get here, as the listening socket (sock)
23803 * has the protocol module (sock->ops->owner) held.
23804@@ -1396,6 +1454,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_accept(int fd, struc
23805 goto out_release;
23806
23807 security_socket_post_accept(sock, newsock);
23808+ gr_attach_curr_ip(newsock->sk);
23809
23810 out_put:
23811 sockfd_put(sock);
23812@@ -1423,6 +1482,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
23813 {
23814 struct socket *sock;
23815 char address[MAX_SOCK_ADDR];
23816+ struct sockaddr *sck;
23817 int err;
23818
23819 sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err);
23820@@ -1432,6 +1492,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_connect(int fd, stru
23821 if (err < 0)
23822 goto out_put;
23823
23824+ sck = (struct sockaddr *)address;
23825+
23826+ if (!gr_search_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr_in *)sck)) {
23827+ err = -EACCES;
23828+ goto out_put;
23829+ }
23830+
23831+ if (gr_handle_sock_client(sck)) {
23832+ err = -EACCES;
23833+ goto out_put;
23834+ }
23835+
23836 err = security_socket_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)address, addrlen);
23837 if (err)
23838 goto out_put;
23839@@ -1685,6 +1757,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shutdown(int fd, int
23840 err=sock->ops->shutdown(sock, how);
23841 sockfd_put(sock);
23842 }
23843+
23844 return err;
23845 }
23846
23847diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/net/unix/af_unix.c linux-2.6.16.2/net/unix/af_unix.c
23848--- linux-2.6.16.2/net/unix/af_unix.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23849+++ linux-2.6.16.2/net/unix/af_unix.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23850@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
23851 #include <linux/mount.h>
23852 #include <net/checksum.h>
23853 #include <linux/security.h>
23854+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23855
23856 int sysctl_unix_max_dgram_qlen = 10;
23857
23858@@ -680,6 +681,11 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
23859 if (err)
23860 goto put_fail;
23861
23862+ if (!gr_acl_handle_unix(nd.dentry, nd.mnt)) {
23863+ err = -EACCES;
23864+ goto put_fail;
23865+ }
23866+
23867 err = -ECONNREFUSED;
23868 if (!S_ISSOCK(nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
23869 goto put_fail;
23870@@ -703,6 +709,13 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru
23871 if (u) {
23872 struct dentry *dentry;
23873 dentry = unix_sk(u)->dentry;
23874+
23875+ if (!gr_handle_chroot_unix(u->sk_peercred.pid)) {
23876+ err = -EPERM;
23877+ sock_put(u);
23878+ goto fail;
23879+ }
23880+
23881 if (dentry)
23882 touch_atime(unix_sk(u)->mnt, dentry);
23883 } else
23884@@ -781,9 +794,18 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
23885 */
23886 mode = S_IFSOCK |
23887 (SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_mode & ~current->fs->umask);
23888+
23889+ if (!gr_acl_handle_mknod(dentry, nd.dentry, nd.mnt, mode)) {
23890+ err = -EACCES;
23891+ goto out_mknod_dput;
23892+ }
23893+
23894 err = vfs_mknod(nd.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode, 0);
23895 if (err)
23896 goto out_mknod_dput;
23897+
23898+ gr_handle_create(dentry, nd.mnt);
23899+
23900 mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
23901 dput(nd.dentry);
23902 nd.dentry = dentry;
23903@@ -801,6 +823,10 @@ static int unix_bind(struct socket *sock
23904 goto out_unlock;
23905 }
23906
23907+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_CHROOT_UNIX
23908+ sk->sk_peercred.pid = current->pid;
23909+#endif
23910+
23911 list = &unix_socket_table[addr->hash];
23912 } else {
23913 list = &unix_socket_table[dentry->d_inode->i_ino & (UNIX_HASH_SIZE-1)];
23914diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/security/commoncap.c linux-2.6.16.2/security/commoncap.c
23915--- linux-2.6.16.2/security/commoncap.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23916+++ linux-2.6.16.2/security/commoncap.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23917@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
23918 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
23919 #include <linux/xattr.h>
23920 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
23921+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23922
23923 int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
23924 {
23925@@ -45,7 +46,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
23926 int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
23927 {
23928 /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
23929- if (cap_raised(tsk->cap_effective, cap))
23930+ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap) && gr_task_is_capable(tsk, cap))
23931+ return 0;
23932+ return -EPERM;
23933+}
23934+
23935+int cap_capable_nolog (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
23936+{
23937+ /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
23938+ if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
23939 return 0;
23940 return -EPERM;
23941 }
23942@@ -61,7 +70,7 @@ int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *pare
23943 {
23944 /* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
23945 if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
23946- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
23947+ !capable_nolog(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
23948 return -EPERM;
23949 return 0;
23950 }
23951@@ -164,8 +173,11 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
23952 }
23953 }
23954
23955- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23956- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23957+ if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
23958+ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
23959+
23960+ if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
23961+ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
23962
23963 /* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
23964 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
23965@@ -176,6 +188,8 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_
23966 cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
23967 }
23968
23969+ gr_handle_chroot_caps(current);
23970+
23971 /* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
23972
23973 current->keep_capabilities = 0;
23974@@ -321,12 +335,13 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
23975 {
23976 int cap_sys_admin = 0;
23977
23978- if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
23979+ if (cap_capable_nolog(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
23980 cap_sys_admin = 1;
23981 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
23982 }
23983
23984 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable);
23985+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable_nolog);
23986 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_settime);
23987 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_ptrace);
23988 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capget);
23989diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/security/dummy.c linux-2.6.16.2/security/dummy.c
23990--- linux-2.6.16.2/security/dummy.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
23991+++ linux-2.6.16.2/security/dummy.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
23992@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
23993 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
23994 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
23995 #include <linux/file.h>
23996+#include <linux/grsecurity.h>
23997
23998 static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
23999 {
24000@@ -139,8 +140,11 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru
24001 }
24002 }
24003
24004- current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
24005- current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
24006+ if (!gr_check_user_change(-1, bprm->e_uid, bprm->e_uid))
24007+ current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
24008+
24009+ if (!gr_check_group_change(-1, bprm->e_gid, bprm->e_gid))
24010+ current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
24011
24012 dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
24013 }
24014diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.16.2/security/Kconfig
24015--- linux-2.6.16.2/security/Kconfig 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
24016+++ linux-2.6.16.2/security/Kconfig 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
24017@@ -4,6 +4,408 @@
24018
24019 menu "Security options"
24020
24021+menu "PaX"
24022+
24023+config PAX
24024+ bool "Enable various PaX features"
24025+ depends on GRKERNSEC && (ALPHA || ARM || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
24026+ help
24027+ This allows you to enable various PaX features. PaX adds
24028+ intrusion prevention mechanisms to the kernel that reduce
24029+ the risks posed by exploitable memory corruption bugs.
24030+
24031+menu "PaX Control"
24032+ depends on PAX
24033+
24034+config PAX_SOFTMODE
24035+ bool 'Support soft mode'
24036+ help
24037+ Enabling this option will allow you to run PaX in soft mode, that
24038+ is, PaX features will not be enforced by default, only on executables
24039+ marked explicitly. You must also enable PT_PAX_FLAGS support as it
24040+ is the only way to mark executables for soft mode use.
24041+
24042+ Soft mode can be activated by using the "pax_softmode=1" kernel command
24043+ line option on boot. Furthermore you can control various PaX features
24044+ at runtime via the entries in /proc/sys/kernel/pax.
24045+
24046+config PAX_EI_PAX
24047+ bool 'Use legacy ELF header marking'
24048+ help
24049+ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
24050+ a per executable basis via the 'chpax' utility available at
24051+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from
24052+ an otherwise reserved part of the ELF header. This marking has
24053+ numerous drawbacks (no support for soft-mode, toolchain does not
24054+ know about the non-standard use of the ELF header) therefore it
24055+ has been deprecated in favour of PT_PAX_FLAGS support.
24056+
24057+ If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
24058+ program header then you MUST enable this option otherwise they
24059+ will not get any protection.
24060+
24061+ Note that if you enable PT_PAX_FLAGS marking support as well,
24062+ the PT_PAX_FLAG marks will override the legacy EI_PAX marks.
24063+
24064+config PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS
24065+ bool 'Use ELF program header marking'
24066+ help
24067+ Enabling this option will allow you to control PaX features on
24068+ a per executable basis via the 'paxctl' utility available at
24069+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/. The control flags will be read from
24070+ a PaX specific ELF program header (PT_PAX_FLAGS). This marking
24071+ has the benefits of supporting both soft mode and being fully
24072+ integrated into the toolchain (the binutils patch is available
24073+ from http://pax.grsecurity.net).
24074+
24075+ If you have applications not marked by the PT_PAX_FLAGS ELF
24076+ program header then you MUST enable the EI_PAX marking support
24077+ otherwise they will not get any protection.
24078+
24079+ Note that if you enable the legacy EI_PAX marking support as well,
24080+ the EI_PAX marks will be overridden by the PT_PAX_FLAGS marks.
24081+
24082+choice
24083+ prompt 'MAC system integration'
24084+ default PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
24085+ help
24086+ Mandatory Access Control systems have the option of controlling
24087+ PaX flags on a per executable basis, choose the method supported
24088+ by your particular system.
24089+
24090+ - "none": if your MAC system does not interact with PaX,
24091+ - "direct": if your MAC system defines pax_set_flags() itself,
24092+ - "hook": if your MAC system uses the pax_set_flags_func callback.
24093+
24094+ NOTE: this option is for developers/integrators only.
24095+
24096+config PAX_NO_ACL_FLAGS
24097+ bool 'none'
24098+
24099+config PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS
24100+ bool 'direct'
24101+
24102+config PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
24103+ bool 'hook'
24104+endchoice
24105+
24106+endmenu
24107+
24108+menu "Non-executable pages"
24109+ depends on PAX
24110+
24111+config PAX_NOEXEC
24112+ bool "Enforce non-executable pages"
24113+ depends on (PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS) && (ALPHA || IA64 || MIPS32 || MIPS64 || PARISC || PPC32 || PPC64 || SPARC32 || SPARC64 || X86 || X86_64)
24114+ help
24115+ By design some architectures do not allow for protecting memory
24116+ pages against execution or even if they do, Linux does not make
24117+ use of this feature. In practice this means that if a page is
24118+ readable (such as the stack or heap) it is also executable.
24119+
24120+ There is a well known exploit technique that makes use of this
24121+ fact and a common programming mistake where an attacker can
24122+ introduce code of his choice somewhere in the attacked program's
24123+ memory (typically the stack or the heap) and then execute it.
24124+
24125+ If the attacked program was running with different (typically
24126+ higher) privileges than that of the attacker, then he can elevate
24127+ his own privilege level (e.g. get a root shell, write to files for
24128+ which he does not have write access to, etc).
24129+
24130+ Enabling this option will let you choose from various features
24131+ that prevent the injection and execution of 'foreign' code in
24132+ a program.
24133+
24134+ This will also break programs that rely on the old behaviour and
24135+ expect that dynamically allocated memory via the malloc() family
24136+ of functions is executable (which it is not). Notable examples
24137+ are the XFree86 4.x server, the java runtime and wine.
24138+
24139+config PAX_PAGEEXEC
24140+ bool "Paging based non-executable pages"
24141+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && (!X86_32 || M586 || M586TSC || M586MMX || M686 || MPENTIUMII || MPENTIUMIII || MPENTIUMM || MPENTIUM4 || MK7 || MK8 || MWINCHIPC6 || MWINCHIP2 || MWINCHIP3D || MVIAC3_2)
24142+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if X86_32
24143+ help
24144+ This implementation is based on the paging feature of the CPU.
24145+ On i386 and ppc there is a variable but usually low performance
24146+ impact on applications. On alpha, ia64, parisc, sparc, sparc64
24147+ and x86_64 there is no performance impact.
24148+
24149+config PAX_SEGMEXEC
24150+ bool "Segmentation based non-executable pages"
24151+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86_32
24152+ select PAX_NOVSYSCALL if X86_32
24153+ help
24154+ This implementation is based on the segmentation feature of the
24155+ CPU and has little performance impact, however applications will
24156+ be limited to a 1.5 GB address space instead of the normal 3 GB.
24157+
24158+choice
24159+ prompt "Default non-executable page method"
24160+ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PAX_SEGMEXEC
24161+ default PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
24162+ help
24163+ Select the default non-executable page method applied to applications
24164+ that do not select one themselves.
24165+
24166+config PAX_DEFAULT_PAGEEXEC
24167+ bool "PAGEEXEC"
24168+
24169+config PAX_DEFAULT_SEGMEXEC
24170+ bool "SEGMEXEC"
24171+endchoice
24172+
24173+config PAX_EMUTRAMP
24174+ bool "Emulate trampolines" if (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && (PARISC || PPC32 || X86_32)
24175+ default y if PARISC || PPC32
24176+ help
24177+ There are some programs and libraries that for one reason or
24178+ another attempt to execute special small code snippets from
24179+ non-executable memory pages. Most notable examples are the
24180+ signal handler return code generated by the kernel itself and
24181+ the GCC trampolines.
24182+
24183+ If you enabled CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC or CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC then
24184+ such programs will no longer work under your kernel.
24185+
24186+ As a remedy you can say Y here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
24187+ utilities to enable trampoline emulation for the affected programs
24188+ yet still have the protection provided by the non-executable pages.
24189+
24190+ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option and EMUSIGRT as
24191+ well, otherwise your system will not even boot.
24192+
24193+ Alternatively you can say N here and use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl'
24194+ utilities to disable CONFIG_PAX_PAGEEXEC and CONFIG_PAX_SEGMEXEC
24195+ for the affected files.
24196+
24197+ NOTE: enabling this feature *may* open up a loophole in the
24198+ protection provided by non-executable pages that an attacker
24199+ could abuse. Therefore the best solution is to not have any
24200+ files on your system that would require this option. This can
24201+ be achieved by not using libc5 (which relies on the kernel
24202+ signal handler return code) and not using or rewriting programs
24203+ that make use of the nested function implementation of GCC.
24204+ Skilled users can just fix GCC itself so that it implements
24205+ nested function calls in a way that does not interfere with PaX.
24206+
24207+config PAX_EMUSIGRT
24208+ bool "Automatically emulate sigreturn trampolines"
24209+ depends on PAX_EMUTRAMP && (PARISC || PPC32)
24210+ default y
24211+ help
24212+ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
24213+ and emulate signal return trampolines executing on the stack
24214+ that would otherwise lead to task termination.
24215+
24216+ This solution is intended as a temporary one for users with
24217+ legacy versions of libc (libc5, glibc 2.0, uClibc before 0.9.17,
24218+ Modula-3 runtime, etc) or executables linked to such, basically
24219+ everything that does not specify its own SA_RESTORER function in
24220+ normal executable memory like glibc 2.1+ does.
24221+
24222+ On parisc and ppc you MUST enable this option, otherwise your
24223+ system will not even boot.
24224+
24225+ NOTE: this feature cannot be disabled on a per executable basis
24226+ and since it *does* open up a loophole in the protection provided
24227+ by non-executable pages, the best solution is to not have any
24228+ files on your system that would require this option.
24229+
24230+config PAX_MPROTECT
24231+ bool "Restrict mprotect()"
24232+ depends on (PAX_PAGEEXEC || PAX_SEGMEXEC) && !PPC64
24233+ help
24234+ Enabling this option will prevent programs from
24235+ - changing the executable status of memory pages that were
24236+ not originally created as executable,
24237+ - making read-only executable pages writable again,
24238+ - creating executable pages from anonymous memory.
24239+
24240+ You should say Y here to complete the protection provided by
24241+ the enforcement of non-executable pages.
24242+
24243+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
24244+ this feature on a per file basis.
24245+
24246+config PAX_NOELFRELOCS
24247+ bool "Disallow ELF text relocations"
24248+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && !PAX_ETEXECRELOCS && (IA64 || X86 || X86_64)
24249+ help
24250+ Non-executable pages and mprotect() restrictions are effective
24251+ in preventing the introduction of new executable code into an
24252+ attacked task's address space. There remain only two venues
24253+ for this kind of attack: if the attacker can execute already
24254+ existing code in the attacked task then he can either have it
24255+ create and mmap() a file containing his code or have it mmap()
24256+ an already existing ELF library that does not have position
24257+ independent code in it and use mprotect() on it to make it
24258+ writable and copy his code there. While protecting against
24259+ the former approach is beyond PaX, the latter can be prevented
24260+ by having only PIC ELF libraries on one's system (which do not
24261+ need to relocate their code). If you are sure this is your case,
24262+ then enable this option otherwise be careful as you may not even
24263+ be able to boot or log on your system (for example, some PAM
24264+ modules are erroneously compiled as non-PIC by default).
24265+
24266+ NOTE: if you are using dynamic ELF executables (as suggested
24267+ when using ASLR) then you must have made sure that you linked
24268+ your files using the PIC version of crt1 (the et_dyn.tar.gz package
24269+ referenced there has already been updated to support this).
24270+
24271+config PAX_ETEXECRELOCS
24272+ bool "Allow ELF ET_EXEC text relocations"
24273+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || IA64 || PARISC)
24274+ default y
24275+ help
24276+ On some architectures there are incorrectly created applications
24277+ that require text relocations and would not work without enabling
24278+ this option. If you are an alpha, ia64 or parisc user, you should
24279+ enable this option and disable it once you have made sure that
24280+ none of your applications need it.
24281+
24282+config PAX_EMUPLT
24283+ bool "Automatically emulate ELF PLT"
24284+ depends on PAX_MPROTECT && (ALPHA || PARISC || PPC32 || SPARC32 || SPARC64)
24285+ default y
24286+ help
24287+ Enabling this option will have the kernel automatically detect
24288+ and emulate the Procedure Linkage Table entries in ELF files.
24289+ On some architectures such entries are in writable memory, and
24290+ become non-executable leading to task termination. Therefore
24291+ it is mandatory that you enable this option on alpha, parisc, ppc,
24292+ sparc and sparc64, otherwise your system would not even boot.
24293+
24294+ NOTE: this feature *does* open up a loophole in the protection
24295+ provided by the non-executable pages, therefore the proper
24296+ solution is to modify the toolchain to produce a PLT that does
24297+ not need to be writable.
24298+
24299+config PAX_DLRESOLVE
24300+ bool
24301+ depends on PAX_EMUPLT && (SPARC32 || SPARC64)
24302+ default y
24303+
24304+config PAX_SYSCALL
24305+ bool
24306+ depends on PAX_PAGEEXEC && PPC32
24307+ default y
24308+
24309+config PAX_KERNEXEC
24310+ bool "Enforce non-executable kernel pages"
24311+ depends on PAX_NOEXEC && X86_32 && !HOTPLUG_PCI_COMPAQ_NVRAM && !PCI_BIOS && !EFI && !DEBUG_RODATA
24312+ help
24313+ This is the kernel land equivalent of PAGEEXEC and MPROTECT,
24314+ that is, enabling this option will make it harder to inject
24315+ and execute 'foreign' code in kernel memory itself.
24316+
24317+endmenu
24318+
24319+menu "Address Space Layout Randomization"
24320+ depends on PAX
24321+
24322+config PAX_ASLR
24323+ bool "Address Space Layout Randomization"
24324+ depends on PAX_EI_PAX || PAX_PT_PAX_FLAGS || PAX_HAVE_ACL_FLAGS || PAX_HOOK_ACL_FLAGS
24325+ help
24326+ Many if not most exploit techniques rely on the knowledge of
24327+ certain addresses in the attacked program. The following options
24328+ will allow the kernel to apply a certain amount of randomization
24329+ to specific parts of the program thereby forcing an attacker to
24330+ guess them in most cases. Any failed guess will most likely crash
24331+ the attacked program which allows the kernel to detect such attempts
24332+ and react on them. PaX itself provides no reaction mechanisms,
24333+ instead it is strongly encouraged that you make use of Nergal's
24334+ segvguard (ftp://ftp.pl.openwall.com/misc/segvguard/) or grsecurity's
24335+ (http://www.grsecurity.net/) built-in crash detection features or
24336+ develop one yourself.
24337+
24338+ By saying Y here you can choose to randomize the following areas:
24339+ - top of the task's kernel stack
24340+ - top of the task's userland stack
24341+ - base address for mmap() requests that do not specify one
24342+ (this includes all libraries)
24343+ - base address of the main executable
24344+
24345+ It is strongly recommended to say Y here as address space layout
24346+ randomization has negligible impact on performance yet it provides
24347+ a very effective protection.
24348+
24349+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control
24350+ this feature on a per file basis.
24351+
24352+config PAX_RANDKSTACK
24353+ bool "Randomize kernel stack base"
24354+ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_TSC && X86_32
24355+ help
24356+ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's kernel
24357+ stack on every system call. This will not only force an attacker
24358+ to guess it but also prevent him from making use of possible
24359+ leaked information about it.
24360+
24361+ Since the kernel stack is a rather scarce resource, randomization
24362+ may cause unexpected stack overflows, therefore you should very
24363+ carefully test your system. Note that once enabled in the kernel
24364+ configuration, this feature cannot be disabled on a per file basis.
24365+
24366+config PAX_RANDUSTACK
24367+ bool "Randomize user stack base"
24368+ depends on PAX_ASLR
24369+ help
24370+ By saying Y here the kernel will randomize every task's userland
24371+ stack. The randomization is done in two steps where the second
24372+ one may apply a big amount of shift to the top of the stack and
24373+ cause problems for programs that want to use lots of memory (more
24374+ than 2.5 GB if SEGMEXEC is not active, or 1.25 GB when it is).
24375+ For this reason the second step can be controlled by 'chpax' or
24376+ 'paxctl' on a per file basis.
24377+
24378+config PAX_RANDMMAP
24379+ bool "Randomize mmap() base"
24380+ depends on PAX_ASLR
24381+ help
24382+ By saying Y here the kernel will use a randomized base address for
24383+ mmap() requests that do not specify one themselves. As a result
24384+ all dynamically loaded libraries will appear at random addresses
24385+ and therefore be harder to exploit by a technique where an attacker
24386+ attempts to execute library code for his purposes (e.g. spawn a
24387+ shell from an exploited program that is running at an elevated
24388+ privilege level).
24389+
24390+ Furthermore, if a program is relinked as a dynamic ELF file, its
24391+ base address will be randomized as well, completing the full
24392+ randomization of the address space layout. Attacking such programs
24393+ becomes a guess game. You can find an example of doing this at
24394+ http://pax.grsecurity.net/et_dyn.tar.gz and practical samples at
24395+ http://www.grsecurity.net/grsec-gcc-specs.tar.gz .
24396+
24397+ NOTE: you can use the 'chpax' or 'paxctl' utilities to control this
24398+ feature on a per file basis.
24399+
24400+config PAX_NOVSYSCALL
24401+ bool "Disable the vsyscall page"
24402+ depends on PAX_ASLR && X86_32
24403+ help
24404+ The Linux 2.6 kernel introduced a new feature that speeds up or
24405+ simplifies certain operations, such as system calls or returns
24406+ from signal handlers.
24407+
24408+ Unfortunately the implementation also gives a powerful instrument
24409+ into the hands of exploit writers: the so-called vsyscall page exists
24410+ in every task at the same fixed address and it contains machine code
24411+ that is very useful in performing the return-to-libc style attack.
24412+
24413+ Since this exploit technique cannot in general be protected against
24414+ via kernel solutions, this option will allow you to disable the use
24415+ of the vsyscall page and revert back to the old behaviour.
24416+
24417+endmenu
24418+
24419+endmenu
24420+
24421+source grsecurity/Kconfig
24422+
24423 config KEYS
24424 bool "Enable access key retention support"
24425 help
24426diff -urNp linux-2.6.16.2/security/security.c linux-2.6.16.2/security/security.c
24427--- linux-2.6.16.2/security/security.c 2006-04-07 12:56:47.000000000 -0400
24428+++ linux-2.6.16.2/security/security.c 2006-04-09 21:23:54.000000000 -0400
24429@@ -201,4 +201,5 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_security);
24430 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security);
24431 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security);
24432 EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
24433+EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_nolog);
24434 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops);
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